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*A newly constructed temporary classroom*

# Transition from War to Peace in Sudan

**author:** Mohamed Awad Osman  
**preface:** Fred Halliday  
**editor:** Mary E. King







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# **Transition from War to Peace in Sudan**

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## PREFACE

The following study by Dr. Mohamed Awad Osman is of special importance because of the insight and expertise he brings to this subject and because it is being published at a time when, for a variety of reasons, international attention is focused on the conflicts long raging in Africa's largest country. I first met Dr. Osman when he came to the London School of Economics in the early 1990s to work with me on his Ph.D., a study of United Nations sanctions regimes against Middle Eastern countries: This was a fine piece of work, which drew on his strengths as someone trained in international law and as someone with a close knowledge of the Middle East as a whole and of his own country, Sudan, in particular. It was a great pleasure working with him, and it is no secret to say, as a supervisor, that there are many instances in the doctoral relationship when it is not entirely clear who is teaching and who is learning. I certainly felt this in working with Dr. Osman. Since leaving LSE Dr. Osman has continued to work in the area of international politics and law and to examine, over years that have seen many challenges and new developments for the world organization, the changing policies of the United Nations itself. I can think of few people who have such a combination of skills, legal and political, and, something evident in all his work, a careful, sound, and independent judgement that serves well any issue or cause to which he devotes attention.

These qualities are evident in the following work and are particularly relevant in the context of discussion and concern about the conflicts of Sudan. Dr. Osman does not offer simple solutions, and he steers ably clear of the many partisan positions, pertaining to history or current events, to which some commentators have fallen prey, and will, in all probability, do so again. He emphasizes the difficulties that are caused not just by different factions within Sudan but also by the way in which, from the years following Sudanese independence in 1956, external actors, some neighbors, others from farther afield, have intervened in, and often used, the conflicts of Sudan. This is part of a broader pattern that we have in the past

decade or so seen elsewhere in Africa, as in, to name two cases, Angola and the Congo, and which has been one of the besetting problems of other internal conflicts, for example, in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Just as in Afghanistan, so in Sudan a precondition for internal peace has been some minimal agreement amongst regional and world states about the shape of a solution.

Dr. Osman is also keen to draw out the possibilities of new forms of conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction. In Sudan, as elsewhere in Africa and in Asia, there has been a growing interest in recent years in using the resources of the existing society itself, be this in the form of relatively new types of organizations, often termed «civil society,» or in the shape of more traditional and established centers of authority, based in the villages, the tribe, or the religious group. The attractions, and pitfalls, of such an approach are, as he shows, present in the Sudanese case: to ignore established figures in Sudan may impose, from the outside, settlements that are unlikely to work, whereas to work with established centers of power, some of which may have grown rich on the war, may give credibility to forces that are themselves part of the problem. This predicament is evident elsewhere, not only with the warlords of Afghanistan, but in southeastern Europe, with the agreements on Bosnia and Kosovo, which include some not very agreeable people. It is indeed present in perhaps the longest- running conflict of all, that of Northern Ireland, where the Good Friday agreement of 1998 gives sanction to what are politely termed «Two Traditions,» and to those who, by dint of the bullet or the vote, or some combination of the two, have emerged as the representatives of these supposedly inherited entities. For those who are dissident within the communities so designated, or for those who are not entirely accepted as part of one or other group, or who are, perhaps, women, such resolutions of conflict contain their own dangers. This is an issue in the Sudanese process, but, as the examples above show, it is far from being exclusively an African, tribal, or third world problem.

This study is, therefore, one that not only addresses the question of Sudan, but also discusses many broader issues present in any

comparative study of conflict resolution and peace building. Beyond these issues of analysis and policy, however, there lies something else, which every reader of Dr. Osman's work must feel—the hope, cautious as it must be, that the terrible sufferings of Sudan that have cost so many lives and made so many people refugees are now nearing their end. Africa has seen many wars, as has indeed the Horn of Africa, over the past half century, and it would be a naïve person indeed who was confident that the north-south conflict in Sudan, and other conflicts, such as that in Darfur, in western Sudan, are now about to be resolved. Yet, for whatever mix of reasons, calculated and humanitarian, there has been significant political movement within Sudan, in Africa, and internationally about this issue. A study such as Dr. Osman's could not, therefore, come at a better time. One can only hope that it will make the double contribution to which it is so well suited—that of assisting in the working out, implementation, and sustaining of a peace settlement in Sudan and that of placing the analysis of Sudan, and the bitter experience of its people, at the service of those who are also trying to find solutions in the many other conflicts of the contemporary world.

Professor Fred Halliday  
London School of Economics  
July 2004

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### **Mohamed Awad Osman**

Mohamed Awad Osman received his doctorate from the London School of Economics in international relations in 1999. He studied international human rights law at the University of Oxford and received a joint certificate from the University of Oxford and George Washington University in 2001. Dr. Osman's undergraduate work was in journalism, at the London School of Journalism. He had also studied law and education in Sudan. He worked for a London law firm from 1999 to 2002 and also developed a career as a journalist. His book *The United Nations and Peace Enforcement: Wars, Terrorism and Democracy* is in its second printing since publication by Ashgate in 2002. UNESCO appointed him a peace messenger for his contribution to the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence in 2002.



## CONTENTS

Summary .....	1
Introduction .....	1
Methodological Approach .....	3
The Role of NGOs .....	5
Knowledge Networking and the Information Community ...	10
Engendering Peaceful Transformation .....	15
The Business Community Gears Up for Peace .....	18
Building Economic Confidence .....	18
Oil and Peace .....	19
Government Institutions and the Making of Peace Policies ...	20
The Office of Peace Advisory .....	20
Parliament .....	21
The Humanitarian Affairs Commission .....	22
The Naivasha Agreement .....	24
Conclusion .....	26
Further Research .....	29
Notes .....	31

## **SUMMARY**

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the fierce hostility that marked the civil war in Sudan had begun to show signs of abating, and under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, a peace process had led to the signing of framework peace agreements in Machakos and Naivasha. Such remarkable progress was achieved through a vast intercommunal participatory process with contributions from all constituencies of Sudanese society. The present study examines through direct interviews and firsthand accounts the roles of non-state and state actors in this process of transformation. Changes that took place in Sudan and the efforts of several groups—including the knowledge and business communities, nongovernmental organizations, and peace-related sectors—consolidated the collective will to attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully and make the process of transition from war to peace irreversible. The continuance of a lasting peace is largely contingent on the sustainability and support of these efforts, but one should not lose sight of the challenges in such a process and the uniqueness of the complexities of the situation in Sudan. The termination of the longest war in Africa and the achievement of a durable peace in a country the size of Western Europe will pose significant challenges to local and international actors alike. This study provides accounts and analyses of the many societal changes and evolving characteristics of a community in transformation and makes recommendations for structural reform and policymaking.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The transformation brought by a peace agreement ending a long-running and devastating civil war is one that only the people affected by the conflict can truly appreciate and comprehend.

Signs of the new reality slowly begin to emerge: soldiers lay down their arms; farmers begin to rehabilitate and replenish their beloved and long-deserted lands; children return to schools; businesses welcome another chance at success. Every aspect of life profoundly changes, as long as the agreement is honored and peace is sustained.

Bombarded cities and besieged towns, home to generations of people who may not know the meaning of «peace,» rise to a new future. Their inhabitants harbor mixed feelings of hope for a better life and anticipation of the inevitable quandaries ahead. Sudan is not the first African nation to emerge from war and engage in the process of reintegrating capital and the human and economic resources of its communities. Although there have been recent relapses into conflict in parts of the African continent, the transition from war to peace and the prospect of building nations anew have been experienced in Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.

When this shift is examined in Sudan, the convergence of a number of factors multiplies substantially the magnitude of the hope and of the challenges to come. In terms of land mass, Sudan is the size of Western Europe—or the United States east of the Mississippi River. In Africa, Sudan is the largest single sovereign entity; it is *thirty times* the area of Sierra Leone and *one hundred times* the size of Rwanda. Its 2,376,000 square kilometers are inhabited by more than 600 tribes who speak more than 500 languages. Its total population of 36 million features a variety of opulent cultures and ways of life.

Rich in water resources, fertile agricultural land, minerals, mines, oil reserves, and a livestock population estimated at 120 million, Sudan is surrounded by nine neighboring countries with extensive cultural and tribal interactions along its borders with other African and Arab states. Inter-tribal relations on these frontiers give Sudan a unique multicultural character. This was the setting

for a four-decade war—the longest in Africa—that claimed the lives of two million people, displaced more than four million people in the last twenty years alone, and inflicted long-term damage to the infrastructure and environment. The number of persons killed in the Sudanese civil war exceeds the number of people killed in any single recent conflict, including in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Somalia.

Planning for transition and postconflict reconstruction in Sudan will be a complex task. Examining precedents might be of some use, but reliance solely on standard procedures would overlook essential factors and considerations. Policymakers and concerned organizations with the intent of implementing transitional programs for Sudan need to consider the following: Local people have mounted extensive efforts to alleviate the suffering endured by civilians, reduce endemic violence, spread a culture of peace, and initiate peace-building programs. Although these programs have sometimes been disadvantaged by incoherence and inadequacy of resources, the merit of their endeavors stems from the indigenous cultures and social fabrics of local communities, which afford the best opportunities for focused and people-centered strategies, durable planning, and rootedness.

## **METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

This examination of the transition from war to peace in Sudan takes a dynamic approach involving firsthand accounts by individuals who actively participated in the process or continue to do so. These people represent a wide range of constituencies and geographical entities, including the three conflict zones, in eastern, western, and southern Sudan. The arrangement of group discussions proved to be a useful and stimulating method for probing opinions among students, elites, and women's and youth groups. The study also benefits from radio and television debates

in which this author participated, as well as from personal observations of transition events.

A significant part of the literature on conflict resolution is devoted to the causes of internal conflict, the nature of civil wars, and the conduct of combat and hostilities, but few contributions concern the question of the transition from civil war to lasting and durable peace. This is in part because of the shift to more topical issues in media coverage and public attention following a cessation of hostilities and signing of a formal agreement. The paucity of research in the field can also be linked to broken promises by donor countries and international financial institutions, whose pledges to provide the necessary funds for rehabilitation, building capacity, and research projects have often gone unfulfilled.

The Naivasha Agreement on security arrangements between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), signed in September 2003, is not viewed here as a constitutional construct or a document setting out obligatory conditions—important as they are—but as part of an ongoing transformational process rooted in the accumulation of efforts and actions by various constituencies.<sup>1</sup> This approach is consistent with the unique nature of the Sudanese peace process, which has taken the form of continuous and diversified rounds of discussion between the parties. In cases of armed conflict, the term *peace process* usually refers to direct, formal talks, but in the case of Sudan, the course of negotiations has included hundreds of meetings on confidence-building issues, informal consultations, and capacity-building workshops. For example, in 2003 the government and the SPLM/A held three meetings—in Oslo, Amsterdam, and Nairobi—to discuss postwar issues and to arrange for the creation of a reconstruction fund.

Focusing more closely on the true sense of the term *conflict resolution*—the finding of solutions and adoption of a forward-looking frame of mind—and analyzing the transition from war to peace in Sudan based on empirical accounts, this study assumes that the nature of changes taking place socially, at the grassroots and institutional levels, will consequently affect the durability of the peace. During the past few years, notable changes running parallel to the peace process have taken place in various political and socioeconomic Sudanese entities. Civil society has established itself as a prominent force and has extended its practices in the areas of social needs and political rights.

The role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is expanding quickly, as myriad groups deal with conflict-related emergencies and work for sustainable development. The role of women is growing steadily, building on the constructive elements of women's indigenous culture, and women's groups are emerging as a leading peace movement with fair levels of connectivity and interaction. Human rights groups and associations are confidently advancing awareness of fundamental civil rights and courageously combating violations of citizens' basic rights. Youth is emerging as a genuine and powerful force in learning institutions and the broader community. Peace and peace-related entities throughout the country continue to evaluate and adjust their functions and objectives in preparation for the new era beset by challenges but full of opportunities.

## **THE ROLE OF NGOS**

The organized efforts of civil society in Sudan are growing rapidly and span a spectrum of peacemaking and peace-building activities. As in many developing countries, in Sudan civil society is a natural phenomenon, embodied in community traditions of self-reliance. The establishment of the modern state in Sudan is relatively new, and the process of state formation is still in progress

and allows for the undertaking of broad roles by non-state actors. Furthermore, the limited resources available to the state, coupled with the vast land mass of the country, have rendered the presence of the central government either symbolic or nonexistent in some areas. Cultural differences have also made regulation from the center unrealistic. For example, the societal and marriage traditions of some tribes do not conform entirely to national laws. A Dinka leader, Gen. Niktora Magar Ashik, noted that a Dinka tribe in Yarol, in southern Sudan, does not allow men the right of divorce; rather, it is for the wife's family to accept or refuse divorce. For many decades the Native Administration represented, together with other indigenous activities and customary rules, the main form of local management in many parts of the country.

The rise of NGOs and community-based organizations in Sudan, thus, has drawn on the varied experiences produced by intercommunal initiatives. The idea of organizing local efforts and resources to confront social and economic problems is familiar to the society. The effects of war and war-related famine have over the years led to the establishment of NGOs in the fields of relief and rehabilitation. A tradition of generosity toward a visitor or stranger, antedating the intermittent war of the last half century, means that even poor communities are willing to share with nearby refugee camps or settlements. The Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) comprises more than 250 NGOs organized in networks according to their mandate and area of activity. Among their activities are work with displaced people, orphans, HIV/AIDS, women, youth, and the environment. Because Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, NGOs have directed most of their activities toward meeting the urgent needs of this group in camps that encircle cities. Ibrahim Ibrahim, executive director of SCOVA, offered an example of one success in this area:

Some of the outstanding accomplishments in the field of IDPs have been achieved in camps of displaced people, where some dislocated school children gained the best results in the final exams in all of Omdurman province of Khartoum state. This is a credit to NGO schools and teachers, but the actual credit goes to the brilliant children who made this success despite the lack of basic needs and against all the odds of displacement.<sup>2</sup>

Ana Assudan, an organization that runs five primary schools in IDP areas where some of these individual successes have flourished, is but one example of Sudanese NGOs coordinating projects in education, health care, water sanitation, and food security for displaced people.<sup>3</sup> Additional efforts are under way to improve the water supply through the provision of sanitary and filtering systems and improved access to safe water resources.

NGOs are also working to provide primary health care for IDPs. They operate medical units with volunteer doctors, carry out immunization and measles vaccination campaigns, and provide drug supplies in cooperation with international organizations and pharmaceutical companies and factories in Khartoum. Africa Welfare International, a Sudanese NGO, points to the positive effect the development of the private Sudanese pharmaceutical sector has had on voluntary health care projects during the past few years, as many companies have proved willing to support such activities.<sup>4</sup>

Under the shock of a surprise attack, IDPs often scatter in different directions. The IDP situation that is often most difficult to handle involves civilians who having fled fresh military combat settle on the edges of besieged towns. In such situations, many IDPs lose their lives or live to suffer under harsh conditions. Some courageous NGOs are building early warning systems, so that once alerted to a possible forced migration, they can send their staff to help fleeing women, children, and elders following the outbreak of fighting.<sup>5</sup> Some of the IDPs encountered by

NGOs have been on the move for years as a result of war, famine, drought, or raids and have thus lost their sense of place and rootedness. «Is it accurate to call them displaced? They were not settled in the first place. This is a story of enduring suffering,» one NGO representative commented.<sup>6</sup>

Reconciliation is one area in which Sudanese NGOs have the experience and aptitude that allows them to capitalize on the indigenous cultures of tolerance and forgiveness. Ethnicity and religion are often causes of conflict and discrepancy, but some Sudanese NGOs have nonetheless succeeded in fostering positive interactions between peoples of different religions and ethnicities. In attempting to bring about peace and reconciliation, they mobilize religious values and teachings in Christianity and Islam that denounce ethnic partisanship, promote peaceful coexistence, and transform ethnic diversity into a source of unity and cooperation. In Liliir village, in Upper Nile province, the Church facilitated in May 2000 a highly successful conference for reconciliation between the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle, and Nuer. Their relationships were bitter, with old animosities having been exacerbated by military rivalries among their factions. Their ethnically motivated attacks were fierce; in one battle between the Dinka and Nuer, some 450 people were killed, and hundreds of families were left without shelter. The «people-to-people» agreement of Liliir settled such issues as access to water resources and grazing areas and provided amnesty for all persons involved in previous attacks against lives and property.<sup>7</sup>

The concept of cooperation represents the best remedy for ethnic divide. Sabil Alrashad, an Islamic organization, specializes in building «peace villages» in areas of multiethnic interaction. Between 1996 and 2003 it helped build approximately two thousand houses in the suburbs of Adaein and in the Jumiza camp in northwest Buram town, in western Sudan, to accommodate people from various tribes who themselves took part in the construction of their living quarters. The organization

believes that when people collectively build their own houses, in the future they will refrain from acts that cause damage or destruction to others' homes. According to executive director Ali Ahmed, the peace village experiment helped reduce ethnic tensions in the area and demonstrated to tribes in adjoining provinces that people from different ethnic backgrounds can live together and share available resources peacefully.<sup>8</sup>

The situation in the Nuba Mountains called for a different category of voluntary activities following the signing of a ceasefire agreement in January 2002. With the cessation of hostilities, NGOs in the area began reshaping their roles and priorities to cope with a postconflict environment and to attend to such postwar challenges as family reunification, social counseling, resettlement of civilians, and the conversion of active soldiers into active citizens. Such efforts are encouraged and supported by several actors, including the Peace Studies Center at the University of Dilling, the Joint Monitoring Commission, liaison offices of international organizations, and local authorities.

The issue of landmines and unexploded ordnance deserves attention, as several organizations are working together—in cooperation with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)—under the umbrella of the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Red Cross, and Operation Save Innocent Lives—Sudan of the SPLM/A.<sup>9</sup> Many of the roads leading to common destinations in the Nuba Mountains are blocked by mines. In October 2003 an antitank mine detonated under a truck, killing eight relief workers near the town of Kauda.<sup>10</sup> Mines and other lethal leftovers of war kill at least five hundred people every year in Sudan. The number of casualties is expected to rise as people attempt to resume their normal lives in the aftermath of war.

It is remarkable that the SPLM/A and the government both implemented programs to clear landmines and other live explosives of war six years before signing the Machakos Protocol

in July 2002. According to Xavier Marshal, head of the European Union's delegation to Sudan,

It has never happened before that a country still at war is ready to let its civil society build up a strong participatory initiative to deal with landmines, applying recognized international standards and developing cross-line contacts and cooperation. . . . It constitutes a very strong message for peace.<sup>11</sup>

Two undeclared civil alliances can be traced across the continuum of local NGOs. First is a collaboration between the ten registered human rights organizations, the media (especially newspapers), and independent lawyers and legal associations, who come together around issues of human rights advocacy and promotion. Second are women and youth groups, who have tended to defend each other's issues, take part in each other's activities, and partner in support of children's rights. Sudanese NGOs have also developed a tradition of coming together in the face of emergencies and national disasters, pooling their resources and consolidating their urgent calls and actions to rescue victims and provide relief for affected peoples. A good example of this practice is the campaign led by the New Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (NESI), which launched a consolidated emergency appeal in July 2001 to deal with the famine looming in parts of the south.

## **KNOWLEDGE NETWORKING AND THE INFORMATION COMMUNITY**

The development of learning institutions and information networks is one of the remarkable changes predating the Naivasha Agreement. Education specialists, families, and the media readily scrutinized and criticized the education system and policies in reports and debates on teaching standards and services

provided by schools. Despite financial constraints and sometimes flawed policies, the expansion of higher education and the doubling of schools' capacity and intake—there are six million pupils in primary and secondary schools—have greatly improved the scope of education and knowledge dissemination.<sup>12</sup> Until the early 1990s there were only five universities in Sudan: two in Khartoum and one in Omdurman, Aljazera, and Juba, in south Sudan. There are now thirty universities supported by the government along with twenty-five private universities and colleges. In areas controlled by the rebels, the SPLM/A established two universities, in Rumbek and Yambio, and a center for strategic studies.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the considerable degree of instability owing to the armed conflict, the rebel movement was able to develop intellectual mainstream and vocational enterprises through collaborative research and training workshops. International organizations have also helped the movement stay abreast of intellectual currents by coordinating seminars on postconflict needs. One example is the training practicum recently sponsored by the World Bank to prime a number of apprentices from southern Sudan in planning and budgetary issues. Education for women has also survived the devastation of war. Girls' schools are being rehabilitated in dangerous conflict zones, such as Rumbek and Yambio. A printing press in Rumbek has recently produced more than three thousand schoolbooks, despite continuous fighting and widespread destruction in the area.

The uniqueness of an approach that emphasizes sustaining education programs in war-ravaged areas means that conflict resolution and peace studies constitute a basic component of the curricula. This is true in Dilling, Juba, and Zalingi universities as well as in universities in areas controlled by the SPLM/A. The *Journal of Peace and Development Research* of the University of Juba is the leading journal of peace studies in Sudan, eliciting scholarly

research mainly undertaken by the staff and students of the Center for Peace and Development Studies.<sup>14</sup>

The academic community has interacted positively within the atmosphere created by growing hopes of achieving a lasting peace and has responded affirmatively to progress in the peace process by establishing research units and think tanks to provide and support in-depth discussion of the issues being tackled in negotiations. Seven centers specializing in peace studies were launched in one year, marking the birth of a largely new discipline in higher learning. These centers and their host departments provide teacher training and research programs, mostly for postgraduates, but they are also struggling to obtain funding from the already overextended higher education system.<sup>15</sup>

Mubarak Almajzoub, minister of higher education, has called on international institutions first to realize the role of these centers as essential vehicles for peace and development in the region, and second to envisage collaborative schemes and joint ventures with Sudanese institutions in order to support them and benefit from their experience in research and training programs:

The courage of the Sudanese people to bring peace and create education institutions to consolidate and sustain the political agreement should be matched by efforts from the outside world. The Department of Technical Education and Community Development at the ministry has plans for the establishment of centers for community-based studies in health, environment, nutrition and technical training. We need to raise the number of technicians to fill the gap, as according to the present equation we have one technical worker compared with twenty holders of higher degrees, while the normal equation is four technicians to one professional. The department aims at making centers of community development available in all provinces of Sudan to equip trainees and students with vital technical skills needed for the

promotion of peace and sustainable development. Such areas of cooperation are very broad and can play significant roles in the achievement of a lasting social and economic order.<sup>16</sup>

Cooperation will enable Sudan to link intrinsically with the global learning network and advance research methods and techniques. Furthermore, cooperation will help support programs for the development of local knowledge and indigenous culture.

There is a yearning among the Sudanese for knowledge and contacts that has expressed itself in individual and institutional intentions to share learning experiences and the findings of research projects. This has led to the creation of information networks among academicians, NGOs, and public service institutions. The imperative of hands-on networking is signified by the various civil society groups that share a focus on issues of availability of and access to information. In September 2002, for instance, the University of Khartoum hosted «Networking for Peace,» a workshop organized in cooperation with the University for Peace (UPEACE). The project arose from meetings of a UPEACE delegation with a dozen vice chancellors of Sudanese universities, perhaps fifty university lecturers, and more than one hundred NGOs and civil society groups earlier in the year. An array of constituencies of civil society and learning institutions expressed the need to meet and exchange contributions. Awad Alkarim Abushiba of the Center for the Culture of Peace reflected on his participation at the workshop:

The encounters of delegates may vary, but they all agree on one fact—that networking is the backbone of peace education. The workshop of September 2002 had pioneered the endeavor for comprehensive networking, but the barrier of availability of technology for the constituencies represented by those delegates will continue to hinder our efforts in this vital area.<sup>17</sup>

A general survey of existing networks conducted for this study shows that the rate of making new connections among youth

and women's groups is higher than that of other constituencies in Sudanese civil society. This is largely because of the dynamism of these groups and their growing role in communities. Civil society groups in conflict areas have shown credible, steady growth in their efforts to create and mobilize peace networks. Following the signing of the Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement, women's groups spearheaded an initiative in February 2002 to establish a network of more than twenty-six local organizations.<sup>18</sup> These grassroots groups initiated community-based activities, such as small productive projects and the provision of support for women and children in the areas of educational and social affairs.

Information departments within the civil service have also launched professional networking schemes to link branches in isolated towns and diverse states. Ali Ali, a specialist in ICT (information computer technology), returned from Europe to take charge of a networking project at the Ministry of Health that will link hospitals in Alfashir, Kadugli, Khartoum, and Wad Madani with hospitals in Juba, Marowe, and Port Sudan. The project is expected to smooth the flow of information between the hospitals and facilitate proper communications with central departments.<sup>19</sup> A few years prior, it would have been unheard of for any Sudanese institution to embark on such a scheme; even telephone lines between different towns were hard to locate, and phone calls to the outside world were all but impossible.

Strategies for reform and proposals for restructuring the public sector in the postwar period would benefit from the development of communications services. The revolution in telecommunications had previously benefited war planning. It is now the turn of peace. The most indispensable effect of such technological progress will be in bridging the gap between Sudan's north and south, the promotion of cultural interaction, and the ending of economic exclusion and discrimination.

## **ENGENDERING PEACEFUL TRANSFORMATION**

Progress in Sudanese women's peace-building efforts has been twofold. First, women have created seventy-one organizations and increased their presence in public and private institutions. Second, they have embarked on two novel areas of activity: adopting a protective role in support of women and children affected by war and famine, and embracing a proactive role in peacemaking and reconstruction activities. The Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, founded in 1984 as Sudan's first women's NGO focusing on peace, conducts work in the areas of resettlement, reconciliation, and peace education.

Indigenous patriarchal cultures may exert biases against women, but they generally allow them an active role in society. The situation of women who work the land in some parts of Sudan while men stay at home is extreme, but it is regardless a symbol of women's active participation and sharing of responsibilities. The number of women in most civil service institutions, the private sector, and institutions of learning either exceeds or approaches that of males. For example, the percentage of female students at the University of Khartoum has recently surpassed the percentage of male students. Most institutions have begun to train their secretaries in a range of computer programs to enhance the efficiency and competency of these organizations. The majority of civil servants in secretarial posts (and the same posts in the private sector) are female, thus allowing a significant number of women access to ICT. Sayeda Ahmed has been a secretary at the National Corporation of Electricity (NCE) in Khartoum for twenty-five years. Ten years ago she received training in word processing, and in 2004 she is being trained in Excel, PowerPoint, and Web-based programs. She contends that such courses have empowered the secretaries of the NCE as well as made it possible for them to cope with the growing needs of their jobs.<sup>20</sup>

This environment has generally paved the way for women to organize efforts and activities with the purpose of strengthening the role of women in society, launching initiatives and programs for the enhancement of women's capacity and skills, and raising public awareness of gender issues. NGOs concerned with women's issues perform significant humanitarian, social, and political activities. Most of the projects are directed at internally displaced persons in refugee camps. Some four million IDPs live in Sudan, most of them women and children, and many of them are psycho-socially traumatized and lacking basic means. NGOs such as the Southern Women's Corporation for Peace and Development, the Sudan Peace Group for Relief and Development, and the Support Organization have launched projects in education, water sanitation, health care, and family reunification. Some organizations have designed innovative programs for youth involving sports, drama, and the arts, such as drawing, which can be utilized as a means of healing and peace education.<sup>21</sup>

Women are playing leading roles in the dissemination of a peace culture through innumerable activities. In this area the Salam Alizza organization introduced a ground-breaking project that seeks to transform the culture of violence spread by Hakamat—influential individual women, mainly in western Sudan, who recite poems that encourage violence—to a culture of peace. Through poetry these women have traditionally inspired men to fight against their enemies and resolve tribal differences with armed force and bloodshed. Salam Alizza's program aims to dispense with the lyrical violence of Hakamat women's poetry while redirecting their poetic abilities toward the promotion of peaceful coexistence among different clans.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the vital role of women in the transition from war to peace, and notwithstanding their emphatic support for ongoing rounds of the peace process, women are usually excluded from the negotiations. In July 2002 in Kenya, the Machakos Protocol

was signed, marking tangible progress in the peace talks. It provides for the preservation of unity as a common national goal, but it also guarantees the right of self-determination for the people of the south. During talks, women from the north and the south united in their support for the protocol and asked that immediate steps be taken to ensure the participation of women in the negotiations. On August 7, 2002, the Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace (SWCSNP) and the Secretariat of Women Solidarity Group issued a position paper.<sup>23</sup> The Southern Women's Group for Peace convened on August 8, 2002, and issued a position paper on the protocol noting that «the negotiation process should include professionals, technicians, and women.»<sup>24</sup> A comprehensive statement by another Sudanese women's group has unequivocally proclaimed women's entitlement to active participation in subsequent rounds of all peace negotiations:

1. [W]e would like to express our special concerns, as women are not well represented in the delegations negotiating the peace process although since 1996 women from the south, north and western Sudan have been networking for peace issues and culture and for strengthening the conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, in relation to the impact of war, in some cases, women have been marginalized in the peace negotiations as if war and peace are not of women's concern and as if Sudanese society is only a male society,

2. We are worried that [women's] exclusion [from] the negotiations would be a momentum to the end results as well as to the after peace or transitional periods. Evidently our rights, needs and interests would be neglected or stereotyped.<sup>25</sup>

The history of the peace talks had not, however, been entirely free of women's involvement. Agnis Lukodo, the first woman governor in modern Sudan, participated in the 1993 peace talks coordinated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), marking a bright experience in the peace

process. Similar participation should be broadened in the interest of securing a lasting peace.

## **THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY GEARS UP FOR PEACE**

### *Building Economic Confidence*

It is almost conventional in analyses of war and postwar economies to emphasize the implications of instability on business and to note that the flow of investment is contingent on the achievement of peace. It is equally true, however, that business growth is an important component of peace building and national prosperity: Business needs peace, and peace needs business. In the case of Sudan, the intertwining of commerce and peace is evident and intrinsic to the resolution of the inequitable distribution of wealth and uneven investment, two conditions contributing to the Sudanese conflict. Armed rebellion erupted last year in Darfur, in western Sudan, because of, it is claimed, economic inequality and political marginalization.

In the past few years, the Sudanese economy has shown signs of growth, and the private sector has substantially expanded, especially at the level of small business and self-employment. A structural reform program supported by the International Monetary Fund has been in place since 1997. In 2003 work began on the Marowe Dam, with the aim of providing a permanent solution to power supply problems that had crippled the manufacturing sector and affected the efficiency of other entities reliant on electricity. Rising consumer confidence and spending boosted growth in GDP to 20 percent in 2003.<sup>26</sup> Sudanese economists made a case for a debt-free transition to peace, calling upon foreign and international financial institutions to write off \$23 billion in debt. In their view, such a step would strengthen fiscal discipline and render valuable support to the campaign to end the war and to pursue a durable peace.<sup>27</sup>

## *Oil and Peace*

Sudan is the most recent oil-dependent state with equipotentiality of oil, which on the one hand could contribute to peace efforts and the creation of a diversified economy, but on the other hand could fuel war and widen Sudan's ethnic division. Sudan, rich in natural resources, also possesses great potential in agriculture and some unexplored resources. Moreover, Sudan provides 90 percent of the world's production of gum arabic, on which such multinational corporations as Coca-Cola are considerably dependent; U.S. president Bill Clinton explicitly excluded gum arabic from the U.S. regime of sanctions imposed on Sudan in November 1997, because it was unavailable from other sources.<sup>28</sup>

The introduction of oil to the Sudanese equation might have fueled the civil war, adding incentive to the initial causes. To be sure, even before the discovery of oil, the recurring issue of a fair distribution of wealth figured prominently in the north–south conflict and was a major issue in the negotiations that led to the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement and the creation of an autonomous southern region. Although the issue of national wealth remained a pervasive feature of the conflict, before the exploitation of oil, it was an abstraction that represented an ideal of the distribution of the limited national income, the just and fair allocation of small-scale agricultural development projects, and the provision of basic public services. Oil has had a unique effect as the symbol of a new dynamic in the reshaping of political and economic power. Oil fields discovered in the south, west, and north have attracted international companies from China and Malaysia.

The presence of foreign oil companies might provide an added impetus to the drive for peace and stability. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) can play useful roles in places like southern Sudan, where many areas are vestigial and underdeveloped.

Consistent with shifting perceptions of MNEs, the nature of modern conflicts has increasingly allowed for the engagement of a range of big and small actors, and, therefore, a possible constructive role for MNEs in consolidating Sudan's peace efforts. Adumbration of the idea can be found in a 1992 attempt by a multinational, the Lonrho Company, to negotiate a peace deal in Sudan. The prospect also exists for coordination between multinationals and civil society to incorporate the community in new economic modalities afforded by the oil industry and in various development and grassroots activities.

## **GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND THE MAKING OF PEACE POLICIES**

### *The Office of Peace Advisory*

The progress of the peace process in Sudan and the gathering public momentum in its favor have greatly affected the government institutions and machinery involved in the management of the process. What is widely termed in Sudan the «Peace Advisory,» led by the presidentially appointed advisor for peace, is the main body in charge of the peace portfolio. It is responsible for the formation of government policy, the administration of the process, and the development of initiatives and negotiation strategies. The Advisory designs capacity-building programs and has engaged in projects in cooperation with local NGOs and international and regional organizations. American, British, Canadian, Dutch, German, Jordanian, Kenyan, Norwegian, and South African institutions have helped launch collaborative projects in support of the peace process and for the purpose of empowering civil society. Long-term programs have also been developed in coordination with IGAD, UNICEF, the University for Peace, and the Institute for African Renaissance.

The Advisory benefited from a streamlined departmental structure and a relatively new political establishment, which helped

to make it a more efficient and flexible bureaucracy. The Advisory's adopted strategy of engagement and ongoing dialogue with the SPLM/A and political parties on the issue of southern Sudan has sustained the peace process, and its prioritization for addressing primary concerns has sustained the implementation phase. Ghazi Atabani, the president's former advisor for peace, believes that the sharing of power and wealth between the south and north should be based on a transparent policy that could subsequently address the inherited organizational, cultural, political, and economic problems of the country. He also feels that efforts should be undertaken to build confidence at the community level as well as cooperation between the southern and northern political leaderships.<sup>29</sup>

### *Parliament*

Peace has become a priority in most of Sudan's institutions. The parliament created the Permanent Peace Committee to monitor peace-related matters and to bring developments in the peace process to the attention of the legislature through regular testimony and open hearings. Although MPs are elected from across the country, there are doubts about whether the national legislature is truly representative and democratic because some of the major political parties boycotted the last elections.

If members of parliament raise questions concerning the peace process that require authoritative responses, the Permanent Peace Committee asks the concerned minister, through the parliament chairman, to appear before a special or public session and impart any necessary details and answer questions. Ministers have been frequently called upon to testify during such sessions. Most of the sixteen permanent parliamentary committees are involved in issues of peace, including the Human Rights Committee, Social Development Committee, Education and Scientific Research Committee, and Judiciary Committee.<sup>30</sup>

When the negotiation's progress stalls or the peace process suffers a serious blow, such as the outbreak of hostilities in Torit in September 2002 following the Machakos agreement, parliament convenes a committee of the whole to discuss the situation with certain ministers and presents its recommendation to the chairman of the legislature.<sup>31</sup> Before leaving for Naivasha in October 2003 to resume peace talks, the first vice-president, Ali Osman Taha, addressed parliament on the achievements of the first Naivasha round and the signing of the framework agreement on security arrangements. He stressed two points: peace would be for all the peoples of Sudan, and a final agreement would be signed before the end of 2003.

The issue of «peace for all» is of particular urgency to the many members of parliament who represent areas that fear being marginalized by a new peace accord. People have little faith in politicians' testimonials that such an event will not be allowed to occur. It is indeed a major task for parliament to ensure that any final agreement will bring peace and development to all parts of Sudan without political or economic exclusion or social discrimination. Few people would fail to see this as an essential measure protecting against further rebellion. The defense minister and top brass of the armed forces appeared before parliament in October 2003 to affirm the army's commitment to the Naivasha Agreement and a final peace settlement. Only time will prove their sincerity, as peace deals are always in danger of being reversed by unconvinced military leaders.

### *The Humanitarian Affairs Commission*

The Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) was established more than a decade ago with the expectation of creating a leading institution in the drive for peace and rehabilitation. The commission and its counterpart in the SPLM/A, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), have developed a working relationship in limited areas of common concern.<sup>32</sup> Since the

early years of the peace process, the two parties have coordinated their humanitarian efforts through the UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). In October 2002 members of the HAC and the SRRA adopted a memorandum of understanding that allows «unimpeded humanitarian access to all areas and for people in need, in accordance with the (OLS) Agreement.»<sup>33</sup> Cooperation on humanitarian affairs and landmine clearance helped prepare the ground for talks between political leaders. This relationship continues to fortify the peace process.<sup>34</sup>

If it were allowed to do so, the HAC could effectively coordinate the efforts of civil society organizations. As a humanitarian institution that has supervised relief work for decades, and which keeps archives and records of NGO activities, the HAC is well placed for the role of coordination. In the past, it had tended to advise organizations with similar objectives to coordinate their efforts and share their experiences to strengthen future programs. Initially contested by some civil society groups that feared a loss of independence, the HAC still needs to prove its efficacy and impartiality. Its role remains necessary at present, because it is able to forecast areas of need, assess strengths and weaknesses, and bestow a coherent structure on the proliferating activities of NGOs.

Looking toward the postwar period, the HAC is slowly moving to establish a postconflict priorities program. According to Hasabou Abdurahman, the leader of the project and head of the Peace Department of the HAC,

the postconflict priorities program concentrates at this stage on the building of a database and the establishment of a management and coordination mechanism, including the forging of task forces and technical committees on both federal and state levels. Training and capacity-building courses will be introduced to prepare our staff and members of national NGOs for the peace-building and rehabilitation tasks. Key

dilemmas will be addressed to help understanding on when to engage, how to form a strategy that matches the complexity of the situation, and how to initiate appropriate responses.<sup>35</sup>

Such a program could transform the HAC's objectives from that of a humanitarian institution that mainly delivers relief supplies to people affected by war into a multidimensional body extending its activities into non-traditional areas, such as the reintegration of former combatants into society, trauma therapy, and reunification of families. The recent decision to elevate the HAC to the level of an independent ministry of government may broaden its capabilities and better equip it to face expanding duties.

## **THE NAIVASHA AGREEMENT**

Reform of the military in Sudan entered a new phase after the signing of the Naivasha Agreement on security arrangements on September 25, 2003. The agreement is a manifesto for policy and structural military reform. Its operational paragraphs are as follows:

1(C) The parties agree to the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides, at a suitable time, following the completion of the comprehensive cease-fire arrangements. . . .

4. Joint Integrated Units: There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Interim Period. The Joint/Integrated Units shall constitute a nucleus of [the] post-referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they should be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.<sup>36</sup>

The armies of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLA during the interim period, as well as the Joint/Integrated Units, will be commanded by a Joint Defense Board under the presidency, «and shall be comprised of the chiefs of staff of the two forces.» The agreement also addresses the principles and policies of the armed forces. Article 6 of the agreement draws outlines for common doctrines:

#### Common Military Doctrine

The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint/Integrated Units, as well as a basis for a post-Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum vote is in favor of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year from the beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the SPLA (in the South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) will be based on this Common Doctrine.<sup>37</sup>

The brief provisions of Article 6 refer to particular areas of concern or identify matters intended for regulation through new doctrines in the future (excepting the training of forces). The exact intentions of the framers of this language are not clear. The issue of democratic control of the armed forces is, however, of great importance and is consistent with the adoption of a democratic constitution for Sudan. A democratic civil-military relationship under new doctrines and constitutional arrangements should logically be institutionalized for the benefit of further societal interaction and collaboration between Sudan's military forces and civil society. Another important policy point was noted in paragraph (D) of Article 1 of the agreement. In it, the army agrees to embrace «no internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.»

One incontrovertible finding demonstrated by the Naivasha Agreement is that preceding implementation of it, a huge amount

of work needs to be undertaken by internal military units, local institutions, NGOs, and higher learning institutions, with the support and participation of international institutions familiar with the situation and the history of the Sudanese conflict. Such a concerted effort would help clarify the reform provisions of the agreement and also reduce differences in interpretation during the implementation phase.

## **CONCLUSION**

The developments that have taken place in various constituencies of the Sudanese community, notably civil society organizations and peace-related sectors, represent a real force and strength behind the peace process. Sustaining such collective energies is crucial to the achievement of a durable peace.

NGOs are playing vital roles in the society, and hundreds of thousands of people are wholly dependent on their projects in education, water sanitation, and health care. They have succeeded in developing full-blown social and cultural trends constituting some of the most pervasive and dominant features in the community. Sudan is thus experiencing a renaissance through myriad peace-building strategies, diffusion of peace culture, promotion of human rights and gender equality, and reconciliation and capacity-building programs. Innumerable groups in civil society are shouldering great burdens in the process of making the transition from war to peace. The NGOs work under tough economic conditions, suffer a lack of basic infrastructure, and confront severe budgetary restraints, which in some cases have led to the suspension of their humanitarian and development activities.

The progress achieved in the peace process has had a profound impact on the country. Yet, a final political settlement still needs to be consolidated by ensuring the participation of all political

parties, following through on institutional reform programs, and applying the political will and patience necessary to nurture the embryonic democratic experience. The military reform stipulated by the Naivasha Agreement and the security forces' accountability are essential and perhaps most important for the creation of a comprehensive human security policy.

Postconflict reconstruction will necessarily pose formidable challenges to local, regional, national, and international policymakers. This has proved consistently elsewhere to be a laborious and lengthy process. Reconstruction began in El Salvador after the signing of a peace agreement in 1992, but remains ongoing as new peace-building projects get under way. Mozambique's peace agreement was signed in 1993, but, as yet, resettlement programs are still being implemented, and the process of national reconstruction after thirty years of civil war continues to be daunting. For Sudan, after forty-six years of intermittent war, the empowerment of social and political institutions and the clarity needed to forecast the tasks ahead will require the enabling of capable and effective mechanisms. These must include the formation of comprehensive and feasible policies.

NGOs and learning institutions need to be cautious of rhetorical planning detached from the machinery to make it work. They have much substance to add to policies. As innovative leaders, they bring to the table rigor, conceptualization based on tested principles, and practical methodological approaches to teaching and research projects. To these they must add documentation and information analyses.

Policymakers must steer clear of short-term, quick-fix planning and avoid making unattainable commitments, which result in fateful and counterproductive results. Sudan's institutions are fragile and need careful maturation. Prudence in making pledges and promises to local leaders is fundamental, especially if the situation involves the potential for disappointment and

frustration visited upon civilians who have been deeply affected by war. A sustainable effort is required for the clearance of the large number of landmines in vast areas of conflict zones. Such an endeavor is a good example of a situation requiring long-term peace-building programs and strategies.

Sudan has continued to receive humanitarian assistance from international donors. Nonetheless, because of the war, the country has for many years been deprived of access to development funds from international financial institutions and developed countries. For the past thirteen years, Sudan's allocations under the Lome IV Convention and Cotonu Agreement, a commercial arrangement between African and Caribbean countries and the European Union, have remained suspended. The release of these development funds and a possible accompanying decision to relieve Sudan of its \$23 billion debt should be viewed in the context of comprehensive planning for economic and trade cooperation.

Sudan's cultural diversity poses a dilemma for policymakers. As international organizations working in the country have learned, the application of culture-sensitive policies must include measures that allow for adaptability in the context of respect for local cultures. The transition from war to peace in Sudan is alluring to disparate international organizations and institutions, and a cluster of specialized centers and think tanks around the world has long been monitoring the situation, waiting for the opportunity to play a constructive role. Delicacy and sensitivity are needed to harmonize the programs and priorities of these institutions with coherent local policies and jointly drawn cooperative frameworks.

Political settlements can be reached even as ethnic tensions and social grievances continue to engulf societies. One way to avoid intercommunal frustration and to guard against possible relapses is the provision of a broad role for civil society, within which contestations and jousting for a political voice can take place. A

clearly defined socioeconomic policy for the attainment of community-oriented sustainable development must be made operational.

## **FURTHER RESEARCH**

The present study is in no way exhaustive or intended to provide an all-encompassing analysis on issues of transition from war to peace in Sudan. Rather, it reviews an evolving transformational situation in an exceptionally diverse country. For reasons related to thematic research and space and framework restraints, some issues considered of importance were omitted or discussed only briefly. Many issues remain for further research and in-depth analysis.

Additional research is needed in prioritizing policy issues and sequencing Sudan's needs in war's aftermath. As with East Timor, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka, a Joint Assessment Mission from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme will be dispatched to study the recovery and development needs in such clusters as food security, health, education, and economic policy. The issues of gender and capacity building should also be considered by international teams and their national counterparts. In-country quantitative and empirical research should determine the sequential addressing of sectoral and cross-cutting issues based on immediate and long-term phases. The effective handling of transitional policy issues by elites in the north and south requires the development of analytical research into the prioritization of issues of main concern and precedence.

In the postwar period, the Sudanese community faces a number of critical peace-building tasks, including resettlement, reconciliation, rehabilitation, demobilization, social reintegration, and de-mining. Each of these components needs continued

debate and focused systematic research to enable the forging of coherent strategies, workable plans, and effective mechanisms. Further studies may compare the successes and pitfalls of nation-rebuilding endeavors in other countries and investigate their recovery plans and implementation in an attempt to draw lessons for Sudan.

The role of modernized Sudanese mass media institutions in coming years should be another area of research, illuminating their influence on the minds of former adversaries through their news reporting and political analysis and how they may have contributed to the consolidation of the fragile peace settlement.

Constitutionalism as a concept that has been closely linked to the political administration of transitional periods is topical and should generate thought-provoking studies to determine the role of Sudan's constitution in political reconciliation and its actual contribution to the achievement of a lasting comprehensive settlement. Key to all these areas of research is launching extensive resources exploration and data collection.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Naivasha Agreement was a significant step. See the section below on the agreement for more on the nature of these arrangements and their possible consequences.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Ibrahim Ibrahim, executive director of the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies, Khartoum, September 3, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Mohamed Muhidin, director of Ana Assudan, Khartoum, August 27, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with Hatim Eltum, director of Africa Welfare International, Khartoum, September 6, 2003; interview with Ismail Bashir, pharmacist with the Dar Addwa Pharmaceutical Company, Omdurman, September 5, 2003; interview with Hussein Ahmed, a pharmacist with Elie Pharmaceutical Company, Khartoum, September 5, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Mohamed Ismail and members of the Southern Sahara Organization, Khartoum, September 7, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> The New Sudan Council of Churches, Liliir Covenant between the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle, and Nuer, May 17, 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Ali Ahmed, executive director of Sabil Alrashad, Khartoum, September 13, 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Hussein Al-Obeid, leader of the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines, August 14, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Mubarak Zaroug, logistics manager of Danish Church Aid in Sudan, Khartoum, October 4, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Xavier Marshal, head of the European Union's delegation to Sudan, press conference, Khartoum, March 3, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Education, statistical sheet, 2000–2001.

<sup>13</sup> Discussion with Yasir Arman, spokesman of the SPLA, Amsterdam, April 3, 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Howida Salah, lecturer at the Center for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, September 24, 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Mubarak Almajzoub, minister of higher education, Khartoum, September 21, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Awad Alkarim Abushiba, executive director of the Center for the Culture of Peace, Khartoum, August 16, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> «National Nuba-Based and Nuba-Led Humanitarian Organisations,» 2002.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Ali Ali, Information Department, Ministry of Health, Khartoum, August 19, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Sayeda Ahmed, secretary at the National Corporation for Electricity, Khartoum, September 9, 2003.

<sup>21</sup> The sport programs of the Solo Organization in Dar Alsalam camp exemplify such activities at camps for IDPs. The use of drama as a means of peace education is being advanced by the Institute for Peace Culture at the University of Sudan for Science and Technology, where the majority of the staff, including the director of the center, are graduates of drama studies.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Inshrah Khalil, executive director of Salam Alizza, Khartoum, September 15, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Sudanese Women's Civil Society Network for Peace and the Secretariat of Women Solidarity Group, «Position Paper: Varying Interpretations of Machakos Protocol in Khartoum,» Khartoum, August 7, 2002

<sup>24</sup> Southern Women's Group for Peace, «Reflections on [the] Machakos Protocol,» August 8, 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Sudanese Women, «Machakos Protocol: Concerns of the Sudanese Women,» Khartoum, July 2002.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with Elzubir Mohamed Alhassen, minister of finance and national economy, Khartoum, September 7, 2003.

<sup>27</sup> Discussion with Mutasim Bashir, director of the Coverall Company; Hassen Mohamed Alhassen, director of the National Bank of Omdurman, Omdurman Branch; and Adil Abdulaziz, economist and financial studies expert, Omdurman, September 16, 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Mohamed Awad Osman, *The United Nations and Peace Enforcement: Wars, Terrorism and Democracy* (Aldershot and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 133.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Ghazi Atabani, former advisor to the president for peace, Khartoum, September 29, 2003.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Ahmed Altahir, chairman of parliament, Omdurman, October 1, 2003.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Sulaf Salih, general commissioner of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission, Khartoum, August 19, 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, Kenya, October 17, 2002.

<sup>34</sup> Osman, *United Nations and Peace Enforcement*.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with Hasabou Abdurahman, head of the Peace Department at the Humanitarian Affairs Commission, Khartoum, October 2, 2003.

<sup>36</sup> Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Sudan People's Liberation Army, September 25, 2003.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.





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*A boy adds his writing to other graffiti on the outside of a tent in a transit camp for demobilized child soldiers.*

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