PEACE, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
PEACE, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A READER

Edited by Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo
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Foreword

The Africa Programme of the University for Peace is pleased to present Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader, the latest addition to our Peace and Conflict in Africa series. We launched the series three years ago to provide members of the academic community, civil society organisations, and policy makers in Africa with materials for furthering the debates on peace and conflict issues on the continent.

The series facilitates access to critical, published writings on peace and conflict by professors, researchers, and students in African universities, where the availability of materials is often limited. The publications under this rubric can also be used by practitioners and policy makers at all levels in building peace and human development in Africa. The series is an integral part of the Africa Programme’s central mission, which is to stimulate and strengthen peace and conflict studies in Africa through teaching, training, research, and service to community.

From its inception, the Africa Programme adopted an approach of working in close collaboration and consultation with partner universities around the continent. The programme focuses on eight key themes:

- conflict prevention, management, and resolution
- human rights, peace, and justice
- peace, conflict, and development
- gender and peacebuilding
- nonviolent transformation of conflict
- regional integration and security
- media, conflict, and peace
- endogenous methods of conflict prevention and peacebuilding

The Africa Programme has produced a range of teaching materials, including the following readers and compendia:

- Gender and Peacebuilding in Africa: A Reader, ed. Dina Rodríguez and Edith Natukunda-Togboa (2005)

Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa contains reprints and extracts of important scholarship and research selected by co-editors Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo. I wish to take this opportunity to thank them and their assistant editors for their dedication and resilience in ensuring the completion of this reader. It is my belief that it will be an invaluable tool for strengthening knowledge in the area of peace, conflict, and development. It is also my hope that it will stimulate current and future efforts to address and resolve the peace, conflict, and development challenges facing Africa.

Jean-Bosco Butera  
Director  
UPEACE Africa Programme

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Contributors

Editors

Erin McCandless is a peacebuilding and development scholar and practitioner with nearly two decades of experience working with international organisations—advising them on policy, programme design and development, and research, evaluation, and training—including ten years based in conflict and post-conflict recovery contexts. She presently consults with the United Nations and other international organisations on a range of peace, security, governance, and development issues. McCandless is adjunct professor at the New School’s Graduate Program in International Affairs and is the founder and co-executive editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development. She is the author of more than fifty publications on issues of peacebuilding and state-building and their linkages to economic recovery and development, as well as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); conflict sensitive policy making; UN peace operations; strategic frameworks and international coordination; exit and transition strategies; and peace research methods. She earned her doctoral degree from American University, Washington, D.C.

Tony Karbo is senior programme officer and associate professor for the UPEACE Africa Programme, Addis Ababa. Karbo is the managing editor for the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, a peer-reviewed journal that deals with contemporary peace and conflict issues in Africa. He was previously a senior lecturer at the Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance at the Africa University of Zimbabwe. Karbo has more than twenty years of experience teaching and fifteen years of experience in workshop design and training in the areas of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, mediation and negotiation, governance, and human rights. His work has taken him to more than twenty African countries, where he continues to engage parliamentarians, senior civil servants, civil society organisations, and non-governmental organisations in peacebuilding processes. He is an associate director and trainer for the South North Centre for Peacebuilding and Development. Previously, Karbo served as the program representative for eastern and southern Africa at the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy. He holds a doctorate in conflict analysis and resolution from the former Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (now the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution), George Mason University, United States.

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Courtenay Siegfried served as editorial assistant.
Acknowledgements

The University for Peace Africa Programme and the editors of Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader would like to thank the following publishers, organisations, and publications for granting permission to reproduce the articles, reports, chapters, and documents in this volume. Full bibliographic information can be found at the beginning of each reading.

Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria
Africa World Press and Red Sea Press, Trenton, New Jersey, United States
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa
Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, United Kingdom
Berghof Research Centre, Berlin
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar
Department for International Development, London, United Kingdom
Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris
Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, New York
European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Hague
Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, New York
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Birmingham, United Kingdom
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Human Security Center, University of British Columbia, Canada
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, United Kingdom
Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria
International Journal of Peace Studies
International Peace Institute, New York
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, United States
Overseas Development Institute, London
Political Economy Research Institute, Amherst, Massachusetts, United States
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Sage Publications, London
South North Centre for Peacebuilding and Development, Harare
Strategic Partnerships and Communications Group, New York
United Nations Development Programme, New York
United Nations General Assembly, New York
United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.
University for Peace Africa Programme, Addis Ababa
University of Chicago Press, Illinois, United States
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Zed Books, London

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Abbreviations

ALF  Africa Leadership Forum
ANC  African National Congress
APCj  Africa Peace and Conflict Journal
ASF  Africa Standby Force
AU  African Union
AUPF  African Union Peace Fund
BCPR  Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CDA  Conflict Development Analysis
CEWs  Continental Early Warning Systems
CIJPOL  International Civilian Police
CPE  Complex Political Emergencies
CSSDCA  Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DESD  Decade of Education for Sustainable Development
DfID  Department for International Development, United Kingdom
ECCAS  Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG  Economic Community Observer Monitoring Group
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EW  Early warning
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWER  Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP  Gross domestic product
GNP  Gross national product
HDI  Human Development Index
HDR  Human Development Report
HINOGs  Humanitarian international nongovernmental organisations
IDDA  Industrial Development Decade for Africa
IDPs  Internally displaced persons
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI  International financial institutions
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPE  International political economy
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO  Nongovernmental organisation
NIEO  New international economic order
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
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<td>ODA</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<td>PCDA</td>
<td>Peace and conflict-related development analysis</td>
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<td>PCI A</td>
<td>Peace and conflict impact assessment</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted social conflict</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional economic communities</td>
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<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>Transitional results framework</td>
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Introduction

The Africa Programme of the UN-affiliated University for Peace (UPEACE) is pleased to present Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader, another step in the effort to ameliorate Africa’s problem of access to practice- and policy-relevant scholarship and information that addresses the twin challenges of building sustainable peace and human development on the continent. It brings together historically important and more recent works from Africa and abroad that examine the role of political economy in conflicts and the methods and tools needed to bring about positive peace—meaning, peace that is more than the absence of violence, seeks to eliminate the root causes of conflict, offers social justice, builds respectful relationships, and results in self-sustaining institutions and capacities for enduring peace.

Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa is aimed at those involved in building peace in ways that foster human-centred, inclusive development and at those working in the development and economic spheres who want to ensure that their work does no harm and actually supports and contributes to peace. It is also part of a broader effort to support the evolution of the emerging sub-field of peacebuilding and development, which must rise from a foundation of understanding and formulate coherent responses to issues as they emerge. In turn, this integrated field of the study and practice of peacebuilding and development stands to serve Africa by reminding practitioners, scholars, and students that the drive for peace should not marginalise the vital priority of human development or vice versa.

The reader is divided into eleven chapters, each introduced by an essay that contextualises the readings. The chapters cover a range of issues at the nexus of peace, conflict, and development. The organisation of the chapters flows from conceptual to more thematic discussions that delve into core debates and examination of lessons and current directions in areas at the heart of this nexus. The reader opens with an examination of the conceptual and historical contexts of the relationship of peace and development (chapter 1) and then looks at investigations into the political economy of conflict (chapter 2) and the role of economic policy in undermining or promoting peace and human development (chapter 3).

Subsequent chapters are structured around what some view as pillars of peace or peacebuilding while at the same time taking into consideration their relationship to the twin goals of peace and human development. These include the strategies behind humanitarian and development aid (chapter 4), demilitarisation and human security (chapter 5), state-building and democracy (chapter 6), and economic recovery and reconstruction (chapter 7). The issue of natural resources and peacebuilding, a controversial and important topic in Africa’s self-empowerment, is also addressed (chapter 8). Discussion of integrated peacebuilding and development strategies and tools of conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention, nonviolence and social mobilisation, and the role of African institutions round out the readings (chapters 9, 10, and 11).

A section on Web resources highlights organisations engaged in activities at the peace and conflict and development nexus. It provides brief descriptions of their areas of emphasis and the resources available through their Web sites. A selection of recommended resources for further reading concludes the reader.

UPEACE’s reader and compendium sets are part of a series of publications produced to provide Africans and African institutions with difficult-to-find materials in order to create a platform for the institutionalisation of peace and conflict studies in Africa. Other

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We hope that the collection of excerpts from critical voices presented in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa will be of great utility to academics, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers working to further peacebuilding and development that serves all Africans.

Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo
Reflecting on African perspectives on peace and development in the late 1980s, Emmanuel Hansen argued that the dominant perceptions and practices of peace were not serving Africa. Hansen highlighted the limitations of a peace concept that addresses only the technical question of the instruments of violence and views minimalist conflict management as a sufficient condition, or the only sufficient condition, for peace. For most African scholars, he argued, the peace and development problematic go together: Peace involves the resolution of conflict and also the transformation of extant social systems at national and international levels. It is a concept of peace that arises from Africa’s particular historical circumstances and responds to its developmental needs but is also applicable to the mass of humanity. A view specific to Africa, he argued, was needed that addresses historic North-South relations, including socioeconomic inequalities perpetuated by globalisation and northern policies.

The premise of Hansen’s views, presented here in the introduction from *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development*, have since increased in value and recognition. Although institutionalised linkages between peace and development are taking time to manifest, former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s oft-quoted statement that ‘[t]here can be no peace without economic and social development, just as development is not possible in the absence of peace’ was a powerful representation of early recognition. Consensus on the meanings of peace and development, and the challenges associated with actually integrating programmes and activities that fall within mandates of particular organisations and agencies, greatly challenge the integration effort. Truly integrating peace and development will require greater interrogation than may presently exist in terms of the actual policies and programmes, examination of their outcomes, and willingness to make changes accordingly.

The selections in this chapter illustrate a range of conceptual and practical thinking on peacebuilding and development linkages. Erin McCandless—in ‘Peace and Conflict Studies’, ‘Emergence of Peace-Building and Development’, and ‘Synopses of Major Concepts’—provides a historical summary of conceptual debates on conflict, development, and peace, placing African conceptions at the heart of the issues and concerns driving the new, integrated subfield of peacebuilding and development. Recognizing that conflict and development are deeply intertwined, as are, consequently, the building of sustainable peace and human development, the subfield of peacebuilding and development continues to evolve. Drawing on the dynamic interaction between scholarship, policy making, and practice, it underscores the critical need for policy- and practice-relevant conceptions and research to better serve the challenges found most profoundly in Africa.

Human development is a practical concept from the development field that is conducive to the building of sustainable peace and to preventing future conflict. The ‘National Human Development Report, 2006: Liberia’ outlines the important differences between the dominant growth model of economic development and the human development model, which shares much with more holistic, positive conceptions of peace. As highlighted in the report, human development encompasses growth and the equitable distribution of the
fruits of growth, assuming both are essential for achieving human progress. A holistic concept balances these aims, viewing development as a process seeking to enlarge people's choices, with multidimensional outcomes that embrace principles of self-esteem, participation, and individual freedom. The human development report usefully places the concept in historical context, reviewing the institutional debates and the tools that have evolved to support its use—notably the human development index (HDI). By measuring standards of living, the HDI offers an important alternative to the growth model's basis in gross national product, which does not account for distributional impact. The uneven distribution of development impacts, as highlighted throughout the reader, is often a source of conflict and a challenge for peace.

Peter Uvin's analysis of the ways in which the development enterprise interacts with conflict and violence lays out seven conceptual, practical paradigms defining key peace, conflict, and development linkages. They range from rhetorical assumptions and related practices asserting that development (of the dominant growth variety) automatically fosters peace to military conditionality and the post-conflict approaches focusing on political and economic liberalisation to the 'do no harm', conflict prevention, and human security agendas, ending with the movement for global system reform. In 'The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms', he examines two particular variables: the extent to which conflict matters are incorporated into the very notion of development and the extent to which development explicitly engages in the political realm, running counter to the norm of sovereignty and the practice of 'a-politicalness' that have historically underpinned development practice. He concludes that the key problem of much of the operational work in putting the development/peacebuilding nexus into practice is the weakness of the knowledge and ethical base on which this work rests. Uvin's contribution and the others in this chapter lay the conceptual foundations for the chapters that follow and that together, it is hoped, will contribute to addressing these weaknesses and enhancing research and action to support African peace and human development.
Concept of the Peace Problematic

Some people are apt to be startled or at the least raise eyebrows at the mention of an African perspective on peace. Peace, it is claimed, is a universal desideratum. This is not a contestable position. How then can we begin to particularize it by talking of an African perspective? How legitimate is it to talk of European peace or Asian peace? To conceptualize peace in this narrow way is manifestly absurd. In addition to the theoretical problems it raises it would seem to have undesirable consequences for peace scholarship as well as for the quest for peace and the peace movement. It compartmentalizes peace studies into narrow, chauvinistic and national or local concerns and fragments the peace initiative at a time when the need for unity is greater than ever. Although the state systems of most countries of the world claim that peace is desirable, the concept of peace, the obstacles to peace, what peace actually is and how it can be realized are issues on which there is no agreement. What is designated here as the African perspective is the consensus of a majority of African scholars on the peace problematic.

To recognize that there are or could be different perspectives on the peace question is not to indulge in irresponsible relativism or to take refuge in philosophical anarchism of the type ‘all systems are fine; it all depends on your point of view’. While we seek to understand other perspectives which may be different from ours, we do not hold the position that all perspectives are equally defensible. The perspective which a group brings to the peace problematic depends on its history and material conditions as well as the position of the group within the power structure of the national or international system. If, as we have argued, certain perspectives are less defensible than others, then the question arises as to what yardstick we use to decide which positions are defensible and which are not. This should not be a difficult issue. For us the perspective on the peace problematic which we can defend and justify is that which makes it possible for the majority of the people on this planet to enjoy physical security, a modicum of material prosperity, the satisfaction of the basic needs of human existence, emotional well-being, political efficacy and psychic harmony. This we believe will enable the mass of men and women in the world to develop their potentialities and consequently themselves as full and autonomous human-beings; it will enable them to develop not as means to other ends but as ends in themselves. Willy Brandt captured the essence of this when he declared in a recent lecture that

> the vast majority of those who carry responsibility for their people and nations... are full of goodwill and... intend to solve the problems and let our world reach a state of security and well being. A state in which according to the capabilities of all its members mankind could overcome oppressive misery and develop its immense resources.\(^1\)

We are aware that many people or nations will not find it difficult to accept this general statement. The problem arises when we seek to attach definite meanings to these terms and when we seek to put these ideals into practice. We shall come to this later on. But we need to stress that it is this collective consensus shared by the large community of African scholars on the peace problematic that we call the African perspective. If we have taken so much space to establish and clarify this point, it is because of two things. We recognize that the peace problematic is not unproblematic even at the conceptual level; and we need to emphasize the difference between our own perspective and what I would call, for the want of a better term, the ‘establishment perspective’.

Any African scholar who has attended any large gathering of peace workers, peace researchers and peace activists or followed the activities of these people will appreciate the distinction we are trying to make and will no doubt not fail to notice certain differ-
ences in people's perceptions. It is important to notice these differences, not for the purpose of scoring political or intellectual points, but to lay the basis for a meaningful intellectual confrontation and a common struggle for world peace. We find that in certain crucial matters such as the concept of peace, the nature of the peace problematic and the ways to seek peace our position tends to crystallize around certain ideas and themes and differs from mainstream European thought or the views held by the leaders of European states. Nowhere was this more amply demonstrated than at the recent seminar of African scholars called by the UN University to discuss peace, development and regional security in Africa as part of a series of regional seminars (its contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace). The seminar was attended by a representative group of African scholars. It is therefore right and proper to call the ideas which crystallized at the seminar the African perspective. The papers which make up the volume were all, with the exception of one, presented and discussed at the seminar. The present effort is limited to attempting a synthesis which captures the essence of the peace and development problematic as perceived and conceptualized by this representative community of African scholars who gathered in Addis Ababa for the seminar in January 1985.

We stated at the beginning that peace is regarded as a universal desideratum. Even people who wage wars claim they do so to maintain the peace. It was not only the ancient Romans who saw things in this way. It might have been hoped that over the years humanity would have made some progress towards the goal of peace. But it is not so. To declare or accept that peace is a universal desideratum does make it unproblematic. On the contrary it is clear that if everyone is for peace then different people will have different perceptions of what it is and what its purpose is. We can then legitimately ask the question, what kind of peace? What kind of peace was Reagan defending when he justified his invasion of the tiny island of Grenada in 1984? Or when he sent his war planes to attack Libya in April 1986? It is comforting to note that not all Americans went along with his reasoning. But it is also frightening to recall the number who swung to his support and supported the invasion in the name of God and country. What kind of peace was Reagan after? Was it the peace of the strong and the powerful or of the rich, high and mighty to do as they please, unrestrained by law, custom, conscience or international morality? Was it the peace of a superpower to do as and what it pleases, to pursue its own interests without regard to the interests, security and concern of other nations which appear to be weak? It is clear that for Reagan peace means keeping the 'communists' out of areas of US interests; he is prepared to do anything, including using armed force, to accomplish this irrespective of what the people of the areas may feel.

In this connection, even Botha, the leading white supremacist and leader of apartheid South Africa, says he is for peace. We believe him. But what does he mean by peace? For him peace means the acceptance of the current status quo. For Botha peace in South Africa can only be maintained if blacks and whites are rigidly segregated in all aspects of their lives and if blacks occupy subordinate positions in all walks of life. Anything else would create friction which would lead to conflict. He does not seem to recognize or admit that the present structure is the basis of much tension and conflict not only in South Africa itself but in the whole sub-region. Looked at in this way it is clear that the sort of peace which Botha wants is not the same as that demanded by the majority of the people of South Africa. Nor can we say that Botha's perspective on peace is as defensible as that of the mass of the population in South Africa. Botha says he wants peace; but he wants peace only to continue to oppress the blacks of South Africa. Most people want peace so that they can develop their potentialities fully as human-beings and attain psychic well-being. Botha's 'peace' is dialectically contradictory to the people's peace.

The example of South Africa is one of the more grotesque; but it illustrates the point we wish to make. The question of peace cannot be separated from the question of the struggle for social and democratic rights and for human dignity. In other words the peace problematic is not unrelated to the issue of extant social and political conditions and the distribution of power. The consequence of this for policy options will become clear as we go on. But this point relates to two central issues of the peace problematic to which we
need to address ourselves: peace for whom and peace for what? It is only by probing such
issues that we can get to the heart of the matter and set out the conditions which would
be necessary for a lasting and meaningful peace. Any peace problematic which does not
respond to this is not facing the reality of the situation.

It is easily conceded that wars are fought not only for the defence of a given territory
but also for the maintenance of a certain moral and social order. But it is right and proper
to ask what values and ideals the social order we claim to be fighting for upholds and
maintains.

The peace question has to be seen in two aspects: peace should be conceptualized and
perceived not only in the negative sense of minimizing or resolving conflict but also in
the positive sense of creating material conditions which provide for the mass of the peo-
ple a certain minimum condition of security, economic welfare, political efficacy and psy-
chic well-being. The two positions are intimately related not only for the purpose of
analysis or as an intellectual exercise but as the only meaningful and fruitful way to face
the peace problematic and define the practical conditions for societal peace and de-
velopment. For us in Africa the minimalist condition of peace conceptualized as merely the
removal, resolution or as it is sometimes less defensibly called, management of conflict,
which leaves the social and material conditions which cause tension and lead to conflict
intact, is unacceptable. It is unacceptable at both the national and the international
level. It is this thinking which makes us say that, important though the anti-apartheid
struggle is (and its removal would remove a major cause of conflict not only in South
Africa itself but in the Southern Africa sub-region as a whole), its removal will meet only
the minimum conditions for the promotion of peace in the sub-region. For a durable and
lasting peace it will be necessary to develop mechanisms to ensure that the broad mass
of the people achieve a measure of material and psychic well-being and control over the
political processes which guide and order their lives. From this point of view it should
be obvious why we in Africa perceive programmes of food security as more relevant to
our immediate peace problematic than the star wars programme of President Reagan.

This brings us to a separate but related question. This year (1985) Europe has been cel-
ebrating forty years of peace. This, indeed, is a noble and commendable achievement and
justly deserves to be celebrated. Such a long period of uninterrupted peace in one area
of the globe noted for violent conflicts, and which has the greatest concentration of the
most deadly instruments of destruction, is a rare occurrence in recorded history. But two
observations need to be made. In nearly all the celebrations, the accompanying symbols
and fanfare were symbols and accoutrements of war, not of peace. The imagery invoked
was that of strength, not peace. There is a thinking among the European states and
among certain people who hold what I call the establishment view of peace that peace
is the result of strength. This is based on the Hobbesian concept of man as a naturally
selfish and aggressive animal to be restrained only by the fear of death and terror. For
some this is the only realistic view. It is a sad commentary on our evolution that although
in science and technology we have devised techniques for solving problems which would
have amazed Hobbes and those of his time, in the field of political and social relations
we have not gone beyond his basic postulates. It could be argued that the focus on war
which characterized the celebration of peace was meant to bring home to the present
generation, especially those too young to know or remember, the full horrors of war and
to allow those old enough to remember it to relive the horrifying experience. It was, how-
ever, strength, especially the strength of armaments, which was displayed and which was
centre-stage.

This was underscored by statements made by some of the European leaders. Particularly
instructive was that of Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who declared that it
was nuclear weapons which had kept the peace of Europe for forty years. President Reagan
echoed the same sentiment. His insensitivity was amply demonstrated by his insistence
on visiting Nazi war graves, an event which brought a justifiably sharp rebuke from Israel.
To celebrate the peace of Europe by paying homage to the most dangerous protagonists
of war the world has ever seen was an astonishing thing for a world leader with claims
to desire world peace. If we have belaboured this point, it is to demonstrate an impor-
tant flaw in what I call the establishment perspective on the peace problematic which
sees minimalist conflict management as a sufficient condition, or the only sufficient con-
dition, for peace. For Reagan it would appear that there is really no difference between
the perpetrators of the most hideous crime against humanity and its victims. Both need
to be remembered equally. Not even the most fervent advocates of the pluralist theory
who make a fetish of maintaining a balance would defend such a position.

Three things follow from this viewpoint. In the first place, for Europe world peace is
European peace. It is true that to have succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe is an
important achievement. But commendable as this is, Europe is not the world: to be com-
pletely oblivious of the wars and conflicts, limited though they may have been in the rest
of the world, for the mere reason that their existence did not disturb the peace of Europe,
is to display an arrogance and insensitivity of the kind which can only undermine peace
and collective security. At the moment there are many areas of conflict in Africa, Latin
America, Asia and the Middle East. But these obviously did not enter into the calcula-
tions of the people who celebrated forty years of world peace because they do not seri-
ously affect the peace of Europe. This leads us to accept the position advanced in two of
the contributions in this volume to the effect that Europe and the United States export
their conflicts to the Third World. This helps them to maintain some measure of limited
domestic stability. If this is the case it is not surprising that the world powers show such
astonishing insensitivity to conflict in the non-European and ‘peripheral’ areas of the world.

In addition to this concept of world peace as the peace of Europe, there is also a ten-
dency, particularly among the nation states of Europe and the United States, to make the
minimalist concept of peace the maximalist position. It is interesting to note that not
only the extant state systems but even certain well-meaning individuals and organiza-
tions concerned with peace conceptualize the peace problematic in this way.4 The third
aspect of the peace problematic which is closely identified with the European state sys-
tem and also, we must regretfully say, with some peace groups and peace activists, is the
concept of peace as nuclear peace. There is a certain thinking in the state systems of
Europe and America and among the world powers generally that this is the kind of peace
worth campaigning for. This is the kind of peace which world leaders such as Reagan
and Gorbachev have in mind when they meet to talk about the arms race. It is a concept
that sees nuclear weapons as the only threat to peace. It is a concept which regards peace
as a balance of terror. To do this is to base the peace of the world on fear and mutual
suspicion instead of mutual trust and cooperation. This, as we have already had occasion
to point out, is no improvement on the Hobbesian position. The kind of approach which
has characterized peace research in Europe and the United States is an illustration not
only of the dominance of this perspective but of its persistence.5 Although much work
in peace research has now shifted from its earlier preoccupation with the arms conflict
between East and West and has begun to tackle issues like the North-South relation-
ship, the problem of creating stable political orders and the question of food security,
this is more of a continental European viewpoint than a British or North American one.

Not only do the states of Europe and America entertain this concept of peace as the right
and correct position; they insist on imposing this definition on the rest of us. We are
not saying that the dangers of nuclear war should be underestimated. For the first time
in history humanity has developed instruments of violence which have the potential to
destroy our species several times over. But to regard this as the only problem is to seri-
ously misrepresent the issue. From our point of view it is not so much nuclear weapons
which pose a threat but the social systems which bring nuclear weapons into being and
the kinds of struggle for control of resources which make nuclear weapons necessary. We
appreciate that it is easier to get agreement on limiting nuclear weapons or to seek their
abolition than to obtain a consensus on appropriate social and political systems; but this
is a position which, if adopted, still leaves the victims of oppression where they are. We
support, and we shall continue to support, efforts to destroy, limit and abolish the use
of nuclear weapons. But we are also painfully aware that before nuclear weapons were
invented we were dominated by Europeans through slavery, colonialism and now neo-colonialism. For us this is a painful reality. If all the nuclear weapons in the world were destroyed we would still be dominated until the social system which oppresses us and which gave rise to the creation of nuclear weapons were eliminated. So long as people are oppressed the basis of serious conflict exists.

It is this which makes us say that a perspective on the peace problematic which addresses itself only to the technical question of the instruments of violence without looking at the deeper structural issues such as the system of power, both at national and international levels, is not likely to achieve much. This is why we say that for us the destruction of nuclear weapons is only a minimalist condition for the attainment of peace. It is this establishment conception of peace which the African position rejects: a conception which sees peace as the peace of Europe, or merely as the absence or management of conflict or as nuclear peace unrelated to extant social and material conditions. The African perspective sees peace and development as intimately related: it sees peace not only as the resolution of conflict but as the transformation of extant social systems at both national and international levels. It is a concept which relates peace to the physical, social and existential needs of people.

To sum up: we stress that the position we take on the peace issue is to articulate, defend and make practical a peace problematic other than the one defined by the superpowers or controlled by the transnational corporations. It is a concept of peace which, though arising out of our particular historical circumstances, responds to the needs not just of our own people but of the mass of humanity. We need to strive for a peace which not only entails the peaceful resolution of conflicts or the removal of major conflict in the main theatres of Europe, but also ensures peace in all areas of the globe and responds to the developmental needs of people at both the national and international levels. We are not claiming that we hold a monopoly of these views. We are only saying that this perspective, which represents a consensus of the views of African scholars, underlies the papers presented in this volume. We are aware that certain individuals and certain peace organizations also hold such a position. What is remarkable in the African situation is that many of the participants at the seminar did not perceive or define themselves as peace researchers, nor did they formulate their intellectual concerns within the established frameworks and paradigms of peace research; but once confronted with the problem, they responded in a way that put them on the progressive side of peace research and peace initiative. For most African scholars there is no difference between the peace problematic and the development problematic. We are aware that even within the peace movement there are many individuals and peace organizations whose concept of peace is very close to that which we have characterized as the establishment perspective and which we insist should be rejected if the world is to attain any meaningful and lasting peace. To say this is not to condemn such peace movements but to state a historical fact. The perspective on peace we have outlined here informs our intellectual posture and political behaviour and is the concept of peace which we seek to put into practice; it is the concept of peace which informs the chapters and individual contributions which form this volume. The logical implications, as we shall see shortly, are clear.

**Social and Political Context of the Peace Problematic: The Global Crisis**

We are seeking to elucidate a peace perspective which, as we have seen above, runs counter to the position articulated and defended by the state systems of Europe and the United States and world powers generally. This in itself poses problems; not only do we not get support; we encounter serious opposition. What is more important is that we are seeking to put these ideals into practice at a moment in world history which is characterized by a severe crisis of global capitalism. This affects us in three ways. It reduces our capacity to confront the peace problematic; it enables the Western capitalist countries to increase their pressure on us and it weakens the determination and capacity of certain progressive countries to assist us.
In Africa the crisis has several features. At the physical level it is characterized by poor economic performance. Although it has now become customary for our leaders to blame this on the global crisis—and we should neither forget nor underestimate the impact of this on our economies—it should be noted that our problems predated the current crisis of global capitalism. The economic conditions in many African countries started to deteriorate in the 1970s and the present trends show even greater rates of decline. Although GDP grew at an average rate of 3.6% in the 1970s it has since fallen. With population growing at the rate of 3% per year it was estimated that income per head in 1983 had fallen to about 4% below its 1970 figure.

Nowhere has the poor performance of our economies been more amply demonstrated than in the agricultural sector. Agricultural output has continued to fall. The drought of the last few years has not made things any better. Originally confined to the Sahelian areas it has now spread to many areas in Eastern, Western, Central and Southern Africa. It is now estimated that 36 countries are affected. The human dimensions of this are incalculable. In Ethiopia about a million people are reported to have died, and many more have perished in Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger, Mali and Senegal. The drought has aggravated an already bad food and agricultural situation. The African region now produces only about 20% of its cereal requirements. Per capita grain production in the 24 countries affected by the drought has been falling on average 20% per year since 1970. It is estimated that if this trend continues per capita production in 1988 will be the same as in the drought-stricken year of 1984, even if 1988 has normal weather. It is true that the picture is not uniformly bad. Certain countries are worse off than others; but even the so-called ‘strong economies’ such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi, often lauded by the World Bank, the IMF and donor agencies, are not doing so well. Not only has agricultural production been declining, there is even a danger of a crisis of the entire agrarian system. To make matters worse there has been a virtual collapse of commodity prices. In addition to declining exports the terms of trade have not been in favour of the primary producer. It has been estimated that between 1980 and 1982 the prices of non-oil commodities fell by 27% in current dollar terms. This represented a loss of income of 1.2% of GDP for sub-Saharan African countries.

It is not only in agriculture that the story is bad. Industry has also been an abysmal failure. Much industrial capacity now lies idle and many of the early import-substitution industrialization efforts have foundered. The situation in West Africa is particularly grave. Here manufacturing declined by 6.8% in 1983; in East and Southern Africa it declined by 1.9%, and in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole it fell by 3.3% in the same year. Relative to world manufacturing output Africa had a share of manufacturing value added of only 0.9% in 1980 and it does not look as if the figure is going to increase in the near future. If these statistics tell a depressing story the human dimension is even worse. It is banal to say that something needs to be done to reverse this trend. It is estimated that child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, which was 50% higher than the average for developing countries as a whole in the 1950s is now almost double the average. In spite of massive imports in food and food aid it is estimated that about 20% of Africa’s population eats less than the minimum needed to sustain good health. With projected GDP of 2.8% per year and a population growth of 3.5% per year we should expect, all things being equal, a fall in per capita GDP of 0.7%. A recent World Bank report concludes, “On this basis, real African incomes in 1995 will be so low that between 65 and 80% of the people will be living below the poverty line, compared with roughly 60% today.” The situation is deteriorating.

Another aspect of Africa’s current economic problem is what is commonly called the debt crisis. This has now emerged as one of the most serious burdens on Africa. Even the continent’s ‘strong economies’ are not free from this. Even countries such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria which benefited from the commodity price boom of the 1970s are facing serious problems in meeting their debt obligations. Africa is rapidly replicating the Latin American experience. Debt service repayments are due to rise sharply in the future thus making the situation even more grave. The World Bank report for 1984 comments,
On the existing public and publicly guaranteed medium and long-term debt alone, they are due to rise from $4.1 billion in 1981 and $5. billion in 1982 to $9. billion in 1984, and an average of $11.6 billion a year in 1985–87.16

Africa's external medium- and long-term borrowings increased from $12.7 billion in 1972 to $99.7 billion in 1983, representing an average growth rate of 21.47% per year for the period. If we were to add undisbursed credits, short-term credits and 'military aid' (these figures exclude Libya and the lusophone countries of Africa) the figure would be even larger.17 Such large external borrowings attract debt services which put a severe strain on the continent's economy. Nominal interest payments by African countries increased from $0.2 billion in 1972 to $4.9 billion in 1983, a rate of 33.41%.18 Many of the new loans have merely gone into servicing debts and not into new investments or the rehabilitation of the economy. To fully appreciate the adverse effects of the debt crisis on the African economies it is necessary to quote in extenso.

Another adverse impact of the debt crisis in Africa is the fact that when a debtor country accumulates arrears and/or announces intention to reschedule its debt, the flow of new resources declines due to erosion of the country's creditworthiness. The erosion in creditworthiness also leads to higher costs of borrowing, both explicit and implicit. Higher implicit costs are reflected, for example in higher margins on imports and in more stringent conditions for import payments. The decline in new inflows, particularly private inflows, has forced many debtor African countries to adopt contractionary measures in order to generate surpluses to meet debt-service payments. These measures . . . have not only reduced economic activity but have also resulted in quite heavy social costs.19

These statistics tell a depressing story, but it is the unquantifiable human dimension which tells an even sadder one. Development economists argue endlessly about the causes of these problems— are they the consequence of internal policy failures or are they generated by the world economy? The mass of the people in Africa only know the effects as they impinge on their material and social lives. Although we made some impressive improvements in the period immediately following independence, particularly in the areas of education, sanitation and public health and transport and communication, on the whole, as the above statistics show, the performance of the post-colonial economies leave a lot to be desired.

We have also faced serious problems at the social and political levels. At the present moment serious conflicts affect many of the sub-regions of the continent: Southern Africa, the Horn, Sudan and Chad, Eastern Africa, and the Western Sahara to mention only the most prominent ones. In addition to these sub-regional conflicts there are other no less serious conflicts at national and local levels. The sources of these conflicts are many. They can be manifested as ethnic or religious, the result of the claims of particular groups, or of conflict among the various factions of the petty bourgeoisie which control the post-colonial state. Conflicts can arise in the process of nation-building itself. It is tricky to harmonize particular interests and claims with the urgent and persistent tasks of nation-building and we cannot always be sure that the necessary tensions can be handled in such a way that conflict can be avoided or minimized. In many countries in Africa we have not been able to work out effective and regular patterns of political succession and competing claimants often have recourse to the gun— with tragic consequences. This has undermined political stability and caused untold human suffering.

One effect of such an unsettled state of affairs is the rise of refugees. Africa now has an estimated five million. Twenty years ago there were less than half a million. One in every 200 Africans is a refugee.20 (These figures do not include economic refugees or those who have been displaced within the borders of their own countries.) The depressing conditions of refugee existence, as well as its humiliation and demoralization, are too well-known to need repeating. In political terms the contemporary history of our continent has been marked by a steep increase in the rise of authoritarianism (not that it is a new phenomenon). This has been with us since the colonial period; but we have improved upon it instead of working for its elimination. Leaders who have come to power decrying the authoritarian rule of their predecessors have all too easily succumbed themselves. Of the 51 independent African countries nearly half of them are currently under military
rule or have had at least one military government. Now a new brand of military regime is emerging on the political scene, practising a mixture of authoritarian populism and absolutism. The net effect is to push off the agenda the programmes for democratic rights and the aspirations of the mass of the people for democratic control of the political processes which order and guide their lives. We as intellectuals can argue and disagree among ourselves as to the cause and dimensions of these social and political pathologies; but we cannot deny their existence or the fact that they do not contribute to the improvement of the material conditions of the lives of our people. The only proof that we as intellectuals can offer of our commitment to the mass of the people is to come out with solutions. This implies taking a position dictated by praxis.

We have here outlined the nature of the African crisis and its manifestations. At the economic level we have drought and famine, the near collapse of the agrarian system and low productivity of both agricultural and industrial goods. The crisis has been intensified by the collapse of commodity prices and an increasing debt burden. At the social and political level it is characterized by conflicts and a rise in authoritarianism and military dictatorships and refugees. We argued that the global crisis enables Western capitalist countries to put more pressure on us and reduces the capacity of progressive countries to assist us. We shall now turn our attention to these questions.

One of the basic features of the global crisis in the West has been the problem of capital accumulation. Western governments have responded to the crisis with a combination of austerity measures, including the abandonment of welfare and the deliberate creation of unemployment. This is meant to increase the capital-labour ratio and consequently increase profits. The response from labour to these measures has been an intensification of the class struggle which has attracted further repression from states bent on reducing and disciplining labour. On the external level the Western capitalist countries have sought to deal with the developing countries in virtually the same way as they have tried to deal with labour. They have sought to do this through political repression and an increase in appropriation in order to discipline the workers of the developing countries. It is this which underlies their response to the demands made by the Third World for the creation of a New International Economic Order or the North-South dialogue or the demands which Third World countries have been making at various meetings of UNCTAD. These requests, minimal though they are, have all been ignored. It would seem that both East and West share a basic consensus that the present international economic and power arrangements which militate so much against our development efforts, should be maintained. It is this which leads some to the conclusion that it would appear that the most relevant divide in the world today is not the so-called conflict between East and West but the contradiction between the North collectively and the South collectively. Of course, no one would be naive enough to deny the reality of the East-West confrontation; but it would appear that both the East and the West are agreed about the nature of the conflict and that in this consensus the collective interests of Africa tend to be sacrificed.

The IMF and the World Bank have been operating— in the words of Lenin— as ‘learned salesmen’ of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and gendarmes of finance capital in the attempt to solve the problem of the crisis of accumulation at the centre. The effect of this is, in the words of Samir Amin, to increase the ‘compradorization’ of Africa even further. The IMF adjustment plan, which is resented almost uniformly by every African country, is the overseas version of the monetarist policies now being pursued with vigour in Britain under the leadership of the Conservative government. In Europe and the United States we see the same trend in the rise of the New Right. Its main purpose at the centre is to subordinate labour more effectively to the rule of capital and thereby increase the rate of appropriation. In Africa the goal is the same. An IMF plan often demands massive retrenchment of labour, euphemistically called labour redeployment; trade liberalization with consequent denationalization of local capital; massive devaluation of local currencies (which could be defended on the grounds of bringing overvalued local currencies down to their realistic value but has had the net effect of drastically reducing the purchasing power of the mass of the people) and support for authoritarian means
of implementing such measures, often excused by pointing out the need for decisive and strong governments— with all that that means for civil and democratic rights.

Political violence against individuals and groups which a few years ago would have caused uproar in both Africa and the international press now passes hardly noticed. There would seem to be a conspiracy between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and our local rulers to increase the pressure on the mass of the people. And in the name of what do the metropolitan bourgeoisie do this? In the name of capital. We have to admit that not all the countries at the center have been operating in this way. There have been progressive European countries, in Scandinavia in particular, and individuals and organizations committed to our cause which have helped us in the past and still show some willingness to help. But the global crisis of capitalism is beginning to undermine both their capacity and their determination to offer us material support in a way which will lead to a real breakthrough in our struggle. This is the national and international political framework in which we are operating and in which we are seeking to respond to the peace problematic. This is the framework which circumscribes our actions and establishes the parameters within which we operate and pursue our objectives. It is important to understand this if we are to understand the nature of the peace problematic in Africa and our perspective on it.

Issues of the Peace Problematic: Conflict

The basic starting point for the study of peace is conflict. We argued above that the resolution of conflict is only a minimalist condition for the achievement of peace. The first real condition is to understand the nature and character of conflict in Africa. This implies two things: an identification of the salient issues and adoption of the appropriate methods. On the question of issues some of the important ones to consider might be: the causes of conflict, the nature and dynamics of conflict, the patterns of conflict, the effect of conflict, the involvement of external powers in Africa's conflict, the style and nature of this involvement and what it entails for the peace and security not only of the country or countries directly involved but for the peace and security of the sub-region. Other issues could be: problems of conflict resolution, the mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflict, the conditions for peaceful resolution and the effects of conflict on the developmental goals of the country and the sub-region and region as a whole. There are several patterns of conflict in Africa. Thus, we have conflicts of secession, ethnic nationalism or self-determination. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of all forms of conflict here. Suffice it to say that the form is often only the outward manifestation of other deep-seated issues. It has often turned out that a conflict apparently caused by ethnic or racial divisions has been nothing more than a conflict between competing elites for the control of state power and consequent access to certain material resources. Another feature of conflict in Africa is its sheer prevalence. We have already detailed the many instances of current conflicts in Africa both at territorial and inter-territorial levels. Since independence there is hardly any African country which has not experienced a major conflict of one kind or another. The geopolitics of the region mean that conflicts in one area easily spill into another, with the danger that they may engulf the whole sub-region. Thus the conflict in the Sudan spilled over into Ethiopia and Uganda while the conflict in Zaire involved Angola, Burundi and Uganda. We have already seen how the conflict in South Africa tends to engulf the whole sub-region. In 1979 incidents in Amin's Uganda led to an open military conflict with Tanzania and for a while threatened the security of the whole sub-region.

Another important feature of the conflicts in Africa is the extent to which outside forces play a central role in maintaining them. It is doubtful whether the conflict in the Chad would have continued till now but for outside intervention. The same can be said of the conflict in the Horn of Africa and that of the Western Sahara. External intervention escalates conflicts and leads to arms transfers which in the last few years have considerably
increased. In addition to the transfer of arms there have also been bilateral external agreements between African countries and certain metropolitan countries. The military pacts between France and many of her former colonies are well-known.24 What may not be so well-known is the extent to which both the US and the Soviet Union are involved militarily in Africa. The US, for instance, concluded a mutual defence agreement with Ethiopia in 1975 (although this was abrogated in 1978 during the time of Ethiopia's conflict with Somalia), with Ghana in 1972, Kenya in 1980, Liberia in 1972 and Zaire in 1972. The Soviet Union also has had treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola since 1976, Mozambique since 1977 and Ethiopia since 1978 (ratified in 1979). The Soviet Union has also concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation with Congo (1981), Egypt (1971) and Somalia (1974). Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda have all received Soviet military assistance under additional military cooperation agreements.25 These bilateral agreements provide access to naval and air facilities for the external power. The consequence of this is the possibility of drawing Africa into external conflicts. This not only endangers security in Africa but produces an atmosphere in which peaceful settlement of disputes becomes more difficult.

Another feature of the African conflicts is their intractability. The conflict in the Southern Sudan has been going on since 1957 (close to three decades) and that in Uganda has lasted for almost two decades. Although mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes exist in the form of the mediation and reconciliation committees of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), they have not been successful. The OAU was unable to stop the Nigerian civil war; it was unable to stop the war between Uganda and Tanzania and has been so far unable to stop the conflict in the Chad, or in the Western Sahara or between Ethiopia and Eritrea. We have already shown how these conflicts lead to such a displacement of people that Africa now has one of the fastest growing refugee populations in the world.

Two main approaches to the study of conflict in Africa can be discerned. One is the modernization paradigm which tends to see conflict as endogenously generated; this looks for explanation to such factors as the conflict between primordial loyalties and the strains of the modernization process. The other I shall call, for want of a better term, the structural approach; this uses the economic and political linkage between African countries and metropolitan countries as a wider canvas against which to work out issues of conflict. This latter approach does not claim that external factors cause conflict in Africa; but they do lay down the parameters within which conflict occurs and they sometimes fuel them. It would therefore be futile to attempt to work out lasting mechanisms for conflict resolution without taking external factors into consideration.

At the present moment Southern Africa is the most serious area of conflict on the continent. It poses the gravest intellectual and political challenge to the African leadership. The chances of the conflict escalating into a major war with superpower involvement in the sub-region are ever present. South Africa is in a state of undeclared war against her neighbouring African states. Although South Africa claims that its action against the neighboring states is a response to guerrilla attacks on its own territory and is merely meant to attack and destroy guerrilla bases, and is thus part of its internal security operations, it is clear that it perceives the existence of neighbouring independent black states as a major threat to its system of apartheid; that is the major reason for the attacks. They are meant to deny the African states bordering on South African territory a chance to develop self-sustaining economies independent of South Africa. South Africa wants to reduce the black states around it to the status of entirely and totally dependent bantustans which are in no position to offer any assistance, material or moral, to the liberation struggle in South Africa. This is the idea behind the Nkomati Accords with Mozambique and the Lusaka Agreement with Angola both signed in 1984. This is the main cause of the conflict in Southern Africa. It is therefore clear that the conflict cannot be meaningfully resolved without changes in South Africa itself.

In the last few years the conflict in South Africa has escalated to a level where many people are predicting a major flare up in the area if there are no substantial changes in the apartheid system. It is clear that apartheid is no longer useful to capital, especially
finance capital. South Africa is becoming ungovernable and capital needs stable conditions for its reproduction. The social conditions in South Africa are now becoming an obstacle to further accumulation. So apartheid must go. It is not surprising that it has been representatives of industrial and financial capital who have been in the forefront of the demands to the government to seek some form of accommodation with the liberation movements. In 1985 a group of South African industrialists and financial leaders went to Lusaka to talk to the leaders of the African National Congress, an action which drew open rebuke from Botha, the apartheid prime minister of South Africa. When we connect this with the increasing loss of confidence shown in South Africa by the international business community then we know that the time for change has come. The critical question is, what kind of change?

There has been talk of talks about talks; it is clear that some feelers have been put out to try and find a way out of what looks like [it is] becoming an ugly situation. The West’s main interests in South Africa are economic and strategic. It is therefore clear that any settlement will have to take this into account. It will also have to be based on the emergence of a black government moderate enough to calm the fears and maintain the privileges of the white minority, at least in the short term, but militant enough to command legitimacy and keep the lid on the aspirations of the black population. This is possible but not easy in the current situation. To this extent the recent statement by Botha that he would be prepared to hold discussions with the ANC if it renounced violence and terrorism and cut off its links with the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union is significant. There is one sense in which South Africa is uniquely different from all other ex-colonies. This is not because it has been independent for a long time, as is sometimes asserted; it is because of the importance of its strategic position to the NATO defence system and its possession of nuclear weapons. These two factors introduce an entirely new element into the situation.

It is because South Africa occupies an important place in the Western defence system that the West has allowed it, and even helped it, to develop nuclear weapons. In fact it is claimed by certain strategic analysts that South Africa’s possession of nuclear weapons is less for the internal suppression of its black population than as part of the Western defence system against confrontation with the East. Seen from this point of view we can appreciate South Africa’s constant appeal to the West not to abandon it. From this point of view we can also appreciate the West’s dilemma over South Africa. In the event of black majority rule how can the West be sure of maintaining its strategic interests in South Africa?

There are only two ways to achieve this. The West would have to promote a black leadership which would be so compromising that it could be entirely depended on, in the event of a confrontation, to allow the free use of its nuclear power and territory in the pursuit of NATO interests. This would present two problems. Considering the polarization in South Africa, is such ‘moderate’ black leadership likely? What legitimacy would such a leadership have? The second strategy would be to integrate South Africa further into the Western economic and strategic defence system before majority rule; any succeeding African government, moderate or militant, would then find itself so circumscribed that the imperatives of Realpolitik and political survival would dictate its operating within the general framework of the Western defence system. But this would not be easy to achieve and would probably founder on the legitimacy issue. Can a black leadership in South Africa, no matter how reactionary, be depended upon to use nuclear weapons on behalf of the West in the event of an East-West confrontation? Another option would be to dismantle the nuclear weapons in the event of majority rule if a satisfactory compromise which would ensure the West’s strategic interests could not be reached. But this would deprive the West of a vital strategic base. This is the heart of the problem in South Africa. Whatever option emerges will depend on the nature of the struggle and the extent to which an accommodation can be worked out between the dominant forces in the conflict. What will be the impact of these arrangements on the peace and regional security of the area? Should the West succeed in working out a formula which would maintain its strategic and defence interests in South Africa, it would continue to threaten the peace and security of the whole sub-region.
We have argued that for us peace and development are inextricably intertwined. Removal of conflict, as we have argued, is only the minimalist condition for the attainment of peace. For a lasting and reliable peace to be attained, it is important to fashion economic systems which can generate sustained economic growth, guarantee for the mass of the population a certain minimum of material existence or basic needs. This would not in itself remove all conflict but it would eliminate some of the causes of tension which lead to conflict. It is not by accident that at a time of economic depression there has been an increase in inter-personal and inter-group social conflict. This has been made more likely by Africa's poor development record.

At the risk of oversimplification to the point of caricature, let me say that African developmental paradigms in the last two decades have been characterized by three main trends: African capitalism, populist socialism or welfarism and Marxism. We should immediately qualify this by saying that all typologies—and these are no exception—simplify a complicated reality. And some African countries have been ecletic in their developmental choices. We should also judge development paradigms not only in terms of what a country has actually been able to achieve but in terms of its aspirations. (This however is not to validate arbitrary self-identification.) We would venture to make a few cautious remarks about the criteria for identification. Is the state the main allocator of value or is allocation left to the free play of market forces? Considering the dominant role which the state plays in nearly all African countries it will be necessary to consider this further. Does the state appropriate on behalf of itself, in the form of the creation of state capital, or does it appropriate on behalf of private capital, local or foreign? Is the basic form of social organization of labour planned, cooperatized or collectivized? Are there plans to achieve this or is it considered desirable that capital should primarily be in private hands? What is the attitude of the state towards the welfare of the people? Does it attempt to be the main provider of the basic welfare of the mass of the people or is it the ideological postulate of the state that this should be the main responsibility of private individuals?

On the basis of these questions it is possible to outline Africa's three main developmental paradigms. The Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and Malawi typify African capitalism. In these countries there has been a strong ideological preference on the part of the petty bourgeoisie which control the apparatus of state power to rely on the market mechanism as the main allocator of value and a tendency for the state to appropriate on behalf of private capital (either domestic or foreign). The second tendency is what I would call welfare socialism or welfarism. Tanzania typifies this position perhaps more than any other country. Here the state is the major allocator of value and surplus is appropriated on behalf of the state. The social organization of labour is based on parastatals or peasant collectives and individual peasant holdings. The third paradigm is the Marxist state which shares some characteristics of the populist socialist state. Perhaps the main difference between this and the populist state is the role of the party as an elite group of dedicated cadres and a formal proclamation of state adherence to Marxism-Leninism as an official ideology. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia typify this pattern.

It is important to stress that these basic developmental paradigms should be separated from the specific policy options chosen as a means of achieving developmental goals. Julius Nyerere's recent remarks on nationalization, for example, should not be taken to infer that the entire populist socialist development model was wrong but only that certain policy options chosen to achieve it were neither well thought out nor well implemented. Nor should we regard some of the recent shifts in policy in Mozambique on state farms and agricultural production as evidence of the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism. In our view they are an attempt to shift policy in another direction in order to realize more effectively the objectives of the developmental model. One aspect which must be stressed is the dominant and interventionist role played by the state in all models of African development. In addition to these general development paradigms there have been some specific strategies which have been pursued by nearly all African countries in an attempt to escape the legacy of underdevelopment; import-substitution industri-
alization is one of these. With the benefit of hindsight it has become fashionable to castigate these policies; but they have been the main article of faith proclaimed by development economists as the sure way for African countries to escape from the legacy of underdevelopment and embark on industrialization. Another strategy is the continuation of the colonial policy of primary product promotion; a third which is now being vigorously advocated by finance capital in the form of the World Bank and the IMF is export-led industrialization. This is designed to increase the export of primary products as a way of building up surpluses which can then be used to modernize and industrialize agriculture, so preparing the base for further industrialization. Without getting into a long discussion on this it has to be said that there is only a very limited market for the expansion of primary products for export—as Nkrumah was to realize in 1965 when Ghana produced twice the amount of cocoa it produced in 1955 but earned only half the 1955 value. There may be likely benefits when only a few countries embark on this policy, but were all African countries to adopt it it would become self-defeating.

The African development experience for the last two decades has been a major disappointment, whatever the developmental options. The hopes of the early 1960s have not been fulfilled and disillusionment seems to have set in. This has led to a sobering reappraisal which has resulted in many debates. These have led to the emergence of two main schools of thought. The modernization school, relying on the historical framework of the development of capitalism in the West, puts forward a model in which through the process of diffusion of innovation and the provision of certain inputs like capital, managerial training, change of attitudes and the removal of archaic and outmoded processes, development is seen as a linear progression from the present underdevelopment of Africa to a replica of Europe. The basic assumption here is that the transition is replicable. If that is true then all that is required is the realization of its potential. According to this model African capitalism is not only possible, but desirable; it is the one sure road to success. Rostow, Hagen and others have produced the intellectual basis of this position.29 Its defenders point to the record of impressive growth rates particularly in the agriculture of the Ivory Coast. As Crawford Young has ably noted, the disasters of Zaire, a country which has also followed this road, or Nigeria, which in spite of its enormous oil revenues seems to be in no better position than some others less well endowed, are hardly mentioned.30 The modernization school concedes that colonialism had some very unsavoury aspects and cannot in all respects be defended on moral grounds; but it argues that on political and economic grounds it is defensible. Colonial capitalism turned stagnant and archaic African societies into rudimentary forms of the modern economy characterized by the cash nexus. It enabled Africans to enter into the cash economy and therefore begin to accumulate a surplus. What needs to be done is to work out a system to continue this process and remove the obstacles which colonialism put in the way of African accumulation. Posed in this way the theory finds it possible to condemn colonialism without condemning capitalism. This has provided a much needed and convenient intellectual umbrella for liberals of all shades.

For some time the modernization paradigm dominated the intellectual landscape until it was decisively demolished by Andre Gunder Frank in his now famous essay Sociology of Underdevelopment and Underdevelopment of Sociology.31 In a subsequent work in which he acknowledged his intellectual debt to Paul Baran, he argued that, far from having no developmental function in Latin America, capitalism had been responsible for its current underdevelopment.32 This argument had an immediate impact in intellectual and political circles and was applied to Africa. One of the most important and influential works on this subject was Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.33 This provided an intellectual and political justification for the countries which had made a policy choice against capitalism. If it is argued that capitalism has underdeveloped Africa then it stands to reason that a minimum condition for development is disengagement from capitalism and the creation of an alternative system; socialism is seen on both ethical and economic grounds as the most viable choice for African countries. Julius Nyerere's speech 'The Rational Choice', which he gave to a gathering of intellectuals and leaders of the Sudanese Socialist Party Union in 1973 in Khartoum, is one of the most eloquent statements on the issue.34 Those who take this position also counter the argument about the impres-
sive growth rates of countries like the Ivory Coast and Malawi with the claim that such growth rates have been obtained by depriving the mass of the people of welfare services; in any case the growth is temporary. But as we have pointed out, in neither case have the results been impressive. Of late the modernization theory has been resuscitated, strangely enough by certain Marxists who claim that capitalism has not underdeveloped the developing countries. On the contrary, it can and does develop underdeveloped countries. This position was first and vigorously put forward by Bill Warren in his Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism in which the essentials of the modernization theory are presented in Marxist terms. He uses selective examples from South-East Asia to try and demonstrate his case. In Africa, Goran Hyden has been perhaps the most foremost defender of this position. His work Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania is a serious indictment of Tanzania's development strategy which he regards as premature and wrong. His subsequent work states the same position. At present there is no dominant paradigm and development theory is in a state of limbo. What is important is to develop a holistic approach to the problem which will combine useful insights from different paradigms—always bearing in mind the need to regard the peace and development problematics as inseparable.

Peace and Development: The African Perspective: A Challenge to Europe

If we are right in what we have been saying so far on the concept of peace, the intricate relationship between peace and development, and the need not only to understand and study the peace problematic but to put it into practice, and the recognition that peace in one corner of the world is related to peace in another corner of the world, the next question becomes, what is Europe’s response to the peace and development problematic of Africa? It would be presumptuous for us to tell Europe and the United States what they should do. But we have the right to state what we expect if our assumption of a common humanity and destiny and universal desire for the collective peace and development of the world is correct. We ask for a greater degree of commitment and support for the demands of the Third World—particularly in the form of the creation of a New International Economic Order. Limited though the proposals are, they are steps in the right direction. The Third World has also made demands for a change in the international power system. We have lately seen the emergence of what we might call the New Right. The leading figures of this are President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl. Their attitudes towards Africa and the Third World are marked by contemptuous arrogance and belligerence. This does not augur well for the prospects for world peace. These leaders have been in the forefront of the drive to intensify the compradorization of Africa and the Third World. These trends must be reversed and the strong support for the collective efforts of Africa and the Third World contained in the Brandt Report is the minimum we should expect from Europe and the United States.

We have argued that of all the areas of conflict in Africa, South Africa poses the most serious threat not only to the peace of the area but to the continent as a whole and consequently to the world. South Africa has been engaged in a protracted struggle to destabilize the economies and governments of its neighbours, particularly Angola, Mozambique and now even Botswana. This is for no other reason than that South Africa cannot tolerate the existence of an African state close to its border which is sufficiently independent-minded, economically successful and nationalistic to provide inspiration and moral and material support to the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. South Africa has extensive military, political and economic links with the Western countries and the United States. We would like progressive opinion to be brought to bear on South Africa to abandon its path of destruction and violence.

Africa has been heartened by the kind of public response which was aroused in Europe in response to the famine appeal. Millions of pounds were collected for the victims. While we are grateful for such a show of humanity we would like to see an equal importance attached to efforts by people in these areas to create self-sustaining economies to improve the quality of their lives and become independent; the next time such disasters occur they will then be in a better position to withstand them without international charity.
We have seen how the current crisis in Africa is making even feeble attempts at democratic government a thing of the past. The United States and Western governments have been supporting unashamedly authoritarian governments so long as their so-called leaders offer protection and security for capital. If we regard democratic structures as desirable in themselves and as instrumental for achieving peace and stability then we would expect Europe to support the initiatives, few and limited though they are at the moment, to create democratic structures which will make it possible for the mass of the people to have meaningful control over the political processes which control and guide their lives. This is the only way in which we can ensure peace and development in Africa. If Europe and the United States are truly interested in peace and development in Africa. If Europe and the United States are truly interested in peace these are minimum conditions which could be met without any difficulty.

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**PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES:**
**ORIGINS, DEFINING ISSUES, CURRENT STATUS**
Erin McCandless


Peace studies comprise a field of inquiry with roots in philosophical idealism, which has been developing for more than a century and seeks to help societies learn to become more peaceable. Conflict studies—based initially on inquiries into industrial disputes—has emerged more recently as a sub-discipline of peace studies. For the sake of simplicity, these two areas are often conflated as peace and conflict studies. In Africa, peace and conflict studies constitute a new area of institutionalised study, although some elements of the field have been developing for decades in the social sciences. Because of its relatively young status, there remains work to be done in shedding characterisations of ‘woolliness’ that often accompanies new disciplines. Debates on whether peace and conflict studies constitute a field, a discipline, or merely an approach have been for the most part inconclusive. Nevertheless, considerable consensus exists concerning certain of its attributes. For example, it is interdisciplinary, policy oriented, and maintains a normative commitment to certain values.

There is certainly room for and merit in making the case that peace and conflict studies constitutes a ‘discipline’. It has literatures, theories, and academic journals. Galtung (1996:9) has argued that peace studies—which for him involves the study of peace and conflict—is an applied social science because it focuses on human beings in a social setting and has an explicit value orientation. He articulates three epistemological branches of peace studies that illustrate the richness and diverse nature of the discipline:

- **empirical peace studies**: based on empiricism and referred to as mainstream, or traditional, social science, which is the systematic comparison of theories with empirical reality;
- **critical peace studies**: based on criticism, taking explicit stands with respect to data and values with reference to the future particularly in terms of policy; and
- **constructive peace studies**: based on constructivism, the systematic comparison of theories with values.

Traditionalists maintain that an empirical or mainstream scientific approach is the only ‘real’ or truly legitimate form of research, but Galtung argues that empirical peace studies, although indispensable, is not the final product. Rather, it is ‘only the beginning of a complex process, much more difficult than empirical studies alone’ (1996:9-11).
Some have pointed to limitations in the professionalisation of peace and conflict studies, because, for example, it has yet to be fully accepted by the public; there are few advanced university degrees and low pay surrounding its services. This is, however, debatable. With increasing numbers of university programmes, research institutes, as well as non-governmental and intergovernmental programmes focusing on its issues come increasing opportunities, expanded practices, and societal acceptance.

Origins

Scandinavian universities introduced peace studies in the nineteenth century. The field of conflict resolution moved onto maps in the 1960s, as scholars in the United States cohered around the study of conflict, in particular offering a critique of simplistic power politics in international relations. Industrial organisational theory and practice formed its conceptual roots, and it incorporated human relations theories from social psychology. Great hope was placed in science to identify conflict causes. Peace studies reached its stride in the 1970s in Scandinavia, led by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, or PRIO. Research focused alternatively on issues of social justice, equitable development, the threat of nuclear war, and the arms race (Ryan 2003:76; McCandless and Schwoebel 2002).

The 1970s and early 1980s saw an expansion in the field internationally, with a strong focus on problem-solving workshops; an emphasis on practice also developed. Conflict came to be perceived as a natural, productive force for change, requiring skills to ensure win-win solutions. Coherent use of nonviolent struggle as a strategy and the emergence of feminism reflected areas of knowledge anchored in the U.S. civil rights movement. Kriesberg (2001) considers the period since 1985 as one of institutionalisation, with the growth of university programmes, journals, and UN interventions reflecting engagement with the field. Peace and conflict studies also became involved in examining challenges rooted in questions of how knowledge is created and for and by whom.

In general, the 1990s saw a growing optimism about the possibilities for conflict resolution, fuelled by a succession of nonviolent revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the spread of democracy, as well as the end of apartheid in South Africa. The UN’s 1992 Agenda for Peace and seeming movement on various internal and international conflicts stimulated interest in the range of approaches for addressing conflict, from resolution to transformation and prevention and with a strong focus on the role of third parties. This period also brought a vast expansion in professional bodies related to conflict and peace, including the establishment of some 300 research institutes, the launch of journals, and the proliferation of university programmes and courses worldwide (Ryan 2003:77).

The study of peace and conflict studies got a late start in Africa, with its development stifled by intolerance towards it as a field of study. Governments tended to view peace and conflict research as a neocolonial project to keep Africa weak and divided (Osaghae 2001:13). By the latter half of the 1980s and 1990s, however, Africa experienced the wider global trend of expansion of interest in and attention to issues of peace and conflict. Governmental and non-governmental institutions arose along with study groups and research networks in many parts of the continent. South Africa accounted for perhaps 60 or 70 per cent of such activity. Of note, CODESRIA arose in the 1990s as the first major centre for the study of conflict, in particular ethnic conflict, on the continent.

Core field definition and distinction issues

Core issues have dominated the focus of researchers’ study in Africa and the rest of the world. All students of peace and conflict studies should familiarise themselves with research and practice related to core issues for peace and conflict studies. The most basic of these are what peace is, the causes of conflict, and the means for resolving conflict. Part of the uniqueness of peace and conflict studies is that its core questions have been considered and reflected upon by philosophers, practitioners, policy makers, and society
at large—outside the formal halls of academia—all of whom have helped to enrich the debates and make them more real.

What is peace? This is a question that far predates the field, occupying the minds of many of the world’s great philosophers and social leaders, including Kant, Hobbes, Locke, Gandhi, Thich Nhat Hanh, and the Dalai Lama. Hansen (1988) has argued that while state systems of most countries in the world claim the desirability of peace, there is little agreement about its meaning and how to realise it. The perspective that a group brings to the peace issue, he argues, depends on its history and material conditions as well as the position of the group within the power structure of the national or international system. An African perspective on peace, which is from Hansen’s reading the consensus of a majority of African scholars, is one that ‘makes it possible for the majority of people on this planet to enjoy physical security, a modicum of material prosperity, the satisfaction of the basic needs of human existence, emotional well-being, political efficacy and psychic harmony’ (1988:1).

Hansen, like many African scholars, takes the issue of what is peace to the level of international politics in an effort to make it an empirical reality. He points to the unashamed support of Western governments for authoritarian leaders so long as they offer protection and security for capital. If democracy, as Western leaders argue, is inimical to peace, then it is expected that they support democratic structures and processes so that the mass of people have meaningful control over the processes that guide their lives.

Cause of conflict theories generally fall within two broad categories: a combination of social and psychological matters or issues related to structural and political economy. Because Africa has experienced more than its share of violent conflict, the topic has great relevance for improving social conditions there. African scholars have written prolifically on this issue, emphasising ethnic and other identity-related causes of conflict as well as those involving political economies. Although there may be some truth to Osaghae’s (2001:14) argument that radical economists who dominated thinking on the continent from the 1960s to 1980s contributed to a disabling environment for the study of conflict—in particular ethnic conflict, given what they saw as its anthropological and thus colonial roots—it can also be proffered that their thinking brought balance to the debate. Where there seemed to be a preoccupation with ethnic conflict—particularly when talking of Africa—as Hansen (1988) argues, ‘it has often turned out that a conflict apparently caused by ethnic or racial divisions has been nothing more than a conflict between competing élites for the control of state power and consequent access to certain material resources’ (p. 13). Radical economic scholars in Africa today have accepted ethnicity as a factor, interpreting it as a weapon of struggle from below rather than as a mask for class privilege or false consciousness. Osaghae (2001:27) warns of the challenges of maintaining objectivity in research, as scholars are often attracted to study their own ethnic group, raising the possibility of exacerbating the problem they strive to resolve.

Articulation and practice of the third core issue—means of addressing conflict and bringing about peace—is expansive in terms of conflict (from management to resolution and transformation) and peace (peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building). Considerable literatures also exist on other strategies for addressing conflict, including dialogue, the use of nonviolent direct action and grassroots movements for social change, problem-solving workshops, international law, reconciliation and justice, the role of gender, youth, business communities, and religion in peace-building, and the prevention of (violent) conflict. Scholars have theorised on how to manage, resolve, transform, and prevent conflict and build peace. Discussions continue on these matters as violent conflict persists as a social phenomenon. The interplay between theory and practice ensures that the field maintain an ongoing dialogue on the critical issues facing practitioners, activists, policy makers, and parties to and victims of conflict.

As the study of peace and conflict develops on the African continent, it is clear that the same field definitional and distinction issues lie at its driving core as in other areas. As Hansen (1988) notes, they only manifest differently because of Africa’s particular social,
economic, and political contexts. Concerns for peace are intimately tied to development, unlike the initial preoccupation in the northern hemisphere with removing the threat of nuclear war. African visions of peace usually involve reference to societal relationships in harmony. Causes of conflict reflect the continent’s driving concerns: land and natural resources, the role of the military in fomenting political instability, and the issues of identity and ethnicity. They continue to relate particularly to the colonial division of borders and manipulation of ethnic identity to serve colonial interests. Means of addressing conflict and achieving peace can draw upon traditional African values and beliefs or on the need for security sector reform or transformation. African concerns in this area usually prioritise reconciliation to address broken relationships and the need for human development to address the challenge of vastly uneven development.

Relevancy for policy, practice, and improving Africa’s social condition

Peace and conflict studies have clear areas of research distinction. Unlike international relations, the field is not mandate-constrained to avoid study of internal (rather than interstate) conflicts, which constitute the majority of conflicts today. Being multidisciplinary, it has been able to bring to bear the strengths of many disciplines in identifying causes of conflict as well as means for resolution. This makes sense, given the complex nature of contemporary internal conflicts, which inevitably have economic, political, psychological, historical, cultural, environmental, religious, ethnic, and racial dimensions.

Given the strong normative element in peace studies—people usually study peace and conflict because they want to contribute to making a more peaceful world—the discipline is also not constrained by a limited purpose that defines more traditional fields and approaches, that is, research for the sake of research, rather than research for action. Peace and conflict studies are highly practice oriented and policy focused and have experienced considerable ‘success’ if the criteria includes seeing its concepts, theories, and proposed methods and practices put into action. For example, an examination of the work of the United Nations reveals clear changes in discourse backed by changes in the nature of collective intervention over the years. Of interest, these have occurred more at the subnational and international levels than at the governmental or interstate levels, probably because of the dominance of international relations within this sphere.

In Africa more work is needed to ensure that peace and conflict research becomes more relevant to policy. For starters, the policy process in developing countries generally is hampered by unrealistic goals, reactive and emergency rather than proactive and comprehensive objectives, a dearth of relevant data, reliance on foreign expertise, and poor implementation and feedback and evaluation strategies (Osaghae 2001:25). A key contributor to these problems is the disconnect between research output and policy-making structures. When a connexion does exist, it more often than not stems from the research of influential donors rather than from independent studies. In addition, the lack of prestige of institutes researching conflict can affect policy in many African countries. Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa, however, are exceptions to this norm, as one finds a plethora of institutes and think tanks on conflict- and peace-related issues that influence not only national policy, but regional and subregional policy as well.

The United Nations has engaged in the search for causes of conflict and means for peace, ensuring a strong theory-practice-policy linkage. In numerous reports, briefings, and statements, Secretary-General Kofi Annan served developing countries well by linking the need for peace with development. Although analysis stemming from the United Nations commonly recognises the place of political economy in conflict, responses have been fragmented and disconnected rather than integrated. This reflects the United Nations’ mandate concerning intervention in conflict areas in which those bringing peace are still predominantly military (peacekeepers) and political (peacemakers) rather than in the business of peace-building. At the same time, few would argue that the most sustainable solutions to Africa’s conflicts and search for peace must be African owned and globally supported. Research has a profound contribution to make in this effort.
EMERGENCE OF PEACE-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARSHIP AND PRACTICE
Erin McCandless

As secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali famously stated, ‘There can be no peace without economic and social development, just as development is not possible in the absence of peace.’ Peace-building and development—a new subfield of peace and conflict studies—is taking shape based on such thinking. It has strong roots in Africa and implications for the production of policy- and practice-relevant research.

Development studies emerged from colonial studies, but the field of peace-building has more diverse parentage. In the 1970s, the peace philosopher Johan Galtung (1976), distinguished ‘peace-building’ from ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacemaking’. Peace-building was put into operation by the United Nations in Namibia in 1978. Although conceptual debates continue to surround its meaning, ‘peace-building’ is generally acknowledged as the building of positive peace, that is, the institutionalising of justice and freedom, addressing the root causes of conflict to stave off a return to war (Miller 2005; Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 1997). Scholarship, practice, policy-making, and programming in the area of peace-building and development have arisen in response to the compelling recognition that conflict and development are deeply intertwined, and consequently, so are the building of sustainable peace and human development. Ethnicity and identity conflicts were the hallmark of much of the conflict and peace scholarship of the 1990s, but today a great deal of attention focuses on the role of economic interests in conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Berdal and Malone 2000). Some researchers are examining such economic factors as the role of greed on the part of certain individuals and groups who may take a country to war or keep it at war for personal gain. Societal or group grievances, many of which involve economic and political disenfranchisement and uneven access or benefit, are also factors worthy of study. In recent decades, it has been increasingly apparent that peace agreements often fail when rooted in traditional settlement approaches in which elites broker agreements. The approaches advocated in peace-building seek to address the root causes of conflict. They are more likely to focus on the attitudes and socioeconomic circumstances of the people who are affected by war and who will build the peace. These are more suited for addressing contemporary conflicts and thus more likely to assist in sustaining peace (McCandless and Schwoebel 2002; Curle 1990). Although such realisations have been influential at policy levels, scholars have led in the articulation of peace-building as a concept and have extensively examined it in theory and practice (Galtung 1976; Lederach 1997; Reychler and Paffenholtz 2001), in tandem with the United Nations and other institutional centres (see the documents on peace-building, pp. 227–29).

From the development perspective, scholarship intertwined with and rooted in policy and programme analysis and evaluation of impact illustrates similarly the essential interconnections of development with conflict and peace. Development practitioners have over the last decade increasingly recognised that they simply cannot ‘do’ development or that development will not substantively occur unless there is peace. Indeed, the United Nations Development Programme’s (2005) estimation that twenty-two of the twenty-four countries furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are affected by current or recent conflicts is testimony to this insight. In a reflective trend perhaps more characteristic of the past decade, many development practitioners have looked at their own role in perpetuating conflict and asked themselves how they can ‘do no harm’ or ‘do’ development with a sensitivity to conflict (Anderson 1996; Gaigals and Leonhardt 2000).

The African continent has contributed greatly to debates on the role of economic policy in undermining human development and generally creating conditions for unrest. Following a decade or two of structural adjustment policies in many African countries,
strong critiques began to emerge of this approach. The observation was advanced that although Western-style democracy stood as a goal of the political and public domain, the growth models relying on private ownership and pursuit of macroeconomic variables operated in a highly undemocratic manner, privileging the interests of those engaged in export and international trade. Such priorities often came at the expense of civil and political liberties and self-government, while fuelling intense social and economic inequality and violent conflict (Olukoshi 1993; Onimode 1989; Adedeji 1997; Adjibolosoo 1995; Cheru 1999, 2000; Sachikonye 1995; Adekanya 1995).

Throughout the 1990s, scholars were at the forefront of elaborating concepts of human development or human sustainable development, often parallel to or in collaboration with UN agencies (Ul Haq 1995; UNDP and the Poverty Reduction Forum 1998; Adjibolosoo 1995; Cheru 1999). Ul Haq (1995) describes human sustainable development as a process in which economic, fiscal, trade, energy, agricultural, industrial and all other policies are consciously designed to bring about economically, socially, and ecologically sustainable development. Human development is now defined by the UNDP as ‘a complex concept of development, based on the priority of human well-being, and aimed at ensuring and enlarging human choices which lead to equality of opportunities for all people in society and empowerment of people so that they participate in—and benefit from—the development process’. Civic groups in Zimbabwe have sought to use this concept as a way of addressing and re-prioritising economic and political power relations at national and international levels (UNDP and the Poverty Reduction Forum 1998).

More than twenty programmes can be easily found on the Internet that link peace-building and development and were founded in the last decade. They respond to the need to analyse rigorously and routinely the issues of human development in an integrated manner, and with an eye towards developing joint conceptual and practical programmes and strategies. Most of the new academic programmes examining these linkages are at the master's level, indicating the professionalisation of the subfield of peace-building and development and its orientation towards practitioners and policy makers. These programmes are concentrated in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, there are hundreds of peace and conflict resolution programmes globally, and many more hundreds, if not thousands, of social and political science programmes that offer courses in these subjects. In Africa alone, some twenty-five centres of peace and conflict studies now exist. New academic journals, such as the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development and Conflict, Security and Development, link the fields of peace and conflict studies or security with development. Of some two hundred academic journals in Africa, perhaps half fall broadly within the social sciences, as opposed to the hard sciences, and regularly touch on issues of peace and conflict studies. A fair and arguably increasing amount of attention is being paid to development-oriented issues in peace journals and to peace-oriented issues in development journals.

Policy and programme interest in the peace-building and development subfield, which descends from development studies and peace and conflict studies, is evident at institutions that have historically addressed peace and is reflected in those that have traditionally addressed development. The United Nations, through its myriad agencies, commissions, and programmes, has moved over the last decade to differentiate peace-building as a concept distinct from peacemaking and peacekeeping, illustrating its acceptance of peace-building as a process necessary to sustain peace. Sealing its commitment to a discrete area of endeavour worthy of human and material resources is the new UN Peacebuilding Commission, with the mandate to ‘marshal resources at the disposal of the international community to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict’. While peace-building embraces sensitivity for and commitment to ingredients of human development within its scope in multiple ways, the differences and thus necessary critical linkages to development are also recognised. United Nations peacekeeping missions, for example, work hand in hand with the United Nations country team—the diverse UN agencies that focus on a range of humanitarian and developmental issues in a given country—to bring it from war to sustained peace.
On the development side, during the last decade much work has been done by development agencies and NGOs to integrate peace-building and conflict programming into their work. Examples include the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit and similar programmes within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and such international NGOs as CARE, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, and countless NGOs in Africa. Scholars and practitioners are working with development agencies to advance the thinking and practice of conducting peace and conflict impact assessments and developing analytical and practical strategies for embarking on conflict-sensitive development. ‘Conflict sensitivity’ is defined by peace-building and humanitarian organisations (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response et al. 2004) as ‘the capacity of an organisation to understand the [conflict] context in which it operates; understand the interaction between its operations and the [conflict] context; and to act on the understanding of this interaction to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the [conflict] context and the intervention’. The UNDP is now making the link with development even more specific as it develops conceptual frameworks around conflict development analysis (CDA) and peace and conflict-related development analysis (PCDA). As a guide for the UNDP, other UN agencies, and their local counterparts, CDA builds upon understanding causes of conflict and its dynamics with a focus on examining the effects of development policies and activities with the goal of strengthening conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming. The UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery further links issues of peace-building, conflict prevention, security, and development through a variety of programmes, such as those examining trading arms for the development of communities in Liberia or removing land mines to facilitate development in Angola.

Growth in the study of natural resources in conflict illustrates the increasing interest in scholarship that links policy and practice. Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have suffered from devastating wars spanning decades and borders in part because of the abundance of badly managed and violently sought after natural resources. The role of natural resources in causing or perpetuating conflict—part of the broader inquiry of scholarship into economic interests in conflict and within the ‘war economies’ literature—has spawned intense scholarly debate, eliciting active participation from research and policy institutes, NGOs, and the World Bank (Herbst 2000; Ballentine and Nitzchke 2003; Cilliers and Dietrich 2000; Renner 2002). This issue has led to the development of international mechanisms to respond to the role of natural resources in conflict. International third-party sanctions on timber and diamonds, for example, have been a key element of the United Nations’ peacekeeping strategy in Liberia. At the global level, the Kimberley process, launched in 2002, requires governments and the diamond industry to verify the origin of diamonds to prevent ‘conflict diamonds’—those mined in war zones and sold clandestinely to finance an insurgent or invading army’s war efforts5—from reaching markets. As in the case of the Kimberley process, scholars have provided case study analyses, statistics, and contributed to elaborating strategies and frameworks that have been adopted at policy and programme levels (though critics complain of ineffectiveness and loopholes that remain to be closed) (Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada 2004a, 2004b).

The strength of this emerging, integrated subfield of peace-building and development is its foundation in scholarship and practice driven by the need to understand, reflect upon, and develop coherent responses to real issues as they arise. Some have asserted that peace studies do not constitute a coherent field or discipline in terms of theory and methods, yet there is no body of theory and analytical technique shown to be the correct way of solving problems. Fuller (1992:100) notes that this is stating the obvious: an interdisciplinary endeavour cannot constitute a coherent field in the same way that a more traditional discipline can. As a subfield of peace studies, peace-building and development faces a further challenge in bringing together two interdisciplinary fields with a view toward integrated analysis and application. Scholarly scepticism and rigidity should not deter scholars who wish to apply themselves to fields that critically embrace more than one discipline if their aim is to address complex, multifaceted problems that are, frankly,
the norm in international politics and development. Those who choose this field have natural partners in policy and practice who demand that scholarship support their endeavours to respond to integrated peace-building and development challenges with suitably sophisticated and thoughtful analyses.

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**SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR CONCEPTS**
Erin McCandless

Excerpted from Erin McCandless and Abdul Karim Bangura, Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology, ed. Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall (Addis Ababa, UPEACE Africa Programme, 2007), 100, 101

Concepts are categories through which people construct meaning and communicate. As such, they are essential tools for conducting research and communicating findings. According to conflict scholar James Laue (1990), ‘there cannot be communication between different approaches, or with policy makers and the public generally, until there is a precisely defined language and appropriate concepts that enable a clear differentiation of the various approaches, and an adequate and agreed theory of human behaviours at all social levels’ (p. 257). The real power of concepts, however, lies in the values and intentions embedded in them. Sharoni (2000) states that ‘these terms and the distinctions between them [are] grounded in explicit or implicit assumptions about the role of power, culture, and other modalities of identity in conflict resolution’ (p. 3). Hence, battles over concepts and the frameworks in which they are situated can never be simply ‘academic’; they have profound political, policy, and practice implications.

Studying and working for peace entails some engagement with its conceptual opposite: conflict. Conflict concepts inevitably allude to assumptions about their causes. Although peace and conflict researchers’ historical debates, most emanating from the North, have focused on root causes as deriving from conflicting positions, interests, and needs, it is usually the case that explanations of conflict fall into one of two broad categories: a combination of social and psychological or structural and political economy. In explaining conflicts in the South, the former grew from organisational behavioural theories of conflict and more recently has gravitated towards theories of ethnic and identity conflicts. In the 1970s, some scholars, including Johan Galtung, espoused structural explanations of conflict and drew on Marxist thinking. Such thinking was re-popularised in the 1990s through international political economy (IPE) analyses of conflict and war. In the identity and political economy scholarship, derogatory strains of thinking have emerged that negatively characterise Africa and, more generally, the South. Defining conflicts solely as ‘ethnic’ or ‘identity’ has led to assumptions of innate irrationality and primordial instincts of Africans as the cause of violent behaviour and intractable conflict. IPE theories were driven by ‘greed versus grievance’ debates, in which greed proponents painted rebelling southern actors as rational but greedy, rather than actors having legitimate grievances rooted in unmet needs. Structural arguments, while critically pointing attention towards the role of the international economic system in generating violent structures that induce conflict, have tended to be deterministic, omitting the relational and transactional elements so important in catalysing transformation. In Africa, the prevalence of violent conflict and its severe implications for destroying foundations of human development have created an urgent need for concepts that can effectively capture and speak to the complex, prevailing challenges. Edward Azar’s protracted social conflict theory and the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) network’s notion of complex humanitarian emergencies aim to do just this.

In addition to giving a preference to concepts of conflict that comprehensively embrace social and psychological as well as political economy notions of conflict and complementary notions of peace, this volume gives more weight to complementary notions of how
to create, generate, and foster the emergence and sustenance of peace—rather than those aimed at simply ‘managing’ conflict. Concepts such as peace-building and conflict transformation stand more in line with Africa’s interests and needs, a preference widely postulated and confirmed in the Dakar workshop.

Efforts to conceptualize peace have for decades centred around enriching or elaborating upon Galtung’s negative peace (the absence of direct violence, especially violent conflict or war) and positive peace (the absence of structural violence and the presence of social justice). Although the majority of non-specialists understand peace in the ‘negative’ sense, peace specialists endeavour to describe and work towards positive peace. Hansen (1988:4) has emphasized the utility of the latter for Africa: ‘For us in Africa the minimal condition of peace, conceptualized as merely the removal, resolution or as it is sometimes less defensibly called, management of conflict, which leaves the social and material conditions which cause tension and lead to conflict intact, is unacceptable. . . . From this point of view it should be obvious why we in Africa perceive programmes of food security as more relevant to our immediate problematic than the star wars programme of [former U.S.] President Reagan’.

The movement towards defining and realising positive peace became deeply intertwined with growing protest from developing countries against colonialism and other forms of injustice. Galtung captured this sentiment with the formulation of positive peace, along with the concept of structural violence, which cogently speaks to a depressing reality. Structural violence describes the situation in which massive death and injury result from structured inequalities in social systems, from human inaction as well as from intended acts of bloodshed and violence. Thus the peace agenda began to shift from one dominated by Western male thinkers concerned with superpower planning and interests of the industrialised world to one centred on the interests of the peoples of the developing world, including women and marginalised minorities. This moved the focus to realising a peace embedded in development and justice (Fuller 1992; Galtung 1969).

Conceptions of positive peace and structural violence may, however, raise more questions than they answer. Positive peace is achieved when structural violence ceases to exist, or according to Galtung, when the gap between human potential and what human beings actually realise is bridged, the size of the gap being a measure of the level of ‘violence’. This is a complicated notion for a variety of reasons, among them the fact that human beings have a potential for violence. Although the concept of structural violence certainly has political utility in raising consciousness about realities in developing countries, it creates conceptual confusion by describing all acts of social injustice, which may include trivial incidents, as acts of violence (Fuller 1992:93). While such controversies do not, and should not, legitimize dismissing or downgrading the study of positive peace, they certainly pose challenges.

The movement towards more conservative politics, or neoconservative politics, and a preoccupation with the ‘war on terror’ and other foreign policy interests of the so-called advanced industrialized countries present other questions. Much scholarship and related research funding now focus on these issues, disassociating further from the interests of the southern hemisphere as well as those of social movements seeking justice at a time when engagement is needed most.

Two parallel discourses and related practices addressing conflict and peace have emerged that share value orientation and aim. Both emerged to some degree in reaction to international relations theories and related state practices of realpolitik, which prioritised the pursuit of national interests and the exercise of economic and military power; security was pursued through deterrence, the threat of force, and the balancing of power. Although such thinking and related practice still prevail among many theorists and leaders internationally, the 1970s also brought forth new ideas about the interdependence of states, and with it, increased international intervention in civil wars, particularly when involving large-scale human rights and humanitarian issues. Proponents of such new thinking pointed to interests more negotiable than zero-sum bargaining positions, in
which one side’s gain necessitates another side’s loss in a competitive process with finite ends (McCandless and Schwoebel 2002:455).

The corresponding fields of peace studies and conflict resolution grew and gave birth to counterpart concepts, from conflict ‘settlement’ to ‘management’ to ‘resolution’ to ‘transformation’ on the one hand and ‘peacekeeping’ to ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peace-building’ on the other. Both areas of study have adopted the language of prevention and reflect a range of concepts intertwined with conservative and realist values and expectations at one end while moving towards comprehensive, relational, and societally embedded notions of transformation or peace on the other. In general, skilled practitioners of conflict conciliation and mediation methods often identify with one definition or school of thought. The United Nations, however, has applied the language of peace to a set of tools or approaches with related projects, all of which are recognised as important and complementary components of bringing a country from war to peace.

Within both fields, however, a growing appreciation for conflict transformation on the one hand and peace-building on the other is noticeable over the last decade. This has translated into new thinking, policies, and practices, while arguably harking back to sensible studies by 1970s peace researchers and activists, particularly from the southern hemisphere, who appreciated and fully comprehended that peace had to be more than an absence of direct violence. Unless and until ‘settlements’ are translated into meaningful, practical changes that address the root causes of war or violent conflict, it is unlikely that the ‘peace’ will be sustained. This fact has increasingly been realized with the trail of broken peace agreements and return to warfare across the African continent and beyond, leading to a recognition of the need for new processes to take into consideration broad new issues.

The need also existed for novel tools to address the contemporary face of war, which usually involves civilian targets and casualties, attacks on humanitarian personnel, child soldiers and victims, vast numbers of internally displaced people and refugees, hands-on violence, less adherence to rules of engagement, and rampant use of land mines. Peace-building, much like its counterpart, conflict transformation, focuses on the context of a conflict, that is, the attitudes, relationships, transactions, and socioeconomic circumstances of the people affected by war and those who will build the peace. This contrasts starkly with approaches that simply focus on the military, the warlords, and the parties that divide them. Such approaches consider the multitude of processes and actors required to transform conflict and build and sustain an agreement (McCandless and Schwoebel 2002:457).

Although conflict transformation has faced challenges in producing agreement around its meaning, considerable consensus exists concerning the building blocks that define it. A review of the literature on transformation of conflict reveals the following common characteristics:

- it is a relational and transactional process and course of action;
- it embraces the idea of transcendence, going beyond the contradictions that cause a dispute by making the conflict more manageable;
- it seeks to transform structures and bring about systemic change;
- it favours the ‘underdog’;
- it develops within particular cultures and draws upon cultural resources;
- it requires ownership of the process at all levels by the participants and stakeholders;
- it emphasizes the role of economics and development issues;
- it stresses the role of identity issues;
- it seeks to address directly past and present injustices, grievances, and traumas;
- it requires the participation of communities and sectors at all levels in the design of peaceful social, economic, and political processes and institutions; and it emphasises the development of nonviolent conflict transformation and prevention mechanisms.

(McCandless n.d.)
Aids for understanding selected concepts from the peace and conflict literature follow, covering concepts of conflict, structural violence, and a range of efforts for resolving conflicts and building peace. ‘Primary Postcolonial Development Models’ encapsulates development approaches, or paradigms. ‘Typology of Paradigms: Development and Conflict’ readily discloses intersections of conflict with development. The first is offered because peace-building, conflict transformation, and the related notion of conflict prevention are intricately linked with human development. The parallel crises of conflict and development on the African continent, the interconnectedness of these concepts, and thus the need to address peace-building and human development as inextricably intertwined help to build conceptual and comparative awareness, an imperative for scholars, practitioners, and policy makers in Africa to be effective. Although northern researchers are responsible for the bulk of published scholarship on peace and conflict resolution, much of the salient scholarship within the broadly defined area of human development has originated among Africans (see Adedeji 1997; Adjibolosoo 1995; Cheru 1999, 2000; Sachikonye 1995), thus providing a critical link to and perhaps a starting point for new African peace research and practice.

CONCEPTS FROM THE PEACE AND CONFLICT LITERATURE

Peace-Related Concepts

The following are commonly used concepts and understandings of peace, followed by a selection of definitions from the African context.

Commonly Used Peace Concepts

Negative peace: The absence of war and physical violence. The concept is held generally at the political level.

Positive peace: The presence of peaceful, just structures and relations, with reduced levels of or ideally an absence of physical and structural violence. This state is defined positively as the presence of social justice and is connected to the analysis and practice of social and economic development. More recent interpretations of this concept include aspects of the ‘good society’: universal rights, economic well-being, ecological balance, and other core values (Galtung 1969; elaborated by Fisher et al. 2000). Sometimes referred to as sustainable peace (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001). . . .

African Conceptions of Peace

Peace is measured by the well-being of the individual and his or her community. This is gauged by physical, material, and spiritual considerations. Conceptions of peace vary from people to people. A few examples follow:

• Ubuntu: ‘An endogenous philosophical perspective of South African peoples that connotes a collective responsibility among human beings to distribute naturally and spiritually the life force for common benefit. The term stems from ntu, “the life force that causes things to happen”, in the Bantu family of languages. Literally translated, ubuntu means “collective personhood”. Its meaning is captured by the Nguni proverb “umuntu ngu-muntu ngabantu” (I am because we are). In other words, human nature can only be realised through relationships with others. The ubuntu spirit is also based on a union of opposites that while maintaining their inherent contradictions are not exclusive, creating a unified and interconnected conception of human existence. A sense of collective solidarity characterizes ubuntu’. (Miller 2005:77)

• A concept of peace that Africans can ‘defend and justify makes it possible for the majority of people on this planet to enjoy physical security, a modicum of material prosperity, the satisfaction of basic needs of human existence, emotional well-being, political efficacy and psychic harmony’. (Hansen 1988:1)
• The African perspective sees peace and development as intimately related: it sees peace not only as the resolution of conflict but as the transformation of extant social systems at both national and international levels. It is a concept which relates peace to the physical, social and existential needs of people. (Hansen 1988:7)

• The question of peace cannot be separated from the question of the struggle for social and democratic rights and for human dignity. In other words the peace problematic is not unrelated to the issue of extant social and political conditions and the distribution of power. (Hansen 1988:3)

• ‘In Zimbabwean languages there are many words for peace. The Zimbabwean concept of peace includes calm, harmonious relationships, and mutual understanding and compassion.’ (Africa Community Publishing and Development 2002:9)

CONFLICT-RELATED CONCEPTS

Below are a range of conflict definitions used by international scholars and practitioners, including Africans.

• ‘Conflict is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon which is an integral feature of human existence, essential to the ongoing processes of history, to social change, and transformation. . . . Conflicts arise because of a perceived incompatibility over material or symbolic resources.’ (International Alert 1996:3–4)

• ‘A struggle, between individuals or collectivities, over value or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals: Social conflict is not only ‘negative’ in the sense of tearing apart; social conflict ‘may contribute to the maintenance of group boundaries and prevent the withdrawal of members from a group.’ (Coser 1956:8)

• Conflict also has a positive dimension as ‘normal forms of social interaction which may contribute to the maintenance, development, change and overall stability of social entities. . . . [thus] it is only a problem when society cannot represent, manage, or resolve its different interests in a productive manner, thus initiating a degenerative or destructive cycle of physical violence’ (Kapila n.d.). Therefore, in the case of actors seeking to reduce human suffering or improve the human condition ‘their aim is not to prevent conflict (infeasible and often undesirable), but to reduce the likelihood of specific conflicts becoming, or continuing to be, physically violent’. (Goodhand and Hulme 1999:14)

• ‘Conflicts arise from human relations in two principle ways: first, individuals or groups of individuals have different values, needs and interests; and, second, most resources are not available in unlimited quantities and so access to them must be controlled and fought for.’ (Toure 1999:23)

• ‘Conflict means a struggle (physical or verbal, or emotional). It is a clash between diametrically opposing forces. It is, also, a state of non-agreement between persons that could end up in violence. In general, conflict is a negation to harmonious co-existence of a people. . . . The management of such cases is always community based, rather than being referred to some constitutionally, or ideologically, or philosophically power based groups.’ (Koka and Gumbi n.d.:2)

Theoretical Perspectives for Defining and Understanding Conflict

Cause-of-conflict theories often fall within two broad categories: a combination of social and psychological matters or issues related to structural and political economy. There are many theorists and numerous schools of thought that contribute to these two broad categories, some of which are highlighted here.

Agency: Social and Psychological

Theories that fall into this diverse category locate conflict causes at the level of individual or collective agency, based on human behaviour (International Alert 1996: part
2:5). They highlight perceptions and misperceptions as causes of conflict. Different perspectives variously argue the following:

- Aggressive behaviour is innate and biologically programmed in the human species (e.g., Lorenz 1974).
- The differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ manifests in the psychological need for enemies, representing a psychoanalytic perspective (e.g., Volkan 1988).
- Processes of group formation and differentiation—particularly the role that images, (mis)perceptions, stereotyping, and dehumanisation play in decision making—lead to violent conflict, representing a psycho-social perspective (e.g., Bloom 1990).

In the 1990s ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘identity conflict’ became commonly used concepts to describe many conflicts in Africa, drawing on several of these theories. African scholars have been at the forefront of rejecting reducing conflicts in this way (i.e., Adedeji 1997, Hansen 1988).

Structural and Political Economy

This category involves explanations that assume that the organisation of society itself creates the causes of and conditions for conflict. Such approaches focus on the general forces and dynamics at play. Galtung’s structural violence illustrates an early example of this orientation, where unequal social structures produce unequal access to resources for different social groups. Structural theories have experienced a resurgence in the 1990s in the international political economy (IPE) and war economy literatures. IPE challenges neoliberal economic theory, maintaining that global political and economic processes contribute to systemic conflict (Duffield 1998; Keen 1997; de Waal 1996). IPE elaborates the functions of conflict for different actors and considers who benefits from war, as well as the internal socioeconomic and political processes underpinning complex humanitarian emergencies and the ways in which societies are re-ordered in the process (Goodhand and Hulme 1999).

Conflict-Related Concepts Balancing the Two General Perspectives

Protracted social conflict (PSC), a concept advanced by Edward Azar, focuses on religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identity. PSCs are dependent upon the satisfaction of basic (developmental) needs, such as security, communal recognition, and ‘distributive justice’. Long-term unmet psycho-political and socioeconomic needs lead to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the use of force. Causes of PSCs include the following:

- communal content, that is, a generic reference to politicized groups, whose members share an ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural ‘identity’ characteristic;
- deprivation of human needs, that is, the lack of physical security, access to political and social institutions, and acceptance of communal identity, which is largely a result of social, political, and economic interactions;
- the state and governance, that is, the role of these in ‘engendering or preventing protracted social conflict by depriving or satisfying basic needs’;
- international linkages, that is, such linkages as economic dependency within the international economic system along with political and military client relationships with strong states, whereby the patron provides protection in return for the client’s loyalty.

PSCs are usually in developing countries, where the situation is worsened by extreme poverty, which creates demoralized and under-resourced populations. This often incapacitates individuals from being able to solve problems effectively. Rapid growth-oriented economic development strategies exacerbate the problems, increasing poverty, inequality, and duality between modern and traditional sectors, and marginalisation. This convergence contributes to patterns of communal discrimination and has the effect of protracting social conflict (Azar 1990).
Complex political emergencies (CPE) are a descriptive category developed by Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme that provides shorthand expression for many, often dissimilar conflicts that combine the following features:

- They are conflicts within and across state boundaries, making them a hybrid form of conflict that is ‘neither purely inter-state conflict, nor confined within the normal institutionalized rules and procedures of domestic conflict management’.
- They have political origins, and causality; the competition for power and scarce resources is the central dynamic.
- They are protracted in duration, with enduring features mediating against a quick return to ‘normal’ levels of societal physical violence.
- They are characterised by social cleavages encompassing, political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of society, and the lives of the people who are a part of them characterise the conflict;
- They involve predatory social formations, often ethno-nationalist in nature, characterized by strong feelings of loyalty for one group and antipathy towards other social groups within the same state. These groups are often mobilized and manipulated by conflict entrepreneurs and political opportunists. (Goodhand and Hulme 1999:16–17).

**Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution**

The following are widely used throughout the growing fields of peace-building and conflict resolution. The two typologies have many parallels in value orientation, actors involved, and scope.

Commonly Used Definitions

- **Conflict prevention**: aims to prevent outbreaks of violence (minimalist) and to root out structural injustices that may cause conflict (maximalist)
- **Conflict settlement**: aims to end violent conflict through peace agreement (or mediation agreement)
- **Conflict management**: aims to limit escalation or avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioural changes among the parties
- **Conflict resolution**: aims to address causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationships between hostile groups
- **Conflict transformation**: focuses on the relationships and transactions between the parties in the midst of or previously engaged in a given conflict; addresses wider social, economic, and political sources of a conflict; and seeks to transform negative energy and war into positive social change


**UN Terminology and Language**

The following are peace-related terms adopted by the United Nations that have gained widespread usage.

- **Preventive diplomacy (or conflict prevention)**: political and diplomatic activity to reduce the likelihood of a conflict escalating into physical violence
- **Peace-building**: a strategic process involving a synergetic series of actions targeted at addressing the sources of conflict and supporting the structures and capacities for peace; usually includes a variety of institutional and socioeconomic measures, at the local or national level aimed at institutionalising justice, building positive peace
- **Peace-keeping**: provision of monitors or peace-keeping military forces, with consent, to stop violence and monitor a cease-fire, generally to provide a buffer between con-
flicting parties. Can prevent looting of humanitarian assistance, help implement peace agreements by overseeing or observing demobilisation and disarmament, and employ other techniques to monitor compliance with agreements and foster mutual confidence.

• **Peace-making**: political, diplomatic, and sometimes military interventions directed at bringing warring parties to agreement.

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**THE DEVELOPMENT/ PEACEBUILDING NEXUS: A TYPOLOGY AND HISTORY OF CHANGING PARADIGMS**

Peter Uvin


**Abstract**

In the space of one decade, the nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of development thinking and practice. This article presents a typology and critical discussion seven ways in which the development enterprise has conceived of its interactions with conflict and violence. These are:

1. **Rhetorical repackaging**: development by definition promotes peace; (thus, no changes development practice are required—only more of it);
2. **Military conditionality**: donors withdraw aid to punish recipients for their excessive military expenditure or military aggression. In its more positive version, security sector reform assists recipients with reform of their military, police, and judicial systems in ways that improve governance and decrease violence;
3. **The post-conflict agenda**: in countries coming out of war, aid agencies invest in new fields such as justice and reconciliation, demobilization and reintegration, and democratic policing;
4. **The “Do No Harm” approach**: minimize the negative impact of all humanitarian and development assistance under conditions of conflict;
5. **The conflict prevention agenda**: agencies undertake a range of early and preferably coherent and coordinated actions to prevent conflict from turning violent;
6. **The concept of human security**: “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” are inseparable sides of the same coin; and,
7. **The “global system reform” movement**: infuses concerns with development and conflict nexus in all North-South relations of trade, investment, and consumption.

**Introduction**

The development enterprise spent the first three decades of its charmed life in total agnosticism towards matters of conflict and insecurity. When violent conflict occurred it was treated as an unfortunate occurrence, forcing development workers out and humanitarians in—an order to be reversed when the conflict was over and conditions were safe for normal development work to resume. The common dynamics leading up to conflict—inter-group resentment, social polarization, rising intolerance and extremism, militarisation of society, human rights violations, and widespread impunity, to name but a few—were emphatically not part of the development mandate. Practitioners might deplore these matters in private, but did not believe they had to consider the implications of their own work on these dynamics, or explicitly seek to address them (Uvin 1998).

This situation has changed dramatically. Nowadays, the nexus between development and peace is a central focus of development thinking and practice. This metamorphosis reflects four major trends, two of which are related to the end of the Cold War, and two internal to the development enterprise. First, violence and war became much more widespread and visible since 1990. Second, the intellectual and political hegemony of the Western ‘lib-
eral peace model’ became greatly strengthened, opening the door to much wider interventions in the internal dynamics of low-power countries, the list of which grew dramatically (Duffield 2001). At the same time, within the development community; new research demonstrated that insecurity and violence are crucial dimensions of deprivation and poverty (Narayan et al. 2000, Chambers 1995). The tragedy of Rwanda, more than any other, demonstrated to both development and humanitarian actors that ‘normal professionalism,’ even if implemented successfully, could lead to disaster if conflict dynamics were not understood.

This is not to say that there has been no resistance to this shift. Public and nongovernmental donor agencies fear that they will become instruments of, and subservient to, foreign policy and defence establishments should they assume peacebuilding concerns. Multilateral agencies are under pressure from their Third World members to abstain from what is perceived to be an interventionist agenda. Senior aid managers everywhere fear that they lack the competencies and personnel to do this well and worry about the safety of their staff. Still, these are resistances against an overwhelming tide favouring the engagement of development agencies in peacebuilding work.

This article presents a typology and critical discussion of seven ways in which the development enterprise has conceptualized its interactions with conflict and violence, and the kind of practices that have followed from this. They are arranged in order of their degree of departure from the status quo. The levels are more or less chronological, each one building on, or reacting to, the previous. Essentially they provide increasingly radical responses to the question: What ought to be the relationship between development aid and peacebuilding? Beneath this taxonomy run two variables: the first is the extent to which conflict matters are incorporated into the development paradigm, i.e., considered not an external objective that development aid can occasionally be used for, but residing at the very core of the notion of development itself. Second, is the extent to which the development enterprise engages explicitly in the political realm, running counter to the norm of sovereignty and the practice of ‘a-politicalness’ that historically underlie its work. It goes without saying that these categories bleed into each other, and their ranking is artificial. Their separation serves analytical purposes; it is not a descriptive fact.

1. Development Axiomatically Reduces Conflict

The first reflex of many a policy-maker and practitioner when forced to come to grips with matters of peace and violence is to argue that development—improvements in people’s wealth or well-being and, increasingly, governance—by definition promotes peace. Attempts abound to establish rhetorical claims that essentially come down to this point: whatever we are doing in the business of development was a form of conflict prevention or peacebuilding all along, and thus all that is needed is more of the same. This usually boils down to statements that development is the best form of conflict prevention, popular with UN Secretary-Generals as well as heads of aid agencies. One humorous anecdotal statement to this effect comes from the annual US Department of the Treasury report on the IMF (2001:24): ‘in helping to create the conditions for a sound economy, the IMF facilitates the reduction of ethnic and social strife.’

Upon closer inspection, there is scarce secure evidence of a causal relationship between economic development and peace. Stedman (1995) has debunked this assertion on two grounds:

- proponents of conflict prevention suffer from an economic and ecological determinism; a shortage of resources causes violent conflict, therefore the solution is to increase aid. Human decision making conveniently falls out of the equation. Moreover, there is the tacit belief that while underdevelopment induces conflict, development is somehow conflict-free. But this is not the case. Transitions to political democracy and market economies are fraught with conflict,

- Social science doesn’t have that much to tell us about the matter either. Does poverty breed violence? Or are easy opportunities for wealth the problem? Or is inequality the culprit? Or rather impoverishment? Or social exclusion and discrimination? Or increasing assertiveness and self-organisation by marginalised groups (e.g., the beloved empower-
ment)? Scholarly opinions are divided on these matters, and even if there was consensus, the capacity of the aid enterprise to affect these factors with any degree of speed or certainty is exceedingly small.

Ultimately, at some point the combination of significant wealth, social justice, responsive and respectful modes of governance is likely to reduce conflict—but in the meantime, paraphrasing Keynes, we'll all be dead. In addition, where that point lies is not clear, as the examples of El Salvador, Indonesia, Algeria, or Yugoslavia show. In short, the notion that development aid is all that is needed for coping with matters of violence and peace does not stand up to scrutiny.

2. Conditionality

Most people, when they first consider the relationship between development and peace spontaneously think of conditionality. How can donors employ aid resources to put pressure on violence-promoting governments to change their ways? When should donors threaten to cut off development assistance, and when should they execute that threat? To which country shall we threaten the withdrawal of our aid in order to oblige it to stop the violence in which it participates?

The first major move in this direction came from the IMF, which in its 1991 annual meeting announced the desirability of reducing military spending. A few bilateral donors—interestingly enough, mainly Japan and Germany, the losers of World War II, formally forbidden to have standing armies—soon joined the IMF in taking the lead on this issue. This constituted a major innovation. In the past, when confronted with this issue—as when critics argued that the IMF imposed harsh social cuts but accepted continued high military spending by countries implementing structural adjustment—the standard answer was always that the level of military spending was a political decision of sovereign states, beyond the reach of the IMF. Mysteriously, after the Cold War ended and Third World dictators suddenly became less necessary allies of the US, it was discovered that military spending patterns are actually a financial matter, related to productive resource allocation and budgeting, thus failing within the competence of the IMF. The trick that made this possible resides in the 'public expenditure reviews' that became part of structural adjustment: because of the fungibility of resources, all budgetary expenditures had to come under review, and thus 'second generation conditionality', as it is called, was born. Still, this is very political and dangerous for the Bretton Woods institutions, and so they must engage in a great deal of verbal gymnastics: The World Bank position is that a country should govern how it uses its resources, including for military expenditure. Security is essential for growth, but development partners need to be convinced that the pattern of resource allocation is appropriate and well-managed.

The German and Japanese aid agencies rapidly abandoned their formal policies on the issue: too difficult to measure and monitor, too sensitive to impose. The IMF and the European Union, however, have persisted. Since 1993, the IMF included a section in its World Economic Outlook reports on military expenditures as a problem of resource misallocation (but note that for most countries, no data were available, and even where they exist they do not capture off-budget expenditures). Recently the UNDP also began publishing data on military expenditures. In some cases, such as Cambodia, Pakistan, Romania, and Ukraine, this matter became a central element in IMF negotiations for standby agreements (Jones 1998). The application of this criterion clearly contains an element of judgement about security. In 1999–2000, Uganda and Zimbabwe, for example, were strongly pressured by the IMF to cut their military expenditure. In 2000, aid to Zimbabwe was even suspended by the IMF on the ground that it misrepresented the cost of its war efforts in the DRC. Meanwhile, no pressure was applied to Rwanda, the prime instigator of the Congolese war, until mid-2002.

In late 2001, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stating that 'countries involved in armed conflicts would suffer sanctions and stop receiving their current levels of subsidies from the European Union,' a point already made gently by the Commission
in 1999, in order to ‘prevent a diversion of funds for belligerent purposes’ (European Commission 1999: 3). Article 11 of the 2000 Cotonou agreement requires a political dialogue around issues of excessive military spending. This has led to cutbacks and suspensions in aid to countries such as Ivory Coast and Kenya, for example. Similarly, in some strong case like Burundi the Bretton Woods institutions now try to ensure that adjustment loans or debt relief are not diverted for military spending, for example by providing foreign exchange directly to the private sector.

In short, an ad-hoc practice of threatening to reduce development aid to countries engaged in war, or spending too much on the military, has now persisted for over a decade. Yet, the practice has been very inconsistent—witness, for example, recent massive IMF support to Colombia when the Clinton administration began its military aid package to that country; or the widely accepted fact that Russia used significant amounts of IMF support after 1995 to finance its military build-up in Chechnya. Combined with the general weakness of conditionality and the capacity of countries to keep military expenditure off-budget (or pay for it through the war effort itself, as is the case of Rwanda in the DRC) the conditionality path is not likely to lead very far. This has led to calls for a more ‘positive’ conditionality, which, rather than threatening countries with losing their aid, supports their efforts to reform their military apparatus—so-called security reform programmes.

The term security sector reform (SSR) is used to denote a new field of action that includes international support for projects and programmes in democratic policing, security sector governance, civil society overview, defence review boards, regional security programmes, human rights training, professionalizing the army projects, etc. It constitutes a move away from conditionality and macro-economic budgetary figures only, to a locally owned security-conscious, externally supported strategy for efficient ‘right-sized’ defence (Nicole Ball 2000, Dylan Hendrickson 2002). All this work is politically very sensitive, both in the countries concerned as well as in the donor community. For that reason, many donors fear to tread there. However, a few like DFID, have acquired significant competence in this area [also funding research at the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King’s College] (Gaigals 2001: 7).

3. Post-Conflict Assistance

The international community has begun codifying and implementing an agenda of using development assistance to promote peace and reconciliation in countries coming out of violent conflict. The first case began more than a decade ago—Cambodia, Uganda, or El Salvador for example—but it is really only in the mid-1990s that a fully-fledged field, with its new institutions and key documents, emerged. The two most important documents may well be the 1997 OECD Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation and the 1998 UN Secretary-General’s report on ‘Priorities for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.’ These documents give priority to areas that until a few years ago were totally off the development agenda (or at least very marginal): governance and representation; justice and security; prejudice and reconciliation. Note, however, that the post-conflict agenda perceives itself as an exceptional, temporary one, with development work reverting to normal once the post-conflict challenge is dealt with. The post-conflict agenda encompasses a set of temporary and functional phases. Starting amidst the rubble of war, people often distinguish the following phases (Harris 1999: 446):

- Rehabilitation and restoration: immediate tasks that must be undertaken right after the cessation of overt hostility and that seek to restore a basic semblance of normality, including a restoration of basic state functions. This phase was initially seen as lasting 3–6 months, although in many countries, such as Rwanda after the genocide, it may take much longer.
- Reconstruction: the basic aim of this phase is to return social and economic life as far as possible to pre-war levels. This does not mean that what is being built ought to be a copy of what existed before. This phase, which is really the continuation of the previous one but under conditions of less urgency, is considered to take a few years.
- Development and transformation: the long-term process of creating a better society (for Lederach 1997, this is a 20 years and beyond matter). This phase goes beyond post-conflict—which is not to say that it could not be imbued with a vision of peace.
A key challenge for the post-conflict agenda is institutional and relates to the gap between humanitarian aid (which is highly prevalent during and immediately after situations of violence), and development assistance (which is mainly concerned with the third phase). There are at least three problems there: first and most obviously, there may be a financing gap as one withdraws while the other is not yet online. Second, both their modalities of functioning may be inappropriate for that period in the middle: emergency aid may be too external and service delivery-oriented, and development aid too slow and inflexible, for this intermediary phase (Mendelson-Forman 2002). Third, there is simply too little coordination and transfer of knowledge between these players. Donors have responded by creating new desks specifically devoted to the niche in the middle. USAID, for example, created the Office of Transitional Initiatives, while the World Bank created the Post-Conflict Unit. These and similar institutions had capabilities to act in a more flexible manner, with shorter planning and disbursement schedules, designed to allow them to act rapidly and appropriately immediately after the end of hostilities. The most innovative practice could be the pooling of donor funds into UNDP-managed Trust Funds. This is partly a tool for donors without representations on the ground to rapidly invest funds in post-conflict work via the UNDP. It could also constitute a flexible, up-front resourced mechanism for joint engagement during sensitive windows of opportunity. This latter function has had a hard time materialising until now.

The post-conflict domain is vast, covering fields as diverse as demobilisation and transitional justice, and countries ranging from Kosovo to East Timor. There exists by now an abundance of literature in these fields: in addition to declarations and prescriptive reports, there are multi-country and sector case studies, comparative researches, consultancy reports, agency evaluations, and the like. The post-conflict domain is really at the heart of the entire enterprise of integrating development and peacebuilding: it is here that most action takes place, and from here that most lessons have been learned. Rather than attempting a superficial synthesis of all this, I will in the next pages present a set of deep, and unresolved, strategic and ethical limitations of this agenda. I believe that, more than financial or technical issues, important as they are, these questions will ultimately determine the success of the post-conflict agenda.

Assessing Post-Conflict Dynamics

A crucial problem in the post-conflict agenda relates to the lack of reliable, quality knowledge. Ambassadors, aid coordinators, and programme managers often feel that they do not know what's 'really' going on, even in the areas of direct concern to them. Why are certain policies adopted, and what are their likely consequences? What divisions exist within political elites and the military? Are the available data on budgets or military spending reliable? What does the population think about these matters? In many post conflict countries, especially those where insecurity still reigns and where authoritarian regimes are in power, donors are groping in the dark with these crucial questions. As a result, they need to guess, speculate, attribute, extrapolate—all of which are likely to be done differently by different persons. In addition, in a world in which there are many ways to go from here to there—and where neither 'here' nor 'there' are necessarily clearly understood—donors often disagree on the strategies with which to proceed. To make matters more difficult, it may well be that post post-conflict situations are fundamentally ambiguous and contradictory. Many situations—or even people's motives and attitudes—are not of an 'either/or' nature but of a 'both/and' nature. This makes judging very difficult, especially for project interventions, which tend to require clear causal scaffoldings.

As a result, donors may and do differ radically in their assessments of the situation and their definition of the correct strategies. Donors may thus end up privileging different if not opposed directions in their approaches to post-conflict situations. This situation is bound to be both highly inefficient and to encounter serious questions of moral hazard.
The Aims of the Post-Conflict Agenda

The previous discussion accepted that the goals and objectives of the donors are clear, shared, and consistent. This is of course not the case. Government and donor objectives and principles, no matter how laudable individually, may conflict, and short-term and long-term concerns may push in very different directions. In Rwanda, for example democracy and good governance objectives conflict, as do reconciliation and justice, economic efficiency and political imperative, short-term security and human rights or the alleviation of suffering and political stability. On what grounds are the difficult choices between these principles made—and by whom? (Uvin 2001).

One major contradiction that needs to be singled out is the one that exists between search for coordination and the principle of local ownership and control. The post-conflict discourse's insistence on coordination and coherence amounts to donors seeking to 'gang up' as efficiently as possible on Third World governments, by creating a tight front in all areas of life.

Often, donors are also guided by non-altruistic motives. At a minimum, they may seek to balance military, political, and economic aims with their sense of commitment and duty, but in many cases no such balancing is even attempted. In the case of Rwanda, for example, France has systematically followed a policy of obstructionism based on its opposition to an Anglophone government in a country that used to be a close ally. This had nothing whatsoever to do with Rwanda's needs, and everything with Paris's frustrated sense of grandeur.

Implementation Problems

In post-conflict countries, where the wounds are deep and the margins for maneuver small, donor principles may well be mostly irrelevant. Donors may have no choice but to adopt a policy of long-term engagement and accept behaviour that violates their principles. Negative political conditionality can almost entirely be ruled out. Positive forms of conditionality may essentially consist only in funding that which already takes place. In addition, a major problem is the one of inertia or path dependency. In theory, all the steps along the post-conflict path ought to be inspired by a vision of a transformed society— the ultimate goal. In practice, the opposite typically happens: at each level, choices are made that reduce the possibilities inherent in the next phase. Thus, the last, defining phase ends up being the de facto result of the previous ones, determined by the non-choices made earlier on. And hence, in so many places, after years of fighting and years of reconstructing, what emerges is often a copy of the old, against the wishes of the large majority of people involved, whether local or foreign.

The main answer of the international community to this problem is the rapid organisation of elections, which shall produce a legitimate government with a mandate to shape a new and better society. The post-conflict democracy solution contains major problems, however. First, against a backdrop of extreme poverty, disorganisation of the political scene, and the legacies of violence, elections may simply not be very meaningful. Second, the insistence on the speedy organisation of elections may lead to a renewal of violence. Third, the international community typically is not willing to or capable of providing the resources required for creating a truly functioning democracy. As a result, there is 'a growing discrepancy between the model that is being propounded and the policies that are actually practiced' (Ottaway 2002).

Finally, the sudden massive presence of hundreds of foreign agencies and their high-paid personnel has profound economic and political impacts. It creates major biases in the economy towards urban areas, and especially in capital cities, where the foreigners tend to congregate: processes of rapid gentrification with severe negative impact on the purchasing power of local middle classes; extraordinary profit opportunities for well-connected barons of the regime who own the houses, restaurants, cell phone compa-
nies, and garages required by the new expatriate elite; a weakening of local institutions, public and private, who see their most competent people drained away by vastly higher salaries offered by foreign agencies; and the reaffirmation of a dependency syndrome, in which social change must pass through donors, their sympathy and funds (Utting 1994). In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the international community explicitly set out to avoid this outcome, describing, for the first time, its resolve to leave a ‘small footprint.’ Yet according to all available information at the time of writing, this has failed.

Ethical Problems

Given the difficulty of understanding post-conflict situations and the even greater difficulty of correctly predicting the impact of one’s actions upon them, there is likely to be some error. At the same time, the cost of error is extremely high and entirely born by locals. In other words, the new post-conflict agenda allows donors to make life and death decisions that are often bound to be wrong; yet, those suffering the consequences of these errors are always other people.

In addition when internal or local solutions emerge, they often take forms that do not conform to Western ethical ideals or international legal principles. In Rwanda, local elections that are non-secret and non-partisan; popular trials without defence—should the international community condemn these as violations of human rights or support them as home-grown and realistic alternatives? On what criteria should such judgements be made? Where to draw the line and withdraw assistance?

Many of the above quandaries are typical of all aid, although they tend to be stronger or more visible in post-conflict situations. Together, they produce a number of related, dangerous outcomes. The legitimacy and success of the post-conflict agenda (as well as the conflict prevention venture) necessitates overcoming these challenges.

Central challenges of the post-conflict agenda begin with the notion that the end result of post-conflict assistance seems almost always to be one where the total is less than the sum of the parts. The breadth of the post-conflict mandate and the absence of prioritisation mechanisms, together with the paucity of resources, result in donors funding a bit of everything. The outcome is a situation of small, scattered, under-funded, short-term, un-coordinated projects, none of which make a major difference and most of which simply repeat the past. This is not to say that these projects do not produce positive impacts on their own terms. Rather, it is that they are too small, scattered, and isolated to make a fundamental difference on almost anything. In addition, the post-conflict mandate is enormous and amorphous, basically encompassing the entire political, economic, and social make-up of post-conflict societies. There is no possible way that major resolutions of the problems in any of these sectors will come about in years if not decades to come—especially with a series of scattered and uncoordinated projects. The end result is a disturbing absence of checkpoints for change, and a lack of accountability to make a real difference.

Second, the new agenda is not contextualised and it is unrealistic. There exists a deep imbalance between its far-reaching and ambitious aims and its limited resources and lack of knowledge. It appears as a giant free-floating machine, hovering, UFO-like, over a society somehow totally out of touch and yet always present. As Plank says about Mozambique: ‘the aim is to build a new kind of state—technically competent, economically rational, and politically dispassionate—on the rubble of war in the poorest country in the world. Such aspirations owe more to faith in the assumptions of neoclassical theory than they do to familiarity with the history and politics of Africa’ (1993: 426). Under these conditions, failure is all but guaranteed—a situation of tragic futility, in the words of Plank.

Third, the post-conflict agenda amounts to an unconstrained license to intervene on the part of the international community. Its aims are highly politically sensitive and intrusive, and it is devoid of tools for making choices about priorities or under conditions of
scarce resources or conflict—the true art of politics. As a matter of fact, with the exception of Bernard Wood’s excellent report for UNDP (2001), none of the policy statements even mention that there are choices to be made, or discuss the thorny issue of who will make the choices and on what basis.

The key question of the post-conflict agenda will remain how to define an approach that minimises the reach of the international community leaving as much as possible to local actors, while being principled and providing a real value-added. The trend until now has been to add new fields of action—an understandable dynamic given the failure of the blindness to conflict and politics that characterised past development practice. Now it is time to reflect on how to do less rather than more, how to minimise our reach while maximising our impact. This means making explicit choices and living by them, ensuring maximum participation and—a necessary corollary—transparency being flexible and yet principled, and being learning oriented—all things that are hard to achieve even under the best of circumstances (Stiefel 1999).

4. Do No Harm

The field research of Mary Anderson and her colleagues at the Local Capacities for Peace Project constituted a milestone in conceptualising the nexus between development and conflict resolution. Although her work deals more with humanitarian aid (which is not part of this article, and presents different challenges), she claims it is also relevant to the development field. Synthesising a decade of participatory research, Anderson (1999: 39) writes:

Experience shows that aid’s economic and political resources affect conflict in five predictable ways:

- aid resources are often stolen by warriors and used to support armies and buy weapons;
- aid affects markets by reinforcing either the war economy or the peace economy;
- the distributional impacts of aid affect inter-group relationships, either feeding tensions or reinforcing connections;
- aid substitutes for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing them to support conflict;
- aid legitimises people and their actions or agendas, supporting the pursuit of either war or peace.

She then presents a number of practical ways in which aid managers can address these problems, or use these dynamics in such a way as to promote peace. These include ‘dispersal in a hurry’, ‘glut the market’, ‘create community accountability around wages,’ and so on. Anderson’s aims are eminently practical. She presents innovative practices that can make a difference by allowing agencies to ‘do no harm,’ to at least avoid unintended negative impacts on conflict dynamics.

Anderson’s work has proven to be extremely useful. It does not pose a fundamental challenge to the way the aid community has historically defined its mandate: it is intelligent fine-tuning, not fundamental rethinking. This explains in part why it has become so widespread and mainstreamed, to the point that many bilateral aid agencies now actually have ‘do no harm’ cells within them. In 1999, Tom Weiss, co-director of the Humanitarianism and War project, wrote an important overview article on humanitarianism and conflict dynamics. In the article he puts Anderson’s work as the 2nd ‘minimalist’ level out of 4, arguing that it thinks through some of the consequences of aid delivery on conflict dynamics but does not seek to address the root causes of the conflict. The root causes of conflict is the third, ‘maximalist’ position. Weiss’ 4th category is the ‘solidarist’ one, where explicit political choices are made in favour of a particular side, a situation possibly characterizing only a few NGOs. His first one was the principled politically neutral one, in the humanitarian business exemplified by the ICRC.

Mary Anderson disputes this categorisation of her work, and could do so on two grounds. First, she really does ask the question: ‘how can humanitarian or development assistance
be given in conflict situations in ways that rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people to disengage and establish alternative systems for dealing with the problems that underlie the conflict? (1999: 1) In other words, her work has a positive, conflict-reduction aim and not only a negative, avoid-to-make-it-worse aim. Be that as it may, her work has become mainly known for the more limited agenda—something she contributed to by the choice of title for her book. Second, her work is based on the notion that all aid may have an impact on conflict dynamics, and thus opens the door to a re-conceptualisation of the entire aid enterprise.

5. Conflict Prevention

From the previous agendas, it is but a small intellectual step to conflict prevention, and this step was taken in the late 90's. After all, as document after document asserted, the longer one waits to do something about the dynamics of conflict, the more difficult and costly it becomes to succeed. Hence, acting earlier, preferably before conflicts become violent and widespread, makes eminent sense. As US President Bill Clinton's and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's speechwriters loved to repeat during the 1999–2000 season: 'the costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war.' For that matter, what else is post-conflict work than conflict prevention for the next round, i.e., avoiding the re-occurrence of conflict? And, as one looks closer at it, where exactly are the borders between conflict and post-conflict, between peace and violence?

Natural and spontaneous as the step from post-conflict to conflict prevention work may be, it does constitute an enormous extension of the development mandate. For one, every country in the world is by definition a potential pre-conflict country, and thus the new mandate applies axiomatically to all developing countries, instead of the 20 or so that are post-conflict. In addition, the conflict prevention paradigm requires the acceptance of a great new insight in the development community, namely that all aid has an impact on the political dynamics of conflict. To quote the first lines of a recent OECD report on the matter:

All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for war, regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognized or not, before, during or after war. The issue is then not whether or not to create incentives but, rather, how to manage them so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution. (...) This involves recognising that perceptions matter as much as facts in aid impacts; that who gets which piece of the cake is usually as important as the total size of the cake; that efficiency may sometimes need to be traded for stability and peace; that the development discourse can be used for many political purposes; and, broadly, that process is as important as product (Uvin 2001).

Here we begin approaching an entire rethinking of the development paradigm and associated practice, using an explicit political lens.

Unsurprisingly, this is strongly resisted by many. There are those in the aid community who long for the good old days of technical, a-political, simplicity: a clear mandate a specialised technical assistant to execute it, and a nice photo of a new piece of infrastructure. The idea that aid would in any way be political, and that that this politicalness ought to be managed, is scary. But the strongest dislike for the conflict prevention agenda comes from Third World governments, who now all fall in the ‘conflict preventable’ category and may thus be subject to a wide range of novel and interventionist uses of aid. This resentment has made the conflict prevention agenda extremely politically sensitive, notwithstanding its compelling logic. Every time the Security Council, or the Governing Board of any UN specialised organisation, discusses conflict prevention, it encounters resistance of its Third World members. When in the late 1990s the World Bank floated the idea of creating an Operational Directive on conflict prevention, for example, the Chinese and Indian governments successfully demanded that all references in the larger document of which this was part be removed. Multilateral organisations are especially vulnerable here, for they are composed of developing countries as well. One solution to this problem is the always popular use of euphemisms—talking about ‘social sustainability’, for example, or increasing countries ‘resilience to violent conflict.’
At the level of implementation, much of the conflict prevention agenda is identical to the post-conflict one. There are no magical tools and new insights that are only valid for one but not for the other (Lund 1997). The main two differences between the two types of work are that conflict prevention evidently is done earlier and that it takes place within a stronger diplomatic framework. The rest of this section will discuss these two points in some more detail.

**Early Warning**

It is by definition true that acting early is at the heart of the conflict prevention practice. This holds even more so for the development community, given its pretence to affect the root and intermediary causes of violence, and not its triggers or manifestations. This immediately poses the knowledge question: do development actors possess sufficient knowledge to be aware of conflict dynamics? Do they possess the deep understanding required to act upon such dynamics?

The call has thus oft been made for Early Warning (EW) methods, designed to provide advance warnings about the likelihood of impending instances of violence. Since the mid-1990s, scholars, agencies, think-tanks, and NGOs (including a few newly created ones, such as FEWER 1996; ICG 1997; and the Conflict Prevention Network, 1997) have begun developing a set of early warning tools.

A number of trenchant criticisms have been voiced against EW systems and their project-related cousins, Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) methodologies. The social sciences upon which they are based are riddled with ambiguities and contradictions, and the EW models cannot but reflect this foundation (Gaigals 2001:22). The available scientific knowledge is at best probabilistic and general; good science also assigns a key role for human agency, and thus contingency. In short, one cannot predict conflict in the kind of dispassionate, objective, manner most EW systems promise. Additionally, these methods tend to be too expert-based. They are based on specialists discussing among themselves with the aim of somehow mastering reality better, rather than engaging in open dialogues or promoting local knowledge generation. Although newer methods include ‘stakeholder analysis’ as part of their toolbox, the aims mostly do remain expert-based (Gaigals 2001; 29 ff.; DFID 2002b: passim). Finally, empirical studies agree that violent conflicts never fall out of thin air, catching everyone by surprise. The OECD's four case studies for example, all explicitly stated that lack of prior knowledge was not the problem (Uvin 1999). Similarly, a German evaluation of its aid policies vis-à-vis six conflict countries concluded that inadequate use of the available information, and not lack of information, was the barrier to action. The study synthesis (the individual case studies were deemed too sensitive by the German government to publish) notes four problems that, hindered adequate assessment of the information: actors may tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting to certain mechanisms (selective perception) in their reporting; the local structures (projects, GTZ, embassy) tend to be reluctant to refer to conflict situations; projects endeavor to shield themselves from the context of the conflict, for staff do not want ‘their’ project impaired by the unfavorable environment; and development cooperation measures fail to forge a link between local conditions and the national or regional situation where a conflict is concerned (Klingebiel 1999:11).

Essentially, it may well be impossible to predict conflict in a way that constitutes a meaningful early warning for policymakers and that would yield results significantly superior to what one could achieve through regular serious conversations with employees and national colleagues (see too Stedman 1995). Indicators can hardly predict conflict in ways that these conversations could not have, nor do they produce the truly useful information: what do local people think can and ought to be done about it? What are the margins for maneuver? What are the perceptions at play? What is required, then, are not expensive EW and CIA systems, but attitude (possibly human resource systems and career incentives) and change.

People then often talk about the need to develop a ‘culture of prevention’ (Brown 2002). Development managers and personnel have to be prevention oriented as a matter of rou-
tine, i.e., consider it part of their 'normal professionalism.' This is both relatively easy (for it requires little money) and hard (for a number of reasons and a lack of moral imagination, bureaucratic pressure, and the inherent difficulty of the matter).

**Conflict Prevention Who Leads?**

From the very moment conflict potential is recognised, and a determination is made that efforts towards conflict prevention ought to be set in motion, the development community needs to build close working relations with the traditional communities that deal with conflict prevention: foremost the diplomats, but also the military. Through inter-departmental coordinating bodies, joint missions to the field, and multi-department peacebuilding funds, donors have begun seeking greater coherence (see UNDPA 2000, EC 2000, and DFID 2002a for some mechanisms). All these efforts, without exception, have a long way to go before they become mainstreamed.

This new collaboration may find the development community in a more subservient role than it likes. Promises of volumes and sectors of aid may be used in negotiations: knowledge gathered from aid employees may be sought to inform diplomatic strategies; diversions of already earmarked development funds for security-related actions may be urgently requested; and decisions on regions and sectors to privilege might be made in function of new criteria, etc. (Wood 2001: IV-3/4). Aid employees are likely to resent this. They will bemoan the level of politicisation and instrumentalization of their mandate, the loss of control and autonomy if not of purity (Macrae & Leader 2000).

When development actors think and talk about conflict prevention, greater political clarity of their mandates, or the need for coherence, they implicitly see themselves in the driver's seat, with the other branches of donor government supporting them. Development actors are strongly advised not to hold their breath waiting for that moment to arrive. Except in those cases where the world of high politics does not care about the outcome—most of Africa, for example—diplomats and generals are likely to have the upper hand in the internal power dynamics.

**6. Human Security— A Vision Thing**

In the late 1990s, the term ‘human security’ came into vogue as a way to capture the development/peace nexus. The term is rather vague, constituting a mobilising device in favour of a departure from the status quo rather than an agreed-upon definition of specific aims. As a result, different players have defined it very differently. Two basic visions are subsumed under the term human security. In practice, there has been a tug of war between countries and agencies on which definition will prevail (Ball 2001). Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (website) represents the narrower, security-oriented definition. Starting from the general point that ‘a people-centered approach to foreign policy . . . recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety, or lives,’ it focuses exclusively on what can be called the ‘human dimensions of security,’ such as small arms trade, landmines, child soldiers, etc. Japan’s approach represents the broader, more development-oriented approach. The late Prime Minister Obuchi said in 1996 that human security is ‘the keyword to comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats.’ The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) goes on to list ‘threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity [such as] poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organised crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel landmines . . . ‘ It is in this definition that human security amounts to a re-conceptualization of the development enterprise, with ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ becoming two inseparable faces of the same coin.

The origins of the interest in human security are multiple. From the security side of the equation, it builds on a variety of dynamics: the gradual rise of insecurity studies concerning the environment, population, and poverty as key sources of insecurity (but note
that we are talking about state security here), popularised during the Clinton administration by the work of Kaplan (Kaplan 2001; see Klare 2001 for a scholarly treatment); the growing involvement of the military in humanitarian operations (e.g., Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti); and the move up on the agenda of concern over issues such as small arms, child soldiers, civil wars, mafias, etc. The most intellectually relevant—but least powerful—strand comes from radical scholars who oppose the traditional state-centric approaches to security and argue that human beings ought to be the point of departure of security studies, and that states are often major threats to such security (Wilkins 1999; Nef 1999; King & Murray, 2000; Buzan 1991).

The relative popularity of the human security agenda is, however, not the result of the enthusiasm of the military/security establishment but of the development community. From human needs in the 1970s, over human development in the 1990s, to human security now, part of the social change community has always resisted what it perceives to be overly narrow and economistic approaches to development, using the adjective ‘human’ as an identifying tag setting it apart from its intellectual competitors. For them, the human security concept holds the promise of achieving two goals: more firmly embedding concerns with insecurity and violence into development work and adding more attention to poverty and empowerment into high politics. There may have been a bit of opportunism at work here, as King and Murray (2000: 589) suggest: ‘the development community saw an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources associated with military security. . . .Those in the security community were interested in reaching out to conquer new areas as well.’

The strengths of human security are also its weaknesses. As a mobilising concept it does a fine job of putting together concerns that have too often been separated; it can act as an overall conceptual framework allowing cross-disciplinary, cross-institutional collaborations. Human security acts as a seducer, trying to incorporate establishments that are traditionally not concerned with social change and convincing them that the development people and associated softies have something to offer. In a post-September 11 world, there are quite a number of people who are open to such arguments, but few of them are found in military establishments, or for that matter, in senior US policy-making circles. The alternative, more realistic definition, becomes too narrow, focusing only on the low-tech aspects of military security: landmines, arms trade, child soldiers. While these are important issues, reducing the concept of human security to them dramatically reduces its intellectual bite. In addition, the concept is also basically, not measurable, meaning that success or failure is hard to quantify, and scientific aura (another great seducer) is lost. Some attempts have been made to quantify human security: King and Murray used years of life lost; while Andrew Mack and his team are working on a measure of violent deaths.

7. The Global System and Conflict

The final level of the taxonomy goes beyond development and aid sensu strictu; it also focuses away from the Third World only, and towards a more global vision, that includes rich countries’ and corporations’ behaviour in the military political and economic realms. The concept can best be described as an attempt to moralize all international relations. The focus then becomes on issues such as arms trade (often involving rich countries as crucial players in production, transportation, or financing), natural resources such as diamonds or oil (often involving rich countries’ enterprises in key functions of trade, transformation, and retail, if not outright production), financial flows and their capacity to maintain oppressive and belligerent governments; debt, trade and adjustments and their impacts on poverty and inequality; and the like. Here we also find reflections about, and mechanisms to intervene upon, rich country patterns of production and consumption. Campaigns for divestments (from countries such as Burma or from companies such as Talisman), ethical or social mutual funds (employing filters against companies that among others, work in countries at war) are also part of the toolbox. These mechanisms often do not employ a development language, nor, usually, an explicit peacebuilding one. Rather
they appeal to broader norms of social and economic justice and peace. They all share notions that the behaviour of people, companies, and governments in rich counties impacts on the poverty, violence, and oppression suffered by so many in the Third World, and that this impact can and should be governed.

The argument is not that Northern corporations, investors or governments have become greedier, nastier, or more thoughtless in their behaviour, nor that the number of corporations negatively affecting conflict has increased significantly in recent years. There is not even necessarily a wealth of widely accepted new insights that corporations are important in creating or promoting conflict. There is a popular strand of research that argues that greed, and not grievance, is the key to most new wars, or more broadly that the presence of 'lootable' resources causes wars (Collier 2001). However, this research is seriously contested among non-economists, and it actually does not argue that the behaviour of corporations is the cause of these wars (indeed, as this research comes from the World Bank, it would be surprising if it did!).

What has changed is simply that there is a growing sense that the behaviour of corporations can, and ought to, be changed in a pro-peace manner. Campaigners feel that they possess the legal and political resources to affect corporations' behaviour in conflict areas, and that doing so provides them with a lever, no matter how small, to decrease the duration of these conflicts. The key notion underlying the campaigns is a rather mechanical one, namely that one can stop the machinery of violence by depriving it of fuel.

In some campaigns, a stronger argument is advanced, that trade or investment patterns are the direct causes of the violence. Shell’s behaviour in Nigeria, for example, in conjunction with the Nigerian government, has been causally linked to the violence against the Ogoni—not a case of war sensu strictu, however, rather one of sustained violence against a social group, with the potential of leading to local civil war-like conditions. Here, attention is paid to human rights violations that result from the behaviour of individual corporations, and campaigners seek to establish legislation and adjudication for such alleged crimes. Such initiatives until now have been unsuccessful. The Secretary-General's 'Global Compact,' in which companies voluntarily promise to respect human rights, labour rights, and the environment, goes in that direction but is clearly very weak. More forcefully still, radical arguments have been made that current modes of globalisation provoke structural violence, and, as a result, acute violence (Uvin 2003). At this level, structural reform of the world economy is advocated—including the establishment of major redistributive mechanisms. These aims are far from being realized, although they are shared by many in the anti-globalisation movement.

All these conceptualisations of the development/security nexus—but especially those on the latter end of this spectrum—take steps away from the traditional development paradigm. Those concerned with the global system and conflict focus beyond development assistance and poor countries, redirecting the spotlight back onto the rich countries and the global international political economy where their corporations and citizens occupy such a privileged position. The modalities of trade (including but not limited to arms and natural resources), finance, and cultural exchange in which we, the international community, partake, or the legacies of past and not-so-past policies, including massive support to dictators, arming of various sides to conflicts, and the like, all these matters now enter into the equation as well. This movement is radical in its challenge to the status quo. At this level, too, we are not only dealing with political matters but doing politics: only political power will make this agenda move forwards.

Conclusion

The intellectual and operational gap between development and security has shrunk significantly since the early 1990s. There exists nowadays a rapidly growing literature, mainly of the grey kind, on the relationship between development and conflict, while policy dec-
larations on the need for further mainstreaming and coherence are commonplace. Experts in the field regularly meet in conferences and workshops, and much learning and innovation has already occurred. Indeed, a new journal devoted to the subject is now being launched! Most of this is what conflict resolution professionals would call ‘track II’ work, i.e., promoting and strengthening dynamics of peace at the level of individuals and communities, but some of it—military conditionality for example, or the calls for coherence—fall squarely within the ‘track I’ government-to-government negotiations approach. Some parts of it, finally—security sector reform, for example, or parts of the post-conflict agenda—seem to constitute new hybrid fields.

Most aid agencies—whether bilateral, multilateral or NCO—are now firmly anchored in the 3rd and 4th levels described above. They try to design their projects and programs in such a way as to do no harm, and they spend significant resources on a variety of new post-conflict sectors, such as reconciliation, transitional justice, and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. It goes without saying that there are significant differences in the importance they attach to these matters, the degree of explicit political analysis they bring to this work, and the sectors, countries, and approaches they tend to privilege. Some agencies—mainly the more progressive bilateral donors, and some NGOs—are trying to move further into the conflict prevention and human security agendas. Work from a ‘global system’ perspective is very limited in the development sector (although aid agency people do closely follow the Kimberley process), but becoming firmly anchored in broad social movements worldwide.

The key problems of much of the operational work in the field are the weakness of the knowledge and the ethical base on which this work rests. To strengthen the emerging edifice, changes are required in both. The list of objectives and domains of intervention must be reduced. This is to be done not by randomly choosing a few domains of the current long list and excluding all the others (there seems to be no intellectually satisfying way to complete such an exercise) but by developing mechanisms that allow for choices to be made that are appropriate for each case and permit for the subsequent evaluation and steering of these choices (Stiefel 1999). Donors must also take their engagements and responsibilities more seriously, and behave more consistently across cases: In addition, there are currently few mechanisms for control or accountability of the donors, for open and critical assessment of projects and programmes, or for squarely facing the ethical trade-offs and dangers involved. Finally, all this work needs to be more firmly anchored in the societies concerned. There is a need for greater discussions and knowledge generation as well as transparency and mechanisms for promoting local dialogues that in turn guide donor policy.

Without these changes, the risk is big that the new agenda will amount to little more than rhetorical, feel-good changes, with self-congratulation on how smart and well-intended we have all become going hand in hand with continued ignorance, inconsistency, and irrelevance. Many issues need to be worked on, practices questioned, and insights shared. This work at the intersection of development and peace cannot be but a joint learning process, a dialogue between scholars, practitioners, and social movements worldwide—a major role for this Journal!
CHAPTER 1: A QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT

This chapter lays the foundation for the report, highlighting the conceptual and analytical foundations and framework of ‘human development’. It traces the origins and growing criticisms of the leading development approaches of the 1970s and 1980s and embraces a sharper, more explicit definition of human development, putting it in a Liberian context. The chapter also establishes a conceptual linkage between human security and human development while introducing ‘capacity development’ as the overall theme of the report and relating it to human development.

1.1 DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH VERSUS SOCIAL IMPACT

The well being of people has traditionally been considered a by-product of growth, rather than the primary objective of economic policy. Within this context, levels of development were measured by the magnitude of national income as measured by economic growth. Countries with high GNPs and/or GDPs were characterized as ‘developed’ even when the majority of their people were impoverished and excluded from the benefits of development. Countries with low economic growth were considered underdeveloped, even if people had access to the basic necessities of life.

As it became clearer that the use of growth indicators to measure development missed the social aspect of development, economists (Seers, 1969; Goulet, 1971) and other social researchers began to rethink the purpose and meaning of development. Theorists and practitioners began to accept that the well-being of society depended not only on the growth factor, which is absolutely necessary, but more importantly on the uses of the increased national income for enhancing peoples’ livelihoods and overall quality of life. The consensus that emerged was that high levels of income, if not properly managed and equitably distributed, would not necessarily contribute to human development, as was the case with Liberia over 50 years ago.

While increasing aggregate national income might enhance people’s security and is necessary, it is not sufficient in fulfilling some important human choices. Individuals and societies might make choices that require no income or wealth at all. For instance, a society does not have to be rich to be able to afford democracy, nor does a family have to be wealthy to respect the rights of each other. A person could be rich, healthy and well educated, but lack the opportunity to effectively participate in the development process, thus constraining individual choices. Valuable social and cultural traditions can and are maintained at all levels of income (HDR, 1994). While economic growth is an important means to development, the achievement of human outcomes such as participation and gender equality do not depend on economic growth and levels of income alone. They also depend on how these resources are used—whether for buying weapons instead of producing food, or building houses instead of providing health care.

The essence of development is therefore to enhance people’s choices and access to life-sustaining opportunities. Development should be human centred, with both the process and outcomes revolving around people. The process places the expansion of human choices and opportunities at the centre and focuses on creating the necessary economic, social and political conditions in which people can expand their human capabilities and use them appropriately. Development outcomes are measured by the improved quality of life for a majority of people.
At the height of the debate regarding the core of development, Yale University professor and social theorist, Dr. Amartya Sen, published his theory on human capabilities. The thesis was that development is meaningful only when peoples’ choices and opportunities were enlarged enough for them to: lead a long and healthy life; acquire knowledge and skills; have access to resources necessary for sustaining a decent standard of living; and fully participate in community life. This theory gave birth to the ‘human development’ approach. In essence, the core of development is about achieving sustained human development.

1.2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: MEANING AND DIMENSIONS

The human development concept ties together growth and the equitable distribution of the fruits of growth; both are essential to achieving human progress. This school of thought sees development as a process with multi-dimensional outcomes embracing the principles of sustainable livelihood, equality, self-esteem, participation and individual freedom. In fact, the first Human Development Report published in 1990 defines human development simply as “the process of enlarging people’s choices”.

The concept of human development has since been evolving, eliciting vigorous discourse within United Nations, academic and practitioners’ circles. It has also been elaborated upon in 15 reports under various themes starting in 1990, each taking up a new policy issue such as globalization, poverty, human rights, gender, freedom, finance and security, among others. A careful review of these reports suggests that the human development concept has three broad inter-related dimensions: people; governance; and international. Elements of each are briefly discussed below.

PEOPLE DIMENSION: Human development is concerned with the conditions necessary for people to live healthier, longer, happier and more creative lives using individual and collective capabilities. It implies that people play a central role in the development process, particularly in determining the path and level of development. At the same time, people are the primary targets of the process and therefore the prime benefactor of development efforts and outcomes. One aspect of the people dimension is securing human freedom and human rights. People must be free and secure under the laws of the land to effectively exercise their choices, apply their capabilities in making those choices and participate in making decisions that affect their lives.

GOVERNANCE DIMENSION: Human development relies upon good governance, which is essential to enable people to utilize collective power and resources to manage their affairs for the common good and in accordance with their needs and aspirations. From the human development perspective, governance—especially political governance—allows people to participate in the decision-making processes that affect their livelihood. These relate mainly to the principles of democracy, representation and power sharing.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION: Global partnerships and the effective participation of a nation in the global socio-economic space are vital to enhancing opportunities and choices. Participation in trade, for example, can offer greater opportunities for increasing living standards of people, especially those in poorer countries (HDR, 2005). The search for equitable access must consequently extend beyond national borders into the global arena. Science, technology and communication provide the needed opportunities for improving personal and national income by accessing global human, financial and product markets.

1.3 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPT IN A POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT

What does the concept of human development mean in a post-conflict context? This question introduces the human security dimension to understanding human development, focusing attention primarily on concern for overall security of individuals from violence, economic distress and environmental degradation.
In Liberia, the concept of human security calls attention to the causes and consequences of individual insecurity. It enables us to define the problems which obstruct the realization of the full potential of individuals caught up in 14 years of violent conflict resulting in death, displacement, economic collapse and extreme human poverty. While human development strives to enlarge people’s choices while guaranteeing their ability to fulfill them freely, conflict severely undermines the fulfillment and protection of these options. The drive to eliminate insecurity, restore peace and achieve reconciliation is informed by considerations of promoting human development and protecting human rights.

Since the 1994 Human Development Report pioneered the concept of human security, some 42 national reports have dealt directly or indirectly with it. Of the over 400 others that have been prepared since 1990, a number have touched on elements of human security. The 1994 HDR shifted the focus of security from the protection of the state and its borders by military means, to the protection of individuals from a wider range of threats to their well-being and security by a wider range of measures and policies at all levels. It defined human security as including “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities.” This implies protecting people and communities against critical threats beyond their control, such as violent conflicts, crime, terrorism, human rights violations, hunger, unemployment and disease. Without these it is impossible to think of human development.

The Commission on Human Security defines human security as intended “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations.”

If human development is concerned with the enlargement of people’s choice, human security allows people to exercise these options safely and freely. People not only need to be educated, well-nourished and respected, they need assurances that nothing will prevent them from exercising these rights. Human security becomes a condition to exercise and enjoy the basic necessities of human development and must therefore be consistent with people’s human development aspirations.

The concept of human security also highlights the acute challenges of promoting human development in a post-conflict environment. Liberia remains in crisis. The unemployment rate is estimated at 80 per cent; illiteracy 70 per cent; and poverty 76 per cent. There continues to be massive human suffering due to the disruption of agricultural activities, the continued displacement of the population, the destruction of private and public property and widespread poverty marked by lack of access to basic social services. Many young people are deprived of the basic skills necessary to secure a livelihood.

In light of these acute difficulties, the human development process in Liberia needs to be informed by the principle of human security since it helps capture the needs of volatile, post-conflict societies. Human security also stresses the importance of accommodating root causes of conflict in the process of peace-building, an approach that ultimately helps us understand the importance of conflict-sensitive development and capacity building.

Today, the humanitarian and security needs of the population remain enormous and urgent and the priority is to mobilize and build capacities to provide basic services. As a consequence of the war and associated political and social upheaval, capacity building must take a multi-dimensional approach: implementing programmes to provide education, health and sanitation and creating an environment to ensure the provision of these services reaches the target beneficiaries by strengthening the capacity of individuals and institutions meant to deliver them. Short-term achievements and the quick delivery of results are essential. However, a long-term capacity-development plan anchored on a
national vision and linked to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is imperative for consolidating peace and security, fostering national reconciliation and improving governance.

In determining choices for reconstruction and development, those responsible must ensure that they proceed with realistic achievements and avoid overly ambitious capacity development programmes that exceed political and/or institutional capabilities. It is equally essential that capacity development supports rather than erodes existing capacity. Nevertheless, the relevance of capacity development for Liberia to improve its human development and building sustainable peace cannot be overemphasized.

1.4 MEASURING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The Human Development Index (HDI)

In addition to establishing the human development approach, it has been necessary to find tools to measure development status and progress within the human development concept. Accordingly, development scientists began to investigate different explanatory variables and indicators to capture the broader view of a country’s development status. To this end, UNDP began to advocate a new approach to measuring development and in 1990, introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) as the primary measure of human development.

HDI is a composite index, which measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions:

- Longevity—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40;
- Knowledge—measured using the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio;
- Standard of living—measured by GDP per capita (PPP USD).

Complementary Indices

Three indices have also been developed to complement the measurement of human development. These indices, briefly described below, are: Human Poverty Index (HPI); Gender-Related Development Index (GDI); and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).

HUMAN POVERTY INDEX (HPI) reflects the distribution of progress and measures the backlog of deprivation in economic provision that still exists. HPI is measured in two streams: HPI-1 (HDR, 1997) and HPI-2 (HDR, 1998). HPI-1 is typically used to measure human poverty in developing countries focusing on longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. HPI-2 is used to measure human poverty in industrialized countries focusing on the same dimensions as the HPI-1 plus an indicator to capture social exclusion as measured by long-term unemployment rates.

GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX (GDI) measures the average achievement using the same indicators as the HDI (life expectancy, educational attainment and income) in the context of the disparity between females and males. The greater the downward disparity in basic human development, the lower the country’s GDI combined with its HDI.

GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE (GEM) measures the degree to which women have power over economic resources and political participation in relation to their male counterparts. The focus is on women’s opportunities rather than capabilities. GEM measures gender inequality in key areas of economic participation and policy decision-making. For example, GEM tracks the participation of women in parliament, senior administrative and managerial positions, and professional and technical works, as well as the gender disparity in earned income.
1.5 LIMITATIONS

Although the HDI has been found useful, it is agreed that the composite measure fails to cover other significant aspects of human development. The ability of a person to participate in making the decisions that affect his or her life is not fully captured. A person's ability to interact within, and enjoy the benefits from, the community is also neglected. For these and other reasons, measures of cultural freedom, human security, democracy and participation are considered vital in human development, and have found relevance in the global human development dialogue. Consequently, two other indices followed the first Human Development Report: the Human Freedom Index (HFI) in 1991; and Political Freedom Index (PFI) in 1992. Neither measure survived past their first year, due mainly to the difficulty in capturing the variables in a single index. But that does not mean that indicators of political and civil freedoms can be ignored entirely in considering the state of a country's human development paths and progress.
CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONFLICT

Robert Picciotto

Conflict is inherent to the human condition. It arises when individuals or groups hold divergent interests and values. It is not necessarily violent, however. Indeed, it may evince dialogue, lead to compromise, and as a result, improve mutual understanding and promote social harmony. Thus, for Albert Hirschman, the peaceful resolution of group conflict is a ‘democratic miracle’ akin to Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’.

Of course, the peaceful resolution of conflict is not automatic. Just as markets function well only where property rights are protected and contractual obligations are respected, conflicts are resolved and leave behind a beneficial residue of social capital only if the institutional environment is propitious, and legitimate arrangements backed by a monopoly of violence are in place to encourage cooperation, facilitate dialogue, and if necessary, adjudicate differences among conflicting parties. Conversely, where such customs and protocols are absent and the rule of law does not hold, violence may be perceived to offer more favourable prospects to protagonists, and social confrontations tend to escalate. In such environments, conflict acts as solvent rather than glue, and armed violence can result.

This reasoning leads to the time honored and plausible notion that peacebuilding is best pursued by nurturing democratic institutions. However, a more recent thesis views economic growth as the ultimate remedy to conflict. The striking relationship between the poverty of nations and their chances of having a civil war is stressed by Macartan Humphreys in ‘Economics and Violent Conflict’. Statistical associations, however, do not imply causality. The robust statistical association between low income per capita and conflict has brought forward diverse explanations, none utterly convincing. One of them maintains that the close link between poverty and conflict is explained by the fact that democracy and development go hand in hand. Thus, the traditional explanation holds. The key to both peace and prosperity lies in democratisation: democracies do not fight one another and are more prosperous than autocracies.

That said, however, not all authoritarian governments threaten global stability, and the path towards democracy is demonstrably perilous, especially where civil society is weak and social mobilisation runs ahead of economic development. An alternative explanation links poverty and conflict to state capacity gaps. It postulates that where the state cannot raise taxes, deliver public goods, or make productive investments, poverty grows, as does discontent, social strife, and eventually violence. The evidence behind this proposition is mixed: not all fragile states are affected by conflict. Other variables intervene: demographic pressure, environmental stress, ethnic strife, neighbourhood effects, and so on. Where weak or failing states do not (or cannot) respond appropriately to local or imported instabilities, the violence may escalate because there is simply nothing to stop it.

Leadership also matters. Political leaders may bid for power by exacerbating local grievances among groups—whether regional, ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic—to profit from fissures in the social fabric and from civil strife and warfare. Exogenous factors—for example, refugee flows, diaspora funding, international criminal networks—also play major roles.

For Paul Collier, the economic agenda of a minority (‘greed’) is more decisive in the onset of civil war than group hatreds (‘grievance’). This neo-liberal hypothesis set out in ‘Doing
Well Out of War' views warlords as economic agents rather than servants of a coherent ideology. From this perspective, entrepreneurs of violence are in the business of warfare because it is the most profitable occupation. Just as Clausewitz characterised inter-state wars as a ‘continuation of politics by other means’, the Collier doctrine perceives intra-state wars as an extension of commerce.

This proposition has triggered a lively academic debate—‘greed or grievance?’—but it has not done justice to the interconnected causes that generate and sustain contemporary warfare. Thus, in 'Africa at War against Itself', David Francis's taxonomy of African wars distinguishes between conventional wars, wars of national liberation, proxy wars, secessionist wars, resource-based wars, and identity-based wars. Equally, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and her colleagues in 'The Conflict-Development Nexus', a survey of armed conflicts in Africa, challenge state-centric assumptions, highlight the importance of sub-national and cross-border impacts, and illustrate the commingling of state and non-state actors at the nexus between development and armed conflict.

According to Samuel Huntington, the stage has been set for cultural differences—in a 'clash of civilisations'—rather than for economic forces or political ideas to inflame tensions, nurture grievances, and provoke conflict within and across states. At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the structuralist worldview, articulated here by Patrick Bond in 'Global Uneven Development, Primitive Accumulation and Political-Economic Conflict in Africa', conceives of conflict in the periphery as the inevitable outcome of capitalist expansion and the looting of natural resources that it induces. This neo-Marxist doctrine views the rules of the game of globalisation as exposing developing countries to retrograde patterns of primitive accumulation, ruthless exploitation, and authoritarian governance. It visualizes change through broad-based social movements, restructuring of the international system, and wholesale rejection of neo-liberal policies.

By contrast, the neo-liberal worldview endorses increased connectivity of developing countries in the global economy. It advocates development cooperation, support of legitimate business enterprises, improved regulatory regimes, security sector reform, certification of natural resources exports (as in the Kimberley Process), and even military intervention to impose peace as a last resort. In contrast, the cultural thesis of Huntington puts the spotlight back on democracy promotion.

The neo-Marxist, neo-liberal, and cultural narratives reflect ideological predilections. They lead to different policy prescriptions, but they are not fundamentally incompatible, and their explanatory power is context dependent. Thus, the Huntington cultural thesis does not preclude a contest of civilisations through hegemonic rule setting as outlined by Bond or through the proxies of warlords motivated by lucre as depicted by Collier. Conversely, the Bond hegemonic thesis could be interpreted as a contest among civilisations consistent with the use of cultural artifacts as tools of market expansion as required by capital accumulation. Finally, neo-liberal principles may be extrapolated to illuminate conflict at the higher plane of nations and civilisations in terms of access to natural resources.

In sum, no overarching thesis that would justify hard and fast rules about the best approach to conflict prevention, peacemaking, or state building has been discovered. Actions to prevent war do seem, however, to make a difference. The Human Security Brief, 2006, a careful examination of war trends by the Human Security Centre, confirms that the increased commitment by the international community to peacemaking has led to a reduction in the number of deadly conflicts and a growing number of wars ending in negotiations. To be sure, resumption of violence following a peace agreement is frequent, and to make further progress towards global peace and prosperity, more research is needed on the relationship between political economy and violent conflict. But we know far more about what it takes to construct and maintain peace than we did two decades ago, and progress, while slow and halting, is undeniable.

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1 Clausewitz may have used the term Politik to mean ‘policy’, a manifestation of state decision making that takes into account a country’s geopolitical position, resources, alliances, and treaties.
Given the nature and complexity of African conflicts, it is difficult to see how causes of conflict can be neatly categorised into root causes, secondary and tertiary factors. Based on field research for this work, what may be a root cause or fundamental grievance for an armed conflict does not remain static for the duration of the conflict. In examples such as DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the actual war and armed conflict has been used by different groups and interests to instigate new wars and armed conflicts. It becomes evident that the causes of war are not static but dynamic. Hence, it will not only be helpful to recognize that all wars have multiple causes, but most importantly, wars and armed conflicts should be understood on a case-by-case basis.

Theoretical Interpretations

Diverse theoretical interpretations and labellings have been used to explain and describe wars and armed conflicts in Africa, in particular the post-Cold War conflicts. They have been variously described as ‘protracted social conflict’ (Edward Azar, 1990), ‘asymmetrical warfare’ (Paul Rogers, 2000), ‘civilian-based civil wars’ (Mary Anderson, 1999); ‘international social conflict’ (Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tom Woodhouse, 2000), ‘regional security complex’ (Barry Buzan, 1991), ‘fire next door’ (David Francis, 2000), ‘complex political emergencies’ (World Bank, 1998), ‘new wars’ (Mary Kaldor, 2001), ‘ethno-religious wars’ (Oliver Furley, 1995), ‘retreat from modernity’ (Ali Mazrui, 1995), ‘new barbarism’ (Robert Kaplan, 1994, Martin van Creveld), ‘greed and grievance’ (Mats Berdal & David Malone, 2000, Paul Collier, 1999), ‘guerrilla/insurgence warfare’ (Christopher Clapham, 1996, Steven Metz, 1994), ‘low intensity conflict’ (Mike Smith, 2003), and ‘unconventional warfare’ (Andrew Janos, 1963). It is important to note that these terms are used to identify different aspects of the same conflict and sometimes used interchangeably by different political analysts and media commentators depending on the context. There is also growing academic and international policy focus on the interpretations of these conflicts. The ‘new wars’ or unconventional wars are mainly internal warfare, or factional wars without defined military fronts. They depend on opportunistic strategies and are fluid in nature. These asymmetrical wars rely on low technology weapons and small arms (AK47 and Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, landmines, and machetes), with the capacity for massive disruption. They are often less costly wars to start and are sustained by control over resources and external support. Civilians are the main targets and combatants often rely on terrorist tactics to destroy the morale of civilians, government forces and other warning factions.

But the phenomenon of non-state insurgence and sub-state threats and the security risks posed by violent non-state actors or sub-national groups is not new. They have been part and parcel of the political landscape of the Cold War period and much of the history of post-colonial Africa. The labelling and description of internal warfare creates definitional difficulties and confusion. Mike Smith contends that:

... terms like ‘guerrilla warfare’ and ‘low intensity conflict’ are fundamentally flawed. They do not exist as proper categories of war. Often they constitute inappropriate distinctions that impede intellectual understanding of internal war phenomena, which has in the past had a negative impact upon policy making. The usage of these terms in strategic studies literature does not facilitate understanding but rather undermines the attempt to comprehend the complexity of warfare as a whole.16

Harry Summers, in highlighting the potentially negative effect on policy making by use of the term ‘low intensity conflict’, asserts that it ‘obscures the nature of the task and obfuscates what needs to be done’.17
The ‘sudden intensity’ in the academic preoccupation with interpreting internal war or low intensity conflict has led to a vast array of literature and perspectives. Ali Mazrui poses the question as to whether the bloody and violent wars in Africa are a ‘retreat from modernity’. He asserts that:

There are occasions when development and modernisation are mutually reinforcing. There may be other occasions when modernisation (the quest for efficiency) and development (the quest for relevant skill and human well-being) pull in divergent directions. Both processes carry the risk of conflict, especially in post-colonial societies.

The internal violence, state failure and collapse, in Mazrui’s view, are part of the difficult and challenging process of state formation and nation building, an often violent and bloody process which Europe and other regions of the world have to go through as well. He, therefore, concludes that: ‘. . . in some African countries political development begins with political decay. Some degree of dis-modernisation gets underway. It may be a matter of regret. However, political development began with the painful decomposition of the old colonial structures.’ Some post-conflict countries in Africa, such as Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, and Eritrea are examples to illustrate the degree of political development after some period of ‘dis-modernisation’ or ‘retreat from modernity’. The resource-rich country of Sierra Leone, after a decade of violent and bloody civil war, that resulted in societal fragmentation and state collapse, has in the post-conflict political order organised its first peaceful, free and fair democratic elections in its 40 year political history. The country is making considerable progress in re-building state governing institutions based on the rule of law and democratic accountability. It is therefore important to understand the factors that contribute to the ‘retreat from modernity’ and the potential for re-building new institutions and political communities from the ashes of the old colonial state.

The horrifying brutality and primordial violence perpetuated in these internal wars have led to the facile conclusion by some analysts that this is nothing more than ‘mindless violence’ and new barbarism, i.e. ‘violence driven by environmental and cultural imperatives’. I have contended that the new barbarism thesis is an inadequate and misleading interpretation of the causes of conflict in Africa. Linked to the new barbarism thesis is the ‘new racism’ interpretation, which focuses on cultural differences and perceives such differences as a source for social disruption, violence, antagonism and conflict. New barbarism, argues Mark Duffield, tends to emphasize one aspect of the new racism discourse, i.e. the primordial, innate and irrational cultural and ethnic identity. The new barbarism discourse has been influential in the interpretation of conflicts in Africa and also in media portrayals of the continent, hence the justification for disengagement from Africa, leaving the Africans to their primordial and destructive devices and antics.

The multiplicity of civil wars and the political economy of violence in Africa has also led to the general description of these post-Cold War conflicts as ‘new wars’. These new wars are broadly low- and high-intensity armed conflicts ranging from identity-based wars instigated by ethnicity, religion and nationalism to conflict over resources. They are in part a product of the negative effects of economic globalisation and the marginalisation, exclusion and radicalisation of dispossessed segments of the population, the erosion of state authority and welfare/security provision capacity, and the resulting internal resistance that have led to state collapse and societal fragmentation. But what is new about the ‘new wars’? The new wars describe the multiplicity of internal armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period involving states, non-state actors and sub-national groups fighting as a result of contested identities, and a struggle for access and control over state power and its resources, but simultaneously taking advantage of the opportunities provided by economic globalisation and war economies. Civilians have become the main targets and casualties of the new wars. Describing the political economy of diamond resources and the regionalisation of the civil war in Sierra Leone, I have illustrated how the civil war has linked warlords, political elites, regional leaders, MNCs, the international diamond industry and trading centers, the arms trade, drug trafficking, Al Qaeda terrorist operatives, and money laundering in a strategic military economic and commercial alliance.
A distinctive feature of the new wars is not only how they are financed, but also their regionalisation. The contagion effects or the ‘fire next door’ dynamics have led to the spreading of armed conflicts into neighbouring states, warranting regional interventions. The Liberian civil war of 1989 eventually spread into neighbouring Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. It also led to the deployment of a regional intergovernmental collective peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. The DRC war has led to the intervention of eight belligerent countries in the Great Lakes and Southern Africa regions, and the ‘informal partitioning’ of DRC into spheres of political, economic and strategic interests. The long-running conflicts in Sudan and Angola have developed strong regional dimensions, and in 2002, the government of Sudan formally accepted the intervention of the Ugandan armed forces into southern Sudan in military pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels fighting the Museveni government in northern Uganda. The interlocking nature of the new wars in Africa and the regionalisation of these conflicts have led to the informal re-drawing of the territorial boundaries in the exploitation of the war economics. The Charles Taylor (President of Liberia)-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel faction in Sierra Leone, at the height of the civil war, controlled the diamond-rich territories in eastern and southern Sierra Leone. The territorial borders of Liberia were, therefore, informally extended into Sierra Leone. The privatization and economic exploitation of the DRC war by both Rwanda and Uganda inevitably led to the extension of the borders of both countries into eastern Congo. Another feature of the new wars is the use of factional forces and civil militias by conventional forces in the pursuit of their military, strategic and economic interests.

I contend that there is nothing new about these so-called ‘new wars’, in that the Cold War proxy wars such as in Angola and Mozambique and secessionist conflicts such as the Biafran civil war in Nigeria and Congo have some of the features and elements of the so-called ‘new wars’ in Africa. However, it is important to recognize the relevance of the following and their considerable impact on and facilitation of the new wars: the changed international environment of the 1990s and the changing nature of wars and conflicts, and the exploitation of forces of economic globalisation by all parties to the conflict. It has become evident that sub-state groups and non-state actors involved in and instigating internal warfare have simply adapted the classic Clausewitzian dictum of war as ‘a continuation of political and economic intercourse, carried on with other means’ to achieve their diverse goals. Mike Smith is however skeptical about the ‘sudden’ academic interest in internal warfare or asymmetrical wars, describing them as a ‘new’ phenomenon. He asserts that:

For this to inspire exhortation about the appearance of ‘new wars’ is itself an indication of the Eurocentric mindset of much contemporary security studies posturing. Vicious civil wars sustained by identify politics, supported by diasporas and waged by paramilitary gangs with a sideline in pecuniary crime have rumbled on from one decade to the next. For all practical purposes, the end of the Cold War has been meaningless for most of these wars as any number of continuing violent struggles, including those in the Basque Country, Burma, Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Sudan and Zaire, provide testament. The truth is that these wars and numerous others like them have always constituted the predominant form of warfare post-1945 and even pre-1945 . . . The key intellectual distinction is that this salient fact was ignored in mainstream strategic studies and international relations thinking for much of the Cold War . . . Now, by seeking to reconstitute this false category of war under different headings such as ‘new war’, ‘ethnic war’ or ‘complex emergencies’, writers merely reveal their own limited grasp of the history of warfare.

Generations of Conflict Analysis in Africa

A starting point for the categorisation of conflict is a basic definition of the term ‘conflict’. A conflict arises between individuals or groups with incompatible interests and objectives. Hugh Miall outlines four features that define a conflict, i.e. perception amongst parties that a conflict exists; incompatible views regarding interests, values, objectives or hostile interaction must lie at the root of a conflict, the parties may be either states or non-state actors or sub-national groups within the state; and the outcome of conflict must be considered important by the parties. When parties to a con-
Conflict engage in hostile interaction and use of force with the aim to control, injure or destroy the opponent, this is regarded as armed conflict. However, it is important to recognise that conflict is an intrinsic aspect of human existence. It is the inability to resolve incompatible interests and differences that leads to violence. Peter Wallensteen and Karen Axell have developed a casualty criterion to categorise armed conflicts into three classifications:

1. Minor armed conflict: where battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1000.
2. Intermediate armed conflict: where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, and where more than 25, but less than 1000 deaths, have occurred during a particular year.
3. Wars: where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of one particular year.30

The classification of armed conflict into distinct categories is problematic when applied to contemporary intra-state wars in Africa for a variety of reasons. It is not only difficult to secure reliable statistics on battle-related casualties, but these ‘civilian-based’ internal warfares have also induced starvation, disease and appalling human misery, resulting in deaths. The civil wars also constantly swing from ‘low’- to ‘high-intensity’ warfare. The low-intensity period may sometimes last two to three years with less than 25 battle-related deaths for a variety of reasons, including cease-fire, an on-going peace process and a relapse into further war. With this in mind, the generation of conflict analysis outlines the distinct types of wars and armed conflicts in Africa and their conceptual interpretations. The taxonomy of wars also attempts to illustrate the history of regionalisation of wars and armed conflicts in Africa.

Wars of National Liberation

Wars of national liberation, or anti-colonial wars, were common between the 1950s and 1980s. The primary objective was to secure national self-determination or self-rule and the end of colonial domination through armed rebellion. They have been variously described as wars of national self-determination or revolutionary wars. These are wars in which societies seek to establish their own state through a war of ‘national liberation’ or it may ‘involve resistance by various peoples against domination, exclusion, persecution, or dispossession of lands and resources, by the post-colonial state’.31 The wars of national liberation were mainly fought against European colonial rule. The end of the Second World War and the weakness of European empires precipitated decolonisation in colonized territories in Africa. Whilst in the majority of Africa, decolonisation was by peaceful transfer of power, in some countries, armed struggle became the only means of ending colonial rule. These wars of national liberation included Algeria between 1954–62, Angola, 1961–74, Guinea-Bissau, 1962–74, Mozambique, 1964–75, Zimbabwe, 1965–80, and Namibia, 1966–90.

But colonial domination and national self-determination has not only been a European affair. Eritrea had to fight a 30-year war of national self-determination against Ethiopian domination and finally secured its political independence in 1994. The Saharawi people, under the political umbrella of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Front (POLISARIO) since 1975, are still fighting a war of national liberation from Moroccan domination.

The wars of national liberation were also coloured with the Cold War ideological conflict and competition, and the majority of the wars of self-determination were interpreted as communist/socialist-based insurgencies against the capitalist west. The majority of the anti-colonial wars not only received political, military and economic support from communist and socialist regimes, but also some of the post-independence governments established were based on socialist ideologies such as the MPLA government in Angola, FRELIMO (Frente de Liberacão de Mozambique) in Mozambique, PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, and FLN in Algeria. The OAU made it a policy to ‘eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa’ and the continental political organisation, therefore, promoted and supported
decolonisation of all of Africa, though this was soon to conflict with its principle of the inviolability of territorial borders of African states.

Wars of national liberation have been different in the various sub-regions and colonial spheres of influence. The British fought a bloody and protracted battle with the Mau Mau in Kenya, and the French in Algeria. The former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique fought a long drawn out war with the Portuguese government and, after the fall of Salazar's regime in 1974, the colonies secured a rather chaotic transfer of power. In the Horn of Africa, the Somalis' attempt to create a 'greater Somalia' was unsuccessful. In Southern Africa, the national liberation wars in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia (South West Africa) were affected by the former apartheid South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation of the 'frontline states'.

The wars of national liberation were not only about self-determination, but also about fundamental grievances and complexities, which in most cases, the nationalist leaders utilised as a mobilising force against colonial rule. This had serious implications for post-independence political settlements and the nature of domestic politics.

Two evident conclusions could be made with reference to wars of national liberation. Firstly, the potential of the regional dimensions of these wars of liberation were limited by the context of the Cold War. This is not to say that there were no regional effects or spill-over from these wars of self-determination. Secondly, the majority of the newly independent states were less concerned with the creation of sub-regional peace and security systems. Their primary concern was the establishment of a continental political and economic body which became manifest in the OAU.

Cold War Proxy Wars

During the Cold War, Africa was a strategic sphere of influence for the superpowers, due to a variety of political, ideological, economic and military interests. The Cold War ideological confrontation converted Africa into a hostile battleground, and the rivalry played out on the continent ensured support for opposite sides of the East-West divide. The Cold War context, and in particular, the strategic imperative to have allies in Africa and to contain the 'threat of communism' saw the outbreak of proxy wars orchestrated by both sides of the Cold War divide. Cold War competition in Africa directly instigated conflicts in Angola in 1975 and Somalia in 1977. Apartheid South Africa's intervention in Angola to prevent the communist-based MPLA from taking power led to the deployment of 12,000 Cuban troops in support of the MPLA government. The perception of communist threat and spread in Southern Africa, not only intensified conflict in Angola, but also instigated another Cold War proxy war between FRELIMO and RENAMO. In addition, it also reduced western pressure for political reform in apartheid South Africa.

The Cold War conflict and competition, and the virtual partitioning of Africa into ideological spheres of influence, led to the support for client states, and the propping up in power of brutal, anti-democratic and authoritarian regimes that owed allegiance and their very survival to the superpowers. Corrupt and tyrannical regimes in states such as Siad Barre's Somalia, Mobutu's Zaire, Mengistu's Ethiopia, and Stevens' Sierra Leone were maintained in power to serve the vested interests of the superpowers and their allies. The Cold War security dictum was based on maintaining order and stability in client states. Former President George Bush Sr. is noted to have described the brutal dictator of Zaire, the late Mobutu Seseko, as 'America's greatest friend in Africa' whilst Ronald Reagan once described the tyrannical UNITA leader, the late Jonas Savimbi, as a 'freedom fighter'.

In some of the more strategic regions of Africa, crucial to the interests of the superpowers, such as the Horn and Southern Africa, there were dramatic increases in arms supplies and military expenditure. According to a DFID report, 'In 1988 alone, at the end of the Cold War, they amounted to more than US$4 billion'. There was also a substantial increase in aid flows and development assistance in support of these puppet regimes. This
led to large-scale armament and the growth of military and paramilitary forces in Africa. The end of the Cold War and the down-sizing of the militaries, have led to the proliferation of Cold War weaponry and free-lance ‘soldiers’ fuelling wars in many regions in Africa.

The Cold War proxy wars instigated by superpower rivalry and security frameworks in Africa undermined the political development and stability of the continent. With the end of the Cold War, support for client states ended and the removal of Cold War patronage led to the collapse of puppet regimes, and the simmering conflicts, previously contained by the Cold War, now exploded into bloody civil wars. Luc van de Goor et al, therefore, argued that: ‘As long as the global political system was characterised by the East-West divide, most armed conflicts could be successfully explained by the tension between the super-powers.’

The notion of proxy war is not only limited to the Cold War period. New types of proxy wars have emerged and limited to the so-called new wars in the post-Cold War period. Former President Charles Taylor of Liberia’s surrogate war in Sierra Leone through the RUF-backed rebels, and both Presidents Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame of Rwanda’s orchestrated wars in the DRC are examples of these post-Cold War proxy wars. The distinguishing feature of these post-Cold War proxy wars is that they have turned the Cold War dictum on its head. During the Cold War, the principle was based on maintenance of order and stability at all cost in client states. Now, the ‘perverted’ principle is disorder and instability at all cost in ‘client states’ or spheres of territorial control for maximum resource exploitation and accumulation.

Secessionist Wars

The arbitrary partitioning of Africa into colonial territorial units at the Berlin Congress of 1885, lumped together disparate communities and peoples into an uneasy administrative entity called a state. It was inevitable that this kind of arbitrary arrangement of peoples would led to ethno-nationalist wars and secession, and this was aggravated in the post-colonial period by the domination, exclusion and disposition of land and resources of particular communities in the new political entity. The secessionist war in Congo between 1960–65 was the beginning of the shape of things to come, hence the OAU enshrined the inviolability of the inherited colonial borders into its Charter.

Wars of secession to create self-government and independent states occurred in the following countries: Sudan 1955–1972, Nigeria, 1966–69, Namibia, 1999 (Caprivi strip), Senegal, 1982 to present (Casamance), and Somalia, 1984–89 (North West). The majority of these secessionist wars failed because the OAU and the international community strongly opposed the break-up of the post-colonial state because of the generalized chaos that would ensue from the contestation of colonial boundaries in Africa. In effect, the secessionist wars affected state formation and nation building, and in some cases, such as Eritrea, it prevented ‘state making’ until 1994. These secessionist wars, often with external support, shifted between periods of violence and attempts at political negotiation and settlement. But how different are secessionist wars from wars of national liberation? The claim could be made that secessionist wars have occurred in the post-colonial states protected by the OAU charter recognizing the inviolability of colonial inherited boundaries. The principle of self-determination was never assumed to apply to post-colonial states. Self-determination was understood and applied by nationalist leaders in a limited sense, i.e. only to external European colonial domination. But this principle was later appropriated by nations and political communities who found themselves in an ‘uneasy and artificial’ colonial union. These nations, therefore, used the same principle of self-determination to secede from the post-colonial state.

Inter-state/Conventional Wars

Conventional wars are conflicts between states and are fought with regular armed forces and sometimes, paramilitary forces, along defined military fronts. The primary targets are military and strategic installations, the forces use expensive military technology and
armoury such as jet fighters and heavy artillery. These are costly wars and, hence, increasingly limited in Africa. The analysis of inter-state wars has dominated the strategic studies literature, and received not only more international media attention but was also treated as an important academic pursuit in the 1970s and 1980s, unlike the so-called low-intensity or unconventional warfare.


These wars are normally a result of conflict over contested inter-state borders, in particular when the territory in question has strategic resources such as the Nigeria-Cameroon conflict over the Bakasi peninsula. The attempt to annex, or the annexation of, disputed territory or territorial claims have often led to inter-state conflicts. In addition, the interference in the internal affairs or domestic politics of a neighbouring state by supporting dissident groups or separatist movements, has also sparked off inter-state conflict. However, the official justification for war often hides the root cause of the conflict, and it may be in some cases due to fundamental political, ideological and personal differences between the political leaders of both countries, or a history of hostile community interaction and inter-state relations. This often resulted in the desire by one state to effect regime change in another, for example, President Nyerere of Tanzania’s war against Uganda in 1978 to ‘kick out’ the brutal military dictatorship of Idi Amin and to install his friend and socialist ally, Milton Obote.

Identity-based Wars

Ethnic (previously described in much of the literature as tribal) and religious wars and armed conflicts are broadly conceptualized as identity-based wars in terms of the threat perception to core identities and values and how they create a mobilisational force for armed conflict. Ethnicism and contested identities have dominated the literature on the analysis of conflict and have come to represent the stereotypical images of Africa. Identity constitutes, but is not limited to, the following: race, ethnicity, religion, language, nationalism and cultural/common heritage. Political ethnicity, religious fundamentalism and virulent nationalism have led to the emergence of assertive identity politics with the capacity to mobilise public support for its cause, exploit the advantages and disadvantages of globalisation, and the capacity to instigate violent conflict. The growth and intractability of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Algeria and Liberia has re-focused academic and international policy attention on the subject. But ethnic-based conflict and genocide is not a new phenomenon in Africa. The exploitation of ethnic differences was a common feature of colonial rule in Africa. In Rwanda (1960–64) and Burundi (1970–74) there were outbreaks of ethnic strife and genocide. In Rwanda alone, the 1994 genocide claimed an estimated 1 million people. These ethnic, or identity-based, wars rely on low technology weapons such as machetes, knives, spears and small arms. The perception of enmity is fuelled by a centrally directed and planned propaganda against the so-called ‘enemy’. It involves the dehumanisation of the ‘enemy’ or ‘opponent’, for example, the Hutu government and Interehamwe militia’s propaganda media in Rwanda described the Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ that must be killed. The eventual ethnic and genocidal fighting rapidly spread into a conflagration involving forced migration, massive displacement and huge numbers of civilian casualties.

Identity-based violence, in particular ethnically motivated armed conflict, is emerging as a common feature in Africa. In fact, ethnicity and tribalism have been popular interpretations of conflict in Africa. Oliver Furley asserts that: ‘Ethnicity in fact has often been a major cause of African conflicts and it continues to be so.’ There is ample evidence to show that ethnicity does kill, i.e. the simple fact of belonging, or the perception of belonging, to a particular ethnic group has led to countless instances of people being killed and whole communities massacred. Stephen Ellis gives a vivid account of the killing and extermination of whole communities in Liberia for the simple reason of belonging or being seen as a Khran, Gio, Mandingo. In conflict situations, ethnicity sometimes becomes the only
banner of protection or ‘safe haven’ as people are killed or spared simply by belonging to a particular ethnic group, irrespective of political or ideological views. Ethnic solidarity provides a sense of protection, and a rallying force to kill the perceived ‘enemy’. It is, therefore, not surprising that ethnicism has been used to explain conflict and genocide in countries such as Nigeria and Rwanda. Donald Horowitz’s book was influential in simplifying the explanation of civil wars in ethnic and tribal terms by asserting that: ‘In divided societies, ethnic conflict is at the centre of politics... Ethnic conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and is often seen as the root of violence.’

But some crucial questions need valid and critical answers. ‘Is ethnicity the root cause of conflict in Africa?’ ‘Does ethnicity kill?’ Why do some multi-ethnic states disintegrate into civil war and others, despite ethnic pluralism, have not faced wars and armed conflicts? Are all conflicts not in some ways about identity or the contesting of identities? It is argued that the ethnic and identity-based interpretation of conflict in Africa is not only simplistic, but also problematic because ethnicity is not just the composition of language, culture and history, but also about perception of identity by groups, family and community or attribution by outsiders. Language, in fact, is a poor guide to ethnic or tribal identity because the deliberate effort to promote good ‘neighbourliness’ has led to the speaking of several tribal languages in many regions of Africa. Equally, dress mode and skin-colour do not provide an objective criteria as to ethnic origin. Adeboyo Adedeji explains that decades of Tutsi migration at different times from Rwanda and Burundi to neighbouring countries has led to the emergence of a new ethnic group, the Banyanwanda, in both Uganda and DRC.

Because ethnicity is socially constructed, it is not a static concept, but rather dynamic, as it is constantly mutating and is reconstructed over time. The valid argument is that ethnicity is not so much the problem, but rather is the politicisation, exploitation and manipulation of ethnicism by the political elites and governing class. The political class, in the desperate attempt to secure state power and its patrimonial resources, has often demonstrated remarkable recklessness and a total lack of restraint in manipulating ethnicity by peddling stereotypes and prejudices against opposing groups. The pursuit of political office, personal ambition and the interests of the political elites are framed in ethnic terms to mobilise ethnic solidarity. The political contest, even within the rules of democratic politics, becomes a fight between ‘us’ versus ‘them’, with clearly dividing faultlines. Ethnicity, in this context, is therefore politicised, manipulated and mobilised to instigate violence, and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality mobilised, often degenerating into ‘tribe-to-tribe’, ‘ethnic-to-ethnic’, ‘people-to-people’ violence and programs as in Rwanda. The fact is that political parties, military establishments, the ruling and governing elites are largely regionally and ethnically based; the politicisation of ethnicity, therefore, provides avenues for regime consolidation, survival and access to state resources. The multi-ethnic character of most African states creates the circumstances for violent politicisation of ethnicity. Rival communities, with the perception of threat to their survival (real or imagined) see the control of the state and its resources as the only means of survival.

If ethnic homogeneity were to promote durable peace and stability, then the Hutus and Tutsis would not be killing each other nor would Somalia have disintegrated into chaos in the 1990s. The fact is that the Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language, and share the same territory and cultural traditions. Similarly, Somalia is unique in terms of its ethnic homogeneity in that its people share the same ancestral origin, language, religion, culture and nomadic heritage. Furthermore, if ethnicism were to be at the heart of the violent conflict and internal warfare in Africa, then one would want to know why is it the case that the majority of multi-ethnic polities have not degenerated into civil wars, but rather are making relative progress in state formation and nation building? The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, therefore, posits that:

The words ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’, ‘tribal’ or ‘factional’—important as they may be in intergroup conflict—do not, in most cases, adequately explain why people use massive violence to achieve their goals. These descriptions do not, of themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over their differences. To label a conflict simply as ethnic war can lead to misguided policy choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural or religious differences inevitably result in violent conflict and that differences therefore must be suppressed.
Braathen, Bøås and Saether’s edited book makes an important contribution to the debate. Though they acknowledge the role played by ethnicity in most conflicts in Africa, in terms of how ‘ethnic affiliation often structures the composition of armed factions’, they argue that it is important to understand the socio-economic, historical and geographical context in which ethnicity suddenly becomes a relevant and divisive issue. Chabal and Daloz make a valid case for the need to focus on unraveling ‘why’ and ‘how’ ethnicity becomes politically exploited. Braathen, Bøås and Saether raise the pertinent question: Why is the outbreak of war in the western hemisphere seen as a result of a number of interactive factors while the outbreak of the Somali civil war is seen as a result of Somali culture, something that lies in the ‘Blood and Bone’ to quote a title from Lewis (Lewis, 1994)? As in every war, the Somali case also has distinct aspects, but this cannot explain why the tribal arguments constitute a paradigm in one case while it is left out in others. War signifies the struggle over the distribution of power, wealth and the representation of identities everywhere.

The above authors, therefore, argue that the dominant Eurocentric discourse such as cultural evolution, narratives such as the ‘white man’s burden’ of civilising ‘primitive and savage’ African tribes, colonial rule and the mapping of societies into native authority, have created, reinforced and perpetuated ethnic and tribal stereotypes. What may superficially appear as ‘ethnic conflict’ is in reality a complex conflict rooted in the political, socio-economic and historical context of the polity. Braathen et al, therefore, view the instrumental utility of ethnicity or identity as serving strategic interests and goals as a conflict instigating factor, rather than ethnicity per se. This accounts for the departure in the recent literature on the civil war in Rwanda that does not buy into the simplistic interpretation of the war as an ethnicity conflict, but instead tries to understand the conflict based on fundamental political, socio-economic grievances and conditions faced by the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Rwanda, as in other war-torn countries in Africa, increasing poverty and exclusion from the economic and political processes of the majority of the populace or certain segments of the polity, have provided a breeding ground for instigating politically motivated ethnic conflict.

But the politicisation, exploitation and mobilisation of ethnicity to serve particular interests is not a unique phenomenon in Africa. The examples of genocide in the Balkans in the 1990s, the ethno-religious violence in the Indonesian province of Aceh, Nazi pogroms from 1938–44, and the extermination of Armenians by the young Turks in 1915 are illustrations of this global phenomenon.

Conceptually, three competing schools of thought have dominated the interpretations of the link between ethnic solidarity and the propensity of conflict. Firstly, the primordialists see ethnicity as historically rooted and embedded in peoples’ way of life and culture, and re-inforced by social institutions, collective myths and memories—developed from early socialisation, and hence likely to persist over time. Secondly, instrumentalists perceive ethnicity as a front for the pursuit, mobilisation, exploitation and manipulation to secure self-serving or vested interests by individuals or groups. Thirdly, social constructionists perceive ethnicity as an invention of the human imagination, an intellectual construct devoid of objective reality.

In addition, serious research has demonstrated that there is no positive correlation between ethnic pluralism and violent conflict. What is more, most ethnic conflicts are not necessarily violent. There is also the tendency to excessively focus on the dysfunctional aspect of ethnicity rather than highlighting the positive ‘functional integrative’ role played by ethnicity in nation building.

**Resource-based Wars**

In the 1980s and 1990s, increasing academic attention focused on the political economy analysis of civil wars in Africa, in particular, how the nature of domestic politics or prebendal politics creates the sources for violent conflict in Africa. The most recent version of this political economy analysis is the ‘greed and grievance’ thesis put forward by Paul Collier and others as the cause for wars in Africa. The nature of domestic politics based
on patron-clientelistic systems in much of Africa had been driven by informal networks through which state resources were appropriated to support and consolidate regimes in power and their followers. Political clientelism, as a system of governance, was a ‘mechanism of exchange: by recognizing private interests and using the machinery of state to purvey private benefits to groups and individuals, in the process giving them vested—and purely instrumental—interest in the maintenance of the state itself. Linked to the politics of clientelism are patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism, which are extensions of the patron-clientelistic nature of domestic politics in Africa. Patrimonialism, as a basis for governance and exercise of political power, entailed the lack of distinction between public and private relationships and the general privatization and informalisation of political life. In Jean François Medard’s view, ‘public authority has been made an object of appropriation by the formal office holders, functionaries, politicians, and military personnel, who based their strategies of individual ascendancy or family ascendancy on a private usage of the res publica’. Patrimonialism involves a high degree of personalised rule, in which the ‘strongman’, including the ruling and governing elites, are able to extract and redistribute patrimonial resources along regional, ethnic, religious and familial lines in order to consolidate political power and ensure regime survival. This nature of prebendal politics in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Côte d’Ivoire, and many others converted the state into a ‘market’ where office holders competed for the acquisition of material benefits and accumulation. The clientelistic and neo-patrimonial politics in Africa produced immobility, inefficiency, unbridled corruption, illegitimacy and exploitation. The privatization and informalisation of the state progressively weakened the political, legal and economic governing institutions of the ‘official state’, and were subverted to serve the vested interests of the ruling and governing elites who control the ‘shadow state’. In the majority of the extractive-based economies in Africa, a rentier state was to emerge with an excessive dependence on external rents from MNCs, international financial institutions and western governments and donors.

The rentier nature of the economy and the ‘allocation state’ in these circumstances totally failed to formulate any sustainable economic and development policies. The corrosive effects of this nature of domestic politics created the conditions for weak and collapsing states that could hardly respond to the basic imperative of statehood. The crisis of patrimonialism in the post-Cold War period, the agitation for political liberalisation and democratisation, and the global economic recession and its devastating effects on the prices of commodities and strategic resources, meant that the patrimonial system was starved of vital resources needed to maintain and prop up clientelistic politics. Patrimonialism and the rentier mentality in much of Africa created widespread impoverishment, dilapidated social services and infrastructure, poor educational systems and badly managed economies, and the marginalisation and exclusion of the majority of the populace from the political and economic processes in the country. The widespread political and socio-economic discontent provided fundamental grievances and the breeding ground for armed rebellion.

Neo-patrimonial politics, to some extent, explain the ethnicisation and militarisation of politics in Africa. Mass politics are reconstructed along clientelistic and ethnic relationships, with the increasing propensity to use state-sponsored violence and repression as a means to extract legitimacy from the governed. The militarisation of political and socio-economic relations amongst competing elites creates the impetus for the social mobilization of ethnic identities.

Paul Collier and the World Bank-sponsored research programme on The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence, have been influential in promoting and popularising the latest version of the political economy/resource-based analysis of African conflicts, in particular, how economic agendas are the primary cause of conflict in Africa. Collier’s approach makes a distinction between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’, and concludes, based on research findings, that greed is the most important cause of violence. He argues that: ‘A country with large natural resources, many young men and little education is very much more at risk of conflict than one with opposite characteristics. The argument is that economic proxies such as DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan, with high
dependence on primary resources (i.e. lootable products) provide the motivation and driving force for violent conflicts. Collier, therefore, concludes that the ‘true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed’. He further asserts that since both greed-motivated and grievance-motivated rebel organizations will embed their behaviour in a narrative of grievance, the observation of the narrative provides no informational content to the research as to the true motivation for rebellion. According to Collier and others, the availability of primary export commodities provides the opportunity to instigate conflict as an ‘income-earning opportunity’, and ‘create economic opportunities for the majority of actors even as they destroy them for the majority, economic agendas therefore ignite and sustain these wars’. For David Keen, these civil wars could better be understood as the continuation of ‘economics’ by other means.

Collier and other adherents of this ‘greed and grievance’ thesis have been criticised for simplifying the causes of conflict in Africa and, in particular, neglecting the importance of fundamental grievances such as socio-economic inequality, political repression and social fractionalisation of communities. In the so-called proxy economies such as Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola, contrary evidence emphasizes the importance of grievances as the root cause of conflict rather than ‘greed’. There is no denying the fact that ‘lootable resources’ fuel and prolong wars in Africa. Economic resources and agendas, in particular the violent entrepreneurial motives of political leaders, warlords and warring factions, create an environment for illegal business practices and commercial opportunities for a vast array of actors and entrepreneurs at local, national, regional and international levels. These interests, therefore, become entrenched in war economies and the war continues because of the profits and as a way of life and livelihood. According to Mary Anderson, ‘Conflicts often embody elements of both principle and self-aggrandisement. Sometimes the initial purposefulness of war changes, and the war itself becomes the reason for future fighting.’ Though greed plays a role in fuelling and prolonging wars in Africa, the relationship is not as simple as Collier claims, and in fact to conclude that greed is the cause of conflict is to miss the key point in conflict analysis, i.e. no single interpretation can explain conflict situations in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter. The focus on the criminalisation of leadership, economic opportunities and profit from organised violence is not the same as the root causes of conflict.

In fact, Adyumobi contends that Collier and others peddling the greed-based analysis of conflicts in Africa are confusing the causes of war with the issues involved in war. Both are very different, and affect wars in different ways. Furthermore, the link between greed and grievance is far more complex than merely financing, rent-seeking and predatory motivations of warlords, political leaders and warring factions. I have argued elsewhere that the popularization of the ‘greed and grievance’ thesis has been unhelpful in conflict analysis in Africa and using one of the proxy economies, Sierra Leone, I raised pertinent questions to erode the validity of the thesis in that, ‘in countries such as Sierra Leone, why is it the case that though diamonds were discovered in the 1930s, the country did not degenerate into violent civil war in the pre-1990s era? Does this not undermine the economic exploitation, resource-based interpretation of civil wars as the primary cause?’

It is also argued that the relationship between resources, economic agendas and civil wars is nothing new. For example, the Cold War proxy war in Angola had all the elements of Collier’s analysis, but could not be simply categorised as the cause of the conflict in Angola. The secessionist wars in Nigeria, Western Sahara, and Zaire were also about armed struggle to control strategic resources. With the end of the Cold War patronage, commercial and economic interests within the context of globalisation now become the new strategic consideration.

Two important observations need to be emphasized from the taxonomy of conflict analysis in Africa. Firstly, that identity-based and resource-based analysis of conflict have demonstrated the greatest potential for spill-over effects of civil wars or the regionalisa-
tion of domestic armed conflicts. From a negative perspective, both identity and resource-based post-Cold War conflicts have generated devastating regional consequences, and in some cases, instigated new wars in neighbouring states. However, from a positive perspective, these identity and resource-based wars have forced on weak and quasi-states the imperative to build regional peace and security systems. Secondly, the generations of conflict analysis, and in particular, the identity and resource-based categorisation reinforces the need to develop and focus on a case-by-case understanding of conflict. No two conflicts are ever the same, despite some commonalities. For example, the war in Sudan could be variously described as war of secession (South seceding from rest of country), identity (Islam North vs. Christianity South, Arab vs. black Africans) and resources (oil, political power)-based conflicts. Similarly, the DRC war could also fit into the description of some of the generations of conflict analysis such as proxy war, identity and resource-based war, and secessionist conflict (Mayi Mayi nationalist rebellion).

The diverse theoretical interpretations and generations of conflict analysis underscore the multi-dimensional and multi-level nature of conflict and its causes in Africa. Any analysis of the causes of conflict in Africa should involve an exploration of the root causes, and secondary and tertiary causes, the historical legacies and particular conflict situations, and external factors. This analysis should be combined with an analysis of the structures that predispose communities to violent conflict, in particular, the perceptions and meanings attributed to these institutions, events and policies, and how these are mobilised to instigate conflict. In addition, analysis of the causes and structures should also include analysis of the actors, i.e. individual, group, community incentives and motivations at local, national, regional and international levels, and the dynamics of conflict, i.e. the changing nature of conflict and its destructive process, and how this reshapes perceptions of causes of war, transforms relations and serves as a trigger for new armed conflict, or creates opportunities for resolution of conflict.

Two important elements relevant to conflict analysis are the role played by external factors and the link between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict. External factors continue to play considerable and, sometimes, decisive roles in instigating violent conflicts in Africa. The development paradigms prescribed for Africa, in particular the latest stage of neo-liberal development orthodoxy, the 'Washington Consensus' Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), have instigated or exacerbated conflicts in Africa. The imposition of SAPs and its negative effects sparked off, and in some cases, fuelled conflicts and hastened the collapse of states in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire. The international economic environment has in most cases aggravated the problems of these weak economies in that unfavourable trade restrictions and lack of access to the world market for primary producers, fluctuating terms of trade, increasing debt burden and debt service obligations have all contributed to the poor performance and devastation of African economies. This has inevitably produced increasing poverty and depressed social and development indicators.

Therefore, developmentalists see a positive correlation between conflict and the nature and dynamics of underdevelopment, hence the only way to prevent and reduce armed conflict and its 'associated pathologies of crime and terrorism' is to respond with development programmes to remedy the underdevelopment malaise. Duffield posits that: 'The association of underdevelopment with high risk of conflict is now a core assumption within the development discourse.' Similarly, many development agencies and analysts draw a positive correlation between poverty and the risks of conflict. Despite varying interconnectedness, development analysts also acknowledge that there is no direct causal relationship between poverty and conflict. It is argued that, in several respects, there is no automatic relationship between poverty and conflict, though poverty and underdevelopment do have conflict instigating aspects. Some of the countries listed at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Report 2003 such as Burkina Faso, Malawi, The Gambia, Benin and Tanzania have not degenerated into armed conflict due to poverty and underdevelopment. Also, some middle-income regions such as the Balkans are mired in conflict. Therefore, ‘poverty does not cause conflict, it only increases its probability.’
New Security Threats in Africa

The widespread wars and armed conflicts in Africa illustrate the dominance of the traditional conception of security, i.e. equated with protection and safety of the state, and the management and use of military force. The perception of security in terms of external threat has dominated the thinking in the Cold War period and International Relations, based on the realist and neo-realist paradigms. But security itself is a ‘contested concept’ in terms of definition, interpretation and specification. Barry Buzan outlines twelve different definitions of security to illustrate the problematic nature of the concept. Put simply, security is a ‘condition of being or feeling safe from harm or danger’. The interpretation and specification of the ‘condition’ of ‘being safe’ from who or what, and the nature and type of ‘danger’ and the normative elements, are part of the problematic of the conceptualisation of security. Other international relations theorists perceive security as the defence, protection and preservation of ‘core values’, and the ‘absence of threat to acquired values’. But, even at the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, the traditional conception of security focusing on national security, interests and power, with the state as the primary referent object of security, the condition of anarchy in the international system, and the military use or threat of force, was criticised by various scholars as not reflecting the nature and complexity of security. The emerging sources of threat to security could not be explained within the framework of the traditional conception of security. For example, the OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil price rises in 1973 due to the Arab-Israeli war highlighted the relevance of economic security and the role of strategic resources in national security. Richard Ullman was critical of the ‘militarisation of the concept of security’. Together with other scholars, Ullman advocated a redefinition of the concept of security and the broadening of the security agenda to take on board the non-military dimensions of security such as the environment, migration, disease, transnational crime, natural disasters, global wealth and poverty divisions, ethno-religious and nationalist identities and the dangers of cybercrime and terrorism. The non-military/non-traditional threats to security have led to the broadening of the reference objects of security to include individuals, non-state actors and sub-national groups.

In Africa, non-military dimensions of security such as environmental degradation, poverty, resource scarcity, ethno-religious and nationalist identities, crime, drugs, disease such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, natural catastrophes like drought, famine and flood, and mass migration of people, have all threatened individual and societal security and survival, and even national security. These non-traditional sources of threat to security affect life, health, status, wealth and freedom of individuals, societies and states, and in some cases have created the conditions for conflict and violence in societies in Africa. The non-military security threats or risks are largely internal rather than external. What is important about these emerging non-military challenges to security and stability is that they emanate from a range of non-state, sub-state actors and factors and are trans-state in character. Also, the dangers and challenges posed by these non-traditional military security threats are not confined to a particular state or geographic region. They represent dangers which are diffuse, multidimensional and multidirectional. These new concerns suggest that individuals as well as states are endangered.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the non-military challenges and threats to security in Africa are increasingly emerging as a key focus for policy- and decision-makers, and analysts. The African Leadership Forum asserted that: ‘The concept of security goes beyond military consideration. It embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life.’ With Africa being the least developed region of the world, it is understandable why the non-traditional sources of threat to security, within the context of widespread wars and conflict, are increasingly attracting the attention of national, regional and international leaders. The UNDP Human Development Report 2002 gives a
depressing picture of development, economic and social indicators. During the 1990s, the number of people living in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) rose from 242 million to 300 million. In comparison, extreme poverty was reduced in South Asia by 7 per cent during the 1990s. In SSA, the estimated number of people living on less than US$1 a day by the end of the 1990s was 46.7 per cent. In addition, per capita income shrank by 0.3 per cent in SSA in the 1990s, while there was an appreciable increase in annual growth in per capita income of 3.3 per cent in South Asia.

But it is necessary to recognize that within Africa there are different sub-regional dimensions of threat to security, for example, desertification in North Africa; famine, drought, and flooding in the Horn and Southern Africa. Desertification in parts of West Africa, the Horn and Southern Africa is threatening human security. In addition, deforestation and overgrazing undermine land productivity, on which the livelihoods of the people depend. Scarce water and land resources in some parts of Africa undermine the security and the very survival of peoples and the preservation of core values of communities. In addition, Africa is emerging as the world’s ‘soft-underbelly’ for global terrorism, as witnessed by the Al Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, terrorist attacks in Mombassa, Kenya in 2002, and Morocco in 2003, and Islamic fundamentalist bombings in South Africa. The conflict zones, state failure and collapse, weak law and state governing institutions, porous borders, the corruption and ‘privatisation’ of the security and banking institutions, and the radicalisation of disaffected populations, have made Africa a safe-haven and recruiting ground for terrorist organisations. Therefore, terrorism, whether state-sponsored, group or individual, is a serious threat to human, societal and national security.

Furthermore, two non-military sources of threats to security in Africa that warrant some discussion are HIV/AIDS and migration. Perhaps the greatest security threat faced by contemporary Africa is the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Though the disease is a global problem and regarded as a ‘global security threat’ as outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1308 in January 2000, it is not given the urgency that it deserves in some regions of Africa. Those countries that are seriously affected by the disease have now considered it as a ‘national security threat’. Wars, political instability, internal displacement, mass migrations and refugee movement are intensifying the spread of the disease in Africa. By the end of 2000, an estimated 22 million people had died from AIDS, 13 million children lost one or both parents to AIDS, and more than 40 million people are living with HIV, of which 75 per cent are in SSA. In Botswana, the most HIV/AIDS affected country, more than a third of adults have the disease and life expectancy has dropped to from 60.2 years to 44.4 years and was projected to drop to 36 from 2000–2005. More than 20 countries in Africa have a 4 per cent HIV adult prevalence rate. The life expectancy in the 35 worst affected countries in Africa is estimated at 48.3 years. The impact of HIV/AIDS on development and economic growth is devastating. In Botswana, the income for the poorest quarter of households will drop by 13 per cent over the next 10 years as a result of HIV/AIDS. A Zambian study shows that two-thirds of urban households that have lost their main breadwinner to AIDS experienced a loss of income of 80 per cent. Zambia lost 1,300 teachers due to AIDS in the first ten months of 1998, the equivalent of two-thirds of all the new teachers trained annually. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that in the 27 most affected African countries, 7 million agricultural workers have died from AIDS since 1995, thereby aggravating the food security problems. Women make up 58 per cent of people living with HIV/AIDS in SSA.

Some African countries are making progress in tackling the pandemic. Uganda, described in the 1980s as the possible scene for an AIDS apocalypse, has reduced HIV prevalence from 14 per cent in the early 1990s to around 5 per cent by the end of 2001. AIDS is not only the number one killer in Africa, but is also attacking the most productive segment of the population. According to Mark Malloch Brown:

AIDS is devastating in terms of creating and deepening poverty, reversing achievements in education, diverting meager health budgets away from other priorities. And by cutting deep into all sectors of society, HIV/AIDS undermines vital economic growth—perhaps reducing future GDP in Africa by a third over the next 20 years. Moreover, by putting huge additional demand
on already weak, hard to access public services, it is setting up the terms of a desperate con-

Conflict over inadequate resources.76

Migration, i.e. the voluntary and involuntary movements of people within states and ac-

cross national borders, is emerging as a major security threat in Africa. The primary

causes of recent migration and population movements in Africa have been wars and armed

conflicts. The widespread wars have led to forced migration and massive refugee flows,

i.e. ‘push-factor’. Ethno-religious persecution, political oppression, in search of economic

and employment opportunities (the ‘pull factor’), environmental degradation, and natu-

ral disasters such as a flood, drought and famine have led to large-scale migrations. An

estimated 13 million people are internally displaced in Africa, with 4 million in Sudan.77

Population movement and refugee flows have created insecurities and also threatened

the peace and security of the continent. In several cases, it has led to violence and ten-

sions between communities and threatened the economic security of the recipient state,

with a huge burden on domestic social services and infrastructure. In other cases, refugees

and migrants threatened the security and stability of the state by taking up arms, using

refugee camps for military training operations, and providing recruitment opportunities

for dissident groups and warring factions as in the regionalised conflicts in West Africa

and the Great Lakes region.78

Conclusion

The widespread wars and conflicts and their devastating effects, and the threats posed

by the non-military dimensions of security have all contributed to converting Africa into

the least developed region in the world. The on-going conflicts, depressing economic,

social and development indicators and the weak political governance, the phenomenon

of state collapse, coupled with the external economic and political environment have seri-

ous implications for the capacity and ability of the continent to promote and sustain

the project of African unity and, in particular, the capacity to build viable regional peace

and security systems. However, these pressing problems and challenges provide the oppor-

tunity for continental and regional co-operative security and solidarity to collectively

respond to both the military and non-military sources of threats to peace, security and

development. A helpful approach is to depart from the usual pigeon-hole and simplistic

interpretations of conflict in Africa. The conflict analysis framework argued in this chap-

ter provides a useful tool to assist conflict and development interveners and the inter-

national community in developing appropriate policies and strategies needed for the man-

agement and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

DOING WELL OUT OF WAR: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

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Excerpted from Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.),

Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars

(Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 91-111

The discourse on conflict tends to be dominated by group grievances beneath which inter

group hatreds lurk, often traced back through history. I have investigated statistically

the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 1965, expecting to find a close rela-

tionship between measures of these hatreds and grievances and the incidence of conflict.

I found that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars start.

Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievances.

If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups therefore have

some interest in initiating and sustaining it. Civil wars create economic opportunities for

a minority of actors even as they destroy them for the majority. I consider which groups

benefit, and what the international community can do to reduce their power.
Economic Agendas as Causes of Conflict

A useful conceptual distinction in understanding the motivation for civil war is between greed and grievance. At one extreme rebellion might arise because the rebels aspire to wealth by capturing resources extralegally. At the other extreme they might arise because rebels aspire to rid the nation, or the group of people with which they identify, of an unjust regime. These two motivations obviously imply radically different types of policy intervention if the international community wishes to promote the prospects of peace. The most obvious way of discovering what motivates people is to ask them. However here we immediately encounter a problem. Those rebel organizations that are sufficiently successful to get noticed are unlikely to be so naive as to admit to greed as a motive. Successful rebel organizations place considerable emphasis on good public relations with the international community. Narratives of grievance play much better with this community than narratives of greed. A narrative of grievance is not only much more functional externally, it is also more satisfying personally: Rebel leaders may readily be persuaded by their own propaganda. Further, an accentuated sense of grievance may be functional internally for the rebel organization. The organization has to recruit—indeed, its success depends upon it. As the organization gets larger, the material benefits that it can offer its additional members are likely to diminish. By playing upon a sense of grievance, the organization may therefore be able to get additional recruits more cheaply. Hence, even where the rationale at the top of the organization is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance. I should emphasize that I do not mean to be cynical. I am not arguing that rebels necessarily deceive others or themselves in explaining their motivation in terms of grievance. Rather, I am simply arguing that since both greed-motivated and grievance-motivated rebel organizations will embed their behavior in a narrative of grievance, the observation of that narrative provides no informational content to the researcher as to the true motivation for rebellion. To discover the truth we need a different research approach.

The approach I take, which is the conventional one in social science, is to infer motivation from patterns of observed behavior. If someone says “I don't like chocolates” but keeps on eating them, we infer that she really likes them, and the question of why she says the opposite is then usually relegated to being of secondary importance. I try to determine patterns in the origins of civil war, distinguishing between those causal factors that are broadly consistent with an economic motivation and those that are more consistent with grievance. I then try to predict whether each country has a civil war during each five-year period from 1960 to 1995 in terms of the values of the causal factors at the beginning of each period. For example, I try to predict whether Kenya had a civil war during the period 1970–1974 in terms of its characteristics as of 1970. This approach only becomes reasonably robust if the coverage is large and comprehensive. I therefore follow current research practice in opting for global coverage, only dropping countries where there are too little data.

I first describe the proxies I use to capture the notion of an economic agenda. The most important one is the importance of exports of primary commodities. I measure this as the share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP). Primary commodity exports are likely to be a good proxy for the availability of “lootable” resources. We know that they are by far the most heavily taxed component of the GDP in developing countries, and the reason for this is that they are the most easily taxed component. Primary commodity production does not depend upon complex and delicate networks of information and transactions, as with manufacturing. It can also be highly profitable because it is based on the exploitation of idiosyncratic natural endowments rather than the more competitive level playing fields of manufacturing. Thus, production can survive predatory taxation. Yet for export it is dependent upon long trade routes, usually originating from rural locations. This makes it easy for an organized military force to impose predatory taxation by targeting these trade routes. These factors apply equally to rebel organizations as to governments. Rebels, too, can impose predatory taxation on primary commodities as long as they can either interrupt some point in the trade route or menace an isolated, and difficult to protect, point of production.
For rebels, primary commodities have one further advantage over other sources of taxation that does not apply to governments. Sometimes, taxation can be much higher if it is levied in kind: The rebels directly extract a proportion of the production, rather than cash. This is particularly likely to apply where production is conducted by poor households rather than by large firms, and the households are themselves cash-scarce because they can only command a small fraction of the international value of their production. If rebels receive taxes in kind, they will need to be able to dispose of the output. Because rebel organizations are extralegal, the disposal of output on international markets potentially poses problems. The more identifiable is the original source of the output, the deeper will be the discount below the international price. Primary commodities have the considerable advantage to rebel organizations that they are generic rather than branded products, and so their origin is much more difficult to determine. The discount from reliance upon extralegal marketing channels can therefore be much smaller.

Although primary commodities are thus a good proxy for the lootable resources that greed-motivated rebels would seek to capture, there are other factors likely to matter for an economic agenda. The most important other factor is likely to be the cost of attracting recruits to the rebellion. Overwhelmingly, the people who join rebellions are young men. Hence, other things equal, we might expect that the total of young men in a society, say those between the ages of 15 and 24, would be a factor influencing the feasibility of rebellion: The greater the proportion of young men, the easier it would be to recruit rebels. Repeatedly, the willingness of young men to join a rebellion might be influenced by their other income-earning opportunities. If young men face only the option of poverty, they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities. I proxy these income-earning opportunities by the amount of education in the society—the average number of years of education the population has received. In developing countries this education will have been disproportionately supplied to young men, so that differences in the average educational endowment between societies will reflect much larger differences in the educational endowments of young males. It might seem to some non-economists that considerations of alternative income-earning opportunities do not enter into the decision process of potential recruits to rebellions. I will therefore give an example of where such considerations were hugely important. The largest civil war of the twentieth century was the Russian civil war of 1919–1920. Both the Red and the White armies were essentially scratch, rebel armies, since the Czarist army had collapsed. For both these rebel armies recruitment and desertion were huge problems. Between them they lost four million men to desertion. Thus, the desertion rate is large enough to be a social rather than just an idiosyncratic phenomenon. The desertion rate was ten times higher in summer than in winter. The reason for this was obviously that both armies were composed of peasants, and during the summer peasants had much higher income-earning opportunities, notably the harvest, than in the winter.

To summarize, my measures of economic agendas will be primary commodities, the proportion of young men in the society, and the endowment of education. There are of course many other potential economic agendas in conflict, such as suppliers of armaments and opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. However, most of these are difficult to measure in a comparative way and so preclude the sort of analysis I undertake here. I now contrast these economic factors with those that proxy grievance.

Rebel narratives of grievance are focused on one or more of four factors. Probably attracting the most horrified fascination from Western media is the expression of raw ethnic or religious hatred. Though such narratives may contain a subtext of specific economic or social grievances, sometimes these refer to very remote time periods, or may appear to be merely illustrations or even pretexts for a deeper hatred. For example this might seem to be the most obvious interpretation of the Serb attack on the population of Kosovo. I measure the tendency to such raw grievances by the extent to which the society is fractionalized by ethnicity and by religion. Specifically, I use indices constructed from historical work by anthropologists that show the probability that any two randomly drawn people from the society are from different ethnic and religious groups. I also multiply the
two indices, which gives a measure of potential cross-cutting cleavages: Societies that are highly fractionalized by both ethnicity and religion will thus get the highest scores on this combined index. Of course, ethnic and religious identities are not given, fixed phenomena, but social constructions. However, they are rather slow to change. I measure them as of 1965 and attempt to explain conflict over the ensuing thirty years; over such a period they have probably changed little.

A second important narrative of grievance is focused on economic inequality. The grievance might refer either to unequal incomes or to unequal ownership of assets. For example, some of the conflicts in Central America are commonly attributed to one or other of these types of inequality. Both of these are now objectively measurable for most societies, although my measure of asset inequality is confined to the ownership of land. However, in low-income countries, land is the major single asset, and so inequalities in its ownership should be a good proxy for overall asset inequality.

A third narrative of grievance is focused on a lack of political rights. If the government is autocratic and repressive, people will have a natural and justifiable desire to overthrow it in the pursuit of democracy. For example, the 1989 uprising in Romania is usually seen as a demand for democracy. Political scientists have now carefully classified political regimes according to the degree of political rights, and I use the one on which most political scientists now base their analyses (the “Polity III” data set).

A final narrative of grievance focuses on government economic incompetence. If a government is seen to inflict sufficient economic misery on its population, it may face an uprising. The successful National Resistance Movement rebellion in Uganda in the early 1980s is often seen as being motivated by despair at gross economic mismanagement by successive regimes. I proxy such economic performance by the rate of growth of per capita income in the preceding five years. Other things equal, an economy that had experienced rapid decline might be more prone to rebellion than one that had experienced rapid growth and so offered hope.

I will now describe the results. The purpose of this chapter is to present results to people who are not necessarily familiar with (or interested in) modern social science research methods. I will simply note that the method used is a “probit” model, which predicts the occurrence of civil war in terms of these underlying factors. The results from this analysis tell the researcher both how important each factor appears to be and how much confidence we can place in that appearance. The results are reported formally in Collier and Hoeffler.2

The results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievance. Indeed, the grievance factors are so unimportant or perverse that there must be a reason for it. And I go on to explain why, I think, grievance-based explanations of civil war are so seriously wrong. First, however, I describe the evidence on the importance of economic agendas.

The presence of primary commodity exports massively increases the risks of civil conflict. Specifically, other things equal, a country that is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income coming from them, has a risk of conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports. The result is also highly significant statistically, meaning that there is only a very small chance that it is a statistical fluke. The presence of a high proportion of young men in a society also increases the risk of conflict, whereas the greater the educational endowment, the lower the risk. Education is relatively more important than the proportion of young men. For example, if we double the proportion of young men, its effect can be offset by increasing the average educational endowment by around two months. Each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around 20 percent. Thus, some societies are much more prone to conflict than others simply because they offer more inviting economic prospects for rebellion. The risk factors multiply up. A country with large natural resources, many young men, and little education is very much more at risk of conflict than one with oppo-
site characteristics. Before drawing out the policy implications, I will turn to the results on grievance.

The only result that supports the grievance approach to conflict is that a prior period of rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict. Each 5 percent of annual growth rate has about the same effect as a year of education for the population in reducing the risk of conflict. Thus, a society in which the economy is growing by 5 percent is around 40 percent safer than one that is declining by 5 percent, other things equal. Presumably, growth gives hope, whereas rapid decline may galvanize people into action. Inequality, whether measured in terms of income or landownership, has no effect on the risk of conflict according to the data. This is, of course, surprising given the attention inequality has received as an explanation of conflict. The results cannot, however, be lightly dismissed. For example the measures of inequality have proved to be significant in explaining economic growth and so are evidently not so noisy as to lack explanatory power. Nor is our result dependent upon a particular specification. Anke Hoeffler and I have experimented with well over a hundred variants of our core specification, and in none of these inequality a significant cause of conflict. (By contrast, primary commodity exports are always significant.)

Political repression has ambiguous effects on the risk of conflict. A society that is highly democratic is safer than one that is only partially democratic. However, severe political repression yields a lower risk of conflict than partial democracy. These effects are of moderate size and only weakly significant: A fully democratic country has a risk of conflict about 60 percent lower than the most dangerously partially democratic societies. In a related work, Hegre et al. investigate the effects of political transition. They find that the transition from one type of political regime, such as repression, to another, such as partial democracy, itself temporarily increases the risk of conflict. However they find that the increased risk fades quite rapidly. One year after the change, three quarters of the risks generated by political transition have evaporated.

The most surprising result for those who emphasize grievance as the cause of conflict concerns ethnic and religious fractionalization. We find that such fractionalization is significant in changing the risk of conflict, the effect is most pronounced and significant when we measure social fractionalization as the combination of ethnic and religious divisions—that is, the potential crosscutting fractionalization created by multiplying the two underlying indices, thus measured, ethnic and religious fractionalization significantly, reduces the risk of conflict. Fractionalized societies are safer than homogenous societies. For example, a highly fractionalized society such as Uganda would be about 40 percent safer than a homogenous society, controlling for other characteristics.

The grievance theory of conflict thus finds surprisingly little empirical support. Inequality does not seem to matter, whereas political repression and ethnic and religious divisions have precisely the opposite of their predicted effects. Why might this be the case? I think that the reason that the grievance theory is so at variance with the actual pattern of conflict is that it misses the importance of what social scientists call the “collective action problem.” Justice, revenge, and relief from grievance are “public goods” and so are subject to the problem of free-riding. However, whether the government gets overthrown does not depend upon whether I personally join the rebellion. Individually, my preferred choice might be that the others fight the rebellion, while I benefit from the justice that their rebellion achieves. This standard free-rider problem will often be enough to prevent the possibility of grievance-motivated rebellion. However, it is compounded by two other problems. In order for a rebellion to achieve justice it probably needs to achieve military victory. For this it needs to be large. Small rebellions pursue all the costs and risks of punishment without much prospect of achieving justice.

Hence, grievance-motivated potential rebellion will be much more willing to join large rebellions than smaller ones. Obviously, however, rebellions have to start small before they can become large. It is quite possible that many people would be willing to join a large rebellion, but that nevertheless it does not occur, because only few people are willing to join a small rebellion and so it does not scale up. Social scientists think of this as
a coordination problem. The final problem that rebels have to fight, before they achieve justice is the rebellion leader may promise to assuage grievances, but once he has won he may have an incentive to behave much like the current government. More generally, the rebel leader has a much stronger incentive to promise things than he has subsequently to deliver them. Because potential recruits can recognize this problem they may not be able to trust the rebel leader and so may decide not to join the rebellion even though it promises release from grievances. Social scientists term such a phenomenon as a “time-consistency problem.”

The free-rider, coordination, and time-consistency problems together pose formidable obstacles to rebellions motivated purely by grievance. How might a rebel leader overcome them? All societies face collective action problems of a great many varieties. Many are not overcome, and others are overcome by the function being taken over by government, supported by taxation and enforcement powers. However, when they are overcome less formally, in a way that could be present to a rebellion, the usual way is through what we know as “social capital”; that is, the trust generated by participation in informal or formal groupings of people into networks, clubs and societies. Through such interactions people learn to set agendas for other matters: I’d better not free-ride now because other people didn't free-ride last time, and if I do, they might free-ride next time. Thus, a rebel leader might seek to overcome the collective action problem by drawing upon existing social capital. This, I think, is why ethnic and religious fractionalization reduces rather than increases the risk of rebellion. Social capital usually does not span ethnic and religious divides. Thus, in highly fractionalized societies it is much harder to mobilize large numbers of people than in homogenous societies. It may only be possible to mobilize the people within a particular ethnic-cum-religious group, but if this is only a small part of the national population, the prospects of victory are poor and so the prospect of assuaging grievance is poor. Grievance-motivated rebellions by small minorities are liable to be quixotic. The pattern of rebellion is sufficiently strongly related to the proxies for greed, and sufficiently negatively related to ethnic and religious fractionalization, to suggest that most rebellion is not quixotic.

The remaining strategy for a rebel leader is to rely upon greed. Greed-motivated rebellion does not face any of the collective action problems of grievance-motivated rebellion. There is no free-rider problem because the benefits of the rebellion can be confined to those who participate in it. There is no coordination problem because the rebellion does not need to be so large as to be victorious nationally in order to gain spasmodic control of some territory and so be predatory on the export trade in primary commodities. There is no time-consistency problem because if rebellions are able to cream off some of the rent from primary commodity exports during the rebellion, then rebel recruits can be paid during the conflict rather than be dependent upon promises. Hence, we might expect that those grievance-motivated rebellions that actually take hold do so by combining some material payoff with the grievance. We see this in many rebellions. For example, in Colombia, groups that began as grievance-based organizations (of the political extreme left and extreme right) have evolved into drug baronies.

To conclude this section, rebellions based purely on grievance face such severe collective action problems that the basic theories of social science would predict that they are unlikely to occur, and the empirical evidence supports this prediction. We can reasonably expect that a society that is fractionalized into many ethnic and religious groups, with high income and asset inequality, and which has a government that represses political rights will have many more grievances than a homogenous, equal democracy. Yet this does not translate into a higher risk of conflict. I suggest that what it does produce is a high-pitched discourse or narrative of grievance. There is a disconnect between these narratives and action. Even in apparently highly charged ethno-religious conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia, there were apparently cases of one side renting tanks from the other side! Such behavior could not occur if the objective of conflict was simply to harm the opposing ethnic or religious group, but it can be explicable if there are economic advantages to the control of territory. To understand action we have to shift our focus from the discourse to the economic agenda. For the reasons I discussed above, this economic
agenda will be concealed. The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed.

Who Gains During Conflict?

Civil wars inflict very high costs on an economy. I estimate that on average during civil wars the economy as a whole declines by around 2.2 percent per annum relative to its underlying growth path. This may seem a small number, but it implies that after a decade of war a society will have an income 20 percent lower than it would otherwise have been.

Despite these overall losses, civil wars create some opportunities for profit that are not available during peace. These fall into four groups.

First, life during civil war tends to become less predictable. As a result, people shorten their time horizons, or equivalently, discount the future more heavily. This changes the calculus of opportunistic behavior. In normal circumstances people tend not to be opportunistic in business relationships because such behavior damages their reputations and so makes it more difficult for them to reach agreement on deals in the future. The less predictable is the future, or the more peculiar are current circumstances, the less worthwhile it is to sacrifice current opportunities for profit in order to maintain reputation. Hence, civil war societies tend to become opportunistic. This will affect business practices, so that some firms will thrive through sharp practices while others become their victims. Profit rates will therefore become more dispersed and increase for the opportunistic.

Second, there is likely to be an increase in criminality. Governments reduce expenditure on the police during conflict as they increase spending on the military. As a result, the risks of punishment for criminal behavior decline. The main economic activity of criminals is theft, and this reduces asset-holding through two routes. An increase in theft makes assets less attractive. Hence, households will tend to run their assets down or shift them out of the country. For example, a common phenomenon during civil wars is for the livestock herd to decline quite drastically. Further, the criminals themselves face an even more acute asset-holding problem than their potential victims. If a criminal accumulates assets through theft, he lacks good title, and so his possession is insecure. A likely response is to shift the assets out of the country, either directly, as when stolen cattle are moved over the border, or indirectly, as when their value is first converted into some other asset.

Third, markets during civil war become disrupted. In riot circumstances the main force keeping marketing margins down, and indeed profits more generally, is competition. If there is good information and easy entry into trading, marketing margins will be driven down to the point at which traders earn no higher incomes than they would in any other activity. Civil wars make information much more costly and particular. Further, they make entry into the activity much more difficult. Existing traders may be able to resort to illegal means to discourage entry, and as opportunism becomes more real, viable trading will contract to those relationships that can still be trusted. Thus competition during civil war tends to break down. Trade becomes increasingly monopolistic, and so marketing margins increase. Of course, during conflict the actual volume of transactions will decrease, but if margins are initially narrow and widen sufficiently, then the profits from trade can actually increase.

Fourth, the scope for rent-seeking predation on trade increases for rebels and may even increase for government officials. Indeed in some instances the very distinction between rebels and government can become blurred: Government soldiers by day become rebels by night. The rebels are not rebelling against the government at all; they are simply taking off their uniforms, in order to reduce detection and thereby increase the opportunities their official weapons provide for predation. In the limit, if such rent-seeking becomes too competitive, it can kill trade off. Imagine that primary commodities must be transported from their point of production to the coast. If at many points along the road each locally powerful rebel, off-duty army officer, or official exacts a charge in an uncoordi-
nated way, the combined extractions can be so high that they make exporting unprofitable: The competitive predation simply kills the activity. Thus, sufficiently decentralized greed-motivated rebellions tend to kill off the economic goose and so die out. If there is no trade, there is no loot. To prevent this, a rebel movement will try to create a monopoly of predation, and for this must generate a monopoly of rebel violence. This may be why a very common characteristic of rebel movements is that they go through a phase in which considerable military effort is expended on fighting other rebel groups. To be economically successful, a rebel group does not need to defeat the government, but it does need to replace the government monopoly of violence with a rebel-government duopoly of violence. Fully competitive rebellions will not normally be profitable except in the short run. This suggests that even when a country collapses into anarchy, such a state of affairs will seldom persist. There will be strong economic forces creating sufficiently large units of power that the primary commodity export trade will not be killed off.

Rebellions in which no group can impose its authority thus fade out. Evidence for this is that the duration of rebellion, as opposed to the risk of its occurrence, is prolonged if the society consists of two ethnic groups. Both ethnically homogenous and ethnically highly fractionalized societies have shorter conflicts. When there are two ethnic groups, probably one being the government and the other the rebels, the rebel organization has the best chance of imposing a cohesive monopoly on rebellion.

The implications of the above are that various identifiable groups will “do well out of the war.” They are opportunistic businessmen, criminals, traders, and the rebel organizations themselves. The rebels will do well through predation on primary commodity exports, traders will do well through widened margins on the goods they sell to consumers, criminals will do well through theft, and opportunistic businessmen will do well at the expense of those businesses that are constrained to honest conduct.

If some people do well out of civil war they may not be particularly concerned to restore peace. Whereas they have increased incomes, all other groups will suffer sharply declining incomes and so have a strong interest in peace. Overall, the losers lose more than the winners gain, so that potentially there is scope for a mutually beneficial peace settlement. However, there are reasons to expect that it will be very difficult to achieve peace through a settlement in which all these groups are confident of being better off. There are two major problems. The first is that even if a settlement can be found in which all groups are better off, it is unlikely that the settlement can be trusted. Settlements face the “time-consistency” problem discussed above in the different context of whether potential rebels can trust their leader. The application to a peace settlement is as follows. Usually, a settlement will involve some military disbandment of rebel forces. As a result, the balance of military advantage is likely to shift to the government. As a result, the government will have an incentive to promise, ex ante, things it will not have an incentive to adhere to ex post. Because shrewd rebels can see this problem, they may rationally decide to decline a peace settlement that would ostensibly benefit them. The second major problem is that it is not realistically possible to construct a settlement in which all of the four groups who benefit from civil war are bought off. For example, although the offer of modest financial incentives to the leadership of RENAMO proved feasible, and may have been critical in ending the conflict in Mozambique, it is morally and politically much harder to offer drug barons the large financial incentives that would be needed to switch their interest from the perpetuation of conflict to the conclusion of a peace settlement.

Hence, although the costs of war appear to offer the potential for mutually beneficial peace settlements, in practice it is much more difficult for those groups that gain from peace to be involved in peace settlements than those who benefit from war. The relative power of economic interest groups is the classic question posed by modern political economy. The literature tells us that small, cohesive groups will be disproportionately influential. Unfortunately, because most people lose from war, the pro-peace group faces a massive free-rider problem in lobbying for peace. By contrast, because the beneficiar-
ies of war are a much smaller group, some of whom gain very large amounts, the free-rider problem of the pro-war lobby is very much less severe.

An implication is that peace may sometimes prove illusive because the small groups that have an economic interest in sustaining or reviving conflict are disproportionately influential. Because the private interests of these groups are very much against the public interest, their true agendas will be actively concealed. Thus, the true motivations for the perpetuation of conflict are normally unobserved, not simply because they get crowded out by the discourse of grievance but because they will be kept secret. If such interest groups cannot be bought off, then they have to be overcome. Interventions that reduce their profits from conflict can work both to reduce their incentives for conflict and, perhaps more important, to reduce their capacity to influence decisions.

One test of these ideas is whether conflict becomes more likely as a result of previous conflict: If grievance is the main driver of conflict, then for sure a powerful impetus to grievance will be previous conflict. Conflicts leave a legacy of atrocities crying out for revenge. By contrast, the greed-based approach to conflict would argue that it is the underlying economic conditions that create the risk of conflict. Some societies will have repeated conflicts, not because of the cumulative legacy of the desire for vengeance but because war is profitable for some groups. Although the evidence is only preliminary, at present it supports the latter interpretation. Once we allow for the risk factors described above, countries that have had a conflict are not more likely to have a further conflict than countries that have been conflict-free. To the extent that this is correct, it is good news for the international community. It implies that conflicts are not deeply intractable in the sense that they are driven by historical loyalties. The loyalties of local communities may indeed be so determined, and the observed discourse may reestablish these loyalties, but there is a wide gulf between this and actual large-scale conflict. If only the international community can change the economic incentives for conflict, it can substantially reduce their incidence, even in societies driven by long-standing hatreds.

Reducing the Incentives for Conflict

How can international policy reduce the economic incentives for conflict? For this we must work through the list of causes of conflict and determine where there is scope for intervention.

Recall that the most powerful single driver of the risk of conflict is for an economy to have a high proportion of primary commodity exports. This gives the international community some opportunity for risk reduction. Most of the international markets for primary commodities are highly centralized, with a small number of key intermediaries. The most extreme case of this is probably the diamonds trade. One reason for centralization is that there are almost always questions of product quality: Primary commodities are not completely standardized. To the extent that it is possible to curtail the sales of primary commodities that are financing conflict, the prospects for peace are increased. For example, diamond exports from Sierra Leone probably account for the high incidence of conflict in that country. Many of these exports originate in highly informal marketing channels but find their way onto world markets. Of course, some markets, notably those for narcotics, are illegal throughout their entire chain, making them uncompetitive and thus providing very high profits to traders. In most markets, however, the task may be to prevent illegitimate supplies from gaining access to legitimate channels. This will drive down the incomes of the illegitimate acquisition of the commodities and thereby reduce the incentive to contest the control of primary exports.

A further way in which the international community can reduce the risks generated by primary commodity exports is to assist in the diversification of the economies of those societies that are most at risk. The instrument for this is development assistance. Obviously, substantial development assistance is usually only feasible during peacetime conditions; so that its role is to create conditions for access to marketing channels and
to influence the incentives for settling current conflicts. Whether aid programs can succeed in diversifying an economy depends both on the underlying comparative advantage of the country and on its absorptive capacity for aid. A well-located country without major natural resources, such as Mozambique, has a better chance of export diversification than a landlocked country with large natural resources.

If an economy has a high absorptive capacity for aid, development assistance can reduce the risk of conflict not just through increasing diversification but through reducing poverty and increasing the growth rate. Recall that both poverty and economic decline increase risks. The absorptive capacity of an economy for aid depends primarily upon the economic policies governments adopt. Recent work using the World Bank’s scoring system for twenty different aspects of policy finds that those developing countries with average policy scores have an absorptive capacity for aid about double that of countries with fairly poor scores. Hence, if governments adopt policy environments that are highly discouraging for economic activity, there is rather little that donors can do to offset these effects through large aid flows. However, where government adopts policies that are more conducive to growth, donors can do a great deal to accelerate the process of development and thereby reduce the risks of conflict. The limitations of aid, in it that it cannot offset the effects of highly damaging policies, should not blind us to the considerable contribution that aid can make to enhancing peace in most environments.

I have suggested that marketing margins tend to widen during conflict, creating some lucrative monopolistic trading opportunities and giving these traders an incentive for conflict continuation. To the extent possible, policy should therefore be focused on making markets as competitive as possible. Competition will reduce profits to normal levels and reduce the attraction of conflict for wartime traders. Agencies of the international community, broadly defined, are themselves the major purchasers during conflicts. If their own purchasing practices are insufficiently cost-conscious, they will become a source for supernormal profits.

The international community (though obviously not the World Bank) may also increase the incentives for peace through political actions. First, the time-consistency problem surrounding peace settlements implies that there is a role for external guarantors of the settlement terms. The incentives for settlement maintenance may range from the military, through the diplomatic to the financial. Second, the above analysis implies that full democratic rights are an effective means of reducing the risk of conflict, and that, although political transition temporarily increases risks, these risks do not persist for long. Indeed, a slow transition from repression may be dangerous because it implies a long period of partial democracy, during which the risks are at their peak. There may therefore be a role for assisting countries during a phase of rapid transition to democracy.

Finally, were the world to be composed of small, ethnically and religiously homogenous states, the statistical evidence suggests that it would have a much higher incidence of civil war. I have already discussed the result that ethnic and religious fractionalization actually makes states safer rather than more dangerous, so that ethnic cleansing is not only repellant in itself but would result in more dangerous political entities. A result I have not yet described is that large states are proportionately much safer than small states. The risk of civil conflict occurring somewhere on the territory of one huge state is approximately one third lower than if the same territory is divided into two identical states. Thus the political forces for self-determination of small, ethnically and religiously homogenous groups may not be benign.

**Economic Policies in Post-Conflict Conditions**

Finally, I briefly consider economic policy priorities in post-conflict societies. Such societies need to reduce the underlying risks of conflict. This will involve the same policies that are appropriate in conflict prevention, such as diversification and poverty reduction. However, there are also some economic legacies from conflict: particular interest groups
that develop during the conflict and that have little interest in peace. These interests need to be weakened as rapidly as possible.

A civil war society tends to favor the opportunistic and the criminal, and to permit the encroachment of monopoly. These tend to be neglected after the conflict has ended. Yet the groups who benefit from these characteristics have an interest in perpetuating wartime conditions. One approach is therefore to weaken these groups as rapidly as possible by reducing their profits.

Market integration can be promoted by deregulation, improved transport, and improved market information, for example, by means of better communications: In post conflict Uganda, when the government deregulated the transport of coffee, the road haulage industry expanded; this new entry into the sector broke the road haulage cartel that had informally operated during the conflict. As a result, road haulage rates approximately halved, and so rural produce markets in turn became more competitive. In the process, the “politics of conflict” probably changed. A larger, more competitive transport and trading sector that has made investments that depend upon the continuation of peace is a strongly pro-peace lobby. The former interest of a small cartel enjoying monopoly profits has disappeared.

Opportunism thrives on conflict. For example, in Uganda a trader who purchased mattresses on credit from the local manufacturer to sell in the North claimed that his purchases had been stolen by rebels. The manufacturers suspected that this claim was false but could not prove the contrary, and so had to accept the default of the trader. The opportunistic trader thus has an interest in unrest. A firm can guard against such opportunism by improving its information. If the manufacturer had a better network of contacts in the North or a better network of information from other suppliers to the trader, it would be more difficult for the trader to be opportunistic. But information networks are costly. Particularly where the telephone system is poor and where newspaper circulation is low, information is expensive and so limited. The Ugandan government has indirectly reduced post-conflict opportunism by encouraging cell phones, radio, and a free press.

Crime thrives on low detection and poor justice systems. The rehabilitation of the police and the courts is thus a post-conflict priority, partly to ease problems of contract enforcement. There is also a need to professionalize the army. As discussed, sometimes during conflict the government army will itself be an important source of crime and predation, so that it will have little interest in peace. For this reason, demobilization may not be as problematic as is commonly feared. Ill-paid government soldiers may be less of a threat once disarmed, disbanded, and dispersed to their farms than when they are together in barracks. The Ugandan demobilization actually reduced crime rates despite the widespread fear that it would do the opposite.8

**Conclusion**

Discussion of civil conflict is dominated by the narrative of grievance. Hence, policy toward conflict tends to be focused upon on the one hand assuaging perceived grievances, and on the other, attempting to reconcile populations that have deep-rooted hatreds. The evidence on the causes of conflict does not really support this interpretation. The objective factors that might contribute to grievance, such as income and asset inequality, ethnic and religions divisions, and political repression, do not seem to increase the risks of conflict. Indeed, to the extent that they have any effect, it is to make societies safer. I do not wish to imply that parties to a conflict do not hold grievances and historical hatreds, and it is indeed sensible to attempt to reduce them. However, the evidence on the causes of conflict points to economic factors as the main drivers of conflict. The combination of large exports of primary commodities, low education, a high proportion of young men, and economic decline drastically increases risks. Greed seems more important than grievance.
Although societies as a whole suffer economically from civil war, some small identifiable groups do well out of it. They thus have an interest in the initiation, perpetuation, and renewal of conflict. Naturally, these interests tend to remain low-profile. Hence, the discourse of grievance is much louder than that of greed, even if it is less significant. Policy intervention should, however, focus rather more than in the past on these economic agendas. Effective policy should reduce both the economic incentives for rebellion and the economic power of the groups that tend to gain from the continuation of social disorder. The restriction of access to international commodity markets for illegitimate exports from countries in conflict, and the targeting of those to high risk countries not currently in conflict, are both feasible strategies for the international community.
ber of wars in this period, but a decline in the last four years (2002–2005) from 14 to six (Human Security Report Project 2006) with a corresponding decline in the number of battle deaths from 8,200 to 2,400 (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005; Human Security Report Project 2006). This trend should be treated with caution because it covers only four years, and many of the political, social, economic, and structural factors of war are still unresolved.

All but six of these 126 armed conflicts were intrastate or civil wars. Many continued for decades interspersed with repeated attempts at settlement and often involved multiple parties pursuing different goals. Others, less intense ‘minor wars’, lasted two years or less (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2006). The majority have been driven by attempts to control the state and only a few involved secessionist groups (Gleditsch et al 2002). Many wars have spilled across national boundaries and developed into sub-regional conflicts, including those in the Great Lakes, Southern Africa, Mano River Basin and Central East Africa.

Today’s armed conflicts in Africa defy the analytical frameworks used in the study of war and security. These conflicts correspond more closely to the concept of ‘new wars’ as they are motivated by both political and private economic objectives, commingle state and non-state actors with local and external allies, and involve violence perpetrated against unarmed civilians by state armies, non-state militias and organised criminal networks (Kaldor 2007; Reno 2005). Kaldor notes that

... although most of these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain (2007:2).

**Non-state Wars**

Most definitions of war, including the UCDP/PRIO dataset used in this paper, include formally organised contested combat against the state. This excludes armed conflicts between non-state actors such as communal violence, conflict between rival guerrilla groups and warlords, state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, and acts of terrorism. Data on non-state conflicts have begun to be collected only in recent years. From 2002 to 2005, there were 77 non-state conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa compared with 17 state-based conflicts. The number of fatalities was smaller—12,834 compared with 20,655 (UCDP Non-state Dataset 4.1). These non-state wars differ in character from state wars; they may be ‘low intensity’, employing unconventional weapons and tactics without regard for traditional political or military codes of conduct (WHO 2002).

**Casualties and Human Costs**

Conventional definitions of casualties only count deaths on the battlefield. While the 126 wars described earlier resulted in approximately one million such deaths, the toll would be multiples of this number if all ‘war deaths’ were counted (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). Battle death estimates do not include victims of state-sponsored violence against unarmed civilians, such as the Rwandan genocide in which 800,000 people perished, and communal violence between non-state groups, such as the 1994–1995 ethnic violence of northern Ghana that saw 15,000 fatalities (Jönsson 2007). It also excludes the depredations of militias on unarmed men, women and children that have characterised much of the violence in Sierra Leone and Angola. Many other non-combatants have died of malnutrition and disease. For example, between 1998 and 2004 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, an estimated 3.9 million people died from all conflict-related causes of mortality (Coghlan et al 2006). Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) found that battle death estimates as a proportion of total war death estimates—which include civilian battle deaths, fatalities from disease and famine provoked by war, and deaths due to criminal and unorganised violence—range from less than 2% in Ethiopia to 29% in Mozambique.

Rape, deliberate mutilation, forced conscription of children and the use of landmines—in addition to death and injury—exact long-term costs and inhibit recovery from war. The overall legacy of violence constrains post-conflict reconciliation and political accommo-
dation. Violent armed conflict ignites humanitarian crisis and disrupts human security in all its personal, economic and political dimensions (Collier et al. 2003; Stewart et al. 2001).

Massive dislocation of people from their homes, livelihoods and communities is another human cost; over the survey period (1980–2005), more than four million Africans fled their countries (UNHCR 2007). In some dramatic cases, as much as 40% of the population of Rwanda fled their homes in 1994, and 14% of Burundi’s people in 1993. In 2005, there were an estimated 12.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 20 African countries—more than twice the total for the rest of the world—including 5.4 million in Sudan, two million in Uganda and 1.7 million in the DRC (Eschenbächer 2006). Unlike refugees, IDPs do not cross international borders. As of 2005 in sub-Saharan Africa, there were 1.9 million people in 17 protracted refugee situations, defined as situations where 25,000 or more people are in exile and reliant upon external assistance for at least five years (UNHCR 2006).

Large-scale forced migration increases mortality and morbidity (WHO 2002; Van Damme 1995). Protracted refugee encampments create security problems and conflict between burdened host countries and their neighbours. Refugee populations may include those sympathetic to the irredentist challenges of ethnic minorities in the host country. Camps often harbour insurgent militias and facilitate small arms trafficking, drug smuggling and other illicit trade (Jacobsen 2002; UNHCR 2006). In host countries, concentrations of refugees may exacerbate environmental problems, including deforestation and pollution and overuse of land and water (Jacobsen 2002, 1997; Black & Sessay 1997; Black 1994).

Consequences of Armed Conflict on Poverty and Development

Civil wars have been called ‘development in reverse’ (Collier et al. 2003:13). They divert resources from productive economic activities and from public expenditures for social goods that advance development. They incur direct human costs as described above, and longer-term developmental costs through loss of household assets, destruction of infrastructure essential for both human well-being and for successful agriculture and commerce, as well as loss of confidence in institutions, leading to lawlessness and capital flight (Stewart et al. 2001).

However, evidence from the 126 wars in this survey shows that the consequences of armed conflict on development are far from simple; the costs not only vary from one country to another, but are also uneven within countries. Within a given country the population does not always suffer the cost of war equally, and in the aggregate, the economy does not always falter. They show a precipitous economic decline in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Burundi, Djibouti and Mozambique among other countries. Only nine of the 22 countries for which data are available show GDP that was lower at the end of the war than at its onset. For some, such as Angola and Rwanda, there were dramatic declines at the height of the fighting followed by recovery. But several countries sustained GDP growth while fighting continued, such as Sudan, Chad, Senegal, Ethiopia, and Niger.

Some examples illustrate why war does not always lead to decline in national development. Oil in both Sudan and Chad has fuelled economic growth even though armed conflicts have left thousands dead and millions displaced. In Uganda, Guinea and Uganda, the fighting has been geographically isolated— in the south and southeast in Guinea and in the north in Uganda— without compromising overall growth at the national level. These positive macro-indicators are pernicious in that they mask both widening inequality and human suffering.

Civil war is development in reverse, but the country is not the best unit of analysis. By disaggregating development indicators along regional or group lines, it is possible to track the deleterious consequences that conflict may have on some segments of a coun-
try’s population despite positive aggregated indicators for the country as a whole. From 1990 to 2004, while armed conflict raged in northern Uganda, the country’s human development index (HDI) improved from 0.411 to 0.502, childhood immunisation rose from 45% to 87%, and access to clean water improved from 44% to 60% (UNDP 2007). Yet these national numbers severely misrepresent the stark and widening regional inequalities. In 2005–06, Uganda’s national poverty rate was 31.1%, while northern Uganda’s poverty level was 60.7% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2006). In addition, the under-five mortality rate remains three to four times higher in the northern conflict areas than in the non-conflict areas (WHO 2005) and the adult literacy rate, which stands at 77% in central Uganda, is a mere 47% in northern Uganda (excluding conflicts with one or less data point recorded during conflict).

Structural Conditions and War Risks

Traditionally, studies of armed conflicts relied on historical and political factors to explain why wars emerge, persist, recur and end. However, in response to the increasing concentration of civil wars in poor countries, new research in the 1990s began to focus on socio-economic conditions that are associated with the frequent occurrence of war. This rich and diverse literature of cross-country statistical and qualitative studies emerged. The research identified a series of social and economic conditions that may exist in a country and that appear to favour the emergence of armed conflict. They identify several socio-economic factors that raise risks of conflict. It is important to point out that these factors are not mutually exclusive and may coexist and be mutually reinforcing (Fukuda-Parr 2007; Murshed 2007). Moreover, while political and historical factors may be the proximate factors that drive war, structural risks are root causes. Were these factors relevant for the 32 countries surveyed in this paper considered here?

Chronic Poverty

Studies found strong correlation between per capita income and incidence of conflict, implying that GDP growth would help reduce war risks (Collier et al 2002). All of the 32 countries are among the world’s poorest countries with large proportions of their population surviving in extreme poverty. For these countries, 2005 per capita GDP ranged from $91 to $997, and HDI in 2004 ranged from 0.311 to 0.532. The proportion of people surviving in extreme poverty measured by the international threshold of $1 a day ranges from 15% to 78% for the 21 countries for which estimates are available from 1996–2005. In this respect, these 32 countries are no different from the other 12 countries of the region that remained conflict-free but which are also poor.

A more interesting question is whether economic decline and a general worsening of poverty precede the onset of war. Often, historical accounts of civil war give serious economic mismanagement and misrule as some of the causes of an insurgency, such as in DRC, Liberia or Sierra Leone. Economic decline prior to the onset of war was registered in 13 of the 32 countries, where per capita income was lower at the onset of war than five years previously, and for nine others, GDP growth averaged less than 1% annually over that period. But this was not a generalised pattern; in 13 countries, per capita GDP was higher at the onset of the war than five years previously, and average annual growth rate was over 1%. Under-five mortality rates were also improving during the years preceding the war for most countries.

Over-Dependence on Natural Resources

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that over-dependence on natural resources increases war risks, with greatest risk reached when primary commodities comprise a 32% share of GDP. Several of the 32 countries are highly dependent on natural resource exports, including Cameroon, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, where primary commodity exports exceed 15% as a share of GDP. If oil is included, Angola, Nigeria and the Congo are also highly resource dependent. However, the major-
it of the 32 countries are not so highly dependent on primary commodity exports. In 2000, Côte d’Ivoire’s share of primary commodities to GDP was 31.6% (UNCTAD 2003); two years later war broke out.

Over-dependence on minerals can be a risk factor in two ways. The first is that groups take up arms to seek control of a country’s natural resources. The second is that once war starts, control of mineral resources becomes a lifeline for the warring parties. In Sierra Leone during the civil war (1991-2000), RUF rebels financed their insurgency through profits from the diamond trade. In Angola’s civil war (1975-2002), both the government and rebels sustained themselves by exploiting natural resource wealth (Gamba & Cornwell 2000). The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebel group did so with diamonds and the ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola did so with oil (Le Billon 2001; ICG 2003; Sherman 2000). In the civil war of Côte d’Ivoire, where primary commodity exports reached almost 32% of GDP in 2000, the role of natural resources (i.e. cocoa) in sustaining violence is more ambiguous. In addition to the examples listed above, it is clear that competition for control of the oil wealth has been a factor in the conflicts in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta.

Horizontal Inequalities

While the idea that stark inequality would lead to resentment and uprising is intuitively appealing, research has not found empirical evidence of armed war occurring more frequently where vertical inequalities are high. On the other hand, there is more evidence associating horizontal inequality—inequality between groups with ethnic, religious or linguistic ties—with conflict (Stewart 2002, 2004). Grievances over historical exclusion from economic, social and political opportunities and power provide incentives for insurgency, and the appeal to group loyalty and identity can be a powerful means to mobilisation. These disparities provide explanations for ethnic wars that go beyond historic enmity between groups (Stewart 2002, 2004).

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by a multiplicity of identity groups with legacies of unequal political and economic power (UNDP 2004). It is widely held that horizontal inequalities are widespread in African countries where ethnicity became politically and economically salient in colonial and post-colonial times. Available data consistently show sharp inequalities when data disaggregated by ethnicity are available for economic and social indicators such as income, educational attainment and access to high-level jobs, as well as in political indicators such as representation in the executive, legislature, military and other institutions of the state. For example, in Namibia the HDI was estimated for six linguistic groups and ranged from a high of 0.960 for German speakers to a low of 0.326 for San speakers (UNDP 2004). Disparities are sharp not only between racial groups but also among Namibia’s African populations: HDI for Oshiwambo speakers is 0.641, twice the index for the San speakers (UNDP 2004).

However, such data are not consistently available. This survey reviewed two databases that assess the extent of horizontal inequalities that are politically salient in the context of their potential for armed conflict. First, the Minorities at Risk Project’s Aggregate Differential Index (ADI) is a composite of 18 cultural, political, and economic indicators that rate differential treatment based on group identity (Minorities at Risk 2005:5). Scores are available for 26 of the 32 countries; Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Liberia, Mali, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda score particularly high—above 10—on a scale where the maximum possible score is 18 (Minorities at Risk Project 2007). Second, the Failed State Index uses a composite of 12 sub-indicators. One is a measure of horizontal inequality—‘Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines’. Two others indicate the level of political mobilisation based on group disparity: ‘Uneven Legacy of Vengeance-seeking Group Grievance, or Group Paranoia’; and ‘Rise of Factionalised Elites’. Most of the 32 countries score high on uneven economic development; 22 of them are at the ‘warning’ level while nine others—Comoros, Angola, Djibouti, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Senegal—fall just below the cut-off. Ghana, Mali and Senegal show low scores in political mobilisation (rise of factionalised elites), but the political salience of
group inequalities is evident in all the countries according to this index (Fund for Peace 2007).

While these databases confirm the presence of group exclusion and their political activation, they do not show whether this was a factor that drove past wars. Academic and policy literature that examines the causes of wars in 32 countries identifies horizontal inequality or group exclusion as a factor in several of them.

The war in the southern Casamance region of Senegal is an example of horizontal inequalities as a factor in mobilising violence. Home to the Diola ethnic group, a distinct cultural group, the Casamance region also has the highest poverty and infant mortality rates in the country (Senegal PRSP 2002). Other examples include conflicts in Burundi, Central African Republic, southern Christians in Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Afar and Somali liberation movements of Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan, Togo, and Uganda. However, it is important to note that group exclusion does not appear to have been a major factor in many other countries such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Somalia, Cameroon, and Guinea-Bissau.

Neighbourhood Spillovers

Wars have taken on sub-regional dimensions as neighbouring countries become embroiled in supporting various warring parties. Neighbouring countries serve as safe havens for rebel groups, receive influxes of refugees, incite support among ethnic groups that inhabit more than one state, and provide opportunities for smuggling of weapons or natural resources. Warring parties receive direct material and political support from states and other groups. For example, Chad provided refuge for thousands of people displaced by violence in the Central African Republic and Sudan; the governments of Eritrea and Somalia supported opposing sides in the war in Ethiopia; the governments of Senegal and Guinea sent troops to Guinea-Bissau; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and Sudan have sent arms to various warring groups in Somalia (ICG 2007; Webersik 2004); and finally, the wars in Sudan and Uganda have fed on each other.

Environmental Pressure Related to Migration

Although the African continent is sparsely populated when compared with other regions of the world, environmental stress and demographic pressures are present in a number of countries that experienced violent conflict. Mounting demographic pressure is one of the indicators of the Failed State Index; all the 32 countries score above six, and several above nine (Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Niger, Somalia, Sudan). Several conflicts have been triggered by rival claims to scarce land or natural resources. Although the conflict in Sudan has been commonly attributed to historical enmity on religious or racial grounds, in fact resource scarcity lies at the root of the conflict. Drought and desertification have increased pressure on water and land resources, forcing group migration into areas historically settled by others. This encroachment has created stress and led to violence (Youngs 2004:8). The Azawad conflict in Mali (1990–1996) was driven by socio-economic exclusion of the Tuaregs, but environmental stress also played a role (Minorities at Risk 2007). The desertification of the Sahel from the late 1960s to early 1970s, as well as frequent droughts in the 1980s, caused a mass migration of Tuaregs from northern Mali to neighbouring countries.

Demographic Youth Bulge

Cincotta (2003) demonstrates strong statistical relationship between demographic patterns and the incidence of armed conflict. His study identifies countries in which young adults comprise more than 40% of the adult population as more than twice as likely as countries with lower proportions to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. In the absence of employment, opportunity or constructive activities, young men especially are known to congregate in gangs that may evolve into politically mobilised insurgencies (Cincotta 2003). This risk factor is present in almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including
those that have experienced major wars, minor wars and no wars. Review of data (UNPD 2006) shows that each of the 32 conflict countries surveyed here has a youth bulge with a population aged 15–29 years comprising over 44% of the total.

**History of War**

Statistical analysis has shown high risk that conflict will re-emerge after an end to violence (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). This has indeed been the history of sub-Saharan Africa where formal peace agreements have failed to achieve long-lasting peace. Of the 126 conflicts being surveyed here, there were 154 cessations in fighting, but only nine of these lasted for 10 years. Peace has lasted for an additional 10 conflicts that ended fewer than 10 years ago. Of the 32 conflict-affected countries only eight have experienced peace of at least ten years duration. In several countries violent state repression or conflict between identity groups has continued unabated (Gleditsch et al 2002; Harbom et al 2006).

**Policy Responses to Address Risk Factors**

The preceding sections illustrate ways in which armed conflict has affected the trajectory of development and vice versa. The destructive impact of wars is a source of current poverty and development challenges. Development patterns such as a history of ethnic exclusion and environmental pressure have been among the drivers of past conflicts and continue to raise political tensions. These linkages have important policy implications for development strategy as economic, social and governance reform policies have important bearing on these structural factors. For example, budgetary allocations can deepen horizontal inequalities and group grievance; health and education policies such as measures to increase schooling of girls are central aspects of demographic change; inappropriate agricultural and rural policies can aggravate environmental pressures and competition for land. In these and many other ways, development policy can either alleviate or worsen group grievance, the youth bulge and unemployment, environmental pressure and poor governance of natural resources; it can then help reduce or exacerbate the risks of armed conflict recurring.

To assess how development policies and priorities address these links between armed conflict and development, PRSPs were reviewed where they were available. PRSPs reflect both national priorities and a degree of endorsement by the official donor community. Several of the PRSPs, notably for countries that are emerging from war following a peace settlement—such as Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Congo Republic, Angola and Djibouti— or following a decisive victory as in Rwanda, identify conflict as a major source of their development and poverty challenges. All of the PRSPs emphasise the importance of governance, but mostly not in relation to preventing recurrence of violent conflict.

Overall, there is scant treatment of armed conflict and its links to development challenges in the 18 PRSPs reviewed; four made no mention of armed conflict that had taken place or was continuing at the time, and while others mentioned the issue, only Liberia's interim PRSP of 2007 had a section devoted to an analysis of the root causes of conflict. The lack of attention to armed conflict is particularly surprising where wars were being actively fought at the time that the document was prepared and adopted: the Ethiopia PRSP of 2002 refers only to the border war with Eritrea and in the historical context of pre-1991 wars, not to the ongoing conflicts within the country; the Senegal PRSP of 2002 makes no mention of the persistent fighting in the south at the time; the Chad PRSP of 2003 refers to conflict only twice in its 142 pages, referring only to a 'climate of insecurity and impunity' in a 'conflict-ridden environment' and to 'decades of armed conflict' and its impact on armed forces. These findings are consistent with a recent study (Scharf et al 2008) that analysed 20 PRSP and similar documents and more than 80 UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and found less than half referred to armed violence.

Structural risk factors—horizontal inequality, youth employment, demographic pressures, migration, neighbourhood spillover effects and the governance of natural resources, for
instance—were not given priority attention in PRSPs. Issues of unequal development along group lines and ethnic exclusion are rarely addressed. Inclusive development approaches, including equitable growth and greater sharing of power and opportunities, are not explicit goals, even in countries where ethnic grievances and exclusion are politically live issues. The term ‘equity’ most often appears in relation to gender equality. Even the interim PRSP of Liberia, which fully recognises the pattern of elite rule as a source of the war that lasted over a decade, is weak when it comes to reflecting inclusion as a policy priority. The document says little about setting priorities across regions and activities to ensure distributional balance. While social and physical infrastructure development has been concentrated in Monrovia and along the coast, and the interior has been neglected, this strategy makes no provisions to reverse these historic imbalances; while poverty is concentrated in rural areas, the economic growth strategy does not give priority to agriculture other than the export-oriented plantation sector (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2007).

Thus PRSPs do not systematically include an analysis of the impact of conflict on development or of the root causes of conflict and grievances over issues of political, economic, and social exclusion. Ongoing armed conflict in a country is systematically ignored as a source of poverty. Indeed, that both a country’s governments and the donors who endorse them turn a blind eye to recent or ongoing fighting in the country inevitably has repercussions for development and poverty.

Conclusions

In surveying the nexus of development and armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa since 1980, several findings emerge that challenge widely held assumptions and suggest directions for reconsidering policy priorities, launching new research directions, and designing more effective policies for human security.

First, the state as a unit of analysis and focus of policy action does not match the reality of contemporary wars in Africa where the actors are both state and non-state, involve local and external allies and are motivated by political and private economic ends. Yet data collection, analytical frameworks and policy interventions remain state-centric. New research directions are needed that focus on non-state actors and transnational conflict networks, destructive impacts of conflicts at sub-national levels, and on the cross-border alliances and impacts. There is a singular lack of data and analysis of non-state conflicts and the distributional consequences of conflicts. Current policy research and policy agendas for conflict prevention, peace building and economic recovery continue to focus on major armed conflicts that involved the state.

Second, the survey found, surprisingly, that economic decline did not uniformly result from war; some economies grew and human outcomes improved even during conflict as impacts were confined to specific locations or as the economy was buoyed by such exogenous factors as commodity exports. More research is needed to understand how the expected consequences of conflict are contained, and their political implications. More policy attention is needed on the distributional impact of armed conflicts.

Third, the survey shows the prevalence of long-term ‘low-intensity’ conflicts which constitute a human security priority because their violence imposes huge human and developmental costs, and has the potential to escalate and spread. They are also a priority for conflict prevention policy. Yet low-intensity conflicts receive little policy attention, especially as a development challenge. As the conflict in northern Uganda illustrates, development disparities are both a cause and consequence of such conflicts, yet they are considered to be a domestic political/security issue and kept out of development policy priority setting. In the context of positive development trends for the country overall, the international community can be tempted to ‘turn a blind eye’ to these sources of human insecurity and worsening war risks. New policy approaches need to be developed in the international community to address these cases.
Fourth, structural conditions identified by recent research as risk factors are present to varying extents in most African countries and particularly in the 32 that have experienced war. Horizontal inequality and the youth bulge are relevant more consistently than other factors. While all countries are ‘poor,’ in many cases economic decline did not precede conflict.

Environmental pressure and natural resource dependence have been factors in few of the 32 countries. The relationship between underlying risk factors and emergence of armed conflict is neither automatic nor uniform, and their presence should not be considered predictive but rather as relevant risk factors requiring attention. Since they relate to development structures, they are highly relevant to development policy, including governance reforms to promote political inclusion and economic and social policies to reduce horizontal inequality, generate employment-creating growth, promote youth employment, and manage the demographic transition. Economic growth alone will not remove these structural risks.

Fifth, neither national governments nor the international community [has] developed and applied systematic approaches to integrating conflict consequences and risks into development policy priorities. Major development policy instruments, starting with the PRSP, need to be more consistent in addressing conflict impacts and risks.

Finally, this survey documents and confirms the high risks of armed conflict in sub-Saharan African countries as political tensions remain unresolved and structural risk factors prevail. Perhaps most importantly, one of the most striking characteristics of armed conflict in Africa has been the fragility of peace; even where there has been an end to violence almost invariably it has resumed. These patterns point to a need for a more proactive approach to preventing conflict by addressing the structural risk factors.
round' of trade. And yet at best only piecemeal critiques of imperial power emerged amid the cacophony of all-white rock concerts and political grandstanding. By 2007, one of the G8 group of nations’ court jesters, Bob Geldof, finally became so frustrated that he called those attending the Heiligendamm summit ‘creeps’ and their work a ‘total farce’ (Blair 2007). Geldof had earlier summed up the achievements of the G8’s 2005 meeting at the Gleneagles Summit as ‘On aid, 10 out of 10. On debt, eight out of 10’—a ridiculous formulation (Hodkinson 2005). The Geldof campaign ‘achieved next to nothing’ because its ‘design allowed it to accept inappropriate markers for success that were never real proxies for justice, empowerment or accountability. And also because its demands were never in fact audacious enough’ (Hertz 2005). NGO strategists of peacebuilding and development suffered from horizons limited by the early and mid-2000s—years of growing ‘humanitarian imperialism’ hubris on the part of Northern elites (Bond et al 2005).

Former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s advisor, Robert Cooper, publicly advocated ‘force, preemptive attack, deception ... a new kind of imperialism’ (Cooper 2002:16–17).

But at its roots, this is not really so new. As was the case a century earlier, tendencies to stagnation have characterised the world economy over the past 40 years. The average rate of growth of GDP fell from 3.6% during the 1960s to 2.1% during the 1970s, to 1.3% during the 1980s, to 1.1% during the 1990s and to 1% during the first half of the 2000s (Harvey 2005). Since capitalism’s laws of motion rely on the imperative of growth via processes internal to the market, this trajectory can be considered a ‘crisis’ in which crisis is defined not as a ‘breakdown’ per se, but a state in which the normal reproduction of a system is no longer functioning, and requires processes external to that system to rectify its problems (Cox 1987).

As David Harvey (1999) has pointed out, during the 20th century, especially after the Great Depression, the capitalist crisis-displacement toolbox added two new geographic and temporal displacement mechanisms. In the first, the problems are moved around as one or another group of territorially organised capitalists either push away the devaluation of their capital stocks or resist it, resulting in more extremely uneven spatial development and intensified exploitation of weaker geographical sites. In the second, the problems are put off, insofar as a rising credit system allows today’s problems to be mitigated through borrowing against the hope of tomorrow’s economic growth. In both cases, crisis displacement strategy becomes increasingly ineffectual, especially when financial system upheavals adversely affect confidence in debt instruments. At that point, wrote Rosa Luxemburg, drawing upon an earlier manifestation of the same problem we witness...

... the deep and fundamental antagonism between the capacity to consume and the capacity to produce in a capitalist society, a conflict resulting from the very accumulation of capital which periodically bursts out in crises and spurs capital on to a continual extension of the market (Luxemburg 1968:347).

The system then turns to more extreme forms of exploitation that occur beyond purely market production and exchange: what Harvey (2003) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. This article sets out why such a formulation is useful for analysing peace/conflict problems in Africa in a context of worsening inequalities structured into global and regional economic relations.

Uneven and Combined Development

The phrase ‘uneven and combined development’ can be invoked here, for it suggests that growth (accumulation) and decline (underdevelopment via super-exploitation) happen in a systematic manner, but not one which follows either the modernisation path—directly along a line of underdevelopment, ‘take-off’ and development—or permanent dependency. Instead, accumulation at one pole and poverty at another happen systematically according to processes that we must carefully analyse and document but that can change, depending upon political processes (Bond 1999). The generation of extreme forms of inequality is directly tied to the increasing wretchedness of masses of people, such that elite deal-making to resolve local conflict tends to work only in the short term, leading soon enough to renewed tensions.
It was Leon Trotsky who originally came up with the phrase ‘uneven and combined’ (1977:26–27). The ‘combined’ component is ultimately contingent upon the power of a dominant economic bloc to extract surpluses from weaker blocs, themselves locked into non-capitalist social relations. Many conflicts in Africa—from Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta and northeastern Congo’s gold and coltan mines to Sierra Leone’s diamond finds and Sudan’s killing fields—follow from this power relationship. In past eras, severely repressive social systems (slavery, colonialism and apartheid) emerged to channel labour from pre-capitalist settings to resource-extraction zones, as Walter Rodney (1972) among others showed. Today, as James Ferguson observes...

...capital ‘hops’ over ‘unusable Africa’, alighting only in mineral-rich enclaves that are starkly disconnected from their national societies. The result is not the formation of standardised national grids, but the emergence of huge areas of the continent that are effectively ‘off the grid’ (Ferguson 2005:381).

The apparent ‘disconnection’, as Ferguson (1990) showed in Lesotho, is misleading because one may get the impression at first blush (as do the World Bank and aid agencies) that poverty comes from lack of exposure to markets. In fact, it is the migrant labour market that decisively contributes to sustained underdevelopment in a context, often, of political repression. In the process, Ferguson (2005) notes, there emerges ‘a frightening sort of political-economic model for regions that combine mineral wealth with political intractability’, from African oil zones to occupied Iraq. The model includes protection of capital by private military companies and what Ferguson (2006:41-42) calls the ‘Big Man’—not by his own national army but, instead, by hired guns—in exactly the way that the U.S. rulers of Iraq, Paul Bremer and John Negroponte, used mercenary firms for personal bodyguards. The bottom line is enhanced profit for international capital and despotism for the citizenry.

Others assume that the continent is not sufficiently subject to the laws of the market. Jeffrey Sachs (2005:189-209) acknowledges the problem of looting: ‘Little surpasses the Western world in the cruelty and depredations that it has long imposed on Africa.’ But he presumes that the critique of corrupt dictators is a ‘political story-line’ of the ‘right’ instead of giving credence to progressive, organic African anti-corruption campaigning. From there, Sachs proceeds to rehearse well-known accounts of malaria, AIDS, landlocked countries and other forms of geographically determinist analysis, and then reconciles these explanations with garden-variety policy advice: adopting good governance plus ‘implementing traditional market reforms, especially regarding export promotion’.

How does combined development create systemic conflict? Luxemburg in 1913 showed in the following summary how violence ‘is the immediate consequence of the clash between capitalism and the organisations of a natural economy which would restrict accumulation’:

Capital is faced with difficulties because vast tracts of the globe’s surface are in the possession of social organisations that have no desire for commodity exchange... Force is the only solution open to capital: the accumulation of capital, seen as an historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further on down to the present day. From the point of view of the primitive societies involved, it is a matter of life or death; for them there can be no other attitude than opposition and fight to the finish: complete exhaustion and extinction.

The next section shows how Africa’s relationship with traditional markets is still having adverse consequences.

**Looting Africa**

Is force ‘the only solution open to capital’ in Africa? The standard routes by which wealth flows from Africa to the North are permanent but inadequate: exploitative debt and finance, capital flight, unfair trade and distorted investment. Although the resource drain from Africa dates back many centuries, beginning with unfair terms of trade and then mediated through slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism, neoliberal policies are today the most direct causes of inequality and poverty. They tend to amplify uneven and com-
bined development, especially pre-existing gender, race and regional disparities, as we have seen above. Although the argument has to be situated in each national setting, there are prima facie relationships between deepening economic exploitation, neoliberal policies and social disintegration, a 'shock doctrine' in the words of Naomi Klein (2007), that can be traced in turn to the global scale.

Through Capital Flight and Debt Repayment

Africa has seen a vast share of its resources—more than $20 billion in 1997 alone—drained out by its own citizens (IMF 2005a: 126). James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana (2000) estimate that over a quarter of a century, $285 billion was drained from a core group of sub-Saharan African countries whose foreign debt was $178 billion in 1996. Other net outflows of finance occur through debt repayment. In absolute terms, Third World debt rose from $580 billion in 1980 to $2.4 trillion in 2002, and much of it is now simply unpayable, a factor recognised by the G7 finance ministers in June 2005 when they agreed to a partial write-off of $40 billion of debt owed by the 18 poorest countries. The debt relief was conditioned by standard neoliberal policy requirements, and represented an outlay of merely $1.5 billion each year for the wealthy countries, in comparison to their military spending in excess of $700 billion a year. In 2002, there was a net outflow of $340 billion in servicing this debt. Overall, during the 1980s and 90s, Africa repaid $255 billion, or 4.2 times the original 1980 debt. As a percentage of GDP, the 2005 multilateral debt owed to the IMF and World Bank exceeded 100% in Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), The Gambia, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Madagascar, several of which are mired in conflict. The few African countries without huge Bretton Woods debt repayment obligations were South Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Mauritius and Swaziland.

According to Eric Toussaint (2004:3, 384), debt inherited from dictators could be defined as legally 'odious' in at least 16 African countries, such as Nigeria under Abacha ($30 billion), apartheid South Africa ($22 billion), or Mobuto's Zaire ($13 billion). Such debts could therefore be eligible for cancellation since citizens were victimised both in the original accumulation (and use of monies against the society) and in subsequent demands that it be repaid. These amounts easily exceed half of Africa's outstanding debt. As Toussaint (2004:3) remarks, 'since 1980, over 50 Marshall plans (over $4.6 trillion) have been sent by the peoples of the periphery to their creditors in the centre!'

The absolute value of loans made to dictatorial regimes might disguise sites where the debt ratios are particularly onerous. By the early 2000s, the debt remained unpayable for at least 21 African countries, at a level of more than 300% of export earnings. For countries like Sudan, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, it was 15 times greater than annual export earnings. It is no coincidence that these countries have been steeped in conflict.

The Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative failed to change the debt servicing ratios noticeably, as even World Bank officials conceded (Bond 2006b: 78–80). The small debt relief concessions—including the June 2005 G7 finance ministers' offer—came at the expense of tighter neoliberal conditionality. The largest slice of debt relief that year, for Nigeria, required a vast down payment. According to the leader of Nigeria's Jubilee network, Rev. David Ugolor, 'The Paris Club cannot expect Nigeria, freed from over 30 years of military rule, to muster $12.4 billion to pay off interest and penalties incurred by the military' (Jubilee USA 2005).

Through Trade and Investment Liberalisation

Trade liberalisation has also exacted a heavy toll on sub-Saharan Africa—$272 billion over the past 20 years, according to Christian Aid (2005) and Kraev (2005). Dependence on primary commodities, worsening terms of trade, Northern subsidies and long-term falling prices for most exports together grip African producers in a price trap as they
increase production levels but generate decreasing revenues (Burnett & Manji 2007). Across Africa, four products at most make up three-quarters of export revenues. Natural resources accounted for nearly 80% of African exports in 2000 compared to 31% for all developing countries and 16% for the advanced capitalist economies. Meanwhile, agricultural subsidies to Northern farmers (mainly corporate producers) have risen steeply—by 15% between the late 1980s and 2004, according to the United Nations Development Programme (2005:94), to $360 billion per year—which has greatly intensified North-South trade inequalities. Developing countries lose $35 billion annually as a result of industrialised countries’ protectionist tariffs, $24 billion of this as a result of the Multifibre Agreement which protects especially U.S. producers.

Non-financial investment flows are driven less by policy—although liberalisation has also been important—and more by accumulation opportunities. During the 1970s, according to the Commission on Africa, roughly one-third of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the ‘Third World’ went to Africa; by the 1990s, this had declined to 5%. Thereafter, what seems like significantly rising FDI in the late 1990s and 2001 can be accounted for by the relocation of South African companies’ financial headquarters to London, and by resurgent oil investments in Angola and military-ruled Nigeria. Tax fraud, transfer pricing and other multinational corporate techniques also reduce Africa’s income. In 1994, for example, an estimated 14% of the total value of exported oil went unaccounted for (Cockroft 2001:4).

Through Resource Extraction

A final example of the processes by which the North drains the South comes from African minerals and petroleum, a major factor in violent conflict across the continent. The World Bank addressed the issue of natural capital depletion in a 2005 document, Where Is the Wealth of Nations? The Bank methodology for correcting bias in GDP wealth accounting is not nearly as expansive as it should be, but at least it recognises that extractive investments may not contribute to net GDP growth if resource depletion and pollution are factored in. The Bank’s ‘first-cut’ method subtracts factors such as fixed capital depreciation, depletion of natural resources and pollution from the existing rate of savings, but adds savings investments in education (defined as annual expenditure). The result, in most African countries dependent upon primary products, is a net negative savings/GNI rate. For every percentage point increase in a country’s extractive-resource dependency, that country’s potential GDP falls by 9% (as against the real GDP recorded), according to the Bank (2005:54) in what is probably a conservative estimate. In sum, even the Bank now admits that exploitation of Africa’s natural resources leaves the continent poorer.

The African countries most affected—those with high resource dependence and low capital accumulation—include Nigeria, Zambia, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo, Algeria and South Africa. Also affected are four countries emerging from intense conflict—Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone—where data are not available. The Bank compares the potential for capital accumulation and the actual measure of capital accumulation, and finds in many cases the differences are huge. Nigeria, a major oil exporter, could have had a year 2000 stock of produced capital five times higher than the actual stock. Moreover, if these investments had taken place, oil would play a much smaller role in the Nigerian economy today, with likely beneficial impacts on policies affecting other sectors of the economy (World Bank 2005:55).

Using Bank data, Gabon’s people lost $2,241 each in absolute terms in 2000 as oil companies depleted the country’s tangible wealth. Other large absolute per capita losses were $727 in the Republic of the Congo, $210 in Nigeria, $152 in Cameroon, $147 in Mauritania and $100 in Côte d’Ivoire in 2000, although Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone would also probably be on a list of countries whose people lost more than $100 in tangible national wealth (World Bank 2005:66). In net terms, even fairly prosperous countries—like Mauritius which lost $3,183 per person and Botswana which lost $2,111 per person—witness dramatic declines in income/wealth statistics using the Bank’s indicator compared to per capita GDP. In sum, the role of extractive FDI in countries rich in oil and other resources should take into account the net negative impact on national
wealth, including natural capital. The Bank's new accounting of genuine savings is a helpful innovation in the broader task of measuring looting, in part so as to establish grounds for reparations in a future, hopefully more just multilateral climate.

One is left with a sense that the world economy is amplifying features of uneven and combined development that are not accidental but are structured into economic interrelationships within the advanced capitalist world and between the North and South. Managing large-scale resource extraction requires strong geopolitical and military capacity, and given the failure of many Pentagon missions in Africa, most notably in Somalia in 1993, local strongmen are required. For example, in Central and East Africa, according to Ian Taylor:

Pro-American leaders in Asmara, Addis Ababa, Kampala and Kigali seemed to be constructing a new bloc of regimes friendly to Washington's interests, linking up with South Africa as a group of states that America could do business with (Taylor 2003:49).

A conservative estimate of three million dead in Central African wars follows logically from the victims' proximity to coltan and other mineral riches. From the late 1990s, the Uganda/Rwanda alliance was contested by a bloc composed of Laurent Kabila's DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Only with Kabila's 2001 assassination and Pretoria's management of elite peace deals in the DRC and Burundi has the conflict ebbed, however briefly, into a fragile peace combining neoliberalism and renewed opportunities for minerals extraction, although thousands continue to die in localised conflicts in the northeastern DRC.

Bridging sub-Saharan Africa and north Africa is another resource-rich sub-region of crucial importance to U.S. imperialism. Libya is being brought into the fold of weapons certification and control, and already U.S. troops have been deployed for small-scale interventions in Mali, Chad and Mauritania. A site of future extraction lies between northern Nigeria and southern Algeria, where the U.S. multinationals Halliburton and Bechtel have contracted gas pipeline options. The major petroleum prize remains the Gulf of Guinea. With Africa closer than the Persian Gulf to Louisiana's oil processing plants, the world's shortage of supertankers is eased by direct sourcing from West Africa's offshore oil fields.

But the African terrain over which capital hops in search of extractive enclaves remains pockmarked by military and civil conflict, in many cases due to the way global corporations and powerful imperial states establish cosy relationships with warlord regimes. The continent's civil wars and adverse climate, producing droughts and floods, are increasingly identified with structural political-economic power relations of the sort examined above, ranging from post-Cold War geopolitical fragility to global warming. New conflicts are in the offing because the scramble for Africa's resources has been joined from the Far East. The rapid rise of Chinese investment in Africa appears not as an anti-imperialist bulwark but rather intra-imperial competition which will exacerbate the looting process (Marks & Manji 2007).

In spite of establishing a new Africa Command in February 2007, in order—as George W. Bush put it—to 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners', the Pentagon cannot police Africa properly. Already by 2002, Washington had established the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance programme which, according to Horace Campbell (2007:21), provides 'offensive military weaponry, including rifles, machine guns and mortars under the guise of "regional peacekeeping"'.

Although local proxies—especially South Africa—will be required to carry out sub-imperial functions (Bond 2006a, 2006b), former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner made a frank declaration of imperial interests:

As the political and security conditions of the Persian Gulf deteriorate, the availability and appeal of reliable, alternative sources of oil for the American market grows. African oil is emerging as a clear direction U.S. policy could take to provide a secure source of energy (Campbell 2007:46).
Ineffective Aid and Development Strategies

Contributions from almost all developed countries fall well below the agreed United Nations target of 0.7% of GDP, with 0.12% of U.S. GDP and 0.23% of Japanese GDP as extreme examples. The 2003 total official aid of $69 billion is reduced to just $27 billion in ‘real’ aid to poor people because of a variety of ‘phantom’ aid mechanisms, according to a study by ActionAid (2005:1). ‘Untied’ aid rose from $2.3 billion in 1999 to $4.3 billion in 2003, but declined as a proportion of total ‘aid’. There is enough aid to ensure African elites are tied into the imperial orbit, with many African countries relying on aid as the basis for a large proportion of state expenditures.

One related legitimating strategy— which unfortunately far too many development and peace activists have endorsed— is the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. According to feminist economist Peggy Antrobus, they suffer from... inadequate targets and indicators; their restriction to indicators that are quantifiable, when much of what is most important — such as women’s equality and empowerment — is not easily quantifiable; their omission of important goals and targets, such as violence against women and sexual and reproductive rights... their silence on the context and institutional environment in which they are to be met (Antrobus 2003).

For a stronger sense of a political economy that can resist the uneven development and primitive accumulation responsible for so much conflict in Africa, African social movements are promoting more promising ways forward. Before turning to examine their efforts, some consideration is given to what peace researchers and peacemakers propose.

What Do Peace Researchers Offer?

Peace and security researchers do build political-economic factors into their discussions of African conflict, but they often rest at the level of localised incidents or institutional malevolence instead of adopting the structural analysis advocated in this article. Laurie Nathan, for example, cites international organisations and foreign powers which... undermine democratic principles and incur resentment and resistance from African leaders and communities when they operate without any semblance of respect for local actors... The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund insist that countries that receive their grants and loans should abide by the principles of democracy, accountability and respect for human dignity. Nevertheless, these institutions have imposed macro-economic policies on debtor countries; they have aggravated poverty through structural adjustment programmes; they are accountable more to their Northern ‘shareholders’ than to recipient governments in the South; and they are not held accountable for their mistakes and failed policies (Nathan 2004:13).

This is a useful start, to be sure, but because the argument neglects to take on the system of capitalist/non-capitalist relations described above, Nathan (2004:14) merely directs his conclusions towards the power elite, asking them not to use their power in the ways they have grown accustomed to:

The most significant contribution that the international community could make to peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa would be to attend to the ways in which foreign powers and multinational bodies provoke and heighten tension and violence. The critical issues in this regard include injudicious arms sales; political and economic support for authoritarian regimes; the debt crisis; structural adjustment programmes; and global trade relations (Nathan 2004:14).

Along with so much other peace/conflict literature, Nathan’s analysis fails to grapple with the underlying dynamics of accumulation and political power discussed in this article. If the analysis stops at the level of symptoms (institutions and policies) of that power, it is not surprising that advocacy campaigns such as Make Poverty History turn to ‘the international community’ to fix itself. But repeated failures of global governance reform initiatives within the existing power structure should instead generate strategies that break from such institutions (Bond 2007). We should instead follow more closely the way Hugo Chavez is trying to delink Latin America from the Bretton Woods institutions (through his commitment to socialism and offers of petro-financing resources) as a means of contesting their roles as central pivots of imperialism—not just malevolent institutions that need reforming.
If such a course were followed, reliance on elite deal-making in conflict situations would be less harmful. Months after Tony Blair had established the Commission for Africa, three key regimes anointed by Blair as modernising, liberalising states—Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia—were racked by violence (Cawthorne 2005). By early 2006, Ethiopia’s President Meles Zenawi had hammered his opposition with a massacre, mass arrests and beating. Aid was put finally put on hold to Addis Ababa just as World Bank credit was withdrawn from Kibaki’s corruption-riddled regime in Nairobi. Then with Western consent, Congo-Brazzaville President Denis Sassou-Nguesso was chosen as the 2006 head of the African Union, notwithstanding his two ascents to power (in 1979 and 1997) through coups, between which he shifted ideology from Marxist posturing to ‘an unashamedly market view of economics’ (Cornish 2006). A few months earlier in New York, Sassou-Nguesso demonstrated how such a shift could improve one’s personal comfort by running up a $300,000 hotel bill during a brief UN summit. ‘The main purpose of the president’s visit was to deliver a 15-minute speech to the General Assembly’s 60th anniversary summit. He was also entertained by an American oil firm’ (Allen-Mills 2006).

Within the elite global and African circuits, as Jean-Jacques Cornish recently noted, conflict resolution is at best fragile:

Things have gone distinctly pear-shaped in South Africa’s two most prized mediation subjects—the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. Governments put in place in both these countries as a result of South African brokered peace processes . . . saw a repeat of bodies in the streets and floods of refugees, reminiscent of their days of civil war (Cornish 2007).

With respect to the DRC, according to revolutionary scholar Wamba dia Wamba,

When a [transition process] takes off on a wrong footing, unless a real readjustment takes place on the way, the end cannot be good . . . Some feel like South Africa has actively put us in the situation we are in. They had a lot of leverage to make sure that certain structural problems were anticipated and solutions proposed. They seem to have fallen into the Western logic of thinking that mediocrity is a lesser evil for Congolese if it stops the war (Majavu 2004).

The ‘wrong footing’ amounts, simply, to self-interest, even where the highly touted South African role in Africa becomes rife with sub-imperial contradictions. In 2002, Pretoria lent $75 million to the regime of Joseph Kabila to repay the IMF for arrears on Mobutuera loans. According to the South African Cabinet (2002), ‘This will help clear the DRC’s overdue obligations with the IMF and allow that country to draw resources under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.’ In the same statement, the Cabinet recorded its payment to the World Bank of $8 million for replenishment of its African loan fund to ‘benefit our private sector, which would be eligible to bid for contracts financed from these resources’. The same year, the UN Security Council (2002) accused a dozen South African companies of looting the DRC during [the] late 1990s turmoil which left an estimated three million citizens dead. Indeed, within 18 months, President Thabo Mbeki was negotiating multi-billion dollar deals through the World Bank for South African corporate access to the DRC. In June 2005, Anglo Gold Ashanti was caught by Human Rights Watch (2005) giving ‘meaningful financial and logistical support which in turn resulted in political benefits’ to brutal warlords in the Nationalist and Integrationist Front in the Eastern DRC. Also in 2005, a diplomatic crisis erupted in the three-year-old Côte d’Ivoire conflict. According to Business Day

South Africa told the UN Security Council on August 31 that its mediation efforts had removed the obstacles to implementing the latest peace accord ending the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. It was now up to the government and rebel leaders to carry out their part of the deal.

But like Mbeki’s ineffectual mediation in neighbouring Zimbabwe, the harsh reality emerged within days when a ‘highly tense meeting’ of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council found that Mbeki’s mediation role had only ‘reinforced the divide’ between President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel forces thanks to Pretoria’s ‘biased’ (pro-Gbagbo) report and its delegation’s endorsement of Gbagbo’s anti-democratic actions in prior weeks (Kaninda 2005). These disasters led Business Day to ask:

Why then, if there is little chance of success, does SA get involved? One reason might be what one could euphemistically call SA’s economic diplomacy. Congo and Côte d’Ivoire are rich in mineral resources and peace there would open up new markets for South African companies. In Congo, for instance, the likes of telecoms company Vodacom took the risk of investing dur-
ing that country's most troubled period. So far, the dividends have been significant . . . It is no wonder then that Pretoria has invested so much time and resources in peace efforts in Congo. The same applies to Côte d'Ivoire. If peace and stability is restored in Congo and Côte d'Ivoire, there can be no doubt the economic and financial benefits for SA would be considerable.

Connecting the dots between imperialist relationships—entailing both accumulation processes and local compradors—is not difficult. What does seem to be beyond the grasp of many in the NGOs, research institutes and peace industry is the kind of critique that anticipates the negative outcomes of elite deal-making. Progressive social movements are launching these critiques and suggesting useful ways forward that address the international political economy behind Africa's looting.

ECONOMICS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT
Macartan Humphreys
Excerpted from 'Economics and Violent Conflict', Harvard University, February 2003

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF REBEL GROUPS

There is considerable variation across conflicts in the ways that rebel groups operate in the economy. Sometimes they act as economic producers, providing public goods; often however they act as extractors. Such variation in their behavior has implications for the economic well-being of populations as well as for the course of the conflict.

HOW DO REBELS FINANCE THEMSELVES? Researchers at the World Bank argue that the ability of groups to control lucrative economic sectors determines whether they can launch and sustain a campaign. There are, however, counterexamples that indicate that the material requirements needed to sustain a rebellion may be very low: The Mayi-Mayi in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides one example of a low-tech, low-cost but long-lasting rebel movement. As a recent report in Scientific American demonstrated, small arms can be very cheap—sometimes as little as $15 for an AK-47. And so can labor. In cases where there is local support for the actions of rebel groups, as with Chechyan rebels, the Viet Cong, and the IRA, it may be possible for people with regular employment to serve as "part time guerillas." In other cases, particularly where rebel groups do not benefit from local support, high levels of financing may be required.

The primary means of financing considered by econometric research and in policy responses is wealth derived from control over valuable natural resources such as drugs, oil, timber and "conflict diamonds." However, case study research indicates that this is too narrow a focus: in fact rebel groups also rely heavily on agricultural products—such as cashew nuts, tangerines, hazelnuts or bananas—to finance their campaigns. Such agricultural goods require continued production, often over extended territories, and have different implications for the ways that rebels interact with local economies and for policy responses aimed at stemming financing. As yet however agricultural products remain largely ignored.

A second means for funding is money collected from nationals based overseas. Econometric work has found a relationship between the size of a country’s emigrant population and its propensity to have civil wars, from which it has been deduced that emigrants must be funding conflicts. The relationship has sometimes been used to conclude that tougher immigration policies are needed in rich countries. Neither conclusion is in fact supported by the evidence. The relationship between conflict and the size of emigrant populations could arise for a number of reasons that have nothing to do with rebel financing. For one, diasporas may be larger because a country has had a history of shocks such as smaller conflicts or droughts that could produce or signal longstanding grievances. High emigration rates may also be the result of few job opportunities (and high levels of dissatisfaction) at home. Alternatively, high levels of emigration could alter
the characteristics of the residual population—possibly resulting in a disproportionately low amount of “entrepreneurs” and a disproportionately high amount of frustrated people left behind. Or, the direction of causality may run in the opposite direction: emigration may result from expectations of future conflict.121 Any or all of these effects could lead to the correlation that we observe between the size of emigrant populations and conflict without producing any evidence that emigrants typically fund wars.122 Yet statistical research has not yet distinguished between them. And of course, even if it were the case that emigrants are an important source of finance for wars, the implications for policy-makers will depend on who is being financed—there is no systematic cross-national evidence to indicate that diasporas are funding rebels rather than governments or civilian militias.123

Another source of rebel financing is sponsorship from third party sources. Remarkably, recent econometric work fails to probe the extent or impact of financing resulting from Cold War politics or of local geopolitics.124 This is particularly surprising given the fact that the civil wars being studied in this research took place largely over the period of the Cold War and there are numerous well-documented cases of financing of rebel groups by Cold War powers (such as US support for UNITA and the USSR’s support for the MPLA125), by local major powers (such as the funding of RENAMO by South Africa) or by religious sympathizers.

A final source of financing is voluntary transfers (notably “subscriptions”) and involuntary transfers (notably looting) from civilian populations. Such transfers may determine the viability of a rebel organization, and may condition its need for cash from other external sources. The form of these transfers is likely to have implications for the relations between rebel groups and civilian populations, with both military and humanitarian consequences. However, since most econometric work relies on macro-economic data, it fails to record any information about these exchanges. Gathering cross-nationally comparable information on the forms of financial relations between rebel groups and civilian populations should become a research priority.

REBELS AS ECONOMIC PRODUCERS. It is easy to find cases of economic destruction by warring groups; however it is also important to understand the extent to which rebel groups also engage in economic production. In some instances, by functioning as service providers and as organizers of economic activity, rebel groups may act as surrogate states, underscore the irrelevance of the government and develop support among civilian populations. In the War of Independence in Ireland (1916–1921), Sinn Féin and the IRA created a parallel structure of public goods provision to rival that provided by London. Similar structures have been provided by the EPLF who have supplied medical, veterinary and judicial services in Eritrea126 and by Maoist rebels supplying banking services and courts in Nepal.127 There is, however, considerable variation in the extent to which and the form in which rebel groups provide services. While in some places groups imitate states as service providers, elsewhere, they imitate states as extractors, using forced labor to manage local economies. This variation in the extent to which rebel groups provide public goods is of substantive importance: it is also likely to have implications for the forms of violence, for whether a war is sustainable and for options for peace settlements. Nonetheless, as yet, scholarship has not concentrated on explaining (or even measuring) this variation.

POLICIES OF GOVERNMENTS DURING WAR

CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE ALLOCATIONS. Like other protagonists of conflict, governments use economic tools as a weapon of war. For governments, the most important weapon is the re-organization of expenditure across regions and across sectors. In secessionist conflicts governments reallocate expenditure strategically either to punish (as in northern Mali) or to appease (as in southern Senegal) the secessionist areas. Governments allocate budget expenditure to promote particular industries—steel, technology, energy, armaments. Also, as might be expected, defense expenditure may come to constitute extremely high shares of total expenditure.128 The rise in defense expenditure during conflict is typically paid for by cuts in social expenditure—and from the health sector in par-
ticular. With a drop in expenditure on health and a rise in demand for health services, the health sector typically gets hit hard, with long-lasting effects. As suggested for example by Frances Stewart and her colleagues, if rises in defense expenditure are inevitable, then maintaining social expenditure at levels that can protect poor populations requires fiscal expansion. The implication is that if international financial institutions require fiscal contraction as part of structural adjustment programs put in place in wartime, they are likely to cause especially extreme hardship for the poor.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TAXATION.** In some instances, conflict has helped to strengthen taxation systems as a result of the state's increased need for revenues, its inability to access revenues from external sources and its enlarged mandate to intervene in the economy. Canada for example introduced income taxes in 1917 to help pay for its war efforts and succeeded in maintaining this revenue source after the end of the war. Similarly, wars fought by Britain in the 18th century and by the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries are often held to explain the development of institutions of domestic taxation. Conversely, some scholars argue that the lack of a military threat to contemporary developing nations helps to explain the weakness of those states. One implication is that the present rise in civil wars may be what is needed to strengthen states, and in Edward Luttwak's phrase we should give war a chance. This conclusion, however, is problematic. While there is considerable evidence for relations between international war and state formation, particularly in Europe, there is little evidence that the logic holds for contemporary civil wars. Possible reasons for the differences are suggested by sociologist Miguel Angel Centeno's study of war and taxation. Drawing on the Latin American experience, Centeno suggests that conflict does not lead to developments in institutions of taxation when state administrative capacity is low, when state control over its own territory is weak and when states have access to “external” sources of revenue. All three conditions are likely to hold for poor, natural resource–dependent states undergoing civil war. It is inappropriate then to expect that states presently undergoing civil war will repeat the European experience and become stronger as a result of their conflicts.

**OTHER MACROECONOMIC POLICIES.** In countries that fail to develop their institutions of taxation and that also face a falling tax base, the rise in defense expenditure results in a squeezing of other sectors. If governments also lose control over export commodities or face a suspension of aid there may be a more severe loss of foreign exchange. In response, government actions to pay for ensuing deficits include issuing war bonds or, simply, printing money. The latter increases domestic inflation while the rise in domestic debt will compound the effects of increased risk to push up domestic interest rates and crowd out private investment.

**INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS DURING WAR**

International corporations that function in conflict situations, particularly those working with natural resource extraction, are likely to find themselves having to take strategic choices that will have implications for warring groups. If corporations control stocks of lootable assets, then they may be one of the targets of conflict and may have to choose between providing for their own security through the use of mercenary groups or, at least tacitly, entering into deals with one side or another in a conflict. These conditions raise difficult questions: Can corporations function during conflicts without making things worse? Does the presence of corporations affect the type or levels of violence employed, or the chances for one side or other to win? Does it facilitate the flow of finances or weapons to fighting groups, or does it affect the way the economy responds to a conflict? Sadly, despite some careful work on the activities of particular industries in particular countries, these comparative questions have been largely ignored by scholars, particularly those engaged in econometric research.

In contrast to the relative silence from academics, many non-governmental groups have paid considerable attention to the economic roles of corporations during conflicts. In the process, corporations have faced criticism for working in conflict zones and in countries...
where human rights are being abused (see for example: Global Witness, Business & Human Rights and Project Underground). NGOs have called for campaigns against companies supporting governments during conflicts (see for example the report by Christian Aid on the activities of oil companies in Sudan). In addition, actions taken against business activities that foster low intensity conflict or environmental damage also have implications for war contexts. NGOs for example are pushing for legislation for disclosure by corporations of their relations with military and police forces (see the International Right to Know Campaign) which, if successful, could have broad application. NGO lobbying extends now also to corporations that are not located in conflict areas but that trade with those that are. Hence for example, the Danish firm DLH has been targeted by Global Witness and Greenpeace for trading with corporations in Liberia.

POLICY RESPONSES. In response to these criticisms some corporations have begun to publish “social responsibility reports.” The Social Responsibility Reports by Talisman Oil for example have been made publicly available on-line. In addition, a number of forums for coordinating corporate policies have been established, including the Corporate Social Responsibility Forum, the UN initiated Global Compact and ad hoc consultative groups. In December 2000 one set of such meetings between companies (Chevron, Texaco, Freeport MacMoran, Conoco, Shell, BP, Rio Tinto), NGOs and the governments of the US and UK, produced a set of guidelines for corporate action, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The principles require investigation of allegations of human rights abuses, greater dialogue with local communities, and standards for the use of private security firms. While the principles carry no legal weight they provide a basis for monitoring corporate action.

Other responses include more formal bans on trade, notably relating to the diamond industry. Diamond bans, however, have proven to date largely ineffective. Bans against exports from particular countries have already been in place without great success in large part due to the complicity of African leaders, international corporations and trading institutions in wealthy nations. After sustained whistle blowing, fears that sanctions and the publicity concerning the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts will hurt the entire industry have now resulted in a number of initiatives involving corporations and governments to allow for the separation of conflict diamonds (an estimated 4% of global production) from non-conflict diamonds. These include notably the recent Kimberley Process that requires a “chain of warranties” linking individual diamonds to their mine of origin.

ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Aid agencies stand accused of making matters worse in war zones. By functioning during conflicts they become agents in war economies. To deliver relief to priority areas they may, as was the case in Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s, have to decide whether to pay rebel groups for right of passage through their roadblocks or to look for more costly or less efficient alternatives. In Sierra Leone, many chose to pay off the rebels. Elsewhere, aid agencies pay armed groups for protection and provide the lootable commodities that groups fight for. And by supporting refugee camps they may (as with Malian Tuaregs camped in Mauritania) provide material resources that are transmitted to fighting groups or (as was the case for the Rwandese Interahamwe camped in Goma) they may provide the security needed for fighting groups to regroup.

Such unintended consequences of humanitarian intervention have received much attention, which has resulted in the establishment of a number of codes of conduct. The problem, however, may run deep. Edward Luttwak, for example, argues that since, after all, an intended effect of humanitarian aid is to provide the means to survive, it may result in a perpetuation of conflict. In support of this discomforting thesis, it has indeed been the case that not only has there been a rise in humanitarian activity over time but the average duration of wars has been increasing over time. Causal arrows probably run in both directions. It does not follow however, as suggested by warring parties, and, occasionally by academics, that the starvation or massacre of one side is either an acceptable or a necessary price to pay for peace.
Added to this there are economic arguments that may link aid to prolonged conflict: aid activity that is centered primarily on import and distribution may produce economic enclaves that prevent the generation of the economic ties that can lead to conflict resolution.158

While such debates over whether aid does more harm than good are morally complex,159 this is an area where as yet there has been little systematic research.

Hence, aid agencies have been criticized for providing humanitarian relief that may serve to exacerbate conflicts. They have also been criticized for suspending development operations during conflicts.160 It may seem unfair to criticize aid agencies both for doing too much and for doing too little. However, both criticisms relate to a failure of agencies to develop an understanding of the economics of conflict and the political nature of their own interventions. These interrelations should push donors to continue more development-oriented rather than simply relief-oriented programs and should encourage them to be more conscious of the political ramifications of their actions. Hence for example, in a bid to maintain some minimal level of expenditure on public goods and social services, Frances Stewart and her colleagues focus on the need to provide fiscal support to governments who divert funds towards military expenditure. In doing so, however, the donor community is likely to liberate more resources for military action and possibly prolong the conflict.161 In some cases, for aid agencies to evaluate whether or not this makes sense they will need to decide which side, if any, they want to win. Alternatively they will need to develop economic interventions that support peace processes.162

SANCTIONS. One economic weapon that can be used by the international community to alter the policies of foreign governments and stem the financing accruing to rebel groups is sanctions. To date however, sanctions have proved to be a blunt weapon of policy, with most attempts at coercion through sanctions ending in failure.163 If groups finance activity though trading illegal commodities—such as drugs—and buying commodities illegally—such as arms—the existence of sanctions is likely to be irrelevant. Even if commodities are otherwise legal, the ability to transship through neighboring states may severely reduce the impact of sanctions. Attempts to limit diamond exports from Sierra Leone have been largely frustrated by the ability of diamond traders to transship through Liberia, the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire.164 Even when sanctions have real impacts it is not just intended targets that suffer.165 Indeed it is wrong to think of sanctions as a non-violent weapon: they often result quite directly in the deaths of large numbers of civilians.166 As with trade protectionism, sanctions have distributive implications, hurting producers of export commodities and benefiting producers of import substitutes. By acting like market regulation that protects domestic monopolies and limits distribution channels, sanctions may also increase opportunities for corruption. This arguably was the case in Haiti167 and in former Yugoslavia where sanctions have allegedly benefited Milosevic and a small clique of élites.168 And if the rationale for traditional sanctions is that they work by inflicting pain on civilians so that they in turn put pressure on their leaders, then sanctions seem especially inappropriate in war contexts, where mechanisms of accountability are particularly weak.169

Nonetheless during the 1990s, there was an explosion in the use of United Nations Security Council-imposed sanctions.170 Sanctions policies have however become more sophisticated, with the recent development of more targeted sanctioning. New approaches freeze the assets or block the freedom of movement of particular individuals. The development of these new “smart” sanctions has been promoted by the Swiss Government through the Interlaken Process, which focused on financial sanctions, and by the German government whose project focused on arms embargoes and travel bans. This work continues with support from the Swedish government. However, because of their lack of comprehensiveness, targeted sanctions may lead to the exemption of particular commodities through either successful lobbying by industries with economic interests in the commodities or because of increased complexity of political or bureaucratic processes for determining the coverage of sanctions. As a case in point it is striking that despite the existence of sanctions against the Taylor regime in Liberia, the timber industry— which
provides financing for the Taylor government and which has been linked to arms deals by the United Nations Panel of Experts—is not covered by the sanctions regime.\footnote{171}

**MILITARY AID AND MILITARY TRADE.** A second area in which the international community can take direct action to alter the incentives or capabilities of fighting groups is through the production and distribution of arms. While much recent work by scholars has concentrated on commodities produced in warring countries, often for consumption in wealthy nations, the arms that are used to do the killing are largely produced in, and sold by, wealthier countries, and often with the support of governments of these countries.\footnote{172}

These arms make their ways to warring countries through two channels: as aid or through trade. Military aid (often classified as development aid) is used systematically, and with some success, to alter the policies of foreign governments and has often been used to support one side or other in a civil war.\footnote{173} As yet however there is little evidence that it has been successful in promoting peace and indeed econometric evidence suggests that increases in military aid are associated with increased future levels of conflict.\footnote{174} One reason is that military aid, by providing the means for increased violence, can heighten tensions rather than leading simply to a clarification of power asymmetries; in some situations it may indeed lead to increases in aid to the other side from rival donors. Another reason is that the motivations for military aid derive from the economic and security concerns of the donor country rather than from the needs of citizens in the recipient countries. Research finds that historically these motivations have rarely been humanitarian.\footnote{175} Add to this the fact that providing aid, while bolstering allies, does not guarantee influence. Econometric studies in fact suggest that military aid is most effective in influencing foreign policy rather than domestic policy and has greatest impacts on civilian administrations—conditions that are not met in many civil war contexts.\footnote{176}

When arms that have been produced in wealthier countries are traded, there is less control over where they end up and an even lower probability that they will reduce conflict. The trade in small arms and light weapons\footnote{177} has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War with falling prices and a massive proliferation of arms resulting from the changing economic situations and security concerns of producer countries.\footnote{178} While arms sales in the 1980s were led by the USSR, the US, the UK and France\footnote{179} many of the small arms (as well as attack helicopters) used in civil wars in the 1990s are traced to Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries—Bulgaria in particular.\footnote{180} Small arms flows from Eastern Europe\footnote{181} for example have made their way smoothly to West African conflicts despite various arms embargoes thanks to poor regulation by exporting countries as well as the complicity by governments of countries neighboring civil war zones, notably Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso.\footnote{182} There are two approaches to limiting the trade in arms: one treats it essentially as a policing problem and focuses on the illicit market; the other focuses on the roles states play in promoting and facilitating arms sales to warring areas. These different approaches are a point of contention between governmental and non-governmental groups. While NGOs call for greater regulation of sales by governments (Human Rights Watch for example calls for a standardized end-user certificate, and for the UN to compile and publish information on violations of end-user certificate provisions\footnote{183}), governmental attempts to stem the proliferation of small arms have focused narrowly on illegal trafficking rather than on governmental responsibility.\footnote{184}

Other responses focus on particular weapons such as cluster bombs and especially the production, distribution and use of land mines.\footnote{185} Land mines, by making productive areas inaccessible well after a conflict ends, have particularly severe economic consequences. Costing as little as $3 to purchase they can cost thousands of dollars to clear.\footnote{186} The greatest advances in land mines policy have taken place through the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On their Destruction. Yet support for land mine prohibitions has been uneven. While the convention has been ratified by 121 states\footnote{187} and has been closely monitored by non-governmental groups,\footnote{188} to date the ban has not been supported by the US, China or Russia. The US is now one of just fourteen countries that continues to allow the production of antipersonnel mines.\footnote{189}
Overview

In October 2005 the first Human Security Report was launched at the United Nations by the University of British Columbia’s Human Security Centre. The Report tracked some of the extraordinary changes that had taken place in the global security landscape since the end of the 1980s.

Published subsequently by Oxford University Press, the Report described how armed conflicts, war death tolls, military coups, refugee numbers, international crises, and genocides had all declined in the wake of the Cold War. It argued that many of these changes could be attributed to an explosion of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, that sought to stop ongoing wars, help negotiate peace settlements, support post-conflict reconstruction, and prevent old wars from starting again.

The next Human Security Report will be published at the end of 2007. It will focus on two major themes—“The Hidden Costs of War” and “The Causes of Peace.” Short descriptions of both are included at the end of this Brief.

The intent of the Human Security Brief 2006 is twofold: to update the core trend data on political violence around the world that were published in the 2005 Human Security Report, and to analyse the key findings of a number of datasets that track these changes.

The Brief also describes and analyses the findings of three recently released datasets compiled by the Human Security Centre’s partner, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University, Sweden. The datasets under review track trends in (a) wars fought by non-state actors, where none of the warring parties is a government; (b) campaigns of organized violence against civilians; and (c) war terminations.

Structure and Contents

The Brief is divided into three short chapters. This overview describes their main themes and findings.

Chapter 1: Trends in Armed Conflict reviews the latest findings of two datasets that measure global and regional trends in the number of armed conflicts and their associated battle deaths.

Chapter 2: Deadly Assaults on Civilians compares the findings of three datasets that seek to measure—albeit very differently—the number of civilians intentionally killed in campaigns of political violence.

Chapter 3: How Wars End analyses the findings of a new dataset that provides a comprehensive account of how wars end in the post-World War II era.

Key Findings

• Notwithstanding the escalating violence in Iraq and the widening war in Darfur, the new data indicate that from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2005, the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world shrank 15% from 66 to 56. By far the greatest decline was in sub-Saharan Africa.

• Battle-death tolls declined worldwide by almost 40% between 2002 and 2005. Battle-death statistics are prone to considerable error, however, so these findings should be treated with appropriate caution.
• The steep post–Cold War decline in genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians has continued. In 2005 there was just one ongoing genocide—in Darfur. In 1989 there were 10.
• Growing numbers of wars are ending in negotiated settlements instead of being fought to the bitter end—a trend that reflects the increased commitment of the international community to peacemaking. In the Cold War era more wars were decided on the battlefield than ended in negotiation.
• The estimated number of displaced people around the world—refugees and internally displaced persons—fell from 34.2 million to 32.1 million between 2003 and 2005, a net decline of 6%.
• The number of military coups and attempted coups fell from 10 in 2004 to just 3 in 2005, continuing an uneven decline from the 1963 high point of 25.

But other trends are far from positive:

• Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world to see a decline in armed conflicts. In four other regions of the world the number of armed conflicts increased between 2002 and 2005.
• International terrorist incidents increased threefold worldwide between 2002 and 2005, and the number of fatalities increased fivefold. Most of the increases were associated with the war in Iraq.
• Campaigns of organized violence against civilians have increased by 56% since 1989. Although most of these have killed relatively few people, this figure supports the popularly held belief that civilians are increasingly being victimized in the post–Cold War era by the perpetrators of political violence.
• The fact that more wars now end in negotiated settlements rather than victories is encouraging news for peacemakers. But it turns out that wars that end in negotiated settlements last three times longer than those that end in victories and are nearly twice as likely to restart within five years.
Understanding the relationship of economic policy to conflict and peace is not straightforward. This is because multiple causes of conflict inevitably always exist, and policy choices contribute to many of the structural factors often associated with both conflict and peace. That said, some clear trends have emerged over the last two decades involving the impacts of economic policy choices that African governments have made.

African scholars have been at the forefront of critiques of the dominant economic policy model that was implemented across much of Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. In ‘Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation’, Thandika Mkandawire points out that during this period Africa’s poor economic performance was blamed on the failure of governments to ‘adopt the right policies’ and that the promise of structural adjustment was not only ‘accelerated development’, but a means to end Africa’s marginalisation from the process of globalisation. The latter would be achieved through the encouragement of foreign investment and subsequent expansion and diversification of exports. Like Mkandawire, Fantu Cheru, in ‘Africa and the Globalization Challenge’, articulates what many African scholars have underscored: structural adjustment policies (SAPs) have not produced the structural transformation promised; they have instead undermined human development, and in short, have not convincingly advanced their primary aim—economic growth. Following SAPs, in 1999 poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) emerged as a new framework for development assistance, including in countries emerging from conflict. In ‘Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa’, Cheru suggests that in addition to adversely affecting some groups within recipient states, the overall distribution of wealth has tended to worsen, widening the gap between rich and poor. This has accompanied poor progress in human development, including large-scale unemployment, declines in education, limited access to health services, exponential population growth, and worsening refugee problems. In one example, the introduction of SAPs in the 1980s brought about a sharp reduction in education funding—from average spending of $41 per capita in 1980 to $25 in 1995, resulting generally in demand far outstripping supply.

In assessing progress, Cheru hone in on key ‘practical challenges’ regarding PRSP implementation: the scope and nature of growth, financing and expenditure management of the PRSP in national budgets, the legitimacy of the participatory process, the adequacy of national capacity for PRS formulation, implementation and monitoring, and harmonisation of donor aid practices with PRS objectives. He argues that PRS-promoted poverty reduction is hampered by inadequate diagnosis of poverty, and critiques the narrowness of the policy prescriptions that are focused more on stimulating growth than on complementary policies for reducing structural poverty. As discussed in chapter 9, the World Bank’s own analysis of conflict-sensitive approaches to PRSPs also addresses the issue of inadequate poverty diagnostics, underscoring the need to link these with conflict analysis. As many within civil societies of countries undertaking PRSPs have argued, Cheru makes recommendations that include the need for more genuinely participatory and result-oriented processes that tackle the multidimensional nature of poverty and asserts that countries should not be rushed into completing these processes, as they have been and usually comply with, to ensure quick access to international financial resources. Cheru underscores the severe challenges for countries to articulate and implement realistic plans.
and notes that international financial institutions (IFIs) and other donors should have better anticipated policy and institutional missteps that served to undermine the building of effective state institutions in Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s. They thus should work to strengthen state capacity to carry out needed reforms and provide resources to implement them.

Adjustment related, or neo-liberal economic policies, can be linked to violence and conflict when distribution and other sources of structural violence and violent conflict are concerned. Roland Paris, drawing on Walton and Seddon, highlights countries where SAPs were greeted with violent protests, including Brazil, Egypt, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Peru, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia. Such policies also appear to have exacerbated inter-communal divisions in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia. He argues in 'Adopt Conflict-Reducing Economic Policies' that economic liberalisation and related policies are particularly problematic for fragile post-conflict settings. This is because capitalism is inherently tumultuous—it can exacerbate conflict and undermine prospects for stable peace in fragile situations—particularly where domestic institutions do not exist to manage the destabilising effects of marketisation. Macartan Humphreys, in 'Economics and Violent Conflict', also points to the mechanisms that link SAPs (and arguably all economic liberalisation-based approaches) with violence: the undermining of social services, the weakening of entrenched elites, and the worsening of horizontal inequalities. Cheru makes a broader point often assumed by peace and conflict researchers globally, many of whom have lived through SAP implementation: Adjustment approaches have intensified societal polarisation with dire consequences for internal political and social transformation.

In explaining Africa's current environment—unfortunately too often associated with 'chaos', given the dire development challenges coupled with the prevalence of war—researchers and institutions tend to adopt explanations that preference internal or external factors. Much of the dominant discourse, supported by the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) and even some African scholars, for example, George Ayittey in Africa in Chaos, look to internal factors, in particular poor governance and ethnicity, to explain Africa's economic crisis. Mkandawire and Cheru, on the other hand, acknowledge internal factors while underscoring external factors, in particular those related to SAPs and wider neo-liberal economic policies and related impacts, including deteriorating terms of trade, uneven patterns in foreign direct investment flows, unsustainable levels of external debt, and externalisation of economic policy-related decision making. In fact, external factors cannot and arguably should not be disconnected from internal factors, as externalisation of decision making has accompanied the weakening of domestic capacities. This notion is supported by Paris's arguments (above) and related discussions in the state-building literature in recent years that liberalisation strategies at the core of the international community's peacebuilding agenda have hollowed out the state, undermining capacity and foundations for sustained peace. Ironically, as pointed out by Mkandawire, although in the pre-globalisation era assessment of economic growth prioritised external factors, this era is more focused on internal determinants of economic performance. He argues that globalisation—a process whereby national and international policy makers proactively or reactively promote liberalisation—might be credibly viewed in parts of the world as driven by technology and the 'invisible hand' of the market. In Africa, however, it is thought that most of the features of globalisation and the forces associated with it have been shaped by the BWIs and by Africa's adherence to World Trade Organization conventions aimed at opening up markets. The conditions under which the process of globalisation is taking place is the problem; despite Africa's relatively high levels of integration into the world economy, growth has faltered, and the developmental needs of the continent and the strategic questions regarding the appropriate form of integration to address those needs are ignored.

In a unique approach to highlighting key issues underpinning economic policy choices and conflict and peace, Johan Galtung creatively illustrates the cultural and political economy underpinnings of different schools of economic thought as practiced by different countries. His analysis in ‘Six Economic Schools’ is premised on the notion that societal organisation of nature, production, and consumption cycles play a significant role in the way a polity operates and the manner in which power is organised. He highlights the role of particular choices made in and by cultures—that is, choices such as individualism versus collectivism, verticality versus horizontality—all of which have a direct impact on social relations and therefore conflict and peace. The tensions embedded in individualism are found in the creation of privileges offered to individuals in a highly vertical structure, whereas those in a horizontal structure are found in the manner in which groups, tribes, clans, and collectivities work together for the common good. Galtung provides as vivid examples the fall of the Soviet Union and the inherent fault lines in the capitalist system of most of the western world as reasons why the organisation of production will continue to offer challenges to the realisation of human development.

Thinking about ways forward, Paris’s thesis of the need for institutionalisation before liberalisation, speaking specifically to post-conflict realities, suggests the need for delaying conflict-generating economic reforms until political conditions are less fragile and while the governmental and legal frameworks needed to regulate a market economy are being established. Reforms should be implemented in a gradual and phased manner, not through ‘shock therapy’. Schedules for achieving fiscal balance and low rates of inflation should also be extended to reduce pressure on social spending in an early post-conflict setting. Other analysts go further, proposing ways that challenge the fundamental assumptions of the dominant approach. Cheru offers a third way to remove Africa from its underdevelopment and instability: the guided embrace of globalisation with a commitment to resist it if necessary. In an instance of the latter, he calls on African countries to devise alternative formulations and conditions under which they would engage in global economic exchanges. Mkandawire similarly challenges African policy makers to recognise the enormous task of correcting the maladjustment of their economies and to introduce more explicit, more subtle, and more daring policies to stimulate growth, trade, and export diversification.

The UN Millennium Project, in the overview from ‘Investing in Development’, highlights the status of countries vis-à-vis the millennium development goals (MDGs), which if achieved would among other things remove 500 million people from poverty and eliminate hunger for 300 million. It assesses why the world is falling short on meeting the goals, citing continued governance failures (that is, ongoing rule of law deficits and lack of appropriate public investment and management), ‘poverty traps’ (such as heavy debt and the lack of fiscal resources to invest in infrastructure and services), ‘pockets’ of poverty within countries, and areas of specific policy neglect. Critiques of the MDGs as a framework for lifting Africa out of poverty are, however, increasing, emphasising that the assumptions, targets, and suggested strategies do not address the deep structural problems embedded in the existing dominant political economy approaches that create and entrench uneven development. The MDGs are merely targets; they do not form the basis of an alternative and sustainable development paradigm.

The literature directly engaging the complex relationship of economic policy and conflict and peace remains somewhat sparse, in part because of the challenges in proving causality, but also due to the general lack of critical analysis of economists themselves in examining the results of their approaches, indicative of the great institutional political obstacles to change. This collection of important pieces suggests key elements that need to be considered when working to conceptualise this relationship and lessons that must be drawn from decades of experience that have in many cases reversed development for Africans. These elements and lessons can help illuminate a path towards the design of economic policies more conducive to peace as understood by African scholars such as Emmanuel Hansen (see chapter 1), which aims at transformation of both national and international social systems for the betterment of entire societies.
Globalization, a phenomenon brought about by technological revolutions, is an increasingly important dimension of international economic relations in terms of its implications for trade, productive investment and finance. In both mainstream media and corporate boardrooms, the rapid integration of national markets with one another is presented as the only means to bring unprecedented world prosperity and freedom in the post-Cold War era (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994; Barber, 1994). This rapid interpenetration of economies is facilitated by a global drive for liberalization of markets and a rapid reduction of the commanding role of the state in national planning. The state itself, therefore, facilitates globalization, acting as an agent in the process.

By contrast, critics of globalization characterize it as the greatest threat to potential human development. The primary emphasis of globalization has been economic liberalization, with very little attention paid to the importance of international equality and solidarity. As the remote forces of globalization hobble governments and weaken the bonds of social solidarity, anger is growing among those whose existence is being threatened (Mittelinnan, 106). Moreover, the rise of globalization has also seen a greater degree of economic differentiation among developing countries, a factor which has further undermined the ideals of South–South cooperation (Nhalapo, 2000: 19). Whatever the merits of these divergent points of view, it is clear that globalization is here to stay. Managing it successfully in order to promote human development and eradicate mass poverty remains the greatest challenge.

As Africa entered the twenty-first century, it faced mounting challenges. Widespread poverty, rapid population growth, ecological degradation, large-scale unemployment, fragile political institutions and weak public administration still hamper the continent’s quest for economic and social transformation. The process of economic globalization further compounds these problems. While African governments increasingly recognize the importance of private initiatives for economic growth, they are being pressed to integrate their economies with world markets in the absence of a transparent trading system in which rules are respected by all. Competitiveness in the global economy will not be maintained or enhanced merely by the steady devaluation of state sovereignty or by erecting barriers against African products once they have penetrated other markets.

African uneasiness about globalization is not without justification. The continent is no stranger to globalization and its deleterious effects. More than any region in the world, Africa has paid a high price for the globalizing policies of rival capitalist powers as they have striven to expand the geographic bounds of capital. Starting with the slave trade in 1650, and continuing under colonial rule after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the continent was heavily drawn into the centres of capitalist accumulation, but always as a subordinate partner whose primary role was to contribute to the development of the metropolitan powers (Rodney, 1982; Fanon, 1963). The present globalization process, much like nineteenth-century globalization under colonialism, could again end up leaving the continent permanently marginalized unless African governments redirect their efforts to manage it successfully to their own advantage. For Africa, this is an absolute necessity if the continent wants to avoid a repeat of the degrading and inhumane treatment its peoples received from the colonial state and capitalist forces. The globalization of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries should not be allowed to leave behind the same terrible economic, political and social legacies.

The process of globalization is by no means complete. Most developing countries with favourable initial conditions—such as a good skill base, sound infrastructure, and solid research and development capacity—will gain more economically from the globalization process than countries with less favourable initial conditions. For example, East Asia has gained the most to date from globalization. The situation of sub-Saharan Africa appears
less promising, however. This is because the basic institutional, infrastructural and human resources required for initiating meaningful transformation are missing. Strengthening the capacities of African countries to manage the cold currents of globalization in ways that promote democracy and human development, therefore, remains perhaps the most critical contemporary challenge. The main goal of this book is to explore ways to reverse Africa’s marginalization and to examine key areas of reform that must be undertaken quickly as a precondition for Africa’s successful insertion into the global economy. These broad-based political and sector-based reforms should serve as the building blocks for Africa’s ‘renaissance’.

A Continent in Despair

The 1980s and 1990s have been billed as Africa’s ‘lost development decades’. Many African countries experienced either stagnation or a reversal of the gains made in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1965 and 1985, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita increased less than 1 per cent a year on average. And, despite positive economic indicators in some parts of the continent since the mid-1990s, growth in the region slowed down after 1998, and poverty is increasing rather than stabilizing. In 2000, incomes for nearly half of the continent’s 760 million people averaged less than 6 US cents a day. The average GNP per capita for the region in 2000 was US$492. But in twenty-four countries, GNP per capita was $350, with the lowest incomes found in Ethiopia ($100), the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($110), Burundi ($120) and Sierra Leone ($130) (World Bank, 2001). Reversing this decline is perhaps the most pressing challenge facing African governments and the international community in the coming years.

Since the early 1980s almost all African countries have embarked on a course of World Bank- and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored structural adjustment. This involved a reduced role for the state, macroeconomic stabilization, economic policy reforms and public sector restructuring with the goal of reviving economies and eradicating poverty. Greater macroeconomic stability and removal of large price distortions in key areas have no doubt made an important contribution to economic recovery in some countries. Fourteen countries have grown on average by 4 per cent a year during the 1990s, with rising annual incomes of 2–3 per cent and even higher, with another ten countries following close behind with growth rates above 5 per cent a year (Camdessus, 1998: 194; World Bank, 2001). A small but significant band of countries, such as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique, which have embraced reforms in the face of significant erosion of the social position of their citizens, have sustained significant real per capita economic growth.

The slow but incremental economic growth in a handful of African countries in recent years, however, does not warrant euphoria or represent a solid indication of the beginning of an ‘African Renaissance’. The supply response of farmers and of the nascent private sector has not been commensurate with the scope of the reforms and few countries in the region have successfully completed adjustment programmes with a return to sustained growth. According to the latest edition of African Development Indicators 2001, published by the World Bank, growth in the region slowed significantly after 1998, with average per capita GDP falling by almost 1 per cent in 1998–99 (World Bank, 2001). The Bank attributed the slowdown in growth to civil wars, poor governance in some countries, and serious external shocks such as the rapid hike in oil prices at the same time that export earnings from primary commodities collapsed. Moreover, the report warns that growth is below the 5 per cent annual level needed to prevent a rise in the numbers of poor people on the continent. Africa’s recovery is still fragile and as vulnerable as ever to fluctuations in commodity prices, bad weather, sudden economic collapse in distant lands, or the outbreak of war.

Even in those cases that have shown increased economic success, something the international financial institutions take credit for, the causal links between economic recovery and the implementation of structural adjustment policies remain weak. Moreover, the moderate economic recovery has not been underpinned by greater investment or increased
Limited Progress in Human Development

Poor economic performance, exacerbated in many countries by political instability and violent conflict, has translated into limited progress in human development. Outside of Africa, it is often difficult to appreciate what the continent’s economic crisis has meant in human terms. For the majority, economic recession means increasingly inadequate diets, income insufficient to clothe children and to buy fuel for heating and lighting homes, and mounting susceptibility to diseases. One out of four Africans has access to clean water. Infant mortality rates, already the highest in the world, will continue to rise. Vulnerability to hunger will increase. In the year 2000, more than 300 million Africans—half of the continent’s population—were estimated to be living in poverty (UNDP, 1997: 4).

Surveying human development on the African continent, a visible collapse can be noted in the following critical areas:

Decline in African education

Demand for education at all levels is outstripping the supply of educational facilities and resources. This has a particularly adverse effect on female enrolment rates, which remain low despite improvements over the past three decades. Female enrolment numbers decrease as girls move up the education ladder. Prospects for increasing the access of women and girls to education have been undermined by economic crisis, budgetary cuts, debt-servicing burdens, and unsustainable levels of military expenditure in many conflict-prone African countries.

With the introduction of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, the education sector experienced the sharpest cut in resource allocation. Average per capita education spending declined from $4 in 1980 to only $26 in 1985 and was $25 in 1995. Meanwhile the proportion of foreign aid allocated to education declined from 17 per cent in 1975 to 9.8 per cent in 1990, increasing slightly to 10.7 per cent in 1994 (Manuh, 1998; 10). These cuts have resulted in a dramatic shortage of books and instructional materials. Teacher salaries have also fallen to desperately low levels. Attempts by governments to recover costs have simply driven parents to pull their children out of school.

Limited access to health services

Deprivation in health starts with lack of access to health care and other services. Despite considerable improvements over the past twenty-five years, nearly 50 per cent of the people in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to adequate health care. In many countries, the exodus of doctors, nurses and technicians, compounded by declining or stagnating public expenditure on health, has culminated in a virtual collapse of the health infrastructure. There is only one doctor per 18,000 people, compared to one per 1,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP, 1997: 28). In 1999, the infant mortality rate in Africa was estimated at 92 deaths per thousand. The average expenditure on the health sector in sub-Saharan Africa rarely exceeds about 5 per cent of GDP (UNEC, 1996: 65). Because the health policies of most member governments are yet to be grounded in preventive and primary health care, a large proportion of public expenditure on health, sometimes as high as 60 per cent, goes toward curative services in a few teaching hospitals.
Similarly, the majority of nurses and other essential health workers are concentrated in a few urban areas. Rural communities are highly disadvantaged.

Health is also affected by lack of access to clean water and sanitation. Inadequate potable water, sanitation and waste disposal in urban and rural areas leave populations vulnerable to water-borne and other environmental diseases. Malaria, lung and other respiratory diseases are still major killers in Africa. High levels of maternal, child and infant mortality and low rates of immunization are symptomatic of the gross neglect of Africa's rural communities. Now HIV/AIDS poses the greatest threat to human development in the continent. At the current level of Africa's economic development, focusing on primary health care is the only viable strategy for achieving health for all in the foreseeable future.

HIV/AIDS as a development crisis

According to a report by UNAIDS, there are now 34.3 million people infected with HIV/AIDS worldwide. Of these, 24.5 million are in sub-Saharan Africa. The current number of people infected in Africa is about three times higher than demographers predicted (UNAIDS, 2000). It is estimated that each day in Africa more than 5,000 people die from AIDS or HIV-related illness, with the figure expected to climb to almost 13,000 by 2005 (UNAIDS, 2000). About 13.2 million children (the vast majority in Africa) have lost either their mother or both parents to the disease. The area of greatest concern is Southern Africa. In the seven countries of Southern Africa, 20 per cent of adults are infected with HIV, which eventually causes AIDS and death in nearly all cases. South Africa has more HIV-infected people than any other country. The current estimate is about 4.2 million, or 20 per cent of the adult population. The nation with the highest prevalence is Botswana, where 36 per cent of adults are infected.

The AIDS epidemic is already measurably eroding economic development, educational attainment and child survival—all key measures of national health—in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Cheru, 2000: 519–35). The demographic effects will only get worse in the coming years. For example, demographers predict that two-thirds of Botswana's 15-year-olds will die of AIDS before the age of 50. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the adult population between the ages of 15 and 49 in Zambia is currently HIV positive (UNAIDS, 1997). In Zambia alone it is expected that more than 40 per cent of primary-school teachers will die of HIV/AIDS by 2005. Zambian Ministry of Education data shows that 680 teachers died in 1996, 624 in 1997, and 1,300 in the first ten months of 1998. Deaths in 1998 were equivalent to the loss of about two-thirds of the annual output of the newly trained teachers from all training institutions combined (Government of Zambia, 1997).

Already the disruptive effects of the epidemic are myriad. For example, in urban areas of Ivory Coast, households containing an adult with AIDS spent half as much on education and four times as much on health care as unaffected households. In a study of farm workers’ families in Zimbabwe, 48 per cent of the ‘AIDS orphans’ of primary-school age had dropped out of school. The Central African Republic has only two-thirds of the primary schoolteachers it needs. From 1996 to 1998, as many teachers died as retired.

The negative effect of HIV/AIDS on macroeconomic performance through the loss of large numbers of the economically active population, the creation of unschooled children (as most AIDS orphans are likely to become) who will lack competitive skills in the job market, and the national cost of treating victims, make the disease Africa's number one development disaster.

The demographic challenge

The demographic explosion compounds the challenge of meeting basic needs and eradicating poverty. Of all the regions of the world, Africa has the youngest population, with roughly 50 per cent of its people below 15 years of age, compared with 20 per cent in the mature market economies. Africa’s youthful demographic profile imposes a disadvantage, in terms of the heavy burden of young dependants. This taxes the already
crowded and inadequate school systems and health services. It also manifests itself in massive rural-to-urban migration, fuelling an urban explosion.

The race between population growth and economic development is on, and its outcome will shape the economy and society of African countries in the twenty-first century. To attain reduction of poverty by half in 2015, according to a major consensus at the World Summit for Social Development, will require a 4 per cent annual reduction in the number of people living in poverty and an average economic growth rate of at least 7 per cent per annum. But Africa’s economy recorded only an average of 3.3 per cent growth in 1998 and 1999, while the population grew at an average rate of about 2.4 per cent. The economic growth rate needs to be increased substantially at the same time as population growth rate is decreased.

A growing refugee problem

The African continent currently hosts about half of the world’s displaced people. About 7 million Africans are directly categorized as refugees. This figure does not include many internally displaced persons forced to flee their homes, those unregistered in camps, or persons who have privately sought asylum in other countries. Twelve countries are responsible for over 6 million refugees, most of them from Eastern Africa. No one will ever know the exact number of displaced populations from recent conflicts in nations such as Sierra Leone, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The primary causes of this phenomenal wave of human displacement are political in nature (ethnic conflicts, civil wars), or associated with drought and famine. While a great many refugees have been repatriated back to their countries following the end of conflicts, millions remain in refugee camps uncertain about their future. Only the ending of hostilities can provide permanent relief to people on the run.

The Causes of Africa’s Economic, Social and Political Crisis

The reasons for the persistent decline of African economies are numerous and complex, emerging and transforming through historical and modern contexts. The interactions of both internal and external factors have made the prospect of managing Africa’s development in a sustainable way more complex, as globalization ensures that destructive processes traverse borders as quickly as those that are constructive. For example, economic crises that have reduced living standards in many countries have in some cases catalysed social, civil and regional conflicts. The domestic and internal factors that underlie Africa’s economic and social crisis will now be considered in turn, although it should be remembered that they are not always readily separable.

Domestic Factors

The internal reasons for Africa’s economic problems vary but include inherited colonial legacies and the transition from colonialism to undemocratic (and often corrupt), highly militarized neo-colonial regimes. These regimes have very often adopted development strategies that benefit a few urban elites at the expense of the majority. Among the indices of such failed strategies are the following:

Inhospitable political climate and inappropriate economic policy environment

The task of reviving African economies involves not only getting socioeconomic policies right but also creating a hospitable political environment. The key elements of such an environment are political stability, rule-based political order mediated by an impartial and independent judiciary and good governance, with particular emphasis on transparency and accountability (Ake, 1996). Poor governance—especially corruption, bureaucratic harassment and a lack of checks and balances—continues to hamper prospects for self-sustained growth in many parts of Africa (Sandbrook, 1986: 319-32; Callaghy, 1990:
Notwithstanding the recent shift in many African countries, democracy in Africa is still in profound trouble. The task of strengthening the key institutions of the state, such as the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches of government, remains problematic. Decentralization of decision making to local structures and the meaningful involvement of civil society in the political process have not taken root.

Good governance and political stability enable governments to develop conducive economic policy frameworks. Experience from East Asia, Latin America and, increasingly, the successfully reforming countries in Africa shows that restoring and maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions—low inflation and manageable fiscal and external deficits—are prerequisites for achieving the increases in private investment and savings that are required to accelerate growth. In the case of Africa, the task of maintaining a conducive macroeconomic framework has consistently been held hostage to protracted political instability and the undemocratic nature of the state. Eliminating corruption and red tape, and establishing a transparent system in policy decisions and contractual arrangements remain challenges. Without a stable macroeconomic environment, the likely result is continued economic stagnation.

Persistent decline in agricultural productivity

Economic decline has been particularly evident in the productive sectors. Agriculture, the backbone of African economies, has done comparatively worse than other sectors. For the most part, there has been no Green revolution in African agriculture. Between 1965 and 1980, agricultural growth rose only 2 per cent a year—less than the rate of population growth—and between 1981 and 1985, it fell 0.6 per cent a year. Compare that with agricultural growth of 3.2 per cent a year in East Asia, 3 percent in South Asia, and 3.1 per cent in Latin America. Stagnant and declining yields in the face of rising population growth rates have led to a long-run decline in food production per capita. This has led to growing dependence on expensive imported food.

Poor performance in agriculture over the last three decades should not be attributed only to droughts and civil strife. The long-term decline in agricultural production and exports has been largely due to the pervasive and significant taxation of agriculture in most countries, combined with the crowding out of private investment and production activities through restrictions on market entry and controlled input and commodity pricing. Reforms to end the monopoly powers of parastatal corporations in agricultural marketing, importation and distribution of inputs, and exportation of produce should be continued. As an integral part of the region's export drive, the provision of agricultural and extension services to smaller older producers, the development of rural infrastructures, and the improvement of public services in rural areas are also important elements in any strategy to upgrade the agricultural sector in Africa (Bates, 1981; Weede, 1993: 25).

The implications of poor agricultural performance for African countries, however, go beyond weaknesses in food self-sufficiency, which is of critical importance in its own right. With the majority of people in the region deriving daily sustenance from agriculture, neither the modulation of absolute poverty nor attempts at its eradication to bring about substantial improvements in welfare can realistically be contemplated without the modernization of this sector. African governments must come to recognize and accept that without agricultural development there will be neither self-sufficiency in food nor the required resources for diversification into non-agricultural activities and the emergence of a strong service sector. Recovery and sustained growth of agriculture are preconditions for economic revival and social transformation.

Poor manufacturing performance

Poor performance in the manufacturing sector mirrors performance in agriculture. Growth rates in manufacturing, which started out strong in the 1900s, declined rapidly in the 1980s. Manufacturing industry’s share of Africa’s economic output rose only marginally,
from 8.9 per cent in 1980 to 10.5 per cent in 1990 (United Nations, 1991b: 33). Only about 9 per cent of the labour force was employed in manufacturing in 1965; this remained virtually unchanged by 1990 (World Bank, 1989c: 223). In 1998, the manufacturing sector grew by 3.2 per cent, down from 3.8 per cent in 1997. The fall in investment was one of the reasons for the drop in the growth of the manufacturing sector (UNECA, 2000: 3). With persistent foreign-exchange shortages and low productivity, capacity utilization in manufacturing is below 20 per cent on average.

The major constraints impeding the full utilization of existing capacity and the rapid industrialization of the continent are well known, and relate to excessive dependence on external sources of technology capital and know-how. The conspicuous lack of capital goods industry has rendered all industrial investment hostage to the availability of foreign exchange. Inward-looking import-substitution industrialization, which was widely promoted throughout the continent, was misguided, for it typically did not foster linkages between mass consumption and mass production. Ironically, this made these countries even more dependent on external sources of machinery, parts and raw materials than they had been hitherto. Even manufacturing industries such as textiles and food processing, where the backward linkage with the domestic economy is very well advanced, have remained dependent on critical and vital imports to complete their production processes.

The challenge to African policymakers lies in reducing the structural dependence of African economies on external resources as the engine of development. And this they can do through intensive mobilization of domestic resources, diversification of the economic base and enhancement of foreign exchange earning capacity.

Inadequate skills base

With the implementation of structural adjustment programmes since 1980, governments across the continent have cut resources for education, resulting in an insufficient supply of books and materials, and inadequate infrastructure. Teacher salaries have also fallen to desperately low levels. These reductions have contributed to low educational quality. Most alarmingly, an outcome of the economic and political crisis has been the dramatic growth in the brain drain involving middle- and high-level manpower that Africa needs for its recovery and development. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa, some 27,000 African intellectuals emigrated to developed countries between 1960 and 1975. Between 1985 and 1990 the number jumped to 60,000, and has averaged 20,000 annually ever since. The unprecedented flight of skilled Africans has enormous impact on the functioning of the institutions of higher learning, industry government and enterprises. The African Renaissance cannot be realized in an environment of depleting skill levels and the loss of the professional class (Africa Institute of South Africa, 2000). Reversing this trend is a precondition for a well-functioning society.

Lack of peace and stability

The last decade of the twentieth century was marred by unprecedented levels of political violence amidst ongoing and emerging crises in the Third World. The African continent has in particular been affected by protracted conflicts claiming the lives of millions of civilians. While the roots of these conflicts date back to the colonial period, they were reinforced by the Cold War machinations of both East and West. With the end of the Cold War, however, the ethnic pieces put together by colonial glue and reinforced by the old world order are now pulling apart and reasserting their autonomy. The persistence of civil strife continues systematically to divert scarce national resources from human development (United Nations, 1997a). As a result, infrastructure—schools, hospitals, roads and communication networks— which takes decades to build is wantonly destroyed. Food production and marketing systems are also a common casualty. Some of the most talented and skilled people are forced to seek their livelihood in more favourable environments in other countries.
Exogenous Factors

The world economy has not been kind to Africa. The current monetary trade and investment regimes reward the developed countries disproportionately and create unmet human needs in the underdeveloped countries. Despite this fact, however, Africa is being advised by the key institutions of the world system to export its way out of poverty by actively participating in global trade. The prescriptions offered are based on a positive scenario that world trade will grow, commodity prices will stabilize, and protectionist barriers will not be erected by the Western powers. The reality has been quite different, as described below.

Deteriorating terms of trade

At the heart of Africa's trade crisis has been a protracted depression in world commodity markets. The rates at which goods are exchanged, or the terms of trade, have not favoured Africa, where most of the region's economies failed to diversify their export base and continue to rely on one or two commodities. A survey carried out by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 1995 indicates that forty African countries derive more than 70 per cent of their export earnings from the sale of commodities (UNECA, 1996).

Meanwhile, exports of agricultural products became even more concentrated. Nine major commodities accounted for 76 per cent of the region's agricultural exports in the 1980s—up from 70 per cent in 1960. Countries elsewhere, by contrast, diversified their export base and increased their shares in world exports of primary commodities. The protracted depression in world commodity markets had a devastating impact on African economies. During the 1980s, prices for most commodities fell dramatically, in some cases to their lowest levels in real terms since the Great Depression, while import prices continued to rise (Brown and Tiffen, 1992). This caused a sharp deterioration in Africa's terms of trade; the purchasing power of the region's exports has fallen by some 50 per cent since the early 1980s. As a result, Africa's share of developing country exports fell from 12 per cent in 1961 to 5.8 percent in 1990 (IMF, 1991: 120–21; UNDP, 1997). Other estimates maintain that Africa's terms of trade fell by more than one-third of their value in the period 1977–93, as opposed to other developing countries, where they fell 20 per cent during the same period (UNCTAD, 2000a: 10).

The regional average obscures the marked deterioration suffered by individual countries. In 1986, for example, coffee provided Uganda with $365 million in foreign-exchange earnings and financed about 70 per cent of its imports. By 1991, it yielded only $115 million, and financed less than a quarter of imports. Overall, the slump in commodity prices cost Africa $10 billion in lost earnings between 1986 and 1990—more than twice the amount the region received in aid.

The persistent decline of commodity prices, despite rapid expansion in production, is influenced by many factors. Many primary resource products are facing mounting competition from substitutes such as synthetics for cotton, aluminium for copper, and sugar beet and corn syrup for cane sugar. Moreover, the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union restricts market access to African agricultural products. The break-up of the Soviet Union, a major market for African products, is also partly to blame for the commodity glut (Wall, 1992: 14–19).

Another factor contributing to the fall in prices is the oversupply of commodity production as countries try to make up for price declines by producing even more. This, in turn, contributed to oversupply and a further fall in prices. Yet the World Bank, which through its structural adjustment programmes has been advising African countries to export their way out of the crisis, expects no significant upturn, in real terms, in the foreseeable future (Laihshley, 1992: 8). At the same time, discriminatory tariffs continue to grow while market access for African products remains limited. Neither commodity price stabilization agreements nor assistance in diversifying agricultural export bases have been forthcoming.
Notwithstanding falling prices and market shares, African economies have not made the necessary switch from reliance upon primary export commodities. One reason is that state marketing boards are mandated to conduct foreign trade at ridiculously low prices (even at a loss) simply to acquire the necessary foreign exchange to service large foreign debt and pay for essential imports. This issue is taken up next.

Uneven pattern in foreign direct investment flows

One of the key elements of the new world economy is the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI), which has now replaced exports as the fastest growing component. Foreign direct investment has overtaken official development finance (ODF) transfers as a channel of development resources. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2000, foreign direct investment by trans-national corporations was due to surpass one trillion dollars in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2000c). The growth in the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, driven by technological and competitive forces, has contributed significantly to the rise of FDI. With trans-national corporations (TNCs) now numbering over 35,000 with more than 150,000 foreign affiliates, their impact on the world economy is staggering (United Nations, 1991c). In the present global economy, attracting significant flows of FDI and stimulating domestic private investment are of crucial importance to sustained recovery and growth in Africa.

Unfortunately the growth in FDI has not been evenly distributed across continents. The European Union (EU), the United States and Japan (referred to as the Triad) now receive more than three-fifths of total investment flows. In developed countries, WI rose to $636 billion in 1999 (from $483 billion in 1998), while WI to developing countries increased to $208 billion (from 3,79 billion in 1998) (UNCTAD, 2000c). EDI is the largest source of external financing for many developing countries, which have found it to be more stable, particularly during financial crises, than portfolio investment and bank lending. As investment becomes concentrated among these powers, few developing countries benefit, other than some of the NICs and second-tier countries, where there exists a strong developmental state, an educated workforce and good infrastructure. The solidification of investment patterns that exclude Africa means there will be little hope for most African nations to attract foreign investment (UNECA, 1991; UNCTAD, 1995).

Despite the fact that many African countries have liberalized their economies and enacted laws to attract foreign private capital, actual FDI inflows have been negligible. FDI flows to the continent rose to $10 billion in 1999 from $8 billion in 1998. This was in line with the faster growth rate generally experienced by the continent during the decade. Investments by trans-national corporations in Africa are still only 1.2 per cent of global FDI flows and 5 per cent of total FDI into all developing countries. About 70 per cent of FDI in Africa in 1999 was concentrated in only five countries—Angola, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. Many African countries are not trusted as the destination for foreign investment because of potential political instability, corruption and the lack of transparent legal systems. Decrepit transport and telecommunications infrastructure, an underdeveloped monetary and banking system, and the massive brain drain further add to the misperception about doing business in Africa. Attempts to reverse these negative factors are moving very slowly.

The real challenge for Africa lies ahead: integration into the global economy, including integration into the regional or global production networks of trans-national corporations. Only then will the continent become a more prominent player in the world market and benefit more from FDI. To reverse the present negative trend, governments must ensure that the needed human capital and institutional structures are in place to carry out the required reforms. Investment in information technology and intellectual capital formation is critical if Africa is to take advantage of the opportunities provided by globalization. Investment in information technology is also important for expanding the information base on democratization. In addition, policies need to be consistent, credible, predictable and transparent—that is, there needs to be good governance.
Unsustainable level of external debt

Compounding Africa’s economic woes is its ever-growing external debt, which stood at $341 billion in late 1996. Of this, sub-Saharan Africa owes $167 billion. The North African countries owe the rest (United Nations, 4997: 274). The debt burden remains heavy accounting for 6 per cent of regional GDP. Actual debt service, which rose from $25.7 billion in 1990 to $26.3 billion in 1996 (close to $10 billion for sub-Saharan countries), absorbed 27.5 per cent of export earnings. This indebtedness is crushing all possibilities for economic growth by diverting scarce resources needed for clinics, schools, and infrastructure and job-creation schemes to the payment of debt.

The problem of indebtedness is especially severe for sub-Saharan African countries. Of the thirty-two countries classified by the World Bank as severely indebted low-income countries, twenty-five are in sub-Saharan Africa. The overall debt of these countries stood at just under $211 billion in 1994, four times higher than in 1980. Over the period 1986-96, Africa paid out a total of $297 billion in debt servicing, $15 billion more than it received in new loans. Over this same period debt servicing to institutions like the World Bank and IMF continued to climb. The IBRD wing of the Bank, along with the IMF, accounted for $28 billion of the region’s debt servicing between 1983 and 1994, over $9 billion more than the region received in new loans from these two agencies. The IMF alone has taken almost $5 billion more out of the region than it has provided in new loans over the same period.

In retrospect, Africa was drawn into the debt crisis in entirely unjustified ways. The three most obvious problems were the use to which borrowed money was put, the variable (fluctuating) rate at which most foreign debt was contracted during the 1970s, and the loaning of monies to undemocratic and unaccountable regimes. While some of the debt originated in the need to cope with the 1973 increase in global oil prices, much of the rest was unnecessary; and destined for white-elephant projects, arms expenditures and the import of luxury goods. The creditor countries and institutions that lend the money are obviously at fault for ‘loan-pushing’. Some of the money was understood to be lining the pockets of corrupt African elites, but international banks, the World Bank and the IMF ignored the moral implications of lending to a Mobutu or, for that matter, a P.W. Botha.

Moreover, during the initial rise in African foreign debt, through most of the 1970s, the interest rates on dollar-denominated loans were negative in real terms. Then in 1979, the interest payments suddenly increased dramatically when the US Federal Reserve implemented a ‘monetarist’ (high interest rate) policy. From negative rates in the 1970s, inflation-adjusted interest rates shot up to 5 per cent, 2 per cent above the average annual growth of the world economy (3 per cent) during the 1980s. A related issue was the ‘collateral’—also known as security—on such loans. Such security was thought not to be an issue, since sovereign countries in the post-war era were not supposed to default. To this end, the IMF was used during the first part of the 1980s as a vehicle for ensuring African countries repaid Northern commercial bank loans. In exchange for structural adjustment loans, countries were expected to implement IMF-mandated policy reforms, including the liberalization of the domestic trade regime, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, the privatization of basic services, and an end to social subsidies.

Extensive default by African countries has been prevented only by repeated rescheduling operations, in which official creditors, meeting in the Paris Club, have allowed interest and future debt charges to accumulate by growth in Africa. Even for countries not classified as severely indebted, the debt overhang poses a tremendous constraint to growth. Given the variations in the creditor composition of Africa’s debt, there is a growing consensus that reducing African debt to sustainable servicing levels will require action by all major creditor sources.
Externalization of decision making and loss of sovereignty

It has been almost two decades since the widespread application of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) across the Third World. Enough evaluations have been done to assess their effectiveness on overall social and economic development. A careful review of the literature points to the conclusion that, while there are significant gains to be derived from liberalization of markets as a result of structural adjustment programmes, such reforms do not provide the best outcome for all. The experience of the last twenty years in Africa and Latin America shows that structural adjustment policies are not consistent with long-term development goals. The evidence challenges the assertion by the World Bank and the IMF that structural adjustment policies alleviate poverty and strengthen democracy.

Between 1980 and 1989 alone, thirty-six sub-Saharan African countries initiated 241 structural adjustment programs. Two decades later, the role of the state in Africa has been significantly curtailed, the dominance of market forces set in place, and economies opened to external competition. However, substantial economic turnaround has not occurred in any of the African countries that implemented structural adjustment programs. To the contrary: living standards for the majority of Africans have declined and investment in the productive sectors of the economy has dwindled. Budget cuts, often targeted at the poorest segment of the population, depress economies’ effective demand, leading to declining growth. Imposed user fees have led to a decline in utilization rates for health and education services, which in turn have reduced ‘human capital formation’ (Cornia et al., 1987; Cheru, 1989; Sparr, 1994).

The most pernicious aspect of structural adjustment has been the curtailing of the autonomy of African states to guide their countries’ development. While market-oriented reforms are arguably necessary and beneficial, donor support for African economic reform efforts has gone far beyond what was initially envisioned. The IMF and the World Bank have de facto usurped the national sovereignty of African countries as they have assumed increasingly a central role in the formulation of national economic policies. The cross-conditionality of bilateral donors, which links assistance to acceptance of IMF programmes, further squeezes African governments to surrender on the economic planning front. As the late Claude Ake succinctly put it:

> When a people must be developed not by themselves but by others, development becomes a benevolence that is largely insensitive to social needs. In Africa, one might say, what currently prevails is development against the people— not of them or for them. The African variet(ies) of structural adjustment break down social consensus, cause violent conflict, anxiety and deep despair, and sometimes cause premature death on a large scale, especially among children. These grim notions of policy reform can be inflicted only by people who do not belong to the adjusting society or by those who are immune to the impact of the reform. (Ake, 1996: 118–19)

This unusually high level of external intervention in the policy decisions of African countries since the early 1980s has meant that African states are increasingly more accountable to foreign creditor nations and international financial institutions than to their own people. In turn, the diminished power of African states decreases their willingness and ability to cope with an expanding social crisis at home. African governments have been unable to take practical measures to alleviate the high unemployment and declining living standards because they are bound by strict spending curbs imposed through externally mandated reform measures.

Consider the role of privatization, a cornerstone of structural adjustment. In many African countries, privatization measures have often not distinguished which state enterprises are strategic in nature. Moreover, the privatization process has too often been accompanied by corruption and foreign takeover of domestic industry, with scant regard for maintaining local employment or production levels (Craig, 2000: 357–66). At the same time, privatization promoted by international financial institutions (IFIs) was not accompanied by consideration of how state agencies could supply services that enhanced public goods— for example, the positive effect of water supply on public health, environmen-
tal protection, local economic activity and gender equality. All state services were reduced to mere commodities, requiring full cost-recovery and elimination of subsidies.

The process of neo-liberal economic restructuring has intensified polarization between classes and ethnic groups, destroying the possibilities of internal transformation as emphasis is placed on external capital and markets as sources of growth (Mengisteab, 1997: 115; Rodrik, 2001: 55–62). The problems facing leaders are further compounded by the resentment and rebelliousness they provoke in the governed. Many Africans have a sense of uncertainty and a feeling of futility. The losers in global restructuring then try to reassert themselves through organized resistance (Cheru, 1989; Beckman, 1989: 83–105). In some countries, the immediate public response is withdrawal from the political process; in others, there is outrage and criticism. As antagonism increases, energies and efforts towards development are dissipated and leadership is at risk of losing credibility (Barber, 1994).

In the face of widespread public and official resistance to regressive adjustment, the World Bank and its allies held fast, insisting that not only are SAPs working but also that they are a necessary element of long-term transformation. On 12 March 1994, the World Bank released a progress report on Africa, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, to defend its failed policy of structural adjustment (World Bank, 1994a). By manipulating selective data of cross-country analysis, and without revealing the significant objection to the report’s conclusion from internal Bank economists, the Bank claimed that African countries that implemented SAPs in the 1980s experienced greater positive growth than those that did not. Two years earlier, a draft World Bank study, entitled ‘Why Structural Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa’, stated: ‘World Bank adjustment lending has not significantly affected growth and has contributed to a statistically significant drop in investment ratios.’ Of the six countries the Bank put forward as adjustment ‘successes’—Ghana, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zimbabwe—four had deteriorating rates of investment and two had negative GDP growth rates during their respective adjustment periods.

One of the most blatant exaggerations about ‘Africa’s Renaissance’ comes from the IMF. In a paper entitled Africa: Is This the Turning Point?, co-authored by Stanley Fisher, the IMF’s first deputy managing director, the Fund loudly proclaimed that the economic situation in sub-Saharan Africa had markedly improved in the last few years. It attributed this mainly to improved macroeconomic and structural policies, which the countries implemented under the Fund’s guidance. The authors of the report further argued that changes in the external environment in the 1990s, such as increasing globalization and declining official development assistance, have indeed brought sub-Saharan Africa to a turning point. They go on to catalogue a series of institutional and capacity problems that are hampering Africa’s capacity to navigate the cold currents of globalization (Fisher et al., 1998).

The Fund’s glowing assessment of Africa’s reforms has been challenged by a draft report prepared by a team of external evaluators hired by the Fund’s Executive Board in 1996. In the report, entitled ‘Distilling the Lessons from the ESAF Reviews’, the external evaluation team, headed by former Ghanaian finance minister Kwesi Botchway—hardly a leftist—concludes that while ESAF-supported economic reforms generally have positive effects on growth and income distribution, they do entail temporary costs for certain segments of the population (IMF, 1998). The report calls for appropriate compensatory measures to be built into program design to protect such groups, including the provision of well-targeted assistance and the allocation of adequate resources for the social sector. In addition, the report concludes that, in implementing ESAF, the IMF failed to reinforce strategies to foster country ownership, particularly with a view to assessing the social impact of the reform programme. As the evaluators point out, attention to fostering ownership and to the social impact of reform could help policymakers build domestic consensus in favour of important but difficult reform measures. The report emphasizes the need by the IMF to engage in intensive and informal dialogue with a country’s political leadership to understand that country’s political constraints and possibilities.
While the reintegration of the African continent into the world economy should not be ignored, it is only achievable if infrastructure is upgraded, trade and financial linkages are restructured, and trading patterns and products are diversified. More importantly, national governments must have the autonomy to guide their countries' development independently and without heavy-handed intervention by the institutions of the world system. Africa's ability to exploit the growing trade and investment opportunities that exist in the world economy is hampered by poor transport and communication systems, a shortage of skilled people, and weak and fragile institutions. These are often made worse by the restrictive trade policies of donor governments, which forbid the easy entry of African products into the markets of the developed countries (Mittelman, 1996). Simply advising African countries to open their economies to outside competition is not a sufficient condition for beneficial integration into the world economy (Mengisteab, 1997: 112–13).

The G7, The HWC Debt Relief Initiative and the Politics of Appeasement

After many years of persistent political pressure by a global coalition of NGOs and civil society organizations to cancel the debts owed by many poor countries, the Bretton Woods institutions were finally pressed to recognize the need to address the issue of poor country debts, and approved the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in the autumn of 1996. The World Bank and the IMF identified forty-one countries as eligible for the HIPC initiative. Under HIPC-1, a country only receives debt relief after jumping two hurdles. First, it must have completed six years of structural adjustment under the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Second, debt relief itself is a two-step process: a decision is taken to grant relief, subject to meeting certain additional conditions; when these are met, the debt is actually cancelled.

Less than three years later, however, the IMF and the World Bank concluded at their 1999 spring meeting that the HIPC initiative (HIPC-1) had major shortcomings and there was a need for more substantive steps to address the debt problem. Not surprisingly, only three countries have received actual debt relief by 1999—Uganda and Bolivia in April and September 1998 respectively, and Mozambique in mid-1999—almost three years after the programme had started. Four others—Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Guyana and Burkina Faso—were close to fulfilling the required conditions at the end of 1999. The stringent qualification criteria simply excluded many eligible indebted countries from requesting debt relief (Cheru, 2001).

HIPC-1 and The Post-Cologne Consensus: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

At the G7 meeting in Cologne in June 1999, the leaders of the industrialized countries announced a major debt reduction initiative that went far beyond what was discussed during the spring meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington. The Cologne Initiative proposed incremental but noteworthy steps towards improving the HIPC Initiative. Chief among these are the proposal to grant larger reductions of the total accumulated debt, quicker reductions in debt service payments, and placing poverty reduction at the heart of an enhanced HIPC (HIPC-2) framework. In launching the enhanced HIPC, a total of $90 billion in debt service was promised for thirty-three countries, with the cost to creditors estimated at just $27 billion, primarily due to heavy discounting of the loans and the advantage of purchasing the debt today as opposed to having it accrue interest over the length of the loan (IMF/IDA, 2000a).

By the time of the IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting in Prague in September 2000, however, there was little substantive progress to report on debt relief under the Cologne Initiative. The incremental, step-by-step approach has delivered some relief ($20 billion out of a total of $90 billion) to only nine countries and has failed to provide relief at the pace and depth required (IMF/IDA, 2000b: 6). In the specific case of sub-Saharan Africa, twenty-two countries had qualified for debt relief by December 2000. However, only $750 million in actual debt relief will be granted each year. At the same time, these countries will be paying $500 million to the international financial institutions alone.
The key impediment to granting deeper debt relief for African countries has been the failure of the G7 governments to dedicate sufficient resources to the HIPC Trust Fund. Both multilateral and bilateral creditors were expected to provide the estimated $28 billion (in net present-value terms) to finance the debt relief programme. Of this amount, four multilateral creditors—the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank—were expected to provide about $14 billion; multilaterals about $13.2 billion; and commercial creditors the rest (Cheru, 2001: 4). However, both multilateral and smaller bilateral creditors are having difficulty securing the funds to cover the cost of their share of financing the HIPC Trust Fund. The rules governing the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank set a ceiling on the amount of their resources that can be allotted for debt relief purposes for fear of undermining their financial integrity (US General Accounting Office, 2000). Commitments from bilateral creditors have mostly come from Paris Club creditors, many of whom have written off a significant amount of bilateral debt beyond their assistance under HIPC. Parliaments and legislative bodies in the respective bilateral creditor nations have been reluctant to dedicate more funds for debt relief above and beyond bilateral debt relief.

The second impediment has been excessive conditionality for countries to qualify for debt relief. Eligibility for debt relief under the enhanced HIPC is conditional upon ‘good performance’ in the implementation of IMF and World Bank enhanced structural adjustment programmes (now renamed as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—PRGF) for a period of three years instead of six years under the original HIPC. Having reached the ‘decision point’ after three years of good economic performance, the country must then demonstrate that its debt servicing is unsustainable, following designated threshold value with respect to the ratio of debt to exports, and the ratio of debt to fiscal revenues. If a country finally qualifies for relief, its debt servicing is brought down to what is deemed within the terms of the initiative to be a sustainable level, but only after reaching the ‘completion point’, or a further three-year waiting period. However, efforts to comply often take many months or even years and cost applicants scarce resources to develop (Sachs, 2000b). This less than generous arrangement still leaves the country deferring a sizeable portion of its scarce foreign exchange into debt servicing for an indefinite period of time.

Finally, the enhanced HIPC initiative as it is currently constituted is inadequate since it does not address debts that are owed to non-Paris Club creditors and that have not been rescheduled or serviced for a long period. Consequently, the debt sustainability ratio for these debtor countries is misleading, since the actual debt situation is worse than is apparent. This is because their balance-of-payments reserve accounts include money that should have been paid out to non-Paris Club creditors. In addition, the current approach does not address the relatively little known problem of intra-HIPC debts, for which no mechanism for resolution exists. For example, Tanzania is a creditor with exposure to Uganda. Similarly, Costa Rica and Guatemala have loans outstanding to Nicaragua. The debts owed by these debtor countries to their neighbours are recorded as part of their respective balance-of-payments reserves, inflating the reserve position of each of these debtor countries. It is more than likely that many HIPC countries with debts to non-Paris Club creditors will fall right back into ‘coma’ since the current approach is silent on how to address non-Paris Club debts.

**The New Protectionism in the Era of Free Trade**

Africa’s position in the new global economy is unique, for it is at once integrated into and marginalized from that structure. This section examines the theoretical assumptions and the institutional structures that underpin the changing nature of North-South relations and, in particular, the aid and trade regimes through which African development is regulated. Particular attention is paid to the last Uruguay Round of trade negotiations; the new EU-ACP Partnership agreement, which replaced the Lomé Convention; and the Clinton Initiative on Africa. While the central aim of these initiatives is to encourage African countries to open up their markets to outside competition, they do not address themselves to the critical need of opening up Western markets to all products from the...
world's poorest countries. Moreover, these initiatives fail to address many issues that are crucial to improving the plight of African countries: debt relief, an end to policies that subsidize rich Western farmers, and the removal of trade obstacles in the few sectors—such as textiles and apparel—where Third World products can compete effectively.

The Uruguay Round

The Final Act of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, poses the greatest challenge for the continent. While the new trade regime brings significant reductions in the costs of goods and services throughout the world, the benefits will not accrue to all countries equally. The least developed countries start off with challenging handicaps: inadequate productive and entrepreneurial skills base, inadequate science and technology infrastructure, and weak government institutions. Furthermore, the Uruguay Round will have an overall negative impact on Africa’s trade prospects, removing trade concessions previously granted by the European Union.

Apart from the liberalization of trade in manufacturing, the main objective of previous rounds, the Uruguay Round brought trade in agriculture and textiles within WTO rules and disciplines. The agreement embraced a number of new issues: services, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPs), which had not been covered in previous GATT rounds. The last round established a timetable to phase out, over a ten-year period, the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) that has governed OECD trade in textiles and clothing for three decades.

Many GATT provisions have ambivalent effects when applied to Africa. The trade-related investment measures, for example, are designed to make foreign investment more attractive to foreigners, an objective widely shared by both sides. At the same time, some of the TRIMs provisions may be viewed as an affront to national sovereignty and an unwarranted effort to repeal local legislation designed to provide protection or subsidy to local firms. Thus, while African countries may open their economies more widely to imports and investments from other countries, they may lack the capacity to take advantage of new opportunities for export in sectors beyond primary commodities unless they deepen their technological base and improve the competitiveness of local firms. However, the TRIMs agreement restricts the right of countries to develop certain measures to increase the contribution of industries to their national development (such as those designed to encourage the use of local materials in manufacture or to export a fixed proportion of output) (Raghavan, 1991).

Africa’s access to beneficial technology is further blocked by the trade-related intellectual property rights agreement, which sets global rules on patents, copyrights and licensing. Except for the short grace period provided for developing countries, these obligations would be at the same level as those for the industrialized countries. African countries would also have to adopt strict domestic enforcement legislation to ensure full compliance, in default of which they could face sanctions including the withdrawal of concessions in the area of trade in goods. Noteworthy is the TRIPs effect on access to medicines, making health a market commodity (Cosbey, 1998: 12–15). The WTO permits compulsory licensing and parallel importing of specific drugs, which opens the door to cheaper access. With US government support, pharmaceutical corporations fought South Africa’s efforts to provide affordable HIV/AIDS medications. Besides medicine, farmers are also concerned about the patenting of plants that could be necessary for their future production and food security. They want to see that indigenous knowledge is not ‘stolen’ away by patent restrictions.

Of all the issues addressed in the last Uruguay Round negotiations, agricultural reform was the key area of concern for many developing countries, particularly in Africa (Watkins, 1991 38–50). Among other things, the treaty requires countries to cut export subsidies to farmers. In consequence, African countries may find it more difficult to provide needed support for their agricultural sectors (in the form of trade restrictions such as quotas and tariff) without violating GATT rules. Moreover, African countries could become vic-
tims of ‘dumping’, such as occurred when European C-grade beef entered the South African market, undermining Namibian beef exports to South Africa. In the meantime, African countries face increased protection in their export markets through ‘contingent’ protection mechanisms such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, anti-dumping and safeguard measures. These instruments are being used as substitutes for the old-fashioned protection. The cost of abiding by the requirements of these measures is very high, as firms are expected to restructure their production and distribution infrastructure.

On the other hand, a number of African countries that grow and export commodities stand to gain from increased agricultural export—for example, beef. This will only occur if they can overcome the more stringent regulations on phytosanitary standards which are part of the new agreement. These gains must be balanced, however, against the erosion of marginal preference that African countries have enjoyed under the Lomé Convention (Ritchie, 1990). For example, Tanzania and Mauritius export almost 90 per cent of their sugar exports to the European Union under the Sugar Protocol. Similarly, Botswana and Zimbabwe export large volumes of beef to the European Community under the Beef Protocol. The process was completed in April 2000 with the signing of a new post Lomé agreement between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which officially ended preferential treatment to the ACP countries (Watkins, 1991: 44).

Hegemonic Bilateralism: The Clinton Initiative on Africa

The Clinton administration proposed the Partnership for Promoting Economic Growth and Opportunity Act in 1997. The Partnership Initiative (the African Economic Growth and Opportunity Act), which was voted into law in April 1999 by the US Congress, is essentially no different from the Reagan administration’s Caribbean Basin Initiative Plan. Reciprocal free-trade arrangements are central to the new trade agreement. Sub-Saharan African countries will be able to sell raw materials and light manufactured products to the USA with little or no duty. In return, African countries will have to privatize industry, cut corporate taxes, open their economies to foreign goods and pursue economic reforms similar to those required by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The economic reforms should include strict budgetary and tax controls that will protect private property reduction of the state’s participation in the economy, support for the growth of the private sector, and removal of restrictions on foreign investment.

Besides requiring massive liberalization, the trade act requires beneficiaries to guarantee intellectual property rights, protect foreign investment, and ensure internationally recognized workers’ rights, as well as adhering to US-style democratic governance. The trade agreement also provides for technical assistance to strengthen trade and investment, and establishes a $500 million facility in equity and infrastructural funds for Africa (Buhera, 2000).

While the Clinton Initiative appears positive on the surface, it will mostly benefit US corporate interests. It will provide new markets for US products and services, as well as investment opportunities for US companies seeking cheap raw materials, cheap labour reserves and markets for manufactured products. The market access offered by the USA to African products, in turn, will have no negative impact on the US economy. The US Congress concluded that, given the ‘lack of competitiveness of sub-Saharan Africa in the global market, and its limited capacity to manufacture and export textiles and apparel, African countries’ expanded access to the US market will not represent a threat to the United States workers, consumers or manufacturers’.

The EU-ACP Post-Lomé Trade Agreement

In February 2000, the European Union and Ministers of the seventy-one African, Caribbean and Pacific countries concluded a new twenty-year Partnership Agreement that replaced the Lomé Convention. The Agreement effectively scraps the Lomé concessions in favour
of liberal principles of open markets and global competitiveness. The EU is now characterized by a marked shift from aid to trade as the main instrument of cooperation. Unlike the original Lomé Convention, which was underpinned by the value of North-South solidarity in the context of decolonization, the new Partnership Agreement has been restructured to reflect dominant neo-liberal multilateral norms of international relations. This was particularly the case with the introduction of economic and political conditionality during Lomé IV and VI, but is also apparent in the new agreement (Brown, 2000: 367-8). The main elements of the agreement in the area of trade and economic cooperation include the following (Tekere, 2000: 7):

- Rolling over the non-reciprocal Lomé trade preferences for eight years to 31 December 2007 under a waiver from the WTO.
- No improvement in market access for the ACP into the European Union market during the transitional period.
- No firm commitment on maintenance during the transitional period of any protocol product, except sugar, which has a life of its own.
- Introduce reciprocity from 2008 in the form of free trade areas between EU and ACP regions.
- Start negotiations about these free trade areas in September 2002 and finish in 2007.
- Cooperate in multilateral trade.
- Produce trade agreements that are WTO-compatible.

An end to non-reciprocal treatment is the more fundamental meaning of the new Partnership Agreement—that is, a rebalancing of obligations and benefits, the subordination of Lomé and all African regional trade and integration arrangements to the WTO. The introduction of reciprocity in trade between unequal economic partners, which the EU and African economies are, will undoubtedly impact adversely on the economies of most African countries (Lambrechts, 1999: 1-3).

Both the United States and the European Union recognize that many developing countries have antagonistic suspicions about the world trading system. And since the collapse of the Seattle trade talks in 1999, both the EU and the USA have struggled to convince Third World nations and their advocates that they are serious about bridging the gap in living standards between the world’s rich and poor. Nevertheless, many poor countries have balked at global trade talks until they see major progress on debt, agricultural subsidy by rich countries, and progress in financing for development. To deal with Third World antagonism and buy new converts, the European Union took the unprecedented decision in late February 2001 to open its markets to almost all products from the world’s forty-eight poorest countries, with the exception of military weapons (Drozdiak, 2001: E1). Whether such a dramatic policy move by the EU will convince developing countries to endorse a new round of global trade negotiations remains to be seen. Humanitarian aid agencies have criticized the EU plan as a feeble compromise that delays duty-free access for such sensitive products as bananas, rice and sugar. EU officials explained that opposition from Europe’s powerful farm lobbies is the reason why such products are not included in the new trade proposal.

In addition to the above three trade agreements, the EU also concluded a special bilateral trade agreement with South Africa, which will have a major impact on the member states of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The agreement will in effect liberalize some $20 billion worth of annual EU-South Africa trade. The agreement commits the EU to remove barriers to 99 per cent of South Africa's industrial exports and 75 per cent of its agricultural exports over ten years. South Africa is to reciprocate over twelve years on about 86 per cent of EU exports. On the other hand, South Africa's partners in the South African Customs Union (SAOU) will end up losing a significant proportion of customs union revenues as a result of the removal of duties on imports from South Africa, as well as increased competition from the European Union (Mbekiani, 1999 25–6).

The homogeneity of new rules governing global economic relations, development cooperation in particular, poses a fundamental challenge to the autonomy of African countries
and the kind of development strategy they may want to follow. Given the pervasiveness of neo-liberal ideology in trade, aid and development cooperation, African countries have two choices: to embrace globalization as a development strategy or to resist globalization and liberalization. Realistically, however, neither strategy is sustainable. To embrace globalization and liberalization uncritically will do little to reduce dependence and marginalization. To resist globalization—by defying the policies of the institutions of the world system—will amount to economic and political suicide unless such a strategy represents a collective Third World response. The latter course is unlikely given the limited power of developing countries in general vis-à-vis the G7 governments.

Conclusion

This book proposes a third option: the guided embrace of globalization with a commitment to resist. African countries must be prepared to come up with alternative formulations and conditions under which they will engage in global economic exchanges. This will mean fully exploiting investment and trade opportunities made available by economic globalization while taking the necessary measures, such as capital controls and expanded South-South trade, to shield their economies from the ill effects of market shifts. To survive and succeed in this volatile global economic environment, African governments will need to expedite the process of democratization; improve the legal regulatory environment necessary for domestic entrepreneurship and productivity; and invest heavily in education, research and development (R&D), and infrastructure.

The challenges confronting Africa are many and there are no ready-made solutions. The majority of African countries are involved in one form of transition or another: from war to peace; from dictatorship to democracy and respect for human rights; from state domination to market-based and private-sector-led initiatives. The task of simultaneously undertaking economic and political transformation is exceedingly difficult. The success of Africa’s transformation agenda will, therefore, depend largely on how quickly the continent successfully completes these transitions and starts putting together sensible national policies to take advantage of the growing economic opportunities in the global economy.

Globalization indeed offers great opportunities, but only if it is managed carefully and with concern for social justice and empowering the poor. This entails the following: enabling poor people to be more productive; achieving universal access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation); improving basic infrastructure; and providing safety nets for those who cannot produce due to old age or chronic sickness. Human development and transformation must be viewed as a sine qua non for self-sustained development (UNECA, 1990).

In the final analysis, the solutions to Africa’s economic and political crisis can only be found within Africa. Regrettably the current African leadership seems to accept ‘external direction’ as given, denying the possibility of self-transformation. While Western governments and aid institutions can play a constructive role in Africa’s transformation, the ultimate responsibility should remain firmly in African hands. Instead of relying on outside actors to solve Africa’s problem, Africans must harness the energies and entrepreneurship of their people by adopting policies that make good economic and political sense. This will require fundamental change in African attitudes, institutional arrangements, orientation to governance and economic management. This can only happen with the establishment of a viable, active and democratic state, and the strengthening of social institutions.

The chapters that follow explore the key challenges that African states must confront in the coming decades. The various topics covered in the book are the most important bridges that African governments must build and strengthen if they are ever to arrest the vicious circle of marginalization. Translating words into deeds will require vision, commitment and hard work. While the reintegration of Africa into the new global economy is a necessity, it must be done on terms determined by Africans themselves and with broad consultation with civil society, the private sector and the key institutions of the state.
MALADJ USTED AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND GLOBALISATION
Thandika Mkandawire

Abstract

The policies of adjustment pursued in the 1980s and 1990s promised African countries not only ‘accelerated development’ but also a means to end Africa's marginalisation from the process of globalisation by encouraging foreign investment and the expansion and diversification of exports. While for much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the poor performance of African economies was blamed on the failure of African governments to adopt ‘the right policies’, by the mid-1990s, international financial institutions were saying that the significant adjustments made by African economies had led to economic recovery. However, the performance of African economies with respect to both investment and trade diversification remained poor. Since this could no longer be explained away by saying that African economies had not adjusted, other explanations were needed: these included institutions, geography, culture and ethnic diversity. In this paper I argue that it is the deflationary policies under the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that have placed African economies on a ‘low growth path’ which has discouraged investments, trade expansion and diversification, by undermining the investment-growth-trade nexus. Indeed, as a result of this, African economies have been so maladjusted that they responded poorly to a wide range of economic stimuli.

Introduction

Globalisation is a multifaceted process that defies unique definition. Different authors emphasise different things about the causes and effects of globalisation, partly because of differences in the definition of the process; partly because of differences in focus; and partly because of different ideological predispositions about the process itself. In this paper I will treat globalisation as a process whereby national and international policymakers proactively or reactively promote domestic and external liberalisation. Africa illustrates, perhaps better than elsewhere, that globalisation is very much a policy driven process. While in other parts of the world, it may be credible to view globalisation as driven by technology and the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, in Africa, most of the features of globalisation and the forces associated with it have been shaped by the BWIs (Bretton Woods Institutions) and Africa’s adhesion to a number of conventions such as the World Trade Organisation, which have insisted on opening up markets. African governments have voluntarily, or under duress, reshaped domestic policies to make their economies more open. The issue therefore is not whether or not Africa is being globalised, but under what conditions the process is taking place, and why, despite such relatively high levels of integration into the world economy, growth has faltered.

The word that often comes to mind, whenever globalisation and Africa are mentioned together, is ‘marginalisation’. The threat of marginalisation has hung over Africa’s head like Damocles’ sword, and has been used, in minatory fashion, to prod Africans to adopt appropriate policies.1 In most writing, globalisation is portrayed as a train on which African nations must choose to get on board or be left behind. As Stanley Fischer, then Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and associates put it, ‘globalisation is proceeding apace and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) must decide whether to open up and compete, or lag behind’ (Fischer et al. 1998:5). The Economist, commenting on the fact that per capita incomes between the United States and Africa have widened, states ‘it would be odd to blame globalisation for holding Africa back. Africa has been left out of the global economy, partly because its governments used to prefer it that way’ (The Economist 2001:12).

Globalisation, from the developmental perspective, will be judged by its effects on economic development and the eradication of poverty. Indeed, in developing countries, the litmus test for any international order remains whether it facilitates economic develop-
ment, which entails both economic growth and structural transformation. I shall argue that in the case of Africa, this promise has yet to be realised. The policies designed to ‘integrate’ Africa into the global economy have thus far failed because they have completely sidestepped the developmental needs of the continent and the strategic questions on the form of integration appropriate to addressing these needs. They consequently have, thus far, not led to higher rates of growth and, their labelling notwithstanding, have not induced structural transformation. Indeed, the combined effect of internal political disarray, the weakening of domestic capacities, deflationary policies and slow world economic growth have placed African economies on a ‘low equilibrium growth path’ from which the anaemic GDP growth rates of 3–4 percent appear as ‘successful’ performance. I will illustrate this point by looking at two channels through which the benefits of globalisation are supposed to be transmitted to developing countries—trade and investment.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with what globalisation and the accompanying adjustment policies promised, what has been delivered and what has happened to African economies during the ‘era of globalisation’. The second deals critically with some explanations of Africa’s failure. And the last part advances an alternative explanation of the failure with respect to trade and access to foreign finance. . . .

Concluding Remarks

The African policy landscape has changed radically during the last two decades. Liberalisation of trade, privatisation as well as reliance on markets have replaced the widespread state controls associated with import substitution. One would expect to see some signs of the ‘accelerated development’ promised by the Berg report in 1981 by now. That adjustment has failed as a prerequisite for development, let alone as a ‘strategy for accelerated development’, is now widely accepted. These failures can, in turn, be traced to the displacement of developmental strategic thinking by an obsession with stabilization—a point underscored by low levels of investment and institutional sclerosis. The key fundamentals that policy has sought to establish relate to these financial concerns, rather than to development. The singular concentration on ‘opening’ up the economy has undermined post-independence efforts to create, albeit lamely, internally coherent and articulated economies and an industrial structure that would be the basis for eventual diversification of Africa’s export base. The excessive emphasis on servicing the external sector has diverted scarce resources and political capacities away from managing the more fundamental basis for economic development. Even the issue of ‘poverty’ has received little attention except perhaps when it has seemed politically expedient to be seen to be doing something to mitigate the negative effects of adjustment. SAPs, due to their deflationary bias, have placed African economies on such a low growth trajectory, which has then conditioned the levels and types of Africa’s participation in the global economy.

Over the last two decades, Africans have been faced not merely with a set of pragmatic measures made on programmatic grounds but with a full-blown ideological position about the role of the state, nationalism and equity, against which many neo-liberals, including Elliot Berg, had ranted for years. It is this ideological character of the proposals that has made them impervious to empirical evidence including that generated by the World Bank itself, and it is that which has made policy dialogue virtually impossible. The ‘true believers’ insistence on the basic and commonsensical message they carry has made dialogue impossible. The assumption that those on the other side are merely driven by self-interest and ignorance that might be remediable by ‘capacity building’ has merely complicated matters further. Things have not been made easier by the supplicant position of African governments and their obvious failures to manage their national affairs well. These policies were presented as finite processes which would permit countries to restore growth. With this time perspective in mind, countries were persuaded to put aside long-term strategic considerations while they sorted out some short-term problems. The finite process has lasted two decades.

There are obvious gains from participation in increased exchange with the rest of the world. The bone of contention is: what specific measures should individual countries adopt
in order to reap the benefits of increased exchange with other nations. With perhaps the exception of a few cases, developing countries have always sought to gain from international trade. Attempts to diversify the export base have been a key aspect of policy since independence. Import substitution was not a strategy for autarky, as is often alleged, but a phase in eventual export diversification. However, for years, the integration of developing countries into a highly unequal economic order was considered problematic, characterised, as it is, by unfavourable secular terms of trade for primary commodities, control of major markets by gigantic conglomerates, protectionism in the markets of developed countries together with ‘dumping’ of highly subsidised agricultural products, volatile commodity and financial markets, asymmetries in access to technology, etc. From this perspective, gains from trade could only be captured by strategising and dynamising a country’s linking up with the rest of the world.

It is ironic that while analysis in the ‘pre-globalisation’ period took the impact of external factors on economic growth seriously, the era of globalisation has tended to concentrate almost exclusively on internal determinants of economic performance. Today, Africa’s dependence on external factors and interference in the internal affairs of African countries by external actors are most transparent and humiliating, and yet such dependence remains untheorised. Theories that sought to relate Africa’s economies to external factors have been discredited, abandoned or, at best, placed on the defensive. The focus now is almost entirely on internal determinants of economic performance—economic policies, governance, rent-seeking, ethnic diversity, etc. While the attention on internal affairs may have served as a useful corrective to excessive focus on the external, on its own, it also provided a partial view of African economies and can be partly blamed for the pursuit of policies that were blind to Africa’s extreme dependence and vulnerability to external conjuncture—a fact that the BWIs have learned as the exogenous factor that scuttled their adjustment programmes. Indeed, unwilling to discard its essentially deflationary policies, and faced with poor performance among many countries which have been ‘strong adjusters’, the World Bank’s explanations have become increasingly more structural—deterministic and eclectic. Even the IMF’s World Economic Outlook explains Africa’s poor performance in surprisingly structuralist language. As it notes, the ‘resilience’ of growth in recent years ‘partly reflected more favourable developments in nonfuel commodity prices, which did not contract as much as in earlier global slowdowns, as well as debt relief under the HIPC initiative’. The IMF also notes that despite the trend toward improved macroeconomic policies in many African countries, ‘external current account deficits in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain relatively high, reflecting in part continued high debt levels but also low savings rates related to low per capita incomes and structural impediments to economic diversification’.

Today, there is recognition that the axiomatic mapping of policies into performance was naïve and misleading. There are admissions, albeit grudging, to having underestimated the external constraints on policy and the vulnerability of African economies to them, to having overestimated the responsiveness of the economies and the private sector, to having wrong sequencing of policies, to inadvertently having eroded state capacities and responsibilities (‘policy ownership’), etc. However, it is still insisted that the passage of time will do its job and the posture recommended to African countries has been to sit tight and wait for the outpouring of gains. There is no recognition that the accumulated effects of past policy errors may have made the implementation of ‘market friendly’ policies in their pristine form more difficult.

Economists increasingly use the concept of hysteresis, a phenomenon observed in some physical systems, by which changes in a property lag behind changes in an agent on which it depends, so that the value of the former, at any moment, depends on the nature of the previous variation of the latter. They use the concept to account for any ‘path dependence’ of the state of economic variables on the past history of the economic system or policies. In explaining the failure of their policies, the BWIs argue that past (before adjustment) policy errors have a lasting effect through hysteresis. Strangely, no such hysteresis is entertained for policies pursued by the BWIs in the recent past. Policy failures, especially those as comprehensive as those of SAPs can continue to have effects on the performance of the
economy long after the policies are abandoned. It may well be that the accretions of errors that are often perfunctorily admitted have created maladjusted economies not capable of gaining much from globalisation. Both the measures of ‘success’ used for African economies and the projections for the future suggest that, essentially, the BWIs have put Africa’s development on hold. This clearly suggests the extreme urgency for Africans themselves to assume the task of ‘bringing development back in’ in their respective countries and collectively. To benefit from interacting with the rest of the world, African policymakers will have to recognise the enormous task of correcting the maladjustment of their economies. They will have to introduce more explicit, more subtle and more daring policies to stimulate growth, trade and export diversification than hitherto.

BUILDING AND SUPPORTING PRSPS IN AFRICA: WHAT HAS WORKED WELL SO FAR? WHAT NEEDS CHANGING?
Fantu Cheru
From Third World Quarterly, 27:2 (2006), 355-73

ABSTRACT

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative came out of the 1999 Cologne annual meeting of the G-7 governments, when the leaders of the industrialised countries announced the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC II). The joint Boards of the IMF and the World Bank officially approved the PRSP in December 1999 as a new approach to the challenge of reducing poverty in low-income countries and as a framework for development assistance. The PRSP approach is supposed to represent a major departure from previous development strategies whereby the World Bank and the IMF dictated the directions of economic policies in poor countries. Implementation of the PRSP approach is now in its sixth year and the purpose of this article is to critically examine the challenges that African governments are confronted with in preparing and implementing credible, nationally owned poverty reduction strategy plans. The article further examines the degree to which the PRSP approach has transformed donor–recipient country relations, thus allowing African governments the policy space to develop home-grown policies.

Since the 1980s, there has been a strong and co-ordinated intervention by the donor community in the national economic policies of poor countries through stabilisation packages and structural adjustment programmes as a precondition for receiving loans from the multilateral financial institutions. The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have reflected the liberalisation of policies towards a particular type of package, mainly focusing on macroeconomic stabilisation, public sector reform and the liberalisation of markets and trade. This process resulted in the adoption of one-size-fits-all economic policies, which were often poorly adapted to a country’s specific needs, which lacked broad popular support, and which failed to make poverty reduction a priority (Cheru, 1989; Mkandawre & Soludo, 1999; SAPRIN, 2004).

In September 1999, however, the IMF and the World Bank announced a new way of doing business, whereby poor country governments would develop their own long-term development plan by involving a wide spectrum of stakeholders, and would put this forward to the IMF and World Bank in the form of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (IMF/World Bank, 1999a; 1999b). There are five core principles underlying the PRSP approach, which are drawn from the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF):

- Being country driven: owned and managed by the government of the country concerned, involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational steps and policy dialogue.
• Being results orientated: promising, at least in principle, better prioritisation and a focus on outcomes that would benefit the poor. Planning is to be done within a common fiscal framework.
• Being comprehensive and long-term in perspective: integrating macroeconomic, structural, sectoral and social elements—recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty.
• Being prioritised: so that implementation is feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms.
• Being partnership oriented: involving co-ordinated participation of development partners (bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental), thus enhancing greater accountability and democracy in decision making. This promises to democratise recipient–donor relationships, by replacing the politics of ‘paternalism’ with the politics of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual accountability’ (IMF/World Bank, 1999c: 30; Klugman, 2003).

The PRSP preparation involves a two-stage process (World Bank, 2000a). Countries must first prepare an interim PRSP (I-PRSP), which is intended as a roadmap for preparation of the full PRSP. The I-PRSP paves the way for the country to qualify for its ‘decision point’ and interim support (or a loan) from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (formerly the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) (IMF/World Bank, 2002: 8). Upon submitting the full PRSP, countries are allowed to jump through the ‘completion point’, which qualifies them for full debt stock reduction, but only after one additional year of good macroeconomic performance.

The implementation of the PRSP approach is now in its sixth year. The main objective of this article is to provide insights into the scope and nature of the challenges that African countries are encountering during the preparation and implementation of credible national poverty reduction strategies (PRS). The article specifically examines five practical challenges regarding PRSP implementation: 1) the scope and nature of the growth strategies; 2) financing and expenditure management of the PRSP in national budgets; 3) the legitimacy of the participatory process; 4) the adequacy of national capacity for PRS formulation, implementation and monitoring; and 5) harmonisation of donor aid practices with PRS objectives.

African Experience with the PRSP

In late 2001 the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) embarked on an initiative called the PRSP Learning Group (PRSP-LG), like the learning events established at the Word Bank, to assist African countries to exchange information and discuss issues relevant to the PRSP process. The objective of the PRSP-LG was, primarily, to identify best practices that can be replicated; to flag institutional and capacity constraints; to recommend actions to remedy those constraints; and to propose actions to be taken by Africans and donors in order to tap the full potential of the PRSP process in transforming relations between African countries and their donor partners. The 12 country studies reviewed for this article were commissioned by UNECA to facilitate the annual meetings of the learning group.2

There is widespread agreement on the relevance of the principles and concepts underpinning the PRSP approach. The initiative has the potential to put country-led strategies for development at the heart of development assistance. More importantly, the PRSP approach has the potential to take poverty out of the social-sector ghetto and into the same institutional home as the budget and management of public expenditure (SPA, 2001; World Bank, 2004).

The available literature on the PRSP highlights two contradictory tendencies. On the positive side, there is considerable consensus that the PRSP approach provides a unique opportunity for governments to clarify their approach towards reducing poverty, to improve coherence across government departments and systems, and to improve the effectiveness of service delivery mechanisms, by linking objectives to the budget process (IMF, 2004: 7; World Bank, 2004a: 5; UNECA, 2002). Moreover, the PRSPs have expanded the dialogue
on social and development policy by broadening the space for a wide spectrum of social actors to participate in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction programmes (McGee & Brock, 2001; Christian Aid, 2001; Painter, 2002).

On the other hand, however, the existing literature, including the evidence from the 12 country studies, points out that African governments are encountering a number of difficulties in the formulation and implementation of credible national poverty reduction plans (Booth, 2001; UNECA/UNESCO, 2002; World Bank, 2004; UNDP, 2003: 17). One key challenge has been the problem of linking the PRSP objectives, including sector plans, to the budget process. Second, while all the country studies emphasised the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction, the links between growth and poverty reduction remain weak, as finding them is hampered by poor poverty diagnosis and the lack of clarity about a country’s growth strategy (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002; World Bank, 2004: xiv). There is particularly insufficient attention to ex-ante analysis of the poverty impact of policies, particularly those pertaining to the macroeconomic framework and structural reforms.

Moreover, progress in simplifying and harmonising donor support for poverty reduction strategies has been disappointing, despite a willingness by some donors to provide budget support to a limited number of countries. Given high levels of aid dependency in most of Africa, promoting African ‘ownership’ of the policy process is not a straightforward matter. The country studies point out that the principle of ‘national ownership’ is being undermined by the tendency of donors to pursue their own timetable, set their own conditions, and demand their own information, largely unrelated to the government in question’s own PRS processes (SPA, 2002; World Bank, 2004; UNECA/UNESCO, 2002). In the pages that follow, the key institutional challenges for effective PRSP implementation and monitoring outcomes are examined.

### Comprehensiveness of Growth Strategies

The introduction of the PRSP offers a significant opportunity to deepen the focus on broad-based growth strategies for poverty reduction in Africa, and to enhance African ownership of these strategies. The realisation of these objectives in large part depends on the comprehensiveness of the growth strategies—macroeconomic, social and structural—pursued.

The literature on the PRSPs points out that significant attempts have been made by African countries to develop comprehensive growth strategies to underpin their national poverty reduction strategies, although the quality varies from country to country (IMF/World Bank, 2002: 8; UNECA/UNESCO, 2002). There is a great deal of commonality in the choice of policy interventions to deepen and sustain growth among the countries reviewed. These include, among others:

- **Rural development and agricultural transformation**: by improving access to productive assets, especially land; providing greater access to markets and credit; increasing productivity; promoting gainful employment; and focusing on disadvantaged groups with respect to agricultural services.

- **Human development**: by enhancing access to primary health care, universal primary education, better nutrition and clean drinking water. With respect to health, in particular, policies are aimed at expansion and improvement in the coverage of primary health care through special programmes geared towards target groups such as women and children.

- **Economic infrastructure**: by improving the road network and the provision of electricity, better communication and water through enhanced financing of basic infrastructure facilities and development of new technologies to promote the availability of non-wage factor inputs at competitive cost.

- **Good governance**: by strengthening democracy and decentralisation; improving governance and the quality and efficiency of state institutions; modernising and reforming the central administrative apparatus; and simplification of bureaucratic procedures and ‘red tape’, and fighting corruption.
• Private sector development: by creating an environment within which the private sector can expand and become dynamic through the promotion of both domestic and foreign investment. This will entail removing the constraints on private sector competitiveness, such as infrastructure constraints, and commercial justice reform with respect to enforcing contracts, etc.

• Macroeconomic and finance: by implementing fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies to maintain low inflation and competitiveness; improving the management of public expenditure; mobilising additional budgetary resources; securing and expanding financial markets; and the promotion of international trade and competitiveness.

On closer inspection, however, the growth strategies contained in the 12 PRSPs reviewed have not been sufficiently pro-poor (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002; Booth, 2001; 2003; UNDP, 2001). All the country studies emphasise the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction, but the links between growth and poverty are very weak. In no country has there been a broad debate about alternative economic policies and their impact on poverty, prompting many critics to label the PRSP approach ‘structural adjustment by another name (UNCTAD, 2002a; Malaluan & Guttal, 2002). A recent report by the World Bank’s Operation of Evaluation Department (OED) reinforces this conclusion by rightly pointing out that, 'most PRSPs to date have not considered the full range of policy actions required for growth and poverty reduction' (World Bank, 2004: viii). Most PRSPs do not include decisive measures to redistribute wealth and promote equality. Critical gaps remain in linking policies and programmes to poverty impact for the following reasons:

Gaps in poverty diagnosis
The potential contribution of the PRSP in poverty reduction is hampered by inadequate diagnosis of poverty as a result of the lack of up-to-date quantitative survey data such as the Living Standards Measurement Survey and national household survey. The focus of poverty diagnosis so far has been on 'income poverty' and less so on the determinants of poverty. Many PRSPs do not highlight the multifaceted nature that combines structural and other factors, such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and food security (Zuckerman & Garrett, 2003; UNDP, 2003: 17). There are also insufficient data disaggregated by sex, and women’s incomes, livelihood and resource constraints are poorly captured (Whitehead, 2003). For example, of the eight African PRSPs audited by Gender Action, only three (Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia) address gender issues commendably if not completely (Zuckerman & Garrett, 2003). As a result, the priority public actions specified in the PRSPs are not realistic and fail to capture the multidimensional nature of poverty. Moreover, the financing requirements for achieving set objectives are often not sufficiently detailed. Poor diagnosis, therefore, leads to the misallocation of expenditure on poorly defined objectives and programmes.

Overly optimistic growth projections
The PRSP approach has focused more on stimulating growth and less on complementary policies to reduce structural poverty. In the majority of countries examined, growth projections (e.g., GDP, fiscal revenues and exports) have largely been too optimistic. Optimistic projections of export growth which have not materialised in many commodity-dependent African countries. There is also inadequate ex-ante analysis of the poverty impact of policies, particularly those pertaining to macroeconomics framework and structural reforms (Oxfam, 2001; Gomez & Lawson, 2003). Nor has there been an effort to analyse macroeconomic risks or alternative scenarios and present contingency plans to respond to economic shocks (World Bank, 2004: xiv; Gomez & Lawson, 2003). Consequently, the coherence between the macroeconomic framework and poverty reduction goals or targets has been very weak. Ideally, the PRSP should incorporate policy scenarios to accommodate different options.

While economic growth is necessary, it is not sufficient in reducing poverty. For growth to work in favour of the poor, it must be accompanied by decisive measures to redistribu-
ute wealth, promote equality and give greater attention to social safety nets. For example, land reform—important for reducing rural inequality—is studiously avoided within most PRSPs (Allardice, 2002; UNECA/UNESCO, 2002).

Poor treatment of governance concerns

Sustained poverty reduction requires rule of law, transparency and accountability of public institutions, and a strong government commitment to fight corruption at all levels (World Bank, 2001: 48). In the countries reviewed, there is a lingering concern by the private sector about corruption and the enforceability of contracts. The central goal of fighting poverty can be easily undermined if the courts, tax collectors, procurement systems, and local service providers are dysfunctional and systematically deny good governance to the poor.

Since the introduction of the PRSP approach, there has been a noticeable move on the part of government to strengthen governance systems and create enabling conditions for economic agents to operate. In Uganda, for example, a proportion of grand corruption cases result from procurement (Government of Uganda, 2000b). In late 2000 the government issued new procurement regulations for ministries, departments and agencies. Under the new regulations, the Central Tender Board is to guide and supervise the work of procuring entities. Each procuring entity is to establish a contract committee that will be responsible for rewarding contracts. Open tendering is required, nationality may not be used to exclude a contractor, and advertisement must be used to attract foreign competition (Government of Uganda, 2001: 18).

Despite some progress in a handful of countries, current efforts by governments to accelerate judicial sector reform (commercial law, labour legislation, banking regulation, etc) in order to shore up business confidence are progressing slowly. African governments still lack adequate capacity to enact and enforce laws and policies in order to bring predictability and stability to the rules of economic and social interaction (Brautigam, 1996: 81–104). As the Office of Evaluation Department of the World Bank points out, ‘countries have focused more on completing the PRSP document which gives them access to resources, than on improving domestic processes’ (World Bank, 2004: viii).

Costing, Budgeting and Financial Management

An important objective of the PRSP is to direct resources to priority areas that have a significant impact on poverty. This objective thus assigns an important role to the budget. Public expenditure, for example, affects poverty outcomes in a number of ways. First, sound aggregate fiscal policy contributes to overall economic stability and growth. Second, policy decisions are financed through the budget. Third, the extent and quality of public services depend on the actual flow of budgeted resources to service delivery institutions (Foster & Zormelo, 2002: 164). All of these, in turn, exert considerable influence on poverty outcomes (Cagatay et al, 2000: 1). Governments are, therefore, expected to ensure that the PRSPs are duly integrated into their budgets and are fully costed (World Bank, 2004: 16). Unless countries have a clear picture of the financial resources (costs) required for implementing poverty reduction strategies, their effective implementation will be jeopardised.

Costing the PRSP

With the introduction of the PRSP approach, countries have made great progress in linking budgeting with planning at the national level. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is a good instrument and resources are projected for both domestic and donor projects. Nevertheless, costing the PRSP programmes and their presentation in a medium-term framework remains a major problem because of the considerable data requirements and technical complexity of estimating costs (World Bank, 2004: 16). Most PRSPs have not been reliably costed and fail to provide strategic prioritisation.
The level of detail on fiscal cost estimates found in the 12 PRSPs is modest and has been done as a first phase approximation, and the quality varies from sector to sector. Only in six of the 12 countries reviewed (Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Rwanda and Malawi) are cost estimates linked to an existing MTEF or preparations of an MTEF. A recent review of MTEF in Africa by the Africa Region of the World Bank found only a subset of countries have produced costings with data on programmes or activities and, of these, many are at an aggregate level covering only a portion of a sector (Talierco & Le Houerou, 2001).

The problem associated with costing is unlikely to be rectified in the near future given the capacity constraints within African countries and the technical difficulty associated with estimating costs and expenditures. Consequently, the financing gap is so wide that the PRSPs are considered a wish list, since no attempt is made to balance priorities with affordability. This implies that achieving PRSP targets in many countries will take longer than is initially assumed. Even in Uganda, a model PRSP country, it is now accepted that reaching set targets of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) will take longer than initially expected. Preliminary estimates reveal that the gap between current and required spending levels to implement the Ugandan PRSP is on the order of 37% (Government of Uganda, 2001: 12). As a result, the government was forced to scale back the PEAP objectives and priorities to bring the estimated fiscal cost more in line with the budget constraints.

Weak link between the PRSP and the budgets

Along with proper cost-estimations of PRSP programmes and projects, prioritisation of objectives in PRSPs is extremely challenging. One of the key challenges in this regard is how to link the PRSP objectives insititionally with the annual budget cycle and the MTEF. The MTEF takes into consideration resource constraints, macroeconomic stability, specified strategy priorities, estimates of current and medium-term costs of existing and new policies, and a decision-making process aimed at matching costs with available resources. It must adequately reflect the specific choices of the poverty reduction strategy, as well as possible medium-term fiscal constraints. As such, the MTEF can serve as an important instrument for prioritising and implementing elements of the poverty reduction strategy.

Only a limited number of PRSPs (Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania) demonstrate any serious shift towards prioritisation or detailed costing of pro-poor expenditures. In Uganda, for example, since the 1990s tremendous efforts have been made to link resource allocations strategically with national priorities via the MTEF, which outlines all public expenditures by linking inputs, outputs and outcomes with the objectives defined in the PRSP. The PRSP is the main and only instrument that guides the allocation of all government expenditures to ensure macroeconomic stability and maximise the efficiency of public expenditure. Sectoral working groups comprising the Ministry of Finance, line ministries and technical advisors help develop sectoral priorities within expenditure limits in the context of preparing the annual Budget Framework Paper (BFP), ensuring that poverty concerns are fully addressed (Cheru, 2001a: 8–9). Despite these achievements, however, Uganda still has weak capacity in budget management and expenditure tracking.

In Mozambique, on the other hand, the MTEF has been disjointed from the budget process and does not act as a real budget constraint. Despite progress made since 1997 in expenditure planning thanks to the adoption of the Budget Framework Law, the budget management system remains weak, thus hindering fiscal transparency and accountability. Spending plans are drawn up with little reference to the PRSP. The effectiveness of the budget as a tool in public expenditure planning is undermined by conflictual relationships between sector ministries and the Ministry of Finance (Berke, 2002). Because of this dynamic, sector ministries regard the MTEF more as a technical document than a public expenditure management tool. As such, it is difficult to adequately access the actual impact of investment on poverty reduction (Flack & Landfald, 2001; Cheru, 2001b).
The challenge of linking the PRS objectives to the budget is further exacerbated by the inability of African governments to consolidate all government expenditures and revenue flows, including 'off-budget' overseas development assistance (ODA) flows, into the MTEF (Berke, 2002: 9–12). In Burkina Faso, for example, HIPC funds are annexed to the national budget and transferred into a special account from which disbursements are made by the disbursing ministries. While this can make the task of accounting for HIPC funds easier, in many instances such practice hinders the effectiveness of the MTEF as a vehicle for effective resource allocation (Koudougou, 2002: 30). In Mozambique only about half of the government expenditure is recorded in the budget (Cheru, 2001b). Currently, 50% of aid to Tanzania is channelled outside the budget, even though the situation has improved from 70% two years ago. This means that a large chunk of resource mobilisation in these countries bypasses normal government approval and monitoring procedures.

A number of African governments are taking the necessary steps to eliminate the practice of 'off-budget' financing. In this respect, Rwanda and Ghana offer a ray of hope that the problem of aligning donor support with the PRSP is not insurmountable. In Rwanda the government has started to address the challenge of co-ordination, starting with implementing what it calls 'the lead agency arrangement', whereby the government assigns leading donors in respective sectors (where they provide the largest support) to co-ordinate the integration of resources coming into that sector with the PRSP (Wangwe, 2002a). The practice normally works in the context of sector-wide approaches (SWAPs). Ghana provides the best successful example where SWAPs— in the specific case of the health sector— are considered the best approach (Foster & Zormelo, 2002; Canagarjah & Ye, 2001).

Poor financial management and expenditure tracking

Monitoring and tracking of public expenditure are key to the successful implementation of PRSP objectives. This requires a transparent budgeting and auditing system, including the modernisation of the financial accounting system. Unfortunately, there exists a huge gap between the scale of the problem and the institutional requirements for a more efficient, reliable and transparent system of budget management and administration. Among the most pressing problems are: weak budget prioritisation, lack of a uniform accounting system, a weak expenditure monitoring and procurement code, inadequate capacity for both external and internal audit and a poor aid and debt management system (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002: 8–11).

The issue of poor financial management has attracted the attention of many donors who have stepped in to assist countries by strengthening capacity in financial control, simplifying procurement procedures, and by introducing an enhanced use of information technology. For instance, in Uganda, development partners have provided technical assistance to strengthen database systems and build financial management and accountability through the Economic and Financial Management project. In Malawi donors financed the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS), which enables the Treasury to monitor and track expenditures. In Ghana, as part of the Public Financial Management Reform programme (PUFMRP), the government is implementing the Budget and Public Expenditure Management System (BPEMS), whereby a new software from Oracle technology is being tested. It will permit the classification, recording and analysis of financial transactions in a timely and standardised manner (Cheru, 2002a: 16).

While these measures to strengthen financial management are long overdue, equally important is the urgent need to manage human resources efficiently. A large part of poor financial management and erratic budget discipline in many African countries is attributed to poor morale in the public service. Many countries have developed skills in the public sector, only to lose them to high-paying jobs in the private sector. In order to tackle the problem of 'brain-drain', governments must develop strategies to secure the services of good accountants and auditors— through an attractive incentive structure compatible with market principles (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002). This can only happen with
comprehensive civil service reform and the restructuring of incentives comparable with prevailing market rates (World Bank, 2002).

The Challenge of Institutionalising Participation

Countrywide participation in PRSPs presents a paradigm shift from ineffective donor-led, conditionality-driven partnership to a system that puts the recipient country in the driving seat. It implies that the emphasis on participation and ownership will improve policy design and the implementation of policies and programmes. Despite [the] assumed potential advantages of a participatory process, however, genuine participation of local stakeholders is a challenge. The process does not often work smoothly, particularly in countries where prior dialogue between stakeholders and government has been lacking. In many countries, participation has been tightly controlled from above (Eurodad, 2001; Sanchez & Cash, 2003; Christian Aid, 2001). In many instances, the participation of societal actors in the preparation of the PRSP has not been extensive and transparent, and sufficient time has not been given to prepare for consultation. With few exceptions, very little attempt has been made by governments to capture the voices of the rural poor (Action Aid USA/Action Aid Uganda, 2004; Eberlei, 2001).

Lack of genuine government commitment to the participatory process

The critical determining factor for broad-based consultation and joint decision making is the depth and scope of government commitment to a participatory process (Painter, 2002; Action Aid USA/Action Uganda, 2004). Countries where the government allows citizen involvement in areas of governance, such as accountability of public funds and citizen monitoring of public services, have been able to build on the experience and conduct participatory processes effectively for PRSPs (Eberlei, 2001). Uganda, for instance, offers a good model. Pre-dating the PRSP, civil society groups had been monitoring district level poverty action funds and reporting results to government, and publicising them in the media (Gariyo, 2001). An institutional window in the form of the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project allowed the government to interface with civic groups collaboratively (Government of Uganda, 2000a; McGee, 2002: 70). A 1997 PEAP was later revised into a PRSP with inputs from a civil society task force led by the Uganda Debt Network. Political will and domestic capacity to lead and manage the process have combined to make the Uganda experience stand out.

Similarly, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Mali and Zambia have also made best efforts to expand the scope for participation of a wide spectrum of stakeholders. In Ethiopia consultations took place in 171 districts. The district consultations were complemented with consultations at the provincial levels, which were then followed by consultation at the federal level (Abebe, 2002: 8–9). In Rwanda the government solicited the views of ordinary people via the National Poverty Assessment study involving 1,000 people, a community action planning process (locally referred to as ‘ubudehe’) where communities developed action plans to solve the problems they had identified, and a policy relevance test (PRT) in 38 of 100 districts where 10,000 people participated in focus groups (Bugingo, 2002; Wangwe, 2002a). In Mali, a number of fora were established for national and regional consultations with an extensive array of functions. In the consultative process, there was extensive involvement of local communities, through the Association of Municipalities; civil society organisations and NGO clusters, law professionals and the private sector unions, and sector ministries (Diop, 2001: 5–10).

At the other extreme, many African governments remain suspicious about the motives of civil society organisations and are reluctant to open up the political space for substantive dialogue to take place. PRSP consultations were all done in a rushed manner, not allowing for true dialogue to take place and participation was not generally sustained beyond the initial process of drawing up the PRSP (Mwulongo et al, 2002: 72–87; Action Aid, 2002: 7; Evans, 2003: 271–287). In Burkina Faso, Malawi, Ghana and Mozambique, the involvement of sectoral ministries, legislators, decentralised administration, and civil society groups in the PRSP formulation process was less than satisfactory, as these gov-
ernments rushed the process in order to secure maximum benefit from debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative (Afrodad, 2003; McGee, 2002: 6; Flack & Landfald, 2001; Koudougou, 2002: 27).

Moreover, the absence of government strategy to disseminate information on time to all societal actors, including government departments, was a major impediment to eliciting views from the different stakeholders. Draft PRSP documents and complementary information on budgets and macroeconomy scenarios were rarely distributed to participants ahead of the consultations (McGee, 2002: 9; CRS, 2001: 21). In Ghana, for example, the large scale meetings, such as the National Economic Forum (NEF), did not lend themselves to meaningful dialogue as participants had to plough through large amounts of papers which they did not have time to digest before coming to the meeting (Killick & Agubre, 2001: 27–32). This has contributed to the gap in expectations between government and stakeholders (World Bank, 2004: 7; Christian Aid, 2001). Civil society participation cannot become meaningful if critical information is not disclosed in advance. Where information is not on the table, there are not open debates and there is less chance for a social consensus around the choices embodied in the PRSP.

Limited role for elected representatives

As one of the stated goals of participation in PRSP is to build national ownership, the exclusion of most national parliaments in the process has been a great omission. In many PRSP countries parliaments and other elected officials have not been actively involved in the PRSP process (UNCTAD, 2002a: 173; IMF, 2002). In Uganda—a successful PRSP country—few parliamentarians were involved in the PRSP process. Although the government organised a consultation workshop for parliamentarians in February 2000, it was done at the last minutes and attracted only five elected officials (Allardice, 2002: 9). In Kenya, fewer than 10% of MPs attended consultations (Panos, 2002: 25). In Mozambique, the overriding government concern for political stability and national reconciliation limited the degree of open political debate in the parliament on the appropriate course of development planning (Flack & Landfald, 2001; Cheru, 2001b). In Malawi, the district workshops were dominated by government officials, trade authorities and influential people at local levels, while ordinary people and elected representatives such as councillors and MPs were excluded from the process. Although government quickly opened up the space for greater civil society involvement in response to Civil Society Organizations (CSO) criticism, the process lost credibility and as a result participation tapered off as the policy cycle progressed (Wangwe, 2002b: 9–11; Afrodad, 2003).

Despite initial omissions, however, the environment for the participation of parliament in the PRSP process has significantly improved in the past three years. Many governments recognise the vital role of parliament in national development strategies since the cyclical policy-making process—like the budget process—offers significant opportunities for parliaments to ensure accountability and transparency in decision making and in the efficiency of public expenditures. Moreover, endorsement of the PRSP by parliament and local authorities will remove any lingering suspicion among societal actors that the PRSP is simply an initiative of external donors.

Exclusion of the private sector

A critical missing element in the participatory process has been the failure of governments to enhance the participation of the private sector in the PRSP process (World Bank, 2001: 3).5 The private sector is the engine of growth and development in Africa. With the exception of Mozambique and Uganda, where the private sector was deeply engaged in the PRSP consultation, the majority of African governments have yet to develop a coherent strategy on how to engage institutions representing the private sector in dialogue over the PRSP (Government of Uganda, 2001; McGee & Taimo, 2001). In many countries, while apex private sector institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce and Association of Manufacturers had been consulted, other private sector organisations representing the interests of the informal sector and women entrepreneurs did not participate in the
national consultations (Eberlei, 2001). Even in Rwanda, where the process has been highly participatory, the private sector was excluded during the consultation process (Mutebi et al, 2003: 280).

Despite many shortcomings, the PRSP has initiated a dialogue among a wide range of national stakeholders. It has sensitised and mobilised local communities, local governments and parliamentarians and has broadened the ‘policy community’ (McGee, 2002). Through open and transparent consultation, attitudes have changed, and governments are increasingly becoming more transparent thanks to NGO scrutiny. New networks and alliances are being formed to influence policy decisions at the local and global levels. Needless to say, participation has not moved beyond consultation and has not led to joint decision making by societal actors. A lot more work remains to be done in order to institutionalise participation throughout the entire policy process—i.e., in sector plans, the budget process, and in the implementation and monitoring of PRS objectives (Eberlei, 2001: 17–27; Wangwe, 2001: 18). In countries where principles of accountable governance, participation, country ownership and a clear poverty focus in national planning were already in place (e.g., Tanzania and Uganda), the PRSP initiative has added weight to reform efforts and opened new spaces for domestic policy dialogue (World Bank, 2004: 33).

National Capacity Needs

Preparing a comprehensive ‘country-owned’ poverty reduction strategy poses many challenges for low-income African countries with weak state capacity. The country reviews uncover enormous gaps in the capacity to undertake poverty analysis, design and implement anti-poverty programmes, and monitor their impacts. In the specific cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the genocide and decades of conflict left an acute shortage of skilled personnel in both the public and private sectors (Cheru, 2002b; Wangwe, 2002a).

Poverty diagnosis and analysis

Substantial gaps remain in many African countries between the political commitment to reduce poverty and the human and institutional capacity to undertake systemic analysis of the causes and consequences of poverty; to design and implement poverty reduction policies and programmes; and to monitor their impacts (Booth & Lucas, 2002).

Poor diagnosis and analysis is partly the result of poor capacity in government institutions and the absence of quality and up-to-date data. Budget outlays for research, data gathering and policy analysis are inadequate, and disbursements fluctuate from year to year, handicapping these institutions to engage in long-term research projects. National statistical institutes remain under-funded and under-staffed, with many lacking the most rudimentary technology to collect and process statistical data and produce analytical reports to key decision makers. This has crippled the effectiveness of the public service to plan and manage development in a sustainable way.

Moreover, retaining and motivating skilled staff has been a problem across the public service in sub-Saharan Africa (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002). Poor incentive structure in the civil service is partly responsible for the dramatic attrition rates, paralysing the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service (Foster & Zormelo, 2002: xii). Stopgap measures, often funded by donors, such as recruiting consultants at salaries ten times the salary of civil servants with the same level of education, have done nothing but deepen the situation of low morale in the civil service.

Ghana, one of the best managed economies in Africa, illustrates the problem. Centrally and in the ministries, government lacks in-house capacity for policy analysis and monitoring. This is a paradox since Ghana is one of the few African countries endowed with a number of research institutions, think-tanks, local consultancy agencies, and policy-orientated NGOs. Yet no effort is made by government to utilise existing knowledge and capacity outside government. This lack of political commitment by African governments to use existing capacity prompted one World Bank official to express the following view:
ultimately, the most important thing is that the public sector has to go through a form of seri-
ous reform. You cannot have a public sector that is just run from the top. The actual paper work
to get investments approved, to rapidly clear custom goods etc, are done by the middle level
personnel but they are the worst paid. The top-level personnel have a different way of comp-
pensation. Living in a bungalow, with garden boys and drivers are all emoluments. If the mid-
dle level personnel are adequately remunerated, most of the problems with implementation
would be solved. (Hanson, 2002: 12–13)

For the PRSP to become an effective anti-poverty tool, efforts must be made to scale up
effective analytical and statistical systems in the powerful ministries with reform respon-
sibilities by focusing on fast-track measures to enhance capacity for macroeconomic pol-
cy formulation, monitoring and evaluating progress in poverty reduction. The capacity-
building agenda needs to address institutional and human capacity. A critical starting
point is effective human resource management and civil service reform. Greater effort is
needed to retain competent African professionals in the civil service through attractive
incentives and improved working conditions. Civil service reform must therefore be linked
to a budget process in which performance influences allocations, and to a transparent
medium-term employment strategy. Moreover, greater efforts must be made to attract
skilled Africans in the diaspora as well as those working in research and policy think-tanks
within Africa through innovative strategies.

Co-ordination and national ownership

Besides the problem of attracting competent African professionals to the public service,
co-ordination of economic policy formulation and implementation has been hampered
by constant inter-ministerial infighting, as well as by the disconnect between key sector
ministries and ministries of finance—the agency that controls the purse strings. In Ghana,
for example, the turf battle between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic
Planning and Regional Co-operation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State House and
the Bank of Ghana, have had an impact on PRSP implementation and follow-up. To address
this fragmentation, the government established the Economic Committee of the Cabinet,
chaired by a senior minister, to ensure better liaison between planning and finance as
well as with other ministries with reform responsibilities (Cheru, 2002a: 25).

It is of the utmost importance that governments and the development partners develop
modalities for strengthening institutional linkages, and establish coherence and comple-
mentarities between the various implementing ministries. This will also require significant
investment in cost-effective computerisation and an information-sharing programme to
enable managed electronic discussion and information sharing between these institutions.

Capacity for monitoring and evaluation

As the PRSPs move into the implementation phase, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) con-
cerns have become more prevalent, systematically bringing to the forefront a range of
longstanding weaknesses in government capacity and system (Lucas et al, 2004). At pres-
tent, monitoring and evaluation in many PRSPs remain overly centred on compliance with
government rules and regulations and tracking inputs and processes, rather than the end
results of policy, programmes and project efforts. While some PRSP monitoring (e.g., in
Uganda) focuses on both poverty and PRS implementation, others give too much empha-
sis only to budget monitoring.

Of the 12 countries reviewed, five (Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Ghana, Mozambique) have
detailed operational monitoring systems. These monitoring systems locate the national
poverty reduction effort squarely within the PRSP ‘technical secretariat’ at the ministry
of finance, with a stakeholder committee meeting involving sector ministries and some
NGOs; the committee meets monthly and transmits its concerns through a committee of
permanent secretaries to cabinet (UNECA/UNESCO, 2002; Booth & Lucas, 2002). In other
countries (Rwanda, Malawi), the collecting, organising and using of M&E data are com-
partmentalised and fragmented between multiple government and donor planning and
progress reporting requirements (ODI, 2003). Therefore, without sustained improvements
in M&E capacities within PRSP countries, it will be difficult to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of poverty reduction efforts over the medium- to long-term.

To summarize, capacity building is central to the sustenance of the poverty reduction agenda. The capacity-building agenda must, therefore, address institutional and human capacity gaps to ensure that individuals and institutions, like think-tanks and policy research institutions, are enabled to produce high quality inputs to the policy process.

**Harmonization of Donor Policy**

External aid is likely to be more effective in reducing poverty if donor policies, procedures and practices are aligned with government-led poverty reduction-related processes. In this regard, PRSPs are potentially important instruments for streamlining and co-ordinating international aid flows. There is an implied shift from conventional conditionality towards mutual obligations for achieving shared outcomes; a requirement on the part of external donors to realign aid modalities and donor practices to the spirit and objectives of the PRSP; and donor commitment to strengthening capacities and institutions for enhanced African ownership of development programmes.

And since the launch of the PRSP approach, there have been substantial changes in donor policies and practices, but the record is uneven (Booth, 2001; UNDP, 2001). This change in donor practices takes place in the form of budget support or expanded lending within the framework of SWAPs). In Tanzania and Uganda, for example, there has been a shift of modalities of financing away from stand-alone project aid towards programme aid and budget support. In Burkina Faso the development partners have constituted themselves into a PRSP budget support group. The group is made up of the European Union, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland (Koudougou, 2002: 20-22).

In Ethiopia, the UNDP and the World Bank have taken the responsibility for harmonising the different interests of donors and lenders through the Development Assistance Group (DAG), comprised of 17 bilateral and multilateral representatives, and chaired by UNDP (UNDP, 2003: 26). Other donors are considering moving to budget support, including Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands and Norway (Abebe, 2002: 25). In Mozambique, the groups of 11 (G-11) bilateral donors are co-ordinating their assistance in line with government priorities. They provide capacity-building support, particularly around sectoral planning and prioritisation, analysis, monitoring and evaluation (Cheru, 2001b: 11).

Despite some encouraging signs, however, progress in harmonisation of donor policy with PRSP objectives has been far from satisfactory. Current donor practices for supporting poverty reduction strategies are cumbersome, involving extensive conditionality, burdensome information requests, and uncoordinated missions. This conclusion is well captured by the following concerns expressed to the members of the mission by Ethiopian officials:

- an excessive number of conditions accompanying aid programmes which also creates a heavy burden on government for additional information;
- donors’ preference for discrete project support as opposed to budget support, which brings with it inordinate amounts of reviews and reporting requirements;
- the preference of most donors to set up separate procedures rather than to work jointly, and the lack of transparency about donor activities and plans;
- variation of donor procedures for procurement, environmental assessment, etc;
- unwillingness of donors to use government systems—whether at the level of policy, priorities, financial procedures, and performance monitoring;
- excessive and unco-ordinated missions, often resulting in multiple requests for information from different donors, and unrelated to the country’s own information and monitoring systems for PRSP implementation;
- insufficient aid predictability and disbursements to incorporate in financial planning (SPA, 2002: 3).

A recent report by ODE echoed the above observations and states:
the rhetoric of donor alignment around the PRSP has yet to reduce the transaction costs for the government. Governments reported that multiple donor initiatives, including the PRSP, have actually increased transaction costs in the short term (World Bank, 2004b: 19).

Without a clear commitment by donors to support a government-led strategy and process, it is difficult to imagine an effective policy dialogue between donors and recipient countries.

Only Rwanda and Tanzania have attempted to develop a national strategy to address the broader question of changing donor-recipient relations in the direction of greater recipient ownership. In Rwanda a joint government and donor document, Guidelines for Productive Aid Co-ordination in Rwanda, proposes concrete long-term and short-term actions for effective co-ordination to support implementation of the PRSP (Wangwe, 2002: 19). The Tanzanian framework, entitled Tanzania Development Strategy (TAS), seeks to promote good governance, transparency, accountability, capacity building and aid effectiveness. The government and its development partners agreed on 18 points of behaviour, which will be monitored through the Consultative Group (CG) process (Government of Tanzania, 2002; Wangwe, 2001: 15).

In short, alignment entails adopting consistent strategies in support of home grown national priorities. It also means ‘streamlining’ conditionality and making donor funding more predictable. This involves a difficult balancing act since many PRSP countries are heavily dependent on donor funding and they stand to lose future assistance if they press too much on the issue.

Predictability of donor flows

While alignment of donor policies with a country’s PRSP are important, equally important is the predictability of donor funding. Since high levels of aid dependency characterise most African countries, the unpredictability of donor funding and disbursements can hamper national efforts to improve the efficiency of public expenditure. Without predictable flows of external finance over the medium-to long-term, African governments are unlikely to have the flexibility to make adequate budget allocations for poverty reduction (Healy et al., 2000).

Donor support for the PRSP cannot be based on traditional stop-go practices. As part of the annual PRS review process, donors should be prepared to offer indicative figures of their support for the coming financial year so that these pledges can be included when establishing the macroeconomic and fiscal framework. They should also indicate clearly specified periods when disbursements will be made during the recipient country’s fiscal calendar year, so that planned expenditures on poverty reduction projects and programmes can be executed effectively and in a timely fashion.

Streamlining conditionality

Streamlining conditionality around the PRSP should be the basis for building stronger and lasting partnerships in support of a nationally defined agenda. However, a common perception is that conditionality in HIPC, Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreements are not adequately governed by PRSPs (Eurodad, 2003; Malaluan & Guttal, 2002). The need for more transparent donor conduct regarding the content and mechanisms of conditionality has moved centre stage in the debate on alignment of donor modalities (Berke, 2002: 23).

The IMF-managed PRGF has received the bulk of the criticism. The PRGF, which is based on a number of briefing papers prepared by IMF experts, is usually negotiated between the visiting IMF mission team and a limited group of key experts at a country’s ministry of finance. This implies that the country’s macroeconomic frameworks are drawn directly from the PRGF and are agreed [upon] without political or public scrutiny (IMF, 2004: 108), the implication being that the PRGF is not guided by the PRSP. The Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) found that ‘in cases where a PRGF arrangement was already in place before the PRSP, the macroeconomic framework was typically taken from the for-
mer with limited efforts to open up the policy debate’ (PRSP, 2004: 72). This practice
does very little to strengthen the principle of national ownership.

Conclusions

The PRSP approach provides a unique opportunity for African governments to clarify their
approach towards reducing poverty, to improve coherence across government departments
and systems, enhance the effectiveness of service delivery mechanisms, and to improve
the way in which development assistance is delivered. While there have been noticeable
shifts in the way African governments conceptualise and execute national poverty reduc-
tion strategies, a lot more work remains to be done to ensure the PRSP approach becomes
more participatory and result-orientated, and tackles the multidimensional nature of
poverty. How to strike the right balance between pushing for more rapid achievements of
PRSP objectives and ensuring that the approach is realistic in light of country constraints
remain a major challenge. This is particularly unsettling given the glaring gap in the
capacity of African states to plan and implement pro-poor strategies in a sustained way.
The problem is further compounded by the persistence of donor conditionality, which
undermines country ownership and domestic institutions (World Bank, 2004b: 7).

Many of the policy and institutional gaps identified in this article should have been antic-
ipated by the World Bank, the IMF and the bilateral donors, who played a decisive role
in dismantling many aspects of the African state throughout the 1980s and 1990s, all in
the name of market-oriented economic reforms. In reality, the neoliberal economic model
can result in reducing poverty where there is a strong state. Given the comprehensiv-
ness of the reform agenda contained in the PRSP, strengthening state capacity is, there-
fore, as critical as the resources required for successful PRS implementation.

ECONOMICS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT

Macartan Humphreys
Excerpted from ‘Economics and Violent Conflict’,
Harvard University, February 2003

Economic Policies and Civil War

What kinds of policy choices make conflicts more or less likely? Research that attempts
to answer this question generally takes as a starting point those features of economies
that are believed to increase the likelihood of conflict and then points to the failure of
governments to address them. Indeed, many of the structural factors that are associated
with conflict—low levels of education and high dependence on natural resources—are
themselves in part a function of government policies. For these the responses—export
diversification, increased investment in human capital, greater job opportunities and so
on—are obvious, if difficult to achieve in practice.

Some of these failures to resolve economic problems result from government negligence.
Political scientist William Reno for example describes ways in which political leaders take
deliberate actions to undermine their economies (and their governments) in order to
enrich themselves personally.57 By weakening state institutions (in some cases signaled
by fiscal collapse) and destroying infrastructure for production, leaders may make rebel-
ion more attractive: they reduce the direct costs as well as the opportunity costs of vio-
ence. Beyond this, states may be deliberate and active in the organization of violence,
and often with economic motivations. This is evident for international wars as well as
state-sponsored genocide.58

The impact of government policies, however, may be more contentious when they are
undertaken with the express intention of fostering economic development. There is for
example much anecdotal evidence that the structural adjustment (or “austerity”) programs implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s spawned civil conflicts.59 These policies, while formally implemented by governments, were strongly promoted by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, who made the granting of loans conditional upon the adoption of their policies. In a number of countries—such as Venezuela and Morocco—they led directly to street violence.60 But can the rise in civil wars also be put down to these policies? Surprisingly, when the World Bank turned to study civil wars it did not attempt to study the role of the structural adjustment programs it helped impose. Work that has attempted to address the question points to a number of mechanisms that may link structural adjustment programs to violence. These range from the undermining of social services to the weakening of entrenched elites.61 Simply by increasing efficiency economic policies can worsen horizontal inequality: While horizontal inequality may often result from state policies that favor segments of society because they form the relevant support base for the government, it may also result from the belief that some groups are more efficient than others.62 However, if, as claimed by the Bank and the IMF, these policies are indeed growth enhancing, then, at some stage, we would expect the rise in wealth to reduce the likelihood of violence.

The evidence for the generality of the link between structural adjustment and conflict is mixed. While IMF adjustment has reduced military spending, whether or not this increases or reduces the likelihood of conflict is not known.63 Studies by the World Bank to look at the effects of policies consistent with structural adjustment have found no direct relationship between these policies and conflict.64 Studies undertaken by the WIDER research group65 has also failed to find a systematic link.66 Nevertheless, the research has helped to identify ways in which structural adjustment programs could be altered to reduce the risk of conflict by reducing horizontal inequality. It recommends free universal education, regional integration programs, affirmative action and the creation of political institutions that guarantee political representation to members of all regional, ethnic or religious groupings.67

Trade and War

Researchers have put some effort into trying to find out whether international trade increases or decreases the likelihood of conflicts (so far no comparable work has been done to find links between internal trade and civil war). The results of this research matter for foreign policy. If, for example, the US increases trading relations with China will this lead to a greater risk of conflict—perhaps by strengthening China and giving it commercial power over the US or, by introducing interdependence and stronger mutual interests, will it reduce risks? Both positions have been put forward by political scientists and advocated by policy makers.

The belief that trade increases conflict, now associated with the “realist” school of international relations theorists,68 has historically been associated with mercantilism, a notion that implicitly denies the existence of gains from importing goods. Mercantilism, while still seemingly popular among some policy makers, is generally considered by economists to be based on a misunderstanding of how benefits from trade actually get distributed.69 Even so, such a misunderstanding could itself lead to conflict.70 More consistent with contemporary realists is the argument that in the absence of optimal trading conditions, potential beneficiaries of trade may use force to access foreign markets. Hence Marxist theorists, among others, have explained colonial wars as being for control of world markets, while international political economists have highlighted the desire of capitalists to put in place, by force, the conditions for profitable foreign direct investment.71 These arguments for conflict-inducing effects of trade rely then on the beliefs that trade relations are harmful to one party or that trade and investment routes are or are likely to become blocked.72

Liberal theorists focus more on the gains to both parties from trade. They argue that where trade is mutually beneficial, to fight with a trading partner would be committing “commercial suicide.”73 Related arguments claim that, through exchange, trading partners develop greater understanding for each others’ cultures. Political philosophers, meanwhile, suggest that trade reduces the risk of conflict because trade alters cultures: that there is something about trade that makes people less violent.74
At some levels the views of liberals and of realists may be reconciled: interdependence may provide occasions for conflict and may even provide a means for striking, but it may also produce the incentives for resolving disputes peaceably. This belief that the net effects of trade and cross-investment will be to reduce violent conflicts has found considerable support among policy makers.75 In Europe for example the view motivated the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, later to develop into the European Union. The logic is also supported by empirical research that demonstrates that once proximity is taken into account, states that trade with each other are indeed less likely to fight each other.76

ADOPT CONFLICT-REDUCING ECONOMIC POLICIES
Roland Paris

In Chapter 9 we examined some of the dangers and pathologies of rapid economic adjustment in war-shattered states. Although “orthodox” structural adjustment programs may create the conditions for sustainable economic growth in the long term, they usually impose significant short-term social costs. The economic reforms typically required by the IMF and World Bank tend not only to lower the living standards of certain groups within states undergoing adjustment but also to worsen the overall distribution of wealth in these states.

Proponents of orthodox structural-adjustment models do not deny the short-term social pains of economic reform, but they argue that temporary dislocation is justified in order to create the conditions for sustainable economic growth in the long term. There are, in fact, excellent reasons to encourage war-shattered states to pursue a market-oriented growth strategy, rather than protecting uncompetitive local industries from domestic or international competition. The second half of the twentieth century demonstrated that centrally planned and state-dominated development strategies—including not only Soviet-style communism but also import substitution strategies pursued in many parts of Latin America and Africa—generally produced lower levels of economic growth than market-oriented development strategies. Although debates continue over the appropriate balance between the market and the state in economic development, there is near-universal agreement today that non-market-oriented economic policies (that is, those that do not give the market the primary role in allocating scarce resources) are too inefficient to generate sustained economic growth. This is not to say that market-oriented economic policies are a sufficient condition for sustained economic growth, but that these policies appear to be a necessary condition.

Nevertheless, there are different methods of promoting market-oriented reform, some of which may be more suited to the needs of postconflict peacebuilding than others. The prevailing model of structural adjustment is a problematic approach to economic reform in war-shattered states, for several reasons. First, as we noted earlier, the economic hardships that rapid adjustment tends to impose on specific population sectors, along with the regressive widening of distributional inequalities, have been generally associated with higher levels of political unrest and violence in states undergoing these reforms. Given the fragile political conditions that exist in most war-shattered states, particularly in the period immediately following the termination of hostilities, it is unwise to pursue a strategy of rapid and immediate adjustment in these states. A better approach would be to delay reforms until political conditions are less fragile, or to stretch the reforms over a longer period in order to temper the disruptive effects of adjustment.60 Some commentators argue that rapid reform is essential because slow reform “allows the [domestic] opposition to coalesce, often in defense of the disproportionate benefits that it receives from public expenditure.”61 While this may be true, the requirements of successful adjustment
must be balanced against the need for political stability in states just emerging from civil wars. As Thomas Callaghy puts it, “economic liberalization without attention to domestic political stability . . . is likely to prevent successful economic and political adjustment.”

This is particularly important for war-shattered states in which economic deprivation or distributional inequalities have fueled violent conflict in the past.

Second, orthodox structural-adjustment policies make it difficult to provide the inhabitants of war-shattered states with a “peace dividend,” or tangible improvements in economic conditions, which could help to reinforce popular support for peace. If peace comes along with material rewards, ordinary citizens may be less willing to heed extremist members of their own community who seek to scuttle the peace. But orthodox adjustment models are based on a different set of priorities: namely, establishing conditions for economic growth in the long term, even at the expense of an initial economic downturn. The IMF and World Bank typically require states undergoing adjustment to implement fiscal austerity policies aimed at establishing budgetary balance, along with reductions in the money supply designed to keep inflation in check. But fiscal retrenchment and monetary contraction tend to suppress economic growth in the short run, in part because they increase the cost of credit and reduce the amount of disposable income in the hands of consumers. As a result, the use of fiscal or monetary policy to stimulate immediate economic growth in the aftermath of civil conflict becomes difficult under prevailing models of adjustment. Rather than enjoying a peace dividend, the inhabitants of war-shattered states that embrace orthodox adjustment are assessed what amounts to a “peace penalty” in the form of policies that artificially suppress growth in the short term, in exchange for assurances about the possibility of economic improvement in the long term. By delaying the implementation of these reforms or spreading them out over a longer period, peacebuilders would have greater flexibility to pursue policies that stimulate economic growth in the crucial period immediately following the war’s end.

Third, war-shattered states typically lack the institutional capacity to successfully manage market-oriented reforms. One of the most important functions that governments can perform in market systems is to maintain a sound legal framework that is capable of upholding property rights, resolving business disputes impartially, enforcing contracts, protecting consumers from fraud, collecting taxes, and regulating the banking system. At the most fundamental level (as Adam Smith and other classical liberal economists recognized long ago), a successful market economy presupposes the rule of law—that is, an environment in which the “rules of the game” are for the most part predictable, clear, and enforced in a consistent and disinterested manner. Promoting economic liberalization in the absence of a sound legal framework is a recipe for a malfunctioning and inefficient market economy in which the boundaries between business and crime are blurred: for example, the Russian economy in the 1990s.

Partly in response to the problematic marketization of Russia and other former Soviet bloc states, the IMF and World Bank have since the mid-1990s acknowledged the importance of effective governmental and legal institutions to the success of market-oriented adjustment programs. Under the rubric of “good governance,” the Bretton Woods institutions (along with major national aid donors) have increasingly made their financial assistance conditional on recipient states implementing institutional reforms, including not only measures to ensure a sound legal framework for the market economy but also improvements in the management of public resources. The IMF in particular has emphasized the importance of reforming public-sector institutions in recipient states in order to increase the efficiency and transparency of their operations and reduce the problems of wastage, corruption, and misallocation of resources. The World Bank has also pointed out that administrative competency facilitates the provision of public services upon which the market economy depends, including education, health care, and physical infrastructure.

War-shattered states, however, represent a special category of underinstitutionalized states. Within the larger class of countries undergoing transitions to capitalism under the guidance of international donor agencies, war-torn territories tend to be particularly lacking in functioning legal systems and governmental institutions. Despite the World Bank
and IMF attention to “good governance,” these organizations remain overly confident in the ability of markets to organize themselves spontaneously, and have tended to push for economic liberalization in war-shattered states prior to the construction of necessary governmental and legal institutions.66

Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in Bosnia, where liberalization programs undertaken in the absence of effective institutions have served, as Michael Pugh puts it, to “reinforc[e] the dominance of clientelistic and mafia political economies.”67 Following the signing of the Dayton Accord in 1995, international donors immediately launched economic reforms that included a far-reaching privatization program aimed at selling off inefficient government-owned enterprises. But in Bosnia’s “especially acute institutional vacuum,” there was little to prevent the dominant nationalist parties from manipulating the selling of these public enterprises “to themselves or to their allies through shady and non-transparent privatization deals.68 This process had adverse effects both for the economic and political reconstruction of the country. Economically, it reinforced the underlying corruption and cronyism of the Bosnian economy, which “remains controlled by a political elite at odds with the very reform policies that would lead to greater openness.”69 This elite reportedly misappropriated as much as $1 billion of international assistance during the first four years of peace.70 Politically, it strengthened the power of the very nationalist groups who are least interested in achieving interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia. While peacebuilding agencies have made some strides in building public-sector institutions to govern the market economy—including the capacity of the central and regional governments in Bosnia to collect revenues, perform audits, and conduct economic forecasts—the fact that these agencies launched a comprehensive economic liberalization program in the underinstitutionalized setting of post-Dayton Bosnia did little to spur economic growth or promote cross-factional reconciliation.71

Attempts by the Bretton Woods institutions to moderate the social costs of structural adjustment in war-shattered states have also been inadequate. In response to criticisms that orthodox adjustment models impose disproportionate costs on the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of transitional states, both the IMF and World Bank have made much-vaunted but essentially minor changes in their lending policies. These initiatives included not only the introduction of “poverty assessments” for each recipient state to evaluate the effects of economic reforms on the poor, but also support for “social investment funds” in a number of countries undergoing economic adjustment. Many of these funds mirrored Bolivia’s Emergency Social Fund, which was established in 1986 in response to the economic and social turmoil that accompanied structural adjustment reforms in that country, and which disbursed money to local projects that sought to “create temporary employment, build social and economic infrastructure, and provide basic social services to low-income populations.”72 Among the countries that subsequently introduced similar social funds are Brazil, Chad, Chilé, Ghana, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Uganda, Uruguay, and Zambia, as well as El Salvador and Nicaragua.73

Some commentators argue that these funds have helped to “dull the pain” of economic adjustment by providing temporary assistance to vulnerable populations,74 but there is also widespread agreement that they have had little or no discernible impact on overall rates of poverty or distributional inequality.75 In fact, one of the World Bank vice presidents, Shavid Burki, acknowledged in 1996 that the Bank’s efforts to minimize the ill effects of adjustment, including the social investment funds, had largely failed.76 With the possible exception of the Chilean program, which was “big enough to reverse the regressive impact of recession and adjustment on the income of the poor,”77 most social investment funds have lacked the financial backing necessary to make substantial headway against the poverty problem in states undergoing economic adjustment.78 In the period 1988–1993, for example, the World Bank committed $4 billion for adjustment programs, while programs aimed at moderating the ill effects of adjustment received only $141 million.79 The government of Denmark concluded in 1995 that social investment funds have been “of little financial significance compared to the overall magnitude of adjustment lending.”80
It should be noted, however, that this state of affairs reflects the broader priorities of the international financial institutions: Social investment funds do not impel developing country governments to “get the fundamentals right” or to open their economies to market forces, and are therefore viewed as peripheral to the adjustment process. The only long-term solution to poverty and distributional inequality, both the IMF and World Bank argue, is sustained economic growth; and efforts to alleviate poverty in the short run, no matter how well intended, risk diverting resources from the adjustment process and perpetuating inefficiencies.

The Bretton Woods institutions have also been criticized, more specifically, for treating war-shattered states as any other transitional countries, rather than as special cases that require policies specifically designed to moderate, not exacerbate, societal tensions. Both agencies responded in the late 1990s and early 2000s by devising a new set of lending principles for postconflict countries and by pledging to disburse emergency funds to such countries in an expedited manner. The Bank’s new goals were to “jump-start” the economy through investment in key productive sectors; to support the reconstruction of governmental institutions, the rule of law, physical infrastructure, and basic social welfare programs; and to facilitate the demobilization of combatants and the removal of land mines. The IMF’s revised goals were more limited: to help war-shattered states cope with urgent macroeconomic imbalances and to assist in rebuilding “the administrative and institutional capacity required to put a comprehensive economic program in place.” How these policy statements will ultimately be implemented, and whether they will lead to substantive changes in lending practices for war-shattered states, remain to be seen. But the apparent willingness of the Bretton Woods institutions to place a high priority on institutional reconstruction in countries just emerging from civil conflicts is a welcome development.

Ideally, comprehensive economic liberalization should be delayed while the governmental and legal frameworks needed to regulate a market economy are being established. Moreover, economic reforms should generally be implemented in a gradual and phased manner, rather than all at once in the orthodox “shock therapy” style, which tends to be politically destabilizing. Schedules for achieving fiscal balance and low rates of inflation should also be extended in order to reduce pressures on social spending and the funding of rehabilitation projects during the fragile period immediately following the termination of hostilities.

Finally, international donors should be more responsive to the fact that economic reforms that worsen income inequalities can work against the consolidation of peace in countries with a history of civil violence arising from distributional grievances. Contrary to the assertions of IMF and World Bank officials, doing more to promote income equity in such countries need not involve a trade-off with economic growth: Several recent econometric studies have concluded that societies with more equitable distributions of income tend to experience higher levels of economic growth over the long term. Even if greater emphasis on distributional issues did ultimately reduce the rate of economic growth, this trade-off would still be sensible if it diminished the risk of renewed civil war. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, a strong relationship exists between the distribution of wealth and the stability of democratic regimes: Democracies with higher levels of income equality tend to be more stable than democracies with lower levels of income equality, independent of their level of economic development.

At bottom, managing this problem in the context of peacebuilding requires reordering funding priorities and redirecting some donor resources away from traditional adjustment projects in order to provide much expanded support to such redistributive programs as the aforementioned safety net funds, along with public education and health-care services, startup money for “microenterprises” and other job-creation programs in poorer communities, and perhaps even temporary price controls for food staples. Whatever specific devices are selected, they should be part of a more serious effort to moderate the polarizing effects of market-oriented adjustment on the income distribution of war-shattered states, particularly those in which distributional inequities have fueled violent con-
conflict in the past. Attempts to effect such changes in the Guatemala operation represented a step in the right direction but were incomplete, as we have already noted.

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**SIX ECONOMIC SCHOOLS**

Johan Galtung


2.1 Defining Schools

Regardless of skepticism where mainstream economics is concerned, there is no denial that the economy, the organization of nature—production—consumption cycles, plays a major role in any society. On the other hand, the same can also be said about the polity, the organization of power; about culture, because culture plays a major role defining what to produce and consume, and how; and the military, the organization of coercive power. The basic thesis of this chapter is that economies around the world are organized with certain logic, according to economic schools. To explore those schools we need discourses, angles under which the schools can be viewed and their basic characteristics better understood. Here we shall make use of the economic cycle, and the underlying culture.

The economic cycle will be seen as inputs, throughputs, outputs, and distribution. We are talking about production of goods and services (bads and disservices). In order to produce, inputs are needed, factors of production. A set of five will be used: nature, labour capital, technology, and management. The production function is \( Pr = Pr(\text{Na}, \text{La}, \text{Ca}, \text{Te}, \text{Ma}) \), where \( Pr \) is the output of products. To arrive at products, relations of production, or organization, are needed. The word ‘throughput’ is clumsy, but relates inputs to outputs. The products then go to distribution. They can be used as inputs to new production, for storage, or end consumption, meaning that nothing remains but waste handed back to nature. The point of departure and point of arrival, the alpha and omega of the economic cycle, a stock to be replenished through recycling processes, not depleted.

The culture is like the soil, providing nutrients for some economic plants/weeds rather than others. We are concerned with some particular choices made in and by culture:

- individualism vs. collectivism
- verticality vs. horizontality
- monetization vs. specificity
- processing vs. ‘naturality’
- expansion vs. stability

‘Individualism’ privileges and highlights the individual; under ‘collectivism’ the collectivity, groups, clans, tribes, nations, is privileged and the individual recedes into the background. The net is highlighted, not the knots.

‘Verticality’ is a predisposition for hierarchy, for a clear ordering in high and low.

‘Horizontality’ is a predisposition for having things, of whatever kind, at the same level.

‘Monetization’ is putting monetary value on something, anything, everything; thereby generalizing and abstracting. The opposite of monetization is specificity, keeping the singular and concrete character of something, anything, everything.
‘Processing’ is to do something to the ‘natural’, imprinting the natural with form, or culture. This concept would include pedagogy or education in general, imprinting the human brain with information. The opposite would be the state of nature, here referred to as ‘naturity’. The French terms le cru and le cuit cover the same dimension, from pure nature to pure culture.

‘Expansion’ is a predisposition for augmenting everything. The opposite is ‘stability’; contraction being unthinkable.

At the end we shall add nature. Its negation is nothingness.

Let us now use this to say something about the economic system that can be used as a point of reference for discussing all of them: Smithian economics, named after Adam Smith. As with any economy the concern is with how to turn inputs into outputs and then distribute them. The hypothesis would be that the cultural profile of Smithian economics is individualism—verticality—monetization—processing—expansion. The term ‘capitalism’ captures only monetization, so ‘Smithism’ is preferred. Smith’s intellectual agenda was clearly inspired by an effort to be positivist/scientific in the tradition of Galileo and Newton, Machiavelli, Vico, Hobbes, peeling off layers of sentimentality and moralism, coming down to ‘the natural’:

An inquiry into the nature of man, seen basically as steered by self-interest, but tempered by moral sentiments.

An inquiry into the natural economic system where everybody acts according to self-interest.

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations based on practicing the natural economic system.

The Invisible Hand: ‘By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it’ (this follows from the three).

Given this, the cultural/structural components of Smith’s intellectual construction follow. Thus, there has to be:

A1: Individualism, as only individuals can act in their own self-interest. The firm and the country are then seen as macro-individuals, which predisposes for a single person at the top of both. The country is a set of individuals, the world a set of countries. The perspective is actor-, not structure-oriented.

A2: Private property presupposes a division of the world into two sets: free actors and private property, with a one— one ownership relation between free actors and private properties.

A3: Freedom in the limited economic sense becomes the right to have private property, and to use private property to make more private property. The basic role of the state follows from this: police for protection of the property of individuals and firms; military for protection (and expansion) of the property of societies; adjudication for disputes among actors.

A4: Market for free actors to articulate buyer demand and seller supply; for willing buyers and sellers, including producers and consumers, to meet and make deals.

B1: Division of labor at individual and societal levels, with different tasks for different individuals and societies.

B3: Competition, for better market deals as buyers or sellers, be they individuals (households), firms or countries.

C: Monetization, of everything in a production function, factors as well as products: prices for products, rent for land (nature); wages for labor; interest for liquid capital; returns for fixed capital; sales value for patents and overall ownership.

D: Processing (manufacturing), imprinting culture and information on raw nature and raw human beings.

E: Expansion (growth) of which there are several types:
   • In quality at least increasing variety, choice of products
   • In quantity, increasing volumes of products
   • In domain, with economic cycles spanning larger territories
   • In scope, with increasing differentiation of inputs and outputs.

The components are listed as ‘syndromes’, A, B, C, D, E.

The A-syndrome of individualism assumes the individual to be the fundamental actor not only endowed with self-interests, but capable of acting accordingly. Two other actors, the firm and the country (society, state) are seen in an anthropomorphic perspective. The image is weak on structural relations except for the market relations of deals between buyers and sellers. A condition for market behavior is property; in the ideal world according to this image, all individuals own something and all somethings are owned. Collective ownership does not exist, res communis = res nullius (what belongs to everybody belongs to nobody: Roman Law). The right to own and to use property to make more is basic, and is here referred to as freedom.

In the B-syndrome of verticality the point of departure is division of labor which makes rank of the position (‘job’) the successor of rank by status (‘birth’). Differential reward is one major mechanism behind the ranking or verticality, justified by differential risk-taking. Competitive market behavior, then, opens for the possibility of mobility upward, and downward.

In the C-, D-, F-syndromes money, processing, and expansion enter, closely related to each other. The result is monetized economic cycles with high levels of processing of inputs (a chip manufacturer, a university), to be repeated, and to be expanded. Ideally, supply meets demand; the prices paid meet the wages to be paid. The goal is to make the cycle at least self-sustaining.

2.2 The Blue School: Market and Capital

Smithism is the basis for the Mother of Schools, the ‘Blue School’. There were predecessors (mercantilists, physiocrats, medieval economics, the Roman Empire, pre-historic, non-Western). But for the past 200 years this school, still dominant, served as an anchoring point for theory and practice.

In this scheme the logic of the Blue (Smithian, capitalist) system rests on 24 feet (with several toes for most). Horizontal readings are better for a total understanding of the system; vertical readings better for more limited economic understanding. The ‘individualism’ expresses itself as ownership because of the underlying assumption of dominio from Roman law. Both factors and relations of production can be owned, controlled. That ownership applies to all factors. Slavery—the ownership of human labor and marketing (at a factor market) of slaves—is entirely within the logic of the Blue school. Abolition is an anomaly, and was, indeed, very strongly resisted. Anti-slavery campaigns can also be explained in terms of Blue logic by looking further down the column of factors for another key variable: factor (including labor) mobility. With a labor rather than slave market there is the additional advantage that workers themselves often pay the costs of moving from
one production site to the other. And African labor could also be used in situ—meaning on plantations in Africa with less mobile factor markets.

‘Individualism’ also appears in the products designed for individual consumption, seen, for instance, in the ratio between cars and buses produced. And then there is the market, the highly competitive, non-lethal, economic battlefield where individuals and macro-individuals (firms, countries) can display their mettle. Sellers struggle for the best sale and buyers for the best buy, in competitive relations. Sellers meet buyers, negotiate, and when they have become ‘willing’ sellers and ‘willing’ buyers they clinch the deal—in this logic like an act of love, events of beauty illuminating the universe.

‘Verticality’ is above all the enactment of the prerogatives of the owner under private ownership (or control). Owners can have control of factors (including the capital they generate themselves, the surplus); of the working conditions inside the organization; of the quality and quantity of the products, including stratifying them for a stratified society; and of the marketing, deciding or at least influencing consumer tastes through a very interesting feature of the Blue school: one-way advertising in the media (including posters and labels) with little or no chance of contradicting or questioning.10

One consequence of this arrangement is that owners (in the broad sense), and particularly first or early generation owners, the entrepreneurs, assume the role as problem-solvers to the extent that they obtain a de-facto challenge monopoly. Problems enter the system; the solution is clouded in uncertainty. A decision removes that uncertainty, decreasing the entropy. But that act requires an input of energy, taken from the problem-solver. In return, he gets an inner spin off, training in problem-solving, ‘experience.’

Another aspect of the verticality is exploitation or inequity. Four types are mentioned: unequal exchange between a center where the factors are processed and a periphery where they are fetched; unequal exchange between those who define and solve problems (challenges) and those who work according to SOPs (‘standard operating procedures’)11 unequal exchange in trade, which may coincide with the first type, and unequal exchange between generations depriving the latter of factors. Center and Periphery emerge as two aspects of the Blue system.12

‘Monetization’ is more than prices on factors and products. The implication that everything priced is up for sale,13 on the market makes everything comparable—so that everything can be traded for everything, including ‘traded off’ for everything. If rationality is defined as acting according to self-interest, maximizing net gains across a range of market activity and over time, then monetization makes that possible. At the same time the variable, price, is quantitative, facilitating construction of mathematical edifices that mirror the logic of the school.14

‘Processing’, imprinting Culture, C, on Nature, N, and increasing C/N, has implications all over. The organization, the firm, has to mirror higher processing by having increasing numbers of increasingly processed people inside, meaning R&D specialists. Products have to become increasingly sophisticated. Moreover, the market has to reflect the trend with increasingly complex transactions of increasingly complex products, meaning increasing transaction costs,15 meaning squeezing out the lesser and more peripheral actors (individuals, firms, countries).16

‘Expansion’ shows up in all four fields: increasing variety and volume of products and transactions, economic cycles spanning ever-larger territories (soon to become extra-terrestrial), and with ever-expanding and increasingly differentiated economic organizations. One mechanism is factor mobility and then factor equilibration upwards to arrive at a balanced mix of inputs; no excesses, no deficits.17 Expansion, with no built-in stop sign.

Finally, ‘Nature’, including humans when exposed to boring, degrading, dirty, dangerous work. The great loser, depleted and polluted in an economic process that has become a goal in itself.
About the Blue school and system libraries have been written. The ability to market an incredible volume of an equally incredible variety of products all over is clear, and a rather major achievement. But there are also well-known problems.

The system works as long as it works, meaning that products supplied to the market generate enough demand to pay for the factors, thereby keeping the cycle growing, or at least going. Whether because factor prices are too high or product prices too low, there is a limit to how much deficit an individual, a firm or a country can accumulate, unless they can draw on sufficient subventions from the outside to weather a crisis. In the Blue system, that type of assistance is based on credit-worthiness in the finance economy. In the Red system, the real economy has the whole state to fall back upon, and in the Yellow system in Japan, individuals or firms may draw on the resources of interconnecting webs of state and capital. There are similar life-prolonging institutions in the world for countries accumulating deficits.

Overproduction is a special and deeper case affecting all, or many, firms producing in a branch of the economy—or, more seriously, all or many firms regardless of branch in a country. There is excess production capacity, or under consumption, meaning effective demand, including for storage. Excess products are then returned to nature directly through destruction instead of via consumers. Excess production capacity has to be eliminated. Not only the firm but the branch has been out competed; not only the branch but the whole country. What follows is massive contraction, even deterioration, of the economic system.

2.3 The Red School: State and Power

This crisis of the Blue system is the point of departure for the Red School. Whereas the Blue system is based on Smithism, the Red system is not based on Marxism, which is essentially a brilliant analysis and critique of the Blue school. The attraction of Smithism lies with its constructive genius, absent in Marxism. The Red socialist school developed by improvisation, challenging Blue assumptions on crucial points.

The Red system can be defined as a weak negation of the Blue. Both are based on alpha structures, vast, peaked hierarchies, run by big corporations, many of them transnational for Blue, and vast bureaucracies, a few of them international, for Red. In both, very few people make decisions affecting very many. But in Blue there is feedback: people have choices in the market, and the choices reveal preferences. To survive in Blue, popular preferences either have to be manipulated or followed; in either case they have to be taken into account. In the best-known Red system, the failed socialist system in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, state power was so absolute that the leaders were not forced to take popular preferences into account. They could offer a supply on a 'take it or leave it' basis. However, our thinking about Red should not be tied to the history of Russia/Soviet Union/Eastern Europe from 1917, 1922 or 1945-48 till the end of 1989. The category is much broader.

Since so much in Red is similar to Blue let us focus on the major negations.

1. State ownership, at least in the sense of control, of the whole cycle—meaning nature (resources), labor (controlled through employment and residence permits), capital (except for capital for household consumption), technology and management; in addition to that, the concrete facilities for production (except for the collectively owned, but state supervised) and the distribution mechanisms (communication, transportation). This massive ownership does not mean that all was owned by the same agency: the multiplication of ministries under Soviet socialism was an effort to parallel the branches of a Blue economy.

2. Planned economy, planning production, distribution, and consumption, there being no official alternative for consumers. Like the God of religion, this secular God was omnipresent (the party); omniscient ('scientific socialism'); omnipotent (the powers of
the state, l’état gendarme, in the Soviet Union, the KGB and the Army); and benevolent
(Pit at providence covers the idea perfectly). Certainly one-way communication of prop-
aganda.

3. First priority: production for basic needs. There should be a floor level in basic-needs
fulfillment, with some efforts to establish a ceiling (number of houses, for instance). The
Red production profile should be higher on food, clothing and housing, facilities (for
health and education); and offer more products for collective consumption (the car:bus
ratio again; or private house:apartment construction). Like profit for the Blue economy,
plan fulfillment easily becomes an end in itself.

4. Full employment as an end in itself. Although high labor productivity is a desirable
goal of the Red economy,\(^2\) it’s not a basis for dismissing workers since full employment,
meaning that everybody has a job even if work performance is perfunctory, is an even
higher goal. Many workers interpret the Red system as being soft on workers, demand-
ing little work.

5. Limited monetization. The state controls the production in the Red system. Factors
are not for sale. Workers cannot sell their labor power to whomever they want, nor can
land be sold. A manager has a fixed salary. Basic needs products are inexpensive, although
scarcity may make for long waiting lines. Low level monetization limits the finance econ-
omy, making it a biased and diminished monetary image of the real economy.\(^2\) All these
five are efforts to negate the Blue system. But the sharp division of labor between those
in command and those commanded is even more pronounced, inviting power struggle. The
Blue system can decentralize initiative and control. Businesses can grow many places, they
may be squeezed out or remain small, but some experience is gained. Up to some point
originality and innovation are rewarded. In the Red system the country’s economy is one
company, too big for complete information, too connected for real change. And rulers on
top are unlikely to take risks.\(^2\)

The Red rulers have even more of a challenge monopoly than in the Blue system. And the
workers cannot use trade unions to improve their terms of exchange (between work and
working conditions, including wages) if the trade unions are run by the same state that
dictates working conditions. Any new economic activity anywhere in a system of that kind
is not a new center but at most a sub-center, receiving its directives from above.

With no competition it is difficult to mobilize sufficient motivation to increase QIP or
C/N, Q/P may be very high because of subsidized prices. But with no or little consumer
choice and producer competition, the best way of getting new ideas is to look at (or spy
at) other economies—in fact, an admission that the system is incapable of generating
its own dynamism.

For the Red system the sentence it ‘works as long as it works’ does not apply. The sys-
tem is doomed from the very beginning, for reasons to be made more clear in the next
chapter. The system self-destructs by expanding at a low level of consumer satisfaction,
with no stop signs, depleting and polluting all over.\(^2\)

2.4 The Green School: Civil Society and Dialogue

If the Red school is a weak negation of the Blue, the Green school is a strong negation.
Based on local economic cycles and Civil Society,\(^2\) the system has neither national mar-
kets nor national plans, and not transnational or international versions either. The basic
idea is local self-reliance, even self-sufficiency, meaning local consumption of what is
produced and local production of what is consumed. Clearly, the Green system is based
on beta structures: small, more horizontal, keeping people together, not segmented in
small tasks, or fragmented in different roles. Instead, there is job integration, job rota-
tion, and job reconstruction.\(^2\) Concretely, this means small economic organizations—
say, no more than 30 persons—so that everybody can be relevant to everybody, and hier-
archies do not arise. This also opens the possibility of expanding households, from the
four-person nuclear family of today to the extended family, or to the ‘commune’ with which many in the West have had recent experiences. In the latter a-, hetro-, homo- and bi-sexual relations might well coexist.

Commune-ism should not be confused with communism. The basic goal of the Green economy is not material economic growth, whether achieved by Blue or Red methods, but nature development (enhancing nature, not only keeping nature sustainable); human development, which means not only somatic health but also mental and spiritual development; social development, which would point to societies compatible with nature and human development; and world development, which means a world setting where diverse societies can interact symbiotically and enhance each other. This is a tall order, but typical of Green thinking, with Gandhi’s sarvodaya villages and ‘oceanic circles’ as models.

Production for profit or plan fulfillment are not goals in themselves. The typical production unit would be a self-managed cooperative with dialogue and co-decision of everyone involved, including customers. Although production is basically for use, not exchange, relations to trade partners would be cooperative. And harmonious relations with nature would be a sine qua non.

The most fundamental aspect of the Green School can now be mentioned and explored: there are four stop signs—these were missing both in the Blue and Red schools. At the same time, these indicate promises and limitations, or at least problems, of the Green school.

1. Production for needs not for greed. Of course, there is a zone between basic needs satisfaction and greed; the question is where greed starts. The last twenty years have not clarified this issue except as general admonitions, probably in vain, for the rich and super-rich to change their lifestyle.

2. Organizations of human scale. The idea is to change all organizations, not only the economic ones, so that people feel comfortable and at home in them. This implies a maximum size, and possibly also a minimum size as people work also to meet other people, getting out of the narrowness of the family and small villages. This does not mean reduction of production volume, as smaller organizations may also be much more productive.

3. Production for replacement. This is a clear norm against simply continuing with thoughtless expansionism. What happens if replacement of products is already too much, like replacement of the human population? In other words, there has to be much dialogue about the level that should be replaced.

4. Local market as primary focus. Any local market is limited. If the first priority is to meet local demands, not aiming for national and world markets, but trying to turn the trend from local to world economies, then production would be limited.

5. The carrying capacity of the planet. The Green school as such has asked the question; the Blue and Pink schools are now doing the same. As a result, a world dialogue is today evolving.

2.5 The Pink School: Blue, Red, and Green

The reader is now invited to place the three schemes on top of each other, trying to derive from that an economic theory and an economic practice. That exercise will not be carried out here. Obviously, we are talking about the social democratic economies of the high North of the Americas and Europe—Canada and the Nordic countries. The economic practice can certainly be described, as it has often been, as a mixed economy or a negotiation economy, the former term pointing to its eclectic nature, the latter to a major mechanism: elite dialogues between the private (market) and public (state) sectors.
But in that short formula, what is missing is the Green element of small scale, cooperatives, human equality, respect for nature and also a certain (non specified) spiritual development. That Green element has probably survived partly because these countries are far away from the major arenas of economic, political, military, and cultural action, and partly because they are small societies compared to such Blue/Red giants as the USA and the former Soviet Union. The Pink economy is here seen as being located at the intersection of all three. It is mixed—but is it also mixed-up, too contradictory? On the other hand: what does not work in theory may work in practice.

The formula Pink = Light Blue + Light Red + Light Green might be useful. A basic idea is to avoid the extremes: of all actors craving for capital and things, of states exercising power to discipline people, and of withdrawal into isolated and static communes. The three schools can be used by Pink to modify each other, playing on the diversity, seeking to build symbiosis.

2.6 The Yellow School: Blue and Red

What we have in mind here is the economic system currently attracting most attention in the world: the economic practice of Japan and other countries in East Asia, China, and the mini-Japans/Chinas: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The reader is now invited to a simpler exercise: putting Blue and Red on top of each other. The Yellow School differs from the Pink in not having the Green element of localism and small scale as a modifying factor. Two alpha structures are combined, Market and State, Capital and Power. What is very strong is the sum of these two, working in harmony, not only unimpeded by the Green but unimpeded by each other. In one simple formula that is the secret of the phenomenal growth of Japan yesterday. China today and tomorrow, the others all the time, more or less).

How can Blue and Red work together if each is the negation of the other? Only if the culture permits contradictions, not only in theory but also in practice, demands hard work and dedication, and the structure produces elites capable of cooperation. The state can then plan optimal conditions for the market to function, with incentives here and disincentives there, using capital as power—not the vulgar force of Red as still practiced in the Chinese version of Yellow. Plan for need, and market for greed—these do not exclude each other.

But nor do the more negative aspects listed under ‘verticality’, ‘expansion’, and ‘nature’. One theory might be that if the positive forces add up, so do the negative. This, however, will be developed further in the next chapter.

2.7 The Eclectic School: Green, Pink, and Yellow

The intellectual strategy of this chapter should be clear: Blue, Red, and Green are the building blocks. All three have a certain purity and theoretical coherence, and that is exactly what makes them problematic. They are vulnerable. The world market collapses—and an export—import dependent Blue economy is helpless, with no strong state or self-reliant local level to fall back upon. That state, in a Red economy, suffers the inevitable: popular support, or discipline, collapses and there is no mature market or local economy to fall back upon. The Pink school sees this and derives strength from combining all three; if one fails, there are always the other two. The Yellow school also ‘walks on two legs’, to use the Chinese formulation. Both are vulnerable, but they are hardly likely to collapse together.

The Eclectic, or ‘Rainbow’, school indicated here and developed more fully in Chapter 4 below goes one step further, combining Green, Pink, and Yellow. With more and highly diverse components in symbiotic interaction, the economy should become more resilient. If the most vulnerable systems are Blue and Red, then they should not be used directly—only indirectly through other combinations, as building blocks. Never Market, State or
Local alone; combine them for resilience and for synergy. This is the famous ‘more than the sum of the parts’.

Blue is represented by the USA; Red by the former Soviet Union; Green by parts of the Third World, most of human history and in this century by ideologies/ experiments gradually taking shape; Pink by Nordic and EU countries (not UK); and Yellow by East Asia. But Eclectic has no clear representative—a challenge indeed!

The Eclectic, pantheistic/polytheistic, school includes the main diagonal of the diagram—Green—Pink—Yellow. The Blue and the Red, trusting in one god only (market or plan), are too vulnerable alone; this also applies to the pantheist Green. The concrete geographical references are only indicative and should not be taken too literally. Any concrete economy will always have some elements of the non-dominant colors, like Red for the US military sector and Blue, Red, or Pink in the center of Third World economies.

**INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS**

UN Millennium Project
Excerpted from Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals: Overview (New York, United Nations Development Programme, 2005)

We have the opportunity in the coming decade to cut world poverty by half. Billions more people could enjoy the fruits of the global economy. Tens of millions of lives can be saved. The practical solutions exist. The political framework is established. And for the first time, the cost is utterly affordable. Whatever one’s motivation for attacking the crisis of extreme poverty—human rights, religious values, security, fiscal prudence, ideology—the solutions are the same. All that is needed is action.

This report recommends the way forward. It outlines a way to attain this bold ambition. It describes how to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world’s time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensions—income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion—while promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights—the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter, and security as pledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Millennium Declaration.

How will the world look in 2015 if the Goals are achieved? More than 500 million people will be lifted out of extreme poverty. More than 300 million will no longer suffer from hunger. There will also be dramatic progress in child health. Rather than die before reaching their fifth birthdays, 30 million children will be saved. So will the lives of more than 2 million mothers.

There’s more. Achieving the Goals will mean 350 million fewer people are without safe drinking water and 650 million fewer people live without the benefits of basic sanitation, allowing them to lead healthier and more dignified lives. Hundreds of millions more women and girls will go to school, access economic and political opportunity, and have greater security and safety. Behind these large numbers are the lives and hopes of people seeking new opportunities to end the burden of grinding poverty and contribute to economic growth and renewal.

Many countries are on track to achieve at least some of the Goals by the appointed year, 2015. Yet broad regions are far off track. Sub-Saharan Africa, most dramatically, has been
in a downward spiral of AIDS, resurgent malaria, falling food output per person, deteriorating shelter conditions, and environmental degradation, so that most countries in Africa are far off track to achieve most or all of the Goals. Climate change could worsen the situation by increasing food insecurity, spreading vector-borne diseases, and increasing the likelihood of natural disasters, while a prolonged decline in rainfall in parts of Africa has already wreaked havoc. Meanwhile, for some Goals, such as reducing maternal mortality and reversing the loss of environmental resources, most of the world is off track. The early target for gender parity in primary and secondary education—with a deadline of 2005—will be missed in many countries.

The Millennium Development Goals are too important to fail. It is time to put them on the fast-track they require and deserve. The year 2005 should inaugurate a decade of bold action. Based on work conducted by more than 250 of the world’s leading development practitioners over the past two years in the context of the UN Millennium Project, this report presents a practical plan for achieving the Goals. Throughout, we stress that the specific technologies for achieving the Goals are known. What is needed is to apply them at scale. To that end, we present 10 key recommendations at the front of the report. More elaborate analysis and recommendations are set out in the 13 thematically oriented task force reports that underpin this plan.

This overview has four parts. The first describes why the Millennium Development Goals are important and the varied progress so far in achieving them. It then offers a diagnosis of why progress has been so mixed across regions and across Goals. The second presents the recommendations to be implemented at the country level, focusing on the processes, investments, policies, and scale-up strategies required to achieve the Goals. The third provides recommendations to guide the international system’s support for country-level processes. The fourth estimates the costs and benefits of achieving the Goals, outlining the millions of lives that could be saved—and the billions of lives improved—through a very affordable but substantial increase in worldwide investments.

Why the Goals are Important and Why We’re Falling Short

The Millennium Development Goals are the most broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world has ever established, so their importance is manifold. For the international political system, they are the fulcrum on which development policy is based. For the billion-plus people living in extreme poverty, they represent the means to a productive life. For everyone on Earth, they are a linchpin to the quest for a more secure and peaceful world.

The Fulcrum of International Development Policy

At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the largest gathering of world leaders in history adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a global partnership to reduce poverty, improve health, and promote peace, human rights, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. Soon after, world leaders met again at the March 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, establishing a landmark framework for global development partnership in which developed and developing countries agreed to take joint actions for poverty reduction. Later that same year, UN member states gathered at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, where they reaffirmed the Goals as the world’s time-bound development targets.

The Means to a Productive Life

For the billion-plus people still living in extreme poverty, the MDGs are a life-and-death issue. Extreme poverty can be defined as “poverty that kills,” depriving individuals of the means to stay alive in the face of hunger, disease, and environmental hazards. When individuals suffer from extreme poverty and lack the meager income needed even to cover basic needs, a single episode of disease, or a drought, or a pest that destroys a harvest
can be the difference between life and death. In households suffering from extreme poverty, life expectancy is often around half that in the high-income world, 40 years instead of 80. It is common that of every 1,000 children born, more than 100 die before their fifth birthday, compared with fewer than 10 in the high-income world. An infant born in Sub-Saharan Africa today has only a one-third chance of surviving to age 65.

The Goals are ends in themselves, but for these households they are also capital inputs—the means to a productive life, to economic growth, and to further development. A healthier worker is a more productive worker. A better educated worker is a more productive worker. Improved water and sanitation infrastructure raises output per capita through various channels, such as reduced illness. So, many of the Goals are part of capital accumulation, defined broadly, as well as desirable objectives in their own right.

The Goals for hunger and disease are part of human capital. The Goals for water and sanitation and slum dwellers are part of infrastructure. The Goal for environmental sustainability is part of natural capital. The first Goal for income poverty is part of economic growth. And because meeting the Goals for hunger, education, gender equality, environment, and health is vital for overall economic growth and development, it is a mistake to talk simply about the rate of economic growth needed to achieve the Goals in a country. It is more helpful, particularly for the poorest countries caught in economic stagnation, to describe the range and levels of investments needed to achieve the Goals and thus to support overall economic growth.

A Linchpin to Global Security

The Goals not only reflect global justice and human rights—they are also vital to international and national security and stability, as emphasized by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Poor and hungry societies are much more likely than high-income societies to fall into conflict over scarce vital resources, such as watering holes and arable land—and over scarce natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and timber. Many world leaders in recent years have rightly stressed the powerful relationship between poverty reduction and global security. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should therefore be placed centrally in international efforts to end violent conflict, instability, and terrorism. As the High-Level Panel recommends, countries that aspire to global leadership through permanent membership on the UN Security Council have a special responsibility to promote the Goals and to fulfill international commitments to official development assistance and other kinds of support vital for achieving them. We endorse the Panel’s recommended criterion of 0.7 percent of GNP in official donor assistance for developed countries aspiring to permanent membership.

Poverty increases the risks of conflict through multiple paths. Poor countries are more likely to have weak governments, making it easier for would-be rebels to grab land and vital resources. Resource scarcity can provoke population migrations and displacements that result in conflicts between social groups, as in Darfur, Sudan, in the wake of diminishing rainfall. Without productive alternatives, young people may turn to violence for material gain, or feel a sense of hopelessness, despair, and rage. Poor farmers who lack basic infrastructure and access to agricultural markets may turn in desperation to narcotics production and trade, such as growing poppy in Afghanistan or coca in the Andes. Many slums are controlled by gangs of drug traffickers and traders, who create a vicious cycle of insecurity and poverty. The lack of economically viable options other than criminal activity creates the seedbed of instability—and increases the potential for violence.

Research suggests a strong causal impact of poverty and adverse income shocks on the onset of conflict. On average a negative economic growth shock of 5 percentage points increases civil war risks by about 50 percent. And the risk of violent civil conflict declines steadily as national incomes increase. While violent conflicts surely result from a combination of factors, poverty creates conditions for igniting and sustaining conflict. The implications are twofold: investing in development is especially important to reduce the probability of conflict, and development strategies should take into consideration their possible effects on reducing the risk of conflict—or inadvertently increasing it.
Alongside diplomacy and military alliances, one of the main instruments of international relations in the twentieth century has been development aid. While diplomacy and military collaboration are traditional instruments of statecraft, development aid is of relatively recent origin. Although post–World War II Europe and Japan benefited greatly from massive external assistance for economic reconstruction, the origins of development aid are found primarily in the global competition between the western and eastern blocs during the cold war era.

Recognising that socioeconomic disparities between western, industrialised countries and newly emerging states constituted a source of instability as well as an opportunity to win allies against the Soviet Union, western governments created specialised aid agencies and launched economic assistance programmes to support friendly governments. The Soviet Union quickly joined the foreign aid game in a global contest for power and influence. Not surprisingly, the extensive literature on development aid is largely western-centric and generally dismisses Soviet foreign assistance as ideological and self-serving while viewing western aid as development oriented.

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the bipolar aid system of the cold war period. While the drying up of Soviet aid adversely affected the prospects of many Soviet-backed states, it also opened the door for a much-needed readjustment of the international aid system as reflected, for example, in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Meanwhile, the recent emergence of new state donors, including Brazil, China, and India, as well as the rise of private aid organisations, such as the Gates Foundation—some with financial resources exceeding the aid of many donor countries—have significantly changed the aid landscape. In reviewing the readings in this chapter, it is important to remember the recent history as well as the ongoing transformation of development aid in the post–cold war era.

Official financial assistance provided by donor countries is political in nature. Nonetheless, it is important to differentiate between various aid modalities and their evolution over the last sixty years. Humanitarian aid—which aims to alleviate the consequences of natural or man-made disasters—is grounded in international law and humanitarian principles and policies; it is a distinct, short-term response to an immediate crisis. Adhering to the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality in the provision of aid, humanitarian action seeks to avoid the narrow political interests of donors or recipients.

Development aid, however, since its early days, has been political in the choice of recipients, aid allocation patterns, and overall motivation. The development aid industry that took shape during the cold war created its own professional bureaucracy, technical expertise, and specialised programmes. The gradual broadening of the concept of development is largely a product of a growing appreciation of the complexity and multifaceted nature of the problems confronting developing countries and the need to tailor development
assistance accordingly. Indeed, development assistance has evolved from its original narrow focus on economic growth to encompass such diverse areas as environmental sustainability, good governance, human security, poverty alleviation, human rights, and most recently, peace and security.

Despite their underlying political goals, development assistance programmes during the cold war avoided peace and security issues. Conceptually, institutionally, and operationally, there existed a well-constructed separation between security and development. Security was primarily concerned with inter-state relations while development focused on socioeconomic problems within states. In cases involving conflict, development agencies worked ‘in’ or ‘around’ but rarely ‘on’ conflict. As the cold war waned, development assistance became increasingly targeted to focus on ‘good performers’ while politically unstable or conflict-torn countries became ‘aid orphans’. It was only with the end of the cold war that development agencies started to deal with violent conflict as a necessary dimension of development work. They not only designed new areas of programming, such as demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict contexts, they also began to integrate conflict sensitivity into traditional programming.

Reflecting the changing geopolitical environment of the 1990s, development agencies often found themselves in conflict-torn, conflict-prone, or post-conflict countries alongside humanitarian aid agencies, diplomats, mediators, peacekeepers, and peacebuilders. In some cases, natural disasters and violent conflicts became intertwined, creating ‘complex political emergencies’. In such instances, the boundaries between humanitarian relief, development aid, peace, and security assistance disappeared, giving rise to new forms of collaboration and competition among a multitude of actors.

It is in this new, fluid, and continually shifting context that a rich body of research and analysis began to take shape. The new literature not only questions the effectiveness of conventional development assistance, but also challenges the rationale and continued relevance of various forms of aid as well as the role of key actors. The readings by Wafula Okumu (‘Humanitarian International NGOs and African Conflicts’) and Joanna Macrae and her colleagues (‘Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action’) examine the changing face of humanitarian aid and raise compelling questions about the unintended consequences of the emergence of new actors, such as humanitarian international non-governmental organisations in Africa and the serious coordination gaps among the multitude of donors engaged in humanitarian action. Meanwhile, approaching the topic from various perspectives, the readings by Roland Paris (the introduction to At War’s End), Michael Pugh (‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding’), and Jonathan Goodhand (‘Understanding Responses to Conflict’) cast a critical eye on the international peacebuilding aid industry that has mushroomed since the end of the cold war and draw attention to the shortcomings of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. The readings by Michael Clemens (‘Smart Samaritans’) and Carol Lancaster (the introduction and findings to Aid to Africa) present a small but significant sampling of the current debates on whether development aid works in its essentially unchanged form and how it might be reformed.

These readings provide keys to understanding the achievements as well as the limitations of the international aid system as it has evolved in the last sixty years. They also raise important questions about the potential for a significant reform of that system in the post-9/11 international environment as traditional donors employ foreign aid to deal with ‘fragile states’—as reflected in the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—while new donors search for economic advantage in resource-rich countries of Africa. There is little doubt that many African countries will continue to rely heavily on various forms of external development assistance for the foreseeable future even as they strive to rid themselves of aid dependency through economic growth. In the meantime, it is critical that African states and societies become active agents in shaping the role of foreign assistance to gain greater control over their own development and to avoid the negative consequences of aid that are increasingly recognised in the literature.
Introduction

In the early 1990s, a new threat to global security and human welfare caught the attention of political analysts and policymakers around the world, a threat that few observers had anticipated: pervasive and pernicious internal violence. They were right to be concerned. Civil wars (which take place primarily within the borders of a single state and among belligerents who normally reside in that state) accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in the 1990s. From Africa to Central Asia, internecine violence and collapsing states became an unfortunate but familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape.

The nature of the threat posed by these conflicts was both humanitarian and strategic. From a humanitarian standpoint, this violence inflicted appalling losses on civilian non-combatants. At the beginning of the twentieth century, approximately 90 percent of war victims were soldiers; during the 1990s by contrast, an estimated 90 percent of those killed in armed conflicts were civilians. Attacks and atrocities against noncombatants became widely employed as deliberate strategies of warfare—including such tactics as systematic rape, mass executions, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide—prompting some commentators to lament the revival of "premodern" forms of fighting that dispensed with customary constraints on the waging of war. Internal conflicts were also the principal source of mass refugee movements in the 1990s, which often gave rise to further humanitarian emergencies.

In addition, chronic civil unrest represented a threat to regional, and even global, stability. Several internal conflicts spilled over international borders and undermined the security of adjacent states—as the Rwandan conflict did when it spread to neighboring Zaire in the mid-1990s, causing the collapse of the Zaire government and triggering a regional war that continued for the rest of the decade. Even when fighting remained geographically contained, the flight of refugees from war-torn states endangered the political stability of nearby countries—as in the case of Macedonia, which became the reluctant host to millions of refugees from Kosovo in 1999. Terrorist and criminal networks, operating with relative impunity in states riven by civil war, also posed security threats to other countries.

The September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., reportedly perpetrated by a terrorist group based in war-ravaged Afghanistan, dramatically illustrated the danger of allowing civil conflicts to fester. As British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw observed in light of these attacks, ”When we allow governments to fail, warlords, drug barons, or terrorists fill the vacuum. . . . Terrorists are strongest where states are weakest.”

In response to these challenges, the international community experimented with a number of new techniques for managing the problem of civil unrest and state failure. This task fell largely to the United Nations (UN) and several other leading governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which launched a succession of major operations in countries plagued by internal violence. A few of these missions sought to deliver humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations in the midst of ongoing conflicts. Most, however, were deployed in the immediate aftermath of civil wars with the goal of preventing a recurrence of violence. These postconflict missions became known as "peacebuilding" operations.

The aim of peacebuilding, in the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was "to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies”—that is, a peace that would endure long after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves.
Annan’s predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, similarly defined the purpose of peacebuilding as the attempt “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The rationale for this kind of mission was straightforward and compelling: Without effective techniques for preventing the recurrence of violence in war-shattered states, large-scale conflict might resume after the initial termination of hostilities, thereby undermining and squandering international efforts to stop the fighting in the first place. But creating the conditions for a stable and lasting peace in the immediate aftermath of a civil war would not be an easy task, because it entailed much more than just monitoring a cease fire. As both Annan and Boutros-Ghali pointed out, peacebuilding involved identifying and alleviating the underlying sources of conflict within a war-shattered state, which required a thorough understanding of local conditions.

To complicate matters, many states emerging from civil conflicts were teetering on the brink between peace and war, with their inhabitants divided by mutual animosities, resentments, and fears, and with large numbers of readily available weapons and ex-combatants proficient in using them. In addition, conditions of general economic distress, weak or nonexistent governmental institutions, few social services for the needy (including those displaced or dispossessed during the war), and damaged physical infrastructure combined to exacerbate local instability. Yet these volatile conditions were precisely what made postconflict peacebuilding so indispensable. The very fragility of war-shattered states—and the fact that countries with a recent history of civil violence had an almost 50 percent chance of slipping back into violence—created the need.

Postconflict peacebuilding developed into something of a growth industry in the 1990s. The first major operation was deployed to Namibia in 1989; followed by missions to Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991) El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), and Sierra Leone (1999). In total, fourteen major peacebuilding operations were deployed between 1989 and 1999 to territories that had recently experienced civil conflicts. These operations involved a diverse array of international actors performing a wide range of functions—from writing and rewriting national constitutions to drafting criminal laws, organizing and administering elections, tutoring policemen, lawyers, and judges, formulating economic policies, and temporarily taking over the administration of entire territories—all in the hope of establishing the conditions for stable and lasting peace. Some missions, such as the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, attracted close attention from the international news media, while others labored away in relative obscurity. But taken together, these fourteen peacebuilding operations represented the most ambitious and concerted international effort to rehabilitate war-shattered states since the Allied reconstruction of Germany and Japan following World War II. Peacebuilding was nothing less than an enormous experiment in social engineering, aimed at creating the domestic conditions for durable peace within countries just emerging from civil wars.

What principles and assumptions guided this experiment? Which models or theories of conflict management, if any, did international peacebuilders apply in their efforts to rehabilitate war-shattered states? While the literature on peacebuilding has burgeoned since the end of the Cold War, few writers have scrutinized the assumptions that underpin the design and conduct of these operations. Observers have dissected the strengths and weaknesses of many missions, but paid relatively little attention to the conceptual foundations of peacebuilding itself, or the basic premises upon which these operations are based. Such questions are important, however, because they allow us to investigate whether the prevailing approach is, or is not, well suited to the task of consolidating peace in war-shattered states, and whether alternative means might be more appropriate. Given the importance of peacebuilding as a means of managing civil violence in the post-Cold War world and the threats that uncontrolled internal conflicts pose to regional and global security and to human welfare, any opportunity to improve the effectiveness of future operations should be vigorously pursued.
Indeed, there is no sign that the demand for new peacebuilding missions will decline in the coming years. Although this book focuses on postconflict operations launched between 1989 and 1999, the early years of the twenty-first century have already witnessed the deployment of new missions to places such as Afghanistan (2002), Ivory Coast (2003), and Liberia (2003)—and at this writing, the United States is seeking to rebuild Iraq, a country that it occupied in the late spring of 2003. This volume does not investigate these latter operations, not only because they were launched after 1999, the cutoff date for this study, but also because the Afghanistan and Iraq missions followed foreign invasions of these countries. The challenges of peacebuilding after foreign conquest are quite different from those in post-civil war missions, particularly when the peacebuilders are the conquering powers themselves. So while it is essential to apply the lessons of the 1990s to new and future operations, this book focuses on a particular category of peacebuilding missions—those deployed in the aftermath of internal wars—and the lessons of these missions do not apply automatically, or directly, to other types of operations.

The Argument of This Book

My thesis is straightforward. Peacebuilding missions in the 1990s were guided by a generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict management: the notion that promoting “liberalization” in countries that had recently experienced civil war would help to create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. In the political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. In the economic realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement toward a market-oriented economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic interests. Although the fourteen peacebuilding operations launched between 1989 and 1999 varied in many respects, their most striking similarity is that they all sought to transform war-shattered states into “liberal market democracies” as quickly as possible.

Underlying the design and practice of these operations was the hope and expectation that democratization would shift societal conflicts away from the battlefield and into the peaceful arena of electoral politics, thereby replacing the breaking of heads with the counting of heads; and that marketization would promote sustainable economic growth, which would also help to reduce tensions. Peacebuilding, in this sense, was a specific kind of social engineering, based on a particular set of assumptions about how best to establish durable domestic peace.

However, this approach turned out to be more problematic than anticipated. If the test of “successful” peacebuilding is simply whether large-scale conflict resumed in the aftermath of a peacebuilding mission, then most of the operations conducted in the 1990s were successful, because in all but three cases (Angola, Rwanda, and Liberia), large-scale hostilities have not resumed. But if we use instead the standard of success articulated by Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali—namely, the establishment of a “sustainable” peace, or a peace that will endure long after the peacebuilders depart from the country—then the picture becomes less favorable. As we shall see, international efforts to transform war-shattered states have, in a number of cases, inadvertently exacerbated societal tensions or reproduced conditions that historically fueled violence in these countries. The very strategy that peacebuilders have employed to consolidate peace—political and economic liberalization—seems, paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence in several of these states.

Peacebuilders apparently believed that democratization and marketization would foster domestic peace; and, as it happens, there is a large body of empirical scholarship that partially supports this belief. Students of the “liberal peace thesis,” from John Locke...
to the present day, have argued that liberally constituted states tend to be more peace-ful both domestically and in their dealings with other countries, and recent evidence has shown that well-established market democracies are, indeed, less subject to internal vio-lence than other types of states. But it also appears that the transition from civil con-flict to a well-established market democracy is full of pitfalls: Promoting democratiza-tion and marketization has the potential to stimulate higher levels of societal competition at the very moment (immediately following the conflict) when states are least equipped to contain such tensions within peaceful bounds. Peacebuilders in the 1990s seemed to underestimate the destabilizing effects of the liberalization process in the fragile circumstances of countries just emerging from civil wars. Their desire to turn war-torn states into stable market democracies was not the problem; rather, the methods they used to effect this change, including their failure to anticipate and fore-stall the destabilizing effects of liberalization, proved to be the Achilles’ heel of peace-building.

I call the belief that democratization and marketization will foster peace in war-shattered states “Wilsonianism”—after Woodrow Wilson, the twenty-eighth president of the United States, who believed that liberalism was the key to peace and security in both interna-tional and domestic politics. Democracy, he wrote, promotes the “ascendancy of reason over passion” and promises “the supreme and peaceful rule of counsel,” or rational debate, which is a recipe for “peace and progress” in political life. Drawing on these ideas, Wilson insisted that the only way to establish a durable peace in Europe after the First World War was to emancipate the various nationalities that lived under authoritarian rule and to open the conduct of international relations to public scrutiny. Until the national-ities, or “peoples,” of Eastern and Central Europe were permitted to exercise their right to self-government, he argued, unrequited grievances would continue to foment new con-flicts. Any attempt to build peace that did not “recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed” was bound to fail. Only a peace “planted on the tested foundations of political liberty” would be likely to endure.

Peacebuilding missions in the 1990s reproduced Wilson’s faith in the peace-producing powers of liberalization. This faith proved to be overly optimistic in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I, where tensions remained and fighting resumed, and also seems to be an overly optimistic formula for peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. The purpose of this book, however, is not to reject the Wilsonian peacebuilding strategy in its entirety, but to expose the weaknesses of the naive version of Wilsonianism that informed the missions of the 1990s. Indeed, I shall argue that peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of converting war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, because well-established liberal market democracies tend to be peaceful in both their domestic affairs and their relations with other states. The challenge, however, is to devise meth-ods of achieving this Wilsonian goal without endangering the very peace that the liberal-ization process is supposed to consolidate. To this end, I shall propose a new peace-building strategy called “Institutionalization Before Liberalization,” which begins from the premise that democratization and marketization are inherently tumultuous transfor-mations that have the potential to undermine a fragile peace.

The new strategy would seek to minimize the destabilizing effects of liberalization in sev-eral ways. First, peacebuilders should delay the introduction of democratic and market-orien-ted reforms until a rudimentary network of domestic institutions, capable of manag-ing the strains of liberalization, have been established. Second, once these institutions are in place, peacebuilders should manage the democratization and marketization process as a series of incremental and deliberate steps, rather than immediately unleashing politi-cal and economic competition. The strategy contains many other elements, but its core prin-ciple is this: What is needed in the immediate postconflict period is not quick elections, democratic ferment, or economic “shock therapy” but a more controlled and gradual approach to liberalization, combined with the immediate building of governmental insti-tutions that can manage these political and economic reforms.
Institutionalization Before Liberalization may, at first glance, seem more costly and time-consuming than the “quick and dirty” approach to liberalization that predominated in the 1990s. However, the potentially higher expense and longer duration of such operations must be weighed against the costs, both in human lives and material resources, that would follow a recurrence of large-scale violence. This strategy may also appear to be contrary to the goal of promoting market democracy, because it calls upon peace-builders to delay the liberalization of political and economic life during the first, fragile period of postwar reconstruction. The objective of this approach, however, is ultimately to achieve more successful transitions to market democracy in countries that are vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of rapid liberalization, and thus to establish a more durable peace. If, as I argue, pervasive civil conflict poses one of the principal threats to human welfare and global security in the post-Cold War era, and the prevailing approach to peacebuilding is flawed, then new policies for more effective peacebuilding are warranted.

Bridging Theory and Practice

The book speaks simultaneously to scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding, and to others interested in the challenges of managing civil violence. The central finding—that implementing liberalization too quickly and in the absence of effective institutions can counteract efforts to consolidate peace—has immediate implications for policymakers in national governments and international organizations who have the primary responsibility for designing peacebuilding operations. Yet this is not simply a work of policy analysis or policy prescription, for it raises questions that scholars of international relations and comparative politics have yet to explore in depth. In what ways, for example, might the transition to market democracy imperil domestic peace, particularly in the immediate aftermath of civil conflict? The liberalization process itself, I shall argue, can give rise to several different “pathologies” that may occur in any state undergoing such a transition. Peacebuilding host states are particularly susceptible to these problems because of the distinctive characteristics of societies that have recently experienced internecine violence—characteristics that will be described in Chapter 9—and, as we shall see, the Institutionalization Before Liberalization strategy is specifically designed to anticipate and avert these pathologies.

This volume also contributes to ongoing debates over the liberal peace thesis. As noted, supporters of this thesis have long argued that liberal states tend to be more peaceful than other kinds of states. Unlike their Enlightenment-era predecessors, however, contemporary contributors to this literature have tended to “ bracket” or ignore the question of how to build market democracies in conditions where governmental institutions do not exist or are only fragmentary. As a result, we have learned a great deal from this literature about the benefits of market democracy once it is established, but very little about the war-proneness of states undergoing this transition, particularly in the immediate aftermath of internal violence. This book uses the record of peacebuilding to investigate this little-explored branch of the liberal peace thesis: the relationship between liberalization, institution building, and peace in countries that are just emerging from civil conflict.

In addition to addressing the specific concerns of both practitioners and theorists of conflict management, this book seeks to break down the artificial separation between those who study “theory” and those who focus on the “real world” problems of policy analysis and implementation. Too often, the practitioners of peacebuilding dismiss academic theorizing as overly abstract and detached from the practical challenges of running field operations. At the same time, many theorists of international relations and comparative politics make too little effort to translate their findings into recommendations for policymakers. This volume, by contrast, aims to set out and scrutinize the theoretical foundations of peacebuilding, and in so doing, to diagnose problems in the design and practice of these operations that might otherwise go undetected.
Organization of the Book

At Wars End is divided into three parts. Part I ("Foundations") examines the political and ideological origins of peacebuilding, and investigates the assumptions that underpin these operations. Chapter 1 traces the history of peacebuilding and the resurgence of Wilsonian approaches to conflict management at the end of the Cold War. Chapter 2 examines historical and contemporary scholarship on the liberal peace thesis, arguing that many important questions remain unanswered, including the question of whether marketization and democratization offer a reliable remedy for civil conflict.

Part II ("The Peacebuilding Record") evaluates the effects of internationally sponsored liberalization efforts in eleven peacebuilding missions deployed between 1989 and 1998. Chapter 3 explains the methodology and scope of the case studies. Chapters 4 through 8 examine the effects of democratization and marketization in Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, and Guatemala. Three post-1998 operations—in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone—are discussed later in the book and in more provisional terms, because of their relative recentness.

Part III ("Problems and Solutions") describes the shortcomings of rapid liberalization as a peacebuilding strategy during the 1990s and recommends a new approach for future operations. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of the case studies and explains why liberalization has sometimes had destabilizing effects on peacebuilding host states. Chapter 10 elaborates the "Institutionalization Before Liberalization" strategy and responds to several possible critiques of this approach. Chapter 11 examines the record of missions launched after 1998, and explores the logistical and political challenges to reforming peacebuilding in the future.

Conclusion

Peacebuilders in the 1990s placed their faith in rapid democratization and marketization as a means of consolidating peace in countries that were just emerging from civil wars. As it turned out, however, immediate liberalization generated a number of destabilizing side effects that endangered the very peace that such policies were intended to strengthen. This conclusion has cast doubt on the prevailing methods of peacebuilding. It has also exposed a blind spot in the existing literature on the "liberal peace thesis," which has paid relatively little attention to the war-proneness of states that are undergoing the transition to market democracy, particularly those with a recent history of civil conflict.

A central dilemma for peacebuilders, I have argued, is to devise methods of avoiding the pathologies of liberalization, while placing war-shattered states on a long-term path to democracy and market-oriented economics. The first step in resolving this dilemma is to recognize that democratization and marketization are inherently tumultuous and conflict-promoting processes, and that postconflict states are poorly equipped to manage these disruptions. By constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions prior to implementing extensive liberalizing reforms, peacebuilders should be able to bolster the "conflict dampening" qualities of societies that host these missions, and in so doing, increase the likelihood of a successful, gradual, and peaceful transition to stable market democracy over the longer term. Classical liberal theorists understood the importance of effective state institutions as a prerequisite for domestic peace, and their insights should now be reincorporated into the scholarship on the liberal peace and into the practice of peacebuilding itself.

The effectiveness of future peacebuilding operations has implications that reach far beyond the borders of the states hosting such operations. One of the principal problems facing the world in the early years of the twenty-first century is the prevalence of internal war and state failure. Chronic civil violence cannot be ignored, for it directly endangers millions of innocent civilians; threatens the stability of neighboring states; impedes efforts to control the spread of disease, famine and crime; and provides refuge to transna-
tional terrorist organizations. Unless the international community improves its techniques for preventing hostilities from reigniting after a cease-fire, attempts to terminate ongoing conflicts will have little prospect of achieving durable and self-sustaining, stable peace. Making peacebuilding more effective is, therefore, an essential first step in countering the broader problem of civil conflict in the post-Cold War era.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING: A CRITICAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE
Michael Pugh
Excerpted from International Journal of Peace Studies, 10:2 (2005), 23–42

This analysis now draws out some of the underlying assumptions of revisionism from a critical perspective under five heads: the silence surrounding structural violence, economics as natural law, the objectification of war-torn societies, squeezing public goods and global integration.

The Silence Surrounding Structural Violence

First, the hubris that pervades the revisionist view is part of a familiar critique of weak regulation, such as that in Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier et al., 2003). The Collier critique calls for tough controls, regulation and monitoring of parties in zones of conflict and an end to “bad governance” by corrupt, undemocratic elites in developing countries. Malfeasance, abuse, torture and even genocidal operations are certainly conducted by elites, rebels and followers against fellow inhabitants in the South. Most casualties are perpetrated by governments against citizens; and there is an ethical imperative to prevent this. Setting ethical standards for state behaviour and intervention are, to be sure, exceptionally difficult to establish without reinforcing the hubris of powerful states. Although this is not the focus of this essay, from a critical theory, and particularly a Habermasian, perspective, a key to the problem of such universal discourses lies in dialogue with local civil societies.

But the millennial critique has also consistently maintained a silence around structural victimization and policies that have emanated from the zones of peace and probity (and the financial agencies that they dominate). The asymmetry of external pressure on state-welfare economies, protected economies, co-operative organisation and collective production denies communities economic options and can produce a politics of victimhood that stratifies and ennifies others, as occurred in Rwanda (Azar and Farah, 1981; Nafziger and Auvinen, 2003; Uvin, 1998).

The divide between rich and poor is, by definition, the precondition for having MDGs in the first place, but the Collier team’s agenda for international action contains one paragraph of barely ten lines recommending a re-examination of the development and trade policies of the Organisation for Economic Development and the removal of subsidies to its producers and traders (Collier et al., 2003: 181).

In similar vein Investing in Development contains a single bullet point that fires the equivalent of a blank at the way capitalist cores are themselves protected from competition and the need for reform of the World Trade Organisation and IFIs (Millennium Project). In a less brutal way, perhaps, the revisionists of this decade may be replicating suppression by the Reagan administration in the 1980s of the South’s demands for a New International Economic Order that might foster alternatives to economic fundamentalism. Silence surrounds the role of interventionary core capitalism in perpetuating poverty through discriminatory policies that structure the global economy.
Economics as Natural Law

Second, the revisionism still takes economics as largely independent of politics and social values. It results, as Robert Cox has suggested, in the de-politicisation of economic issues (Cox, 1992), as if a natural law or a primordial economic equivalent of the sex drive, rather than powerful interests, were guiding economic activity. Consequently, there is only one solution to all inadequately developed societies, whether East Timor or Haiti, and it is a solution based in the economic rationalism of (capitalistic) entrepreneurship. The project is completely transparent in its notion that public monies, whether from revenues raised in developing countries or from aid derived from the public purse in the donor countries should be used to provide profit-seeking business with a leg up. Unsurprisingly, the contradiction inherent in this so-called ‘rationalism’ is not addressed by the revisionists, though it is of acute concern to societies in the process of transformation from war to peace. Notoriously, aid often privileges the purchase of donor goods and expertise rather than local products and employment. Privatisation has been pursued at the expense of public goods and public space—where public goods are defined as accessible to all, non-exclusive and whose value for one consumer does not diminish their value for others (Kaul, 2005). Values other than those of economic rationalism are neglected, including the freedom to decide how markets are conducted, even though they figure in the UN “Millennium Declaration” and have been espoused by, among others, Amartya Sen (Sen, 1999). Inequalities and non-physiological needs are considered more significant than either absolute poverty or, beyond a survival point, physiological needs. This means that provided people are not destitute (which might be equated to the deep poverty scale of the UNDP), they may choose to live humbly in order to feel fulfilled. Such an approach recognises that the paths to modernisation may not be convergent at all, and the marginalised peoples of the world are entitled to choose the extent to which, and how, they integrate in the global economy.

Objectifying War-Torn Societies

Third, the discursive trope of imperial peacebuilding pathologises populations in war-torn societies as if suffering from congenital incapacities that needs treatment through forms of therapeutic governance. In their critique of the psychosocial treatment of states as “failed service providers run amok,” Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac note that political processes divorced from the depiction of problems of conflict, oppression and poverty [have] opened the way for therapeutic approaches to intervention (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005: 2). Archived as congenitally incapable of governance and statehood, these societies require forms of trusteeship that inevitably reflect the priorities of the trustees.

The Mantra of Global Economic Integration

Fourth, the revisionists continue to regard development, at least rhetorically, as a matter of convergence and integration. Although the Sachs report does subscribe to fairer, if not fair, trade, it regards replication of an economic system, advanced in New York as the goal of development. Whether this is an ideal that pervades economic representations to give hope to the undeveloped, when in practice policy makers sometimes act as though there are parallel and even divergent economic development(s), or whether the convergence/replication programme is a matter of self-delusion, is less important than its role in reinforcing a particular model of sustainable development. Similarly, the fetish for integration and participation in global trade, manifest in the Balkan Commission’s Report, learns nothing from research on development by Kamal Malhotra’s team for the UNDP and from critical work on the political economy of peacebuilding (Malhotra et al., 2003). Inverting the neoliberal/Sachsian mantra that integration produces trade and growth, the critical perspectives that map both historical and current transformations demonstrate that integration follows growth, which follows protectionist policies, much as the UK, United States and EU protected, and continue to protect, vital economic interests while promoting freer trade. The vulnerable, it might be legitimately argued, need to be protected from the risks of integration.
Squeezing Public Goods

Fifth, a significant deficit in all strands of revisionism, however, concerns public goods. Recovery generation and poverty reduction is constructed as a matter requiring physical security, state building, therapeutic governance, private (therefore largely foreign) direct investment and welfare pluralism. In the economics of social policy, for example, “welfare pluralism” remains the order of the day. In addition to residual state supply and community/civil society provision for such basic services as health, education and water, market mechanisms and the private sector have been integral to development (World Bank, 2004). Indeed, economies have been opened up to liberalisation, public goods have been poor quality and budget deficits have deprived governments of resources (Carbonnier, 2004; Hilary, 2005). Detailed analysis indicates, however, the absence of intrinsic benefits from the process:

This welfare pluralism takes the clock back to an earlier historical era when social advances and capabilities enhancement proceeded at a much slower pace than during the decades of state-led welfare provision…. [yet] there is no reason to believe that developing countries should already embark on a path of extensive privatisation in social services, especially as large part of their populations are still not covered by the most basic education and health services. (Mehrotra and Delamonica, 2005: 141)

Alternative Options

Other straws in the wind, however, indicate a more substantial departure from the old liberal orthodoxy. The Department for International Development (DFID), for example, denies that aid should be placed at the service of global security, and the institution is itself committed to refocusing its work on governance to include more direct support for the security of the poor (DFID, 2005: 13, 24). This not only entails therapeutic governance to establish accountable political systems, combating crime and promoting transparency in the management of resources and public finance. It also proposes more emphasis on the provision of basic services such as health and education, security and justice. DFID even bawls into the silence surrounding the adverse impacts of structural adjustment, citing the role of the IMF in precipitating the crisis in former Yugoslavia (DFID, 2005: 9).

Furthermore, the UK claimed to relax its aid conditionality in March 2005. Aid would continue to be linked to poverty reduction, human rights, military spending levels and misuse of aid, but would no longer be tied to global security goals. The UK would also cease demanding specific commitments from aid recipients to privatise state industries and liberalise trade, and would urge the World Bank and others to follow (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID, 2005; Beattie and Daneshku, 2005). Whether the proposals are simply part of an internal debate and whether, if activated, they will carry weight in either UK or international politics might be doubted, however. The 2005 G8 summit in Scotland promised much, but— as indicated by the inclusion of debt relief in the aid figures and relief limited to repayment write-offs for 18 countries for only three years— claims for an historic deal for Africa reflected the interests of donors under pressure than the Africans seeking justice (Monbiot, 2005). DFID itself has spent huge sums on consultancy firms to advise on privatisation in developing countries, firms whose own analytical frameworks reflect the privileging of investor interests. For example, the pro-privatisation Adam Smith Institute (International) received over £34 million from the UK aid budget in 1998–2003, and £700,000 of £3m British aid to Malawi was spent on US consultants (War on Want, 2004; Hilary, 2005; Hencke, 2005).

Others have challenged some of the tenets of the liberal peace in a more fundamental way. James Boyce, for example, not only calls for substantial abandonment of conditionality, but also for reform of the aid donation system and for support to state economic direction. While rampant inflation can lead to social unrest, so can vicious austerity, and thus the current priorities may be ill-suited to societies emerging from conflict (Boyce, 2002). Similarly, Simon Maxwell suggests that social protection should be a high priority and pro-poor growth needs to be complemented by distributive measures. Although Maxwell assumes a common destination for developing countries, pursued at
different speeds, he contends that they should not be suddenly exposed to liberalisation without safety netting for vulnerable sectors. Furthermore, international "governance reform" should be a precondition of more money going through the World Bank (Maxwell, 2005: 5–6).

Another macro-level approach would be to draw upon the traditions of protectionism. Even on their own, statist terms, proponents of the liberal peace tend to overlook plenty of examples of protectionism and dirigisme, that nursed vulnerable societies through difficult times: France, Sweden, Cuba, Asian states (including Vietnam which recovered from war quicker than Cambodia). To soften the impact of integration pressures in southeast Europe, for example, the development of a regional customs union has been suggested (Horvat, 1999: 136–149, 170–171). As with the original European Payment Union and the European Community after the Second World War, this would concede that mutual protection to replace national protection is a reasonable starting point, rather than aiming to engineer integration on the basis of complete free trade. A regional payments and customs union would work towards abolition of import duties between the members but maintain common tariffs, though gradually lowered, against selected imports for a period of, say, 10–15 years.

Investment in public goods, infrastructure, social welfare systems and public employment may be necessary to help redress a situation in which a few individuals flaunt obscene affluence but public facilities are often squalid. Such dirigisme may entail controls and a degree of political authoritarianism every bit as irksome as that employed by international civil administrations in post-conflict societies. But a strong and active state role in planning and implementation (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003) with expansionist policies to increase employment, income generation and consumption power to wean vulnerable people off illegal activities through investment in public services and social protection may be less dysfunctional than the orthodox neoliberal model. Specifically, the statist measures might include:

- production generated by import controls and protection of critical sectors, especially agriculture;
- high taxes on luxury items and rationing or subsidies for basic foodstuffs;
- government intervention to boost re-training, employment and public services;
- maintenance of public sector salaries;
- increased purchasing power through public works;
- deficit financing;
- controls on donor corruption;
- reduction in tied aid.

On the other hand, the emphasis on state building in the liberal peace project has only lately paid attention to the political economy of grass-roots levels. In particular collective and cooperative production and marketing, whether part of the formal or informal economy, are often viable mechanisms for economic organisation. This is not invariably the case. Many African co-ops are not so much member-owned, as financed by, and accountable to, governments, which have used them as channels for implementing economic policy (International Co-operative Information Centre, 1994). However, independent, self-help co-operatives have been important in war-torn societies where central economic authority has been weak. They have been especially important to women (from Rwanda to Bosnia), for whom they have been vehicles of empowerment as well as economic survival. Similarly, credit unions have emancipated people from centralised banking and insurance companies. For people who have limited access to towns, who are penalised by traditional bank profiling and charges— or who need to receive remittances from diasporas abroad— credit unions serve various needs. Over £2 billion is estimated to be sent from Britain to other countries in this way, and other estimates indicate that over US$200 billion is transmitted globally through such informal channels. Credit unions number 40,000 worldwide (the largest number in the United States) with an aggregate membership of over 136 million. The world coordinating body, with support from USAID, opened two unions in Afghanistan, which in the first two years attracted 2,000 mem-
bers (World Council of Credit Unions, 2004a; 2004b.) Both co-ops and credit unions appear to have alliances and linkages with aid organisations and are given credence in the UN system, especially in the International Labour Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation.

Conclusion: Who Is Peacebuilding For?

In conclusion, there have certainly been notable shifts in the development and peacebuilding debates. There is now a potential institutional merger of the two through UN reform. The liberal peace has come under sustained pressure as a consequence of critiques and failures in practice. Pragmatic shifts, to some extent towards pro-poor and emancipatory engagement with local populations, have occurred.

But we are still entitled to ask the critical question: who is peacebuilding for, and what purposes does it serve? The means for achieving the good life are constructions that emerge from the discourse and policy frameworks dominated by specific capitalist interests—represented as shared, inevitable, commonsensical or the only available option—when they correspond to the prevailing mode of ownership. Economic wisdom resides with the powerful. As Murphy notes, political inequality leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives (Murphy, 2005: 18). For Cox, too, “whereas the right of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social and economic context the individual’s capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine its implementation is removed. Consequently, just as in one-party, authoritarian regimes, politics is about depoliticizing people, by removing the economic determinants of everyday conditions from political control” (Cox, 1992). The millennial revisionism represents a significant shift. But ultimately it may perpetuate asymmetries that maintain the liberal peace, albeit in less orthodox forms. Indeed, the revisionism may intensify the grip of capitalist-dominated financial and trade institutions. The recommendations of the 2004 UN High Level Panel's report on boosting the UN's attention to peacebuilding activities includes provision for international financial institutions to be more actively involved in peace processes. However, without transformation of the IFIs, and the liberal agenda itself, subjugation rather than emancipation will continue to be injected into the political economy of peacebuilding.

UNDERSTANDING RESPONSES TO CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND AID

Jonathan Goodhand

Excerpted from Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 77–99

In this chapter some of the key academic and policy debates on conflict, aid and NGOs are examined. The role of NGOs is explored in a context of growing international interventionism in countries affected by instability. Close attention is paid to the critique of humanitarianism that developed in the 1990s, and the donors' and NGOs' responses to this critique. Finally, in the light of the changed international environment, some of the principal challenges faced by NGOs attempting to work in or on conflict are highlighted.

NGOs, Peacebuilding and the New Security Terrain

The last decade has seen the dramatic rise of NGOs. They have become significant players at a global level in terms of numbers, resources and influence. According to Lewis (2002: 373), this increased significance has been associated with three interrelated trends, of which the first is the disillusionment in the 1980s of international donors with the ability of governments to tackle development problems. Second, NGOs became ideologically attractive at a time of privatization policies linked to structural adjustment programmes imposed on Southern governments by Northern donors. Third, there was renewed
interest in civil society generated by popular resistance to eastern European totalitarian states and to Latin American military dictatorships. NGOs were viewed as part of the third sector which had the potential to strengthen democratic processes, widen citizen participation in civic life and contribute to the formation of social capital (Putman, Leonard and Nanett, 1993). A fourth factor, not mentioned by Lewis, but one that has evidently contributed to the growth of NGOs, has been the rash of small wars at the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast to the Cold War period when they operated on the fringes of conflict (Macrae and Zwi, 1994; Prendergast, 1996; Duffield, 1997), NGOs found themselves playing a significant and sometimes central role in a succession of multilateral peace operations and humanitarian experiments (Macrae, 1999a). Many of the major international NGOs that originated in the aftermath of the First or Second World Wars expanded their operations as a result of the growing funding and humanitarian needs created by the armed conflicts of the 1990s.

This chapter focuses on the international response to war and its role in shaping NGO strategies and approaches. In the last decade the fields of peacemaking/security, development and humanitarianism have converged. It can be illustrated diagrammatically as three (increasingly) overlapping circles.

The conceptual models, institutional arrangements and policies associated with peace and security, development and relief that were distinct and separate during the Cold War years have increasingly merged in the 1990s. Conceptually, ideas have coalesced around the framework of human security. Institutionally this is reflected in the growth of multi-mandate peace operations bringing together military, diplomatic, development and humanitarian actors. Programmatically it has been articulated through the idea of three-way programming, which involves combining peacebuilding, development and humanitarian objectives under the same umbrella (Goodhand and Hulme, 1997).

Views about this convergence are divided. Liberals tend to take a benign view of the trend towards more expansive, multi-levelled approaches. NGO interventions, it is argued, can contribute to peacebuilding efforts by complementing and reinforcing other tools and instruments. Others argue that the basic thrust of Western interventionism has been to protect liberalism from unruly parts of the world. Duffield (2001) characterizes this attempt to quarantine war (Richards, 2005: 3) as the imposition of a ‘liberal peace’, a term which is meant to capture the ideological mix of libertarian concepts of democracy, market sovereignty and conflict resolution (Pugh and Cooper, 2004). NGOs are viewed as the agents of the liberal peace, since it is difficult to separate their development and humanitarian activities from the pervasive logic of the North’s new security regime (Duffield, 2001: 16). The tension between these two positions have become even more acute as a result of the GWOT, as explored further below.

NGOs and Peacemaking

Growing Interventionism

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding have become a new growth area for NGOs, though these fields have a long pedigree. NGOs’ increased involvement in this area has led to growing concerns about their role and effectiveness in the ‘late Westphalian’ environment, as more complex roles are ascribed to them (Richmond, 2003: 2).

One of the principal differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War period has been a redefinition of the notion of national sovereignty. In 1992 the Agenda for Peace of the newly appointed UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, declared the ‘time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed’. The progressive incorporation of human rights and humanitarian values into the international political and normative structure were arguably symptomatic of a shift in the centre of gravity of international relations away from states towards individuals (Yannis, 2002: 824). NGOs played a role in this process. In the subsequent UN report of 1994, Agenda for Development, three areas were identified in which NGOs could build peace: preventative diplomacy, humanitarian pro-
vision and post-conflict peacebuilding. States and intergovernmental organizations have provided or been pressured to provide avenues of participation for NGOs, and they in turn have endeavoured to constrain states in whether and how they use force against other states and against their own people (Richmond, 2003: 2). NGOs, it is suggested, are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns, which enables them to work in normative frameworks untainted by official, state and systemic interests (ibid.: 5).

The end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal capitalism seemingly opened up a new space for multilateralism. The Agenda for Peace (UN, 1992) outlined an expanded role for the UN, declaring it right to intervene under Chapter VII in the name of citizens' rights. The UN, it was argued, should be involved in preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding, its role stretching from the earliest stage of conflict prevention through to the final stages of post-conflict reconstruction. Peacebuilding was therefore increasingly associated with multi-track or system-wide responses linking different official and unofficial conflict resolution tracks. With this came a growing focus on coherence and coordination arrangements, because, in the words of the Carnegie Commission (1997: xiv): 'the prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term too hard—intellectually, technically and politically—to be the responsibility of any single institution or government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared, and labour divided among actors.' An important role was ascribed to civil society actors, with their potential to ‘deepen and widen islands of civility that have endured in war conditions’ (Kaldor, 1999: 111). This new agenda for peace entails deep intervention in aspects of governance, humanitarian aid and development (Richmond, 2003).

While the idea of sovereign inviolability may never have been as sacrosanct as conventional wisdom assumed, the 1990s have seen the emergence of increasingly robust interventionary strategies, from Kosovo to East Timor to Afghanistan. UN peacemaking activities have increased nearly fourfold from four in 1992 to 15 in 2002 (HSC, 2005: 153). The UN peacekeeping budget increased from $230 million to US$3.6 billion between 1994 and 1997 (Ottunu and Doyle, 1993: 299). Four different types of international mandated peacebuilding operations can be identified, running along a continuum from consent-based/limited engagement at one end to coercive, multidimensional engagements at the other (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000):

1. Monitoring or observer missions;
2. Traditional, consent based peacekeeping, under Chapter VI of the UN;
3. Multi-dimensional peacekeeping;
4. Peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN.

Interventionism in its most extreme version has taken the form of international trusteeship, with the UNSC acting as the alternative custodian of sovereignty.

Most accounts of the activism of the 1990s focus on its multilateral character, rather than the domestic politics of Western powers. But the growth of interventionism and an associated human rights discourse can also be understood as part of a search for an external source of legitimacy by Western leaders following the end of the Cold War. A discourse (and a reality) of failing states and humanitarian crises created a new justification for intervention. According to Chandler (2003: 303) a so-called ethical foreign policy was a ‘strong card for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home’. This moral mission in the international sphere could be contrasted with the uncertainties of domestic policy-making, at a time when the old left/right political framework appeared to have collapsed. An ethical foreign policy helped buttress the moral authority of governments, although it involved very little pressure to account for final policy outcomes (ibid.: 310). It is therefore as well to remember that global governance and the UN have not escaped state power, even though during the 1990s, collectively, ‘conflict prevention, humanitarian interventions and post-conflict peacebuilding became parts of an activist international agenda’ (Tschirgi, 2004: 4). The normative framework underpinning liberal internationalism (Paris, 2004) was captured in a report pub-
lished in 2001 by the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled The Responsibility to Protect. First, like the Agenda for Peace, it questioned absolute sovereignty, and second, it presented a case for intervention based not on realpolitik but on morality. Essentially this involved prioritizing human security over national interests and setting out thresholds for intervention on this basis. Some optimistically felt that this signified the emergence of a Kantian democratic consciousness, based upon cosmopolitan frameworks. It has been argued that 9/11 and the consequent US commitment to unilateral activism fundamentally undermined the normative framework for liberal peacebuilding. But in some respects it intensified the pre-existing trends of international activism, the militarization of peacebuilding and the blurring of the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Tschirgi, 2004). If there has been a shift, it has been in the underlying rationale for intervention, with the focus of the debate moving from human security to homeland security. Arguably peacebuilding is now about protecting ‘our’ people, rather than protecting ‘other’ people. Peacebuilding has therefore become increasingly associated with a discourse and set of institutional arrangements related to nation-building, regime change and counter-insurgency. In the post-Iraq world, it is likely to be more difficult to build consensus around the idea that intervention may be a force for good. For NGOs, there are fears that the US shift towards unilateralism is being associated with efforts to shut civil society out of development issues, as the government moves to grant more contracts to private companies instead of non-profit organizations (Soederberg, 2005: 291).

The Effectiveness of Peace Operations

What has been the track record of international attempts to enforce or build peace? Evidence and opinions are mixed. According to Wallensteen (2002), of the 110 armed conflicts between 1989 and 1999, 75 had terminated by the end of 1999. Out of these there had been 21 peace agreements and 22 outright victories. The largest category out of the 110 is continued conflict. However, according to the authors, one-quarter of all conflicts end in negotiated settlement sooner or later. Wallensteen (2002: 31) argues that peace-making has become a global enterprise and in its absence the number of wars would probably increase significantly. Studies by the University of Maryland (Marshall and Gurr, 2005) together with the Human Security Report (HSC, 2005) provide an even more positive prognosis, drawing a direct link between the decline in civil conflicts in the 1990s and the upsurge of activism by the international community in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding (ibid.: 155).

Others draw more skeptical conclusions from the empirical data. Stedman (2001), for instance, found that between 1900 and 1980 85 per cent of civil wars were decided by one side winning. Only 15 per cent ended as a result of a negotiated settlement. Similarly Licklider (1995), who analysed civil conflicts between 1945 and 1989, found that 58 out of 93 conflicts were settled, but out of these only 14, or 24 per cent, were solved through negotiation. Fighting resumed in seven of the 14, meaning only 12 per cent were resolved through negotiation. Peace settlements may have perverse outcomes. Two massive outbreaks of violence in the 1990s—Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994—followed the failure of peace agreements to end these wars, leading to death tolls of 350,000 and 800,000 respectively. As Stedman (2001) notes, far more people died in the aftermath of peace implementation in these two cases than had died from the preceding years of civil war.

Where warring parties have access to resources and a vested interest in the continuation of fighting, consent-based models may have severe limitations. In the case of Sierra Leone, for instance, it was ultimately the use of force through the deployment of the private security company, Executive Outcomes, that changed the balance of power in favour of negotiations (Shearer, 1997). What clearly does not work is peacebuilding on the cheap, variously referred to as a ‘bargain basement’ model (Ottaway, 2002) or ‘national building life’ (Ignatieff, 2003). There is rarely a correlation between the ambitions of the international community and their willingness to invest time and resources. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the set of prescriptions for state reconstruction was so exhaustive that it could not possibly be followed in practice (Ottaway, 2002: 1009). The bargain
basement option has the virtue of being relatively cheap, it soothes the international conscience because something is being done. It is based on international principles of democracy and human rights. Unfortunately it does not appear to work.’ (ibid.: 1022)

In a study of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found a strong correlation between the difficulty of the context and the robustness of the international response. Without a peace treaty the likelihood of success of a PKO drops substantially. But multilateral UN peace operations were found to make a positive difference, particularly in the case of missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform and elections oversight.

Different analyses and interpretations of the shortcomings outlined above lead to different prescriptions. One is to argue for less intervention, as neorealists like Luttwak (1999) do. In an article entitled ‘Give war a chance’, he states: ‘an unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace’ (ibid.: 36). This may be a cheap option in the short run and it may ultimately lead to the emergence of an internal solution to the problem. However, international neglect may also have blowback effects. An alternative option is that of ‘liddism’ (Rogers, 1999), or the containment of disorder, since the West cannot garrison every failed state (Hirst, 2005: 47). This can be characterized as a conservative multilateralism, which involves ‘providing the minimum of force necessary to sustain the current liberal international economic system and prevailing interstate order’ (Hirst, 2005: 47). The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of August 2000 (otherwise known as the Brahimi report) argues for a more activist multilateralism. It found major deficiencies at the political and institutional levels, noting that ‘for peace-keeping to accomplish its mission . . . no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force’ (UN, 2001: viii). Arguably, this approach gained ascendancy in the late 1990s, but has since been added to, or even usurped by, the unilaterial activism of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. These different variants of peacebuilding co-exist alongside one another, even though one may be hegemonic at a given point in time. To an extent none is empirically grounded, but Northern policy-makers find them attractive because they resonate with particular sets of ideological presuppositions (Richards, 2005: 6).

The empirical evidence suggests that NGOs’ impacts on conflict resolution are likely to be ephemeral and have a limited effect on wider political processes unless there is a credible and robust Track One process (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999; Goodhand with Atkinson, 2001). The profile and scope of NGOs’ conflict resolution efforts appear to be inversely related to the geostrategic importance of a particular conflict. For instance, it would have been unthinkable for International Alert to have played the same kind of role in the former Yugoslavia as they did in Sierra Leone, where they were involved in Track One negotiations (Sorbe, Macrae and Wohlgemuth, 1997). Therefore, NGOs’ roles may be residual rather than complementary in the world’s discretionary conflicts where there is limited or arm’s-length international engagement. An evaluation of International Alert, for instance, concluded that NGOs alone cannot ‘compensate for the failure of governmental and inter-governmental bodies to effectively confront the problem of international war’ (ibid.: 75). In contexts like Kosovo, where the objective is explicitly to construct neo-liberal democratic entities, this raises serious questions for NGOs about their roles, objectives and relationship with militaries, states and other non-state actors (Richmond, 2003: 1). These questions are brought into even sharper relief in the context of the GWOT and NGOs’ associations with an occupying power.

Neo-Kantianism or Neo-Imperialism?

Debates on the ethics and efficacy of international engagement are therefore marked by wide divisions. Liberals tend to take a benign view of intervention, based on the belief that the international system is falteringly moving towards the doctrine outlined in the Agenda for Peace. NGOs are seen to complement the role of governmental and intergov-
ernmental agencies, primarily by strengthening people's voice and participation in peace processes (Woodhouse, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999). Critics of the liberal position argue that Western powers are not disinterested parties. Peacemaking and peacekeeping within the Westphalian system tends to replicate the flaws of that system (Richmond, 2003). In the absence of a centralized international system that can authoritatively articulate, interpret and enforce the common interests and values of the international community, peace enforcement approaches risk being perverted and becoming an arm of the foreign policy of dominant states (Yannis, 2002: 830). NGOs, it is argued, have contributed to the privatization of peacebuilding, which paradoxically undermines the overall goal of peace and stability by eroding the authority and legitimacy of states. Furthermore, like other organizations attempting to regulate conflict, NGOs take it upon themselves to adjudicate over internal processes of social and political transformation, even though they lack a political and ethical framework capable of distinguishing between just or unjust claims (Voutira and Brown, 1995; Duffield, 1997).

The tension between these two positions, that might be characterized as Kantian or Clausewitzian, manifests itself in different ways, for instance, in the European focus on soft security and the US focus on hard security (Duffield, 2001), or the tension between the UN as 'we the member states' and the UN as 'we the people', in other words, between the UN and its political and ethical frameworks and the UN as a central body responsible for the protection of the welfare of people within states and the laws of the UN, Geneva Conventions and human rights treaties (Donini, 2003b).

**NGOs, Development Aid and War**

**Development Aid and Conflict in the Cold War**

The increased involvement of NGOs in peace operations can be attributed partly to the growing significance of specialist conflict resolution agencies involved in Track Two activities. However, also important—and perhaps more so in funding terms—has been the mandate expansion of development NGOs into Track Three work.

The development enterprise has until recently been largely agnostic towards matters of conflict and insecurity (Uvin, 2002: 5). In Rwanda, for example, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the annual flow of aid to the Rwandan government rose by 50 per cent, notwithstanding the regime’s complicity in inciting violence by Hutu extremists against the Tutsi minority (Boyce, 2002c: 1032). Even in countries with fresh memories of civil war, such as El Salvador, aid donors were criticized for being conflict-blind. In the period immediately following the peace agreement the IMF pushed ahead with its economic reform package, failing to coordinate with, or make concessions to, the fragile UN-led peace process (Boyce, 1996). In many parts of the world, concerns about conflict were less pressing than the need to support Cold War allies. For instance, a World Bank study found that between 1970 and 1993 aid allocations by bilateral and multilateral donors were dominated by politics, both the international politics of the Cold War and the internal politics of aid agencies (cited in Boyce, 2002b: 62). Though development NGOs were less constrained by the Cold War straitjacket, an analysis of Oxfam’s response to the Ethiopian famine of 1984 highlighted their blindness to the links between emergencies, conflict and development (Vaux, 2001).

**The Post-Cold War Radicalization of Development**

The end of the Cold War removed the rationale for nurturing a complex web of political allegiances through military and development aid. Arguably this opened the political space for aid donors to make funding decisions based primarily on development criteria such as needs, effectiveness or impact. NGOs gave them the flexibility to do so. They became a central part of the new aid paradigm (Duffield, 1998), filling the gaps created by the withdrawal of governmental control under pressure of neoliberal reforms (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Van Roy, 1999). Aid donors became increasingly involved in the inter-
nal politics and economics of recipient countries. By the 1990s donors had added political reforms to the economic template of structural adjustment. This was associated with a radical shift in thinking. It involved moving from the realization that certain political and economic preconditions were required for development aid to work, to the belief that aid itself could create these preconditions (Macrae, 2001). The end result was a level of intrusion and social engineering that would not have been countenanced by earlier generations of aid donors.

During the last decade significant resources have been invested in areas threatened, affected or emerging from violent conflict. A third generation of aid conditionality emerged as awareness grew about the links between conflict and development. Peace was added to economic and political reforms as a further condition to be placed on aid. Peace conditionality, the use of formal performance criteria and informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of peace accords and the consolidation of peace, has increasingly been applied to aid in conflict-affected countries (Boyce, 2002a: 1025). In practice peace conditionalities involve a series of mini-bargains with leaders and communities and the judicious application of ‘carrots’ in the form of aid and ‘sticks’ in the form of sanctions or the withdrawal of assistance.

The reinvention of development as a strategic tool for conflict management and peace-building has been described by Duffield (2001) as the securitization of aid. In a sense aid and politics have been reunited, although in a different fashion from the Cold War period. Whereas development and security were interstate affairs during the Cold War, the locus of security has become the nature and quality of domestic relations (Duffield, 2002: 1066). This is seen to be the natural domain of NGOs, who have been encouraged to reconceptualize their development activities as peacebuilding programmes, reflecting earlier ideas of NGO comparative advantages: they are closer to the grassroots, better informed, can more easily build trust, are flexible and so on (Duffield, 1997: 88). Development and security concerns have coalesced around the issue of civil society, in spite of the absence of any consensus regarding what civil society is or how it works (Voutira and Brown, 1995; Stubbs, 1995; Duffield, 1997). At best it is an ill-defined space ‘of uncoerced human association’ (Hopgood, 2000: 1) between family and the state.

Conflict is seen as the result of internal development malaise and the prescription is to build human security through a range of economic and social policies, including poverty eradication, tackling corruption, protecting human rights and supporting popular participation—and also new more sensitive areas such as reform of the security sector and the judiciary (Uvin, 1999). Somewhat perversely, as ambitions increased and the conditions placed on aid grew, there was a decline of aid in real terms from $63 billion in 1992 to $55 billion in 2000. However, aid flows were increasing prior to 9/11 and in 2002 reached a record high. Paradoxically, although development actors have never had it so good in terms of funding levels and political profile, there is a deep unease among donor agencies. This stems from concerns that with growing funding has come diminished autonomy. Development actors feel increased pressure to align themselves behind security objectives related to the GWOT rather than the Millennium Development Goals. Although it is too early to come to firm conclusions, the changed pattern of funding appears to confirm these fears. Mirroring the subordination of development programmes to foreign policy in the Cold War period, the distribution of funding is beginning to reflect the new division of the world into rogues and allies. Therefore, Pakistan, a key ally in the GWOT, was the highest recipient of aid in 2002. In 2003, the US pledged US$20 billion for reconstruction in Iraq, equal to one and a half times the US's annual development aid budget (Cosgrave, 2003: 1). Moreover, in the same year the US created the Millennium Challenge Account, a development fund of $5 billion per year, the qualifying grounds being largely political (Soederberg, 2005).

Therefore, during the 1990s there has been a merging of development and security and this process appears to have intensified since 9/11. Arguably, in the 1990s development and security were viewed as different but equal, in the sense that development assistance was largely shaped by and implemented according to development criteria. The GWOT has meant that security has risen to a position of determinacy (Duffield and Waddell, 2004).
The recalibration of aid appears to involve a new quid pro quo: it is about providing ‘them’ with development, in return for ‘our’ security. For many aid agencies the hardening of the security agenda has reversed the progress of the 1990s in relation to human rights, arms sales and poverty reduction (ibid.: 3).

The radicalization of development is reflected in corresponding changes in donors’ strategies, approaches and institutional arrangements. The fact that conflict prevention is currently accorded a priority by the World Bank, the UN, OECD/DAC and the G8 would have been inconceivable even five years ago (Mack, 2002). New organizations have been created such as the World Bank’s Post Conflict Unit, the US Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) or DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), and new coordination arrangements have been developed.

NGOs are only one set of actors in a multilevel, networked system involving different contracting arrangements and partnerships with a range of state and non-state, commercial and not-for-profit actors. However, the extent to which this radical new agenda is implemented in practice can be questioned. Donor behaviour appears to be much more variable—between individual donors and from country to country—than many commentators seem to allow. Uvin (2002), for instance, maps out a continuum of donor approaches to conflict and peacebuilding, ranging from minimal adaptation (‘rhetorical re-packaging’) to a fundamental reorientation of strategies (‘global system reform’). The former tends to involve feel-good changes such as tinkering with projects and the development reflex of arguing that development by definition promotes peace. The latter involves a more radical rethinking of the development business, necessitating a global vision which ‘redirects the spotlight back onto the rich countries and the global international political economy where their corporations and citizens occupy such a privileged position’ (Uvin, 2002: 20). The obstacles to effective peacebuilding assistance lie not only on the recipient side, but also, as Boyce (2002a) argues, on the policies and practices of aid donors and operational agencies. For instance, the Utstein evaluation study of peacebuilding (GTZ, 2003) by Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK found that none of the countries was able to articulate an agreed policy or doctrine on peacebuilding.

**NGOs, Humanitarianism and War**

The Growth of Humanitarianism

In the West, the term humanitarian has become elastic. It can be a straight synonym for ‘compassionate’; or it can embrace a wide spectrum of aid based on commitment to shared humanity; or it can refer more specifically to the technical delivery of relief in zones of disaster or conflict. (Bentham, 2002: 28)

Humanitarianism is rooted in 17th-century enlightenment and 18th-century philanthropy, but its emergence as a component of the international response to war is a more recent phenomenon. For much of the 20th century emergencies have been treated as aberrant phenomena to be treated with relief. Many of today’s major NGOs were formed in response to emergencies or war: the Red Cross as a result of the wars of Italian unification, Save the Children at the end of the First World War and Oxfam in response to the Greek famine of 1943 (Smillie, 1995). Up until the 1980s, humanitarian aid was confined to the periphery of conflict, to safe government areas and refugee camps in neighbouring or neutral countries. However, with the thawing of Cold War relations, gaining access to the victims of conflict was increasingly articulated as a humanitarian right. International intervention in several war-torn countries was seen as evidence of humanity trumping sovereignty. NGOs linked to rebel movements, as in Tigray and Afghanistan, delivered humanitarian assistance without the consent of the Ethiopian and Afghan governments respectively. Operation Lifeline Sudan, established in 1989, was the first attempt to institutionalize a framework to secure access to civilians in both sides of the conflict (Macrae, 1999a: xiv).

During the 1990s NGOs became significant players in a number of humanitarian experiments conducted under the umbrella of the UN, which sought to develop new approaches to conflict-related disasters. In non-strategic conflicts humanitarian action has tended to
be the primary if not the only form of international engagement. In high-profile emergen-
cies, however, NGOs have had to contend with a complex set of agendas and relation-
ships with non-aid actors, many of whom claim to be acting under the banner of human-
itarianism. Kosovo was after all declared a 'humanitarian war' by the British prime minister,
Tony Blair. In such conflicts there has often been deliberate blurring of the lines between
the military and the humanitarian. The visibility of humanitarian aid was important in
legitimizing military and political interventions both to the domestic public in Western
democracies and internationally (Macrae et al., 2002: 12).

These experiments were made possible by the rapid expansion of the aid system. By 1999
some 40-50 million people were direct beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. Between
1990 and 2000 the volume of official humanitarian assistance almost tripled from $2
billion to $5.9 billion. It also increased as a proportion of ODA from 5.83 per cent to 10.5
per cent (Macrae, 2002: 11). By 2000 one-half of the UN aid budget was devoted to relief
(Froman and Patrick, 2000: 2). Successive emergencies have had a ratchet effect and have
served to lever up the overall volume of humanitarian assistance. This has been in the
context of declining global ODA, leading to concerns that development funds have been
cut at the expense of emergency funding.

NGOs have been one of the chief beneficiaries of this expansion. They have been instru-
mental in extending the reach of the humanitarian system, as donors increasingly directed
resources through them based on a belief in their comparative advantages over govern-
ments and multilateral agencies. In 1980 there were 37 NGOs on the Thai border; in 1995
there were 200 in Goma and in 1996 the number had grown to 240 in Bosnia (Natsios,
1995, cited in Cooley and Ron, 2002: 10). There has been a trend away from multilat-
eral methods of disbursing humanitarian assistance towards direct support for NGOs. By
the late 1990s most OECD countries were disbursing at least 25 per cent of emergency
assistance through NGOs and by 1998 over 60 per cent of the European Commission
Humanitarian Aid Office was being spent through NGOs (Reindorp, 2001). The 1980s and
1990s have seen the growth of a number of super-NGOs or transnational NGOs, such as
CARE, Plan International, Save the Children and Oxfam, who in many conflicts rival or sur-
pass the UN in terms of operational capacity. There are six or seven major NGOs who man-
ge $2.5–3 billion, amounting to 45–55 per cent of global humanitarian assistance
(Smillie and Minear, 2004: 195).

Humanitarianism in Crisis?

In the eyes of many people, humanitarian aid has lost much of its moral currency. Once an
undisputed symbol of solidarity with those struck down by misfortune and adversity, humani-
tarian assistance is now vilified by many as part of the problem, feeding fighters, strengthen-
ing perpetrators of genocide, creating new war economies, fuelling conflicts and perpetrating
crises. (Clare Short, former Secretary of State for DFID, cited in MacFarlane, 2001: ix)

During the 1990s the aid system came under increased scrutiny. This was related to the
growing role and public profile of humanitarianism and the introduction of public man-
agement reforms in Western governments. Both led to an increased focus on NGO per-
formance, value for money, accountability and impacts. For humanitarian NGOs a num-
ber of defining events, including Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo, focused attention on the
dark side of aid and its potential to have unintended impacts. Somewhat perversely, emer-
gency assistance has never been subject to so much external scrutiny and internal reflec-
tion, while the demand for such assistance has never been greater. The critique of human-
itarianism has many different strands, but it can broadly be divided into three areas: first,
aid has become politicized and is manipulated by non-humanitarian actors; second, aid
has perverse effects; third, aid actors are unaccountable, unregulated and ineffective.
Whereas the first two focus on the relationship between intervention and the wider con-
text, the third is concerned with the internal deficiencies of the aid system.

The politicization of aid. Humanitarianism is not a political project. It has the modest but
vitally important ambition of ensuring the most vulnerable are not sacrificed in times of
conflict and crisis (De Torrente, 2004: 28). This reflects the hard-won practical wisdom
of organizations like ICRC and MSF. But actually existing humanitarianism rarely main-
tains such a distinct and independent position in relation to politics. Humanitarian intervention always involves considerations that are non-humanitarian. As Smillie and Minear (2004: 23) note: ‘No government’s humanitarian policies are free-standing— they flow from a country’s foreign and domestic policies and projects.’ In practice they have tended to mirror global politics, so that more robust and concerted programmes have been conducted in areas of strategic interest like Kosovo, in contrast to those of less immediate importance like the DRC or Sudan. This is the argument of humanitarianism instead of politics, in other words the idea of aid as a fig-leaf for Western inaction. A variance of this analysis is the more radical idea of politics through humanitarianism or, to put it differently, humanitarianism as the continuation of politics by other means. Simply by applying the label ‘humanitarian’ the normal rules of sovereignty are suspended. Whereas economic and political conditionalities have to be negotiated and require the consent of the governments exposed to such measures, ‘humanitarian intervention can take place without such consent. In other words, humanitarian intervention involves setting aside the protective barriers of international norms, the defence device which allowed the post-colonial state elite a free rein in domestic affairs’ (Sorensen, 2000: 6).

As Ignatieff argues in relation to Kosovo, humanitarianism is essentially an imperial enterprise because it requires imperial means: garrisons of troops and foreign civilian administrators, and because it serves imperial interests; the creation of long-term political stability in the south Balkans, the containment of refugee flows into Western Europe, and the control of crime, drugs and human trafficking. . . Humanitarianism is in the service of long-term state interests of the rich nations on the Security Council’ (Ignatieff, 2003: 60). On the whole Ignatieff appears to be supportive of this development, though in his view imperial power should project itself more robustly and consistently. Sovereignty, it is argued, should be treated instrumentally, not as a shibboleth (Keohane, 2003: 10), and the sins of omission, like Rwanda, are more serious than the sins of commission. Others are less comfortable with ‘state-led humanitarianism’ (Rieff, 2002), as through its incorporation into a wider conditional aid package it loses its unconditional and universal value (Duffield, 2002).

An analysis of funding trends illustrates how responses to conflict are highly selective and bear little relationship to humanitarian needs. Comparatively generous donations tend to flow to emergencies in the media spotlight: virtually 100 per cent for former Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1995, though falling to 69 per cent while the area was out of the news in 1996. Other crises, with perhaps just as much need, are largely ignored. In 1999, for instance, a refugee in Kosovo could expect to receive $207 per year in international aid, while an Afghan would receive on average $23 per year. The UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is the nearest thing to a global assessment of need. Figures from the CAP for 2000 show great variation in appeals per head, ranging from less than $10 per head in Uganda and Tajikistan to $185 per head for southeastern Europe (Macrae, 2002: 14). In 2002 global funding for humanitarian assistance was $4.7 billion, of which 83 per cent was spent in Iraq, though few agencies have identified a humanitarian crisis there (Duffield and Waddell, 2004).

It has been argued that there is now a closer relationship than ever between the assertion of national interests and the provision of humanitarian assistance because of the trend towards the bilateralization of aid. Bilateralization is understood as donors reducing the share of their aid channelled through multilateral institutions in order to exert influence more directly (Macrae et al., 2002: 10). Between 1996 and 1999 the volume of assistance channelled multilaterally increased by 32 per cent compared with the previous decade, while bilaterally managed expenditure increased by 150 per cent. A very small group of donors account for the bulk of humanitarian spending. The US dominates, providing about one-third of spending in 1998–2000. The US and eight other bilateral donors account for 93 per cent of official humanitarian aid (ibid.: 3).

Aid fuels conflict and undermines local capacities. The links between humanitarian aid and conflict are very old, though discussion on this topic is comparatively recent (MacFarlane,
2001). One can identify a range of unintended effects, direct and indirect, on conflict structures and dynamics, as follows:

- Assistance may have perverse political effects: NGOs which set up parallel systems of service provision may undermine the social contract between governments and their citizens (Hanlon, 1991; de Waal, 1997). Because of the overriding imperative to gain access, NGOs can inadvertently legitimize unrepresentative groups (Anderson, 1999) and remain silent in the face of widespread human rights abuses (Keen, 1998).
- Aid may have a range of economic effects, which can fuel war economies: Le Billon (2000) identifies a number of ways in which relief is either directly manipulated by armed groups (e.g. taxation or diversion, manipulation of populations or humanitarian space, purchasing of protection) or has unintended effects on the war economy (e.g. substituting or distorting effects). These impacts appear to be greater in instances where there are few other valued resources (MacFarlane, 2001: 64).
- Aid has important social effects: particularly in camp situations it has been argued that the manner in which aid is delivered can undermine community coping strategies and create dependency (Harrell-Bond, 1986). Aid interacts with the emotional economy as well as the political economy of war and it may have symbolic value for either pro-war or pro-peace groups.

Aid actors are unaccountable, unregulated and ineffective. The humanitarian system tends to impose a new response for each successive crisis (Forman and Patrick, 2000). The NGO sector, as Smillie (1995) notes, is a haven for ‘wheel inventors.’ The multi-donor evaluation of the Rwandan crisis, for example, could not locate one-third of the 170 NGOs registered and $120 million of funding went unaccounted for (Bryans, Jones and Stein, 1999: 14). The evaluation also noted the waste and duplication of efforts in the aid community, due to a lack of strategic co-ordination.

Emergencies attract a multiplicity of actors with diverse mandates, who all claim to be humanitarian but have very different and often contradictory approaches. In such settings the accumulated lessons of best practice gained in development contexts are either ignored or viewed as irrelevant. As noted by Pottier (1996: 57): ‘Emergencies are internationally interpreted as occasions for swift action, not as opportunities for critical reflection. In emergencies therefore, it has become legitimate to ignore clients’ views of problems and solutions. This leads to top-down approaches to crisis management.’ Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that short-term thinking, short-term mandates and short-term funding are being used to confront entrenched and long-term problems and needs. As Edwards (1999) argues in relation to humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia, too many resources were wasted on poorly designed technocratic quick fixes and not enough on slower, longer-term initiatives. Also important has been the increased marketization of aid (Cooley and Ron, 2002). According to de Waal, one of the most strident critics of humanitarianism, in a situation of unregulated NGO activity, a form of humanitarian Gresham’s Law takes over, whereby ‘debased’ humanitarianism drives out the authentic version (de Waal, 1997: 138). The capacity to learn has no marketing appeal and openly questioning the success of the aid project means putting future funding at risk (Schloms, 2003). In spite of the veritable cottage industry that has developed around humanitarian research, evaluation and lesson learning, there is limited evidence of fundamental change in the humanitarian system: ‘the international system appears to have an extraordinary capacity to absorb criticism, not reform itself and yet emerge strengthened’ (de Waal, 1997: vi).

Responses to the Critique

Broadly there have been two reformist responses to the humanitarian critique. One argues for a maximalist approach, which involves broadening the humanitarian mandate to include development and peacebuilding objectives. The other argues for a minimalist approach involving a return to the narrower and more tightly defined classical humanitarianism.
Beyond relief? Broadening humanitarian responses. One response to the humanitarian critique has been for NGOs to adopt a more expansive approach to humanitarianism, which has involved the collapsing of old distinctions between politics and aid, relief and development, aid and human rights (Macrae et al., 2002). These have been a lateral movement into ‘non-copyright’ areas (Smillie and Minear, 2004) as donors have encouraged NGOs to think beyond relief and to conceptualize their interventions along a relief-development continuum, so that relief activities contribute to development as peace returns. Agencies are increasingly invoked to do no harm (Anderson, 1999) and a growing number of NGOs have become involved in conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities. In practice, these distinctions mean little to those living through violent conflict and it is argued that NGOs should aim to achieve the optimum mix of activities, matching them to the needs of individual contexts (White and Cliffe, 2000; Roche, 1994). Multi-mandate organizations may be best placed to exploit the synergies between such activities, whether they are categorized as relief, development or peace-building.

Associated with these changes has been a shift from duty-based ethics, in which simply attempting to do good was seen to be sufficient, towards consequentialist ethics, in which agencies need to consider the possible effects of their interventions and whether they do good or do harm. This has involved harnessing humanitarianism to higher goals such as justice and peace. Copyright humanitarianism, on the other hand, which places neutrality as its highest value, fails to engage with what is right or wrong in a conflict (Anderson, 2004a: 70). That humanitarian NGOs have a role to play in peacebuilding was officially recognized in 1999 when MSF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Back to basics: reaffirming humanitarian values. Aid workers have been drawn to ideas about peace and rights because of frustrations over the limitations of what humanitarianism can achieve on its own in a political vacuum (Rieff, 2002). But to what extent has this frustration led to unrealistic expectations of humanitarianism? As Macrae (2002: 7) says, ‘The 1990s saw the concept of humanitarianism transformed from a distinctive but narrow framework designed to mitigate the impact of war into an organizing principle for international relations, led largely by the West.’ With aid being increasingly politicized, the humanitarian imperative and principles of neutrality and impartiality are at risk.

The overall thrust of the minimalists’ reform agenda is that humanitarianism should go back to its roots, in the sense of reaffirming the core beliefs and principles of humanitarianism. It is about recovering and safeguarding the original meaning of humanitarianism from the well-meaning but dangerous reformers (Barnett, 2003: 412). This position is based on a number of assumptions and assertions: first, that humanitarian intervention is driven by the humanitarian imperative, in other words saving lives comes first; second, that the key frameworks and tools for achieving this are the principles of neutrality and impartiality and international humanitarian law. Humanitarian neutrality in essence involves a morally justified suspension of judgement (De Torrente, 2004), which in turn creates a suspended space or humanitarian no-man’s-land for those giving and receiving aid. Third, although it is recognized that there is a need to ensure aid does not fuel or prolong conflict, it is not part of its mandate to try to resolve conflict. Ethically there is no justification why future benefits derived from achieving peace or development should outweigh the immediate rights of victims to receive life-saving aid (ibid.). Nor, it is argued, should aid become more developmental. Development assistance depends on bilateral relations with a recognized and legitimate state, something that is usually absent in today’s wars (Macrae, 2001). Extending the logic of development assistance in peacetime to humanitarian assistance in war is to misunderstand the specificity and relevance of humanitarianism to the victims of war (De Torrente, 2004). Therefore, minimalists are concerned with fidelity to the humanitarian imperative, developing accountability and improving standards for relief delivery and protection. Iraq and Afghanistan, it is argued, highlight the dangers for NGOs of extending their mandates and thus exposing themselves more directly to the influence of state interests.
Minimalism and Maximalism: A Polarized Debate

Is minimalism a nostalgic and naïve call for political virginity (O’Brien, 2004)? Or is it a vigorous defence of the specificity and relevance of independent humanitarianism? The debate between the minimalists and maximalists has become unnecessarily polarized (Jackson and Walker, 1999). Its quasi-religious tone and the ‘with us or against us’ polarity strangely mirrors the language of the GWOT. One is reminded of Ignatieff’s (1998) ‘narcissism of minor difference’, such is the anger and passion generated between the different humanitarian ‘tribes’. The passion is understandable, but it tends to lead to oversimplistic arguments, postures and defensive reactions. As Jackson and Walker note, the debate has generated more heat than light. There is insufficient understanding of the impacts of aid on the dynamics of conflict and peace and there is a lack of tools to measure and calibrate them. The maximalists probably overestimate the impact that aid can have on political processes, as in the majority of conflict-affected countries aid flows are limited in relation to other economic inputs, and consequently have little political leverage. So far maximalism has remained largely aspirational and there is limited empirical evidence of humanitarian actors building peace from below. There are fears that it may lead to unrealistic expectations of what NGOs can achieve and be held accountable for in areas of conflict.

In some respects debates have moved on and the key point now is less about aid’s leverage over conflict than its legitimizing effects on international political and military interventions, as Macrae suggests (2002: 8). However, the minimalists appear to abdicate any responsibility for engaging with the wider political context. The thrust of their argument is about what not to do; and essentially it is concerned with damage control through minimalist inputs of food and medicine (Christoplos, 1998: 1). It is also an extremely Northern-led debate, with humanitarianism being seen as ‘our’ problem.

Both sides of the debate overstate the newness of contemporary wars and the consequent need for new approaches. NGO workers who cut their teeth in Biafra would recognize many of the political and operational challenges faced by contemporary NGOs in the DRC or Liberia: from the politicization of aid, to dealing with non-state actors, to the denial of access, to the charges that aid prolonged conflict. Overstating the novelty of the post-Cold War landscape limits the important lessons that earlier experience can teach. As Minear (2002: 6) states, there is a need to situate humanitarianism within its broadest possible historical context: ‘to have expected the Cold War years to have been followed by an era of principled multilateralism and a new sense of humanity seems historically naïve’.

In practice there is probably a lot more middle ground than the purists on either side would care to admit. One of the few studies on the connection between conflict and aid, for example, concluded that: ‘relatively small-scale and contextually sensitive efforts to adjust humanitarian programming in active conflicts may have a positive effect in mitigating the impacts of war. Moreover, carefully delivered transitional assistance may assist in building sustainable peace’ MacFarlane (2001: 62). Aid agencies are not usually faced with the simple choice of providing or not providing aid; it is normally about how much to provide, of what types, to whom and with what conditions attached (Boyce, 2002a). Boyce says that conditionality does not require a threat to cut off all aid and can be applied selectively to the subset of aid of greatest benefit to political leaders and least benefit to at-risk populations. The idea of doing no harm is perhaps less useful than benefit-harm (O’Brien, 2001) analysis, since the latter recognizes the inevitably negative effects of aid and the need in many situations to choose the least-worst option.

At the heart of the minimalist-maximalist debate is the question of which objectives should be elevated. Should conflict prevention and peacebuilding have the same value as saving lives and sustaining livelihoods? Should peace be prioritized over justice? Does this mean that agencies should be judged on their ability to prevent violent conflict and build peace? In practice it forces agencies to confront deep ethical questions about the
ends their aid is meant to serve. However, such questions cannot be addressed without reference to individual contexts and agency mandates. What has often been lacking in such debates is substantive analysis of particular contexts at particular times with reference to different types of NGOs.

Conclusion

However diverse and pluralistic the world may seem to Western eyes, to non-Western eyes it can appear to be dominated by a group of victorious powers that seek to impose an ideological hegemony of their own and that do not tolerate opposition. (Freedman, 2004: 253)

Debates on NGOs and peacebuilding suffer from being too aid-centric. To appreciate the potential and limitations of NGOs in peacebuilding it is necessary to look beyond aid, at the wider political framework in which NGOs operate. This chapter has outlined some of the key features of the political and institutional landscape which set the basic parameters for NGO operations in areas of conflict. This was complemented by an analysis of some of the key trends and debates within the NGO sector in relation to aid, conflict and peacebuilding. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.

First, globally there has been a growth of interventionism and militarized peacebuilding. Although international intervention has been selective and often half-hearted, a defining feature of the post-Cold War period has been the widening and deepening of the international community’s engagement with war. Following Somalia, there was a temporary reluctance to get involved in military adventures. But overall, there has been a trend towards more coercive forms of intervention and a greater commitment to engagement in the post-conflict context. Interventions have become more ambitious, wide-ranging and trusteeship-like. The humanitarian experiments of the 1990s and the humanitarian wars at the turn of the century have been justified in terms of universalistic and legal ethics. But in the absence of credible and effective mechanisms of global governance, the rhetorical commitment to universalism has been undermined by the assertion of national interests.

Second, how one understands peacebuilding depends on one’s interpretation of these trends. Critical analysts argue that peacebuilding has become a liberal and increasingly imperial project, and is essentially a means of pacifying unstable regions which threaten the core interests of dominant powers. ‘Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous social experiment in social engineering—an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict; in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization’ (Paris, 1997: 56). The liberal view, on the other hand, is that peacebuilding, underpinned by an expanded notion of human security and soft power, is a progressive and benign attempt to operationalize the Agenda for Peace doctrine. After 9/11, this position is more difficult to sustain, as arguably concerns about homeland security and counter-insurgency have led to a recalibration of peacebuilding, resulting in an increasingly illiberal peace. Perhaps a more accurate representation now would be for ‘security’ to encircle both ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘development.’ However, neither of these views fits neatly with the empirical evidence; the discourses may appear to be monolithic but the practice is certainly not. A variable approach to the issue of weak and failing states has emerged and it may be more accurate to talk about different variants of the liberal peace being applied in different contexts (Richmond, 2005). It is difficult, for example, to explain interventions in East Timor or Sierra Leone purely in terms of the assertion of liberal (or imperial) interests, though Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq fit more obviously into this framework.

However one interprets these trends, it is clear that a model of third-party intervention based upon the assumption of neutral or benign outsider interests is unrealistic. It is not possible to separate out international action as though it were an independent and neutral variable in relation to conflict. Interventions are likely to have an influence on the underlying causes and dynamics of conflict, as well as shaping what emerges afterwards. War may be seen as a point of leverage for the international community, particularly in the post-conflict moment, when sweeping reforms will meet limited resistance. The moti-
vations and incentives of those who make peace are just as mixed and complex as those who make war. Just as the discourse around war cannot only be taken at face value, the same applies to the discourse around peace. Humanitarian intervention has become an important mobilizing idea, which according to Chandler (2003) and Rieff (2002) is now part of the West’s conception of itself. War is legitimized through a particular kind of emotional economy. Peace pursued through foreign intervention similarly requires a strong sense of mission and moral certitude, which serves to mask the divergent interests of the peacemakers. The concept and practice of peacebuilding expanded in the 1990s partly in order to accommodate the growing number of actors and interests involved. It has become a mobilizing metaphor, like participation or good governance, ‘whose vagueness and ambiguity are required to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromises, to enrol different interests and to multiply criteria of success’ (Mosse, 2004: 663).

Third, in terms of achieving stated goals, neither hard power nor soft power appears to be working very well. Institutional reform has not kept pace with the changing political-military landscape. There is a poor fit between the determinants and dynamics of state collapse and the external solutions offered. We do not have sufficient knowledge of the causes of state collapse or the mechanisms for reconstructing failed states. But we do know that though conflicts are complex and variegated, the international response tends to be formulaic and off the peg. It is characterized by Ottaway (2002) as the Procrustean model, meaning the model is given and then the country is pushed and pulled to fit it. There is also a mismatch between the expectations of the international community and the time and resources they are prepared to commit. The fiscal policy to pay for peace that was so central to the success of the Marshall Plan has been absent in most contemporary peacebuilding efforts. It is therefore important to keep external efforts to engineer peace in perspective. Development and humanitarian aid are relatively tiny proportions of global wealth. One should be modest about their potential peacebuilding role in countering the effects of much more powerful military, economic and political interests in intra-state conflicts. Aid is rather a small part of the story of conflict (MacFarlane, 2001).

Fourth, in the last decade there has been a reworking of the relationship between aid, politics and security. Development aid and to an extent humanitarian assistance are seen as strategic tools for the promotion of security. Peace conditionalities have been added to economic and political conditionalities to effect changes in recipient countries. All forms of assistance, it is argued, have to be coordinated and made coherent with the underlying goal of building peace. Aid policy finds itself subordinated to political calculation: ‘when the crunch comes, politics nearly always trumps universal principles’ (Donini, 2003a: 4). To a great extent the key issue is not the impact of aid on conflict but how its legitimating effects are used by other international actors. But again these trends can be interpreted differently. The relationship between politics and humanitarianism is ambivalent and two-directional. Though politics clearly intrudes upon humanitarianism, some would argue politics is being humanitarianized: humanitarian concerns have forced their way up the political chain and are now aired and discussed at the highest levels (Minear, 2002).

Fifth, NGOs have had to adapt to these changes and increasingly find themselves working in intensified political engagements involving new demands and new pressures. This has involved developing an understanding of the political economy of the response as well as the political economy of war. NGOs have been encouraged by donors to re-conceptualize their humanitarian programmes in areas of conflict by moving beyond relief into developmental and peacebuilding activities. There are concerns that more expansive approaches will lead to the distortion of humanitarian principles and prevent aid agencies from achieving their primary goal of saving lives. Although there is some agreement that agencies should develop their capacities to work in conflict more effectively, the idea that they should have an explicit focus on peacebuilding is more contentious. There has been limited systematic research to support the argument of the maximalists or the minimalists.

Finally, it is important to take the long view on these issues and debates. Wars are not new and neither are the debates about the politicization of aid or the links between aid
and conflict. It is important to take a historical perspective on these questions. Moreover, the debates tend to extrapolate and generalize to such an extent that they lose sight of the variability of individual contexts. Actually existing practice is messy, contingent and unpredictable. The debates tend to be shaped more by the concerns of the interveners than the particular challenges of individual contexts and the experiences of people living in them.

HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL NGOs AND AFRICAN CONFLICTS
Wafula Okumu
Excerpted from Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 120–137

As the number of collapsing African states increases, humanitarian international NGOs (HINGOs), alongside UN agencies and sub-regional organizations, are increasingly being called upon to play more and significant roles in complex emergencies. Besides mitigating the social and economic consequences of collapsing states, HINGOs are also implementing peace accords, promoting democratic and economic reforms, protecting human rights, and encouraging the settlement of conflicts. Although scrutiny of humanitarian assistance was mainly focused on criticism of its delivery, analysis of its guiding principles and the evaluation of its position in the humanitarian–development continuum, there is now increasing concern over its adverse effects on its beneficiaries and on its role in prolonging or solving the conflicts that produced them. There are now widespread indications that humanitarian assistance that is being delivered through HINGOs may actually be prolonging conflicts. Thus, the premise of this article is that aid may be important in assisting people in complex emergencies but it might also prolong conflicts by diverting attention from the real causes of the conflicts and by inadvertently assisting warring parties.

What Is a HINGO?

A humanitarian international NGO is a private, not-for-profit organization that engages in transnational activities to relieve human suffering wrought by human activities such as wars, and by natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes. The present number of HINGOs in existence is difficult to ascertain, although the 2000 Yearbook of International Organizations reported that there were more than 26,000 international NGOs with an annual budget of over US$6 billion. One reason why it is difficult to know the number of operational HINGOs is that many of them, known as ‘come 'n' gos’, mushroom during complex emergencies and scale down with the mitigation of the crises. HINGOs range from the ‘first generation’ organizations, such as CARE and Save the Children, to newer ones like IN and Emergency Medical Corps. But eight HINGOs control 75 per cent of all emergency funds. Most of the first-generation HINGOs have in the recent past integrated psycho-social care conflict resolution and peacebuilding into their portfolio.

Humanitarian aid is aimed at saving lives and helping people to enjoy the most basic rights which are threatened in conflicts. Conflicts destroy necessities for survival like shelter, water and food. Warring parties in contemporary conflicts have adopted nearly similar military strategies of disrupting life and forcing people to leave their places of abode—essentially depopulating the conflicted regions and using civilians as pawns. It is at this point that HINGOs respond to complex emergencies—by helping uphold both international humanitarian law and human rights, particularly related to the right to aid for all in emergencies.

While it is generally accepted that HINGOs are doing good work, there are many instances where their relief efforts have produced unintended and even counter-productive conse-
In this section, I identify a number of ways in which HINGOs have prolonged conflicts in Africa.

Manipulation

HINGOs have been manipulated not only to provide resources used to fuel wars but also to gain access to the civilian population in need of humanitarian assistance, and to give de facto recognition and legitimacy to warlords and their rebel movements. In countries where states have collapsed, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), rebel leaders heavily rely on HINGOs and international agencies to provide for the welfare of the people under their control while using the money levied from mining companies operating in the territory to buy weapons which they use to fight the government forces and other rebel groups. The mere facilitation of medical and food provisions, as well as other forms of assistance, have earned warlords legitimacy from the local population and the will to prolong the conflicts.

Using People as Shields

By locating their military and training bases near food centres or positioning themselves near civilians and airstrips, governments and rebel groups have used the starving population as shields against attacks. Besides being used for protection, relief centres have become reservoirs for 'fresh recruits for military missions' by both the rebels and the governments. The case of the Rwandan refugee camps in Eastern Zaire were probably the best example of how humanitarian aid was used to control the population by former Hutu militias and government officials. For instance, the Hutu militants set up a military camp at Bilongue so as to access the nearby Chimanga civilian camp that was close to the border with Rwanda and was one of the main staging locations for the cross-border military incursions into Rwanda.

Creating Theatres of Operation

The governments have also exploited humanitarian assistance in the execution of their military strategies. By moving the civilian population into ‘safe areas’, HINGOs and international agencies can also inadvertently promote one of the warring party’s military objectives of depopulating the theatre of operations. One such government was Mozambique’s, which in the late 1980s encamped large populations that were fed by HINGOs under the protection of FRELIMO forces. This not only bolstered the government’s legitimacy but also allowed its forces to mop up RENAMO rebels in the areas that had been depopulated. In Southern Sudan, facilities such as water wells, schools and health centres provided by HINGOs have become easy military targets of the Sudanese government, which adroitly manipulates humanitarian assistance in insidious ways. For instance, in the mid-1990s it bombed and raided the Nuba mountains to push the people from their land into rebel-controlled areas. When these areas were hit by drought in 1998, the government, in conjunction with the UN World Food Programme and HINGOs, established ‘peace camps’ that were used as magnets to drain the rebels of their fighters who were lured by food. This was a deliberate government strategy to weaken the rebels and strengthen the government’s position in the then ongoing peace process.
Looting and Bartering Relief

Humanitarian assistance—particularly food, medicine, equipment and vehicles—has also been used to fuel war when it is looted and bartered or sold to obtain weapons. The food is looted while being transported in convoys or on rails and barges, and at warehouses and distribution centres. The rebels have also subjected relief supplies to ‘taxation’ or inflated the number of recipients when receiving food to distribute to the people under their control. For instance, the SPLA has been known to falsify the number of refugees in areas under its control and to divert food intended for refugee camps and sell it in Uganda. Similar practices of looting humanitarian inputs and selling them to buy weapons have been reported in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC.

Extortion

Humanitarian assistance can also exacerbate conflict when militias, rebel groups and governments demand from HINGOs bribes, ‘access fees’ at checkpoints and roadblocks, and ‘protection fees’ for convoys and warehouses. HINGOs have also underwritten war economies by being charged outrageous currency exchanges, some as high as four times above the normal rates. The most extreme example was in the 1980s when the Sudanese government restricted the foreign exchange rates charged to HINGOs at 4.4 Sudanese pounds to $1 US instead of the market rate of 17 Sudanese pounds to a dollar.31 The profits made from these transactions were then used to buy war matériel. In Somalia, HINGOs paid salaries for ‘technicals’, rents to warlords, and entered into transport and storage contracts with businessmen who were also financiers of the clan lords. The warlords also earned large amounts of money by imposing import duties, license and visa fees, and port or airport charges on HINGOs’ relief supplies and personnel. Warring parties have also demanded to be included in the needs assessment exercises, where they use inaccurate and incorrect data that is obtained through manipulation of sources. The aim of influencing needs assessment is to control and manipulate the scarcity and supply of food so as to later reap huge profits.

Fungibility

Relief aid has indirectly increased the resources of conflict through fungibility. By providing aid HINGOs have relieved governments of the responsibilities of providing for the welfare of their populations, ‘thus freeing resources for combat and often leading local populations to shift from productive activity to pursuing aid and in the process become more dependent and politically compliant’.32

Recognition and Legitimacy

HINGOs have also given recognition and legitimacy to the war efforts of governments and warlords by being forced to enter into ‘prior agreements’ and arrangements for ‘security services’, such as those with the Khartoum government and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) in order to guarantee that at least part of the aid will reach the desperate people. By making agreements with warring parties, HINGOs have given de facto recognition, which is used to entrench and expand their activities, to the warring parties despite their lack of legitimacy. Such arrangements were also made with Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in early 1990s, with SPLA since the 1980s, with Somali warlords after the demise of the Barre regime in 1991, and with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the 1990s during the Ethiopian civil war against the Mengistu government.

Furthermore, combatants have also specifically targeted humanitarian aid for political and economic goals—particularly those of solidifying legitimacy over the population under their control and providing employment opportunities, which are only offered by the relief operations. This was quite common in the days preceding the downfall of the Mohamed Siade Barre government in Somalia in 1991 when war was fought among clan lords over the control of resources such as land, animals, and sources of employment for
‘technicals’. However, particularly in the period 1991–92, humanitarian aid became ‘the predominant liquid asset and a major resource’ that the warlords fought to control. This was indirectly aggravated by the well-meaning approach of dispensing aid through local organizations and using local staff; but which instead gave warlords opportunities to establish fronts staffed with their ‘technicals’. In providing aid through rebel-controlled organizations, such as SPLA’s SRRA, HINGOs have played a role in legitimizing the main rebel organizations and their leaders.

**Dual Use of Infrastructure**

There have also been numerous cases in which warring parties have promoted their military objectives, using ‘humanitarian infrastructure and assets’ such as reconstructed roads and bridges, and personnel and agreements to facilitate delivery of relief supplies. This frequently happens in Southern Sudan where reconstructed roads have enabled combatants to move farther and faster, and human assets, particularly health workers, have been conscripted into military service after being trained. In Liberia and Eastern Zaire, HINGOs’ physical assets such as vehicles and communication equipment were ‘borrowed’ by rebels and never returned.

**Creating Perceptions of Power Imbalance**

HINGOs have prolonged conflicts by creating perceptions of power imbalance among warring parties. In Southern Sudan, ‘perceptions by Jikany Nuer leaders of the disproportionate aid benefits accrued by Lau Nuërr has helped fuel Jikany cattle raiding . . . into Dinka areas’ since 1991. In Somaliland, aid imbalances have been cited as contributing to the Garhajis’ opposition to the government, whom it accuses of benefiting from aid disbursement and controlling their access to it.

**Criticisms of HINGOs in Africa**

Despite the laudable work of HINGOs in saving lives in complex emergencies, their increased involvement in the management and transformation of violent conflicts is now being widely criticized. But what is the motivation for HINGOs prolonging conflicts? Alex de Waal argues that aid agencies are motivated by two interests: a ‘soft’ or altruistic interest aimed at helping those who are suffering, and a ‘hard’ interest which is based on the HINGO’s need to justify its existence. Two of the most vocal critics of HINGOs have been Clare Short, British Secretary for International Development, and Raakiya Omar of Africa Rights. They both argue that the zeal of HINGOs to reach the victims is driven by market forces that have made them operate more or less like businesses—competing for scarce resources, jockeying for attention, and selling themselves to potential donors. In June 1998 Clare Short caused a storm when she criticized the methods used by aid agencies to raise famine relief funds. She pointed out that the use of ‘unbearable’ images of starving African children not only made ‘people flinch and turn away’ but also led to ‘compassion fatigue’ in the long run. Rakiya Omaar has referred to this tactic of promoting their profiles to raise funds as ‘disaster pornography’. Omaar asserts that these NGOs cross the line of common decency when they use ‘ghastly photographs’.

Almost all African conflicts have attracted hundreds of HINGOs that are too small, amateurish and confused in their aims. In order to survive they have to compete with each other in raising money and winning accolades for their noble missions of saving the most unfortunate of the human race. Some agencies, with MSF being the most accomplished, have become masters of spinning the story of an event to influence public opinion of the donors. Since they have to depend on the media to publicize their activities and fundraising, HINGOs require resources, both money and time, to market themselves. A review of their operational budgets shows that they are spending between 15 and 25 per cent of their funds on marketing and fundraising.

Despite such criticisms that have been levelled at HINGOs, David Bryer, the Director of Oxfam GB, strongly defends humanitarian assistance by contending that ‘tens of thou-
sands of lives are saved every year, and an enormous amount of further human suffering is avoided.\textsuperscript{41} David Shearer, in his defence of HINGOs, argues that relief aid from ‘a more macro perspective . . . appears to have had little impact on the course of civil wars’. And that most conflicts such as Sudan’s have proved extraordinarily resilient to peace and have ‘continued unrelentingly’. In view of the elusive quest for peace, ‘the assertion that aid is fuelling war in Sudan ignores the historical realities’. In Somalia, Shearer points out, there has also been ‘little observable correlation between amounts of aid and levels of violence’.\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, it is ‘impossible’, on the micro-level, to quantify the economic and organizational benefits brought to warlords by relief aid.\textsuperscript{43} Despite some individuals benefiting from the war, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how much earnings warlords have pocketed from the war.

To be fair, aid can be less pernicious than scarce commodities.\textsuperscript{44} In Angola, UNITA was earning around US$500 million from diamonds per year before sanctions were imposed on ‘blood diamonds’ that were being used to finance its war against the Angolan government. Shearer argues that UNITA did not start the war in 1966 to make profits from it and that Charles Taylor also financed his guerrilla war mainly by exporting hardwoods from the areas under his control.\textsuperscript{45} Humanitarian aid also ‘played virtually no part in Sierra Leone’s brutal and ugly war’ in which the RUF armed and equipped its fighters through diamonds that were found in the territory under its control.

Shearer’s spirited defence of humanitarian assistance overlooks the fact that HINGOs have seriously taken into consideration manipulation of food aid and regard it as normal practice. It is a fact that some HINGOs regularly include a 30 per cent loss in their budgets, and others have made payments to militias to guard relief supplies or local army units to transport food safely; or in other words, paid the people who would otherwise attack their lorries.

Recommendations

After describing three ways, the ‘mandate blinders’,\textsuperscript{46} ‘aid on our terms only’,\textsuperscript{47} and ‘do no harm’,\textsuperscript{48} in which NGOs have responded to the political effects of their work, Mary Anderson recommends that HINGOs should give up their apolitical stance by first denouncing war itself.\textsuperscript{49} Their assistance should then be directed towards supporting and protecting local opposition to war, and to promoting people’s efforts to disengage from the conflicts. But this will require developing alternative methods of distributing assistance that are not easily misdirected into the war effort such as supporting local capacities for peace and capacities for community self-reliance.\textsuperscript{50} When aid is given in ways that ‘provide or enlarge the safe space where people act and speak in non-war ways’ it gives the people incentive and motivation ‘to disengage from conflict’.\textsuperscript{51} HINGOs have a responsibility to promote ‘these positive side effects and mitigate the negative ones’.\textsuperscript{52} Fostering economic cooperation and interdependence between non-combatant members of warring groups can make positive contributions to peacebuilding efforts.

According to Ben Hoffman, those NGOs without political or partisan positions can ‘gain access and entry, build relationships, and offer conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation services in situations where more formal diplomacy has not been immediately welcomed’. By providing humanitarian assistance, NGOs can ‘lay the groundwork for more in-depth conflict resolution initiatives’.\textsuperscript{53} But this is only feasible if HINGOs’ agenda is designed, and humanitarian action is undertaken, to complement the peace agenda, as pointed out below, as part of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy that also includes recovery and development of society.

HINGO workers, who have no training in conflict resolution and diplomacy, can complicate the resolution of conflicts when they dabble in peace-making activities with the aim of facilitating their relief efforts. Nevertheless, HINGOs can build trust in areas of conflict, thereby creating an opening for peacebuilders to come in. As the peacebuilding efforts get under way, HINGOs can continue working more closely with peacebuilders to
coordinate the transition to post-conflict reconstruction. Regardless of how long it takes for peace negotiators to come in, humanitarian workers should never assume the burden of ending the conflict.

According to Nobert Ropers, there are four ways HINGOs can contribute to conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{54} The first way is by ‘empower(ing) single or all parties to deal with the conflict constructively and/or to support them to avoid a violent outbreak’. This can be done through measures such as monitoring and lobbying for human rights and the protection of minorities, building the capacity and protective measurements for disadvantaged or endangered groups, and training peace activists in conflict transformation skills. Second, HINGOs can ‘create channels and forums to balance out the influence of power-differences, power-political positions and negotiation strategies in favour of an orientation towards basic interests, the clarifying of relationships and the enabling of common problem-solutions’. In other words, HINGOs can serve as a bridge between warring parties and peace negotiators/makers. Third, HINGOs can ‘help the victims of violent conflicts regardless of interests of power and sovereignty’. But this ‘well-meaning approach’ is now under review as a result of the on-going debate that humanitarian assistance has negative sides. And fourth, HINGOs can civilize ‘conflicts by promoting skills and capabilities for a constructive conflict-management to as many individual persons as possible’. But regardless of the role they are called upon to play besides the primary one of helping those suffering due to conflict, HINGOs should guard against being sucked into being players in the conflicts. The danger of HINGOs becoming players in the conflicts increases when their workers engage in conflict resolution; but instead they should create ‘the stimulus for the continuation of the conflict - albeit involuntarily’.\textsuperscript{55} To help them avoid overreaching their mandate and capabilities, HINGOs should always bear in mind the words of Oxfam’s Bryer that ‘relief is, after all, exactly what it says. It is not the solution to violence.’

To summarize, HINGOs should take into careful consideration the following:

- Avoid being pawns: HINGOs should not allow themselves to be used as ‘humanitarian alibi’ by Western governments who want to misuse the humanitarian idea and humanitarian workers by doing little or nothing at all in economically dreary regions like sub-Saharan Africa.

- Set clear goals and operate with realistic objectives: HINGOs should not exceed their limit. Besides lacking ‘sufficient legitimacy’ to end conflicts, HINGOs also lack internal structures that can support their primary functions and engage in highly specialized roles of conflict prevention, management and resolution.\textsuperscript{56} In particular, HINGOs lack finances to pursue activities beyond feeding the hungry and treating the sick victims of complex emergencies. HINGOs need not only take a more cautious approach but also realistically reassess what they can and cannot accomplish. Having the moral courage to pull out once the relief has been compromised through the manipulation of the aid is a higher moral principle than that of helping the victims of conflict and in the process supporting those who are victimizing them.\textsuperscript{57}

- Adopt strict moral standards: HINGOs should be directed by moral standards in their fundraising activities and eschew ‘disaster pornography’, obsession with publicity and violation of the universal humanitarian code of conduct that is based on serving humanity.

- Use proper evaluation criteria: HINGOs’ performance of providing the minimum requirements of relief assistance—shelter, water, food and health care, as well as educational and social support—should be judged not only by how many lives they save but also by how they avoid being part of the conflict.

- Train humanitarian workers: The aid workers, before and during the relief operation, must ‘understand the cultural, political, social, and religious tensions that lead to war’ and its victims whom they are assisting.\textsuperscript{58} This also means that HINGOs should ensure that their contributions to peacebuilding are not pulverized by the rather macho mentality of their workers who—despite their poor, or lack of, conflict analysis and diplomatic skills—undertake messianic adventures. It is in a climate of ignorance and arrogance that grievous mistakes are made.
Engage in greater coordination: And lastly, since ‘experience shows that aid is highly likely to do more harm when the number of aid organizations and aid resources is large and when coordination efforts are minimal’, it logically follows that HINGOs must work in greater coordination under the principles laid out in the Sphere Project’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. HINGOs must also differentiate between those ‘who support war and have a vested interest in its continuation’ and those ‘who represent either existing or incipient capacities for peace’ so as to be ‘able to identify situations where their aid might support or undermine existing and latent local capacities for peace’. HINGOs must ‘carefully plan their delivery strategies so that the substance, timing, and modalities of delivery support local capacities for peace and not the forces of war’. This is similar to the ‘Norwegian model’, which is based on close, but informal and flexible, cooperation between the authorities and NGOs that allows humanitarian assistance to develop local knowledge and contacts which are later used in peace and reconciliation processes.

HINGOs can continue providing relief without fuelling or prolonging conflicts by working within a comprehensive framework of a peace support partnership with development, democratization and human rights agencies, the military, and civilian police operations. But this would only be possible if the mandates given by the UN Security Council or regional organizations for humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts should contain all the key components of peace support operations—humanitarian aid, restoration of rule of law, diplomacy, promotion of human rights, and development assistance—and stipulate the structures which reflect this comprehensive approach.

Beyond the central dilemma of sticking to the humanitarian assistance principles or withdrawing aid when it is abused, there are a number of other dilemmas which HINGOs must confront: whether to aim at reaching those who are in most need, or only those victims allowed access to by the combatants; whether to provide the type of aid most needed (such as water pipes, fertilizer, seeds and educational material), or only that which the combatants allow; and whether or not to use the military or local militias (or ‘technicals’, as they are called in Somalia) to provide security for their workers and food warehouses.

Some HINGOs have taken a positive step in reaction to the criticism of their massive involvement in civil wars and ‘complex emergencies’ by adopting the Hippocratic Oath policy of ‘Do No Harm’. The following two examples illustrate choices that can be made by HINGOs to avoid being used to harm victims of conflicts. The first case took place in 1995 in Liberia after the warlords looted more than 400 aid vehicles and millions of dollars of equipment and relief goods from the HINGOs to directly support the war. The vehicles and radio equipment were then used for military purposes and also to transport diamond and gold to buying centres and return with weapons. When the 13 humanitarian agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), came to the realization that they had unwittingly fuelled the war in Liberia, they decided not to renew major operations in June 1996. The 13 HINGOs resorted to using ‘locally-available equipment’ and stopped bringing new resources into Liberia that could fuel the ‘war economy’. They also limited their relief work to distributions of food to those directly threatened with starvation. Oxfam made a bold move of cutting off relief efforts, such as improvement of the water supply in south-east Liberia, to prevent their vehicles and equipment from being seized to fight the war. It was Oxfam’s conviction that more lives would ‘be saved by preventing such looting than by providing humanitarian aid’.

Another significant and relevant example was the decision taken by some of the largest HINGOs operating in southern Sudan not to sign a memorandum of understanding to operate joint relief operations with the humanitarian wing of the main rebel faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose military wing is the SPLA. These HINGOs have rejected SPLM’s arrangement on the ground it would undermine their neutrality and have opted to withdraw from OLS operations despite the fear that such an action would adversely affect civilian populations benefiting from their relief efforts. This is in line with Pamela Aall’s admonishment that HINGOs ‘must identify and ally themselves with forces seeking to resolve political differences, not with groups trying to fuel the conflict’.
Chapter 1: Introduction

“Why,” the senator asked, “with so much aid has there been so little development in sub-Saharan Africa?” I was an expert witness at a hearing on foreign aid in Africa. As I groped for a good answer to such a broad and fundamental question, I recalled the lines of the poet Tennyson that Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, cited at the beginning of his autobiography:

So many worlds, so much to do,
So little done, such things to be.

In 1957, at the time Nkrumah wrote, there had indeed been so much to do to promote development in Africa. But after more than three decades and billions of dollars of foreign aid, there was still so little done. The question was why.

Now, a decade later, many more people—in the United States as well as in Africa—are asking the same question. This book is an effort to provide an answer.

Foreign aid—the transfer of concessional resources from one government to another—is a tool of statecraft. It is often used by the government providing it to encourage or reward politically desirable behavior on the part of the government receiving it. It is also used to spur economic development (defined here as equitable growth) in poor countries through financing investment projects, funding research and technical assistance, and supporting economic and political reforms. This study is concerned primarily with the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting development in Africa.

The issue of aid’s effectiveness in Africa is an important one. The amounts of foreign aid to most countries of sub-Saharan Africa have been among the largest in the world relative to the size of their economies. In 1994–95, foreign aid averaged nearly 8 percent of the gross national product (GNP) of African countries, and for many, it was well above that ratio. (Aid as a percentage of GNP averaged only 0.7 percent for Asia, 1.3 percent for the Middle East and North Africa, and 0.4 percent for Latin America.) For most African countries, the relatively high levels of aid had extended over several decades.

Nevertheless, economic development has been disappointing in most of Africa. Average per capita income in the region is nearly the same in the 1990s as it was in the 1960s. Nearly half of Africa’s 570 million people live on only one dollar per day. This percentage has not changed over the past decade or so. As a consequence, population growth has added 30 million people per year to the ranks of the impoverished. Moreover, the degree of impoverishment is greater in Africa than in any other part of the world. Social indicators—levels of literacy, life expectancy, health—remain among the lowest in the world and may be deteriorating. The region has seen its share of world trade shrink and has been all but bypassed by the surge in international capital flows beginning in the 1990s. It remains the least industrialized of regions and the most heavily indebted.

Foreign aid is supposed to promote development. It has apparently failed to do so in Africa.

A Preview of the Study

Four main findings of this study explain the puzzle of large flows of aid over an extended period combined with disappointing development. First, the aid itself has been relatively ineffective in Africa. While there have been some remarkable and important successes,
on the whole, aid-funded projects and programs have been disappointing. Aid to Africa has typically had the poorest success record of any worldwide (often half or fewer aid-financed activities achieve their goals), and projects and programs there have proven to be the least sustainable. In some cases, only one out of five projects and programs endures after aid funding is terminated. Particularly problematical have been "complex interventions" that have included multiple activities or required behavioral, institutional, or political changes on the part of Africans. There is also evidence that the large and continuous aid flows have in some cases had negative side effects on development in the region.

Second, it is primarily to the donors of aid that we must look for an explanation of its failure. Of course, the effectiveness equation has two sides: conditions in the country receiving the aid and the capacities and policies of the governments to which it is provided; and the policies and capacities of the governments and organizations donating the aid. On one level, the often limited natural-resource base, harsh physical environment, faulty policies, and weak institutions in many African countries go far in explaining the relative ineffectiveness of foreign aid in the region. It is difficult for foreign aid to bring about beneficial and sustainable changes where economic growth itself is stymied by government policies that discourage investment, by ineffective or corrupt public institutions, or by political repression and instabilities—all problems evident in much of the region.

But at a deeper level, this explanation for the ineffectiveness of aid in Africa is unsatisfying. Those deciding whether to aid African countries or not have been the donors of that aid, both governments and international organizations. They could always have decided to terminate aid where it was clearly ineffective. Moreover, in Africa more than in any other region of the world, the donors have had the major say over how the aid has been used. African governments have typically been exceptionally eager to obtain as much foreign aid as possible and have rarely rejected donor-proposed aid programs. As a result, Africans have frequently ceded much of the responsibility for identifying, designing, and implementing aid-funded activities to the donors, which have for the most part gladly seized the initiative. Both aid agencies and African officials have acknowledged the phenomenon of "donor-driven" aid. General Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, once lamented, "In education and in industrialization, we have used borrowed ideas, utilized borrowed experiences and funds and engaged borrowed hands. In our development programmes and strategies, not much, if anything, is ours."

Third, on the basis of the case studies of eight major donors operating in Africa (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, the World Bank, and the European Union), it is clear that the principal causes of the developmental ineffectiveness of aid have been two. One is the allocation of that aid for nondevelopmental purposes—primarily diplomatic and commercial. But contrary to widely held views (especially among development practitioners), this is not the main problem. The primary problem is the lack of capacity on the part of aid agencies to undertake the kind of interventions they have attempted with the amount of aid they have tried to disperse. Most donors have attempted to commit large and (until recently) rising amounts of aid to African countries, an increasing quantity of which has funded the complex interventions mentioned above. While the problems donors have attempted to address with this aid are key ones in African development, the aid agencies themselves have often lacked the technical experience, local knowledge, staff, and appropriate processes to manage such projects and programs effectively. And they have usually been driven by bureaucratic and political imperatives to spend the monies available to them, often regardless of the economic and political conditions in recipient countries or their own capacity to design and manage effective projects and programs. A major study of the World Bank observed that "the Bank committed the very error that it saw as the root of the region’s problems; like the SSA [sub-Saharan African] state, it manifested a marked inability to judge institutional limitations. Though it correctly saw institutional weakness as the heart of the region’s predicament, it overestimated its own ability to help in such matters." What is true of the World Bank—among the more capable aid agencies—is true of the others. Aid agencies have overreached in Africa. And their individual weaknesses have been multi-
plied by the large number of agencies (usually numbering forty to fifty per country) operating without strong coordination among them.

Fourth, the performance of aid agencies in Africa is not uniform. While they share common patterns of performance, there are also important differences. These differences, described in detail in the case studies, are the result of the autonomy (that is, ability to make policy and allocative decisions based on developmental criteria) and the capacity of individual aid agencies. Each of these characteristics is determined by a number of specific factors. Among those factors, geopolitical posture and domestic political institutions and players (including other government agencies, legislatures, political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and other organized and informal groups) claim the major roles. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have gained increasing influence over the aid programs of a number of the countries examined here. Foreign aid may be a tool of development, but its use is greatly affected by domestic factors peculiar to the aid-giving countries.

The study concludes with a number of recommendations intended to enhance the effectiveness of aid in Africa, involving a significant reorientation in the way aid agencies do business in the region.

**Foreign Aid and Development: The Conceptual Landscape**

There is a large and diverse literature on the impact of foreign aid on development, of which only the most summary description will be offered here to indicate the location of this study in the broader discourse and to identify some of its intellectual precursors. This discourse on aid and development has taken place at both the theoretical and practical (or empirical) levels and in a number of disciplines.

At the risk of some oversimplification, we can identify two main approaches to analyzing the impact of aid on development. There is the “contextual” approach, which tends to be more theoretical and considers that the impact of aid on development is primarily a function of the broader economic and political context in which it is provided. And there is the “instrumental” approach, which is more empirically oriented and evaluates the impact of aid largely in terms of the success or failure of the programs and projects it finances.

Within the contextual approach, there are several different theories of the impact of aid on development. One emphasizes the relations of power between rich and poor countries. An example of this is the “dependency” school, which views underdevelopment and poverty as a consequence of the exploitation by powerful capitalist countries (the “center”) of weak developing countries (the “periphery”). “Dependendistas” have viewed aid as a tool of capitalism to reinforce exploitative behavior and, therefore, deepen underdevelopment and poverty. The polemical nature of many of these works, their weak empirical bases, and the very real economic progress evident in much of the developing world have discredited this approach in scholarly circles. (Not surprisingly, it never had much currency among Western development practitioners.)

During the 1990s, another, related view of aid and development appeared. “Deconstructionism” was inspired in part (like the dependency school) by the great disparity of power between the rich, developed world and the poorer developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The deconstructionist approach—reflected primarily in the writings of anthropologists—attacked the validity of the very idea of “development” and the concepts and discourse it has engendered as an invention of Western capitalism, intended to create “an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World,” but with little basis in the realities of that world, which in any case, it was argued, cannot easily be known or articulated accurately by Westerners. Foreign aid is simply a tool for the exercise of power by the donor, with little relevance to (and possibly with negative consequences for) the lives of recipients.
In its extreme form, deconstructionist discourse is highly polemical and poorly grounded empirically. Taken to its logical conclusion, it implies that the scientific method itself is artificial. In effect, one cannot know; one can only imagine. However, its more moderate, empirically oriented adherents have produced insightful studies analyzing the impact of aid on the societies in which it is provided. One such work is by James Ferguson, who examined an aid-financed rural development project in Lesotho and found that it failed to achieve its goals largely because the “development apparatus” providing it, immersed in a discourse of its own creation, misunderstood the social and political environment in which it was working. Additionally, the project had the effect of expanding bureaucratic power and “depoliticizing” poverty by treating it as if it were a technical problem rather than a consequence of the unequal distribution of political power within Lesotho.

Another, very different approach to the contextual analysis of the impact of aid on development revolves around assumptions about states and markets. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the “mainstream” discourse on aid and development has been conducted by Western-trained economists and, to a lesser extent, political scientists. It is also this discourse (on which more detail is provided in chapters 2 and 3) that has been the main influence on aid policies. Mainstream development specialists during the 1950s and 1960s viewed underdevelopment as a result primarily of the lack of savings and investment in poor countries. It was further assumed that states—even in poor countries—could plan and implement effective development policies and programs and that because of the weakness of markets, they should do so. Where state capacity was weak, technical assistance could overcome that weakness. Deficiencies in resources could be remedied with increased amounts of money and technical assistance from external sources—primarily in the form of concessional loans and grants from foreign governments, since for much of this period, only a very limited amount of private international capital was available to poor countries. Foreign aid would thus help stimulate growth and reduce poverty. Perhaps the best-known articulation of this view was by Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout in “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development,” published in the American Economic Review in 1966.

While this approach informed much of the early discourse on aid and development, it was not unchallenged by those who were much more skeptical of the ability of states (because of their ineptitude and, often, their capture by greedy elites) to play a positive role in managing development and much more confident of the ability of markets—if left alone by governments—to spur growth. Peter Bauer of the London School of Economics, for example, argued that the main impediments to growth were misguided government policies and that foreign aid would simply strengthen and even expand those impediments.

The 1980s and 1990s saw a blend of these two contrary views of the capacity and roles of states and markets and their implications for foreign aid. The failure of many states in the developing world as well as in the former Socialist bloc countries to promote healthy growth (spotlighted by the debt crisis and the collapse of Communism in the 1980s) led mainstream economists to argue that the influence of states over markets needed to be circumscribed. Foreign aid could be effective in promoting development when provided to states as an incentive to encourage policy and regulatory reforms, which would free markets and stimulate investment and growth. Anne Krueger articulated this role of aid in development in her “Aid in the Development Process” in the World Bank’s Research Observer in 1986.

Once economic-policy change, or “structural adjustment,” became a focus of the discourse on aid and development, it was only a short step to ask why governments of developing countries adopted policies that appeared to defeat their stated goals of promoting economic growth, and how foreign aid might influence policymaking by those governments. A number of political scientists and economists in the 1980s demonstrated that governmental policies reflected the interplay of powerful political interests within countries (and within the governments themselves). In this “political economy” approach, aid and aid agencies, it was argued, could play the role of external constituents for economic-policy change—in effect, substituting for or strengthening domestic constituencies for reform. Two notable

By the mid-1990s, a number of aid agencies had extended the logic of leveraging economic-policy change into the political realm, attempting to use their assistance as an inducement for political reform, including improved governance (involving greater transparency, accountability, and predictability) and, often, democratization on the part of recipient governments. While there was little dispute that transparent, accountable governments supporting the rule of law were important to create an environment for investment and development, the assumptions, made by a number of aid agencies, that democracy was key to ensuring both good governance and development and that foreign aid was an effective tool in promoting democracy in developing countries were still controversial.

Another contextual approach to aid and development focused not on states and markets but on the distribution of income within particular states. Proponents of this approach (popular particularly in the 1970s) argued that where there was an inequitable distribution of income (and this included most poor countries), economic growth would benefit the poor little and might even make them poorer. Aid could be effective in bettering their lives only if it were used to fund government programs and projects intended to benefit the poor directly. For example, Dudley Seers of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and Mahbub ul Haq of the World Bank argued that the focus of aid should be to address problems of unemployment and poverty. The latter argument had a considerable impact on aid policies during the 1970s, leading to an effort on the part of a number of agencies to target the basic human needs of the poorer elements of the population of developing countries. Targeting aid directly on the poor remains a core element in the policies advocated by many NGOs and others in the development community today.

Turning to the instrumental approach to assessing the impact of aid on development, we find two clusters of literature. One involves highly polemical exposés of the iniquities of aid donors, usually based on a series of anecdotes presented by the author. One of the numerous examples of this genre is Lords of Poverty by Graham Hancock, who asserted that foreign aid as a tool of development is fundamentally flawed by the misguided policies, bureaucratic inefficiency, self-interest, and corruption of official aid agencies— and should be terminated.

More sober and balanced and far more important contributions to the instrumental approach to evaluating aid and development are the efforts by scholars and practitioners to assess the impact of aid, based on available evaluations, studies, and other empirical materials. By the 1980s, with the increasing amount of data on aid and growth and the evaluations undertaken by aid agencies, a number of scholars attempted to determine whether foreign aid had had a positive impact on development. One group took a quantitative approach, examining the statistical relationship between aid flows and economic growth. They found no significant, systematic relationship between aid and growth, suggesting that aid either was too small to have an impact or was not able to deliver the growth benefits it promised. A 1996 quantitative study done by Craig Burnside and David Dollar of the World Bank found that when monetary, fiscal, and trade policies in recipient countries were taken into account, aid had a positive impact on growth in supportive policy environments.

Another group of analysts took a different approach. Robert Cassen and associates in Does Aid Work? examined evaluations of a large number of aid-funded projects and programs in various parts of the world and concluded that aid was effective in achieving its goals most of the time. Where aid was ineffective, Cassen pointed to donors’ multiple goals (other than development) as a key factor. Another study, by Vernon Ruttan, Anne Krueger, and Constantine Michaelopolous, based on country and sectoral case studies, also found evidence for the effectiveness of aid when the policy environment was supportive.
A few studies of aid, located primarily in the field of public administration and organizational analysis, addressed another influence on the effectiveness of aid: the nature of aid agencies themselves. Two notable examples of this approach are Judith Tendler and Dennis Rondinelli, who have both examined the organizational characteristics of one aid agency—the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—and how they affected its performance. Their findings have identified the problem of “fit” between the operational processes of aid agencies, often aimed at control, and the realities of managing what are often highly experimental interventions in foreign lands. They have also examined the incentives and constraints on decisions and actions created by aid bureaucracies themselves—for example, the pressures to spend all available monies. This book draws on a number of their insights in explaining the developmental effectiveness of aid in Africa.

Other scholars have examined particular types of aid. On aid for policy reform, Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye, in Aid and Power, found a mixed record of effectiveness in World Bank structural-adjustment lending, with the political conditions in the borrowing countries themselves playing a key role. Uma Lele, in her ambitious and valuable Aid to African Agriculture, found evidence of limited effectiveness of smallholder agriculture projects in a number of African countries, with a combination of weak African institutions and poor donor practices at the core of the problems.

Uma Lele’s study was the first major examination of the effectiveness of aid focused entirely on Africa. Robert Cassen had found earlier that aid in Africa had been particularly disappointing but did not attempt to explain why in detail. But with the deteriorating economic situation in Africa, others followed Lele’s lead. Tony Killick, in a study for the World Bank in 1991, primarily blamed recipient countries’ policies for the apparent failure to improve economic performance. Like Cassen, Killick identified the nondevelopmental goals of donors (that is, promoting foreign policy or commercial interests) as important in the poor performance of aid.

Another book focusing on the effectiveness of aid is Improving Aid to Africa, by Nicolas van de Walle and Timothy Johnson. This short study accepted that aid had been largely ineffective in promoting development. It pointed to policy, institutional, and financial weaknesses on the part of recipients and, echoing the findings of others, to problems with the multiple goals and bureaucratic policies of donors.

**The Locus of This Study**

This study builds on the findings of many earlier studies of aid’s effectiveness. It shares the “mainstream” assumptions that underdevelopment and poverty are objective, measurable phenomena, and that foreign aid, when designed and implemented appropriately in a supportive policy and institutional environment in recipient countries, can further development. The study examines in some detail the record of aid in Africa, including the size and duration of aid flows, as well as the type of assistance (project, program, technical) and sector to determine what sorts of aid-funded activities have been more or less effective.

The principal focus is on the performance of aid agencies in Africa and the factors affecting that performance. But aid donors differ considerably in their policies, programs, and procedures. To assess the performance of different donors, the study provides a comparative analysis of eight bilateral and multilateral donors, representing 60 percent of the total concessional assistance to Africa. These are the United States; the two major colonial powers, France and the United Kingdom; Japan, the second largest bilateral donor after France; Sweden, the largest of the Nordic donors; and Italy, among the largest donors in the early 1990s (and whose performance in Africa has particularly interesting lessons). Also included are the two principal multilateral donors—the World Bank and the European Union. Finally, this is an “agency centered” study, focusing specifically on the autonomy and capacity of aid agencies and the factors influencing those two key characteristics.
The Plan of the Study

This study attempts to understand a problem—the disappointing impact of foreign aid on development in Africa. As such, it inevitably cuts across several social-science disciplines, including political science, economics, and sociology. However, the focus is primarily on politics because at the core of the problems of development in Africa and the performance of aid agencies are political factors: power, policy choice, the influence of political institutions, and the functioning of public organizations. To examine these political factors, the study applies concepts from a number of areas of political science, described below.

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter reviews development in Africa and asks why it has proven so disappointing. Building on the extensive literature on African politics and African political economy, the chapter emphasizes the key roles of economic policies, the institutional weaknesses of African governments, and the political and social factors explaining the unsustainable development model adopted in much of the region. A final section examines the African side of the effectiveness equation—the impact of government policies and institutions (including the way Africans sought to manage their aid and their aid relationships with donors) on aid’s effectiveness.

The third chapter scrutinizes the phenomenon of foreign aid itself, including its size and impact in Africa. This chapter draws on the literature of aid and development as well as the growing literature on aid’s effectiveness, already previewed above. Empirical data is drawn primarily from the studies and evaluations of aid projects and programs generated by the aid agencies, bilateral and multilateral, managing that aid. The fourth chapter introduces the eight case studies of the performance of aid agencies. In describing a framework for analyzing their performance, it borrows insights from works on policy choice, including bureaucratic politics, the “new institutionalism,” and collective action, as well as from public administration and the smaller field of policy implementation. The case studies of aid agencies, organized in four chapters, include the eight donors, and these studies draw on articles, books, documents, and interviews. These case studies draw brief conclusions on the factors affecting the effectiveness of their aid in Africa, to be further analyzed and compared in a final chapter. That chapter offers conclusions on effective aid, a comparison of the policies and politics of the different aid agencies, and a discussion of trends in foreign aid, and proposes a set of reforms to improve the effectiveness of aid in Africa.

Sources and Methods

This study is based on extensive empirical research. But it is also informed by my own experience in the U.S. government, most recently as the deputy administrator of USAID, where I had to deal with issues of politics, policy, resource allocation, program implementation, and agency management. My experiences have sharpened my instincts and insight on how the policy process actually works and on how institutions and individuals relate to one another on foreign-assistance issues. I have also had a chance to observe the policy process in other governments and institutions examined here. Further, my experience in the senior management of an aid agency has heightened my appreciation for the roles of organizations and processes in the implementation of policy and program choices. Because of that experience, this book, the writing of which was interrupted by my three-year service in USAID, has a shape quite different from its original plan.

For the materials in the case studies of eight aid agencies, I have relied on studies and evaluations, primarily funded by the aid agencies themselves, supplemented by other studies, both official and scholarly. I have not read all the audits, completion reports, and impact evaluations produced by the agencies discussed in this book—that would be humanly impossible, since they number in the thousands. And in any case, it would not produce robust, finely grained comparisons since the scope and rigor of evaluative materials varies enormously. I have relied therefore on impact studies, summaries of comple-
tion reports, particular evaluations where available, studies, and other relevant materials to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the aid of individual agencies. These materials permit only broad generalizations or comparisons among aid agencies. They nevertheless provide abundant insights into patterns of effective or ineffective aid.

In assessing the autonomy and capacity of aid agencies, I have used published and unpublished documents of governments and international institutions as well as official policy statements and studies by aid agencies themselves. I have also consulted the staffs and drawn on studies of aid agencies undertaken by various research institutes in Europe and the United States, including the Overseas Development Council in Washington, the Overseas Development Institute in London, and the German Development Institute in Berlin. I have consulted scholarly books, articles, and, where relevant, newspaper reports. Supplementing these written materials are interviews with current or former officials of all the aid agencies examined here, officials from other parts of donor governments, officials from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), outside experts, NGO staff, journalists, and African officials and experts on aid. When I can, I cite those I have interviewed. In some cases, I must protect the confidentiality of those still associated with their governments or multilateral aid agencies or others in sensitive positions. I have also drawn on my own extensive experience with officials of the agencies included here (and other experts) and the hundreds of discussions I have had, particularly when I was a government official myself, on the issues examined in this book.

The scope of this study is uncomfortably broad, as it must be to answer the practical and fundamental question it raises. It identifies patterns of policy and performance and draws conclusions on the basis of those patterns. Inevitably, there will be exceptions to generalizations about the effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa and on the behavior of aid agencies. I trust that the weight of evidence and argument is nevertheless compelling. I hope that this book leads to debate and to further research on those many aspects of aid effectiveness and donor performance that are controversial and uncertain.

There is one concluding point to make. While this book focuses on the problems of effective aid in Africa, its intent is not to attack aid but to understand and improve it. This study’s findings indicate not that aid should end but that we should examine it dispassionately in order to better its effectiveness. There is plenty of evidence that this is both possible and urgently required. There is still in Africa so little done and so much to do.

Chapter 9: Findings

It is now time to pull together the evidence and threads of argument in this study and suggest some directions for the future of aid in Africa. This chapter first addresses several sets of findings: broad conclusions regarding the effectiveness of aid in Africa, the performance of aid donors based on the case studies, and other findings, some of which are relevant to the fields of comparative politics and international relations. Based on these findings, a second section makes proposals—some of them significant departures from the status quo—on how the developmental effectiveness of aid in Africa can be enhanced.

Findings on the Effectiveness of Aid in Africa

We can now answer the question we began with: why, with so much aid, has there been so little development in Africa? Extraordinarily high levels of aid relative to the size of its economies have gone to the region over an extended period. At the same time, economic development has been disappointing by almost any standard. Foreign aid, which is supposed to promote development, has had some real successes in Africa, proving that it can be effective. But it has frequently proven unsatisfactory in impact and its positive results unsustainable over the long run. The more complex the aid-funded interventions (that is, the more they involved multiple activities and required social, political, and behavioral change), the less effective they have been.
A basic lesson is that while foreign aid can promote development, it does not guarantee development. And more aid does not necessarily buy more development. Indeed, unless it carefully avoids reinforcing flawed policies and poor governance, weakening African institutions and creating dependence, more aid can buy less development. This may seem an exceedingly obvious conclusion to many readers, but it has yet to become part of the public discourse on aid, judging from the continuing focus on the size, rather than the impact, of aid and the reluctance of many of the supporters of aid to recognize and address its failures and limitations.

On the other hand, large flows of aid do not automatically retard development, another basic lesson confirmed by this study. Data relating aid flows to growth show no strong correlation one way or the other. This may seem like another terribly obvious conclusion. But this is not apparent in many of the continuing criticisms of foreign aid. Behind both of these lessons is the point that factors other than the amount of aid—even when relatively large—often play a critical role in determining its effectiveness. This was noted early on in the literature on aid and development but has often been neglected in discussions of policy and even scholarly debate. The experience of aid in Africa cannot but remind us again of this important point.

What other factors explain aid’s ineffectiveness in Africa? Much attention has been rightly paid to the responsibilities of Africans—in particular, a poor policy environment and weak institutions. The policy and institutional weaknesses reflect strong social forces and political tendencies within many African countries. But much of the responsibility for the ineffectiveness of aid must rest with the donors. They have always decided which countries to aid, and in Africa—more so than in other regions of the world—they have often had the predominant say about how their aid is used. Donors, usually for diplomatic purposes, often have chosen to provide large amounts of aid to governments with little commitment to development. While this aid may have attained its diplomatic goals, much has been wasted or even counterproductive from a developmental standpoint. But misallocation of aid from a developmental point of view is only a part of the problem. The other, more serious, problem involves the way the aid has been designed and managed by aid donors. There are three elements to this problem. First is the increasingly complex and experimental nature of aid interventions, often designed by foreigners with too little knowledge of local conditions (and frequently, without the engagement and assistance of Africans who have it), shaped by elaborate programming processes that are a poor fit for such experimental work.

Second are the constraints on aid programs deriving from domestic politics and bureaucratic imperatives within donor countries. These pressures, such as the imperative to spend available monies and the influence of political parties, private interests, and government agencies themselves, are described in the individual case studies. Third is the multiplicity of poorly coordinated aid agencies operating in individual African countries. By ceding such a large amount of discretion to aid agencies and failing to coordinate them effectively, African officials have deprived those agencies of what is in many other countries a form of mediation undertaken by recipient government officials by which they help shape the aid according to their local needs and capacities—and sometimes reject the aid when it appears inappropriate.

Aid Effectiveness and Donor Performance

Let us examine the specific findings of the case studies on the performance of aid donors in Africa that lie behind these more general conclusions. Many aid agencies exhibit similar patterns of performance, but nearly every one has a particular lesson to teach.

1. If an aid agency lacks both autonomy and capacity, significant and rapidly increasing amounts of aid are likely to end in programmatic and political disaster. At best, the aid is likely to be wasted. At worst, it may be captured by agencies and interests with no commitment to promoting development and, once it becomes known that the aid has been
diverted to other uses, public support for aid is likely to plummet. Italian aid in Africa best exemplifies this finding.

2. The experience of Japan in Africa would seem to contradict this finding. Here is a case in which the autonomy of the two aid agencies active there—JICA and OECF—was weak vis-à-vis other government agencies and the capacity of both agencies was limited (though they were far larger and stronger technically than the Italian aid agencies). Yet, Japan seems to have suffered no major aid disasters in Africa. Several explanations of Japan’s experience are plausible. One is that Japan has few high-priority diplomatic or economic interests in Africa and relatively little experience there, so the temptation to divert aid for nondevelopmental ends has been limited. Second, the Japanese have recognized the limitations on their capacity to program development aid in Africa and have sought to shift some of the responsibilities for designing and implementing programs to others—through cofinancing with the World Bank and procuring through British Crown Agents and by undertaking projects that emphasize infrastructure rather than the more complex and experimental interventions.

3. If the autonomy of an aid agency is limited and other government agencies are eager to deploy aid for nondevelopmental purposes, the aid allocated for those other purposes will tend to be sizable and less effective or even wasted from a development point of view. This is the case not only because the recipients may include incompetent or corrupt governments, but also because deploying aid for one purpose usually constrains the ability to use it for other purposes and, in particular, the ability to withhold it if one of the other purposes cannot be met. The case studies best illustrating these findings are the United States and France. They had strongly diplomatic motives for aiding particular African regimes, and a number of those regimes turned out to be developmental disasters, leading to a waste of aid. However, with the end of the Cold War and with the economic stresses in the region during the 1980s and 1990s, the diplomatic and commercial interests of most donor governments in Africa (the greatest exception being France) have diminished along with the pressures to divert aid for purposes other than development. This is a positive change from a developmental point of view.

4. However, an important finding of this study is that the diversion of aid for nondevelopmental purposes is only one explanation of the problems of aid in Africa and not the most important. The other major explanation involves the capacity of agencies to manage aid. For example, the World Bank is the most autonomous aid agency considered in this study, yet it has experienced considerable problems in Africa. These problems have involved the design and implementation of projects and programs on the part of Bank staff and are the result primarily of two factors: the absence of the extensive local knowledge and experience that can come from an informed and authoritative field presence, and the bureaucratic pressures to spend that have resulted in hasty project preparation and have limited the incentives for Bank staff to refuse to lend where conditions were unpropitious. This last point also applies to the European Development Fund, which has long had limited ability to refuse to provide agreed levels of aid to its African partners. Other donors have often been influenced by pressure to obligate available funds within given time periods, reducing their incentives to make prudent decisions.

5. There is an assumption—both intuitively persuasive and widely shared by development practitioners—that an extensive and authoritative field presence is important to the design and implementation of effective aid. This study does not prove or disprove definitively the validity of this assumption. It does, however, demonstrate that such a presence is no proof against problems of program and project design and implementation. USAID has the most extensive and authoritative field presence of any aid agency, and yet it has not avoided these problems, even in countries where it was the principal decision-maker on the size and use of the aid. USAID and the World Bank are interesting contrasts in this regard—one that has had an extensive field presence and one that has not. But the evaluations of project and program performance in Africa of the two aid agencies do not show substantial differences in the effectiveness of their aid. (It is possible that such differences exist, but they do not appear to be significant enough to be picked
up in evaluations). USAID's disappointing experience with its field missions appears to be a result of the bureaucratization of those missions—particularly because of the excessive demands put on mission personnel by Washington. It might be said that field missions have not produced the highly effective aid hoped for because they have never been fully free to do so.

6. One of the problems evident in many of the aid programs in Africa is that they have been “donor driven”—with projects identified, planned, and implemented with only a minimal input from African officials and private individuals. Not only do donor-driven projects risk being unworkable in the unfamiliar social and political environments of Africa, but as many have noted before, they often lack “ownership” on the part of Africans—the sense of involvement and commitment by those affected and the generation of benefits that create a supportive constituency—so that when aid ends, the projects collapse. However, what is not so widely recognized in the development community is that “recipient driven” projects may fare no better, if the experience of Sweden in Tanzania is anything to go by. African leaders, like leaders of countries elsewhere, are highly political, and among their goals development may not rank high. African government agencies, too, tend to be greatly politicized and lacking in capacity. Aid monies left to them to allocate are likely to be used for purposes with a high political payoff. Donors concerned about the developmental effectiveness of their aid in Africa cannot take a hands-off posture on how it is used. The challenge confronting the donors is finding the right balance between control and diffidence.

7. The aid donor with seemingly a combination of the greatest autonomy and capacity is the United Kingdom. For much of the period of this study, DfID (formerly ODA) was formally part of the Foreign Office. But it nevertheless functioned with a considerable degree of discretion in Africa. And its professionalism has also been highly regarded, though it has lacked an extensive field presence. Yet its own completion reports suggest a degree of effectiveness in Africa not significantly different from that of the World Bank. The performance of the more capable aid agencies suggests that in regard to effectiveness of aid in Africa no agency has got it right yet.

To sum up, these findings suggest that an absence of autonomy and capacity in aid agencies can lead to disasters. Limitations on the autonomy of agencies can lead to a use of aid for nondevelopment purposes and to significant wastage from a development perspective. But even agencies with a considerable degree of autonomy and capacity have delivered ineffective aid in Africa. We must continue to search for the reasons why.

The Problem of Capacity

In chapter 4, we pointed to the importance of the fit between organizational form and function. It is a familiar issue in public administration and organizational analysis. It is also a problem that specialists in development administration have raised in the past, though it has received relatively little attention from senior officials responsible for managing aid agencies and for shaping systems and processes by which those agencies do their business. The new systems and processes that aid agencies are beginning to borrow from popular notions of “reinventing government” (including, above all, programming for measurable and immediate results) may, if not handled carefully, further complicate and reduce the flexibility of what are essentially experimental ventures in promoting development in Africa and elsewhere. And always, the goal of expanding or at least avoiding decreases in budgets remains a high priority generating the familiar pressures to spend cited above.

What should the basic considerations of form and function be in managing aid for development? The most basic considerations are uncertainty and lack of control—uncertainty about how to accomplish risky tasks in unfamiliar environments that aid officials cannot control. Adding to their difficulties is the fact that their goals are often ambiguous and outcomes difficult to measure. These characteristics of the “task environment”
of aid agencies suggest that such agencies, to be most effective, should have a number of key qualities: a minimum degree of decentralization of staff and authorities to the field where their work must be accomplished (but not so much as to lose broad program and policy coherence) and with the opportunity to spend time outside of field offices learning about the society in which they are posted, programming systems that permit and reward experimentation and learning, a technically qualified staff capable of managing all the various types of activities the aid agency undertakes, the involvement of local individuals and groups in the planning and implementation of aid-financed activities (consistent with the maintenance of programming standards and accountability), a system of evaluation that is reliable, comprehensive, accessible, and with incentives for staff to use its findings, and incentives for aid officials to decide not to plan and obligate monies where conditions are not supportive of the success of their programs or projects. The bottom line is that aid agencies, probably more than any other government agencies, need to be flexible, “learning” agencies with the ability to say no. However, these characteristics are present only to a limited degree in the agencies examined in this study, which are organized and function more like firms or public organizations where goals are relatively clear, measurable technologies for accomplishing them are known, and the environment in which those goals are achieved is easily controlled.

In reality, aid agencies tend to be highly centralized, with most decisions made at headquarters, to have elaborate, standardized, and at times rigid programming systems, to use the quantity of funds spent as a measure of the effectiveness of projects and programs while having weak and underused evaluation systems. As a result of these misfits, projects and programs are often poorly designed and implemented, pressures to spend drive programmatic decisions, the real impact of those programs and projects is often unknown, and what is known is seldom used to inform similar activities—with the result that mistakes in policy and programming are repeated many times before they are corrected. Aid agencies do learn, but slowly and expensively.

Why does this misfit exist and persist—despite the past critiques by a number of experts on aid administration? The main reasons are political: the size and often the use of the aid are driven by domestic political and bureaucratic imperatives, as the case studies in this book have shown. In contrast to many government agencies in Western countries, the intended beneficiaries of aid agencies—the poor in other countries—have very little say over how aid agencies are organized and run because those agencies are not accountable to those beneficiaries. One can imagine what kind of collective action European or American farmers would take if government programs intended to benefit them proved as ineffective as development aid programs in Africa. Pressures for more effective programs would likely force the adoption of more appropriate organizational and programmatic systems. Absent these pressures, aid agencies have tended to adopt programming systems similar to those that are known and used in other government agencies or preferred by legislators, bureaucrats, and policy-level officials keen to centralize power, to regularize processes, to spend available monies, to control programs, and to maximize political support for their activities and their budgets. We shall address the question undoubtedly in the reader’s mind, what, if anything, is to be done about this problem, in the last part of this chapter.

The Autonomy of Aid Agencies

We posited at the beginning that the autonomy of an aid agency is influenced by the degree to which it has allies within governments and constituents outside it that support its development mission. Let us elaborate our findings in these two categories.

In terms of the relationships of aid agencies with other government agencies, there appear to be several findings from the case studies worth noting. One is that in the three-way contest for influence over aid funds within donor governments—between ministries of foreign affairs, economic ministries, and aid agencies themselves—ministries of foreign affairs have most often been the winners on issues of “high” diplomatic politics, that is, where important national or presidential priorities were involved. Where such issues were
few or nonexistent in Africa (for example, for Sweden), these conflicts were far fewer and the priorities of aid agencies—promoting development—were more influential. However, where the ministry of foreign affairs had an interest in the aid program, it often limited the influence of economic ministries. This appears to have been the case in the United States, where the Department of State played an important— and the Department of Commerce and the Export-Import Bank a minor—role in the allocation of aid during the Cold War.

Despite the reliance of most aid agencies on ministries of foreign affairs (or their incorporation into those ministries), many have nevertheless managed to operate with a degree of autonomy. Thus, a second finding—contrary to what may have been expected—is that the institutional location of aid agencies does not necessarily determine their autonomy. The location of ODA within the British Foreign Office did not prevent it from exercising a considerable measure of autonomy over aid allocations in Africa, while the semi-independence of USAID from the Department of State has not prevented the latter from constraining the former’s autonomy to a significant degree (at least during the Cold War). Other factors playing a role in autonomy include the organization and governance of the aid agency (or agencies), the respect accorded the development professionals and their mission by others in government, the leadership of the aid agency, and, very importantly, the size and influence of the constituency for development outside government.

Turning to the question of a constituency for development aid, this is the first study to examine and compare the role of NGOs—the primary development constituency for most aid agencies—in bolstering (or limiting) the autonomy of aid agencies. The materials and analysis generated by the case studies of aid donors point to a number of findings that are relevant not only to the practical interests of this book but to those parts of the fields of comparative government and international relations concerned with the role of transnational, nonstate actors in influencing policy choices of governments, and in the case of this study, of multilateral development banks as well.

1. NGOs interested in development and related issues (for example, humanitarian relief, the environment, or population problems) have been increasing in number, organization, political sophistication, and influence on policy. Their growth has been encouraged by the political space created by democratization in much of the world, by the prominence and encouragement given NGOs through the various UN summits of the 1990s, through the example of the influence of NGOs in developed countries—for instance, in the United States—and by NGOs themselves, which have established formal and informal networks of information, support, and advice. We have here in effect a rapidly expanding worldwide network of nonstate actors, acting at times separately, at times together, to influence government policy. They seek to influence not only governments but also multilateral institutions, including the two considered here—the World Bank and the European Commission. In the latter two cases, we have an instance of transnational nonstate actors seeking to influence other transnational, nonstate actors.

2. NGOs have become the most important constituency for the activities of development aid agencies. They have often supported the policies, programs, budgets, and, at times, survival of those agencies. But they have also at times been highly critical of those agencies and of their governments’ policies. In either case, the tactics of influence pursued by NGOs have varied according to the political systems in which they are functioning, much as institutionalists would predict. They typically seek important points of access to key policymakers and shape tactics according to the nature of that access. Where the legislature plays an important role in policy and individual legislators can be influential—as in the United States—NGOs focus on the legislature and adopt tactics intended to influence key legislators (for example, working through constituents or using legislators supporting their positions to pressure other legislators for support). In governments where the legislature plays a limited role in influencing policy, NGOs have attempted to cultivate close relations with relevant policy officials, through personal contacts and through serving on government advisory boards. NGOs in Sweden appear to have relied primarily on this avenue of influence, assuming that it was adequate to promote and protect their
interests. When it has proven possible, NGOs have turned to the courts (as in the United
Kingdom), challenging government policies on the basis of existing legislation. In Japan,
NGOs have resorted to gaiatsu—working through foreign NGOs to exert pressure on the
Japanese aid bureaucracy (replicating the same tactic of influence used by the Japanese
government officials in alliance with foreign government officials). And in most places,
NGOs have used the media—sometimes in a number of countries at the same time on the
same issue—to prod or embarrass governments to adopt desired policies.

3. NGOs have also found ways to criticize, to support, and to influence multilateral devel-
opment institutions. The World Bank and European Commission, as nonstate actors them-
selves, are accountable directly to their member states, but neither is directly accountable
to a legislature. NGOs have sought to influence such institutions primarily through three
channels: one has involved direct personal and institutional contacts, much as with bilat-
eral aid agencies. The World Bank and the European Commission both have advisory bod-
ies made up of NGOs. But NGOs have not relied solely on these channels for the good rea-
son that they provide only limited influence. They have utilized the media to support or
embarrass the multilaterals, much as they have with bilateral aid agencies. And where pos-
sible, they have worked through the legislatures of member states, again, much as NGOs
have done with bilateral aid agencies, where that has proven possible. This has been most
evident in the case of the United States. In the case of the World Bank, we also see the
influence of institutions on tactics, where NGOs in major contributing countries have linked
up with NGOs in borrowing countries to resist certain Bank policies, especially in the area
of the environment. Multilateral institutions, not surprisingly, produce multilateral tactics
of influence.

4. We have noted the tendency of a number of aid agencies to expand the portfolio of
activities they fund. This is most evident in the case of the World Bank, at least if the
statements of its president are an indication of its intent. But it is also evident in most
other aid donors—the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, the Europeans. In addition
to the more traditional portfolios of infrastructure, health, education, and agriculture, aid
is now provided for economic reforms, democratization, the environment, women in devel-
opment, and other purposes. Most of these activities are not new. What appears to be
novel is that most aid agencies want to do all of them. Despite declining budgets and
calls for more coordination and specialization based on the comparative advantages of
different agencies, portfolios of most aid agencies show every sign of expanding (or cer-
tainly not contracting). Why?

We can propose an answer based on the findings of this study. With the end of the Cold
War, one of the main rationales of foreign aid for the United States and a significant or
implicit rationale for a number of other governments for funding development in poor
countries is gone. Additionally, with the real economic progress in much of Asia and Latin
America, economic development is no longer the principal issue in the bilateral relations
of rich and poor countries. Foreign ministries have a declining interest in aid as an instru-
ment for achieving their diplomatic goals. Foreign-aid agencies are left to search for alter-
native rationales for what they do and a constituency that will support them in doing it.
NGOs are the obvious constituency. But NGO interests run strongly in the direction of
“people-oriented” development activities, and they are often organized to promote par-
ticular goals—such as improving the status of women or protecting the environment—
rather than the broader goal of development. Aid agencies seeking their support are
beginning to reflect their preferences but without dropping existing activities (in part
because those activities have constituencies inside aid agencies in favor of their contin-
uation). It appears that the political imperatives of finding relevance and garnering sup-
port are a key factor in the trend toward a broadening of aid agency portfolios.

5. Despite the recognition here of the growing influence of NGOs, it is also important to
recognize that NGOs, although increasing in numbers and influence, still remain relatively
weak in most political systems. Collective action is new for most of them; they are fre-
quently based volunteers who feel strongly about a normative issue but whose fervor may
wax and wane. And most of them are highly dependent on the financial support of their
own governments, potentially limiting their abilities to take strongly critical positions of those same governments. But much of the future size and direction of development aid is likely to be dependent on them, as the foreign-policy uses of aid diminish.

Public Opinion and Foreign Aid

It is worth examining comparative findings vis-à-vis public opinion and development aid in the case studies included here. There are two interesting questions in this regard: what can we deduce about the role of public opinion in supporting and influencing foreign aid? And what influences public opinion on foreign aid? First, public opinion usually plays a relatively passive role in supporting foreign aid. A supportive public (as in the case of Sweden) provides aid agencies with a friendly political environment and so, greater autonomy and a broader scope for action and perhaps experimentation. A less supportive public—as in the United States—is likely to lead to greater scrutiny and criticism of aid funding, likely to tolerate or demand greater constraints on action and experimentation and to require greater public accountability. Second, while the public may be relatively passive on foreign aid, it can be aroused by shocks (humanitarian disasters or scandals in the aid program) and exert enormous pressure on its government to respond to those shocks. Third, where a high proportion of the public turns against foreign aid (as in Italy), it is difficult for governments to continue such programs.

What influences the degree of public support for foreign aid? It appears that public education and advocacy campaigns make a difference. Governments, like that of Sweden, which have spent relatively large amounts of money on such campaigns over a significant period of time, have for the most part enjoyed a supportive public. Others, like the United States, have spent relatively little and have had considerably less public support for foreign aid. But public education is clearly only part of the answer. Another part is likely to be the basic values accepted by a country’s public. In Sweden, for example, the public was long broadly supportive of the idea that the rich had an obligation to help the poor and government was an appropriate vehicle for organizing much of that support.1 It was not difficult to make the case for development aid abroad to a public that already accepted these premises as bases for policies at home. However, in the United States, there has never been a strong consensus on the obligation of the rich to help the poor, and the role of government in U.S. society remains controversial. It appears that Americans often see foreign aid through a domestic welfare program optic and judge it accordingly. For this reason it may be much more difficult for a public education or advocacy program in the United States to gain significantly greater support for aid.

A third factor that clearly influences public opinion is economic conditions at home. Where countries suffer from recessions, their publics become less supportive of sending national resources abroad to help others. This is evident even in Sweden, with its high public support of foreign aid. Alternatively, where there are major disasters abroad, in which human suffering is made known to the publics of rich countries (as with the periodic droughts in Africa), support not only for relief but for overall development aid rises—at least for a time.

A Return to Hypotheses

Let us examine these findings in terms of the four hypotheses set out in chapter 4. Hypothesis number 1 was that the main impediment to aid effectiveness on the donor’s side was the use of aid for nondevelopmental purposes, reflecting primarily the influence of ministries of foreign affairs over its allocation and use. The case studies here suggest that the allocation of aid for nondevelopmental purposes was at times an impediment, but greater impediments were the limitations on the capacity of aid agencies to undertake the types of aid interventions they chose to mount.

A second hypothesis was that field missions with delegated authorities led to more effective aid. The findings of this study suggest that while such field missions may be help-
ful, they are no guarantee of more effective aid, as the case of USAID demonstrates. What seems likely is that field missions can contribute to effectiveness—indeed, they may be essential—but only if those in the field have the technical and local knowledge and the time (along with appropriate programming processes) to gather and maintain that knowledge which will allow them to shape and manage aid programs and projects appropriate to local needs and capabilities.

A third hypothesis was that programming processes must fit the tasks demanded of aid officers. There is much in these studies that suggests this is correct. Finally, a fourth hypothesis was that there needed to be “ownership” locally of aid interventions if they were to be effective. This study suggests that a degree of local involvement is critical, but donors are unwise to turn over all authority over decisions on the uses of aid to recipients if they want to ensure their aid has the desired impact and proves sustainable.

**Summing Up**

Can we boil down the findings of this study to a few basic points? Yes, and they appear to be three. First, the challenges of development in Africa are especially difficult and complex and involve not only economic but political and social change. Second, because of the eagerness of Africans for aid and the willingness of donors to provide it in significant amounts during much of the period covered by this study, the weight of decision making on how that aid has been used has fallen largely to the donors along with the corresponding responsibility for making it work. Third, aid donors, often because of the domestic political and bureaucratic factors that influence their aid, have been limited in their capacity to use the aid to realize the economic, political, and social changes needed to further development in Africa. The first of these points will not be altered easily or quickly. But there are things to be done to change the second and third points to produce more effective aid in Africa, and these things involve the donors of that aid. It is to the reform of foreign aid that we now finally turn.

**Whither Aid in Africa? Proposals for the Future**

It is usually expected in public life that the person who raises problems also offers solutions. The solutions to the problems of effective aid in Africa need to include fundamental reforms in the way aid agencies do business in Africa, if that business is to be more effective in the future than it has been in the past in supporting development. As a general matter, aid programs need to be “depoliticized”—meaning that aid agencies need greater autonomy, within the requirements of public accountability, to manage those programs to realize their development goals. More importantly, the agencies themselves need to create organizational structures, staffing, and more flexible programming systems appropriate to their tasks. Most importantly, aid agencies and their staffs need to eliminate bureaucratic pressures to spend. Aid officials need to be able to decide not to commit funds without being penalized. Finally, aid agencies need to create mechanisms that will ensure greater coordination and coherence in their programs in particular African countries.

Changes such as these run against the grain of politics in most of the countries examined here. They would require an act of political will on the part of aid-giving governments in Africa to depart from traditional domestic political and bureaucratic practices. But the time is propitious for such an initiative on the part of aid donors. The Cold War (with its attendant influences over allocations) is over; aid to Africa is declining, and many donors are rethinking their overall aid programs and reorganizing their bureaucracies. Moreover, among both Africans and aid agencies, there is an increasing concern about ineffective aid and what can be done about it.

However, more than an act of political will is necessary to achieve more effective aid in Africa. A set of new mechanisms involving the management of that aid is required. The proposals below describe just such mechanisms. Some of them represent a radical departure from the way aid is organized and delivered in Africa at present. They will be criticized as impractical and politically naive. I believe they are neither. I would ask the reader
to keep an open mind while reading them and to remember that in politics, what was believed to be impossible yesterday can seem inevitable today.

First, donors should shift much more responsibility for planning and programming their aid to their field staff in African countries receiving the aid, consistent with overall policy priorities of individual aid donors. That means a decentralization of staff to the field with delegated authorities to commit funds within agreed country budgetary levels, flexible programming systems to support field staff, and rigorous evaluation systems whose findings are widely disseminated and used. But decentralization is not enough, as the experience of USAID has demonstrated. Three other things are needed: field staff who have the time and incentives to work with potential recipients of their aid rather than spending time in their offices, much better coordination among donors in a country, and a much less intrusive approach to delivering the aid. These goals can be realized in a new organizational and programming mechanism shared by donors.

**Joint Donor Missions**

Donors should consider the establishment of joint missions in the field to which representatives of donor aid agencies would be accredited. Donor agencies would not surrender authority over decisions on the use of their aid to these missions, but their representatives to them would have authority to commit aid funds to agreed activities provided those activities were in accord with the broad policies and regulatory requirements of their agencies. These missions would agree with a counterpart African agency (probably a government agency but with input from relevant elements of civil society) on an overall country strategy for assistance. (The aid donors would no longer draft such strategies themselves; this would have to be done by the Africans). This strategy would provide a broad framework within which donors would plan their projects and programs. Different donors would then indicate which sectors or types of activities they would be willing to fund and the standards and conditions they would expect project and program proposals to meet.

The project and program proposals would be the responsibility of African governments and private-sector organizations to design and present to the joint donor mission for funding. This would be another departure from current practice. Aid donors could provide temporary technical assistance to African organizations if it were required for drafting fundable proposals. The proposals would be considered by the donors and approved for funding, rejected, or returned for revisions, much as philanthropic foundations do. Aid agencies would have to permit their representatives in the field to decline to spend available monies without negative consequences. Perhaps this would involve “no year” aid funding (that is, that aid monies appropriated for one year would remain available until spent). It would also mean that aid officials were evaluated not on how much money they committed but on the quality and, eventually, the outcome of the projects and programs they funded. They would have to remain in country or associated with country aid programs long enough for reasonable assessments of project or program outcomes to be made—more than the two or three years now common for aid assignments. This “demand-driven” approach would involve a far less intrusive posture on the part of aid donors and provide strong incentives for African institutions, public and private, to develop the capacity to design and manage aid-financed activities. It would also avoid the problems of “recipient-oriented” Swedish aid by requiring funding proposals to fit within overall strategies and individual donor priorities, and to meet agreed standards of quality and accountability.

I can almost hear the objections to these proposals. First, the Africans do not have the capacity to design and implement projects and programs. This may be true for many government agencies and NGOs at present. But it need not continue to be the case where there are incentives for capacity building. The problems of capacity in Africa today stem far less from the lack of trained manpower than ever in the past. Indeed, in many countries, there is an excess of educated Africans who could, where necessary, be further trained to manage development projects. What is needed are the incentives for governments and NGOs to utilize available capacity effectively. Where obtaining funding for
development projects hinges on being able to design and implement such projects effectively, it is likely in all but the poorest countries that the capacity could quickly be developed or strengthened. This is unlikely to happen, however, if donors continue to do the work themselves.

A second objection is that donors would never be willing to cede a substantial amount of the responsibility for designing and managing their aid to Africans since donor aid agencies must be accountable to their publics for the use of monies appropriated to them; and a number of donor governments have, in any case, motives other than promoting effective development for providing their aid. There are several responses to these objections. First, the approach suggested here is less intrusive but not less accountable. Aid agencies would still adopt goals and seek the most effective and efficient means of achieving those goals. They would still audit and evaluate the use and impact of their expenditures. But rather than design the details of the projects they fund, they would hold the recipients responsible for designing the details and enable the recipients to alter those details as they learned from implementation or as the conditions affecting those projects shifted. It should also be recognized that mistakes and failures will occur in some aid projects designed and managed by Africans, at least in the early years of such an approach. But donors must be prepared to accept such mistakes as a price of improvements in the long-run effectiveness of their aid. It is difficult to believe that the publics in donor countries would not be willing to tolerate such failures as a price of learning and eventual success on the part of Africans.

Another possible objection to the approach proposed here is that it would limit the ability of NGOs, other private interests, legislatures, and other government agencies to influence the allocation and use of aid. This is true, and it is in fact part of the intent of this proposal. One of the advantages of enhanced donor coordination and joint donor missions working within agreed country development strategies is that they could bolster aid programs in African countries that are shaped more by local needs and opportunities than by domestic politics and bureaucratic imperatives in donor capitals. A joint mission with some stature in donor capitals could act in effect as a lobby with individual donor governments wanting to alter planned aid levels or spend aid funds for purposes inconsistent with those to which it has committed itself as part of the joint mission.

Finally, the reader may be asking what all these proposals imply for the level of aid to Africa. My response is that it is the wrong question. If there is one important finding in this book, it is that the level of aid to African countries is not as important as what the aid accomplishes. Aid levels for individual countries should be decided on the basis of conditions in that country and on what donors and Africans together can expect to accomplish. In countries where economic policies are supportive of development and additional capital would reduce the constraint on growth, it may make sense to focus on the size of aid flows— the “gap-filling” approach still evident in the thinking of a number of aid donors. In countries where economic policies are not supportive of development or where nonfinancial obstacles (social, political, institutional) impede that development, it is not the overall level of aid that is critical but what the aid can do to remove those obstacles and bring about beneficial changes.

But, a persistent reader may demand, won’t the proposals outlined here result in lower levels of aid, at least in the short run, while African governments and NGOs gain the capacity to design and manage aid activities satisfactorily? This seems highly likely. But if less aid in the short run leads to more effective aid, a stronger local capacity, and a stronger sense of local capacity, and a stronger sense of local responsibility (together with less dependent attitudes toward aid donors) in the long run, the decline would prove beneficial. Indeed, these results are essential to the effectiveness of aid and to the future of development in Africa.

Those familiar with the fashions in foreign-aid discussions will note that the catch phrases of today— in particular, “participation” and “selectivity”— have rarely been mentioned in this book. There is a reason for this. Their popularity combined with their ambiguity often
obscures rather than furthers constructive discussions of the problems of aid effectiveness in Africa. Yet much of this book is about the core meanings of these words. The participation of the intended beneficiaries of aid—its “clients” in current-speak—need not only to be sought (often as far as “participation” goes on the part of aid donors) but needs to be part of the decision making on the use of foreign aid—in particular, its design and implementation. This does not mean, as some NGOs would have it, that beneficiaries ought to have complete say over how the aid is used. But to leave them out or involve them only perfunctorily as donors hasten to commit all their available monies is also a mistake and one not unfamiliar in donor practice.

Second, there is “selectivity.” The meaning of this concept is clear—aid should be provided to those who can use it effectively. This is an easy policy for donors to support but a difficult one for them to implement, as suggested—nay, as demonstrated—by the history of aid in Africa. The absence of selectivity based on development considerations has been one of the greatest weaknesses of aid, a weakness attributable to the way aid donors have managed their resources. The decline in nondevelopmental interests of donors in Africa and the contraction in available aid monies may fortify donor commitment to greater selectivity. But the flexibility and capacity on the part of donors to say no to potential recipients and to terminate aid where it is not working or where recipients are not fulfilling their parts of aid agreements is central to the use of aid as an effective incentive.

This book has attempted to answer the question, why with so much aid has there been so little development in Africa? It is an important question, and the answers should affect policies as well as the lives of the many Africans foreign aid seeks to benefit. However, the answers and reforms proposed here are a beginning, not an end, to making foreign aid a more effective tool for promoting development. There is still much we do not know about African societies and polities as well as about the potential contribution of aid to the betterment of the lives of Africans. It is my hope that this work may contribute not only to a better understanding of aid and development in Africa, better policies and practices and more effective aid there, but also to continuing efforts on the part of the practitioners, scholars, and beneficiaries of that aid to push out the frontiers of our knowledge yet further. There is, indeed, so much still to be done.

SMART SAMARITANS
Michael Clemens
From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007

How can rich outsiders help the poor in places where nothing seems to work? Fresh out of college, I worked on a United Nations project to bring new farming methods to a remote and impoverished jungle village in Colombia. The first clue as to the difficulties we would face hit me as soon as I stepped off the bus and saw the moldy, abandoned headquarters of an earlier project—apparently its only lasting achievement. Ninety minutes later came a second clue: guerrilla fighters massacred 18 people right outside town by firebombing the very bus route I had just taken.

As I talked to farmer after farmer, a landscape of challenges emerged. Which of many competing locals represented “the community”? Why should farmers listen to us when there were so many officials, indigenous leaders, business people, traffickers, soldiers, rebels, and missionaries peddling different, and often conflicting, advice? And even if our UN team somehow got the agronomy and the politics right in this village, what would that matter if the four-decade cycle of civil war continued?

Three years later, I found myself on a World Bank mission in the office of a government minister in Guyana, one of the poorest countries in South America. The minister’s telephone
interrupted our conversation. On the other end, he explained after hanging up, was an anonymous voice hinting that his children might not arrive home safely that night. Earlier that day, the minister had announced plans for court proceedings against a powerful Asian company active in the same area as our World Bank project. “That’s why I carry this,” he said, hoisting a leg onto the desktop to reveal a revolver strapped to his lower calf.

As an outsider, it seemed to me that the minister was a hero engaging villains in a high-stakes showdown to which I was largely irrelevant. No matter how carefully we on the World Bank team did our work, what could it achieve if we did not somehow help this man? How, exactly, could we help him from Washington? And anyway, how certain could we be that he was in fact a hero?

These are standard dilemmas for anyone involved in development projects. After being spurred to act, most are quickly forced to ponder the complexities of the systems with which they are interacting and consider what they can actually achieve—and what sorts of unintended consequences their efforts might have. Most go home—as I did—to opulent lives, while those left behind continue to live with few opportunities.

Two recent influential books by brilliant economists mark opposite poles in the debate that has arisen from such dilemmas. These works have come to define the policy discussion for anyone who studies how rich countries can help poor countries. It is a debate of great importance: where you come down between the opposing views leads to enormously different acts in government offices and in villages all over the world.

The first is Jeffrey Sachs’ The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. Sachs presents a deeply affecting moral argument for a carefully designed $195 billion annual program of village-level interventions in schooling, nutrition, sanitation, road paving, and malaria prevention. He is currently piloting his approach in around a hundred “Millennium Villages,” most of them in sub-Saharan Africa.

The second is William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Easterly is dramatically more skeptical of aid’s potential. He details a wide range of interventions in poor countries that—despite careful design and moral fervor—produced only waste or, in many cases, harm.

Sachs stresses the ethical imperative of bold, concerted action and derides “armchair economists” who do not offer constructive alternatives. Easterly criticizes “planners” such as Sachs, seeing more promise in the “searchers” who have historically solved economic problems in a decentralized, piecemeal fashion. Sachs highlights sins of omission, Easterly sins of commission. (Both men are affiliated with my employer, the Center for Global Development, Sachs as a board member and Easterly as a fellow.)

Many of those working day to day on poverty reduction, in both rich and poor countries, express dissatisfaction with both sides in this argument. Sachs’ exhortations do not convince many insiders because, according to the refrain, he promises too much and does not see the limits of money and technology. (One memorably described Sachs’ book to me as reflecting the thoughts of a “great preacher, mediocre theologian, and lousy minister.”) Yet even many of the battle-hardened assert that Easterly’s doubts go too far; they see him as a wise but blithe naysayer, comforting cynics who would happily leave poor countries to their fates.

Trapshooting

Paul Collier, an economist at Oxford, aims to fill the gap between the two poles. His new book, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, is meant to surmount the Sachs-versus-Easterly debate by remedying what Collier sees as the limitations of each view. Collier wants to temper Sachs’ grandiose claims by arguing that a worldwide aid plan will be ineffective and that assistance should be more focused in both space and time. And he seeks to temper Easterly’s aid skepticism.
by arguing that less should be expected and that the instruments of assistance should extend far beyond mere aid. As he puts it, rich countries must “narrow the target and broaden the instruments.”

Collier’s first step is to show that the people most in need of our attention are not all those who are poor but those who are both very poor and caught in countries whose economies are not growing. This includes about a billion people living in the 58 countries that have low per capita incomes and have not grown over the long term. Most of these countries are in Africa, but they also include Bolivia, Cambodia, Haiti, Laos, Myanmar, Yemen, and several Central Asia countries. There are many very poor people in other places, such as India, but at least that country is starting to generate opportunities for larger numbers of people. The poorest people everywhere might need humanitarian assistance, but development assistance—something distinct, for Collier—should go primarily to those countries currently achieving no sustained growth.

For the countries of the bottom billion, the long-term problem is not that they have lacked “sustainable, pro-poor growth ... it is that they have not had any growth.” Such stagnation, Collier argues, is due to a series of “traps”—traits that simultaneously cause and are reinforced by poverty, locking a country into a vicious cycle. Sachs, in his recent Reith Lectures on the BBC, focused on four traps: poor nutrition, debilitating disease, terrible infrastructure, and high fertility. Collier does not take serious issue with any of these but rather points out four related traps in which the bottom-billion countries are caught: armed conflict, dependence on natural-resource extraction, poor governance, and geographic isolation from good markets (this last is essentially identical to Sachs’ infrastructure trap).

The book’s discussion of these traps is rich and highly informative—even if some of the statistical evidence Collier cites remains controversial. In sketching the conflict trap, he questions simplistic notions that most wars in bottom-billion countries arise from ethnic strife (he cites Somalia’s relative ethnic homogeneity). And he argues that many groups rebelling against brutal regimes are not romantic freedom fighters; they are profit-obsessed resource grabbers.

Collier’s second trap, natural-resource dependence, is not simply a matter of a soaring currency killing nonresource exports—the “Dutch disease” economists often speak of. It is more importantly a problem of politics. A centralized source of easy and unaccountable cash tends to annihilate a fledgling democracy by creating patronage machines and lowering the pressure to develop a social contract that comes with effective taxation.

The third trap, poor governance, Collier highlights as particularly pernicious. Reforms that can assist growth often go against the interests of key actors, and when their death grip is broken in rare moments of reform, the technical skills necessary to exploit the chance are scarce. This is a direct attack on Sachs, who often suggests that donors invoke poor governance as an excuse to do nothing.

Finally, will globalization free the bottom billion from all these chains? No, Collier maintains, because other traps will prevent it. A trade trap arises: because it is cheaper to open manufacturing facilities in places where they are already concentrated, the poorest economies, even with their lower wages, cannot compete with the Asian export centers. An investment trap bites when individual international investors expect returns to be low and unpredictable in the poorest countries, thus eliminating potential finance for complementary industries that could raise or smooth those returns. There is even a self-confidence trap: Collier suggests that some African governments that have the possibility to break into new global markets “will not even try because they lack belief in themselves and expect to fail.” And the nature of all these vicious cycles is that they cannot be broken except through some extrinsic event; things will not get better automatically.

The Nobel laureate Robert Solow once wrote that economists are intellectual sanitation workers: their key contribution is to consign bad ideas to the trash. Collier seizes this
role vigorously, launching a devastating bombardment on people and organizations that, benevolently or malevolently, reinforce the traps: Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe would make his greatest contribution to development “by dying.” Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Christian Aid inhabit a “satisfyingly simple . . . fantasy world” and exercise “power without responsibility.” Advocates of “fair trade” effectively work to ensure that poor people “get charity as long as they stay producing the crops that have locked them into poverty.” Campaigners for trade barriers to protect poor countries from globalization are “idiots,” and rich-country bankers who hide and invest kleptocrats’ assets are “pimps.” And aid workers furtively dodge the bottom billion because most find life unglamorous in outposts such as Bangui and Vientiane.

Selective Interventions

So much for what will not help. The centerpiece of Collier’s book is his own plan for the G-8, based on a hoard of his own research and experience in advising governments. In laying out this plan, Collier is skeptical of quick fixes, funny, and also deeply caring, with a keen eye for the crucial issues. He is specific, suggesting exactly who should do exactly what, and he takes the development agenda far beyond aid. He aims the spotlight directly and convincingly at the very poorest, and he sets the proper target for development (as opposed to humanitarian) assistance. He emphasizes that “growth is not a cure-all, but lack of growth is a kill-all.”

Collier’s plan has four principal elements: aid for postconflict reconstruction and regional infrastructure development, five international charters, a trade policy to help the bottom-billion countries compete with Asia, and selective and very limited military interventions. Unfortunately, it appears that the effects of each would be limited and uncertain. To start with, Collier’s postconflict interventions would last just ten years. Although longer than donors’ historical attention span, this is a short period, after which any of these countries would remain poor and therefore at high risk for more violence; a real peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan might take much longer. As Collier himself notes, “Conflict prevention is really about breaking all of the other traps,” which is very hard.

Collier’s five international charters address natural resources, democracy, budget transparency, postconflict politics, and international investment. There sources charter would facilitate the punishment of Western oil companies that did not “publish what they pay” to extractive regimes. Unfortunately, information is just one of many tools that domestic reformers need. Even full revenue transparency did not stop Chad’s leaders from shuttering the civil-society group monitoring the use of its oil windfall and canceling promised social spending. Collier also proposes certifying the origin of oil—for example, telling consumers that the gasoline they are pumping comes from Angola. But this assumes unrealistically informed consumers; 7-Eleven stores’ recent decision to label their gasoline as Venezuela-free does not appear to be giving Hugo Chavez insomnia. Meanwhile, many of the elements in Collier’s democracy charter are already in the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a charter of uncertain relevance to the actions of the signatories North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

And as Collier well knows, democratic Senegal did not emerge from among the countries of the bottom billion under the uncorrupted Leopold Senghor, whereas Indonesia did so under the rule of Suharto, an unaccountable autocrat who tops Transparency International’s list of all-time largest pilferers of public funds. The ideas in Collier’s budget-transparency charter might act in some small way to shore up reformers like Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a dynamic woman who, as Nigeria’s finance minister, made massive waves when she had the temerity to simply publish how much each state received in oil revenue. But such effects are easily overwhelmed by context: despite massive international support, Okonjo-Iweala was forced out of office when her reforms became politically inconvenient in the run-up to a contentious election last spring. As a model for the investment charter, Collier approvingly cites the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. But in its two decades of existence, that body has not done much to
change investors’ minds about the very poorest countries, and the reforms Collier suggests seem inconsequential.

On trade policy, Collier wants to protect the poorest exporters against competition from Asia not by raising new barriers but by further lowering the barriers to the bottom-billion countries. As he freely admits, however, the barriers against Asian producers are heading down to such a degree that the scope for such selective tweaking will only last another few years. He also wants less restrictive rules of origin in existing concessional trade agreements with the poorest and a special forum in the World Trade Organization to negotiate unilateral concessional trade-barrier reductions. The recent euthanasia of the Doha Round of trade negotiations casts doubt on the practicality of these ideas.

Collier also would like to revive the notion of selective and limited military interventions. He seeks to overcome post-Iraq allergies to such a concept and holds up the broadly successful and much-admired Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone (a British intervention little known, he laments, among Americans). Such interventions would be accomplished through a European rapid-reaction force managed by the African Union. But it is not clear that the African Union has the institutional strength this role demands, and what is more, the very idea of an intervention force is controversial. The Stanford political scientist Jeremy Weinstein, among others, has pointed out that civil wars are far more likely to recur in countries where conflicts have been settled by means of negotiations or a UN intervention than in countries that experienced military victory by one side. This is not to say that interventions should never happen, but it is reason to be cautious about their use.

One additional point flies in the face of conventional wisdom in the aid industry. Collier recommends that aid programs targeting the bottom billion focus less on development outcomes and tolerate larger relative expenditures on administrative overhead. Doing otherwise, he argues, makes donors too risk averse and disbursement happy. Aid officers who must show quick results with low overhead have a strong incentive to simply avoid tough regions where results come slowly and the price of entry is high.

Nonclinical Economics

Collier sometimes conveys a realistic sense of what these measures can achieve and sometimes vastly overreaches. “Change in the societies at the very bottom must come predominantly from within; we cannot impose it on them,” he rightly states. But in the very next paragraph he writes, “We can crack this problem; indeed, we must.” Later comes the definitive edict: “Let me be clear; we cannot rescue them. The societies of the bottom billion can only be rescued from within.”

Yet the bottom billion “should rightly stay on the G-8 agenda until [they] are decisively freed from the development traps. This book sets out an agenda for the G-8 that would be effective”—that is, would free them. In his introduction and his conclusion, Collier does not give us a third way that takes us beyond Sachs versus Easterly. He simply gives us Sachs and Easterly on different pages.

Looking beyond the summary statements, many of the proposals in this volume are indeed sensible and worthwhile. Still, these recommendations are not quite enough to liberate benevolent rich countries from their own trap— the Sachs- versus-Easterly, planners-versus-searchers conundrum. Ultimately, Collier’s approach does not succeed in either remediying the fatal problem with Sachs’ plan or addressing the heart of Easterly’s critique.

Sachs (who is married to a physician) argues for a “clinical economics” that makes a careful, scientific “differential diagnosis” of the traps in which poor people find themselves and then intervenes massively to break all of them: “Do all of it at once,” urges the Millennium Promise Web site. Collier’s response to this is to point out additional traps to which Sachs pays scant attention, such as armed conflict and poor governance. His plan is a new range of treatments for different diseases.
The problem of the bottom billion, however, is not that they live in places where functioning modern economies have become sick and require a doctor. It is that they live in places where there have never been functioning modern economies.

Development assistance began as an effort to rebuild Europe after war—indeed a case of helping a sick patient become healthy once again. In countries of the bottom billion, there are not and never have been preexisting healthy economies to which to return. There is, in the medical metaphor, simply no patient. As interesting and correct as it may be to list self-reinforcing “traps” that prevent an absent organism from existing, this exercise tells us nothing about how to fabricate the body from scratch.

Events of economic conception—growth takeoffs—tend to occur in small enclaves that get things right for extremely complex reasons, never homogeneously across large areas. In countries so small that the enclave was the entire country—Botswana, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore, Taiwan—growth has been astounding. In countries where the national boundaries include places where it happened and places where it did not—Brazil, India—growth has been good. In places where the national boundaries happen to include no place where the right cocktail of factors has come together, there has been little or no growth. All of the bottom-billion countries fall into the last category.

To highlight the problem of economic conception is not, however, to advocate inaction—the principal conclusion many people have taken from the sort of skepticism that Easterly has become known for. Easterly does not recommend inaction at all, and I suspect that many people who ascribe the lesson of laissez faire to his writings have not read them. He speaks highly, for example, of conditional cash transfers for education, now embodied in the massive public interventions of Mexico’s Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia. Crucially, these programs have embodied an interest in continuous exploration, evaluation, and learning from failures. They build long-term constituencies through realistic promises.

Collier himself recognizes that even the finest medicine cannot cause growth where there is none. He makes clear in the heart of his discussion that he understands the limitations of his, or any, plan (although various statements at the start and finish of the book do not reflect this modesty). Each trap guarantees its own persistence, he points out, and the only way out is for an external event to change the dynamic. Most of these arrive rarely and by chance; indeed, Collier pushes for intervention mostly in those few places where luck has already arrived.

In recommending that aid for trade stimulus come as “a once-and-for-all big push, country by country,” an easily misinterpreted phrase, he immediately clarifies: “It does not make sense to attempt such an approach everywhere. The landlocked and the resource-rich are likely to be out of the game, and there is little point in spending aid to try to get them into it. And even among the coastal, resource-scarce countries, those with really bad governance and policies may be out of it.”

Listing new treatments for the economic “clinic” does not get us much past Sachs, then, and proposing an omnibus G-8 agenda does not address Easterly’s most basic critique: Who will lose their jobs if these things do not work? The right book to overcome this debate would give a large and inspiring catalog of deliberate interventions that have helped at the margins in diverse circumstances, through slowly building mechanisms of communication and accountability.

In the end, intervention is about modestly and cautiously seizing small opportunities, continuously learning to reward success and punish failure, and patience. Many of Collier’s 58 countries where the bottom billion live “basically need to be on international welfare for a long time…. For these countries the psychology of aid needs to recognize that it is not there as a temporary stimulus to development, it is there to bring some minimal decency to standards of living.”
What We Can Do

In the Colombian jungle years ago, I wondered what my team of outsiders could accomplish in the context of a complex protracted conflict. Collier essentially urges us to wait for opportunities to nurture the margins of an oasis of peace that has arisen of its own accord. This is more or less what happened in Liberia when a decade and a half of civil war ground to a halt and the dynamic, highly trained governing team of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took over last year. Technical and other assistance have poured in, with promising results. In contrast, the United States' half billion dollars of support for the doltish Samuel Doe in the 1980s did little to reduce poverty and simply set the stage for further conflict in Liberia.

And in that office in Guyana, I pondered what our World Bank team should do in a milieu corrupted by graft and fear. Here, Collier urges us to do what we can to help incubate seedlings that may fortunately spring up from time to time and slowly expand their influence. The European Development Fund now sends about $10 million a year to Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, which has successfully prosecuted several high-level officials for brazen stealing.

The commission's head, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, braves frequent death threats (while balancing his desire to put crooks away with his desire to prevent the commission from being closed by powerful friends of those crooks). His work is demonstrably effective and actively supported from without. Naturally, support for such things must be done with humility and caution: critics have alleged, for example, that Ribadu selectively pursues enemies of his president—charges that, although never proved, cannot be definitively dismissed.

There are many deliberate acts that can help at the margins as an event of economic conception grows into a complex organism. But we are play-acting if we underestimate the magnitude of the challenge by peddling "solutions" of any sort. The combined GDP of the 58 countries of the bottom billion is about $350 billion per year—smaller than the GDP of metropolitan Chicago. It is not at all clear that every slice of such a tiny pie is viable as a future rich country. And even if we could somehow spark two percent growth across the bottom-billion countries (an epochal achievement in a zero-growth area), two generations from now their collective income per capita would hover around $3 a day—about the level of Honduras and Sri Lanka today.

Helping the bottom billion will be a very slow job for generations, not the product of media- or summit-friendly plans to end poverty in ten or 20 years. It will require long-term, opportunistic, and humble engagement, much of it through public action—built on a willingness to let ineffective interventions die and on a sophisticated appreciation of the stupendous complexity of functioning economies. The grievous truth is that although a range of publications can and should help many people, most of the bottom billion will not—and cannot—be freed from poverty in our lifetimes.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF OFFICIAL DONORS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Joanna Macrae, Sarah Collinson, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Nicola Reindorp, Anna Schmidt, Tasneem Mowjee, and Adele Harmer


3.1 Introduction

Over the past decade, as levels of humanitarian aid have increased and the number of agencies providing it has multiplied, so donors have become more involved in the coor-
dination of humanitarian action. They are doing this at a global level, establishing new mechanisms to influence humanitarian organisations, and in relation to specific humanitarian operations. This shift has been partly driven by the proliferation of agencies providing humanitarian assistance, particularly in high-profile crises. In this crowded environment, donors have shown increased interest in funding NGOs, and funding to UN agencies has been subject to greater earmarking, reducing multilaterals' room for independent manoeuvre. The involvement of military actors or assets in the provision of humanitarian assistance is an added facet of the coordination challenge, as is the drive for humanitarian action to be coherent with other policy responses to crises and complex political emergencies. These factors—the increased profile of humanitarian action, the proliferation of actors, the shifting fortunes of bilateral and multilateral agencies and the push for policy coherence—are all aspects of the changing face of humanitarian coordination.

This chapter documents the findings of a review of the role of official donors in the coordination of humanitarian response. The research focused on four donors: the US, the UK, Denmark and the EC, and on two recipient countries, Somalia and Afghanistan. The four donors were selected because they embody a broad range of funding preferences. Thus, the US favours a bilateralised approach, Denmark is a strong supporter of multilateral funding, the UK sits somewhere in between and ECHO is a multilateral donor in its own right. The two country case studies were chosen on the basis of earlier HPG research, which found that the donor coordination groups in both cases were a significant innovation (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). The case studies involved extensive interviews with donor personnel, UN staff and NGO workers, as well as a review of grey literature, including minutes of meetings, reports and evaluations.

This chapter comprises four parts. Section 3.2 gives a brief history of donor and humanitarian coordination, and suggests that donors are seeking to enhance their input into the coordination of humanitarian action at both global and field levels. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 examine the approaches of different donors to coordination at field level, both in general terms, and in two specific cases—Somalia and Afghanistan. Section 3.5 looks at the implications of the emergence of so-called 'Friends of' groups. Section 3.6 reviews donors' efforts to enhance coordination among themselves, and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter by outlining the key implications of this analysis.

3.2 Coordinating Humanitarian Action: An Overview

3.2.1 Donors and the Coordination of Development Aid

The history of development aid yields a number of instructive lessons about donors' involvement in aid coordination generally. First, coordination does not come naturally to donor governments; they have always needed strong incentives or pressure to coordinate with one another. One of the earliest examples of post-war intergovernmental coordination—the Marshall Plan for European recovery—was not purely voluntary, and assistance was made conditional upon regional cooperation. Recipients engaged in joint assessments of needs and submitted common requests to the US. They also monitored each other's performance.

Second, donors' performance in coordination has always been subject to criticism, and throughout the post-war period donor governments have received frequent and urgent injunctions to coordinate their development aid policies more effectively. In the late 1960s, the Pearson Commission's report on international development, Partners in Development, took coordination as a key theme (Pearson, 1969). A decade later, the Brandt Commission's report North–South: A Programme for Survival noted confusion and overlap between different sources of development finance. The Commission pointed to the proliferation of agencies both inside and outside the UN system, and argued the need for policies, procedures and programmes to be much more concerted and effectively coordinated (Brandt Commission, 1980). In the early 1980s, the OECD called for increased coordination. The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Report) of 1987 noted new imperatives and opportunities for international
cooperation, and highlighted the weakness of international agencies in coordination. In 1999, a World Bank evaluation noted that donor policies and practices had actually hindered coordination, that governments in developing countries saw no improvement in the coherence of donor activities, and that there had been only marginal improvements in consistency and efficiency (Eriksson, 1999). An EC report, also in 1999, reached much the same conclusions (EC, 1999).

Third, donors have relied on multilateral agencies to play a key coordination role. The World Bank's Consultative Group annual meetings, at which developing countries present their plans, have been an important mechanism for coordinating development assistance for individual countries. UN Development Programme (UNDP) Round Tables have served the same function for some countries, often those emerging from conflict. However, while the practice of delegating coordination to a third agent has persisted, UN organisations have been sidelined in favour of agencies more closely controlled by powerful donor governments. By the late 1990s, the World Bank was chairing Consultative Groups for 60 countries, compared to 20 Round Tables convened by the UNDP (Eriksson, 1999).

Fourth, donor coordination has expanded from an early focus on mobilising aid resources to include more substantial policy coordination. This change is linked both to increasing concerns about the effectiveness of aid provision, and the significant increase in the number of actors involved (Eriksson, 1999). Thus, the purpose of aid coordination now includes harmonising donor policies and practices; negotiating economic policy reforms at the macroeconomic and sectoral levels; and dialogue on a range of development-related issues (Eriksson, 1999). At the country level, efforts have increasingly focused on improving coordination on World Bank-led initiatives such as the Comprehensive Development Framework and its corresponding Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and Sector-Wide Approaches. More recently, coordination has centred around the Millennium Development Goals.

3.2.2 Governance and Humanitarian Coordination

The coordination of humanitarian action has changed in similar ways to development aid, and is beset by many of the same problems. Yet between the two forms of aid, there is a significant distinction in the role accorded the government of the recipient country. In theory, if not always in practice, states deemed fit to receive development resources are judged sufficiently legitimate and competent to be at the centre of coordination efforts. With humanitarian assistance, by contrast, aid is frequently delivered in response to emergencies created by a crisis of governance, which means that there may be no legitimate or capable government with authority across a national territory. In effect, humanitarian agencies and coordinators work around the government, or in its place. Thus, coordination arrangements, like the choice of aid forms and channels, are determined by, and a comment upon, the quality of governance in a particular setting. The choice of coordination arrangements has symbolic power, as well as operational consequence.

Despite assertions about the value and importance of coordinated humanitarian responses, none of the donors looked at for this study actually has a policy on coordination. Instead, donors tend to see it as a task for multilateral agencies, principally the UN.

3.2.3 Humanitarian Coordination Structures in the UN

The first key innovations in humanitarian coordination in the UN came in 1971, when General Assembly Resolution 2816 (XXVI) established the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) ‘to mobilise, direct and coordinate relief’. The move followed a number of high-profile emergencies: an earthquake in Peru in 1966, the Biafran war of 1967–71 and war and flooding in Bangladesh in 1971. The UNDRO was not a success, and during the 1980s a ‘lead agency’ was sometimes appointed from among the principal humanitarian agencies to coordinate emergency relief in situations of armed conflict (Righter, 1995). Ad hoc coordination bodies were also established. These included the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA), which was set up in 1984 to coordinate responses to crises in the Horn of Africa, and the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes Relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA), established in 1988.

In December 1991, after 17 resolutions and decisions seeking to strengthen disaster response, General Assembly Resolution 46/182 was passed. The Resolution recognised that the UN had a 'central and unique role to play in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts of the international community.' It led to the designation of an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to lead a new department, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The Resolution also set up the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the CAP and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). At country level, the ERC was represented through Humanitarian Coordinators. Under terms of reference agreed in 1994, coordination would 'normally' be assumed by the UN Resident Coordinator in the affected country. However, the Humanitarian Coordinator might also be appointed separately from the Resident Coordinator (or in a situation where there was no Resident Coordinator), or the local country director of a designated 'lead agency' might fill the role.

The DHA was given inadequate resources and was unable to tackle the competitive tendencies of the UN operational agencies, some of which were themselves given coordination responsibilities from time to time. It was also side-tracked by its management of a plethora of small funds for programmes that fell outside other agencies' mandates (UN Secretary-General, 1997; IASC, 1998). In 1997, as part of his reform programme, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan replaced the DHA with a new body, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA was divested of the DHA's operational activities, and given a more streamlined mandate focused on coordination, advocacy and policy development. However, debates continued among donors and UN agencies around the respective merits of the three so-called models of coordination (the Resident Coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator; the Humanitarian Coordinator appointed separately; and the 'lead agency' model). Work continued within the IASC and the UN Secretariat to clarify relationships and responsibilities. The report of the UN Expert Panel on Peace Operations—the Brahimi Report—animated the debate on coordination, particularly between the UN's humanitarian agencies and UN political and military personnel involved in complex peacekeeping operations (Brahimi, 2000). Meanwhile, OCHA increased its presence on the ground through the deployment of field offices, and began its own reform process. By mid 2002, OCHA was present in some 35 countries around the world (OCHA, 2002).

Although donor governments ostensibly delegate the coordination of humanitarian response to UN actors and agencies, their behaviour, particularly their funding decisions, still has a profound impact on how these structures work. Over the past decade, donors have made some efforts to strengthen UN coordination activities. In the mid-1990s, for instance, ECHO, the BPRM and OFDA all channelled their funding through UNHCR, butressing the agency's coordination role in the Ngara camps in Tanzania (Borton, 1996). Donors have also at times taken a keen interest in appointments to coordination posts, and have in some instances asked NGOs to report on the UN's performance in coordinating humanitarian assistance.

Overall, however, while at a rhetorical level donors maintain their support for the UN's unique role in humanitarian coordination, there is evidence to suggest that in practice they are much more equivocal (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001; Minear at al., 1992). Both the DHA and OCHA have suffered from inadequate funding and resources, while funding tactics have consistently confounded effective coordination by fuelling competition within the system; agencies vie with each other for funds, corroding relationships and coordination at all levels (UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP, 1998: 4). Donor governments also frequently undermine coordination by making conflicting demands of agencies. The DHA's ambiguous mandate shackled it from the start, as donors insisted that it expand its operational presence into areas left unfilled by other UN agencies. Its subsequent role in demining, demobilisation, natural disaster mitigation, logistics and transport forced the DHA into a level of operationality that invited criticism from other agencies, and fundamentally
compromised its capacity for coordination. OCHA too has struggled, with insufficient means, authority or support (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). Finally, as described in Chapter 2, by choosing to contract NGOs directly, rather than channelling resources through UN bodies such as UNHCR and WFP, the leverage that UN agencies can exert over operational agencies is necessarily diminished.

3.2.4 The EU and ECHO: A New Force for Multilateral Coordination?

The emergence of ECHO as a major actor in humanitarian assistance has had an important impact on the evolution of humanitarian coordination. Even before ECHO was established in 1992, steps were being taken to make the European Commission a coordinator of the assistance activities of Member States, such as the intervention of the UK’s Overseas Development Administration in northern Iraq in 1991. With the rapid growth of the humanitarian aid budget and the appointment in 1995 of a Commissioner specifically responsible for humanitarian assistance, pressure grew from Member States for greater accountability and improved coordination in the field. This approach was confirmed in 1996 with the adoption of Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, and the EC Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (COM 96-153). The European Council pressed for a greater focus by ECHO on cooperation with the UN and the Red Cross, and the European Parliament argued that ECHO should coordinate Member States’ emergency aid during major natural disasters.

Despite these ambitions, from the outset there has been ambiguity as to ECHO’s coordination role, both internally and with external actors. Its mission statement refers to the coordinated delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection through partner organisations, but does not make clear the requirements of implementing partners, or of ECHO itself (Brusset and Tiberghien, 2002). Although Member States meet regularly with ECHO in the HAC, ECHO has no systematic procedures to facilitate coordination either within the Commission or in relation to Member States’ humanitarian programmes. The UN and NGOs continue to secure funding for similar or related actions from several EC sources, managed by different departments; both ECHO and DG Development, for instance, provide significant amounts of aid to WFP. The need for improved coordination between different services was highlighted by the Court of Auditors in 1995, and again by an independent evaluation of ECHO’s activities published in 1999 (Franklin Advisory Services, 1999).

ECHO’s coordination with other agencies and donors has also been difficult. According to the 2001 Strategy, its ‘strategic orientation will strive for maximum complementarity and coherence with other key players’ priorities’. In order to develop ‘a common vision and effective division of labour’, ECHO began a ‘strategic dialogue’ about particular countries, themes and priorities with other major humanitarian players, both within the Commission and externally. However, ECHO’s Global Plans for funding long-term emergencies do not include coordination strategies with other donor governments, and ECHO’s efforts to raise the profile of its aid have made relations with other actors difficult. ECHO does not contribute to CAP appeals, and, as described in Chapter 2, its principal funding tool, the FPA, is designed to provide project-based funding, not unearmarked, programmatic funding for the UN and other international organisations. There have been individual efforts to address these coordination difficulties, including the Standing Interdepartment Working Party (GPIS), set up November 1994 to define the EC’s position with regard to UNHCR, but problems have persisted. More recently, ECHO has sought to broaden the basis for its engagement with international organisations through more formal, planned dialogue. In November 2000, it initiated such a process with UNHCR. This has since been sustained, and has enabled the sharing of basic information, including ECHO’s Global Plans, to which UNHCR did not formally have access.

3.2.5 Herding Cats? The Challenge of NGO Coordination

The proliferation of NGOs, with their diverse and self-appointed mandates, nongovernmental status and concerns about independence, poses one of the key coordination challenges for the humanitarian system. Donors have shown interest in supporting
coordination between NGOs. The US government, for instance, provides 60% of the funding for the Interaction Disaster Response Committee, an umbrella group set up to improve the coordination of US NGOs in emergency response, and has also subsidised coordination units in the field. OFDA claims to require ‘its’ NGOs to coordinate, DFID requires NGOs to be ‘constructive members of the community’, and Danida encourages Danish NGOs to work together. Yet although all the donors looked at for this study expressed concerns about the performance and quality of the NGOs they fund, none makes coordination a consistent or explicit part of their requirements of NGOs. No donor produced systematic indicators of what effective coordination would look like, and there was no evidence of a donor withdrawing funding from an agency on the basis of a lack of coordination with others.

This is not to say that donor pressure is necessary before NGOs coordinate with one another or other actors involved in humanitarian response. NGOs often lead coordination at sectoral level, and have been responsible for some highly coordinated, even integrated, operations. These have often gone beyond information-sharing to encompass joint advocacy, shared standards of action and even mechanisms to ensure compliance to such standards, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Leader, 2000). Such efforts do not necessarily involve the UN; indeed, some of the best operational NGO coordination took place precisely because the UN was not present, as in Biafra, the Oxfam-led consortium for Cambodia in 1979–81 or the Emergency Relief Desk for Eritrea and Tigray in 1981–91 (Borton, 1994).

3.3 Donor Coordination in the Field

Shifts in donors’ involvement in coordination are most apparent at field level. Yet here again, these changes have been gradual, and appear to be a response to particular events, rather than the result of a considered policy. There are two main aspects to this change: the increased deployment of donor personnel in the field; and the use of formal field-based coordination mechanisms.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Danida has only a limited field presence. Field-based staff are located in embassies, and focus on Denmark’s bilateral development programme. The only exceptions are the Kosovo Steering Unit and a post at the Nairobi embassy covering Somalia. The Steering Unit, which meets Danish NGOs fortnightly, encourages coordination among Danish NGOs. The Nairobi-based staff member has been a key player in coordination among Danish NGOs. The Nairobi-based staff member has been a key player in coordination among donors, the UN and NGOs.

By contrast, OFDA maintains large regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, whose staff members travel to emergency areas throughout their region, and the BPRM has 23 Refugee Coordinators in posts around the world, attached to US embassies. OFDA’s Africa office has sought to be a focal point for contact with Coordinators, as well as other governments and humanitarian actors. Regional offices are credited with improving the perennial coordination difficulties that dog the US aid bureaucracy; the US Interagency Review of US humanitarian assistance of 2000 (the so-called Halperin Report) points to US government personnel on the ground working to overcome the limits of their bifurcated structure, informing each other of their funding decisions and undertaking joint monitoring, for example in Afghanistan (US government, 2000).

The EC experimented with field-level coordination throughout the 1990s. Among the first instances was the Zagreb task force, which was set up in 1992 to support UNHCR’s humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia. Its aim was to improve coordination on the ground, principally by facilitating the exchange of information on actions funded, between donors: in practice, the respective responsibilities of Member States and the EC were left ambiguous, and the task force had insufficient funds and received inadequate cooperation from donors (EC, 1999). In 1993, the EC established an ECHO cellule de crise (crisis unit) with the Rwandan government. Task forces were also established in Liberia, Haiti and Guatemala. However, ECHO correspondents in the field continue to play a role in coordination.

There are distinct differences in how the US and the EC approaches coordination. For the US, the UN remains the primary coordination mechanism in the field. US field personnel interviewed for this study see their function as catalytic and service-oriented, both to
headquarters, with the provision of information and scrutiny of programmes, and to part-
ners on the ground, ‘a pusher and prodder’, as one official put it. Thus, the Halperin Report
points to the importance of information flows to implementing partners, and argues that
‘Embassies should be encouraged to share as much information as possible through reg-
ular briefings for all US implementing partners’ (US government, 2000). Staff appear to
see their role as facilitative, although the tendency to focus on US government imple-
menting partners can exclude collaboration with others, suggesting that monitoring is
more important than a more general approach to the coordination of the overall relief
effort. By contrast, EC field personnel see coordination more as control. ECHO’s field cor-
respondents are often in a good position to observe the failings of UN coordination mech-
nisms, and can adopt a more direct approach to coordination themselves, at least with
ECHO’s implementing partners (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001).

PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 2007

Preamble

A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need
to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes
in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not
by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared Principles
can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.
The Principles are intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement
between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak gov-
ernance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger perform-
ing countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes,
not to generate new ones. In particular, they aim to complement the partnership commit-
ments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As experience deepens,
the Principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.

The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national
reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engag-
ing productively with their people to promote sustained development. Realisation of this
objective requires taking account of, and acting according to, the following Principles:

The Basics

1. Take context as the starting point. It is essential for international actors to under-
stand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strate-
gic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different
constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and the differences between:
(i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance
environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound
political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country and regional
context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional
strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments accord-
ing to context, and avoid blue-print approaches.

2. Do no harm. International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions
and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and gov-
ernance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, interna-
tional decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases
of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on
domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated re-
responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.

3. **Focus on state-building as the central objective.** States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

4. **Prioritise prevention.** Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

5. **Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.** The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a "whole of government" approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

6. **Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.** Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

7. **Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.** Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments— such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds— can facilitate shared priorities and responsi-
bility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors. This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.

9. Act fast . . . but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.

10. Avoid pockets of exclusion. International actors need to address the problem of "aid orphans"—states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.
Events in the post-cold war era have highlighted the importance of demilitarisation and human security as central to the formation of an agenda for global peace and development. Protracted situations of intra-state, regionalised, and international armed conflict, the difficult nature of democratisation processes, events of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, as well as renewed discussions about nuclear capability and threats are indicative of the frail advances in the areas of demilitarisation and enhancement of human security.

Demilitarisation is a process whereby political, societal, environmental, economic, and security issues can be addressed in nonviolent and non-militaristic ways via constructive conflict management approaches. As Alex de Waal notes, ‘The values of militarisation affect not just soldiers but all members of society’, indicating that militarisation extends to domains other than security. For example, in politics, it can play a role in transitions from (civilian or military) authoritarianism to more democratic ways of rule. A resurgence of coups d’état in Africa during the early 2000s (including in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Togo) is evidence of this. Militarisation is not, however, a feature unique to democratising countries. The al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States and the ensuing adoption of a militarised response under the guise of a ‘war on terror’ has resulted in some instances in the sidelining of human rights and demonstrate that established democracies can also be prone to militarist responses. In light of this, de Waal’s notion of ‘demilitarizing the mind’ appears to assume renewed meaning and relevance in contemporary politics. Although some object to conceptualizing demilitarisation from a multidimensional viewpoint, it arguably allows for greater understanding of its inherent challenges and potentialities as a tool to promote human security.

Within post-conflict settings, demilitarisation is an aim to be achieved through a variety of processes within the broader remit of peacebuilding. In ‘The Security-Development Nexus and the Imperative of Peacebuilding with Special Reference to the African Context’, Theo Neethling argues that peacebuilding represents the core challenge to African countries because it is where durable peace, long-term security, and sustainable development become intertwined. In Africa, early approaches to demilitarisation have focused on reductions in military expenditures, personnel, and force projections in pursuit of an economically based peace dividend, as explained by Geoff Harris. Such parsimonious endeavors were met with resistance from the military institutions of African countries, which experienced simultaneous military, economic, social, and political transitions giving rise

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2 Ibid.
3 Geoff Harris (ed.), Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cost Effective Alternatives to the Military (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 3-4. Harris offers that during the 1990s, military personnel in the sub-Saharan region fell by 17 percent and force projection by 35 percent. There were significant reductions in military expenditures a number of countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Mozambique.
to complex peacebuilding processes. These efforts comprised, among others, the need to address such interrelated challenges as transforming mindsets towards interacting in a socially peaceful manner and tackling rising levels of criminality, rehabilitation of the most war-affected communities, and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

After almost a decade of being associated with the expanded, non-statist and nonmilitary concept of security, and after growing awareness of the nexus between security and development, demilitarisation came to be understood as a corollary of processes centrally located within this interface, along with disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration (DDRR) and security system reform (SSR). It is in the interface between security and development that demilitarisation and human security meet, insofar as they share the goal of creating a secure environment for achieving freedom from fear and from want, as stated in the UN secretary-general’s report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’.4

The absence of fear and having ones needs met represent the security and development dimensions at the core of the peacebuilding enterprise, that is, the need to achieve the shorter-term goal of stability while planting the seeds for longer-term development. For example, as Daniel Vencovsky stresses in ‘Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’, in regard to DDRR this means that more attention needs to be devoted to the neglected aspects of reinsertion and reintegration, here focusing on the need to create peaceful and sustainable income-generating activities (to prevent combatants from resorting to violence as a means of earning a living).

The idea of addressing the security-development nexus seems, however, to be more enshrined in discourse and policy suggestions than in practise. The United Kingdom Department for International Development, in ‘Development and Security Working Together,’ a chapter from ‘Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World’, notes the lack of adequate collaboration between those working in development, defense, and diplomacy and their differing perspectives on important issues, including time frames. A report of the International Peace Academy further develops this line of argument in ‘The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century’.5 Necla Tschirgi proffers in ‘The Security-Development Nexus: From Rhetoric to Understanding Complex Dynamics’ that despite a growing convergence in the strategies of development and security actors working in conflict-ridden environments, such collaboration does not automatically spur effective conflict management outcomes. In addition, she raises the point that more attention needs to be devoted to understanding the inherently political nature of the peacebuilding agenda and the relationship between international and local actors.

Peter Middlebrook and Gordon Peake, in ‘Right-Financing Security Sector Reform’, capture well the role of the international community in peacebuilding. According to them, ‘The needs assessments often are followed by poorly sequenced external assistance. . . . This leads to the “projectization” of the national budget, the emergence of parallel delivery systems, and a second civil service—the aid community.’ This highlights the need to firmly question and deconstruct the widely touted notions of participation and local ownership, while at the same time enquiring into their undermining effect on, for example, the idea that Africa needs to develop its own SSR vision, as argued by Martin Rupiya in ‘An African Perspective of the Reform of the Security Sector Since the 1990s’. As demonstrated by Eboe Hutchful in ‘A Civil Society Perspective’, the obstacle to building and sustaining an African SSR vision lies partly in the ability to find executive, legislative, and civil society actors that are thoroughly committed to developing and implementing such a vision at the local, national, and regional levels.

A larger issue extends beyond the well-intentioned endeavor of achieving lasting peace through demilitarisation and human security to address the equation of conflict, security, and development. This agenda, while increasingly gaining in importance, has not been a priority of the international community, which has experienced a resurgence of militaristic and interventionist approaches in response to globalised challenges to power. This state of affairs, coupled with sustained economic hardship over the years and the recent financial crisis, continues to alienate those most in need of peace and security, thereby undermining the joint processes of responding adequately to conflict and insecurity while fostering development.
The link between conflict (insecurity) and development is a complex, but indisputable one. Most of the world’s 20 poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past decades. Because the nature of conflicts has changed fundamentally in the post-Cold War era, contemporary conflicts are now increasingly internal, intense and protracted, and their social, economic and environmental consequences are considerable and long-lasting (UNDP undated).

In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance proposed that the following be used as norms for security policies in the ‘new era’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995:84–85):

- All people, no less than states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights.
- The primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet’s life-support systems by eliminating the economic, social, environmental, political and military conditions that generate threats to the security of the people and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into armed conflicts.
- Military force is not a legitimate political instrument, except in self-defence or under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).
- The development of military capabilities beyond that required for national defence and support of UN action is a potential threat to the security of people.
- Weapons of mass destruction are not legitimate instruments of national defence.
- The production of and trade in arms should be controlled by the international community.

The principles advocated by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 clearly pointed towards changing perceptions of what constitutes security. This coincided with the emergence of human security—a security paradigm that is vested in the belief that the state-centric security thinking of the Cold War era has become insufficient for coping with the challenges of today’s security landscape (Werthes & Bosold 2004:1). Shortly before, in 1994, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Development Report probably promoted the notion of human security for the first time (Fourie & Schonteich 2001) when it was stated that:

[...]the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression... For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? (UNDP 1994:22)

Since 1994, a host of role-players considered, proposed and reflected on appropriate human security definitions and conceptualisations. Although a commonly accepted definition does not seem to exist, Werthes & Bosold (2004:2) argue that there are some basic premises all definitions have in common, namely: a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension; a freedom from fear/safety of peoples dimension; and a freedom from want/equity and social justice dimension.

Upon closer scrutiny it appears that some middle-powers (e.g. Canada) base their approach to human security mainly on human rights and an extended arms control nexus; thus a combination of the first and second dimensions. The Asian approach (e.g. the Japanese approach), however, seems to be more related to a conceptualisation that stresses the connection between security and economic and social development, and could be subsumed under the second and third dimensions (Werthes & Bosold 2004:2-3).
This has clearly manifested in the following conceptualisation by former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (as quoted by Werthes & Bosold 2004:3):

‘Human security’ is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable—the poor, women and children, and the elderly—threatening their survival and dignity.

The above-mentioned clearly points towards a security-development nexus and should be viewed against the background of linkages between security and development that formed a central focus of research during the latter half of the 1990s. From a more political policy point of view, Sending (2004:11) argues that it was only in the late 1990s that a clear and more ‘politicised’ agenda emerged, which bore the promise of an integration between development and security policy. As an agenda related to the concept of ‘human security, it was launched in an effort to integrate both development and security concerns with a focus on individuals rather than states. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report, The Responsibility To Protect, specifically stated that ‘the responsibility to protect’—i.e. any form of intervention by international role-players or multinational institutions against a state or its leaders—should be focused on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:8,13). Moreover, this document should be seen as a ‘radical political document’ (Sending 2004:11), effectively making state sovereignty dependent upon the ability to provide ‘human security’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:13). Therefore, the emphasis of the security debate should be on ‘human development with access to food and employment’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2002:15).

The UNDP Human Development Report of 1999 clearly states that ‘while underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental conditions as well as weak or ineffective political institutions certainly diminish a society’s capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner.’ To this end, UNDP became involved in development assistance, which is geared towards building or rebuilding that capacity (UNDP undated).

As far as conflict resolution is concerned—the dimension where peace-building comes into play—the point is rightly made that ‘ensuring a speedy and smooth transition from the large-scale, short-term, externally driven humanitarian and military interventions that are typical in the midst of crisis to the more grass roots, locally driven development interventions that must take root in the transition out of conflict is no easy task’ This is why ‘credible peacebuilding and development programming’ is of such importance (UNDP undated). In view of the above, Tschirgi (2003:1) states that since the end of the Cold War, it has become commonplace to assert that peace and development are intimately linked and that the UN and other international role-players need to address the twin imperatives for security and development by means of integrated policies and programmes through peacebuilding in support of conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction.

**Peacebuilding as a Link Between Security and Development**

Not all development impacts the security environment. Conversely, not all security concerns have ramifications for development. Where peace and security are affected by factors that (may) cause, perpetuate, reduce, prevent or manage violent conflicts, peacebuilding comes into play. Lying at the nexus of development and security, peacebuilding requires a readiness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace (Tschirgi 2003:2).

Since the early 1990s peacekeeping operations have become charged, for example, with the task of enforcing peace, and of assuming de facto sovereignty over a territory, as in the case of East Timor and Kosovo. As a consequence of developments, security policy and peacekeeping operations have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing large-
scale socioeconomic and political change. It has also been realised and recognised that investments in both conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution form an integral and central element of security policy. To this end, it is today accepted that to provide peace and security, policy instruments outside the toolbox of traditional security policy need to be mobilised.

Furthermore, ‘development policy’ has been transformed to suit a new socioeconomic and political environment. Since Cold War thinking presented a paradigm that defined development assistance as external to security, ‘development policy’ was only indirectly tied to issues of security in the form of guaranteeing political support and preserving the spheres of influence of the two super powers. Importantly, the policy tools of development were never employed specifically to reduce the potential for violent conflict (Sending 2004:3).

In other words, the end of the Cold War offered an opportunity for inter-national role-players to revisit dominant conceptions of security, and to devise integrated and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address violent conflict from a peacebuilding perspective. As far as a proper understanding of peacebuilding is concerned, Tschirgi (2003:2) states that at its core, peacebuilding aims at the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction with a view to avoiding a relapse into conflict. Proceeding beyond the traditional security (military) approaches of the Cold War era, peacebuilding seeks to address the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts, which include structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors.

An Agenda for Peace, introduced in 1992 by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented a concept of peacebuilding that has gained widespread acceptance in academic and political circles. According to the Secretary-General, peacebuilding consisted of ‘sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems’ (UN Secretary-General 1992). However, Haugerudbraaten (1998) argues that the measures listed in An Agenda for Peace, namely disarming, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection of human rights, reforming institutions and promoting political participation, did not carry the notion of being sustained efforts that addressed the underlying or root causes of problems. In addition, a host of questions and issues were also raised as a matter of discourse with regard to peacebuilding as a notion. Some of the most pressing questions were inter alia (Haugerudbraaten 1998) those about:

- The aim of peacebuilding: Is peacebuilding about removing the root cause of a conflict or about finding ways to resolve old and new disputes in a peaceful manner?
- The temporal (time) aspects of peacebuilding: Are the measures employed in peacebuilding short- to medium-term or long-term ones?
- The main actors of peacebuilding: Who are the main actors in peacebuilding—indigenous or external actors?

After considerable debating and disagreements regarding the exact meaning of peacebuilding, the Secretary-General modified his position in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace and suggested that peacebuilding could also be preventive (UN Secretary-General 1995). This coincides with a somewhat broader view that peacebuilding is essentially about removing or weakening factors that breed or sustain conflict, and reinforcing factors that build positive relations and sustain peace (Hitchcock 2004:38). Hence it could be stated that peacebuilding has evolved from a strictly post-conflict undertaking to a concept with a broader meaning, and the general consensus would seem that peacebuilding efforts should (ideally speaking) already be attempted during the earliest indication of tension in a situation of potential conflict. Against this background, Tschirgi (2003:1) points out that the term peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle. To this end, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are often considered two sides of the same coin.
However, it should be noted that the exact concept of peacebuilding remains an issue of conceptual confusion, disagreement and discourse (Haugerudbraaten 1998; Shannon 2004:36). Disagreements especially revolve around the point that some international role-players or functionaries view peacebuilding as short- to medium-term undertakings aimed at preventing a resumption of violence, and not as long-term developmental and nation-building endeavours. Others clearly view the purpose of peacebuilding as to avoid a return to conflict and argue that in some cases it may require ambitious long-term nation-building efforts by international actors. As far as this article is concerned, the view is taken that the role of peacebuilders could be salient when civil wars have ended not in the conquest of one of the parties, but rather in a peace settlement between two parties (typically as in Mozambique). However, where civil war was the consequence of resource scarcity (as earlier in the Horn of Africa) or skewed land property structures (as in Central America), one could only hope to accomplish limited objectives by promoting good governance. In such cases, undertakings have to involve long-term processes, and a number of indigenous role-players must be involved (Haugerudbraaten 1998). In other words, the aim, duration and actors involved should depend on specific peacebuilding challenges and would differ from one case to another.

On a more practical note, the challenge for the UN—as the pre-eminent organisation responsible for international peace and security—was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into efforts aimed at societal transformation. Efforts aimed at building peace, as opposed to providing security, brought security thinking and practice into closer collaboration with development policy. Experiences from El Salvador and Mozambique, from Angola and Cambodia, all suggested that a central challenge for the UN would be to formulate policies and strategies that focused on the foundations necessary for the rebuilding and restoration of war-torn societies (Sending 2004:5). From an international or macro perspective, peacebuilding, therefore, required that the elaborate doctrines, strategies and institutions that were developed during the Cold War to deal with issues of international peace and security be regarded as inadequate for dealing with conflicts in the ‘new’ era (Tschirgi 2003:1).

Against this background, a range of international reforms throughout the international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. There were numerous proposals for a fundamental overhaul of the UN system, inter alia by the 2000 Report of the Panel of UN Peacekeeping Operations (other-wise known as the Brahimi report). Furthermore, major aid agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. There was also an effort on the part of some Western governments to align their foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the evolving conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda of the contemporary international community (Tschirgi 2003:4-51).

Today, a great deal of the international debates about the future of security and development policy, respectively, tends to focus on the need for more and better co-ordination between already existing bureaucratic organisations, such as the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), or between UNDP and United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), on the one hand, and DPA and DPKO, on the other. By its own account, UNDP’s work is now central to post-conflict peacebuilding. Areas in the nexus of peace and security where, for instance, UNDP is most active are the demobilisation of former combatants, comprehensive demining action, sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the restoration of governance institutions to support the rule of law and build just and democratic societies. Thus, the role that UNDP normally plays in a peace process is essentially a supplementary one—a role geared to coaxing the parties towards further accommodation in a peace negotiation that has already been triggered by a fundamental shift in the military and political balance. In such situations, UNDP’s involvement boils down to be that of a facilitator; often in close collaboration with NGOs and institutions of civil society; creating a politically acceptable distribution of power through institutional development projects that address the legal framework within which the nation’s polity should act; and identifying common development needs and designing projects that straddle
internal political and military boundaries, separating the participants and using the projects as a mechanism for fostering common ground and reconciliation (UNDP undated).

From an African point of view, the question arises as to what confronts the peacebuilding agenda on the African continent. Furthermore, what instruments and programmes have been put in place to address armed conflicts from a peacebuilding perspective? To what extent have peacebuilding endeavours been undertaken in the international community in general and in African states in particular? These questions will be examined in the section below.

4.2.2 The case of Sierra Leone

After a disastrous encounter with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in May 2000, when the UN suffered one of its worst setbacks in the history of UN peacekeeping, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) made significant strides towards achieving its goals. The UN has moved speedily to increase the capacity of UNAMSIL to a strength of more than 17 000 uniformed personnel, and the mission appeared to be better organised and equipped than before. To this end, UNAMSIL was able to play a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone’s war-ravaged population in moving towards an election process.

In his report of 14 March 2002, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reported the following with regard to the peace process (UN Secretary-General 2002:2-5):

- The overall security situation in Sierra Leone was generally stable.
- The disarmament process had progressed well with a total of 47 076 combatants disarmed between 18 May 2001 and 17 January 2002.
- Some 1723 ex-combatants had been selected for reintegration into the Sierra Leone army.
- Substantial progress had been made in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections.
- Political parties could continue to prepare for the scheduled elections.

The Secretary-General furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL throughout the country had created a relatively more secure environment, which provided the opportunity for Sierra Leone to hold free, fair and credible elections, to concentrate on national reconciliation and recovery, as well as on building sustainable institutions. Interestingly, the Secretary-General mentioned that ‘the international community has invested heavily in Sierra Leone, both politically and financially’ (UN Secretary-General 2002:11-12).

Against this background, the conducting of general elections on 14 May 2002 represented a significant step forward in Sierra Leone’s elusive search for peace and democracy. Though the elections did not result in a change of government, the participation of the RUF signalled a commitment to both peace and the democratisation process. One of the remarkable features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement and the peaceful nature of the campaign process (Jalloh 2002:59, 61). Another remarkable or most outstanding feature—especially significant from a peacebuilding perspective—was the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) under the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 between Sierra Leone’s government and the RUF. The TRC, clearly meant to be a nation-building project, was intended to address impunity, to break the cycle of violence, to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, as well as to get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. Modelled on past commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa, the TRC intended to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations that occurred in the country, help restore the human dignity of victims, and promote national reconciliation. Apart from fostering national reconciliation through the TRC, it was also decided to establish a Special UN Court to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law that have taken place in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. However, the Court was meant to be punitive as opposed to the TRC with its aim of being complementary to promoting sustainable peace in Sierra Leone (IRIN 2002).

Other issues that received attention in the peacebuilding process relate to programmes in the fields of humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the promotion of human rights and good governance, as well as the restoration of the legal system. Without going into much detail, it should be noted that considerable amounts were invested and practical aid was provided by the European Union, as well as the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. For instance, the United States' total humanitarian and emergency contribution in the fiscal year 2002, including grants to the World Food Programme and other aid agencies, assistance to refugees, programmes to combat HIV/AIDS, reintegration of combatants and development programmes, amounted to USD 56 million (Human Rights Watch 2003).

Approximately five years after its creation, UNAMSIL is (at the time of writing) approaching the end of its mandate in December 2004. Amongst other successes, UNAMSIL managed to disarm some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvement to infrastructure, expanded state authority, and has almost rebuilt the national police to the target of 9 500 officials. Although UNAMSIL has enjoyed considerable success, certain challenges remain and others are sure to arise in the upcoming withdrawal process. Low levels of public confidence in the capabilities of the police and armed forces may especially pose security challenges of a serious concern. However, should the peace process—and post-conflict peacebuilding—prove to be successful, it will represent a major success in international peacekeeping in one of Africa's most conflict-ridden states (Molukanele et al 2004:42–43).

Thus, from the above it is clear that the peace processes in the cases of Angola and especially Sierra Leone (to mention only two recent African experiences) clearly involve a human security approach, specifically based on a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension; a freedom from fear/safety of peoples dimension; and a freedom from want/equity and social justice dimension. Moreover, it involves a commitment to peacebuilding: a willingness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the basic conditions for making sustainable security and development possible.

Having said this, the question arises as to what the South African view on peacekeeping entails. This question is of considerable importance given South Africa's political and economic strength on the continent, as well as the country's evolving role in African peacekeeping requirements. To this end, the South African view will be explored in the section below.
THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: FROM RHETORIC TO UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX DYNAMICS
Necla Tschirgi
Excerpted from Swiss Yearbook of Development Policy
(Bern, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2006), 12–15

Introduction

The international community tends to speak and work in code: sustainable development, human security, the Monterrey consensus, the Doha Round, the Millennium Development Goals, conflict prevention, rule of law, security sector reform, peacebuilding, the war on terror, state building.1 The list is long and has been getting longer in the last decade as liberal internationalism has expanded its reach and scope. Once encapsulated into a formula, the world's problems seem more amenable to policy interventions. There is, however, a real danger in codifying complex problems. The simpler the formulation, the less meaningful it becomes in guiding policy. This is precisely the case with the security-development nexus.

The necessity of linking security and development has become a catchy refrain among policy makers. In the process, a compelling idea—designed to challenge the artificial separation of security and development policies during the Cold War era—has virtually become a tautology. Most recently, at the September 2005 World Summit in New York world leaders boldly declared: “There will be no development without security and no security without development.”2 While the statement sounds convincing, it is hardly a credible basis upon which to design integrated and effective policies.

The call for greater convergence between security and development policies emerged in response to the multi-dimensional humanitarian, human rights, security and development crises that confronted international policy makers in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, two important documents issued by the United Nations, An Agenda for Peace and An Agenda for Development, became important milestones in the evolution of policy thinking on the linkages between peace, conflict, security and development. These were quickly followed by other policy documents by governments and international institutions.3 Interestingly, academics and researchers were late-comers to the international debates and were slow in overcoming the blinders of their particular disciplines to examine the linkages between security and development—two realms of study and practice that had developed quite independently for much of the 20th century.

Over the last decade, a growing body of policy, practice and research has emerged, providing a fuller understanding of the promises as well as the limitations of the call for integrated security and development policies. While drawing upon this larger body of academic and policy literature, this paper is primarily based on the results of a multi-track research program on the “Security-Development Nexus” undertaken at the International Peace Academy in New York in 2004–2006 which is described below. The paper argues that, despite the rhetoric about the growing convergence between security and development, there is little evidence that the two realms are necessarily directly linked; nor is there reliable guidance on how security and development policies should be integrated. Instead, research findings point to serious contradictions, tensions and trade-offs between different conceptions of security and development as well as between competing priorities and policy objectives.

Security and development are both valuable goals; however, it is not necessarily true that there is no security without development, and no development without security. Any nexus between security and development ultimately depends, among other things, on working definitions, the selected levels of analysis, political context, policy priorities, and operational realities. Thus, aspects of security and development might be causally linked—positively or negatively: they might co-exist independently of each other; or they might be connected indirectly through complex causal dynamics. The accumulating body of knowl-
edge from thematic, sectoral and country case studies reveals multiple configurations between various dimensions of security and development in different contexts. Research also points to the importance of politics as an intervening variable between long-term security and development trends and outcomes in different contexts. This is not to negate the value of striving for mutually supportive security and development policies. Instead, it confirms the need for differentiated national and international responses that go beyond the rhetorical call for integrated security and development policies. In short, in lieu of formulaic approaches to the interdependence between security and development (such as the “3-Ds” or the “poverty-conflict trap” which are discussed below), recent research argues for policies that are empirically-informed and context specific.

This paper provides a quick overview of the evolving body of knowledge on the complex linkages between security and development, summarizes key findings from IPA’s “Security-Development Nexus” program, and concludes with concrete policy recommendations for identifying and designing more coherent—if not necessarily integrated—policies to promote socio-economic development and to enhance security in developing countries.

II. Security and Development: Overcoming Multiple Blinders

Notwithstanding the growing currency of the security-development nexus concept, there are serious impediments to identifying and designing security and development policies that are integrated, mutually reinforcing, and effective. The most obvious impediment is definitional. Any postulated relationship between security and development obscures the fact that security and development are not unitary phenomena. Instead, they are both highly-contested, multi-dimensional concepts. The scope of security, for example, has expanded greatly in the last decades from a narrow focus on military threats to incorporate a wide range of non-military threats. In the 1990s, as inter-state wars diminished, intra-state conflicts gained in prominence thereby challenging state-centric definitions of security. The emergence of the concept of “human security” reflected the shifting nature of security in a fast-changing international environment. Like security, development is a catch-all concept; over time, its scope has also broadened, moving beyond economic growth to include other dimensions such as environmental sustainability, human rights, political participation and good governance. Yet, the security-development nexus formula is basically reductionist and essentializes both security and development regardless of their multiple meanings.

The second impediment to integrated thinking and policy relates to who defines the terms of the debate. In both the academic and policy worlds, the postulated relationship between security and development depends greatly upon one’s vantage point. Diplomats, defense departments, military leaders, terrorism and security experts generally approach development from a security and stability perspective. On the other hand, development agencies, humanitarian NGOs, human rights organizations, environmental groups and development experts view security from a development perspective. Their meeting ground is rarely the same—even if they use the same terminology. Nor are the two perspectives on an equal footing. Indeed, since 9/11 critics have increasingly been complaining of the “securitization of development” without the corresponding “developmentalization of security.”

A third, and related impediment, involves the selected level of analysis. There is considerable confusion among analysts and policy makers about the appropriate level at which security and development intersect. The current policy debates often take place at multiple levels: local, national, regional and global. Discussions move from human security and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to regional conflict formations, global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—depending upon the nature of the policy platform, its mandate and constituency. Finally, the security-development nexus concept is applied indiscriminately to different development contexts and to different phases of conflict. While there are various efforts to classify countries along a graduated security-development axis (e.g. “fragile states”, “low-income countries under stress”, etc.) these are factually as well as politically problematic. As a result, policy discussions generally remain process-oriented rather than context-driven.
Despite these formidable impediments to integrated analysis and policy making, the security-development nexus concept has gained currency in light of difficult challenges on the ground. In the short interregnum between the end of the Cold War and the start of the global war on terror, post-conflict peacebuilding emerged as the most promising policy arena for security and development actors to overcome their separate mandates in order to address the complex problems of war-torn countries. Initially, the primary focus was on civil wars and the necessary policy responses to address local or regional violent conflicts. It was argued that countries emerging from war could not consolidate peace and security without addressing the root causes of violent conflicts which often lay in entrenched socio-economic-environmental problems. Thus, peacebuilding rested on solving development problems in order to prevent or resolve violent conflicts.\(^5\) These policy debates gradually expanded to other areas (such as conflict prevention, humanitarian action and human security) where the links between security and development concerns and programs came under increasing scrutiny. Indeed, as the chapter by Thania Paffenholtz in this volume demonstrates, peacebuilding became an overarching term to describe various activities intended to prevent or overcome violence and sustain peace.

Following the traumatic impact of 9/11 on security establishments as well as on publics at large, the policy focus on post-conflict peacebuilding was overtaken by state-building at the critical nexus between security and development. It was argued that lack of development led to the hollowing out of the state which undermined the state’s capacity to maintain domestic order and security. Weak states, in turn, posed a security threat to the international system through the cross-border transport of terrorism, criminal networks, conflict trade, refugees and other de-stabilizing problems. In light of the heightened security concerns after 9/11, state-building emerged as the appropriate policy arena for stabilizing the state-based international system as well as addressing the underlying development needs of fragile or weak states.\(^6\) Thus, while the international agenda of the 1990s focused on integrated strategies to address the security and development challenges of conflict-torn, conflict-prone or post-conflict countries, in the wake of 9/11, the security-development nexus has increasingly come to refer to integrated strategies to reduce global insecurity by addressing development problems in the so-called weak or fragile states. In short, currently, there are multiple discourses and policy approaches to the security-development nexus which are conflated and often work at cross purposes.

To avoid the conceptual confusion surrounding current discussions of the security-development nexus, it is important to clarify the focus of this paper. First, the paper subscribes to narrow definitions of security and development in order to better understand the possible interplay between different dimensions of these two composite concepts. Security is defined as the absence of the threat or incidence of physical violence including armed conflicts, political violence, terrorism, criminal violence. Development, on the other hand, is understood to refer to a society’s ability to provide for the material well-being of its members (exclusive of physical security). Second, the paper examines country-level linkages between security and development and their implications for developing countries rather than the international system as a whole.\(^7\) Moreover, security and development are understood in terms of the lived experiences and perceptions of individual countries and their populations. Accordingly, what constitutes development or security in one country does not automatically apply to another country. Finally, the paper distinguishes between security and development as conditions, policy choices, and desired outcomes—as will be elaborated below.

Despite these qualifications, it should be noted that the paper cannot fully escape the ambiguities, debates and disagreements in the broader body of literature, as will become evident below.

### III. Current Explanatory Frameworks

In the current academic and policy literature, there are several distinct approaches to the security-development nexus: 1) development problems and failures causing insecurity; 2) conflict and insecurity retarding or reversing development; and 3) development and security as independent phenomena that can intersect in multiple configurations.\(^8\)
Much of the recent literature on the so-called “security-development nexus” falls in the first two categories. Although they may disagree on the relative weight of various explanatory factors, analysts offer multiple explanations for development failures causing conflict and insecurity. These include: a) socio-economic factors such as environmental or demographic pressures, poverty and horizontal inequality and inequitable globalization; b) socio-cultural factors such as ethnic cleavages, cultural marginalization, and religious or ideological clashes; c) political factors, including ineffective or incompetent political institutions, repressive regimes, absence of rule of law and human rights; and d) international factors such as inter-state competition over resources, inequitable rules of international trade, the rise of global criminal and terror networks, and the negative impacts of external aid.

The literature on the impact of conflict and insecurity on development is not as extensive—partly because security studies have traditionally been rooted in international relations theory and thus have not focused sufficiently on the domestic developmental consequences of conflict and insecurity. With the end of the Cold War and the heightened interest in intra-state conflicts, the human as well as societal costs and consequences of violence and insecurity have gained greater attention. Interestingly, among development experts, there is some debate as to whether violence is necessarily harmful for development. Drawing upon the historical evolution of Western societies, some authors have convincingly argued that both conflict and violence can be seen as the midwife of much-needed change in some contexts. Indeed, several analysts maintain that war should not be seen as an anomaly, but rather as the pursuit of politics through other means. However, much of the literature takes a conventional view by arguing that widespread insecurity has far-reaching and negative impacts on development.

Finally, there is a growing body of empirical research which approaches security and development as independent phenomena amenable to multiple configurations. This approach is different from the mainstream literature in both fields which still treat security and development separately. While one might be seen as providing the context for the other, each field basically views the other as exogenous to its concerns. A quick review of the contents of key journals, sectoral policy documents, institutional reports, and professional conferences reveals the continued separation of these two fields, although they might occasionally include occasional coverage of topics of common interest to both, such as security sector reform. (As already noted, perhaps the major exception to this is the growing body of knowledge on peacebuilding which, in a way, has almost become a separate field of study.)

Instead of treating security and development as separate concerns, new research argues that they can well be parallel but independent phenomena, without direct causal linkages. IPA's Security-Development Nexus Program fits in this category. The Program was explicitly designed to examine the relationship between security and development—while remaining agnostic about the nature of the relationship. The Program asked several interrelated research questions: a) What exactly are the linkages between security and development at the conceptual, policy, operational and institutional levels? b) How have national and international actors revised their policies and operations to address security and development challenges in developing countries in the post-Cold War era? c) What empirically grounded assessments can be made of current approaches to linking security and development in conflict-prone, conflict-torn or post-conflict contexts? The selected research findings summarized below are drawn from the Program's various research tracks, but specifically from its forthcoming edited volume titled "Security and Development: Critical Connections."

IV. Research Findings

Due to space limitations, research findings will be grouped around three sets of issues: a) understanding complexity; b) dealing with diversity; and c) limits of policy integration. The conclusions and policy implications of these findings will be summarized in the concluding section of this paper.
i. Understanding Complex Causal Dynamics

Analytically, approaching the security-development nexus from any angle leads to recognition of complexity. Since they are composite phenomena, security and development intersect in multiple permutations. The following review of research findings from five issue areas (changing patterns of physical violence, poverty, demographic transitions, environmental pressures and globalization) is far from exhaustive; however, it serves to illustrate the complex interplay among several key dimensions of security and development. More importantly, the thematic analysis below is intended to identify the potential role of selected global trends and risk factors as well as critical intervening mechanisms (including policy decisions) that help shape security and development outcomes.

Physical Security, Conflict and Violence: The recent release of the 2005 Human Security Report has been sobering on many grounds. The Report dispelled the widespread view that violent conflicts have been on the rise and continue to inflict growing casualties. It also highlighted the fact that threats to security go beyond the traditional categories of inter-state wars, armed conflicts and civil wars; instead, security threats now also include terrorism, political violence and transnational organized crime which have yet to be fully understood and properly measured. An analysis of global trends on the prevalence and incidence of various types of physical insecurity is both worrisome and perplexing. The geographic distribution and intensity of physical violence is changing rapidly within and across countries. Within states, violence is increasingly an urban phenomenon. Globally, low income countries are at higher risk of conflict. There is a rise of asymmetrical violent conflicts both domestically and internationally. Regional conflict formations are a prevalent feature of contemporary conflicts.

Meanwhile, the boundaries between different types of threats have become porous. Terrorism, civil wars, criminal and political violence are not discrete phenomena but are increasingly linked as a result of globalization and the impact of modern technology. Various forms of violence feed into each other or mutate as, for example, when civil wars, terrorism and criminality overlap in their activities. Different actors, such as political spoilers, factional militias, criminal networks and illicit traders join forces in perpetuating insecurity and violence. As a result, violent conflicts take on a dynamic of their own—rarely corresponding to their original causes and motivations. The heated debates among the proponents of the greed vs. grievance explanations of conflict tend to exhaust themselves once it becomes apparent that the two often operate simultaneously. From socioeconomic factors to power differentials, existing causal explanations of violence fall short of capturing the range of contemporary threats to security or the evolving nature of these interrelated threats. Yet, one correlation consistently stands out: the links between violent conflict and poverty.

Poverty: Contemporary violent conflicts increasingly take place within the world’s poorest countries. Since 1990, more than half of the countries affected by conflict were low income countries. Statistics repeatedly point to the high incidence of violent conflicts among the world’s poorest countries—as captured in the following portrait of countries that have experienced conflict: 9 out of 10 countries with the lowest HDI; 7 out of 10 countries with lowest GDP; 5 out of 10 countries with lowest life expectancy; 9 out of 10 countries with the highest infant mortality and child mortality rates; and 9 of the 18 countries whose HDI declined in the 1990s. A third of all violent conflicts from 1990 to 2003 occurred in Africa, the world’s poorest region. While global conflict trends have been on decline, Africa remains mired in multiple conflicts. Recent research points to strong statistical correlation between low levels of GDP per capita and the risk of conflict. Economists have estimated that the risk of war rises by three times for a country with a per capita income of $1,000 compared with a country where per capita income is $4,000. The rate of growth of GDP is also inversely correlated with the risk of conflict: it is twice as high for a country with a growth rate of −6% compared with a country whose growth rate is +6%.
Since countries that have already had a violent conflict face a significantly higher risk of violence, some researchers see a vicious circle at play with poverty undermining prospects for peace, and conflict undermining prospects for development. Various explanations have been advanced for this so-called vicious “conflict-poverty trap.” The impacts of civil war on poverty is relatively easy to document. Wars destroy and disrupt physical infrastructure, human capital, government capacity and services. They weaken and distort social capital. Civil wars undermine the economy, reducing economic growth, capital flows, exports, investments and savings. Income poverty rises as employment opportunities shrink and shift to the informal sector. Nutrition deteriorates with the disruption of food supplies. Diseases spread with population movements. These consequences do not only have immediate human costs, they also undermine the basis for longer term development. Yet, consequences are not causes; violent conflicts and other forms of physical insecurity often accompany rather than cause poverty.

Poverty as a direct cause of conflict is even harder to substantiate. Nonetheless, various theories have been advanced to explain the dynamics by which poor countries become prone to civil war. These include the low opportunity cost of taking up arms; weak state capacity; ‘horizontal inequalities’ and exclusion of cultural identity groups; environmental pressure; capture of natural resources; and failure to manage spillovers from conflicts in neighboring states. Despite the analytical richness of this body of research, Jonathan Goodhand has rightly noted that “the links between poverty and conflict are complex and cannot be defined precisely. There is clearly no single explanatory framework, and one directional, monocausal explanations have limited value. Most assessments argue for two-way causality—poor countries have a greater disposition to conflict and increased poverty is a common outcome of conflict. Thus poverty, inequality, scarcity of nonrenewable resources and external economic forces can have a major destabilizing effect on political stability in certain conditions. Similar configurations of poverty and bad governance may, however, result in conflict in one context and not in another. Much depends on history and contingency and relationships are probabilistic...”

In short, the vicious “conflict-poverty” trap is less a causal explanation than a working hypothesis to be tested and re-tested in each case where physical violence and material deprivation co-exist.

Globalization: Although its impacts across countries and regions vary widely, globalization has emerged as one of the most powerful phenomenon affecting socio-economic conditions throughout the world. Yet, its differential impact on security has so far remained poorly understood. Analysts offer differing assessments of the security consequences of globalization. In focusing on the security consequences of globalization, John Rapley argues that two related phenomena have intersected at the crossroads of neo-liberalism and globalization, conspiring to yield a politically volatile outcome. On the one hand, there has been a widening gap in income and wealth distribution between rich and poor countries as well as within countries. On the other hand, there has been a concurrent diminution of the distributional capacities of states—especially in developing countries. This has led to the emergence of “political vacuums” at a time when the demand for access to resources has been exacerbated by relative scarcities. The contracting role of the state has created space for political ‘entrepreneurs’ who contest the state’s authority in order to impose themselves on the ground. The emergence of various “private” networks that compete for control of territory has in turn resulted in an increased risk of political violence and instability. Thus, although armed conflicts are in decline, globalization has created many new opportunities that have been exploited by transnational criminal networks—leading increasingly to the transformation and privatization of violent conflicts. As already noted above, privatized violence, often linked to transnational criminal and terrorist networks, and rooted in spaces increasingly beyond the control of states, has emerged as a serious threat.

In analyses of the intersection between globalization and insecurity, the role of the state consistently comes up as the key intervening variable. Nonetheless, the literature on state weakness and failure is itself highly contested. In the final analysis, while new research
points to dangerous risk factors accompanying globalization, it does not offer conclusive insights that are universally applicable. Instead, it demonstrates the growing vulnerability of countries to socio-economic forces that create “problems without passports” and public policy challenges that seriously strain the capacity of national institutions.

**Demographic Transitions:** Along with poverty and globalization, demography has increasingly emerged as a security concern. There is mounting statistical and qualitative evidence that certain demographic patterns and dynamics pose a high risk of civil strife. Among these, demographic transitions is particularly noteworthy. Demographic transitions refer to a population characterized by short lives and large families to one composed of small families and people with long lives. Statistical research has demonstrated that from the 1970s through the 1990s, countries at the early phases of their demographic transition have endured more than 10 times the risk of an outbreak of civil conflict as those in the transition’s latter phases. There have been various attempts to explain this correlation. Perhaps the most compelling is the increased volatility, vulnerability and size of the supply of young men as recruits to insurgents, state forces and criminal networks. Yet, analyses of the relationship between the demographic transition and the likelihood of civil conflict have also yielded several unexpected findings. For example, the statistical likelihood of civil conflict decreases fairly evenly and consistently as countries' birth rates decline, suggesting that for most states the demographic transition promotes a “soft landing.” However, when coupled with democratic transitions (i.e. the transition from authoritarianism to fully democratic forms of governance) demographic transitions can have unexpected outcomes. Some types of partial democracies— states offering an institutional mixture of civil freedoms and authoritarian constraints— tend to be statistically more vulnerable to state failure than either fully democratic or wholly authoritarian regimes.

Another important finding is that statistically, the very low per capita income of most early-transition countries only partially explains their vulnerability to civil conflict. As Cincotta and Knight note: “Middle income countries that are delayed in the demographic transition are more vulnerable to an outbreak of civil conflict than would be expected of their income level. Thus, where both a country’s position in the transition (birth rate) and its per capita income (GNI per person) are statistically tested, each makes roughly an equal contribution to the best-fit model of the likelihood of conflict.” These findings confirm that, on their own, demographic risks do not condemn states to civil war. However, when coupled with other relevant factors (low incomes, democratic transitions, high unemployment) they present complex challenges to state institutions and political leaders.

**Environmental Pressures:** The links between demography, environment and conflict, which were underscored by Thomas Malthus in the 18th century, have been recognized by students of development and security throughout the 20th century— albeit from their respective disciplinary perspectives. After the Earth Summit in 1992, the complex relations between environmental change, human and national security, violent conflicts, and environmental sustainability gained increasing attention. Researchers have begun exploring the environmental underpinnings of historical patterns of conflict and insecurity that, during much of the twentieth century, were linked primarily to processes of economic development, colonialism, state building and ideological rivalry. Nonetheless, the weight of environmental change in generating violence and conflict remains difficult to specify.

Multiple theories and causal pathways have been advanced to explain the linkages between various factors. These simultaneously include theories of “resource scarcity” as well as of “resource curse” alongside other factors such as human settlement and land use patterns, ethnic cleavages, low education and high infant mortality and the legacy of previous conflict. More recently, there has been a growing understanding of the impact of demographic inequities and globalization on environmental as well as societal vulnerability through such concepts as the “population explosion,” “microbial threats” and the “youth bulge.” However, recent research has also made it clear that the outcome of
any cluster of variables is never assured—partly because of the capacities at all scales to adjust and adapt to many forms of environmental stress. In short, notwithstanding the rich body of literature on the linkages between environmental pressures, development and security, the evidence remains mixed and at best probabilistic.

The above review of research findings from selected dimensions of development and security serves two important purposes. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the knowledge base of the security-development nexus is both fluid and highly contested. On the other hand, it confirms the existence of powerful socio-economic-environmental-security trends and global risk factors that intersect in complex ways and generate both positive and negative outcomes that can be mutually reinforcing. Yet, as researchers consistently maintain, these factors are neither inevitable nor irreversible. Moreover, since they are based on statistical correlations or global trends, they do not provide reliable explanations for the interplay between security and development in concrete contexts that can help inform policy interventions. For that, research has to turn to country case studies.

ii. Responding to Diversity: Insights from Comparative Country Case Studies

If thematic research establishes complexity, country case studies unequivocally affirm diversity. The proliferation of country specific research and evaluation studies on conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding over the last decade has been invaluable in exposing the multi-dimensional challenges facing many developing countries. The following insights are drawn from seven country case studies undertaken under IPA’s Security-Development Nexus research program. They include Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen. These countries were selected for study mainly because they are relatively small, low to middle income developing countries that have experienced varying degrees of physical insecurity in the last 10–15 years. Yet, none of the case studies is particularly high in terms of its importance in world politics. Thus, gaining a closer understanding of their security and development problems is expected to generate policy-relevant insights that are less encumbered by broader geo-strategic considerations as would be the case for high-stakes countries like Afghanistan.

A summary of the country-specific findings from country case studies is beyond the scope of this paper. However, since all the case studies followed a common analytical framework, their findings provide important clues about the similarities and differences in their security and development conditions, the explanatory factors across countries and their broader policy implications. The common framework oriented the case study authors to investigate a wide range of factors that existing theoretical as well as cross-national empirical research has suggested as the most important ones in determining security and development conditions. It also asked authors to assess the relative significance and impact of those factors in their particular country contexts. It further guided them to examine the impacts of national and international policy choices on security and development conditions in that country. Thus, case study authors analyzed the interplay between security and development conditions as these evolved over the last 10–15 in their countries, examined the factors that accounted for their particular configuration in each country, and assessed the effectiveness of recent approaches to addressing security or development challenges.

Country case studies have confirmed the obvious fact that countries experience security and development differently. However, the differences are significant and in fact change over time within countries. For example, although Yemen, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau and Tajikistan are included in various international lists as low-income countries confronting security risks, their security problems are far from similar in the early years of the 21st century. Yemen faces a serious “security paradox” as its government seeks to balance external pressures to play a more active role in the global war on terror which, in turn, creates domestic security challenges unrelated to its population’s search for human security and human development. Somalia, on the other hand, faces a unique set of development and security problems that are exacerbated by its lack of a central political
authority. The emergence of an Islamic authority in Mogadishu—alongside a formal government based abroad—has once again catapulted Somalia to the international limelight as both internal and external actors assess the broader security implications of this development within the post 9/11 context. Largely insulated from larger geo-strategic concerns, Guinea-Bissau's security and development problems are directly linked to its history of repeated political coups. Meanwhile, despite its short but violent civil war, Tajikistan seems to be on a relatively steady course in terms of both security and development—even though it confronts various security challenges including drug trafficking, militant Islam, and regionalism.

Thus, despite the tendency to classify these countries together as “under stress”, “vulnerable” or “in turmoil”, their problems are quite different. In fact, in addition to facing different forms of “insecurity”, the nature of violence in each country has mostly been sporadic, time-bound, and largely confined in geographic scope and societal impact. In other words, not only do countries face different security challenges; they also experience them differentially.

Equally important, the case studies fail to reveal any necessary or consistent interactions of an obvious kind between conditions of security and development across countries. The seven countries exhibit four different patterns of development: “steady but modest growth” in the case of Namibia and Yemen; “slowing growth” in the case of Guyana; “decline and recovery” in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; and “no net growth” in the case of Guinea-Bissau. Given these difference, it is quite difficult to correlate a country’s development patterns with its security status. Longitudinal review of development and security conditions does not provide strong evidence of direct mutual influence. Only in certain extreme situations of intense armed conflict does the lack of security seem to block development. Although development is inhibited by insecurity, it is still possible. Meanwhile, development occurs despite insecurity, and restoration of security does not necessarily lead to development.

Turning to the factors that affect security and development outcomes in different countries, one of the persistent findings is the role of country-specific initial conditions and legacies. The variable impact of colonial history, ethnic composition, geography, topography and institutions emerge as having far-reaching influences on a country’s current conditions and future prospects. For example, comparisons between Namibia, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia in terms of the timing of their independence suggest that Namibia found a favorable climate for its development strategies in the post-Cold War climate which other post-colonial states did not enjoy. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started their national transitions under highly unusual (but basically benign) circumstances with the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Their experiences as part of the Soviet bloc, the structure of their economies which were highly integrated into the Soviet economy, their lack of armies had direct implications for their security and development options.

Another set of influential factors that may affect security and development are societal and institutional inheritances, and specifically, post-independence governing institutions, political culture and political leadership. It is worth noting that, despite their diverse colonial experiences, each of these countries was significantly shaped by their colonial rulers. In fact, the nature of the post-colonial state (more specifically, the central political authority that was put into place at the end of colonial rule) has had far-reaching and long-term impact on each of the countries—although the timing of the de-colonization process again emerges as a critical factor. The post-colonial states that emerged in independent Guinea-Bissau and Somalia were significantly different than the post-Cold War state in Namibia. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan grappled with difficult political transitions for which they were ill-prepared. Comparative experiences across these countries confirm that the early creation of a viable “political” center (with control over the state’s assets, security forces and distributional networks) is critical for development and peace. To that extent, the political structures bequeathed by a country’s colonial rulers have had long-term consequences.
Yet, case studies also demonstrate that historical legacies shape but do not necessarily determine a country's prospects. There are other facets of a country's life that are dynamic and lend themselves to policy interventions. However, even then, the limits to domestic choices seemed to be severely constrained. The conclusions from country case studies challenge several theoretical as well as policy assumptions about the suitability and effectiveness of various policy interventions at the intersection of security and development. Significantly, Namibia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were under foreign rule until recently and thus had little control over their domestic security or development policies. On the other hand, Guinea-Bissau, Yemen, Guyana and Somalia formally enjoyed longer periods of independence. Nonetheless, these countries pursued development and security policies which were largely influenced by donors, international financial institutions, or their Cold War patrons. Each country has a record of shifting policy priorities, approaches and strategies. Guinea-Bissau, for example, experimented successively with socialist economic policies in the early 1970s, state-led economic policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and privatization, structural adjustment policies and liberalization since then. Similarly, development policies in Guyana and Somalia reflected the dominant influences of their ideological and political sponsors. In divided Yemen, its two political entities closely followed the socio-economic models of their respective ideological patrons. Since unification, Yemen's domestic policies have been in a state of flux due largely to external developments beyond its control, including the Gulf War of 1990–1991 as well as the current global war on terror.

If overall domestic strategies have been heavily influenced by changing external models or influences (or, as prominently displayed in the case of Guinea-Bissau, “serial policy failures”), each government's sectoral policies have basically been piecemeal and compartmentalized. In those issue areas or sectors (such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, natural resource management, political liberalization, institution building) where there is greater room to change development and security conditions or to influence the interplay between them, no consistent, universal patterns emerge about the coherence or effectiveness of different policy interventions. Instead, comparative assessment of cross-country findings at best generates highly contingent generalizations—re-affirming the importance of modest but empirically-grounded policy interventions. Meanwhile, the impacts of new (and often donor-driven) programs for democratization, political and economic liberalization, security sector reform, rule of law, national dialogues, state building, and media and civil society promotion remain extremely difficult to trace—let alone validated through concrete changes in security and development conditions.

Notwithstanding the role of colonial legacies and post-independence external influences, the nature of local political processes emerges as a consistent and defining variable across the country case studies—underscoring the centrality of politics to both security and development outcomes. This is particularly evident in the case of Guinea-Bissau and Yemen where local political dynamics are both deep-rooted and highly fluid. However, in each of the other countries, power-sharing arrangements between groups, the quality of political leadership and predictable rules of succession have been critical to the country's post-independence stability and socio-economic progress. In fact, more than any mix of sectoral policies, it appears that broad national strategies that are rooted in domestic political legitimacy hold the key to a country's longer-term material well-being and physical security. Namibia is an outstanding example of the long-term benefits of well-designed ruling arrangements supported by external actors that have survived the country's violent road to independence. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Somalia are still struggling with political transitions whose outcome remains undetermined. Meanwhile, politics in Yemen, Guyana and Guinea-Bissau reflect the unfinished business of political accommodation among ruling elites who are neither able to set their countries on a sustainable development path nor to resolve their security crises.

iii. Assessing Policy Integration

As the above sections indicate, research findings on the relationship between various dimensions of security and development do not lead to firm conclusions; instead, they
reveal complex dynamics across issue areas and point to neutral, positive or negative causal connections. Similarly, country-level investigations have uncovered mixed experiences of countries in terms of their developmental progress and security conditions. Another important area for investigation is policy integration. More specifically, what has been the record of the last fifteen years of repeated calls for integrated security and development policies?

There is a growing body of evaluation studies, academic research and agency-specific "lessons learned" exercises that are beginning to provide a better understanding of the translation of policy rhetoric into action. These studies repeatedly confirm that, despite numerous efforts to promote integrated approaches, both national governments and international actors continue to address development and security problems through fragmented sectoral policies. On the big policy issues (trade, debt, migration, employment, international financial flows, energy, global warming, or disarmament) there is little evidence of the convergence of security and development concerns or a corresponding reallocation of resources and policy priorities. Although some donor governments have usefully begun to adopt a linked-up-government approach to align their diplomatic, defense and development policies, the "three-Ds" have yet to be translated into effective programs at the international level where they can have the most direct impacts by changing bilateral or multilateral arrangements. Moreover, donor policies rarely extend to critical areas of national importance such as migration or trade. The Doha Round of trade negotiations or Western immigration policies are often pursued in isolation from their linkages to global risk trends on rural poverty in mainly agricultural societies or demographic pressures in rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Even in the most prominent area of policy intervention—poverty alleviation—the current focus on the MDGs involves implementing a narrowly-cast development agenda irrespective of security considerations.

Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that donors are increasingly supporting a growing range of programs, projects and aid packages across the vast security-development spectrum. These include elections monitoring, security sector reform, rule of law, democratic institution building, human rights monitoring, micro-enterprise development, inter-group reconciliation, trauma counseling, media development, and police training. Beyond the "whole-of-government" approaches at the national level and the growing calls for harmonization of efforts at the international level, it is difficult to identify any coherent and strategic policy framework underlying these various programs and projects. Even in post-conflict contexts, the absence of an integrated and coherent peacebuilding strategy has emerged as a serious problem. Meanwhile, in the absence of a broader strategy, the incremental—but ultimately limited—policy adjustments in official development assistance, humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, debt relief, disease control, sanctions and peacekeeping fall far short of addressing the structural risk factors which lie at the source of physical insecurity and societal vulnerability in conflict-prone, conflict-torn and post-conflict developing countries. Thus, there is continued disconnect between the policy rhetoric for integrated security-development approaches at the international level and policy coherence at the sectoral level.

The disconnect applies equally at the country level. Country case studies show that governments and international donors pursue multiple policy priorities such as promoting economic growth, achieving the Millennium Development Goals, enhancing social cohesion, executing an anti-terrorism campaign and ensuring regime stability—even though these can be working at cross purposes. The reality is that in many cases, even socio-economic policies on discrete issue areas such as education, employment or crime are fragmented and often contradictory—and these are regularly supported by donors through sector-specific assistance programs. With development policies far from integrated, their coherence with security policies becomes doubly difficult—especially in countries with weak or overstretched public institutions with narrow mandates. For example, notwithstanding growing donor calls for security sector reform, many national security institutions remain immune to reform and focus primarily on traditional threats to state or regime security rather than the wider range of threats to human security.
The gaps, contradictions and dilemmas across policy areas at the national level also arise within a single policy area. For example, research on rule of law programs reveals serious tensions between law enforcement and human rights agendas. Similarly, there are dilemmas between rule of law approaches supporting market liberalization vs. equitable development. Yet, few mechanisms exist through which such tensions can be resolved. More often than not, policies are translated into discrete projects and programs with their own objectives—divorced from a broader security or development strategy. In short, policy coherence is more an ideal than reality.

V. Conclusions and Policy Implications

As the above review demonstrates, multi-dimensional research has begun to provide support to the growing dissatisfaction with the international policy mantra for integrated strategies in addressing security and development challenges in developing countries. As noted above, security and development do not only intersect in varying configurations in different contexts; they are not necessarily compatible at all times. Over the long term, investing in both security and development is necessary since they are independently worthwhile goals. Addressing environmental destruction, unchecked population growth, transnational crime, and intra-state conflicts is bound to reduce vulnerabilities—thereby contributing indirectly to security and development. However, beyond the obvious, different policy actors need concrete and context-specific recommendations.

From the United Nations to bilateral and multilateral donors, from NGOs to regional organizations, there is urgent need to unpack the policy mantra that without security there is no development and without development there is no security. Security and development co-exist in different combinations: they can be mutually supportive, mutually harmful or independent of each other. The same is true for other presumed causal connections: security sector reform or rule of law do not simultaneously promote security or development, even though they can be instrumental in doing so indirectly. Assuming the contrary can only lead to faulty diagnosis and inappropriate responses.

Policies are often based on broad generalizations—shying away from complexity and uncertainty. Yet, countries consistently defy generalizations. Simplification of country characteristics or their incorrect assignment into ready-made categories like “failed or failing states”, “countries at risk” or “difficult partnerships” tends to create policy blinders. Since the problems of post-conflict and pre-conflict countries are significantly different, the mix and sequencing of policy interventions has to be different. On the other hand, although historical legacies are important, they are not reliable guides to policy since unexpected events can radically change a country’s policy environment. The end of the Cold War and September 11th have demonstrated the variable impact of exogenous events on countries as diverse as Kyrgyzstan, Yemen and Somalia.

Research consistently points to the importance of politics at both the national and international levels. Social engineering that evades politics risks failure. External actors need to acknowledge the political nature of their interventions, and the political choices that these entail. This is particularly true in the case of rule of law and security sector programs which cannot serve as substitutes in lieu of understanding and responding to a country’s need to address its fundamental political arrangements. As noted above in the case of Namibia, playing a constructive role in facilitating a country’s management of its critical political transitions peacefully is a more important role for external actors that any mix of short-term socio-economic or security policies. In this context, current strategies of institution-building or state-building that are technocratic in nature seem to underestimate the centrality of domestic political arrangements.

Yet, given the donors’ growing programming in such areas as good governance, security sector reform, and rule of law, there is also the need for strategic frameworks that can help to bring coherence to disparate external interventions. Such frameworks can be strengthened through rigorous conflict analysis to diminish the risk of the “one-size fits
all syndrome”. Strategic frameworks also allow for more realistic timelines. Both development and security require investments beyond the two- or three-year project cycle. Reform in such areas as the rule of law and the security sector can actually be undermined by short-lived international support. There needs to be recognition that reform is a process that cannot be achieved within the short project cycles established by donors but has to be part of longer term national planning process that is sustainable.

Sustainability, on the other hand, is directly linked to “national ownership” which has also become a policy mantra. Even in societies where national authority is contested or extremely weak, donors tend to privilege the government or the formal institutions of the state. These formal institutions represent only one reality. In many developing countries the informal sector often comprises a larger reality in the socio-economic, legal and security realms. While it is vital— for practical and symbolic reasons— to strengthen the state’s formal sectors, these efforts will only be successful if they are supplemented by investments in the informal sector. Yet, external actors are particularly ill-equipped to deal with the informal sector since it requires a more intimate understanding of local languages, culture and context than international actors are generally prepared for.

The accumulating body of research is beginning to identify the limitations of current efforts to link security and development. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that there has been a sea of change in the international community’s understanding of the need to examine the security and development challenges in developing countries through integrated thinking, more accurate diagnosis and innovative action to overcome the traditional boundaries between these realms. The starting point of theory, policy and practice has definitely shifted significantly towards greater disciplinary and sectoral integration than was the case throughout much of the Cold War. However, the next generation of scholarship, policy and programming needs to go beyond the current orthodoxies to context-specific and empirically-based analysis as the basis of more effective action.

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**DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY WORKING TOGETHER**

United Kingdom Department for International Development


39. Development, defence and diplomacy need to work together. It is not possible to address present threats to human and global security without close collaboration. But this is challenging. Security and development people do not regularly talk to each other. And some development people worry that working with security counterparts risks diverting aid for political purposes.

40. There are some genuine differences between security and development approaches. DFID’s primary concern is Low Income Countries, where we spend 90% of our bilateral aid, mainly in Africa and Asia. Many international security threats, however, are linked to networks operating in Middle Income Countries. DFID does work in some Middle Income Countries, which have an important role to play in regional stability. DFID will spend around £225 million in Middle Income Countries in 2005–06.

41. In some cases, security and development people have different timeframes. Those working in security must sometimes focus on achieving immediate, short-term objectives; for example bringing hostilities to an end, or preventing an outbreak of fighting between warring factions. Development workers, on the other hand, tend to focus on longer-term objectives, such as improvements in political and economic governance, reductions in inequality and discrimination, and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. This can create frustrations on both sides. Development may be slow,
especially in post-conflict situations, until conditions are right. And by virtue of the focus on short-term outcomes, security work may inadvertently undermine the institutional foundations necessary for long-term development.

42. Security and development communities can operate in different ways. Development agencies have learned that country-led, partnership approaches—where national partners are in the lead—work best. This may result in fewer bilateral development staff working in-country, as multilateral agencies and national partners play the leading role. In some cases, this will be at odds with the highly operational role of international security forces, who may feel they lack international development partners to work with on the ground.

43. Human rights is an important area where the security and development communities need to work together more closely; for example, to tackle abuses during conflict and to establish post-conflict justice and security. During armed conflict, it is important to act promptly to ensure compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law. Security concerns should not be a justification for allowing violations of human rights.

44. There are examples of good collaboration. Since 2001, DFID, the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been working together on the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools. The Conflict Prevention Pools have provided opportunities to learn more about each other’s aims, approaches and experience. Most of DFID’s security sector reform, small arms and light weapons, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration work is managed through the Pools.

45. More recently, the UK Government has established an inter-departmental unit to coordinate work on post-conflict reconstruction. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit will help countries put in place quickly the civilian capabilities needed for a stable environment in the aftermath of war, so that reconstruction can begin.

46. Development agencies can and should play an active role after conflict has ended, to ensure the right foundations are laid in the short term for longer-term state building and poverty reduction. Security and development communities also need to forge stronger links between programmes for the demobilisation of ex-combatants, and programmes for their successful reintegration in peacetime society.

47. Successful collaboration can produce dramatic results. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, an integrated UK strategy clarified the responsibilities of each government department at the outset. Working with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, DFID focused on reintegrating ex-combatants into productive civilian life, improving standards of policing, and capacity building for key ministries, including defence.

48. DFID is also helping the Government of Sierra Leone create a more inclusive society so as to reduce the risk of future conflict. The exclusion of youth was widely seen as a major source of conflict in the region. Although the situation remains fragile, it is improving.

49. As Sierra Leone demonstrates, development and poverty reduction cannot happen in isolation. Development agencies must work with defence and diplomacy to achieve progress. We should not be afraid to disagree. There will be differences of opinion, but we must ensure that action to tackle global threats does not undermine the development of capable and accountable states, which can deliver services and rights to poor people.
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AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
SINCE THE 1990s
Martin Rupiya
Excerpted from Len LeRoux, Martin Rupiya, and Naison Ngoma (eds.),
Guarding the Guardians: Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations.
The Challenge for SADC (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2004),
3–15

Introduction

Notions of arms control and disarmament ideologically inform the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), as currently popularised.\(^1\) In practice, however, the initiative’s implementation in the targeted countries, mainly in the developed world, has resulted in different responses. In the former East European states acceptance has been positive, partly because many of those states are desirous to be fully incorporated into the Western political and economic realms. Meanwhile in Africa, the SSR initiative since the 1990s has received mixed reaction, with a significant number spurning the overtures. Again part of the explanation lies in its initial impact that tended to weaken states and ignored the realities of genuine insecurity, leading in extreme cases to some countries collapsing as political entities. Somalia, Burundi, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are concrete examples of this phenomenon.

The challenge facing practitioners and policy makers on this question is: How can we come up with policies and strategies that will forge common ground between the two poles? In our view, Africa does not necessarily wish to challenge the status quo in the international security system, but states on the continent are not about to support their own deconstruction through the template of the existing SSR mechanism. Given the differences in the reception of the SSR initiative as evidenced above, there is a need to come up with an alternative that is acceptable to the former. On the African continent, the alternative clearly needs to address the major failing of spawning insecurity both of the state and individuals. This must lie in an appropriately structured force that is adequately resourced to support emerging political democracies. Stated differently, there is a need for an SSR initiative that is unique and specific to African conditions, whose raison d’être arises from different motivations in comparison with that of the West.

Two conferences both focusing on the theme of SSR in the developing world were held during the first quarter of 2003. In retrospect it is now evident that both conferences represented the re-launch of the third phase of the SSR initiative, focused exclusively on the developing world. The first conference, entitled ‘Security Sector Reform (SSR)—Moving the agenda forward: Global facilitation network for SSR’, was held in London from 24–25 March 2003 and was funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). Dominant among the audience and presenters were colleagues from the defence and security community among whom were military practitioners, defence analysts as well as policy makers directly responsible for the executive function as well as the civilian oversight of the armed forces.\(^2\)

The second meeting was held the following month (11–12 April 2003) in Oslo and was entitled ‘Coherence, cooperation and comparative strength: Conference on justice and SSR’. This was hosted by the Governance Office\(^3\) based in New York, falling under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The majority of the participants in Norway were UNDP country representatives drawn from the 166 countries in which the organisation is represented. Academics from the development field made up the rest, with the odd defence and security practitioner and policy maker. Although both conferences dealt with SSR, the emphasis in London was on ‘moving the agenda forward’ while in Oslo, the focus was on maximising the ‘comparative strength’ of the widely dispersed UNDP offices that, as a matter of procedure, work closely with governments generally in the developed world. The different emphases being expressed in London and Oslo also revealed frustration at the admitted failure of previous attempts; hence the upfront dec-
larations of 'moving the agenda forward' or 'relying on comparative advantage to make a more significant impact'. More importantly, however, this was not to be through joining the DFID and UNDP's forces but operating as different entities. In practice, where their efforts converged this would merely be incidental.

It is also important to assess the significance of the composition of the audience dominant at each conference. On the one hand, in the realm of SSR, the defence and security community that gathered in London had traditionally held the monopoly on doctrine, policy and strategic influence on the subject but had begun to concede space to other 'civilian' input as well as restructuring aspects of the security sector to fit in with the emerging democratic dispensation. It can be argued that the defence and security community is likely to surrender only the barest minimum as it seeks to retain cherished control of the defence and security apparatus.

Meanwhile the development community—long immersed in socioeconomic issues—recently realised that their efforts have been wasted through internecine and protracted conflict and that the time had come to delve into the murky world of conflict resolution as a precondition for development initiatives. For the latter congregation, the discovery that it is imperative to achieve sustainable cease-fires and peace before any meaningful development can take root, is a recent phenomenon but one which is likely to continue and expand in the immediate future. As a consequence of this realisation the development community, through the conference in Oslo, is seriously investigating the possibilities of how it can intervene and engage conflict players around the issues related to SSR.

However, we need to be reminded that their participation is only a precondition or a stepping stone to their traditionally cherished goal—development initiatives. Stated differently, the UNDP views SSR as a hindrance and not as a priority vis-à-vis their main mission. It is therefore clear that each interest group is conceding or expanding its interests, as the case may be, while still retaining their core functions. Based on these perceived intellectual concessions from both the defence and security versus development colleagues, further areas of synergy need to be identified as well as a more serious move made towards collaboration when it comes to SSR and what (should) work on the African continent.

Finally, yet another difference lay in the UNDP conference title that sought to broaden SSR beyond the traditional security sector and to include the restructuring of the jurisdiction as well as the penal system. This may have been implicit (but was certainly not explicit) in the DFID theme.

The above assessment of differences in themes, audiences, expectations as well as separate main motivators presents us with a common denominator perspective that should guide our expectations of the involvement of both the DFID and the UNDP in SSR. In other words, the DFID programme is a New Labour Party interest initiative that may or may not survive the change of government in the UK. On the other hand, the UNDP does not have resources of its own and depends on convincing those countries with resources to commit their own funds in order to support nations requiring assistance. Aspects of SSR, for example demobilisation, are expensive and require huge amounts of financial and other support that is generally beyond the capacity of most developing nations.

Lacking in both conferences was the intellectual history and motivation by the West for SSR targeted at the developing world. In the case of Africa, the Oslo papers did make a low-key connection between renewed SSR and arms control as well as disarmament, although even here the literature failed to highlight that this is the centerpiece for Western involvement.4

Given these ongoing efforts and the appearance of a blissful African audience at both conferences, it is imperative that the underlying dynamics and seeming intellectual sleight of hand shrouding the current SSR initiative be sufficiently contextualised and highlighted.
In other words, we need to establish whether there is an African perspective on the global initiative requiring developing nations to reform their security sectors. If such a perspective exists (as this paper argues), why is this so and, more significantly, what are the implications for SSR on the African continent? Before proceeding with attempts to address the above questions, we need to define what security sector reform means.

**Definition of SSR as Presently Constructed**

The Western idea of SSR emanates from the liberal democratic philosophy that champions market economies and related social arrangements. When it is suggested for implementation in the developing nations, it bears the hallmarks of post-1945 ideas of arms control and disarmament. The idea at present is therefore an attempt to fit developing nations within the hierarchy of a world dominated by the ‘victorious’ West. More generally, reforming the security sector is basically part of a process designed to fit the bureaucracy within states, especially those structures that have/had the role of exercising monopoly of violence on behalf of ‘one-party states’ or such like, in line with the new liberal democratic dispensation—and subordinated to the existing international security system.

While there is no standard definition that exists to define the special nature of reforming the category of government departments responsible for intelligence, policing, military activity, paramilitary functions and upholding the customs and penal systems, the very act of targeting these entities challenges the sensitive questions of national security, sovereignty, state-regime security as well as the human security of political entities. The reform initiative is designed to alter power relations amongst competing elements for the control of the armed forces, between nationals located in the executive, the legislature, institutions and civil society groups. This can also manifest itself at yet another level of regional alliances and coalitions in the international security system. In effecting SSR, there are losers and winners, making it obvious that those affected are likely to resist change while others acquiesce only in order to maximise their own positions. As a result, the SSR initiative is perceived as ‘violating’ hitherto hallowed ground.

In practice, a useful definition of the present trend of SSR can best be gleaned through an analogy relating to similar events between the Allies and the defeated Axis powers soon after the end of the Second World War in 1945. At that time, the ‘victorious’ West was conscious of lost opportunities when it had failed as a group to follow through on the triumph of the First World War, epitomised by the 1923 Treaty of Versailles. Soon after tipping the balance of forces in favour of the Allies in Europe in 1917, America after the end of the war in 1918 went into political isolationism. This left a power vacuum in war-weary and devastated Europe in which belligerent European countries failed to find accommodation.

The result was inter-war rivalry between the former Allied European powers in a process that provided an opportunity for the rise of the German Social Nationalist Party (Nazi) under Adolf Hitler during the late 1920s and early 1930s. This laid the foundations for the Second World War. After August 1945 the Allies moved with speed, battening down the hatches of managing the post-war peace environment through Arms Control and Disarmament. This culminated in the systematic political deconstruction of the German Führer and Japanese Emperor’s offices, as well as the physical occupation of the two territories. This practice has continued to this day, representing the most successful case studies of the reform of the security sector the world has ever seen.

Given the ‘victory against communism’ in December 1991 a similar SSR, as briefly reviewed above, was launched. This was now aimed at removing the residual armaments capacity still located in the developing world. The ultimate purpose was to subordinate the former Eastern bloc and developing nations’ militaries within the hierarchy of the international security system through the regimes of Arms Control and Disarmament, which is dominated by the West.
Owing to the underlying objectives of arms control and disarmament, the initiative has received mixed reaction in the targeted client states. In this discussion, the former Eastern Europe and Africa have each responded differently to the challenge. More generally, in former Eastern Europe where communist political structures collapsed, the new political elites and their majority peoples, anxious to become part of the European Union, appear to have embraced with little inquiry, far-reaching reforms of the security sector.

In Africa, however, Cold War alliances were based on strong nationalistic undercurrents that have now sought to reassert themselves as independent and sovereign governments. As independent entities, many African governments baulked at the prospect of arms control and disarmament by the West through the notion of 'reforming the security sector and enjoying the peace dividend' during the initial suggestion made in 1989, as we shall see.

The history of African militaries and political elites has, however, not necessarily endeared itself with its citizenry. At the precise period of the end of the Cold War, ethnic and protracted conflict ravaged African states. The Robert Gersony Report commissioned by the US State Department documented horrendous atrocities in Mozambique, and the plight of ordinary people in Somalia reached epidemic proportions at the hands of armed factions. In 1991, the US launched an innovative UN International Task Force to try and reign in marauding rebel groups and warlords as a precondition for the deployment of a full UN Peacekeeping Mission. However, by 1993, after more than 14 US Special Forces were killed and their bodies unceremoniously dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the US and other influential UN Security Council members lost the appetite to keep the peace on the African continent. Protracted civil strife also ravaged Angola in 1992 and 1994 even after the withdrawal of Cold War warriors that had helped to prop up both sides in the conflict. A similar fashion of unremitting conflict engulfed Burundi in 1993 and later reached genocidal proportions in which over 800,000 people lost their lives in Rwanda in 1994. As the massacres broke out, a limited UN contingent was instructed to withdraw, overwhelmed by the intensity of the unfolding drama. Conflict also engulfed the then Zaire (now DRC) in 1996, 1998 and 1999 resulting in casualties of over three million people, largely from the effects of the war. Finally, protracted conflict destroyed the shaky political edifices in Liberia and Sierra Leone at this time.

Against the deteriorating security situation on the African continent and the general withdrawal of the North led by the US, models of force restructuring were suggested. These were the now infamous African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) by the US; the Reinforcement of African Military Capacity (RECAMP) by France; and the more mundane Wider Peacekeeping by the UK. Again these did not find ready reception and also struggled against former colonial regional influence.

The important point to take away here, was the acknowledgement by the international community of the desperate security plight of African people and the lack of capacity of the continent's armies.

The end of the Cold War had resulted in the increased vulnerability of African regimes and peoples. As discussed below, this is precisely the point at which the Bretton Woods institutions suggested an across-the-board, prescriptive reform of the security sector whose emphasis was on downsizing and speedy demobilisation, as witnessed in Uganda and Mozambique.

On the one hand, the desperate situation reflected the need to have properly and adequately equipped forces to provide state and individual security of citizens. On the other hand, however, large and unproductive militaries acting as predators on the hapless population resulted in calls for disarmament and force reduction. Clearly, some sort of middle of the road equilibrium was/is required for an SSR process that will enjoy the support of locals given the conflict conditions on the African continent. Despite the failure
of the secondary security intervention mechanism by the reluctant North, which also constitutes the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the plight of Africans has continued to be of major concern. Herein lies the challenge of coming up with an adequate rationale that resonates with and responds to the subjective and objective African conditions and that will result in the implementation of SSR that enjoys majority support.

This paper argues that SSR as presently constructed by the North fails to take into account sufficiently the concerns of African peoples. The current SSR initiative is preoccupied with fitting developing nations into the hierarchy of the existing international security system. In practice, this has been, we think quite rightly, resisted by the majority of African governments. The challenge for both the North and Africa is in coming up with a SSR process that allows African democratic states to strengthen national, regime and human security, without necessarily challenging the West in the highly contested international security system.6

**The Evolution of Post–Cold War SSR in Africa**

**Phase One: 1989–95**

As the defeat of communism appeared imminent during the late 1980s, considerations regarding the management of post-Cold War relations dominated. Washington and its allies sought an entry point aimed at effecting Arms Control and Disarmament within the developing world now that Moscow was in full retreat. Security interests were at the forefront of Washington’s thinking in 1986 when it maneuvered for the Bretton Woods institutions; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pipped the UNDP in the struggle for the global agency to lead the post-Cold War economic management and restructuring. Both were also already instrumental in providing significant financial support to the developing world and needed to retain influence with their clients.

In a report entitled ‘Voices of the poor’, the World Bank provided the ‘factual’ underpinning to this argument portraying military expenditure in the developing world as “excessive, unproductive and wasteful”. In coming to this conclusion, the report had interviewed 20,000 sampled representative individuals from 200 communities in 23 countries. The majority of the respondents had “expressed the desire that security was top of their priority list”, in a sense demonstrating the widespread insecurity that followed the departure of the Cold War. “Bloated security sectors were seen as impeding development and [were] cast as blights to achieving poverty reduction”.7 Within two days in September 1989, World Bank President Barber B. Conable and IMF Director Michel Camdessus addressed press conferences where they put forward the case for a radical “capping of military expenditure in the developing nations”.8

In their presentations, both argued that military expenditure had reached alarming levels (over 800% by 1997) and needed curbing. In parallel with the withdrawal of financial support from the Banks, it was argued that they needed to target decision-making nodes within the political systems of client states in a comprehensive reform of the security sector. This political act or challenge by the international financial institutions was to constitute the thin edge of the wedge that would create tension and suspicion with governments in the developing world.

The suggested unilateral capping was pegged at the previous year’s (1998) military expenditure that stood at 4.5% of gross domestic product (GDP). The UNDP—marginalised in the role of post-Cold War global economic management—suggested an even more radical capping of only 4%. Much later, in the case of Africa, the UN secretary-general suggested no more than 1.5%, followed by a 10-year moratorium.9

Taking this ‘global leadership role’ of the IMF, World Bank and the UNDP in criticising the developing world and especially African governments’ military expenditure, the donor
community took its cue and started demanding reductions as a precondition for bilateral and multilateral funding. Consequently, reform of the security sector under this notion has been characterised by blanket downsizing. But what was the African response to this initiative emanating from the North?

Most African states were caught between a rock and a hard place. Over 30 countries on the African continent had economies qualifying them as amongst the poorest in the world and therefore needed budgetary and development financial support from the donor community led by the IMF and the World Bank. The option of openly challenging the SSR initiative therefore appeared suicidal, notwithstanding the deep disagreement that the African governments had with the prescriptive suggestions. The responses were therefore muted or shown by the failure of the programmes, despite a deceptive decline of expenditure of about 25%, later discovered to be attributable to the withdrawal and end of conflicts in South Africa, Mozambique and partly in Angola.10

A tabulation of the factors reflecting this situation after the launch of the first phase included the following:

- It was clear that the World Bank and IMF's series of demobilisation exercises where designed only for the short-term and did not take into account the long-term nature of successfully reintegrating combatants into civil society. The limited resources allocated were also a point of concern. Furthermore, the rushed demobilisation and integration of former factions that had been at each other's throats failed to take into account the realities of raising armed factions, characterised by regional and ethnic as well as personalised leaderships—a phenomenon that needed to be weeded out in time before armed groups could attain 'the national status and ethos'.
- The SSR initiative was prescriptive and its 'one-size-fits-all' approach soon revealed serious flaws in understanding genuine security demands of states and peoples. In practice, several communities were left without a central government.
- In Mozambique (following implementation of the 1992 Rome Treaty) and elsewhere, private security emerged as better equipped compared to central government, raising the idea of the privatisation of security and the increased vulnerability of incumbent regimes.
- African governments, desirous of keeping lines of financial aid flowing from the West, reacted by removing military expenditure figures from public scrutiny.
- Finally, a rapid and unforeseen escalation of protracted conflict, violence and genocide characterised by severely weakened or collapsed states—measured in more than 19 major conflicts—presented a difficult environment on the African landscape for successful SSR.

Available evidence reveals that by the mid-1990s, the North was convinced that the SSR initiative on the African continent had failed and required a new push. The nature of this new push, which constituted the second phase, was, however, to differ in approach between the US and its European counterparts.

Phase Two: 1999–2003

Aware of the reluctance of African governments to conform, the US adopted the route of legislation in Congress that had implications for officials in the World Bank and IMF to 'enforce' in the developing nations that which would result in SSR by default.11 According to this reasoning, the US Congress in 1996 began debating a bill whose provisions would require developing nations seeking support from the World Bank and IMF to submit their defence expenditure figures. This came into effect in 1999. In the interim period, officials from these institutions had been positioning themselves to implement the bill's provisions once it became law. In 1999, given the involvement of Zimbabwe and other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries in the conflict in the DRC, Bretton Woods officials demanded that Harare submit its defence expenditure figures in the Congo. Not surprisingly, the government in Harare was amazed at this request and initially refused to entertain the demands. Later, it appeared that the Zimbabwean gov-
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government had been persuaded to provide some answers and submitted that its military expenditure was being paid for by Angola. This was, of course, received with some scepticism but was not too dissimilar to what other African governments had done under the same penetrating questioning by international organisations representing the North. On this score, it is safe to conclude that the US now relies on the leverage of its domestic laws as they relate to the work of the Bretton Woods institutions—in which the World Bank is always under the directorship of a US national and Europe appoints the head of the IMF.

Meanwhile, Europe, with many of its members linked to Africa as a result of former imperial connections, decided to continue engaging with the continent but with a similar objective as the US—namely, SSR aimed at fitting the continent within the nuanced international security system. In the search for an alternative to the failed first phase, several meetings were held in The Hague, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris, at which the theme was ‘Military expenditure in the developing world’, and how to deal with this dominated the discussions. It was at this time that amongst the Europeans, the British government, under New Labour, decided to launch a separate but more dedicated initiative. This was designed to encourage developing nations’ growth and stability with the programme supervised by the DFID, led by Clare Short. With the new British initiative on board, it was again decided to launch a second phase of SSR especially in Africa that would focus on public sector management training, including the security sector.

The second phase began with a conference held in Ottawa in 1997, organised by the European Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), now emphasizing “sound financial management principles” and focusing on civil service retraining. This development was almost a replaying of the McNamara Systems Analysis and Public Sector—especially defence sector—restructuring seen in the US during the late 1960s. A secondary factor and criterion of ‘good governance’ was added to the ‘technical’ approach suggested by OECD.

Three years after the launch of the second phase in 1999, available military expenditure figures reflected that the initiative had also failed. Military expenditure in Africa had initially dipped during the early 1990s as a result of the withdrawal of the big spenders—South Africa and Angola. However, after the failed elections of 1992 in Angola and the increase in conflicts, military expenditure by 1996 stood at a high 22%.12

While in our view the programme still held on to the same objectives expressed in 1989–90, the slight difference was to depart from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and to seek to work closely with the different governments on the continent.

Failure of the attempts in the second phase included some of the reasons elaborately cited in phase one, but the most important was the persistence of internecine strife, even in countries previously perceived as politically stable, such as the Ivory Coast. A return to the drawing board then culminated in the launch of the two conferences in London and Oslo at the beginning of 2003, referred to earlier. A further qualification during this period was declining interest in African affairs as a result of international attention being focused on the war on terrorism, in which the continent plays a peripheral and marginal role. A number of important elements also reflected the flaws of the SSR initiative during the second phase. These included:

- a general absence of a rationally thought-out defence policy among many African states;
- the absence of expertise for managing the defence sector outside the armed and uniformed forces;
- the absence of public dialogue in many of the states on the defence and security issues; and
- the impact of 9/11 and terrorism, which has diverted attention away from African issues.
African Perspective of Reforming the Security Sector

The African perspective on the reform of the security sector since the 1990s has been shaped by bitter experience. The end of the Cold War raised expectations of a peace dividend throughout the world. However, events on the African continent in the 1990s provided a scenario of conflict never before experienced. The conflict in Somalia degenerated, smashing the remains of General Siad Barre’s government on the horns of competing warlords and religious differences. During 1991, the US launched the UN International Task Force on humanitarian grounds but was forced to abandon the operation in Africa two years later when troops from the elite airborne division were captured, executed and dragged through the dusty streets of Mogadishu for the entire world to see. With the operation initially timed as a preliminary phase to long-term UN peacekeeping involvement, these events drastically curbed the presence of this international body on the continent. The protracted conflicts in Angola, Mozambique and the Sudan acquired a new intensity despite the removal of the Cold War umbrella from 1992. In Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, ethnic-based conflicts erupted with such force that Africa witnessed a horrendous genocide in Kigali which left over 800,000 people dead with the UN unable to intervene.13 In 1996, Africa’s third largest country, the then Zaire (DRC) became host to the spill-over effects of civil wars being fought in neighbouring states. It was further destabilised by the competing mainly multinational mining companies whose operations had been disrupted in the chaos that ensued; and was subjected to intense conflict waged by armed factions within the country itself. Again the UN was unable to provide support to the mounting refugees, internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and millions of casualties made up of mainly women and children in the Congo. While the UN was conspicuous in its failure to have a presence on the African continent, the continental body, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), also demonstrated a serious lack of capacity.

During the last decade over 19 major conflicts took place on the African continent, with 21 of the UN’s 24 missions being hosted there. Clearly, the removal of the Cold War umbrella had worked against the majority of peoples on the African continent who now needed strong central governments supported by appropriately raised, funded and legalised forces to provide minimum public safety.

It was against this background that the World Bank and the IMF launched the first phase of SSR in 1989–90, as discussed.

Security sector institutions established during the colonial era had been for the purposes of perpetuating imperialism and needed to be restructured philosophically and ideologically in order to “remove the noxious reputation of modern Africa—characterised by coercion and violence directed against subject populations”.14 During the contested period of the Cold War, some African political elites did not materially restructure these forces, continuing to depend on military aid from former colonial powers.

As Odoche correctly points out:

“[t]here is little to indicate that African leaders [in the newly independent states] attempted to understand or define security beyond what was bequeathed to them by the colonialists.”15

Den Hank continues: “Not surprisingly, ordinary African citizens came to equate the term ‘security’ with purveyors of terror and coercion.”16 This frame of mind in ordinary Africans regarding the security establishment needs to be factored in when we talk about reforming this sector. Rapacious militaries were most evident in West, Central and North Africa while Southern Africa tended to be split between nationalists and those electing to sign friendship treaties with Russia.

Following the end of the Cold War, when nationals in many countries were expecting at last to enjoy some relief from the militarism that had characterised international relations since 1945, African countries found themselves in the throes of fratricidal ethnic and inter-state conflicts. In the single decade of the 1990s, protracted wars and genocide occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Somalia, Angola,
Mozambique and Zaire (DRC), with casualties estimated in the millions. Africa found herself with the highest refugee and IDP population in the world. The clear message was general insecurity. Instead of enjoying the much hoped for ‘peace dividend’, Africa experienced the unique phenomenon of collapsed states, weak states and was host to increasing UN peace missions. As a result of inadequate security, nationals were left at the mercy of warlords, armed factions and precariously positioned governments in the Congo, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola— to name but a few of the areas affected. Furthermore, following the peacekeeping debacle in Somalia in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda in early 1994, the ‘victorious West’ and the UN Security Council decided to withdraw its robust engagement from Africa. Populations, as recently evidenced in Liberia, were left vulnerable to armed gangs and so-called rebel groups.

It is against this background that the sentiment has emerged that Africa needs adequately equipped and properly legalised armed forces to safeguard basic human security. Existing armed factions—raised by individuals and consequently owing their allegiance to these characters—are not representative of ‘national forces’.

The continent desperately needs the establishment of basic and standard security structures that are designed to foster confidence to nationals without necessarily threatening Western dominance of the international security system. This aspiration is not evident in the policy orientations viewed above in phases one and two of the evolution of SSR since 1989.

Conclusion

SSR is a phenomenon that has different departure points for the West versus Africa. While the Western desire is to locate the continent within the nuanced international security system, African governments have opted to operate, as best they can, outside this regime. However, even as this by-play is evolving, Africa needs serious SSR that provides its ordinary people and regimes with adequate security and stability. The challenge that faces us is how this intellectual gap can be overcome in order to arrive at a common objective without emasculating or empowering one side in the process.
Insecurity costs. Without security, many states risk remaining weak and fragile states. Insecurity hinders economic growth, exacerbates poverty, cultivates fear among citizens, and presents significant challenges for democratic governance. Attempts to arrest insecurity strain government resources and redirect them from more economically productive ends.²

As a result, improving security—for the state and for its citizens—is emerging as a top priority of the international state-building agenda in countries as diverse and demanding as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste.³ Perhaps nowhere is this more necessary than in post-conflict environments, where reestablishing sustainable, legitimate security is essential to wider social and economic recovery efforts.

The concept of right-financing for the security sector “involves the determination of sustainable policies and strategies, institutions and service delivery capacities that balance security, governance, service quality and fiscal sustainability concerns in weak and fragile states.”⁴ Right-financing is therefore essentially about determining an acceptable trade-off between “right-sizing” security forces and higher-quality and more equitable security services over time.⁵

“Security sector reform” (SSR) is the term used to describe programs adopted by governments with the support of international partners to achieve professional security institutions that meet the needs of citizens, society, and the state and which operate within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.⁶ Addressing the wide range of state institutions with a formal mandate to ensure the safety and security of the state and its citizens, SSR’s goals are both immediate and long-term. In the short-term, it is intended to improve the ability of a country’s military, police, justice and intelligence organizations to provide basic and equitable security. Its long-term aims, however, are much more ambitious: to ensure that security institutions serve the interests of society as a whole, rather than those of a political elite or grouping. This involves radical changes to the management, purpose, structure, financing and values of security organizations.

Providing security has its costs as well as benefits. In post-conflict settings, these costs are often unavoidably high. For this reason, issues of financial management are central to security sector reform. Yet in the majority of cases, the medium- and long-term fiscal implications of short-run policy decisions have not been factored sufficiently into early post-conflict engagement processes. On one hand, national fiscal capacities are frequently overlooked by donors when making security sector assistance decisions. All too often, donors burden states with security sectors they cannot afford, and at the same time effectively mortgage their own aid budgets to supporting them in the medium to long term. Weak government revenues coupled with significant external support to state security institutions breeds aid dependency. What revenue the state is able to generate is disproportionally allocated to security institutions at the expense of other, vital needs. This “live now, pay later” approach to SSR risks, over the medium to long-term, undermining the very statebuilding process it is meant to support. On the other hand, too great a focus on existing revenue constraints could lead to the under-provision of security, as fixed non-service delivery costs are often funded first. Without financing immediate defence, policing, correctional, and justice needs, the “buy only what you can afford” approach risks the statebuilding process in the short term.

Fiscal sustainability and the provision of adequate security cannot both be achieved at the same time in countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo or Sierra Leone. Existing revenue constraints would lead to the under-provision of security, since fixed non-service deliv-
Every costs are often funded first. Rather, a middle approach that moves towards a fiscally sustainable path sequentially, trading off fiscal capacities with actual needs is required.

To address cost efficiency and sustainability issues, the “right-financing” approach should be adopted by both security and development institutions. Right-financing is about finding an acceptable balance between the size (and composition) of the security sector required by current circumstances—“right-sizing”—and achieving fiscally sustainable security sector expenditure over time based on honest appraisal of resource projections. Determining sustainable levels minimizes risks associated with future under-funding of security due to financial constraints, including the risk of overly stringent application of fiscal policy conditionalities by IFIs. At the same time, it decreases the likelihood of expansionary security policies that crowd out other public spending and push back opportunities for early exit by the international community.

This paper outlines what a right-financing approach looks like, why it is beneficial, and how it can be achieved through existing institutions with enhanced collaboration, established tools, and new measures. The paper begins with a brief overview of the public finance origins of SSR. We then offer four sets of recommendations based on the right-financing approach. The first is that security should become a normalized element of the state-building agenda, integrated into peace agreements, post-conflict needs assessments, development strategies, and expenditure planning. The second set resolves around aligning the security sector with budgetary and political realities. The third set focuses on adopting a “service delivery” model for security. The fourth relates to capacity building and good management in both national governments and the international organizations that assist them.

The Development of the SSR Concept

It is now accepted wisdom that security and development are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. The policy justification for SSR is that a security sector that is effective, efficient, equitable, accountable and sustainable is an essential precondition for creating an enabling environment for wider economic, social and political development. The expanding roster of actors engaged in SSR attests to the importance attached to it as a tool for development and conflict management.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) has been the institutional locus for much SSR policy development. Its definition of the “security system” indicates both the breadth of vision in SSR and the scale of the task that confronts would-be reformers:

- Core security actors: armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).
- Management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- Justice and the rule of law: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, and political party militias.

SSR encompasses a broad range of methods to improve the capacity, governance, performance, and sustainability of the sector. These include retraining police, reforming penal systems, restructuring military and intelligence organizations, creating or strengthening internal and external oversight and accountability mechanisms, and building organiza-
ional capacity. In post-conflict situations, SSR is also linked closely with demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR).

Financial aspects of the security sector are acknowledged in the OECD/DAC definition, under the rubric of management and oversight structures. Financial dimensions of SSR include allocating resources according to priorities, both across sectors and within the security sector, and ensuring that expenditure is transparent. But an examination of both SSR literature and SSR programs reveals that, in practice, this has been a curiously neglected topic.

This lacuna is odd in two respects. Firstly, it ignores the doctrine's own intellectual lineage: the roots of SSR lie in discussions and debates in the mid-1990s as to how best to “down-size,” or “right-size,” state military structures in Eastern Europe. Much of the early writing on SSR had a clear financial focus, dealing with expenditure reviews, off-budget expenditure and accounting best practice.11 Secondly, current SSR policy and programming remains largely oblivious to the real-world relevance of public finance issues and the consequences that ensue when these are insufficiently considered.

The negative consequences of this neglect—unsustainable reforms, under-provision of security, and the squeezing out of other vital sectors—are belatedly beginning to drive greater attention to the public finance aspects of security. There seems to be growing willingness by donors to adopt whole-of-government approaches and to cooperate among themselves. But moving from stove-piped decision-making to integrated policy requires attention to more than the “3Ds” of development, defence, and diplomacy: it must also include finance ministries and funding instruments. In the words of a recent study on reform in post-conflict states, “money matters.”12

The four proposals that follow lay out the foundations for a right-financing approach to the fiscal dimensions of security that is designed to contribute to sustainable, long-term stability and development.

Proposal 1: Build Security into Peace Agreements, Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, Development Strategies, and Expenditure Planning

For the security sector to reach a sustainable form, size, and function, best practice suggests that reform must be based on an overall national vision, a national threat assessment, a security environment analysis, a SSR review, and the provisional fiscal framework. In post-conflict countries, the foundation for these processes is determined in large measure by the political settlement and subsequent transitional arrangements. The interests of informal networks within security institutions often run counter to the trajectory of reforms proposed by outsiders. All too often, force establishment decisions gain political buy-in prior to any assessment of the implications of their recurrent or capital costs. As a result, agreed political commitments can be financially unattainable, necessitating ad hoc, mid-course, downward revisions. Since the 1999 Lomé Accord, for example, the size of the army in Sierra Leone has been decreased due to financial realities from 17,000 to 10,500 troops—and may be further cut to 8,500 in the medium term. The ad hoc approach to planning that yields such unrealistic force sizes is inefficient and wasteful, diverting limited financial resources from other development priorities.

Fiscal sustainability for security forces is a long-term issue, but its prospects for success are influenced by early decisions. For this reason, a right-financing approach should start with peace agreements. These provide the road map for political normalization, the establishment of transitional authority and the strengthening of public administration, as well as for the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants, and the transformation of security institutions. Bringing right-financing considerations to the negotiating table can minimize the problems caused by fiscally blind security policies. Peace agreements should indicate that size targets for the security sector are subject to fiscal constraints, and therefore tentative.
A right-financing approach also means including security in multilateral planning processes. A post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) is the main tool used by donors for assessing the reconstruction costs and needs. However, security is often not addressed in these “comprehensive” assessments, remaining the purview of police and military “experts” outside the process. This has resulted in oversized security sectors that the state can ill afford. The 2001 Afghanistan Reconstruction Needs Assessment, for example, underestimated the level of security expenditure required, while at the same time factoring in security improvements that did not materialize.\textsuperscript{13} As a result, the 2002 donors’ conference in Tokyo did not raise adequate funds for security, a problem that has been addressed only as Afghanistan’s security has deteriorated.

Joint assessments that incorporate the security sector are advocated by both the new OECD Implementation Framework for SSR and the proposed UN/World Bank draft guidelines for PCNA/Transitional Results Frameworks (TRF). The PCNA/TRF guidelines note that political and security issues should be “treated as an integral part of the national planning and budgetary process, rather than through separate fora which may lead to a lack of transparency or the taking of decisions which are unfunded, fiscally unsustainable or undermine other reconstruction elements.”\textsuperscript{14} Whether led by government, the UN, or IFIs, these assessments seek to bring government and external actors together to agree on a common set of principles and priorities. Ideally, the needs assessment includes an inception phase of dialogue with the whole-of-government,\textsuperscript{15} followed by a specific SSR assessment. As many of these issues are extremely political, fostering a supportive environment is vital to managing the process of change. The inception phase should support contextual understanding of key problems and needs, with the SSR assessment then identifying strategic interventions to reform the form, function, and financing arrangements across the sector. Including the security sector in initial needs assessments is a powerful statement of intent on the part of donors; it acknowledges the need to mainstream SSR into wider development strategies, and not treat the sector as “stand-alone.” A well-timed SSR assessment would be a useful tool to recalibrate force sizes to fiscal issues. This process could also help identify where and how trust funds might be established and aligned to the national budgetary process.

In the early post-conflict period, IFIs are well placed to conduct quick fiscal analysis to determine the likely size and trajectory of the domestic revenue base. While IFIs traditionally have not engaged with the security sector, the World Bank’s decision to conduct an expenditure review of the security sector in Afghanistan demonstrated their potential to play a valuable role. The argument the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank restrict support in this area was usefully re-interpreted in this instance, providing a precedent for future engagement on the financial dimensions of SSR. IFIs should help to develop provisional post-conflict macro-fiscal forecasts based on available information or pre-conflict analysis. While conflict often leads to contraction of the formal taxable economy, informed estimates of both the overall fiscal envelope and the likely envelope for the security sector would assist planners in making decisions early on in the reform process, while also informing decisions related to the establishment of trust funds. This information would permit more realistic decisions about pay, grading and force size. Implicit in right-financing, therefore, is removing the shroud of secrecy that often cloaks security spending.

Proposal 2: Align Short-Run Security Policy Priorities and Spending Decisions with Long-Term National Budgetary and Political Realities

SSR assessment must consider the short, medium, and long-term security and fiscal impacts of different force sizes, functions, and pay and grading options. Above all, international actors and their counterparts in national government need to pay more attention to the medium-to long-term fiscal consequences of short-term restructuring decisions.

Political realities in fragile states pose a considerable challenge for doing so. At present, such decisions are often made on the basis of national governments concerned about protecting their authority, rather than their people, or by international donors concerned
about international security. In transitional governments, powerful political figures often control defense and law and order institutions, enabling them to obstruct reform efforts based on fiscal priorities and a realistic security threat assessment that might undermine their personal authority.

Right-financing argues that the budget ought to be the primary tool of policy—and that security threat assessment should be funded in a balanced and fiscally sensitive manner. The costs of running the Afghan National Army, for instance, remain far beyond the capacities of state, with on-budget security expenditures totaling 485 percent of domestic revenue collection in 2005/2006. In Sierra Leone, UK-led reform of the military and law enforcement sectors likewise created an army and a police that the state cannot easily afford. In the short to medium term, special trust funds established by donors can support payment of police or military staff where state revenues remain wholly insufficient. But such arrangements should include clear “exit strategies” for an orderly transition to a normal budgetary process.

In assessing security needs, a key question guiding national policy must be, “security for whom?” Whether the security sector is oriented towards ensuring the safety of citizens, protecting the power of ruling elites, or shielding the international community from terrorism has direct implications for how priorities, targets, and financing mechanisms are determined. Based on a realistic fiscal estimate for the entire security sector, attention should be given to: (i) conducting a pay and grading review to determine market comparative wage scales; and (ii) right-sizing the army, police, justice and penal systems as one unified process rather than four distinct ones.

The sustainability of SSR also hinges on that oft-repeated mantra, local ownership. It is clear that the SSR process needs to involve a strong civilian element and should focus not just on the quantity of security services, but their quality as well. Where civilian perceptions of security have taken a greater role in defining priorities for reform—as, for example, in Sierra Leone—national security is often not identified as the biggest threat. This suggests that strengthening civilian oversight should not take a back seat to building up the operational capacity of security forces. The size, structure, and function of the security and justice sectors ought to be transformed based on demand, rather than simply supply.

In a world in which inter-state wars are diminishing in number, and where, as in Africa, national armies have been notoriously detrimental for peace and development, there may be good reasons for nations not to have a standing army. A corollary question is whether a well-trained and well-managed national police service—with the appropriate border and custom units—might serve as a viable substitute. In Central America, Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948, demonstrating since that time that sovereignty and statehood need not require armed forces. Taking this one argument one step further, we can consider the implications of the fact that non-state systems are the main providers of security and justice for some 80–90 percent of the population of post-conflict and other fragile states. In many cases, such non-state systems are more effective, accessible, legitimate, and cheaper than the formal security sector. In certain contexts, such institutions might serve as viable alternatives to the state, or at least as interim providers pending the build-up of formal institutions.

Proposal 3: Move to a Service Delivery Model for the Security Sector

A critical step in developing an appropriate, affordable security sector is to cost and prioritize investments for the army, police, justice and penal institutions. Service delivery benchmarks are commonly set for sectors such as health and transport, but all too often not for the security sector. Here, measurement is poor, if not altogether absent. One result is a lack of certainty as to what reform activities are actually being conducted, how they are implemented, what is being achieved, and whether the reforms are effective or not. In most cases there are no reliable, valid metrics to discern whether progress is being made towards building capable, efficient, and institutionally robust police apparatuses,
nor to assess the performance of those trying to achieve this. The metrics that are relied upon instead are less than meaningful because they measure outputs rather than outcomes. “Numbers trained” is the most frequently used indicator of progress, but this is at best a poor guide to either quality or capability. In Afghanistan, for example, we know the numbers of national police and soldiers trained; less is known about the impact of this hastily trained (and frequently unvetted) assemblage in providing security.19

Policy innovations that are needed to address this fundamental weakness include (i) collaboration among multilateral and bilateral actors to establish model service delivery benchmarks for defense, police, justice and penal systems that can be used in the SSR review process; (ii) developing standard unit costs for services delivered in a given context; and (iii) integrating these benchmarks into annual budget formulation exercises and medium-term expenditure frameworks. The benchmarks should reflect the transition of security sector from an emphasis on combating “enemies of the state,” towards providing law and order and justice services to citizens. Once service delivery benchmarks have been set, and based on the provisional unit costs, external donor support may be required while meeting fundamental public finance principles of affordability, discipline, and predictability.

Proposal 4: Strengthen International Capacities to Support Right-Financing

The ability of international actors to support SSR generally, and right-financing specifically, faces two challenges, coherence and capacity:

• Coherence: When the external institutions involved behave in an un-strategic, uncoordinated manner, the already complex process of reform becomes virtually intractable. In Afghanistan, for example, five lead nations were charged with developing security policy in each of five SSR “pillars”: DDR (Japan), building the Afghan National Army (USA), training the police (Germany), legal reform (Italy), and counter-narcotics (the United Kingdom). The five were embarrassingly uncoordinated: each lead nation pursued its own vision of reform with little concern for how the government would bear the associated recurrent financial costs, or for how reforms within sub-sectors linked up across the sector as a whole. Key dimensions, like intelligence reform, were left out of SSR altogether. The result was the antithesis of the unified strategy advocated above. Right-financing cannot be adopted by individual agencies acting alone; it requires cooperation among multilateral and bilateral donors. We are not naïve as to the challenges of finding concordance between institutions. But neither are we naïve as to the price of failing to address these challenges.

• Capacity: Reform is fundamentally about building institutions. For this reason, the personnel recruited to execute programs need to possess the requisite expertise in capacity building, management, and institutional development. The needs involve not only professional police-work and soldiery, but also staff versed in financial management—accountants, auditors, bookkeepers, and office managers.20 But just because one is (or was) a member of an institution in one country does not necessarily make one capable of reforming the same institution in another. Building the capacity of security institutions requires qualified personnel and capacities within the donors and implementing organizations themselves. In other words, good capacity building needs to begin at home.

The first phase of external assistance for SSR is assessment. In spite of the fact that the international community regularly supports “reconstruction needs assessments” in post-conflict countries, there is no universally prescribed methodology for doing so, nor is there a specialized institution with a pool of expertise to undertake such assessments. The needs assessments often are followed by poorly sequenced external assistance, provided before the capacities of budgetary institutions have been established. This leads to the “projectization” of the national budget, the emergence of parallel delivery systems, and a second civil service—the aid community.

To strengthen needs assessments in general, and the assessment of security systems in particular, policy makers should consider establishing a pool of expertise across interna-
tional organizations (e.g., the UN, IFIs, the European Union, NATO, and the African Union) and bilaterals. This pool should include fiscal, public finance, public sector restructuring, aid management, and revenue experts. Policy makers should also assess how international support can prime the pump for revenue mobilization. The needs assessment methodology could consider the potential role of the security sector in addressing revenue issues, including the need for measures to limit the risks of non-state capture of state revenues.

Once needs assessments are completed, security sector assistance programs need to be planned and implemented. The manner in which such programs are designed and managed frequently militate against the achievement of intended goals every bit as much as the difficult, contested, environs in which they take place. For example, during the UN transitional administration for East Timor, of an approved complement of 1,250 CIVPOL (international civilian police) personnel, only two posts were allocated to institutional and organizational police service development.

To strengthen SSR implementation, policy makers should: (i) actively promote the migration of public sector restructuring experts, including those focused on administrative and civil service reform, as well as public finance management (PFM) experts, to build the capabilities of the civilian parts of the ministries of defense, interior and policing entities; (ii) conduct a multi-agency assessment of the comparative advantages of different UN, IFI and bilateral agencies to support SSR; (iii) develop support operations to strengthen the role of ministries of finance in budgetary process towards the security sector, including its involvement in national security council and coordination fora; and (iv) mainstream procurement arrangements for the sector to maximize efficiency and accountability and to minimize corruption.

Finally, the international community needs to establish a performance-based, outcome-oriented monitoring and evaluation framework for SSR programming. Assessing the impact of public spending on security has been almost impossible in post-conflict states. Moreover, in the absence of performance-based indicators of enhanced equity and quality in service delivery, key issues related to horizontal equity—ensuring that security coverage is not biased towards certain groups, and that employment opportunities within the security services are equitably distributed—have been routinely neglected. To support movement towards a service delivery model for the security sector, we recommend that (i) the OECD/DAC, in collaboration with the UN and IFIs, work to establish a standard set of objectively verifiable indicators and means of verification; and (ii) multilateral and bilateral donors support the development of information management and public expenditure tracking systems within national defense and policing institutions.

CONCLUSION

The proposals advanced here are intended to improve the quantity, quality, and sustainability of security services, benefiting the international community and their taxpayers, as well as recipient governments and most importantly their citizens. As post-conflict states struggle to gain traction towards creating a virtuous cycle, in which security promotes economic growth and political stability, and vice versa, issues of scale, prioritization, effectiveness and efficiency become fundamental to the delivery of security services. The challenge is not to choose between fiscal and macro-economic insecurity on one side or the underprovision of physical security on the other, but to strike an acceptable balance. The aim is to build responsive security capacities without forcing the governments into a fiscal abyss and mortgaging their future. If sustainable solutions are to be found for the problems of statebuilding, right-financing the security sector is a necessity.
The economic reintegration of ex-combatants into society is an essential element of the broader peace-building framework in contemporary peace support operations. The DDRR (disarmament, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration) of combatants has become an integral part of present-day efforts to transform war-torn societies into peaceful entities. The role of DDRR is to augment security by disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian society. It has been recognised that the success of DDRR and that of wider peace-building are mutually interdependent; sustainable peace cannot be attained without successful DDRR, and conversely, any gains achieved by DDRR cannot be sustained without broader long-term recovery. Getting DDRR right can have a significant positive effect on the fate of war-to-peace transitions in Africa and a deficient DDRR process can prolong the state of insecurity and hinder the transition to peace.

DDRR itself is a multi-faceted process that consists of a number of interdependent components. After having been disarmed and demobilised, former combatants embark on the process of gradual reintegration into the social and economic fabric of civilian society. It is crucial that they are supported in this process through national and international assistance. The focus of this article is on economic reintegration, the process of absorbing ex-combatants into peaceful economic structures. This process consists of two phases: reinsertion (interim assistance that meets the immediate needs of the ex-combatants in the period before lasting reintegration structures are established) and reintegration (efforts to durably engage ex-combatants in non-violent economic activities). It has been noted that “possession of arms is not just a function of insecurity but also an important economic asset”. For many, living by the gun presents an opportunity to earn a livelihood and, in peacetime, ex-combatants have to be offered an alternative mode of making a living.

The failure of reinsertion and reintegration (RR) can negate previous successes of the disarmament and demobilisation (DD) phase and hinder the transition to peace or result in increased crime and insecurity, discouragement of other ex-combatants from disarming and substantial re-recruitment. DDRR programmes in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been criticised for their inability to create sustainable economic opportunities for ex-combatants and for the slow pace of progress, respectively. In order to successfully reintegrate youth ex-combatants in Liberia, the DDRR programme needs to address the socio-economic conditions that contributed towards the emergence of the conflict, among them the lack of economic and educational opportunities. Lack of progress on RR has contributed to the reported re-recruitment of former fighters for the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in 2005 deficiencies in RR components in Ituri in the DRC reportedly resulted in heightened crime and insecurity as only a fraction of disarmed ex-combatants had enrolled in reintegration programmes or found employment.

Despite their importance, RR programmes across Africa have suffered from a lack of and delays in donor attention be devoted to reintegration into agriculture, micro-enterprise creation and projects that benefit both ex-combatants and local communities.

Reinsertion

The first step in RR is reinsertion assistance, also known as the transitional ‘safety net’. It aims to bridge the gap between demobilisation and lasting reintegration. It is usually targeted for a period of six to twelve months after demobilisation and can comprise both monetary contributions and in-kind entitlements, such as clothing, basic household goods, hygiene products and baby-care kits. The precise format of reinsertion assistance is a subject of contention and the benefits and drawbacks of monetary assistance and non-liquid aid have been hotly debated among academics and practitioners. The second point of contention centres on the form of the payment of cash assistance, which can be disbursed either as a lump sum or in instalments over an extended period of time. These debates are explored below.
Cash Versus In-kind Allowances

The advantages of cash payments include relative logistical simplicity and the resultant cost-effectiveness, flexibility for beneficiaries, stimulation of local trading systems, and increased attractiveness of the DDRR process and resulting acceleration of the peace process. Counter-arguments stress that cash may fuel funding and operational difficulties due to inadequate design. This article aims to contribute to the improvement of the RR component in DDRR programmes in Africa by identifying the main lessons learned from DDRR experiences in West Africa and the DRC. The article first reviews two debates surrounding reinsertion assistance. First, it explores whether this should take the form of a cash payment or in-kind assistance, and secondly, whether cash payments should be made as a lump sum or in a number of instalments over a longer period of time. The article proceeds by reviewing the success of stop-gap projects (interim projects between demobilisation and reintegration) and suggests that these projects can have a significant positive impact. As regards reintegration modalities, this paper criticises some common deficiencies in the design of vocational training programmes, namely lack of consideration for the attributes of the post-conflict labour market, and suggests that more international arms markets, it can pose a security risk for beneficiaries, it can be easily extorted by former commanders, it can be used to rearm, it can accelerate inflation and if markets are disrupted beneficiaries may not be able to purchase objects of daily use. Porous borders, the wide availability of weapons across Africa, and different value of reinsertion assistance in various countries may result in the creation of regional arms flows: it has been noted that reinsertion assistance in Côte d'Ivoire was in excess of US$ 900, while in Liberia ex-fighters were offered a total of US$ 300 only. The use of cash also increases the likelihood of DDRR being perceived as a cash-for-arms scheme. This approach creates expectations that may prove difficult to manage. DDRR in Liberia in 2003–2004 resulted in violence and the temporary suspension of the process due to unsatisfied expectations of ex-combatants. In addition, due to the widespread proliferation of small arms, weapons can be easily reacquired. It has been suggested that DDRR should embrace a development-for-arms approach and make cash assistance conditional on participation in the longer-term reintegration process, as is being attempted in Liberia.

Lump Sum Versus Instalments

The second dilemma centres on the disbursement of cash assistance as a lump sum or in a number of instalments. Proponents of lump sum payment argue that it is logistically easier and offers a resource that can be invested in productive ways thus going beyond reinsertion itself and providing an instrument of reintegration. Critics argue that a lump sum payment may be squandered on alcohol and objects of short-term benefit, may pose a security risk for recipients, and increases inflationary pressures. Logistics have presented a daunting challenge in the DRC due to the size of the country and the high number of ex-combatants to be catered for (77 000 as of June 2006). DDRR in the DRC has utilised both approaches (at differing points in time): a larger initial payment followed by twelve smaller monthly instalments or two larger lump sum payments. The DRC has utilised cutting-edge technological innovations to deal with these challenges. A mobile phone operated payment system has been devised. Payments are verified via a mobile phone network and cash is released in a mobile phone outlet, where the immediate funds come from local sales of mobile phone services. The sum is later reimbursed by the government. Instalments paid over a period of time have the advantage of embedding reinsertion into a process and their payment can be made conditional on participation in reintegration activities and decreased over time in order to phase out dependency. This would contribute towards entrenching payments into the development-for-arms approach.

Stop-Gap Projects

The void between demobilisation and reintegration can also be filled by stop-gap projects. These are "short-term interventions that can help ensure a smoother transition from demobilisation to reintegration. Stop-gap projects implemented through community-based activities in sensitive and strategic areas, can help reintegrate ex-combatants into the
community by creating short-term jobs, whilst they wait to enter longer-term reintegration programmes." Stop-gap projects, also known as quick impact projects (QIPs) in the peacekeeping mission setting, offer a number of benefits: they contribute to the short-term economic well-being of ex-combatants, they can involve skills transfer and if conducted in conjunction with employing the local civilian workforce, and for the purpose of infrastructure and amenity renovation, they can also contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation.

Stop-gap projects have been successfully used in various post-conflict environments throughout Africa. In the DRC, the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC), as well as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), have been using interim reintegration projects. In Sierra Leone, the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) employed around 6,000 ex-fighters, together with 1,500 community members in short-term infrastructure reconstruction and agricultural development QIPs. Ex-combatants and civilians were encouraged to take meals together and engage in sports activities, thus positively impacting on economic reconstruction as well as reconciliation. Various international and domestic organisations have successfully run reconstruction projects that employed both ex-combatants and community members in various countries.

It is apparent that stop-gap projects can have substantial positive benefits. Their increased use in the pre-reintegration stage (if they are used as a means of paying ex-combatants for the work they carry out rather than offering them reinsertion payments) could not only embed reinsertion assistance into the development-for-arms approach, but also aid later reintegration due to skills transfer, reconciliation and reconstruction, which is a precondition for later economic development.

Reintegration

This section elaborates on the main deficiencies of the reintegration modalities previously used in DDRR programmes. The various strategies of economic reintegration are conditioned by the state of the post-conflict economy, for example the availability of land and the state of the labour market, and by the characteristics of the target group, such as education and skills attainment, age, gender, etcetera. The main reintegration avenues include either formal education or vocational training followed by employment, either in wage jobs, self-employment, or in agriculture. There is a wide scope for international and domestic assistance in this process and the most common methods include vocational training, sponsorship of formal education, and employment creation initiatives.

Vocational Training: The Car Mechanic Syndrome

Vocational training offered to ex-combatants commonly includes soap making, tailoring, plumbing, woodworking, car repairs, electrical work and agricultural skills. There are two main problems associated with vocational training in DDRR. First, the training may not reflect the needs of the labour market, and secondly, post-conflict economies may not offer enough opportunities for employment. It has been noted that reintegration training support can take two forms: either establish a predetermined set of options that are offered to ex-combatants or shape these options according to the expectations and desires of reintegration clients. The latter option helps promote individual initiative and ownership of the process, but the ex-combatants’ choices may not correspond with the demands of the labour market. In Liberia, the latter approach was adopted and ex-combatants were asked to make decisions about their reintegration route: as regards vocational training, auto mechanic was the most popular choice among men and tailoring was the most favoured option among women.

In a non-African example, Baaré notes that in Haiti, “of the 4,867 [ex-combatants] trained, only 304 had found employment, 28 of them as security guards, which was not a job for which training had been provided... What of the reality that 1,790 men had been trained as auto mechanics, probably doubling or even tripling the number of mechanics in Haiti.” A similar observation has been made about Mozambique, where
most ex-combatants did not find employment in the field that they received training in. The same phenomenon may be taking place in Sierra Leone. There are indications that vocational training may offer a better option than formal education due to the more practical nature of the skills transfer, but reservations remain as to which sectors of the economy have the highest capacity to take in large numbers of ex-combatants. An economy with few cars can only sustain a limited number of car mechanics. It may also be a fallacy to expect ex-combatants, who spent a number of years in the bush, to realistically access the opportunities available. The most realistic options seem to be agriculture, and self-employment in a trade or craft.

Reintegration programmes also have to reflect the absorption capacity of the labour market. Labour markets in post-war societies tend to suffer from high unemployment, breakdown of productive economic activities, and decayed infrastructure, and are usually unable to absorb more job seekers. In Liberia, the unemployment rate is reported to be between 75 to 85 per cent. For this reason it is suggested that more emphasis be put in reintegration into agricultural activities and micro-enterprise creation. These options are further explored.

Viable Options

Agriculture may offer a means of securing a living even in the absence of a developed labour market. However, the DDRR schemes in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed to encourage viable agricultural reintegration, partly due to reliance on choices made by ex-combatants. The situation was further complicated by issues relating to land ownership and inadequate access to land by young people. However, those who sought employment in agriculture fared better than recipients of other forms of training. Micro-enterprise offers a livelihood option in environments where there are no opportunities for wage employment. Micro-enterprise creation can be supported by start-up grants or loans, skills training and business coaching.

The Community-Based Approach

DDRR programmes harbour an inherent conflict between equity and security: there is a need to neutralise the threat posed by ex-combatants by offering them viable economic opportunities; however, this often affords them preferential treatment over the rest of the population, which can cause resentment in the society. A focus on ex-combatants may result in adverse reactions (including instances of violence) from the rest of the community and accusations of rewarding ex-fighters for their participation in the war. By offering economic advancement to ex-combatants and persons associated with fighting forces only, these individuals enjoy an unfair advantage over the rest of the society. It has been suggested that ex-combatants should be merely reintegrated into the living standard of the rest of the society. It has also been suggested that RR should adopt a broad community-based approach and focus not only on ex-combatants, but on the community at large and reintegration of ex-combatants through overall economic recovery. Community-based reintegration is, however, a comparatively more expensive option. Many stop-gap projects have embraced this approach.

In addition to examples mentioned earlier, in southeastern Liberia a Danish Refugee Council project engaged a group of 4 500 people in reconstruction efforts. This group comprised both ex-combatants (60 percent) and unemployed civilians (40 percent). DDRR in the DRC introduced the ComRec scheme, a United Nations Development Project (UNDP)-managed project that gives funding to ex-combatants. The idea is for the ex-fighters to organise themselves and, with the help of a local nongovernmental organisations (NGO), design business ideas in the area of reconstruction of local communities. These projects are then funded from the ComRec budget. ComRec embraces many approaches already mentioned: it is community-based, promotes reconciliation and offers the opportunity for a business start-up. It is, however, hampered by insufficient capacity on the part of local NGOs and ex-combatants themselves.
Funding Difficulties

DDRR processes invariably suffer from funding difficulties: delays are common, and donors often express reservations as to the use of their funds. To date the majority of DDRR donor funding has been into DD, rather than into creating sustainable livelihoods through ex-combatants’ reintegration. DD can be funded through the UN budget but RR tends to depend on voluntary contributions from a variety of actors, therefore funding for RR is often late or insufficient.

In Liberia, funding problems were compounded by a massive underestimation of how many combatants would join the DDRR process. The initial estimation was 38,000 but in the end 103,000 were included. DD was financed through assessed UN contributions (UNMIL), and RR was to be funded through a UNDP-administered trust fund. Budgetary shortfalls and delays resulted in deficiencies in the RR process that fell short of the needs of the ex-combatants.

Conclusion and Recommendations

DDRR aims at the durable reintegration of ex-combatants into the economic fabric of civilian society. This article has reviewed a number of tools in RR and assessed their appropriateness by identifying the main tensions and dilemmas. In concluding, it can be summarised that reinsertion cash payments should be spread over a period of time and tied to participation in reintegration programmes, and possibly be taken as a wage for participation in community reconstruction projects. Stop-gap projects play a vital role in providing interim sources of income before reintegration efforts can take effect and can positively contribute to community reconstruction and reconciliation. Reintegration has to better assess vocational training options offered to ex-combatants and more attention should be given to truly viable reintegration options, such as agriculture and stimulation of micro-enterprise. The community-based approach should be utilised wherever financial capabilities allow.

A CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVE

Eboe Hutchful

Excerpted from Anicia Lala and Ann M. Fitz-Gerald (eds.), From Providing Security for People: Security Sector Reform in Africa (Shrivenham, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2003), 35–41

1. Reasons for CSOs Involvement in SSR

Must civil society organisations (CSOs) seek to be involved in security sector reform (SSR)? Rhetoric apart, I find such involvement to be still far from conventional wisdom among African governments and CSOs themselves. Some reasoned justification must thus be made for such intervention.

a. Democratisation does not merely require the dismantling of authoritarian structures. Proper governance of the security sector is at the very core of the democratisation process, and thus an essential (and legitimate) focus for action by CSOs. But CSOs face two challenges in this respect. One is that the concept of ‘governance’ itself has only just begun to percolate into the security sector. Another related problem, exposed by a number of studies, is the limited effectiveness of civil oversight mechanisms (parliament in particular) in most African countries. Hence, in most cases, democratisation has made little or no difference to the conduct and operations of security institutions. The poor quality of security sector governance is thus clearly one of the key deficits of African democratisation, and CSOs have a primary responsibility to rectify this. New constitutions sanctioning more democratic governance frameworks for the
sector provide an important political entry point for CSOs. The guiding principle for CSO action is that SSR should be regarded (like democratisation itself) as a fundamentally political process, requiring dialogue, participation, and consensus.

b. Engagement by CSOs is essential in shaping SSR in more democratic directions. The fact is that SSR is presently being attempted for a wide variety of reasons, by no means all of which are consistent with democratisation. These include: termination of conflict and peace-building; defence restructuring as a result of changing strategic environments; the growing impact of regional collective security mechanisms (ECOWAS, SADC, IGADD) on force restructuring and disposition in member countries; fiscal restructuring and public expenditure management reforms; and even the need to equip the forces for a developmental role (increasingly emphasized as a legitimate objective in reforming the military).

However, perhaps the greatest pressure (other than peace-building) to rethink security architectures in African states is coming from a combination of three sources:

1. the growing ‘security dilemmas’ of these states, which face new forms of violent politics and crime—often conjoined—proliferation of small arms, and competition from a variety of private and community security organisations;
2. the perception that the African state itself is becoming less and less central to the control of violence and the management of security, particularly given the widespread decay of the security apparatus in many states (due in part to cutbacks in military expenditures and in part to the scaling-down of external patronage);
3. and deficit-reduction, which during the 1980s and 1990s increasingly targeted security institutions (Government of Canada/OECD 1997).

The problem, of course, is that these objectives may (and often do) conflict, to the detriment of democratic control and human rights in particular. There is a real danger, given the deteriorating situation in some of these countries (particularly in the aftermath of political liberalisation), restoring ‘security’ and ‘safe streets’ will be given primacy over (or promoted at the expense of) human rights. The intervention of CSOs is necessary to prevent this from happening, and to ensure that governance and human rights issues are kept at the forefront of the agenda. A second, more arcane (but no less real) possibility is that ‘deficit-reduction’ will further gut security institutions and seriously impair their ability to conduct legitimate operations. CSOs can not only humanise ‘security’ doctrine, but help transform it into an instrument of inclusion rather than exclusion, in the way, for instance, that the South Africans were able to do in their Defence Review.

In this regard, though, African CSOs need to react cautiously to ways that donors have tried to operationalise the concept of ‘human security’, and to fuse the concerns of security and deficit-reduction. The concept quite properly tries to expand the meaning of security to address not only physical security but also security of livelihoods, steering it away from its traditionally militaristic, state-centric and gendered meaning, to one that sees the human person, rather than the state, as the beneficiary of security. The real difficulty begins when we move beyond rhetoric. The notion has emerged that SSR must contribute to—indeed be justified on the basis of—poverty alleviation, and thus ‘human security’.

There are two versions of this approach:

- One is that poverty alleviation would be promoted or enhanced through a ‘peace dividend’ and reductions in military expenditure (milex). Apart from the problematic assumption that reductions in military expenditure somehow translate automatically into poverty-reducing assets, this ‘deficit reduction’ approach failed to recognise that it was precisely the deterioration in the capacity of the state to provide security (largely—though not exclusively—as a result of past budgetary cuts) that was, to a large extent, responsible for precipitating the security crisis of these states.
- The second version is that the poor (who are unable to purchase private security, and who are also most vulnerable to human rights abuses) appreciate ‘security’ most of all, leaving open the possibility that appropriate investments in security would
not be ‘anti-poor’. However, who benefits from security, and to what degree, is a political and not an economic issue. In reality, even though it has come to be recognised that an effective, well-governed, and accountable security sector is essential, it is the first approach that continues to govern donor policy. This poverty-alleviation focus has tended to be expressed through the framework of National Poverty Reduction Strategies (NPRS), but in many cases the profile of the security (or Public Safety) sector in NPRS is usually quite low, and its actual impact on poverty is (to say the least) unclear.

- In general, the attitude of ‘human security’ advocates in the donor community to ‘hard security’ remains problematic. There is a temptation to regard human security as a substitute for, rather than complementary to, national security—and in reality, to counterpose the two rather than seeing them as organically related. There has been little effort to engage traditional security institutions on this concept (in terms of doctrine, these continue to think and operate pretty much as they have always done). Nevertheless, international development agencies are increasingly driving security policy in Africa (directly or indirectly, through their control of the purse, something that they are ill equipped to do. Its strengths notwithstanding, ‘human security’ as a concept has come to be perceived as donor-driven, perhaps not surprisingly, given its emergence almost conterminously with neoliberalism and the assault on the welfare state.

c. Justification for CSO intervention is surely the polarisation (or mutual suspicions) that these transitions have often generated between security institutions, on the one hand, and newly elected political authorities (and even civil society), on the other. Typically, the transitions have left militaries and security institutions (often seen as the cornerstone of authoritarianism) bruised and defensive. However, they have also produced civilian governments that are defensive toward the military, have few concrete policies on the security sector, and lack the experience and necessary infrastructure for civil control. CSOs are well placed to create platforms to bring the various stakeholders together.

d. One reason for CSO involvement is the lack of transparency that has come, in general, to characterize SSR. While in a number of cases SSR has arisen as a product of the democratic transition, and been preceded by open negotiation and dialogue between political parties, civil society organisations, and the security institutions themselves (as was the case to different degrees in South Africa, Mali and Tanzania), such broad and open dialogue is still the exception rather the rule. By contrast, many African countries and defence establishments are involved in ‘stealth reform’, to which they would rather not call attention, and which dispenses as far as possible with public dialogue. This defensive approach is not entirely without justification, of course, given the circumstances. Nevertheless, CSO involvement is imperative to break the lock of secrecy (and thus contribute both to the legitimacy or reforms and the consolidation of democratic space).

e. The final issue is the question of ownership. While African states have occasionally launched indigenous reforms, SSR in Africa has at least as frequently been the product of pressure by donors and other external forces, either as part of a process of rebuilding societies torn by conflict, or as an ingredient in fiscal reform. The very concept of SSR has been heavily donor-driven. With the exception of South Africa, African countries have contributed little to the development of the concept or its benchmarks (perhaps in part because of lack of local capacity). CSOs can help to redress this imbalance.

2. CSOs Contribution

a. In the context of strengthening capacity CSOs can play a crucial role in:

1. Bringing all sides together and facilitating dialogue, debate, and transparency on SSR initiatives;
2. Offering civic and human rights education;
3. Mobilising various analytical and capacity-building resources;
4. Enhancing indigenous voice and ownership, and restoring balance and appropriate scope to SSR (for example, by ensuring that it does not remain—or regress
into—a narrow technocratic exercise, or simply an exercise in deficit-reduction which may erode capacity to provide security in the long run, etc)

b. The problem is that African CSOs are often disinterested in this area or have weak capacity to play these roles. CSOs that have been a driving force in democratisation in Africa have been notably absent in the field of SSR. African CSOs have been reluctant, as well as unequipped, to influence security policy and oversight. While the role of CSOs in peacebuilding is well recognised, very few CSOs seem to take an active interest in SSR (or indeed think that they should), and fewer yet combine both areas of activity. While their reluctance may be ascribed to local political constraints (in many African countries issues of security and defence continue to be taboo), it is at least as often the product of a particular mind-set and a genuine aversion (often shared with donors) to becoming involved in this ‘dangerous’ issue. The problem is magnified by the relative rarity of African research institutes specialising in security issues; certainly the theme of SSR is striking in its absence from the work of mainstream political scientists and university departments in Africa.

c. Also, strategies of CSOs toward the security sector in many African countries have often tended to lack political astuteness. It is not uncommon for the security sector (and the military in particular) to be demonised wholesale by pro-democracy advocates, leading to some hostility between the two. African CSOs and political parties are distinctly lacking in what Stepan describes as a ‘democratic strategy’ toward the security sector. I have myself argued the need to see security institutions as prime victims of authoritarian politics, and suggested the need to craft political alliances around the construct of democratic professionalism (Stepan 1988; Hutchful 1997 and 1998; Fitch 1998).

In addition, opportunities for CSOs to work in this area tend to be shaped very much by the nature of the country political context, and of the transition itself. Clearly, where there has been no ‘real’ transition—or where it has been gerrymandered (as is too often the case)—opportunities will be correspondingly limited, though not necessarily absent. Most countries obviously lack the exceptional political space created by the broad transformational process in South Africa, although it should also be understood that this ‘space’ was itself also the creation of a remarkably sophisticated and active civil society.

3. ASDR'S Experience

Our own experience at the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) shows what is possible in terms of CSO participation in SSR. When we tried to register ASDR as an NGO in early 1998 (under the name of DEPRAC) our application was summarily rejected on the grounds that an NGO had no business dabbling in security or defence matters. Yet in a little over two or three years our organisation had come to be accepted by government, the parliament, and the security institutions as a legitimate partner and focus of work on security and defence transformation. We received our first big break in 2000 (our first full year of operation) when we obtained support from DFID and the South African High Commission in Ghana for a Ghana-South Africa ‘Roundtable on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation’ in Accra in June 2000. Even though the (Rawlings) regime was considered ‘closed’ on security issues, the Minister for Defence at the time (who coincidentally had attended the DFID conference on Military Expenditure in London in February 2000) was supportive, and his ministry agreed to co-sponsor the event with the ASDR (the first time this had ever happened). He and the Vice-President jointly opened the Roundtable, committing themselves in their speeches to democratic control and SSR. Just over a year later, in August 2001, we mounted a similar Roundtable for the Police (on ‘Police and Policing in Africa’), with participants and presentations from Nigeria, South Africa and Sierra Leone. Once again, this was co-sponsored by the Ghana Police and the Ministry of Interior, and drew consistent attendance from the top command of the National Police.

These antecedents contributed to the ASDR being selected as consultants to the Ghana National Police Reform Program, launched and funded by UNDP in mid-2002, and as a local partner in the Performance Improvement Program (PIP) of the Ministry of Defence, which has just been launched with the assistance of the UK Department for International
Development and the Defence Advisory Team. In addition to these hands-on activities, we have engaged in our `traditional' activities of research (which, usefully, feeds into our more policy-oriented activities including much networking with African and foreign colleagues and organisations; briefings on conflict, small arms, and policing issues to local stakeholders and foreign embassies; many dialogues with donors on SSR and conflict issues, etc). These are activities that few could contemplate only a few years ago, and which probably might have been considered 'subversive' at the time. But political survival in this tricky terrain is not to be taken for granted. Having established some (precarious) credibility with the Rawlings regime, we had to then survive the change of regime, and the fact that we did so underlines the need for independence (both political and financial) and even-handedness in this operating environment.

4. Lessons

We have learned some salutary (and not so salutary) lessons in the process:

a. The first is that of mutual learning: We have found that African legislators and policy-makers, long blasé to Western advice and models, tend to be much more responsive to African models and successes.

b. The second is that dialogue between non-traditional partners and stakeholders is much more feasible than might be imagined. (Unfortunately, `non-traditional' appears to include the key actors within the political leadership [including the parliamentary committees] and the security institutions, where communication has often been absent or minimal). In particular, the military has been much more open than many people had expected, although there has also been some defensiveness on the part of more conservative officers.

c. The third lesson is the strategic value of networking: Our network, spanning organisations, scholars, researchers, practitioners, parliamentarians, and policy-makers in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, has sought to combine expert analysis of defence and security issues with dialogue, policy development and capacity-building across the security sector. We have found such networking to be a cost-effective way of extending our (limited) capacity. We have also found it an ideal forum to promote south/south dialogue and share experiences, highlight regional `best practices', and build regional synergy for reform.

d. The fourth is that CSOs have to choose their entry points with some care. This will of course depend very much on the nature of the political context and the characteristics (and strengths) of the organisation. Engagement is obviously easiest when the political authorities and ruling party have mandated dialogue on SSR, as the ANC did in South Africa, and the CTSP in Mali.

Inevitably, of course, not all CSOs will be equally equipped to play this role to the same degree. In my experience, it is best attempted by CSOs that:

- Command some expertise in the analysis of security issues and policies and can speak (and yet transform) the language of the securocrats;
- Are perceived as `neutral' and without obvious political baggage;
- Can engage the security institutions over technical issues of defence and security transformation.

The current policy vacuum opens up a potentially vast area for engaging both the armed forces and the political authorities on a range of issues (defence policy, roles and missions, force deployment, equipment and training, etc). In our case, this engagement has been both direct (formal dialogues) and indirect (through our research, for instance on military budgeting), and shaped as much by our own skills and resources as by the opportunities and capabilities brought to the table by our network partners. Access is clearly important, but not an absolutely necessary condition. CSOs can work at a variety of levels, reflecting their particular interests and skills. They can engage the military on a range of issues pertaining to democratic `civil-military relations', offer training on gender, human
rights, community relations, environmental sensitivity, and collaboration with humanitarian NGOs in peacekeeping and peace-building, or discuss the developmental dimensions of military roles and missions (a particularly popular topic with militaries these days). These topics can then be used to break the ice and deepen the dialogue in a variety of (more sensitive) directions.

5. Challenges and Obstacles

There have also been some constraints and setbacks. First, at least in West Africa, the number of CSOs interested in issues of SSR (other than episodically) remains limited. Research capacity and policy engagement in these areas have not improved substantially. There continues to be a lack of high-level political leadership and awareness of the need for a national security policy framework—this is something that only governments, not CSOs, can provide. Similarly, capacity for oversight seems to be improving only slowly within parliaments and hardly at all in most of the media (both of these should be seen, of course, as a long-term agenda). There appears to be little in current SSR programmes by way of support for parliamentarians, and even less for CSOs like ours, and what resources are made available appear to be skewed toward a particular region and institutes. One wonders whether donors, rhetoric notwithstanding, are not more comfortable having CSOs as ‘outsider-insiders’ (allowed in occasionally, but much of the time being on the outside looking in), or in utilising them as individual consultants rather than as social forces with real political impact in this area. Finally, the many players (mostly Western governments and donor organisations) in this area, each with its own agenda, make for unnecessary competition, loss of ownership, and difficulty in coordination.
CHAPTER 6

STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY

Erin McCandless and Mary Hope Schwoebel

State-building and democracy lie at the heart of establishing sustainable peace and human development, but their meaning and relationships continue to elicit debate, with implications for Africa. In recent years, international interest in the concept and practice of state-building has grown, alongside efforts to understand the peacebuilding–state-building relationship and to apprehend the tendency to conflate them.\(^1\) There is now a considerable consensus that state-building is a process to get states to function more effectively. This involves strengthening state institutions and enhancing their capacity to underpin functioning state-society relations.\(^2\) Post-conflict settings represent significant opportunities for rebuilding states in new ways—transforming institutions, fostering new and more constructive state-society relations, and plausibly, addressing the sources that led to war. Conversely, without legitimate and effective government institutions and healthy state-society relations, post-conflict societies are unlikely to be free of violence and poverty. At the same time, state-building and peacebuilding are processes that can often be in tension, particularly where the state may not be viewed as a facilitator of peace in a particular context. State-building can undermine peacebuilding when it disturbs power relations and fuels insecurity and group tensions. Conversely, the quick wins of service delivery and livelihoods needed for peacebuilding (i.e., ‘peace dividends’) are often hindered by a lack of state capacity to actually deliver.\(^3\)

Much of the literature in the emerging sub-field of peacebuilding and development highlights the critical role that issues of state-building, governance, and democracy play in contributing to peace, human security, and human development. These discussions have roots in older literatures. Within political science and international relations, the relationship between democracy and development has been long debated—that is, whether development, or economic reform, is a precondition for democracy or political reform or vice versa and whether they can truly co-exist or whether trade-offs are required in order to achieve and sustain peace. In these debates minimalist conceptions of both have too often been prioritised, i.e., liberal notions, such as elections, majority rule, and the rule of law on the one hand, and economic growth on the other. Many African scholars have historically sought to recast these conceptions, emphasising the incompatibility of democracy and development as narrowly understood and the compatibility of human development and ‘real’ democratisation.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) At the intergovernmental policy level, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has contributed to this discussion, particularly in the context of fragile states. This project is sponsored by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) International Network on Conflict and Fragility, a subsidiary of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Many helpful papers can be found at http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_42135084_1_1_1_1,00.html.

\(^2\) This concept has been developed within the context of OECD-DAC discussions on state-building and is gaining international recognition and usage, departing from older notions that were simply concerned with the strength of institutions. See, for example, OECD-DAC, International Network on Conflict and Fragility, State Building in Situations of Fragility, Initial Findings, August 2008.


Today most international institutions view the concept of democracy beyond free and fair elections of political leaders and rule of law to also include good governance, a pluralist civil society, adherence to a democratically derived constitution, and mechanisms for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts. The United Nations considers democratisation as non-negotiable, intertwined with good governance and human development. As Kofi Annan is quoted as saying in 'Democratic Governance for Human Development', part of the Human Development Report, 'Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.' Thus the human development paradigm promoted by the United Nations considers democracy and good governance integral parts of the human development process aimed at enlarging people's choices and freedoms. Although numerous African countries are democracies with reasonably free and fair elections, they lack the foundational institutions of democracy, including civilian pre-eminence over the military, an independent judiciary, a free and genuinely representative parliament, a constitution that protects liberties, and a vigorous civil society. They also are notably weak on the human development scale, although there are different views on the causes of this as highlighted throughout this volume.

Democracy is not always associated with peace. Many theorists agree that the process of democratisation often generates considerable violence within states. In particular, elections can be risky where competition for power through the ballot box sharpens differences, often along ethnic lines, despite the recognition that elections are acknowledged as critical elements in moving towards the systems of nonviolent conflict management that a democracy should rest upon. At another level, democratic peace theory, which suggests that democracies rarely go to war with each other, has elicited notable critiques and observations: Democracies have led and fueled proxy wars in Africa, especially during the cold war. Moreover, intra-state wars are now far more common than inter-state wars in Africa, rendering the democratic peace theory somewhat irrelevant for the continent.

Among post-colonial African governments, goals and calls for socialism were ultimately abandoned, as governments more often than not failed to expand their social bases and instead increasingly relied on coercion and violence for compliance, as human rights violations, nepotism, cronyism, and corruption increased. These trends prompted international donors, beginning in the 1980s, to dramatically increase their support to civil society as a force to hold governments accountable and to make them transparent and a base upon which democratic culture could be built—a notion promoted by democratic theorists since de Tocqueville. Problematically, donors have tended to support professionalised NGOs dedicated to advocacy or civic education work relating to democratisation rather than older, well-established voluntary organisations and social movements focused on broader issues of public good. African governments have often viewed this as a threat, particularly as it accompanied the spread of economic liberalisation policies premised on the notion of drastically reducing the state's role in development. This has often served to undermine rather than support the development of healthy state-society relations, a situation that international actors concerned with state-building should heed.

Especially on the African continent, the civil society–state relationship must be critically examined where civil society actors and social movements have worked to overturn colonial and dictatorial governments, often becoming part of new administrations and maintaining allegiances in the years and even decades that follow. In 'Theories of Civil Society' (from 'Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn Societies'), Richard C. Crook argues similarly that the liberal conception does not adequately capture reality and makes the case for a sociologically and historically rooted conceptualisation of civil society that considers how civil society is structured through its relations with the state.

The need to support the strengthening of state institutions is found in both state-building and peacebuilding literatures. Respected African scholars have called for a return to stronger states, especially in Africa. In 'State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure', Mohammed Ayoob argues that if Third World countries are to successfully democratisise, states must consolidate their power, including gaining a monopoly over the means of coercion (i.e., violence). He asserts that democratisation, therefore, must complement rather than contradict the process of state making; effective states provide the political order that sustain the gains of democratisation. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and other failed states in Africa and elsewhere would appear to support Ayoob's argument that strong states are essential to consolidating peace and democracy.

In 'Postwar Statebuilding', Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk build upon Paris's important study of post–cold war peace operations (many of which occurred in Africa) that found that institutionalisation (or state-building) is a prerequisite for effective liberalisation in post-conflict settings (see chapter 4). Here they identify the tensions and dilemmas of state-building and peacebuilding encountered in the effort to identify and execute effective responses. Trends in the literature and in practice relating to how the international community has interpreted and has sought to implement governance and democracy efforts, intimately tied with state-building efforts, are usefully reviewed by Charles Call and Susan Cook in 'Postconflict Peacebuilding and Democratization'. Newer efforts to expand the understanding of state-building and its complementary relationship with peacebuilding are being driven by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's International Network on Conflict and Fragility, a subsidiary of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

New Trends

Debates about democracy and development reveal much about the contradictions that have emerged from certain conceptions and practices. Alternative conceptions are required if these contradictions are to be transcended, and recent literature suggests that they already exist within African cultures and societies themselves. While much literature on Africa has historically been largely written by international scholars wearing disciplinary blinders that gave short shrift to indigenous or customary approaches thought to be the domains of anthropologists and sociologists, new material is being generated by African scholars around these debates, boding well for the recognition in policy circles that state-building must be an endogenous process. Africans will need to decide how to employ democracy and development in ways that support state-building and peacebuilding on African terms while constructively engaging the international community and its varied models. This arguably will require engagement with less-dominant paradigms, such as human development and human security, which tend to better address the complex interrelationships between freedom from want and fear and the need to build upon the strengths, capacities, and sources of resilience and cohesion that already exist in societies and communities, even those devastated by war. Earlier continent-wide development frameworks supported in Africa shared similar concerns and priorities as these models, including, for example, the Lagos Plan of Action, which was unfortunately set aside following persistent international pressure for Africa to adopt an approach in line with structural adjustment.

The identification and development of mechanisms and processes for different indigenous, non-indigenous, and formal and informal systems and structures to co-exist and interact in ways that support peace rather than conflict represents a critical gap in the

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literature and practice related to state-building and peacebuilding. No one is better positioned to address this dearth than African scholars.

Francis Deng points to the need for Africans to achieve clarity on political frameworks that can best manage their rich diversity of cultures and achieve good governance while drawing upon indigenous cultures, values, and institutions as sources of strength and legitimacy. In his introduction to Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa, he argues that the legacy of constitutions and political frameworks of colonial powers has proven largely ineffective and has contributed to a crisis of identity throughout much of the African continent. Deng asserts that although existing legal frameworks stress unity, they actually suppress diversity, leaving many Africans feeling disempowered and unable to identify with governance processes in their own nations. In a similar vein, Sam Doe suggests that indigenisation is a process of enabling people to reflect upon their own practices, identify their own resources, and cultivate their own sources of power to heal themselves, reconcile their society, and build new institutions or transform old ones to respond to new challenges. This does not, however, preclude a role for outsiders, who can be catalysts for such processes.7

There are reasons for optimism about the future of peace, democracy, and development in Africa. Most governments have formally embraced multi-party democracy, held elections at various levels of government, signed on to international instruments relating to human rights, and articulated transparency and accountability as goals. In addition, there have been popular reform campaigns and a mushrooming of civil society organisations, including non-state media outlets. Adebayo Olukoshi, in ‘State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa’, reminds readers that this is a far cry from the Africa of two decades ago in which genuine civil society organisations and non-state media outlets were non-existent under authoritarian regimes, U.S.- and Soviet-sponsored alike. He encourages more critical approaches to understanding the processes of state-building and democratisation and urges Africanists to go beyond interpreting African realities through comparisons with the histories of other parts of the world, most notably Europe, and to develop prescriptions on this basis. ‘Africa needs to be studied primarily in terms of its own dynamics, which are the products of the interplay of internal and external factors’, he contends.

It must be underscored that Africa itself is immeasurably diverse. Attention to understanding this diversity in governance and state-building contexts across the continent should be the basis for identifying innovative and effective responses to challenges that will support sustained peace and inclusive, people-centered development.

The events of the past few years, by removing the Second World from the international equation, have helped present the dichotomy between the global core and the global periphery— the First World and the Third World— in very stark terms. By removing the Cold War overlay from Third World conflicts and thus exposing their fundamental local dynamics, the end of bipolarity has also demonstrated the close linkage between these conflicts and the dynamics of state making (and its obverse, state breaking and state failure) currently under way in the global periphery.

However, the dichotomous representation of the First and Third Worlds that is currently fashionable hides the essential similarity in their process of state making, which has been (and is) crucial in determining the political trajectories of states. This point becomes clear if one compares the current situation in the Third World not with that prevailing within and among the industrial democracies today, but with the situation from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, when the earliest of the modern sovereign states were at a stage of state making that corresponded with the stage in which most Third World states find themselves today.

The process of state making has been most succinctly defined by Youssef Cohen and colleagues in a seminal article published in 1981 as “primitive central state power accumulation.” Thus defined, state making must include the following:

- the expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war);
- the maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has been already imposed (policing); and
- the extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state, resources essential not only to support the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state but also to maintain the apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, deepen the state's penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes (taxation).

All three broad categories of activities, however, depend on the state's success in monopolizing and concentrating the means of coercion in its own hands in the territory and among the population it controls. That is why the accumulation of power becomes so crucial to the state-making enterprise; the more primitive the stage of state building, the more primitive and, therefore, the more coercive the strategies employed to accumulate and concentrate power in the hands of the agents of the state. Cohen and colleagues stated in 1981: “The extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence depends on the level of state power prior to that expansion. . . . The lower the initial level of state power, the stronger the relationship between the rate of state expansion and collective violence.” One needs to be reminded that the violence generated during the process of state making is the result of actions undertaken both by the state and by recalcitrant elements within the population that forcefully resist the state's attempt to impose order.

The inherent similarity in the logic of the state-building process provides us explanations for the current replication by Third World states of several dimensions of the early modern European experience of state making. Simultaneously, the difference in the pace at which state building has to be undertaken and completed in the Third World and the dramatically changed international environment in which Third World state making has to proceed explain the divergence in other dimensions from the earlier European model of

STATE MAKING, STATE BREAKING, AND STATE FAILURE
Mohammed Ayoob
Excerpted from Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007)
state building. The similarities and the differences are equally important, as is the bearing they have on problems of authority and governance within Third World states.

It should be noted that in most of Europe, state making usually antedated the emergence of nations and nation-states by a couple of centuries. This is why it is essential not to confuse the building of modern sovereign states with the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Charles Tilly has highlighted the distinction between modern sovereign (or, as he would call them, “national”) states and nation-states. Tilly defines the former as “relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organizations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contiguous, and dearly bounded territories.” Nation-states, on the other hand, are those “whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity.” Nationalism, the necessary condition for the establishment of nation-states, although not of sovereign states, has been defined by Ernest Geliner as “primarily a principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”

Sovereign and relatively centralized states that have performed successfully over a long period of time—and have therefore knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal codes, language, religion, and so forth—may evolve into nation-states or at least provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of nation-states, but they are not synonymous with the latter. Historical evidence has convincingly demonstrated that in almost all cases in Europe, with the exception of the Balkans (an exception that may provide the clue to the current violence and strife in that region), the emergence of the modern sovereign state was the precondition for the formation of the nation.

This generalization applied as much to late-comers such as Germany as to the earliest examples of modern states such as England and France. Without the central role performed by the Prussian state, Germany would probably have remained nothing more than a geographic or cultural expression. The similarity between the German experience on the one hand and the French experience on the other has been summed up well by Comeia Navari: “When Hegel insisted that it was the state that created the nation, he was looking backwards to the history of France, not forward to the history of Germany. When Germany was unified ‘from above’ in 1870 and the Reich was formed, this way of proceeding did not appear to most Germans to be at variance with the experience of their Western neighbors—a substitution of Union ‘by force’ for the ‘organic growth’ of France and England. It appeared to be a repetition of it, differing only in that it was less bloody. Here, as there, the state was moving outwards into diverse feudal remnants of the old order, dissolving them, making all obedient to the same law.”

The chronological sequence of the establishment of the sovereign state and the evolution of nationalism in the Third World bears very close resemblance to that of modern Europe, with the state taking clear historical precedence over the nation. As Anthony Smith has put it very succinctly, “the western model is essentially a ‘state system’ rather than a ‘nation system’; and this has been its fateful legacy to Africa and Asia.” Smith goes on to point out that despite the differences in geopolitical and cultural terms between Europe and the Third World, “the central point . . . of the western experience for contemporary African and Asian social and political change has been the primacy and dominance of the specialized, territorially defined, and coercively monopolistic state, operating within a broader system of similar states bent on fulfilling their dual functions of internal regulation and external defence (or aggression).”

In this context, it is instructive to note Tilly’s point that “the building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor. . . . The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities. . . . Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of
strong states.”¹⁴ Tilly’s description of conditions in Europe at the birth of modern sovereign states has an uncanny resemblance to present conditions in many Third World societies. It thus helps to explain why if one arranges the current state-building strategies employed in the Third World on a continuum ranging from coercion to persuasion (with the two ends representing ideal types), even those states like India that fall relatively close to the persuasive end of the continuum are forced to rely on significant amounts of coercion—as witnessed in Punjab, Kashmir, and the northeastern states—to entrench and consolidate the authority of the state in regions where it faces, or has faced, major challenges.

In order to replicate the process by which relatively centralized modern states are created, Third World state makers need above all two things: lots of time and a relatively free hand to persuade, cajole, and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule to accept the legitimacy of state boundaries and institutions, to accept the right of the state to extract resources from them, and to let the state regulate the more important aspects of their lives. Unfortunately for Third World state elites, neither of these two commodities is available to them in adequate measure.

Our point regarding the availability of time becomes clear if we examine the amount of time it took for the states of Western Europe to emerge as full-fledged sovereign states, enjoying the habitual obedience of their populations, basically secure in the legitimacy of their borders and institutions, and, therefore, in a position where they could respond positively to societal demands, since these demands no longer ran counter to the logic of state building and the accumulation of power in the hands of the state.

It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the states of Western Europe and [their] offshoots in North America emerged as the responsive and representative modern states that we know them to be today—the end products of the state-making process that had unfolded for at least three hundred or four hundred years. Although leading historians of state building in Europe differ about the exact dating of the origins, in the sense of beginnings, of the modern sovereign state, there is little argument about the fact that “it took four to five centuries for European states to overcome their weaknesses, to remedy their administrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of nationalism.”¹⁵

Unfortunately for Third World state makers, their states cannot afford the luxury of prolonging the traumatic and costly experience of state making over hundreds of years à la Europe. The demands of competition with established modern states and the demonstration effect of the existence of socially cohesive, politically responsive, and administratively effective states in the industrialized world make it almost obligatory for Third World states to reach their goal within the shortest time possible or risk international ridicule and permanent peripherality within the system of states. In this context it is valuable to point out that there was no dearth of “Somalias” and “Liberias” in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe.

The pioneers of European state making (although not the latecomers such as Germany and Italy) were remarkably free from systemic pressures and demonstration effects, because all the leading contenders for statehood—England, France, Spain, Holland—were basically in the same boat, trying to navigate the same uncharted sea. Where European states did not have this opportunity and had to telescope together some of the sequential phases that constituted the process of state building, they suffered from a “cumulation of crises.”¹⁶ This applied particularly to the states of Germany and Italy, which emerged as unified sovereign entities only in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and were immediately faced with the pressures of mass politics. In fact, it can be argued that the emergence of Italian fascism and German Nazism was a result of the Italian and German state elites’ inability in the first two decades of the twentieth century to respond successfully, in a context of mass politics, to the accumulated crises threatening their respective states.¹⁷
If this was the case with Germany, which had the well-established Prussian state at its core, one can well imagine the enormity of the challenge faced by the postcolonial states of the Third World. The latter's problems have been compounded by the fact that they are under pressure to demonstrate adequate statehood quickly; to perform the task of state making in a humane, civilized, and consensual fashion; and to do all this in an era of mass politics. The inadequacy of the time element and the consequent fact that several sequential phases involved in the state-making process have had to be collapsed or telescoped together into one mammoth state-building enterprise go a long way toward explaining the problems of authority and governance faced by the Third World states today. Furthermore, the demand for humane treatment of subject populations during the early stages of state building has made that task in the Third World enormously difficult and complicated.

Given the short time at the disposal of state makers in the Third World and the consequent acceleration in their state-making efforts necessary to demonstrate that they are moving speedily toward effective statehood, crises erupt simultaneously, become unmanageable as the load they put on the political system outruns the political and military, capabilities of the state, and lead to an accumulation of crises, which further erodes the legitimacy of the already fragile postcolonial state.

INTRODUCTION: IDENTITY, DIVERSITY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA
Francis M. Deng

This study assumes that African countries have yet to achieve clarity on what political framework will best manage their rich diversities of people, achieve good governance, and draw upon indigenous African cultures, values, and institutions as sources of strength and legitimacy. As evidenced by contemporary problems in Africa—civil wars, increasing disparities in wealth among populations, and economic stagnation—the legacy of constitutions and political frameworks left behind by colonial powers has proven largely ineffective. Postindependence governance frameworks have contributed to a crisis of identity throughout much of the African continent. Existing legal frameworks that seem to stress unity through the suppression of diversity have left many Africans feeling disempowered and unable to see themselves reflected in the governance of the nation within which they live. This study argues that if an African nation’s constitution and its attendant governing framework are to embody the soul of that nation, as they are expected to do, they must reflect the essential cultural values and norms of all the nation’s peoples and build on their worldview as the starting point for constitutionalism—with constitutionalism defined as a mechanism for controlling, regulating, and managing the exercise of power in a process by which people, individuals and groups, pursue material and other values through institutions using resources with outcomes and effects. Constitutionalism in Africa must be seen not as a process that begins and ends with the mere elaboration of a constitutional document, but rather as a living process that is constantly evolving with the participation of its people to promote their ownership of the governing frameworks and make them reflect the political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics of the continent and its populations.

The crisis of identity that this study seeks to address is not a product of mere contemporary events, but rather one with historical roots. It is common knowledge that the African state was carved out of diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural entities, which gave the state a pluralistic configuration. The African state was and is still to this day largely a com-
posite of distinct ethnic units—many of which would likely have described themselves at the time of colonization as nations in their own right. The tendency of colonial powers to treat certain groups and regions preferentially in the development of political and economic policies led to considerable disparities among ethnic groups in the shaping and sharing of power, national wealth, social services, and development opportunities and effectively sowed the seeds for future conflict among indigenous groups. Instead of seeking remedies in addressing these disparities through an equitable system of distribution of power and representation, many postindependence African governments adopted wholesale the constitutional models and governance structures prescribed by their colonizers. In doing so, they emphasized monolithic concepts of unity by suppressing territorially definable ethnic minorities, who sought not only to be recognized for their distinctive identities but also to participate in the constitutional and governing frameworks of the states within which they lived.

In a number of African countries, this tension between the colonially anointed and governing elite and the groups subject to that elite culminated in armed conflict and a demand for various forms of self-determination. Sudan suffered a seventeen-year secessionist war that began only four months before the declaration of independence on January 1, 1956. When the former Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) declared independence in 1960, the province of Katanga tried to break away, igniting a civil war in which the interests of the major powers became involved and that resulted in the death of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. In Nigeria, Biafra waged a secessionist war during the late 1960s that was suppressed only after considerable loss of life and severe destruction. Eritrea, once part of Ethiopia, fought a war of independence that lasted for thirty years until 1991. Civil wars also devastated Angola and Mozambique, and while these wars were more ideological than ethnic, they had undercurrents of identity conflicts. Chad too suffered a violent conflict in which ethnoregionalism was a factor.

Some of these conflicts, or at least their root causes, persist today, even where a semblance of peace has been achieved. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is back in arms. Côte d'Ivoire, previously seen as a model of stability, has exploded. Senegal is confronting a regional rebellion in the Cassamance region. The situation in Nigeria remains precarious. In Sudan although the North-South conflict, which had resumed in 1983 after a ten-year precarious peace, appears to have ended with the January 9, 2005, signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the war in Darfur in western Sudan and the less visible conflict in the Beja region in the east continue to pose a major challenge to peace, unity, and stability in the country.

As Crawford Young contends, democratic transitions in contemporary Africa indicate that “cultural diversity constitutes a significant challenge to national unity and state effectiveness in a politically liberalized environment, but not an insuperable obstacle. Careful constitutional design can facilitate (though not guarantee) accommodation of ethnic, religious and racial differences. In such institutional practice, accumulated experience demonstrates that cultural pluralism needs to be acknowledged, through arrangements which ensure inclusionary politics, and create structural incentives for intercommunal cooperation.”

Among the critical questions posed by ethnic conflicts and the crises of identity behind them is whether a country that is pluricultural and multi-ethnic should be governed as such; whether the role of religion (in particular one religion) should dominate the affairs of an inherently pluralistic state; and whether majority rule is sufficient to satisfy contemporary standards of democracy. How different governments respond to these questions will reflect not only differing perspectives on race, culture, and religion but also differing conceptions of the extent to which race, culture, and religion should determine the distribution of power and national wealth, the provision of public services, the enjoyment of the status and rights of citizenship, and the pattern of development.

Accordingly, this study addresses two sets of interrelated issues, the management of diversities through various forms and degrees of self-determination (including those that ensure
equal participation in the governance of one's country, as well as self-administration, autonomy, and federalism) and cultural contextualization through the application of relevant indigenous norms within a framework that recognizes both peculiarities and commonalities. These two sets of issues will be examined with particular emphasis on a number of policy areas: conflict prevention, management, and resolution; democratic principles of consensual decision making; the pursuit of human dignity through culturally relevant principles of “human and people's rights”; socioeconomic development as a process of self-enhancement from within that balances growth with equitable distribution; gender equality; and the integrity of the environment.

The study approaches constitutionalism as a concept that goes beyond the constitution to embrace political, economic, and social and cultural dynamics in a comprehensive process—more fully discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Self-determination should be understood as a means by which people sharing distinct characteristics decide on the framework and the system of governance under which they wish to live and participate in the realization of the same—whether within the existing state framework or in a newly independent entity to which they choose to subject themselves, as explored in chapter 4. Accordingly, the study views self-determination as a tool of conflict prevention, management, and resolution within or outside the unity framework.

Although preserving national unity is the preferred option, this study maintains that it is indeed in the interest of that unity for countries to pursue credibly the principle of self-determination, including independence, not to promote secession, but to encourage the creation of conditions that would make unity attractive to potential secessionists. While the prospects of national integration in the long run should be cautiously and sensitively promoted, in the short run governance should be pursued through a constitutional system based on coexistence within a broader national framework of unity; diversity and the integrity of every group, however small, should be respected and equitably accommodated. With this goal in mind, whether the resulting constitutional system is labeled “autonomy,” “federation,” or “confederation” is less important than the effective distribution of powers it stipulates and the manner in which the system attends to the needs and rights of all of its peoples, regardless of their racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural differences.

It should be acknowledged that at present, in virtually all African countries confronted with national identity crises, demands for self-determination by ethnoregional groups run against the official objective of preserving national unity. They are accordingly suppressed, often with the disregard and even connivance of the international community. Indeed, in its stereotypical form, the desire to preserve national unity is fortified by the principle of territorial integrity and the protection of colonial borders as reflected in the charters and instruments of the Organization of African Unity, reaffirmed by its successor, the African Union, and endorsed by the United Nations.

To place the challenge of conflicting national visions in context, this book aims to examine the situation in a select sample of regionally representative countries: those that have experienced colonial policies; those struggling to accommodate religious, racial, and ethnic diversity; and those dealing with the challenges of federalism and threats of secession.

A personal note about the process that has led me to this study is called for. No work is entirely without a genesis and a historical evolution in which experiences interplay to chart the way for the next step. My work began in the late 1950s with a focused legal anthropological study of the Dinka and led to a broader study of their culture, folklore, oral history, and biographies. I then moved on to the Sudanese crisis of identity that has been a key factor in the North-South civil war and the conflicts proliferating in several regions of Northern Sudan. An aspect of the work on this national, or second, level has been the search for peace with justice within a framework of equitable unity in which my occupational responsibilities in government and diplomacy predisposed and facilitated my involvement. The third level of my activities has focused on Africa as a whole, in collaboration with other scholars. I have explored ways of preventing, managing, and
resolving conflicts, and promoting participatory democracy, human rights, and culturally sensitive development. The fourth level of my work has had a global purview. For twelve years, from 1992 to 2004, with a global mandate as the UN secretary-general's representative on internally displaced persons, my preoccupation was on the plight of 25 to 30 million people, in more than fifty countries who were uprooted by armed conflicts, communal violence, egregious human right's violations, and other human-made or natural disasters within their own nations. These peoples had not crossed international borders and were therefore not refugees in the conventional sense and not covered by the 1951 Convention on Refugees and its 1967 protocol. Nor were they protected and assisted by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. My findings from some thirty-three in-depth missions around the world revealed that the conditions of the victims of these internal wars had much in common, nearly always characterized by an acute crisis of national identity that privileges some to enjoy the full rights of citizenship and marginalizes others on the basis of race, ethnicity, culture, and religion to the extent that citizenship becomes only of paper value.

Despite all that is shared by these conflicts and crises of nationhood around the world, there are significant differences, especially within a continent as diverse as Africa. Although Sudan, of course, stands out as an acutely divided country, the conflicts that have raged elsewhere, such as in Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, reflect cleavages of varying degrees. And although Nigeria has been relatively successful in managing its diversities through federalism, the crisis of national identity continues under the surface and from time to time flares up. Even Somalia, reputedly homogeneous, has experienced devastating conflict based on clan divisions.

It goes without saying that my experiences at these four levels have significantly contributed to my perspective on the issues involved. There is, of course, an inherent danger of overgeneralization from what one has experienced and witnessed. Kwame Anthony Appiah has warned against generalization: "Now I am confident in rejecting any homogenizing portrait of African intellectual life, because the ethnographics and the travel literature and the novels of parts of Africa other than my home are all replete with examples of ways of life and of thought that strike me as thoroughly pretheoretically different from life in Asante, where I grew up." Appiah went on to elaborate with specific examples of what is not in common and provides a vivid picture of the diversity experienced by a number of African societies:

Compare Evans-Pritchard's famous Zande oracles, with their simple questions and their straightforward answers, with the fabulous richness of Yoruba oracles, whose interpretation requires great skill in the hermeneutics of the complex corpus of verses of Ifa; or our own Asante monarchy, a confederation in which the king is primus inter pares, his elders and paramount chiefs guiding him in council, with the more absolute power of Mutesa the First in nineteenth-century Buganda; or the enclosed horizons of a traditional Hausa wife, forever barred from contact with men other than her husband, with the open spaces of the women traders at southern Nigeria; or the art of Benin—its massive bronzes—with the tiny elegant goldweight figures of the Akan. Face the warrior horsemen of the Fulani jihads with Shaka's Zulu impis; taste the bland foods of Botswana after the spices of Fanti cooking; try understanding Kikuyu or Yoruba or Fulfulde with a Twi dictionary. Surely differences in religious ontology and ritual, in the organization of politics and the family, in relations between the sexes and in art, in styles of warfare and cuisine, in language—surely all these are fundamental kinds of difference?

Putting aside his preferential tone, one can only agree with Appiah about the differences among the Africans. Abdullahi An-Na'im demonstrates another point of view: that despite the differences, there are cultural similarities among the Africans. As he has argued, we need to recognize not only the multifaceted diversity of Africa but also the similarity of the experiences of its peoples with colonialism and its aftermath.

One needs to be careful about generalizations in view of the diversity of cultural, ethnic, religious, and other features of African societies . . . [but] the similarities of recent African experiences are too obvious and relevant to ignore in efforts to pool resources and develop responses to the drastic consequences of past colonialism and current differentials in global power relations. For the purposes of the legal protection of human rights in particular, those consequences include the establishment of European model nation-states premised on specific constitutional
and legal assumptions, and ways in which that model was misconceived or misapplied in African settings. They also encompass patterns of political development, educations, systems, and social trends as well as economic, technological, and other forms of postcolonial dependencies of African countries on developed industrialized countries.4

In the area with which I am most familiar—customary law—scholars who pioneered the study and teaching of African law note in their writings that there is as much that divides as there is that unites indigenous African legal systems, including the value systems that the law is intended to promote and sanction. It is this premise that gives me the courage to tackle African problems of governance from a continental perspective. However, it must be conceded at the outset that one's own proximity to a particular African subculture, and deep-rooted attachment to the same, will inevitably color one's outlook. I do not conceal the fact that much of my scholarly and professional life has been devoted to the problems of my own country, Sudan. If my views or perspectives appear too colored by this experience, I hope tolerance will prevail to forgive the shortcoming without prejudice to the whole.

STATE, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: 
THE COMPLEX PROCESS OF RENEWAL
Adebayo Olukoshi

Among many Africanist researchers and policymakers of different ideological hues, the last few years have witnessed the growth of profound pessimism, even outright disillusionment, about the overall prospects of the African continent. Much of this pessimism and disillusionment has been captured by the concept of “Afro-pessimism” that has gained currency since the early 1990s. The case with which Afro-pessimism—that state of mind whereby nothing good is seen as presently or potentially coming out of Africa in the near term—has spread is quite astonishing and stands in complete contrast to the cautious hope that pervaded discussions about Africa's place in the world a few years earlier. With the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, many intellectuals and politicians had pointed to the prospects for a new, brighter global order from which Africa was expected to profit considerably as the international peace dividend was distributed. However, the rapid collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself, combined with a host of other factors such as the resurgence of violent ethnic nationalism, turned the table of opinion as the 1990s dawned.

Political and Economic Dimensions of “Afro-Pessimism”
The dwindling domestic economic and social fortunes of the continent, combined with a decrease in its share of global economic activity (especially trade and investment flows), a deepening debt crisis,1 shrinking international competitiveness, declining revenue receipts, a growing refugee problem, spectacular cases of state decay and collapse,2 and systematic violence, reinforce the feeling that the basis for hope had been (almost) exhausted, at least in the short term. This feeling was vividly captured by Robert Kaplan in his 1994 essay on what he described as the “coming anarchy,”3 even if several commentators shuddered at the cynical extremism and tendentiousness of his commentary and its tone. But even in otherwise respectable intellectual and policy circles, including the World Bank, few were able to resist the prognosis that Africa had become “hemmed in,”4 with its societies sliding back to precolonial and early-colonial enclave arrangements,5 its states undergoing a “free fall,”6 and its people increasingly abandoned to a Hobbesian law of nature amid growing disorder. For many, the question that was posed was: can Africa survive?7 In many respects, a significant proportion of scholarly energy
during the 1990s has been devoted to seeking terminologies and concepts that were thought to best capture what has been widely seen as a season of (irretrievable) anomie and decay in Africa. It was the era of the “basket-case” thesis of Africa.

The feeling that all things are falling apart in Africa was reinforced during the early 1990s by the fact that some of the most vociferous Afro-pessimists saw very little possibility that external aid and externally imposed International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank structural adjustment programs stood any chance of restoring Africa to the path of recovery. Even the appetite among foreign governments for sending in their armies to “restore” order, either unilaterally or under United Nations supervision, appeared to be in recession. Within Africa itself, “cultural” pressures were thought to be such that countries were not capable of sustaining liberal political reforms. Viewed from all possible angles, Africa appeared not only to be increasingly disengaged from the international system (rather involuntarily), but also to be abandoned by the world to its enforced isolation. Africa’s loss was posited as Asia’s gain as attention increasingly focused on the growing centrality of the Asia Pacific belt to the international system. Studies proliferated on how the “Asian tigers” were able, over a relatively short period of time, to transform themselves from low-income to middle- and high-income countries; pointed and partisan suggestions were made regarding the lessons that Africa could learn from them.

At the same time that the raw statistics pointed to Africa’s increasing “marginalization” and the spread of “aid fatigue,” a parallel development—namely, the funding, curriculum, and paradigmatic crises of African studies in North America and parts of Europe—tended to reinforce the mood of Afro-pessimism in various academic and political circles. Some saw an organic interconnection between Africa’s marginalization in the post–Cold War world order and the decline of African studies in the West; others felt that the problem facing African studies was much more one of inappropriate methodologies and paradigms that consistently produced one-sided interpretations of the complex processes of change on the continent. Depending on where different scholars stood in this debate, there was a tendency to express exasperation at the alleged failure of Africa to meet the challenges of the post–Cold War world by reforming along the lines prescribed by the Bretton Woods twins. The message was direct: adapt or perish. In all of this, analytic attention was focused exclusively on the internal sources of the African crisis; the role of external factors was completely downplayed or totally discounted.

The range of proposals that has been tabled purportedly to enable Africa to overcome the scourge of Afro-pessimism is legion, but two stand out in particular. The first, echoing the so-called Washington consensus, consists of a constant reiteration of the need for Africa to fully embrace the market as the only viable alternative path to recovery that is open to it. The fact that much of Africa has been implementing IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs since the beginning of the 1980s without much to show for it is often downplayed or explained away, either through a resort to the ubiquitous concept of “neopatrimonialism” or through claims that the situation on the continent would have been far worse, had the market reforms not been imposed in the first place.

The second proposal centers around various notions of re- and/or self-colonization, with or without a UN mandate. This proposal derives from different motivations depending on who is making it. There are those who claim that recolonization is necessary because the project of “modernization” or “civilization” that was started with the onset of colonialism was abandoned hastily and in mid-stream by the colonial powers following the post-1945 shift in the international balance of power. Others table the proposal in the fervent belief that only external powers can stabilize the continent’s violently fractious polities and prevent an implosion that would be accompanied by major humanitarian tragedies. It has also been suggested that Africa’s main regional “hegemons” might lead a project of self-colonization as a means of securing peace and stability in their spheres of influence.

It is, without doubt, reflective of the cul-de-sac to which much of the fashionable academic research and policy prescriptions about Africa have led that the mainstream discourse about the future of the continent is dominated, if not by blind faith in the mar-
Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa

To be sure, there are many intellectuals who, reflecting on the wholesale takeover of the (economic) decision-making apparatuses of African countries by the Bretton Woods twins, have written with concern about the creeping onset of a “second colonialism” and/or the increasing “donorization” of several branches of government. But theirs is an altogether different preoccupation from that of the advocates of re- or self-colonization, whose proposals merely appear to add an explicit political dimension to a slightly earlier intellectual trend. According to this trend, categories of modernization that were once thought to be extinct are being revived within the framework of neoliberalism and its political economy in an effort to capture the African reality, even as the twentieth century draws to a close.

Beyond Afro-Pessimism: The Struggle for Renewal

The basic underlying assumption of this chapter is that for all of the crises that have beset African countries over the last decade and a half—and these should not be diminished or glossed over—there is a neglected parallel struggle for renewal that is also unfolding on the continent, but that is not sufficiently remarked upon and supported because of the faulty analytic prisms through which attempts are made to interpret the state of the continent. This struggle is not new; the popular agitation for political reform has, in many senses, always been a constant element of Africa’s political history. What is new is that for the first time since independence, the local and international contexts have improved, relatively, in the post–Cold War period, allowing the bearers of the struggle for political change to organize and assert themselves more boldly and openly than in the past. This struggle is mainly underwritten by the local forces that have, historically, defined themselves as the bearers and defenders of the democratic moments in the nationalist struggle for independence and that have sought to defend the existence of autonomous political spaces for the citizenry. These forces, which include diverse social categories such as workers, peasants, students, professionals, and politicians, have, with varying degrees of unity, energy, and success, been in the vanguard of the resistance to political authoritarianism, corruption, and neocolonialism.

During the Cold War years, the bearers of the local struggles for political reforms and their movements were the victims of repression, justified by the need to contain either communism, or capitalist revisionism, as the case may have been. Regimes across the African continent spared no effort to prevent the associations and social movements that attempted to champion the popular aspiration for democratic governance from organizing freely. The sheer weight of the repression that was unleashed by the state against them did not, however, succeed in eliminating all resistance; it merely altered the mode and tone of the struggle. Thus, as a discernible movement, the overall resilience of the local forces for democratization has been an important factor in the open struggles for reform that have recently been played out in various parts of Africa; they were the sources of the pressures from below to which many governments have had to respond to since the late 1980s. If students of Africa have missed the significance of these struggles, it is partly because, for much of the period from 1960 to 1980, they were mainly preoccupied with building nation-states. Since the 1980s, that preoccupation has been replaced by the task of building markets and creating an enabling environment.

Following from the perspective developed in the preceding paragraphs, this chapter represents as much a plea for a more balanced, dialectical reflection on the African reality as for a complete shift in the prevailing conceptual and methodological approaches. These approaches have for too long dominated the study of Africa and produced, at best, only partial interpretations of developments on the continent and, at worst, gross caricatures that many African residents on the continent find difficult to recognize. This plea has assumed a greater urgency as a wide gulf appears to be developing between African social scientists, mostly situated within Africa, and their Africanist colleagues, mostly located outside the continent, over the most appropriate tools for understanding the changing situation on the continent. The former have expressed profound disquiet not only at the ease with which definitive conclusions, built on weak evidence, poor understanding, and shaky methodologies, are drawn about developments in Africa, but also about the
dizzying array of terminologies, most of them of doubtful analytic value, that are invented as quickly as they are discarded to “explain” every twist and turn in the transitional process that is unfolding on the continent.

The Challenge of Consolidating Democracy in Africa

Several of the chapters in this book point to different aspects of the complex process of renewal that is under way in Africa in spite of the enormous problems that continue to affect the process and confront the continent. The task of separating processes of renewal from those of decay is, of course, not made easy by the fact that they are unevenly distributed in space and time, and the rapidity with which the balance of forces is shifting calls for considerable caution. Still, for several of the contributors, the “gains” that have been made in the area of political reform constitute an important area of focus. Since the late 1980s, Africa has witnessed a great deal of activity in the political arena involving popular campaigns for reform, the convening of sovereign national conferences or constitutional assemblies, and the abandonment, in most cases, of single-party and military rule; side by side with the introduction or reintroduction of multiparty politics, the emergence of local nongovernmental organizations on a scale never before witnessed, the licensing of private newspapers and broadcasting organizations, the conduct of first and repeat elections for various tiers of government, usually under the “watchful” eyes of local and international observers, the assertion by the public of the right to free speech and assembly in many countries where they were once denied, and an increase, even if still insufficient, in the voices of women and the youth. It is all a far cry, from the situation at the end of the 1970s, when the African political landscape was dominated by single-party and military regimes, which mostly maintained exclusive and tight control over the domestic sources of information and opinion and had scant regard for the due processes of law. Of course, the reform process is itself incomplete in many respects, and there are still many important missing links that need to be put in place, but at the same time, considering the situation that prevailed before the end of the 1980s, there have been some significant changes in the political space.16

The Case for Democratic Constitutionalism and Against Democratie Troplalisée

How are we to understand the changes that have occurred in the African political landscape, and how can the progress made be consolidated? These are among some of the most difficult questions that are at the heart of the ongoing debates on transitional politics in Africa. Several of the contributions in this volume have addressed different dimensions of these questions, so we need not repeat their arguments here.17 It seems necessary, however, in the context of these debates to emphasize a number of points for further reflection. The first of these relates to the need to distinguish between constitutionalism as such and democratic constitutionalism. The former, where it is overemphasized, runs the danger of, at best, getting us bogged down with technical minutiae that tell us little about the continuing sources of stress and strain in Africa’s political space in spite of the (re)introduction of constitutional reforms; at worst, it makes us run the risk of unwittingly becoming apologists for a status quo that might be very unsatisfactory. The latter issue underlines the centrality of democratic politics to the success of the reform process in Africa and, in my view, constitutes an important element of the challenge of democratic consolidation on the continent.

I shall return more fully to the issue of democratic consolidation shortly; the really important point that I want to underline here is the necessity for students of Africa’s transitional politics to pay greater attention to the democratic content of constitution making and constitutional practice, since it is perfectly possible to have authoritarian regimes that are also rooted in constitutionalism and the rule of law as such. It is not enough when we assess political developments in Africa as part of our study of the transitional process, simply to say that the actions of governments were in accordance with the constitution and the law, since the constitution and the law can themselves easily become instruments of exclusion and oppression. It is, furthermore, important to underline this position in order to discourage the growing suggestion in some policy circles
that what Africa needs is not so much democratic governance— which it is claimed, seems at present to be unachievable, or which allegedly tends to derail economic reforms and promote fiscal “irresponsibility”— as much as “good” governance that produces “effective” and “efficient” administration for the purpose of permitting the implementation of the “rational” economic policies that are expected to restore the continent’s economic fortunes.

Related to the above, in the sense that it also touches on the qualitative nature of the transitional process and framework, is the importance of applying standards of assessment that do not unwittingly encourage the embrace of dubious electoral and political arrangements on the grounds that, at this stage of Africa’s development, this is the only outcome that can be realistically expected. Many African social scientists, reflecting on the writings of some of their Africanist colleagues, have been concerned about the ease with which, in the name of realism, assertions about Africa’s political transition have been made using standards of evaluation that, elsewhere, would be completely unacceptable. This attempt to foster a notion of démocratie tropicalisée, a tropicalized version of democracy built on lower standards of assessment—and analysis—has been vigorously rejected, and rightly so, by a host of scholars who not only insist that Africa must be judged by the highest standards possible, but also that, for better or for worse, Africa is condemned to democracy as the only viable framework within which it must seek to promote political reforms and economic development.

To insist on the highest possible standards is not to call for the development of definitions of democracy and parameters for determining the existence or absence of democratic politics that correspond to no actual or known historical examples anywhere in the world. The use of ideal types that belong only to the world of those interested in mystification and fetishism is one of the biggest problems with which practitioners of African studies have long had to deal—recall here the host of ideal types that informed the debates on development and underdevelopment in Africa during the 1970s and the idealized notions of the market and its workings that have been in vogue since the early 1980s. On the contrary, mine is a plea for students of Africa, fully mindful that democracy intrinsically has an element of process to it, not to attempt to wish away or excuse serious shortcomings simply on the grounds that the status quo is the only realistic thing possible at the present time. Also implicit in this critique is the need for students of Africa not to assume that the only applicable yardstick against which the African democratic project can be measured is what is loosely referred to as “Western” democracy. Quite apart from the Eurocentricism inherent in such an approach, scholars such as Claude Ake have noted that the practice of liberal democracy in much of the industrialized world is so “impoverished” as to be of limited value in the current African conjuncture.

Basic Prerequisites of Democratic Consolidation

Among the range of factors that various critics have mentioned as potentially and/or actually inhibiting the consolidation of democracy in Africa are the low level of literacy on the continent, the low levels of per capita income and gross domestic product, the alleged dearth of ideology, the preponderance of political and professional elites of the ancien regime in the democratization process, the disruptive power of competing ethnicities, the supposed absence of an independent commercial class, and the persistence of “neopatrimonialism” and “rent seeking” in the political economies of African countries. Assuming that these explanations, alone or in combination, are valid (and there are strong grounds for questioning the explanatory power or quality of several of them), the argument here is that they still do not address what in my view remains perhaps the single most important missing factor in the debate on the prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa. This factor centers on the need to anchor democratic constitutional and political engineering to popular sovereignty in society, and it derives from the position that democracy, even in its conventional constitutional sense, cannot endure unless it is rooted in popular sovereignty.

To put it another way, the chief challenge of democratic consolidation in Africa today centers on the need to anchor representation (through electoral pluralism and universal
adult suffrage), the rule of law, and the freedom of speech and association to popular participation and control in decision making at all levels. This manner of posing the challenge of democratic consolidation in Africa is not altogether new, but its chief advantage rests in the possibility it offers the student of contemporary Africa to move the discourse beyond a focus on factors that are arbitrarily selected by particular authors.

The question of popular sovereignty in the democratic process broaches several other issues relevant to the consolidation of the political reform process. The first of these concerns the meaning and content of citizenship, both historical and during this transitional period in Africa. In addition to the challenge of revisiting the basis for the definition of citizenship (i.e., whether it is posed in terms of the place of birth or ancestry, or the place of residence or site of labor) and citizenship rights (as they pertain to the differential meanings that they have for the urban and rural populace), it is important also to address the issue of how to reverse the erosion of what M. Roche describes as "social citizenship" on the continent. The erosion of social citizenship dates back to the onset of the economic crisis on the continent, but it has been significantly accelerated by the ascendancy of neoliberalism and IMF/World Bank structural adjustment implementation since the early 1980s. The decline in social citizenship has been so severe that some African scholars have been tempted to speak of the emergence of the "irrelevant state" in their bid to draw attention to the growing irrelevance of the state to the social and welfare aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the citizenry. Other scholars, like Naomi Chazan, speak of a process of "disengagement" by the citizenry from the state in the context of a gathering process of informalization.

The decline of social citizenship and of the role of the state in social provisioning has, in many cases, been paralleled by the creation or revival of ethnic, communal, and religious networks and structures as individuals and groups seek alternative means of producing their own social welfare needs in a process that also challenges the postcolonial, national-territorial, secular state project of independence. A key challenge of citizenship today, therefore consists not just in the restoration of political rights and liberties, but also in the revival of the role of the state in advancing social citizenship. For, as has been pointed out by many commentators, there is a distinct danger of the legitimacy of the democratic project itself being eroded if crucial social livelihood questions are not addressed. As Thandika Mkandawire, paraphrasing sentiments that are growing across the continent, puts it, "people do not eat democracy," a point reiterated in a different context by L. Rudebeck, based on focus group discussions in Kandjanja, Guinea-Bissau, to the effect that "if no concrete improvements take place, we shall withdraw."

The second issue arising from the notion of popular sovereignty in the democratization project concerns the relationship between the internal and the external in the political reform process unfolding in Africa. Among the range of questions that have been raised in this discussion, the one that bears reiterating here is what has been described as the choicelessness imposed by the international donor community on Africa's elected governments. This tendency is evident in several domains, but it appears most notably in the foreclosure of choice regarding the path to economic reform (both in terms of policy content and instruments) and in the limitation of the scope for internal policy and political debate about required economic policy mixes and their timing, phasing, and sequencing. This has meant that even as African governments have been encouraged to open up their political spaces, the scope for internal and governmental choice over economic policy has remained narrow. As a consequence, the domestic consensus and coalition building required for sustainable economic reform has been neglected and undermined, and accounting to donors has taken the place of accountability to the populace. Thus, the donor-led economic reform process has tended to erode the legitimacy of the internal democratic process through the externalization of effective economic decisionmaking. Executives have been pitted against parliaments as the former attempt to keep key economic policies away from the scrutiny of the legislative arm of government, and civil society groups have also been pitted against the state as they demand public debate on key questions pertaining to the management of the national economy and the reform of social policy. It is this state of affairs that prompted Mkandawire to describe the African gov-
ernments elected since the late 1980s as "choiceless democracies"—a situation that must be redressed if democracy is to be successfully consolidated on the continent.

Neglected Themes in the Study of Democratic Consolidation

Three questions that have been generally neglected in the discourse on democratic consolidation but that are crucial to the project in Africa are the need to rehabilitate the state, the role of the military in the political reform process, and the impact of influential regional players on the direction and content of change. Regarding the state, it seems quite clear that the work of democratic renewal and consolidation cannot be fully undertaken without attention to the task of rehabilitating the state in Africa. At the beginning of the 1980s, the ruling intellectual vogue was the adoption of the zealous and decisively one-sided anti-statism of the neoliberals. Within the framework of donor structural adjustment programs, efforts were made to dismantle the African state, which both in theory and practice, was, and to a large extent continues to be, seen as the main obstacle to growth, development, and liberty on the continent. This single-minded external attack combined with processes of internal decay to considerably weaken the state and, in many cases, rob it of an autonomous and well-anchored organizing principle. Thus, decline has gone hand in hand with drift and a worsening legitimacy deficit.

Fifteen years after the implementation of structural adjustment began in Africa, the view that the state is basically the root of all of the continent’s evils is only gradually beginning to be tempered. But much of the effort to bring the state back in "has consisted of encouraging it to create an enabling" environment for the market and the private sector to thrive. The issue of how the state might be reconstructed to support democratization remains largely ignored. The point, therefore, that insofar as the consolidation of democracy in Africa is concerned, there can be no question of a trade-off between the state and the market still bears reiterating. The presence of effective and legitimate state structures is essential to the construction of stable and sustainable democratic systems; indeed, there is a sense in which state rehabilitation is, at this historical juncture, a central part of the African democratic project and should be more fully factored into our conceptual apparatuses. One such conceptual effort that is worth exploring and developing further consists of the notion of "developmental democracies" that was tabled before the seventh General Assembly of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa in July 1995.

The second relatively neglected issue in the discourse on democratic consolidation relates to the question of the military and its response to the inauguration of political reforms that by definition, exclude it from the direct process of governance. As Richard Joseph’s chapter on Nigeria in this volume underlines, the capacity of the military to obstruct or roll back the political reform process is one that must not be underestimated. At the same time, in cases such as Mali and Malawi, the military did play an active role in enabling the political reform process by, in the former, responding to popular appeals for a national conference and, in the latter, disarming Kainuzu Banda’s Young Pioneers and refusing to shoot at civilians agitating for the restoration of multiparty politics. The Malian and Malawian cases are, however, somewhat exceptional, and they do not necessarily preclude military derailment of the political reform process. This immediately raises the challenge of how to get the military to respect and uphold the constitution. At one level, the question of restoring or upgrading military professionalism in various countries has to be seen as an essential part of democratic consolidation. At another level, the entire issue of the function and organizational structure of a peacetime army is one that will also have to be debated. But beyond these, important sections of the civil population itself will need to be freed from the debilitating effects of the ideology of militarism that has sunk roots into their thinking and praxis. In many African countries, not least Nigeria, where, as Joseph notes, ethnicity plays a role in the sustenance of military autocracy, many people still have to learn that the alternative to bad civilian government is not military rule, but better civilian government. The vigilance of the democratic forces in society, linked where possible with military professionals who accept and respect the democratic framework, needs to be developed as part of this strategy. The international community, too,
can assist in this by decisively sanctioning and isolating military regimes from the comity of elected governments.

A third largely neglected theme in the discourse on democratic consolidation in Africa relates to the potential and actual impact of the continent’s regional hegemons on the political reform process in the regions where they are dominant. We must, of course, be aware of the limits of the regional hegemon thesis itself, not least because there are limits to what external forces can do in any given country. Intervention by a regionally influential state does not necessarily guarantee success or sustainability and, in the wrong hands, this thesis has been employed to advance the case for re- or self-colonization. But within the context of our concern with the challenges of democratic consolidation, the question of the impact of regional hegemons on the process of political reform has been brought to the fore by a number of developments across the continent. These include the intervention by South Africa, acting in concert with Botswana and Zimbabwe, to restore the elected government of Lesotho after it was toppled by the country’s military; the pressures emanating from South Africa for political reforms in Swaziland; the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States and its Monitoring Group in Liberia and Sierra Leone; Nigeria’s endorsement and accommodation of military putschists in The Gambia and Niger during the 1990s; and the effects on the Great Lakes area of the crippling of the Zairian state by the Mobutu kleptocracy.

At a very general and tentative level, it seems that in the parts of Africa, such as southern Africa, where the key players accept and follow a basic framework of electoral pluralism, the internal forces for political reform and constitutional government in the region enjoy a conducive environment within which to operate. Conversely, in regions of west Africa, where a key demographic and economic giant like Nigeria is under military rule, its influence and example could serve, and in many respects has served, as a source of inspiration for antidemocratic elements throughout the region, especially in the military. Though the installation of democratic governance in Nigeria does not, by itself, preclude the takeover of power by antidemocratic elements in other states in the region, such forces would at least have to contend with the adverse response of a democratic Abuja. The implication of this perspective is that democratic forces in Africa need to take more fully into account developments in other parts of the continent when formulating their strategies for initiating and sustaining political reform. Such an approach might provide regional organizations and groupings with new, meaningful mandates.

Meeting the Intellectual Challenges of the African Transition

If, as we have argued, Africa is in the throes of a process of change that has involved the formal embrace by most governments on the continent of electoral pluralism, a crucial challenge associated with scholarly efforts to understand the content, direction, and scope of the change that is under way is a willingness to revisit the analytic frames and methods by which the continent has hitherto been studied. In this connection, it is worth drawing attention to a number of limitations that have tended to weaken the quality of analysis and obscure the crucial questions that should normally engage the attention of the academic and policy communities. My starting point in this regard is the growing trend, integral to the “new” political economy, of applying the categories of economics to the study of African politics, as well as processes and outcomes, in Africa. Such rigid dichotomizations as those made between the private and the public, the state and the market, rentier activities and market relations, the formal and the informal, the urban and the rural, and tradables and nontradables, which have underpinned much of the discourse on African economies, have been extended by political scientists and political economists to the realm of political analysis.

In the effort to apply the categories of economics to the study of African politics, what is often forgotten is that, in real-life situations on the continent, these categories interpenetrate one another in an organic relationship that is at once complementary and contradictory. Moreover, it is not as straightforward as it seems to categorize individuals and groups neatly into one slot or the other for the purpose of determining political behav-
ior and predicting outcomes, since the distinction between these sectors is often much more blurred than is recognized. Indeed, as has been pointed out by several scholars, the sectors are quite often blended together, so that much of social, economic, and political life in Africa falls into “gray” areas. Actors straddle the formal and the informal, the private and the public, the sphere of tradables and the arena of nontradables, and the state and the market.

The reality of straddling, which makes nonsense of the rigid dichotomizations on the basis of which many political economists have attempted to grasp the problems and prospects of democratic change in Africa, dates back a long time. The case for abandoning attempts to understand political life in Africa on the basis of these dichotomies has, however, never been stronger than at the present time when, by all accounts, the boundaries of informalization have been expanding rapidly, making the fashionable distinctions favored by the new political economy ever more problematic. Furthermore, the politics of straddling entails multiple modes of livelihood and multiple identities that, in playing themselves out, complicate political behavior, as well as the task of understanding it. The challenge that this situation poses for students of Africa is the need to develop appropriate conceptual and methodological tools that are adequate for the task of capturing developments at a time of flux. Such tools and methods may never be able to fully capture the complexity of the situation; it will, however, be sufficient if they are the products of a painstaking effort to understand Africa on the basis of what is unfolding, rather than through preconceived notions built on methodologies that unjustifiably tend to freeze a dynamic situation and take the vitality out of politics and the activities of political actors.

While it is important for students of Africa to develop a comparative framework within which to understand the continent—indeed, there is a sense in which the future will belong to comparativists—it is equally crucial not to take this to mean that the African reality can be interpreted only through a one-sided recourse to analogies drawn from the histories of other parts of the world, especially Europe. All too often, in a bid to explicate developments in Africa, many students are tempted to go back to an earlier epoch in the history of Europe and abstract concepts from those historical phases for application to contemporary Africa. Related to this is the study of earlier experiences from other parts of the world with a view to identifying the factors that are thought to explain their successes (rarely their failures). These are then extended to the African terrain in order to argue that the absence of the factors that allegedly accounted for the success of another region explains why Africa is experiencing the difficulties it is encountering, or why the prospects for success are limited. Policy prescriptions are then derived from such accounts. It is, to say the least, an approach that is highly problematic, not only because of the ahistoricism that is involved and the fact that it suggests a certain unilinear evolutionism, but also because, quite often, what is described with certitude as constituting the comparative experience from which concepts are derived is, in fact, the subject of vigorous contestation among historians specializing in the study of those other regions of the world.

The African experience cannot be fully understood through its subordination, as it were, to the experiences of others. While an awareness of the experiences of others can be very useful from both a scholarly and a policy point of view, those experiences should not themselves become the implicit or explicit narratives from which the African reality is deduced. Africa needs to be studied primarily in terms of its own dynamics, which are the products of the interplay of internal and external factors. This project is one of the most important intellectual challenges confronting students of Africa at this stage in the continent’s history.
Statebuilding has become a central focus of multidimensional peace operations in war-torn societies. But efforts to construct legitimate, effective state institutions are rife with tensions and contradictions. Understanding these tensions and contradictions is essential for anticipating many of the practical problems that international agencies face in the course of statebuilding operations and for devising more nuanced and effective statebuilding strategies for future missions.

Introduction

Statebuilding—the construction of legitimate, effective governmental institutions—is a crucial element in any larger effort to create the conditions for a durable peace and human development in countries that are just emerging from war. In recent years, statebuilding has emerged as a central goal of multidimensional United Nations peace operations in war-torn societies, and for good reason. Without functioning and legitimate state institutions, postconflict societies are less likely to escape the dual “traps” of violence and poverty.

But the record of postwar statebuilding operations has been mixed, and in many respects disappointing. In Liberia after 1997 or Timor Leste after 2002, international agencies prematurely reduced their efforts to secure peace in the wake of conflict. In other cases, including Bosnia and Kosovo, international statebuilding efforts have lingered on in seeming perpetuity, while reconciliation and institutional reform efforts have stalled and irritation at the large international presence has mounted. In Afghanistan and Iraq—both unusual cases of statebuilding after an external invasion, rather than after a negotiated settlement to a civil war—the task of constructing effective and legitimate governmental structures is facing extraordinarily difficult, perhaps even insurmountable, challenges. But even in the most “successful” statebuilding operations such as Cambodia, Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo, the outcomes of institutional reform efforts may be more superficial than sustainable.

One explanation for these less-than-stellar results may be that expectations for these operations have been too high. Institutional reform is a complex and arduous task even in the most favorable settings—and even more so in countries that are just emerging from civil wars, where social cohesion is shattered and existing governmental structures tend to be weak, factionalized, or even non-existent. Nor can state-building actors rely on any universally applicable, surefire formulas for creating the conditions for lasting peace in postwar societies, because there are none. Each mission necessarily involves a large measure of improvisation in order to respond to variations in local conditions. This combination of complexity and variability gives the entire peacebuilding enterprise the quality of an enormous experiment—one that is important and necessary, but also prone to unanticipated consequences and failure.

There is, moreover, a deeper problem that may have contributed both to the excessive expectations and the disappointing results of recent statebuilding efforts: insufficient knowledge and analysis of the intrinsic tensions and contradictions of externally-assisted statebuilding. Scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to explore the competing (and sometimes contradictory) imperatives facing those who attempt to reconstitute effective and legitimate governmental structures in war-torn states. These tensions and contradictions have manifested themselves as vexing policy dilemmas—that is, difficult choices that involve tradeoffs between multiple imperatives where there are no obvious solutions. Conceiving of postwar statebuilding as an inherently contradiction-filled enterprise, rather than a linear sequence of cumulative or mutually reinforcing steps,
allows us to think more carefully about the characteristics of the tensions and contradictions themselves. In so doing, we can also gain a better understanding of the practical policy dilemmas that face statebuilding practitioners.

This report summarizes the research findings of the Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding (RPPS), a collaborative research project of thirteen scholars from six countries who have sought to disentangle and scrutinize some of the key dilemmas of statebuilding.1 The contributors to this project believe that improving the effectiveness of statebuilding as a method of postwar peace consolidation requires more than simply identifying “lessons learned” from previous missions. Rather, it also demands more awareness and analysis of the tensions, contradictions and dilemmas of statebuilding.

Our hope is that such an analysis will ultimately help those who are seeking to improve the strategies of statebuilding. We do not, however, purport to offer solutions to the difficult dilemmas that face the practitioners of statebuilding. There are no solutions—or, to be more precise, there are no simple or fully satisfying ones. This is precisely what makes the dilemmas so vexing and the operations so inherently complex. However, greater knowledge of the tensions and contradictions of statebuilding should make it easier to manage the dilemmas in a more informed, nuanced, and effective manner. In particular, the challenge for statebuilding practitioners is (1) to analyze and understand the dilemmas, (2) to make a series of informed policy choices that carefully balance competing imperatives, and (3) to do so in a way that not only serves short-term needs but also furthers the long-term goal of establishing sustainable, functioning and legitimate state institutions.

In exploring this subject, the RPPS project builds upon the International Peace Academy’s research on statebuilding, peace implementation, transitional administration, post-conflict economic reform and the security-development nexus.2 Indeed, Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur helped to define postwar statebuilding as a research field in an IPA report published in 2004.3 Their observation that “it is only through a more nuanced understanding of the state as a network of institutions that crises of governance may be properly understood and, perhaps, avoided or remedied” offers a point of departure for the RPPS project and our investigation into the great dilemmas of statebuilding.4

Background: From Peacebuilding to Statebuilding

As the Cold War came to an end, a new type of international peace operation emerged as the dominant security activity of the United Nations: missions aimed at helping war-torn countries make the transition from a fragile ceasefire to a stable peace, or what became known as “post-conflict peace-building.” Although this form of intervention was not unprecedented—the UN had stumbled into playing a similar role in the Congo during the early 1960s, when a mission designed to oversee the departure of Belgian colonial troops from the newly independent Congo got caught up in a civil war—post-conflict stabilization was a new area of focus for the world body in the period immediately following the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1993 alone, eight peacebuilding operations were deployed to countries just emerging from civil conflicts: Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda.

These missions were quite unlike the traditional peacekeeping operations which had been the UN’s main security function during the Cold War, and which typically involved monitoring ceasefires or neutral buffer zones between former combatants. Rather, peacebuilding now involved the implementation of multi-faceted peace agreements, which often included humanitarian, political, and economic elements, in addition to more traditional monitoring of a ceasefire. As then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, the goal of peacebuilding was “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” This typically included monitoring or even administering post-conflict elections as well as other activities such as the demobilization of former fighters, resettlement of refugees, human rights investigations and economic reform. Furthermore, the UN shared these
responsibilities with several other international actors, including major regional organizations, international financial institutions, national and international development agencies and a host of international nongovernmental organizations.

By the mid-1990s, however, there were growing concerns that these first-generation peacebuilding missions had been too brief, too limited, and too focused on speedy political and economic reforms to consolidate peace in the host states. In some cases, peacebuilders rushed ahead with post-conflict elections, declared success, and departed. This “quick and dirty” approach failed in Angola (where elections were a catalyst for renewed violence), Rwanda (where overly optimistic assumptions about the willingness of the parties to implement their peace settlement were shattered by genocide), and in Cambodia and Liberia (where elections yielded superficial democratization and a quick return to authoritarianism—and, in the case of Liberia, resurgent war).

Learning from the shortcomings of these early missions, the UN and other international agencies began to shift their focus towards more far-reaching approaches to postwar peacebuilding. This strategic reorientation was especially visible in the Bosnia operation, created in late 1995 to buttress the Dayton Accord. The Bosnia mission was originally scheduled to last one year (until the end of 1996) and in this sense it echoed the “quick and dirty” approach that defined peacebuilding in the first half of the 1990s. But the need for a longer-term deployment in Bosnia quickly became apparent and the termination date was eliminated in order to give more time for institution-building and economic reform to progress. By the late 1990s, new missions were being launched with broader mandates, now focused on longer-term statebuilding efforts, including in Burundi, Kosovo, Timor Leste, and Sierra Leone.

A similar evolution also took place in the study of peacebuilding. The first generation of peacebuilding research was comprised primarily of descriptions of the new “multifunctional” missions of the early-to-mid 1990s and a preliminary assessment of lessons learned. The second generation of studies (in the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s) offered more systematic cross-case analyses and reflections on the record of peacebuilding to date. One of the findings that emerged from this second generation of writings—crystallized in several publications that appeared in 2004—was that more durable peacebuilding outcomes would require more focused attention on building up governmental institutions in formerly warring states.5

These findings coincided with policy shifts in several major international organizations, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which led all of these organizations to place greater emphasis on the goal of building up the “governance capacity” of developing countries, particularly those just emerging from conflict. Statebuilding thus emerged as a central objective of peacebuilding—to the point where discussions of post-conflict reconstruction in the UN and elsewhere are now commonly replete with references to enhancing state capacities as a foundation for war-to-peace transitions and, more generally, for development.

Statebuilding, however, raises its own set of challenges. As mandates and time-frames of postconflict missions expanded to accommodate the requirements of institution-building, the problematic aspects of externally-assisted statebuilding became more apparent—and troubling. To be sure, practitioners of statebuilding in the United Nations and other international organizations have been aware of many of these problems. Issues such as coordination and coherence, local ownership, legitimacy, capacity-building, dependency, accountability, and exit are now commonly discussed in meetings of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and elsewhere. But each of these problems emerged from deeper tensions and contradictions that are less well understood: outside intervention occurs in order to create self-government; international control is required to affect local ownership; universal values clash with local peculiarities; long term goals may contravene short term imperatives; and peace may require both a break with the past and a reaffirmation of local history.
Only by acknowledging and examining these tensions in detail is it possible to understand the forces that might sustain—or derail—statebuilding operations. Such knowledge is also crucial for developing more effective strategies of managing the many dilemmas that confront the international, national, and local actors involved in postwar statebuilding missions.

**Defining the Contradictions and Dilemmas of Statebuilding**

The individual research papers that comprise the RPPS project examine a broad array of policy dilemmas that confront statebuilding actors. Each of these dilemmas arises from underlying tensions and contradictions in the idea of statebuilding, which the authors also scrutinize in detail. (See the Appendix for summaries of the individual studies. Full-length versions are available at www.statebuilding.org.)

**Key Tensions and Contradictions**

Among these various tensions and contradictions, five emerge from the RPPS papers as particularly important and fundamental. They are listed separately here, but in practice they overlap and interact with each other:

1. **Outside intervention is used to foster self-government.** Some of the most difficult policy dilemmas flow from this paradox: statebuilding missions seek to promote national autonomy and self-government, but they do so by means of international intervention. Even though these missions are designed to assist national authorities, the power they exercise is inevitably intrusive, no matter how well intentioned they may be. This tension is at the heart of such practical challenges as designing transitional governance structures, providing security, delivering public services, determining how long a mission should continue and in what form, and addressing questions of transitional justice.

2. **Foreigners are involved in defining “legitimate” local leaders.** The need for “local ownership” of political and economic reforms has emerged as a statebuilding orthodoxy. But some measure of international management is typically required to implement the principle of local ownership over a peace process. (If local ownership could be achieved without foreigners playing a significant role, there would have been no need for an international statebuilding mission in the first instance.) But this creates a paradox: When foreigners participate in identifying appropriate local “owners,” their involvement in such decisions defies the principle of local ownership. This contradiction not only raises difficult policy choices for statebuilding agencies, but also potentially calls into question the legitimacy and sustainability of any ensuing political institutions.

3. **“Universal” values are promoted as a remedy for local problems.** Civil wars have both international and domestic drivers, and they sometimes spill over national borders. At bottom, however, they are predominantly local phenomena, fought and experienced by individuals and groups who live in a particular sociocultural context. Some of the policy dilemmas faced by statebuilding actors derive from incongruities between the universal values (predominantly those in the liberal tradition of individual human rights, democratic governance and market-oriented economics) espoused by international organizations and donor governments on the one hand, and the particular social practices, political traditions and cultural expectations of the host society on the other. This tension, like the previous two, contributes to the problem of defining statebuilding policies that are appropriate, effective, and legitimate, not only in the eyes of the interveners, but also for the local elites and general population of the country.

4. **Statebuilding requires both a clean break with the past and a reaffirmation of history.** Moving from war to peace entails continuity as well as change. Statebuilding operations, in other words, cannot remake war-torn societies. Indeed, international actors often underestimate the persistence and resilience of the deeply engrained patterns of political and economic life. Yet statebuilding must also involve the introduction of new approaches to conflict resolution and management,
which can and do challenge traditional practices. The old and the new may blend into new hybrid forms of political and social organization, as David Roberts and Christopher Cramer argue in their RPPS studies. The combination of old and new may also generate conflicts and “transformational” tensions that are not uncommon in developing societies undergoing rapid change and can serve as a dangerous source of destabilization in the particularly fragile conditions of countries just emerging from civil wars.

5. **Short-term imperatives often conflict with longer-term objectives.** In the early stages of a statebuilding operation, outside actors typically face strong pressures to address short-term needs, but doing so may run counter to the longer-term requirements for establishing effective, legitimate state institutions. Preserving a ceasefire and managing potential “spoilers,” for example, often involve making explicit or tacit bargains with ruling elites whose continued power (whether this power is formally recognized or informally exercised) can get in the way of building “depersonalized” state institutions and broadening political representation beyond the parties that fought the preceding war. Similar tensions between short-term and long-term imperatives also pose a problem for the planning of economic reconstruction and aid delivery, security sector reform and transitional justice goals.

### Types of Dilemmas

The tensions and contradictions outlined above exist at a relatively high level of abstraction from the day-to-day realities of statebuilding operations. Yet they are the underlying source of many concrete policy dilemmas that the practitioners of statebuilding routinely face. We use the term “dilemmas” advisedly: by definition, these are problems that defy easy solutions because they present choices between compelling but mutually conflicting imperatives, which in turn reflect the deeper tensions and contradictions of statebuilding described above.

These dilemmas are explored in detail in the RPPS studies. For the purposes of this overview, however, they can be grouped into five broad (and overlapping) categories:

1. **Footprint Dilemmas**
   
The footprint of an operation refers to its degree of intrusiveness in the domestic affairs of the host state, which in turn is a reflection of (1) the size of the international presence, (2) the scope of the tasks that external actors take on, and (3) the assertiveness of the external actors in pursuing these tasks. The dilemma is this: on the one hand, a dominant international presence (a “heavy footprint”) may be required to maintain security and to oversee (or even enforce) the implementation of a peace agreement, including the process of initiating political and economic reforms. On the other hand, a less intrusive international presence (a “light footprint”) may be required to allow local political, social and economic life to achieve a post-conflict equilibrium on its own terms, without the distorting effects that the presence of powerful external actors can have.
   
   David Edelstein, in his RPPS paper, examines this dilemma as it relates to the military aspects of externally assisted statebuilding, but the footprint dilemma appears in nearly all the RPPS studies in relation to both military and non-military issues. Astri Suhrke’s study, for example, finds that the economic footprint of the statebuilding effort in Afghanistan since the defeat of the Taliban regime has served to weaken, not strengthen, the legitimacy and capacity of that country’s government.

2. **Duration Dilemmas**
   
   Difficult choices relating to the duration of international statebuilding operations are explored in several RPPS papers. On the one hand, state-building is necessarily a long-term enterprise. Elections can be held quickly, but the political institutions to which public officials are elected take much longer to consolidate. Similarly, economic reforms can be started right away, but in the absence of administrative capacity in the host government (and at least a minimal system to uphold the rule of law), these reforms have the potential to go awry. On the other hand, while statebuilding is a lengthy process, there are countervailing pressures against a prolonged or open-ended inter-
national presence. First, over time, important segments of the local population tend to grow increasingly disillusioned—or even hostile—towards the continued presence of powerful outside actors, which can in turn undermine externally assisted statebuilding efforts. Second, lengthy or open-ended missions can produce quite a different problem: passivity within the local population, including a lack of interest in taking on the responsibilities of self-government (see the section on Dependency Dilemmas below).

In addition, the international resources for statebuilding operations are often limited, both in scale and duration. Few donor countries or international organizations are willing to “sign up” for more than a few years of statebuilding in any given country. Nevertheless, the objectives articulated by these donors and organizations necessarily entail lengthy commitments. The tension between the goals and means of statebuilding raises questions about the credibility of the operations and the objectives articulated by statebuilders themselves, as Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher suggest in their study.

3. Participation Dilemmas
Factional leaders do not necessarily represent the population of their countries, yet they are typically the individuals most involved in peace negotiations, and as a result they tend to be central political actors in the period immediately following the conflict. As Kirsti Samuels argues in her RPPS paper, a key challenge for statebuilders is to strike a balance between maintaining the cooperation of former fighters and other potential “spoilers,” while simultaneously drawing a wider range of groups, and ultimately the population as a whole, into the postwar political process. If factional leaders are too powerful, new institutional structures may be viewed as illegitimate by other groups and individuals who believe that these leaders are unrepresentative, corrupt—or worse—criminal. On the other hand, alienating factional leaders can provoke renewed conflict.

Compounding this dilemma is the danger that the international presence may itself constrain political participation: first, by diverting civil society activity towards externally-defined objectives rather than allowing local groups to pursue their goals and activities to develop in a more undirected manner, and second, by exercising de facto decision-making power that is not subject to popular control and accountability. Further, as noted above, while promoting local ownership is an important and essential goal for statebuilding, there is no simple way (particularly for powerful outsiders) to determine who the “owners” should be. The very act of stimulating political participation and local ownership can lead to perverse results, no matter how well-meaning the international actors may be, simply because the very presence of an international mission will have distorting effects on economic relationships and local politics, like a powerful magnet in an electric field.

4. Dependency Dilemmas
Related to both the footprint and duration dilemmas is the risk of fostering within the host society dependence on the international presence. The goal of postwar statebuilding is to foster the conditions for self-sustaining peace through effective, legitimate self-governance. Yet large flows of outside assistance, and the “hands on” role of international actors in facilitating the implementation of peace settlements, can create new political and economic patterns in the host society that come to rely on a continuation of large-scale external aid and guidance. If these expectations and dependencies harden, statebuilding missions can work against their own ultimate goal of fostering self-government. Worse, they risk morphing into indefinite trusteeship arrangements that raise additional problems, which may include, paradoxically, a growing resistance to the international presence in some parts of the population.

This combination of dependency and resistance has the potential to create pernicious patterns of political and economic development that have proven unsustainable in the past, most notably in colonial societies. But if statebuilding requires both a measure of international control (particularly at the outset of a mission) and a long-term process of institution-construction, then some measure of dependency may be unavoidable. Squaring this circle is the core challenge of the dependency dilemma, which like other dilemmas described here, emerges from underlying tensions and contradictions in the idea of externally assisted statebuilding.
5. Coherence Dilemmas

Statebuilders face two kinds of coherence dilemmas: (1) organizational coherence and (2) normative coherence. Organizational coherence involves the need for coordination among the myriad international actors involved in these operations, including national donors, regional organizations, international financial institutions, specialized international agencies, global bodies such as the UN, and non-governmental organizations. However, coordination is very difficult to achieve, due in part to the confusing or competing lines of authority and budgetary autonomy among these actors, including within the UN system itself. Further, as Roland Paris argues in his RPPS study, efforts to improve coordination can actually serve as a substitute for achieving substantive cooperation—by focusing attention on issues of process and away from the substantive and strategic challenges of statebuilding.

Beyond the coordination of international actors, there is also a need for organizational coherence among the legitimate representatives of the host society itself, so that international actors can engage effectively with national leaders. The danger, however, is that efforts to identify national-level interlocutors can result in an over-emphasis on elites based in the capital, at the expense of regional and local institution-building.

A second type of coherence dilemma—at the “normative” level—arises from inconsistencies in the values that statebuilders articulate (often drawn from universal norms) versus the values that are reflected in the actual policies that statebuilders pursue in the field and the results of these policies. Principles such as democratic accountability, national self-determination, the rule of law and good governance all tend to be compromised, to varying degrees, by the very fact of international intervention and by pragmatic imperatives to (1) cooperate with powerful local actors and (2) tailor institutional designs to reflect the distinctive patterns of political and economic life within the society.

Managing Dilemmas

The main purpose of the RPPS project is to elucidate these dilemmas and their underlying drivers through in-depth studies, and not necessarily to offer solutions to these dilemmas. Indeed, there are no “solutions” because these are true dilemmas that cannot be resolved in any definitive sense. Some RPPS contributors disagree with each other’s specific policy recommendations. For instance, Robert Rotberg recommends delaying post-war elections until “a transitional administration or a new government has secured the cities and the countryside and ensured human security, disarmed and demobilized, established legal norms, stabilized and reinvigorated the economy, developed at least some rudimentary political institutions, reconstructed roads, and restored essential services, such as schools and clinics,” whereas Timothy Sisk argues that delaying post-conflict elections can be deeply problematic because popular votes are an “essential step in the process of reconstituting political order after civil war.”

The RPPS project, in other words, does not offer falsely simple prescriptions for what it takes to consolidate peace in countries that are just emerging from war. On the contrary, the project pointedly highlights the deep-rooted complexities of statebuilding—and the need for a better understanding of these complexities, from the unanticipated consequences of promoting political and economic liberalization in deeply divided societies, to the awkward disjuncture of international guidance versus local control. At best, the many dilemmas of statebuilding can only be managed, not resolved. But effective management must itself be based on a careful analysis of the underlying contradictions and tensions which give rise to these dilemmas, as well as the interaction between these dilemmas. It must also be based on extensive knowledge of the host country and careful consideration of the long-term consequences of short-term actions.

There are, of course, limits to how “rational” policymaking can be in any organization, be it a national government, an international agency, a nongovernmental entity or, for that matter, the congeries of actors involved in postwar statebuilding operations. As Charles Lindblom pointed out nearly 50 years ago in his classic examination of public
administration in the United States, "muddling through" is more typical in policymaking than the rationalist archetype of means-ends planning. Given the nature of statebuilding—its many actors, the scope of its task and the relatively high level of uncertainty regarding its impacts and outcomes—there will always be significant elements of improvisation and "irrationality" in statebuilding policy. This reality, however, should not be taken as license for complacency. The design and conduct of statebuilding operations can be more rational and better informed than they have been in the past. The stakes are too high, and the consequences of failure too great, to resign oneself to the limitations of muddling through.

For this reason, a primary recommendation emerging from the RPPS project is that statebuilding actors should conduct "dilemma analyses" prior to and during their operations. The more typical approach to mission planning involves identifying a sequence of steps to be completed at particular moments by particular actors, with the moments defined either according to a timeline or on the basis of having achieved specific prerequisite conditions. By contrast, dilemma analysis begins from the assumption that many of the elements of statebuilding will not fit together easily. Rather, they will often work at cross-purposes. In fact, some of these elements are likely to interact in ways that have the potential to undercut, not advance, the goal of establishing legitimate, effective state institutions in war-torn countries.

Such an analysis is essential, in our view, to managing the dilemmas of statebuilding. It does not replace a more conventional planning process, but supplements it. The key questions for those who wish to do dilemma analyses of ongoing or contemplated statebuilding missions are the following:

1. To what extent, and exactly how, might the major statebuilding dilemmas manifest themselves in this operation?
2. What are the particular features of the local environment that make it more (or less) likely that certain dilemmas will become particularly problematic?
3. What are the underlying "drivers" of the anticipated dilemmas?
4. How might each dilemma interact with, or give rise to, other dilemmas?
5. Which of the anticipated dilemmas has the potential to be most problematic, and why?

One benefit of conducting such analysis is that it requires deep local knowledge and can therefore expose knowledge gaps that might otherwise go unnoticed in a conventional planning process. It also focuses attention on the deeply engrained continuities in the political, social, and economic life of a society emerging from war, which have tended to be under-appreciated. Further, it is a necessarily multidisciplinary exercise (due to the thematic span of the dilemmas themselves) and consequently creates incentives to bring together teams of analysts with different expertise—and from different statebuilding organizations—thereby helping to break down disciplinary and organizational silos.

Ultimately, however, the main purpose of dilemma analysis is to anticipate these challenges at the outset and to inform the process of devising more nuanced and effective statebuilding strategies. To this end, the RPPS studies suggest, first, that navigating dilemmas should be at the center of statebuilding policy; second, that in most cases, the challenge is to find a "sweet spot" that carefully balances competing imperatives; third, that it is crucial to scrutinize both the intended and possible unintended consequences of policy action within the context of these dilemmas; and fourth, that short-term decisions must be evaluated in the light of their longer-term implications for institution-building.

More awareness, scrutiny, and understanding of these dilemmas should also yield more realistic expectations of what can be achieved during an initial period of postconflict statebuilding and in the ensuing period. As noted earlier, one of the weaknesses of recent missions has been the gap between the stated objectives and the actual performance and outcomes of statebuilding efforts, which can foster disappointment and perceptions of disingenuousness—or worse, hypocrisy—that risk undermining the legitimacy of, and
support for, these efforts. Greater sensitivity to the inherent tensions and contradictions of statebuilding should, among other things, highlight the limited ability of outsiders to effect profound and truly far-reaching transformations in the workings of any society. Bringing expectations into closer alignment with possibilities would itself strengthen the prospects for effective statebuilding.

**Sustainable Statebuilding and “Successive Missions”**

Acknowledging the limits of externally assisted statebuilding does not mean going back to the “quick and dirty” approach that defined the peacebuilding operations of the early-to-mid 1990s. Building effective, legitimate governmental institutions remains a crucial goal in consolidating transitions from war to a self-sustaining peace—and in helping postconflict countries escape the dual traps of recurring violence and poverty. Effective statebuilding should therefore focus on sustainability.

Sustaining international attention on states that have hosted missions is one of the laudable goals of the new Peacebuilding Commission. However, sustainable statebuilding is equally about designing mission strategies with the longer term in mind. For statebuilding strategies, such missions need to be viewed not simply as postconflict operations, but rather as the first of many phases of international engagement in recovering countries, most of which will remain fragile long after the formal termination of the initial mission. For example, threats to a postwar democratization process can manifest themselves over many years, not only in the first or second electoral contests.

These subsequent phases of statebuilding may be viewed as “successive missions” aimed at the gradual stabilization of political and economic conditions within the country. This does not necessarily mean open-ended military or security deployments. Rather, once initial transitional tasks are completed—such as disarmament, demobilization, return of refugees, interim government, and elections—the international role should gradually shift towards a more “ordinary” international development and monitoring presence. Further analysis is required to evaluate what different types of successive missions (involving fewer military deployments but still providing for security and credible commitment to peace agreements) are best deployed to fill the gap between the full-scale peace operation and a “normal” development presence.

The idea of successive missions also calls into question the usefulness and appropriateness of thinking about “exit strategies” for statebuilding operations. As Dominik Zaum writes, “exit should best be seen as a process, not an event, and therefore does not mean disengagement.” According to this view, rather than exiting, external actors remain involved in promoting (and to some extent overseeing) the statebuilding process in progressively less intrusive ways. These might involve long-term international police missions, deployment of significant numbers of UN civilian personnel, further security sector reform activities, rule of law and judicial reform, working with parliament and political parties, training future elections observers, building civil society or community-level conflict resiliency, and developing the capacity and dispute resolution skills of electoral management bodies. A key challenge for international statebuilders is to incorporate planning for these subsequent phases directly into the initial design of the mission, thereby reducing some of the contradictions between short-term and long-term statebuilding needs.

**Statebuilding at a Crossroads**

There is more at stake in this discussion than simply refining current statebuilding practices. The historic experiment in internationally assisted postwar statebuilding, which has been so important within the activities of the United Nations and other international agencies since the end of the Cold War, appears to have arrived at a crossroads.

Criticism of statebuilding has been mounting in recent years from several directions. Some observers claim that these missions represent a new form of colonial control over the territory of war-torn states. The strongest versions of this critique portray statebuilding as
a form of neo-imperialist or capitalist exploitation of vulnerable societies. In the post-9/11 period—and particularly since the 2003 invasion of Iraq—it has become increasingly difficult to separate discussions of statebuilding in all contexts from the ill-fated “imperial” attempt to stabilize post-invasion Iraq. In spite of important differences between Iraq and other postconflict missions (including the fact that Iraq was conquered and occupied, whereas most statebuilding operations have been launched at the invitation of local parties and following a negotiated settlement to an internal war), exasperation over the deterioration of conditions in Iraq seems to be spilling over into skepticism in some quarters about the potential effectiveness or desirability of any kind of postwar statebuilding operation.

Others have leveled more measured criticisms. Some, for example, point to the mixed record of statebuilding and wonder whether it is worth the resources and sacrifice. Most countries that have hosted these missions have not reverted to war, but, as previously noted, the durability of peace even in the most successful cases is less clear. How should we judge, for example, the outcome of peacebuilding in Central America when the missions did little to address deep socioeconomic inequalities in those societies, which have arguably been among the root causes of the region’s violent past? What about the utter failure of peacebuilding in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, or the on-again, off-again progress in Angola or Sierra Leone? And what should we make of the burst of renewed political violence in Timor Leste in 2006, in a country that was widely touted as one of the most notable peacebuilding successes? Such outcomes have raised doubts about the prospects for peacebuilding and statebuilding even in relatively favorable settings. Although most experts hold that these operations have, on the whole, done considerably more good than harm, serious doubts persist about the ability of international agencies to foster conditions for sustainable peace. These doubts have, in turn, contributed to arguments favoring a major scaling-back of international statebuilding in order to give war-torn societies the opportunity to pursue their own “autonomous recovery.”

In the face of these diverse criticisms and doubts, the future of the state-building experiment seems uncertain. A widespread loss of confidence in international statebuilding would make it more difficult to provide assistance to countries just emerging from war. In the most extreme case, a rejection of statebuilding could effectively abandon tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease, and fear. Beyond their humanitarian effects, state weakness and state failure are global concerns because their effects often spill over the borders of the affected country.

Making statebuilding more effective and sustainable are therefore critical objectives at this moment in history. To do so, however, practitioners of statebuilding need to focus more attention on the inherent tensions and contradictions of this type of intervention, as the RPPS project makes clear. The dilemmas of statebuilding will never go away, but they can be managed more successfully than they have been in the past. The first step is to deepen existing understandings of the dilemmas, their underlying causes, and their interactions and implications.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
United Nations Development Programme

Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.

— UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
Around the world, more people are recognizing that governance matters for development—that institutions, rules and political processes play a big role in whether economies grow, whether children go to school, whether human development moves forward or back. So, promoting human development is not just a social, economic and technological challenge: it is also an institutional and political challenge.

Accompanying this new consensus is a growing conviction that many persistent development problems reflect failures of governance. Studies in a range of countries and regions hold weak governance responsible for persistent poverty and lagging development. The governance crisis is evident in widespread corruption, inefficient public services and a host of other failures. These studies have also shown what poor governance means for ordinary citizens—schools without teachers, courts without justice, local bureaucrats demanding bribes at every turn.²

What does it mean to promote good governance? There is no single answer. But much of the recent debate has focused on what makes institutions and rules more effective, including transparency, participation, responsiveness, accountability and the rule of law. All are important for human development—especially since ineffective institutions usually cause the most harm to poor and vulnerable people.

But just as human development is about much more than growth in national incomes, governance for human development is about much more than effective institutions and rules. For three reasons, it must also be concerned with whether institutions and rules are fair—and whether all people have a say in how they operate:

• Participating in the rules and institutions that shape one’s community is a basic human right and part of human development.

• More inclusive governance can be more effective. When local people are consulted about the location of a new health clinic, for example, there is a better chance it will be built in the right place.

• More participatory governance also can be more equitable. Much is known about the economic and social policies that help eradicate poverty and promote more inclusive growth. But few countries pursue such policies vigorously, often because the potential beneficiaries lack political power and their interests are not fully represented in policy decisions.

Governance for human development is partly about having efficient institutions and rules that promote development by making markets work and ensuring that public services live up to their name. But it is also about protecting human rights, promoting wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect people’s lives and achieving more equitable economic and social outcomes. Thus governance for human development is concerned not just with efficient, equitable outcomes but also with fair processes. Governance for human development must be democratic in substance and in form—by the people and for the people (see the special contribution by Nobel Prize-winner Aung San Suu Kyi).

The Role of Political Freedom and Participation in Human Development

Political freedom and participation are part of human development, both as development goals in their own right and as means for advancing human development.

Political Freedom and Participation Are Essential Goals of Human Development

Political freedom and the ability to participate in the life of one’s community are capabilities that are as important for human development as being able to read and write and being in good health. People without political freedom—such as being able to join associations and to form and express opinions—have far fewer choices in life. And being able
to participate in the life of one's community—commanding the respect of others and having a say in communal decisions—is fundamental to human existence.

That political freedom and participation are crucial to human development is not always well understood. Indeed, there is a widespread misperception that human development is only about economic and social outcomes such as reducing income poverty and improving health and education. Though these are important for human development, its aim is much broader—to promote the freedom, well-being and dignity of people everywhere. Economic growth is a means to these broader ends. The success of the human development index (HDI)—itself only a partial measure of the economic and social dimensions of human development—has contributed to this misperception because it leaves out so many aspects of human development.

They Are Also Important for Making Human Development Happen

As the first Human Development Report said in 1990, “People are the real wealth of a nation.” People are not only the beneficiaries of economic and social progress, they are also its agents, both as individuals and by making common causes with others. That is one reason strategies for promoting human development have traditionally emphasized investing in education and health and promoting equitable economic growth. These are two pillars of development because they mobilize individual agency by strengthening productive capacities.

But this Report highlights a third pillar of a 21st century human development strategy: promoting participation through democratic governance. Participation promotes collective agency as well as individual agency—important because collective action through social and political movements has often been a motor of progress for issues central to human development: protecting the environment, promoting gender equality, fostering human rights. In addition, participation and other human development gains can be mutually reinforcing. Political freedom empowers people to claim their economic and social rights, while education increases their ability to demand economic and social policies that respond to their priorities.

Broadening the Scope of Human Development: Why Participation, and Why Now?

Putting participation at the heart of human development strategies raises a question about the scope of human development: which capabilities are part of human development? Human development is certainly broader than education and health. Many other capabilities are also important in expanding human choices. But public policy is about setting priorities. And the human development approach requires deciding which capabilities are most important for public policy.

There can be no single answer: societies and people value capabilities differently depending on their situation. Human Development Reports have applied two criteria in identifying an important capability. First, it must be universally valued by people the world over. Second, it must be fundamental in the sense that the lack of it would close off many options in life. Other than that, the basic concept of human development has remained open-ended. Different capabilities may be considered important over time and in different parts of the world.

In the decade since the first Human Development Report, political freedom and participation have become much more prominent in public policy debates. The political shifts of the 1990s built greater consensus on the value of political freedom and human rights—consensus reflected in recent intergovernmental declarations such as the Millennium Declaration of the UN General Assembly and the consensus document of the March 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development.

In an era of rapid globalization, markets and political liberalization—not government planning—are often the main drivers of economic and social change. But a decade ago,
with the legacy of the cold war still alive, the world was divided on the importance of political freedom and participation. And 1990 was the tail end of the planning era of development, with the state as the primary actor. As a result human development strategies emphasized the need to reallocate public investments in favour of human development priorities, especially the two pillars of expanding primary health care and education and promoting pro-poor growth.

Changes in the world have shifted human development priorities and made political freedom, participation and collective action much more important as public policy issues. Alongside the economic entrepreneurship that drives markets, social entrepreneurship now drives policy debates on issues that matter for people. In addition, consensus is emerging on the importance of collective action by people and civil society groups in shaping the course of human development.

Other capabilities might be considered important today—such as personal security or the capability to be free from physical danger or violence. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of democratic governance of security forces.

**Democracy and Human Development**

Democratic principles follow naturally and inescapably from this vision of human development. The word democracy, from the Greek, means “rule by the people.” It sums up well the human development approach to governance because it expresses the idea that people come first: governance must conform to the needs of people, not vice versa. Whether there can be such a thing as “will of the people” in a world with disparate and competing interests, the basic democratic principle—of the equal concern for all people in the formation of governance structures—captures a key part of what human development should be about.

The democratic system of voting in elections adds another crucial element of governance from a human development standpoint, because elections are the paradigm of enforceable accountability. When a government fails to live up to the needs and desires of the people, the people can throw it out of office. No form of accountability is more direct. There is also no more egalitarian form of participation. The principle of “one person, one vote” gives every individual an equal say in the choice of government—in theory if not in practice. Other forms of participation can also be important for ensuring the accountability of state and non-state actors when, for one reason or another, the ballot box fails to do the job. But there is always the risk that particular groups and interests will wield undue influence, as those with more resources, or simply more determination, impose their views.

It would be a mistake to equate democracy with regular elections and to fall into the fallacy of “electoralism.” Some analysts consider the mere fact of elections a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy, assuming that once fair and free elections are regularly held, all other democratic institutions and practice will naturally follow.

But democracy also requires functioning institutions. It requires a legislature that represents the people, not one controlled by the president, prime minister, bureaucrats or the military. It requires an independent judiciary that enforces the rule of law with equal concern for all people. It requires well-functioning political parties and electoral systems. It requires security forces that are professional, politically neutral and serve the needs of people. It requires an accessible media that is free, independent and unbiased, not one controlled by the state or by corporate interests. And it requires a vibrant civil society, one that can play a watchdog role on government and interest groups—and provide alternative forms of political participation. These institutions, underpinned by democratic values and respect for human rights, provide checks and balances against the risks of tyranny—and of populism, because in democracies populist politicians can mobilize support by using propaganda and appeals to racism and other forms of intolerance.
In democratic societies people participate in the public sphere in many ways—debating issues with friends and neighbours, writing to newspapers on the rights and wrongs of government policies, marching in protests, becoming members of political parties or trade unions—giving them a say in the decisions that affect their lives. Participation involves engaging in deliberative processes that can bring people's concerns to the fore. Open space for free political debate and the diverse ways in which people can express their views are the essence of democratic life and are what make decision-making work in democracies. In representative systems of government, decision-making is delegated to officials. But informed decisions require input from the people affected by them and cannot rely solely on "expert knowledge".

Democracies take different shapes and forms—because political systems vary, they may be "differently democratic" on many fronts. For the world's parliamentarians the essence of democracy lies in its basic principles. It is the only political regime compatible with human development in its deepest sense, because in democracy political power is authorized and controlled by the people over whom it is exercised. The most benign dictatorship imaginable would not be compatible with human development because human development has to be fully owned. It cannot be granted from above. As Human Development Report 2000 explained, democracy is also the only political regime that respects open contests for power and is consistent with the respect and promotion of all human rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social.

Is There a Trade-Off Between Democracy and Development?

In many countries questions linger about compatibilities and trade-offs between democracy and development. Military takeovers are most often justified on the grounds that democratically elected governments are incompetent in managing economic and social life. Authoritarian regimes often argue that they have an advantage in building strong states that can make tough decisions in the interests of the people. They also argue that democratic processes create disorder and impede efficient management—that countries must choose between democracy and development, between extending political freedom and expanding incomes.

These arguments are not supported by empirical evidence. Rather, there are good reasons to believe that democracy and growth are compatible. With just two exceptions, all of the world's richest countries—those with per capita incomes above $20,000 (in 2000 purchasing power parity)—have the world's most democratic regimes. In addition, 42 of the 48 high human development countries are democracies. These outcomes do not mean that there is a causal relationship—that democracy leads to economic growth or higher income. Indeed, the correlation between democracy and income weakens or disappears when only low-income countries are considered. In fact, the literature finds no causal relationship between democracy and economic performance, in either direction. A systematic study by Adam Przeworski and others of 135 countries from 1950–90 discredits the notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Similarly, studies of sources of economic growth find no strong evidence that democracy is an explanatory factor.

Democracy Contributes to Stability and Equitable Economic and Social Development

Democracy expands political freedom, a desirable outcome in itself. But democratic institutions and processes can also contribute to development, especially human development. Competition for political power—through elections and other features of democracy—makes politicians more likely to respond to people's needs and aspirations. It can also help manage conflict and promote stability.

In democracies people have a voice—underpinned by freedom of speech and thought, freedom of information, free and independent media and open political debate—that allows them to be heard in public policy-making. Public pressure can influence the decisions and actions of public officials as well as private agents, as with environmental pol-
lution or abusive labour practices. These democratic processes are clearly related to three aspects of development.

First, democracies are better than authoritarian regimes at managing conflicts, because the political space and the institutions that provide for open contests give opponents hope that change is possible without destroying the system. Some politicians argue that democracy leads to political instability, undermining development. But empirical studies show that the reverse is true. Socio-political unrest and handovers of power occur more often in democracies than in dictatorships, but they do not disrupt development. Between 1950 and 1990 democracies experienced twice as many riots and demonstrations and three times as many labour strikes. But such events—as well as changes in government—did not slow economic growth in democracies. Under dictatorships they did. Dictatorships were also more prone to violent political upheavals, experiencing a war, on average, every 12 years, compared with every 21 years in democracies. And wars caused greater economic hardship in dictatorships than in democracies.11 Democracies can mitigate internal conflicts so that they do not develop into political crises and economic turmoil.

The same relationship holds in the opposite direction—that is, higher incomes help democracies survive once they emerge, and the likelihood of reverting to authoritarianism declines as incomes increase.12 Higher incomes also contribute to political stability.13

Second, democracies are better at avoiding catastrophes and at managing sudden downturns that threaten human survival. As Amartya Sen has argued, democratic institutions and processes provide strong incentives for governments to prevent famines. Without opposition parties, uncensored public criticism and the threat of being thrown out of office, rulers can act with impunity. Without a free press, the suffering from famine in isolated rural areas can be invisible to rulers and to the public. “Famines kill millions of people in different countries of the world, but they don’t kill the rulers. The kings and the presidents, the bureaucrats and the bosses, the military leaders and the commanders never are famine victims.”14

Consider China, India and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In India famines were common under colonial rule—for example, 2-3 million people died in the 1943 Bengal famine. But since independence and the establishment of democratic rule, there has been no recurrence of famine—despite severe crop failures and massive losses of purchasing power for large segments of the population, as in 1968, 1973, 1979 and 1987. Each time the government acted to avoid famine. For example, food production fell sharply during the 1973 drought in Maharashtra, but famine was averted, partly because 5 million people were quickly put to work in public works projects. In contrast, during 1958-61, famines in China killed nearly 30 million people. And one of the worst famines in history continues in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, having already killed an estimated 1 in 10 citizens.

Political incentives in democracies also seem to help societies avoid other disasters, especially economic ruin and the collapse of development. The worst economic crises in democracies have been much less severe than the worst under dictatorships. True, some of the highest economic growth has been achieved under non-democratic rule, notably in the East Asian tigers between the 1960s and 1990s. But authoritarian regimes have also taken countries to economic ruin—as in Mobutu Sese Seko’s Congo, Papa and Bebe’s Haiti and Idi Amin’s Uganda. Only 1 of the 10 countries with less than 1% annual growth for at least 10 years between 1950 and 1990 was a democracy.

Third, democracies help spread the word about critical health issues, such as the negative implications for women of a large number of births, the benefits of breast feeding and the dangers of unprotected sex in the context of HIV/AIDS. In these areas open dialogue and public debate can disseminate information and influence behaviour. Sharp declines in fertility in highly literate Indian states such as Kerala were due not only to high literacy but also to its interaction with public debates on the benefits of small fami-
ilies. Free, open public debates are the cornerstone of what Amartya Sen calls the “con-
structive role” that democracies can play in promoting development. And among coun-
tries with similar incomes, people live longer, fewer children die and women have fewer
children in democratic regimes. This hugely important result has strong implications for
human development given the importance of lower fertility for women’s lives and choices
and for the health of future generations. Understanding what lies behind this result and
identifying the policies that made a difference are research priorities.

Still, The Links Between Democracy and Equitable Development Need
To Be Strengthened

When more than growth is considered, democratic institutions and processes contribute
to development. But the links are by no means automatic. Social injustices are widespread
in democratic and authoritarian regimes alike, whether deliberate or otherwise in the allo-
cation of public services or in discrimination against squatters, street children, migrants
and other socially marginal groups. Discrimination against ethnic minorities, women, the
elderly and others continues even in long-established democracies, as the Commission
for Racial Equality recently reported in the United Kingdom. Political incentives to
respond to the needs of ordinary people may be offset by incentives to respond to the
demands of the powerful or the wealthy.

Much is known about how to promote equitable development that benefits poor people:
widening access to credit, reforming land ownership, investing in basic social services for
all, promoting the informal sector, following sound macroeconomic policies. But too often
such policies are not adopted because of systematic biases that protect the interests of
elites. Around the world, public spending is often skewed in favour of rich people in such
critical areas as basic health and education. Moreover, taxation and spending policies
are not more progressive in the countries with the highest income inequalities. According
to one study covering more than 50 countries, countries with higher income disparities
have lower tax revenues and government spending than countries with more evenly dis-
tributed incomes.

Such biases occur in both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Democracies range from
those with highly uneven income distributions to those that are more egalitarian. The
same is true for less democratic regimes. Similarly, there is a wide range of achievements
in key human development indicators such as the under-five mortality rate or the net pri-
mary enrolment ratio. Mali has progressed further than Togo in stabilizing its democratic
structures but has done no better in spreading primary schooling, raising literacy or reduc-
ing infant mortality. Bahrain and Syria have done as much to spread primary education
as more democratic Jordan— and more than Morocco.

Some democracies have huge, often growing inequalities in income, wealth, social
advantage and power. Consider Brazil and the Russian Federation, with some of the
world’s widest income disparities. In many Latin American countries disparities in
income and education rose in the 1990s after democratic rule was restored in the
1980s. Income inequalities also jumped in the former Soviet Union, Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltics. By contrast, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and
Malaysia achieved solid economic growth and reduced income inequalities under non-
democratic rule in the 1970s.

So, while democracy can promote equitable development, the goals of democracy and
equity should be considered largely independent— with both requiring dedicated effort
and political will. Democracy may not automatically secure equitable social and economic
development, but poverty does not prevent democracy from taking root: Costa Rica,
Jordan, Mozambique and Senegal have expanded people’s freedoms and participation
much more than their less democratic neighbours with similar incomes. The lesson is that
democracy is not a luxury for developing countries. On the contrary, democracy has intrinsic value for human development because it has strong links to political and civil freedoms and can contribute to social and economic development. But these links are not automatic, and strengthening them is the challenge of democratic governance—making democratic institutions serve human development.

**Today’s Governance Challenge**

Democracy and human development have something else in common. They are both more a journey than a destination—a promise rather than a list. Societies can be more or less democratic, just as people can have broader or more constrained choices to lead lives they value. But there is no defined end point. No society is ever completely democratic or fully developed. What matters is moving forward, and not slipping back.

People everywhere want to determine their destiny. The kind of democracy they choose need not follow a particular model—the North American or the Western European, for example. The model must be adapted to local circumstances and history. But everywhere, democracy requires a long process of political development. It needs basic institutions, formal and informal, of the state and outside it. It will not thrive without the spread of democratic culture—of values and principles that guide the behaviour of individuals and groups. Threats to democracy come not only from political parties that are personalized and unable to represent people, but also from intolerance, extremism and a lack of respect for human rights and human dignity.

The implication is that priorities for advancing democratic principles vary according to the social context, just as priorities for human development vary over time and across communities. Promoting the equal concern for all people in the formation of governance structures meant something different in an era of state-owned industry and the transistor radio than it does in an era of transnational corporations and the Internet.

It follows that fulfilling the promise of democratic governance in a 21st century world cannot depend simply on making state institutions function better. It must also take into account the fact that global economic integration and political liberalization are reshaping the environment in which state institutions operate—often fundamentally changing what it means for people to have a say in how they are governed.

To be sure, the nation-state is still a powerful force shaping individual lives, and in most cases it is the most important one. But new actors are also becoming important, from the World Trade Organization to national and international corporations, to new groups in civil society and the media, both local and international. As the actors change, so do the rules: from participatory local budgeting to regional trade rules to international protection of human rights. And as people's lives become more interdependent, democratic principles of participation and equal concern for all must be reflected in the way that these new actors structure their institutions and in the way that rules are formulated and implemented.

Democratic governance in this fast-changing environment is about more than people having the right to vote. It must be about strengthening democratic institutions so that they keep pace with the changing distribution of economic and political power. And it must be about promoting democratic politics that make participation and public accountability possible even when the relevant power and processes lie outside the formal institutions of the state. What this two-part strategy implies for governance is the subject of the rest of this Report.
INTRODUCTION: POSTCONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook
From Global Governance, 9:2 (2003), 135–39

Scholars and practitioners have recently given increased attention to the intersection of two concepts: postconflict peacebuilding and democratization or, more broadly, governance. Several factors contribute to this development. First, postconflict peacebuilding itself has become an important concept within international security. The field of peacekeeping, long concerned chiefly with reaching and maintaining durable peace agreements, now embraces the need to address a complex range of challenges in war-torn societies: preventing future armed conflict, redressing past human rights abuses, building effective state institutions, (re)creating a social fabric, and fostering a healthy civil society. Although some question its utility as a concept, peacebuilding has firmly entered the lexicon of peace and security studies.

Second, good governance is increasingly seen as an important concept in postconflict reconstruction. During the 1990s, multilateral and bilateral development agencies brought governance into their philosophy and programs on economic development. Security specialists have followed that trend, embracing the link between good governance and durable peace. International actors have added good governance to a postconflict agenda that has historically focused on ensuring immediate military security and regenerating the economy. Preventing future conflicts is not solely a matter of keeping those with guns from using them, but of establishing accountable, transparent, and participatory systems of authority. As United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administrator Mark Malloch Brown states in his article “Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework for Sustainable Peace,” democratic governance is “vital not just for ensuring sustainable development, but also for sustaining peace within societies.”

Third, sound governance, at least in its political dimension, is increasingly identified with some form of democracy. Although controversy surrounds definitions, in this special issue governance refers to the exercise of political, economic, and social authority in a society. Democracy, used in these articles to mean free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees, is now widely viewed as the only acceptable form of national-level political governance.

As Gregory H. Fox demonstrates in his article “International Law and the Entitlement to Democracy After War,” minimal elements of democracy are part of international legal obligations, and norms of democracy permeate the UN system as well as regional intergovernmental organizations. European and U.S. democracy-promotion programs have grown tremendously in the past decade, and “democratic governance” now receives most of the UNDP’s core funding, as its administrator notes in this issue. International assistance, especially to countries experiencing some sort of political or military transition, virtually requires the instauration of electoral democracy, even if authoritarian practices and curbs on freedoms persist, and perhaps half of the world’s population lives in political systems that are not meaningfully democratic. Indeed, many such systems are deemed legitimate by the populations living within them. The “third wave” has its limitations.

However, the increasing convergence in practice of these two sub-fields—peacebuilding and democratization—has only recently been accompanied by concentrated attempts by the scholars and practitioners of each to address one another. The postconflict peacebuilding community and the democratization communities have enjoyed remarkably little dialogue. The recent peacebuilding literature, for instance, has not engaged some of the difficult questions posed by research on democratization and governance. Much of that research emphasizes structural preconditions for statehood and democracy that fall beyond the short-term control of policymakers. More importantly, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize that democratization, especially untimely elections, have sometimes sparked wars and genocide. Under what circumstances do postwar elections
deepen hostilities and undermine good governance? Peacebuilding analysts and actors have not adequately addressed this question.

If the peacebuilding literature has not grappled with the field of democratization and governance, democratization theorists have not sufficiently examined the particularities of postconflict societies and polities. Some structuralists seem too pessimistic. Where states and societies experience great disruption, perhaps international actors and elites can forge new institutional arrangements more easily than in past centuries. Some democratization theorists have emphasized the agency of domestic actors during regime transitions from authoritarianism, underplaying the enhanced opportunities for international actors. The incentives afforded by globalization and by the increased leverage of international organizations may permit the bypassing of historically prescribed steps in state formation and democratization.

At the same time, some democratization theorists may be too optimistic, and postconflict settings may present insurmountable challenges. Most of the literature on democratization, civil society, and participation draws on European and Latin American experiences rather than on the circumstances in African and Asian societies, where many recent peace operations have occurred. Assumptions about formal organizations or even the concepts of state and war may have little relevance. Despite notable successes, many so-called successful peace processes—for instance, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, and Guatemala—have not led to what may be called stable democracies. Problems of violent crime, authoritarian rulers, social inequity, and marginalization have redounded negatively on local populations' perception of new polities. These experiences suggest revisiting conceptual frameworks.

The deficient dialogue between peacebuilding and democratization specialists led a group of scholars at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies to organize a conference in April 2002. "State of the art" theorizing about democratization and local governance, on the one hand, and postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, on the other, constituted the agenda. The conference addressed several main questions: What is the current state of thinking about how to foster good governance in postconflict societies? How can we improve both the concepts and actions of international and national actors involved in postconflict peacebuilding? Can we identify innovative ways beyond Western models of democracy that enhance local participation in postconflict governance? More broadly, what is the future research agenda for issues of governance and local participation in war-torn societies?

With the exception of the three "Global Insights" articles introducing the volume and of Michèle Griffin's article, "The Helmet and the Hoe: Linkages Between United Nations Development Assistance and Conflict Management," the contributions to this special issue were prepared for that conference. All four of the former contributions add the informed voices of UN practitioners to the more academic treatments of the material. UNDP administrator Malloch Brown starts off this special issue pointedly explaining why democratic governance is crucial for development and postconflict reconstruction, acknowledging the need to adapt forms of democratic governance to local imperatives. Marrack Goulding's article, "Deliverance from Evil," makes a powerful argument for the sorts of international interventions that often lead to postconflict UN missions. He argues for wider interventions to stop human rights atrocities, even while recognizing that developing countries that are most often the objects of such interventions see a double standard behind the major powers' decisions to intervene. In her article, "Afghanistan: The Way Forward," Graciana del Castillo shows the relevance of debates over governance and postwar reconstruction for current decisionmakers in Afghanistan.

Nancy Bermeo's article "What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn't Say—About Postwar Democratization," takes an overdue look at war's role in the founding of democracies worldwide, examining what democratization theory says about postwar situations, including challenging African cases. As guest editors for this issue, we draw on the conference discussions and other developments to explore the intersections and gaps
between the fields of postconflict peacebuilding and democratization and governance. We suggest some future research directions. Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko in “Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda,” show how Western concepts of justice have not worked well in that country, and how a local-level practice known as gacaca seems to offer an attractive and widely accepted means of simultaneous achieving justice and reconciliation. Their article illustrates the need to reflect upon how traditional forms of justice and governance may be integrated with liberal forms of democratic governance in war-torn societies.

Griffin offers an account of how the dual, historically separate goals of the UN system—peace and development—have converged in concept and in practice over the past decade. She illustrates the operational links between international peace and development in recent UN post-conflict peacebuilding missions. Fox shows how core elements of the “democratic entitlement” are enshrined in international law. He provides a rationale for democracy promotion in postconflict societies and suggests a corrective for what he views as excessively narrow and negative assessments of UN efforts to foster Western models of democracy.

Finally, two reviews consider different literatures on conflict and peacebuilding. Elisabeth Jean Wood in “Civil Wars: What We Don’t Know,” provides a detailed analysis of recent work on the origins and termination of civil wars, arguing for cross-regional, comparative case studies to supplement burgeoning quantitative research. Melissa Labonte in “Dimensions of Postconflict Peacebuilding and Democratization,” reviews six recent books on peacebuilding and democratization, exploring concrete instances of the intersection of the two concepts that undergird this special issue.

As guest editors, we are grateful for the contributions, collaboration, and time of the journal’s editors in preparing this special issue of Global Governance. It mixes scholarly contributions from an academic conference with other contributions related to the themes of the conference. We hope that our readers find it a useful mix that sheds light on the challenges of democratic governance in postconflict societies.

THEORIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

R. C. Crook


1.2 Theories of civil society

The revival of the concept of civil society owes much to the dissident opposition movements of the former Communist states of Eastern Europe and the USSR (Walzer 1991). Their pursuit of a realm of freedom outside the control of a totalitarian party and state led them to emphasise the virtues of an autonomous ‘civil society’ which would be ‘non-political’, independent of and separate from the public realm of the state and yet, through free association, able to embody democratic norms and ideals. In the Eastern European context the profound hostility to the state derived in part from its association with foreign domination and it thus became part of the ideology of the pro-democracy movements which became successor regimes after the collapse of Communism (Seligman 1992: 7). Their self-identification as the founders of a new democracy based on the ideals and associations of civil society was in turn accepted by donors and Western sympathisers.
The message then spread rapidly into the discourse surrounding democratisation in the South, principally because parallels could be drawn between the attempt to build democracy in the post-Communist world, and the same process in countries with apparently similar legacies of statist domination by authoritarian, post-colonial states over fragmented, weak and marginalised civil societies.

For these reasons—even though the social bases and political strength of the dissident movements have proved to be much weaker and more ephemeral than anticipated (Padgett 1999)—one concept of civil society which is very prevalent in the literature seeks to restrict the term to voluntary, non-ascriptive associations organised according to participatory and democratic principles which are independent both of the state and of ‘narrow’ parochial, private or vested interests (Gellner 1994; Hadenius and Uggla 1995; Diamond et al. 1997). Because they cross-cut particular interest groups they can facilitate a social engagement and a renewal of mutuality and social trust which will provide a viable alternative to anomic and social fragmentation on the one hand, and the exclusive, irreconcilable communities of ethnicity or religion on the other. Because they are independent of the state they can also form a ‘Third Sector’ basis for democratic life which will restrain the state’s hierarchical and dominating impulses. In the African context, this view of civil society leads Bayart to argue that civil society is as yet unformed in Africa because civil society is by definition characterised by self-consciousness and a conceptual ability to oppose the state beyond parochial concerns (Bayart 1986). In this formulation, the concept becomes an aspiration, a state of affairs to be worked for rather than an empirical concept (Rieff 1999; Kasfir 1998; Padgett 1999: 5; Chandler 1999).

The ‘post-Communist’ view of civil society is in effect a reformulation, or reworking in a different language, of pluralist theories of democracy derived from the de Tocquevillean tradition. According to this tradition, democracy depends on checking the power of the state by diffusing power and influence amongst a multiplicity of cross-cutting civic organisations (called ‘political society’ by de Tocqueville) no one of which can dominate and which can prevent the state itself from being captured by a particular class or interest (Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). Civil society itself legitimates the ‘regulative consensus’ administered by the state in order to mediate conflict; but it is essential that there be a rich density of voluntary associational life, and that excessive polarisation be avoided through cross-cutting memberships and a citizen culture of social engagement and civic virtue (Dahl 1982). As Kasfir points out, it is probably no accident that current advocacy of this view for the post-Communist world and the South coincides with the agonised debate in American intellectual life over the alleged crisis of declining participation, social fragmentation and lack of civic virtue in the very home of pluralist liberal democracy (Kasfir 1998).

It is argued here, however, that a prescriptive and pluralist concept of civil society is not adequate for comparative, empirical research into the actual outcomes of civil society’s organisational activities in countries such as Bosnia and Uganda. More appropriate guidance can be found in the sociological tradition of civil society analysis. Within this tradition, two very broad schools can be identified: on the one hand is that deriving from Hegel through Marx, Gramsci and Habermas, which stresses the contradictions and incompleteness of civil society and its integral or dialectical relation to the state (Calhoun 1997). On the other, is that originating in the Scottish Enlightenment, through Durkheim, Simmel and Parsons which focuses on the individual as both a moral and social being, whose existence can only be understood sociologically but is nevertheless capable of sustaining a reasoned and consensual society based on mutuality and social solidarity—Durkheim’s ‘conscience collective’ (Seligman 1992: 124). In spite of these differences both schools share a common concern with the idea of how societies resolve and mediate the relation between individual interests and public ethics, the market and collective good; and this is because they recognise that the very problematic emerges with the rise of a market economy—in short, with capitalism and modern social differentiation.
An historical and sociologically based concept of civil society must incorporate, therefore, the following elements:

• the very idea of a realm of social life which is both collective (public) and associational and yet rooted in private interests perceived as separate from the state is based on the division of labour, social differentiation and inequality associated with the emergence of a market economy. The division of labour creates the paradox of a dense plurality of organised interests and classes which are simultaneously conflictual and interdependent.

• This social differentiation in turn produces a multiplicity of possible communities; the historic contrast is between the ascribed communal, familial or political statuses of non-market societies and self-conscious, interest-based association (Crook 1991; Seligman 1992). Such organised interests, although based on the resources of private wealth, education, and the social consciousness associated with such a system of production and exchange, are not, therefore, confined to those rooted in economic relations (e.g. labour and capital).

• Civil society is a realm of public or collective activity; even if one allows highly informal kinds of interaction ('street corner' society, neighbourhood relations) (Varshney 1998), it is where individuals pursue group-mediated or defined issues with their own 'publics' or with other groups, whether this be cooperative or conflictual.

• Civil society is structured through its relations with the state— the overarching definer of the public realm and of the boundaries of a particular social formation. (It is worth noting that in Locke’s original conception, a civil society was not empirically distinct from the state; it was the set of cooperative social relations which constituted the state as a legitimate political authority and political community) (Dunn 1996). Although seemingly separate from the state, civil society interests are engaged in a constant, reciprocal relation with the state over the distribution of power and resources in society. It is for this reason that a distinction can be made between ‘society’ and ‘civil society’; the latter is political in that it is the activities of social groups in their interaction with the state-defined public realm (Scruton 1996). Although an analytical distinction can also be made between ‘civil society’ and ‘the state’, their relationship is equally integral. The realm of the state interfaces with civil society at all points where it enforces, upholds or represses particular relationships, through law or through political action (Poggi 1978). It thus permeates the whole of civil society. As Crawford Young argues, ‘the very notion of civil society loses its meaning if severed from the state’ (Young in Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994). In other words, state and civil society are inextricably bound together, in a mutual process of structuration and negotiation (Fatton 1995).

• Civil society is a realm of both contestation and the search for agreement, principally because of the inequalities and power differences inherent in society (Marxists would also say, because of the inevitable conflict of class interests in capitalist relations of production) (Cohen 1982). But these contestations are not solely about economic interest; they are also about norms and social meanings (Bratton 1994). In Gramsci’s terms, they are about the ways in which a dominant class attempts to reproduce its hegemony through manipulation of cultural identities and ideological world views. The state and its public discourse are important tools in this process, and hence the importance of civil society as a site for both enforcement of hegemony and ‘counter-hegemonic struggles’.

An overall definition of civil society would therefore include all those self-conscious associations and organisations representing private interest groups and local, class, religious and intellectual ‘publics’ which emerge with the rise of a market economy. It thus encompasses but is not confined (as in the Marxist use) to the social relations of particular forms of production and exchange. These groups engage in the political or public realm through their interrelations with the state and their contestation over, or reproduction of, societal norms. Such organisations can be both ‘civic’ and ‘uncivil’ in their behaviour and orientation, ranging from parties of both class and mobilised ethnic, cultural or religious communities, to business associations, trade unions and farmers’ move-
ments, local civic groups such as community development associations and specifically 'pro-democracy' organisations concerned with civil rights or political reform. Their character and strength will be determined by their particular economy and society with its specific history and culture and particular degree of differentiation and marketisation. Different societies will therefore have different densities and mixes of CSOs with differing degrees of strength, coherence and fragmentation.
CHAPTER 7
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION, RECOVERY, AND PEACE
Erin McCandless

War leaves behind destroyed economies, decimated infrastructures, and more often than not institutional, human, financial, and other capacities in need of rebuilding. This chapter considers three interdependent aspects of this economic recovery process that are vital to peace sustainability: the economic aspects of peace agreements, financing peace, and economic recovery strategies in post-conflict settings.

A number of scholars today are inquiring about the economic aspects of peace agreements as they build upon the growing body of literature on the causes of conflict and increasing awareness of the last decade that failed peace agreements can be attributed in part to traditional Realpolitik approaches to war termination. In ‘Peace Agreements as Basis for Post-Conflict Statebuilding’, Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann, and Marcia Dawes underscore the need for peace agreements to serve as a foundation for long-term structural change. They suggest that even when provisions are included, they rarely specify implementation strategies. As well, in the search for a ‘swift end to violence’, peace agreements too often do not address the root causes of conflict or consider the long-term peacebuilding and development issues needed to sustain the peace. They often focus on provisions for democratisation and economic reforms, which can complicate and protract negotiations. The UN secretary-general’s 2009 report on mediation lays a path for shifting practice. It asserts that resolution of all major issues and grievances that led to initial tensions must be addressed, focusing on the root causes and establishing institutions to deal with them over time.1 There will also be a need to monitor and assess these evolutions in peace agreements, and their results, to discern and promote ever-better practices.

In ‘Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation’, Susan Woodward, like Suhrke and her colleagues, underlines the importance of financial resources in implementing peace agreements and points out the political dynamics that emerge with donor financing. Most post-conflict governments do not have the revenue necessary for reconstruction, creating unbalanced power dynamics with donors whose aid they need. Woodward states the need for attending to the following economic tasks when implementing peace agreements: funding for specific commitments in the agreement; establishing economic foundations to sustain peace over the long term; and generating sufficiently rapid economic revival so people buy into the peace process. ‘Financing the peace’, must therefore go beyond return and reintegration issues and towards ensuring that a stable government is in place. Getting people back to work and transforming former warring factions into political parties capable of governing are key, as is rebuilding vital physical infrastructure. Woodward suggests that support for salaries is needed so that people can actually get back to work. In practice, however, the notion of salary ‘top ups’ can be highly controversial with donors because they fear this undermines the development of liberal norms and practices.

Questions of who should pay for peace, and the processes and mechanisms through which finances are mobilised and allocated, present challenges with which post-conflict governments are exceedingly familiar. James Boyce and Madalene O'Donnell, in ‘Policy Implications: The Economics of Postwar Statebuilding’, emphasise that violence and insecurity impede efforts to collect and expend public resources. The willingness of the public to pay taxes is dependent upon a trust in government that is often severely challenged in post-war contexts. They argue that sound public financing is central to peacebuilding and point to four ways in which the international community can support government efforts to mobilise domestic revenue: by providing technical assistance, linking some aid to progress in domestic revenue performance, helping curb extra-legal revenue extractions, and reducing tax exemption on post-war aid.

These issues point back to questions surrounding the amount of aid that is appropriate and useful in contexts where governments are trying to recover economically and build peace. Boyce and O'Donnell argue that too much aid can create unrealistic expectations and budget commitments as well as weaken a government's resource-mobilisation capacity, which they call 'crowding-out'. They suggest that external resource caps could help with this, and international aid could be better allocated if consideration is given to performance indicators. They caution against the unwitting tendency of post-conflict aid to create a dual public sector— that is, one funded and managed by government and another by donors. Aid should have as its ultimate goal the building of institutions to effectively manage resources without donor assistance. Debt relief, in particular odious debt, is another critical resource-mobilisation issue central to the discussion. The authors recommend the creation of an international body to review illegal or odious debts in post-conflict countries.

Despite the importance of economic recovery strategies to address the particular needs of post-conflict settings, the literature in this area is surprisingly sparse; the history of international attention to the issue has been one of default in favour of the same economic liberalisation strategies pursued in traditional development contexts, even as the success of these strategies remains questionable. Woodward, in examining the economic strategy behind peace agreements, notes the adoption of policies originally devised for other purposes rather than designed to specifically address ending civil wars. She criticises the lead role the international financial institutions play in creating macroeconomic policies for governments lacking implementation capacity, conditionality policies, and ineffective or harmful debt relief programmes. Despite the shift in thinking from divided relief and development strategies to a more integrated approach, Woodward argues that most donor agencies retain the orthodox split between relief (the natural disaster model) and development (the reconstruction model).

The notion of economic recovery as a specific effort to address the gap that has historically existed between humanitarian relief and development efforts has gained ground over the last couple of years. Economic recovery is increasingly understood as a strategy to restore the capacity of government and communities to rebuild and economically recover from war and other crises. As highlighted in the United Nations Development Programmes’ (UNDP) Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, this should be done in new and transformative ways that can facilitate the consolidation of peace, rather than restoring pre-war economic and institutional arrangements. A new political economy dispensation must be created. Economic recovery efforts should catalyst sustainable development activities, as they build upon and maximise the utility of humanitarian efforts. A comprehensive literature, policy, and practice review linking recovery and peacebuilding can also be found on the Peacebuilding Initiative's Web site.²

The UNDP report focuses on three vital pillars of economic recovery: indigenous drivers; macroeconomic policies to support economic recovery; and the role of the state. Economic recovery, it argues, is most sustainable and successful when strategies are developed through locally owned processes, specifically 'indigenous drivers'—that is, the efforts of individuals, households, and communities within their socio-historical contexts. Local actors have the most motivation for building a strong economic base for their livelihoods. On the macroeconomic side, policies that can support recovery in tough post-conflict economic environments are needed. These include managing inflation, administering external aid effectively and efficiently, building an investment climate attractive to the private sector, and achieving fiscal autonomy and steady economic growth. After war, the state's recovery and rehabilitation must be viewed as a top priority for peace consolidation, with specific measures aimed at restoring effective government control over public finances, reconstituting mechanisms for oversight and accountability, re-creating a professional public administration, and rebuilding representative and inclusive political mechanisms and institutions.

Spotlighting poverty and inequality in the recovery process, Tony Addison's introduction to From Conflict to Recovery in Africa argues for a broad-based approach 'that improves the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people, especially the poor'. He notes that conflict creates uncertainty in communities and the private sector—that is, distrust in the economy's ability to support them—that results in short-term thinking and an undermining of the state's capacity. Post-conflict development policies, therefore, must focus on long-term investment and decrease uncertainty. Addison argues that state building (or 'institutionalisation' as discussed elsewhere in the volume) should not be undertaken per se before economic reforms; changing economic policies that often favour a narrow elite (and are causes of conflict and grievance) are central to achieving broad-based recovery. This argument assumes, however, that economic policies will be aimed at redistributing resources towards greater equity and addressing grievance, a practice hard to find.

All the readings in this chapter emphasise the linkage of economic recovery with sustained peace. They are concerned with issues of grievance in conflict and post-conflict settings, more often than not rooted in severe structural imbalances of a 'horizontal' nature—that is, between identity groups—in society. Ensuring that causes of conflict, such as grievances around economic inequity, and building-state capacity to mobilise and allocate its resources effectively for peace remain critical challenges in need of further attention by Africa scholars.
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

Susan Woodward


No international or local action in support of peace can occur without a budget or donor to tap. The organization of peace implementation requires financial resources. What donors are willing to fund will heavily influence the actual strategy of implementation, often more than the peace agreement itself. In addition, war is physically as well as psychologically and socially destructive. The first steps taken by people themselves toward peace are physical repair and reconstruction as they struggle to put their lives back together and reorient to peaceful pursuits. The best indicator of success in the first stages of implementation will in fact be the level of such activity, which is a calculated risk that will not be taken if the environment has not begun to change in the direction of greater physical and psychological security.

These economic aspects of peace agreements and their implementation are obvious. But to move from the obvious to hard conclusions about the role of economic factors in the success of implementation and to policy recommendations supported by evidence from actual cases is very difficult. This is surprising, given the substantial and growing attention during the 1990s by scholars, specialized research institutes, and international organizations such as the World Bank and UN agencies to the causes of state failure and civil war, to the characteristics of war-torn societies, and to policies for postconflict reconstruction. By 1999, such attention had even provoked substantial policy initiatives and new mechanisms at the international financial institutions (IFIs), the UN, and many bilateral development agencies. Nonetheless, there has been no systematic analysis of the contribution of economic factors to the success or failure in the implementation of peace agreements.

One explanation may be that the economic aspects of peace agreements and the staging of their implementation tend to take a backseat to security concerns. Two case studies for this project conclude that peace agreements are only achieved at the cost of ignoring the economic disputes (often identified as “root causes”) that led to war. Mounting evidence of the longer-term economic trajectories of postconflict cases shows that countries that have experienced a civil war never fully recover to the economic level they had before war began. Their growth paths also remain lower economically than comparable countries that did not have a civil war. But both of these findings suffer the same temporal problem in judging the role of economic factors in successful implementation; the outcomes of economic assistance are often not known for quite some time. Moreover, economic conditions usually worsen after the civil war ends. And while armed hostilities may cease, growing economic inequalities and hardship can fuel increased violence from crime or social crises after the peace agreement, thus substantially complicating the tasks of building peace and stable government. These outcomes have tended to be judged as regrettable but inevitable rather than as a matter of policy choice.

Peace agreements, as a rule, do not address economic reconstruction and development. Economic objectives are often included in a list of concerns, but with little and vague discussion, particularly when compared with the attention given to security and justice. There are a few partial exceptions—Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique, as well as the Oslo Accords for Palestine—that addressed economic concerns directly. In Guatemala and Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of the IFIs were present at the peace negotiations and had some influence over the outcome. But far more common is the example of Cambodia, where the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority there (UNTAC) was “limited to rehabilitation” and where assessments rated economic reconstruction as “one of the least effective aspects,” involving “exceptionally poor planning and administrative confusion.” An explicit mandate to a reconstruction agency is rarely included in peace agreements.
There is somewhat greater knowledge about the economic role of outsiders in peace implementation. Widespread consensus exists that economic resources do matter to success. The surest way to failure, as illustrated by the failures in Angola and Rwanda, the mixed results in Cambodia, and even by certain important aspects of the otherwise successful case of El Salvador, is not to provide sufficient external resources in support of a peace agreement. But even more influential than the level of resources available is the kind of resources provided. External assistance can be “redundant, harmful, or squandered.”

A repeated theme of postconflict reconstruction assessments is the stark contrast between what is known to be needed in the first years after war and what is currently funded and done. A summary of the role of Bretton Woods institutions in peacebuilding written in 2000 concludes: “IFI efficacy cannot make a peace process, but IFI inefficacy can break one.”

Another reason for the lack of analysis may lie in the nature of the policy response to such findings and criticism, which has tended to focus on operational aspects, particularly efforts to improve the delivery of aid—for example, faster, more efficiently, with greater flexibility and transparency, better coordination among donors, or more targeted conditionality. Some of these refinements in the technology of aid appear to improve chances of success. But one would not know from the actual measures of that success because these measures are also technical—such as performance criteria for the delivery of money or the completion of economic projects and programs. These technical measures do not assess the contribution of aid to the implementation of the peace agreement or its political goals.

Finally, one might be able to deduce conclusions from recent efforts by the IFIs to learn lessons from experience or to concede to criticism coming from other donors in regard to the substance of economic policy and strategy. But the result has been shifts in policy emphasis from one fad to another, for example, from macroeconomic stabilization to good governance to social capital. These shifts confound the task of analysis and assessment further. They also reveal the absence of agreement on appropriate economic strategy specifically addressed to the tasks of implementing peace agreements and the first years after war.

**The Economic Needs and Priorities of Peace Implementation**

There are three sets of economic tasks necessary to implement a peace agreement: sufficiently rapid economic revival to buy confidence in the peace process; funding to implement specific commitments in the peace agreement; and the economic foundations necessary to sustain peace over the long term.

**Reviving the Economy**

The first, immediate economic tasks are both straightforward and inexpensive, although their funding is often quite difficult to secure. The provision of services such as garbage collection, sewage, electricity, power plants, and sufficient, clean water are not only basic to health but also the best way to build confidence in government, that elusive ingredient called “social capital” that is considered essential to a successful transition and collective action of any kind. Such services may only require repair of existing facilities, but they may require entirely new construction.

Because these simple economic necessities are obvious, their political role in the success of a peace agreement—and thus the significance of funds for their provision—can easily be overlooked. Peace agreements are commitments signed by leaders, but the population must also be persuaded to make a commitment to peace. Some signal that there will be a “peace dividend”—that the benefits will outweigh the costs—must be palpable for people to make even the minimal investment in rebuilding their lives and supporting politically those promoting peace.
In the words of Christine Wallich, 1995–1997 director of the World Bank's five-year program for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and recovery in Bosnia, “an accepted prior of all peace agreements” is an early peace dividend and quick transition to earned incomes that provide “relief from the cruelty of the environment and a clear signal from the international community that they stand to support them and the agreement.” Such apparent consensus, however, has not translated into early assistance and aid policy as often as its acceptance would lead one to expect.

In addition to speed, this dividend must be equitable. Reviving the inequalities that caused or fueled civil war, or creating new ones, will create divisions that can be easily mobilized by populist rhetoric from politicians who are dissatisfied with the terms of the peace or its actual results. Distributional differences are inevitable, such as between areas with greater or less war damage or the needs of urban and rural populations. But if these differences are perceived as unjust, there will be at least fuel for spoilers and for delays in demobilization.

Moreover, if equal access to basic services including education and healthcare and explicit attention to land redistribution are not addressed in the first stage of peace, macroeconomic policies aimed at currency stabilization and at domestic and foreign investment in growth will institutionalize the inequalities produced by wartime and likely worsen their effects. The political task of achieving greater equity later will be very difficult. Success in implementation will depend on a transformation in methods of political conflict and competition, from the threat and use of violence to those for nonviolence. Generalized poverty is less threatening to such practices than are sharp inequalities.

A contemporary vogue to view civil wars in the Cold War period as based on class conflict and those since the Cold War as wars of identity and ethnicity may have wrongly diverted attention away from economic inequality. Even if there were any truth in this tendency to essentialize identity and ethnicity, the end of a civil war requires warring factions of different identities to create a single state—not only to accept a new balance of political power but also for some to abandon hopes of independence. The ability in such cases to create one constituted state, whether through majoritarian or proportional rules, depends even more on avoiding the emergence of economic inequalities that can be interpreted as discriminatory on cultural grounds (religion, language, lineage).

The concept of security must also change from that required in wartime to the expectations of law and order and broader human security. While most peacebuilding missions give priority early on to demobilization and reducing the capacity to make war and may even include monitors on human rights, they tend to neglect the institutions that must fill the security vacuum that arises—law enforcement and assistance to organizations that can bargain with authorities over human rights protection or wages and prices. Yet, overall crime rates tend to rise in the first years after war and threats to individual lives may actually be greater than during the war. Peacekeeping missions now recognize increasingly that law enforcement cannot be delayed until the separation of forces and their cantonment or demobilization are complete, but funding sources have not caught up. Moreover, as one practitioner with leading positions in many UN peace-implementing missions has emphasized, the primary focus of the average citizen in the first year is on everyday concerns for material survival, such as jobs, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, which are perceived fundamentally as a matter of security.

Financing the Peace

The second set of tasks are specific commitments made in the peace agreement that simply will not be met if they are not funded and organized. Most prominent in studies of peace implementation are the demobilization of wartime armies and the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return home. Return requires substantial resources for housing, transport, and some minimal welfare. Although spontaneous return is the most common experience, the more important the role of return is to achieving the polit-
ical goals of the peace, such as the attempt to reverse ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the more that external resources will be necessary to success. And where spontaneous return depends on remittances sent by relatives living abroad, such in El Salvador, there will be a cost in the return of those who sent remittances. Even more necessary to success in implementation is funding for the demobilization of armed groups. As Joanna Spear points out in Chapter 6, without monies and programs for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civilian society, demobilization will fail.

Although a stable government is rarely a specific element of a peace agreement, there will be no peace without it. The construction of a new government, or an entire governmental system, requires salaries for civil servants and perhaps also training, particularly, as Terrence Lyons suggests in Chapter 8, if the goal is to transform former warring factions into political parties capable of governing. Physical reconstruction of infrastructure—power plants, schools, health clinics—makes no sense without monies to pay the salaries of the people who run them, but many donors have rules against paying local wages and salaries. Elections figure prominently in most third-party engagements in peace implementation. The creation of a voter register, preparation of electoral rules and regulations and their enforcement, and the mounting of information campaigns cost substantial monies. Third-party mediators increasingly urge the adoption of a power-sharing agreement among the parties as an inclusionary political formula to end the war, but such arrangements also presume public expenditures.

Sovereignty depends not only on international recognition and a functioning government but also on relations with the rest of the world. Embassies and ambassadorships need to be funded. Even more problematic and urgent are relations with IFIs; without full membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), countries cannot receive World Bank, International Development Association (IDA), or International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) loans, borrow in international capital markets, or join trade associations. For membership, a country must first settle its debt arrears.

Sustaining the Peace

The third set of tasks arise[s] because initial success in implementing a peace agreement cannot be sustained unless the bases of a functioning government and economic growth are also put in place. Both political and economic institutions must be built. Years of war will have created a genuine need for economic development, if this had not already been the case. Transforming a war economy will require legalization of property rights and the elimination of trafficking routes that provided arms, ammunition, and financing for the war, and the creation of judicial systems to protect contracts and property rights. It is likely also to require a total reorientation of a production structure and economic policy that was based on defense to civilian industries and export production. While the literature on civil war emphasizes human reintegration, the reintegration of the country in physical, economic, and administrative terms will also be necessary.

Sustainability means both a continuation of peace and an increasing capacity to survive without external assistance, or at least to reach a level of economic independence in which foreign loans and credits can be serviced effectively and domestic revenues are sufficient to keep the budget deficit at a manageable level. In the short run, sustainability requires generating popular confidence that the hardships will be only temporary.

Strategy

Until the second half of the 1990s, donors responded to these economic tasks and their financing with long-established programmatic approaches developed for other circumstances. The tasks were divided into two categories: relief and development. Relief was provided on humanitarian principles by humanitarian organizations or emergency response divisions of development agencies. Development was provided by development agencies, both bilateral and multilateral. The increasing number of cases of third-party-assisted
implementation of peace agreements during the 1990s, and the growth of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions, however, led to a recognition that there was a gap between these two types of assistance. Very specific lessons drawn from the mounting number of cases seemed to demonstrate that quite different policies were needed for the immediate transition that were neither relief nor development. The result was to reconceptualize the division between relief and development as a continuum and the stages in that continuum in terms of transitions and postconflict reconstruction.

Nevertheless, by the year 2000, only one government, Germany, had taken this lesson on board in terms of budget lines; all others perpetuated the inherited approaches and distinctions between relief and development through separate budget lines. Some governments did create new sections, such as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or the addition of the word “conflict” to the humanitarian affairs department (CHAD) of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Canada established a Peace-Building Fund, and similar special budgetary lines for policy coordination under these circumstances were introduced by Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. But the distinction between relief and development and the resulting bureaucratic stovepipes remains the dominant influence over funding and field operations.

These two aid strategies, relief and development, are based on different economic models: the natural disaster model of crisis relief, and the post-war stabilization and reconstruction model for development.

The Natural Disaster Model

The natural disaster model provides the conceptual framework for most postagreement assistance in the first year or two, as it does for most humanitarian assistance and emergency relief during wartime. Organized by crisis-response divisions of bilateral development agencies and implemented by international NGOs, its principles are rapid response and the use of local labor. Its aims are to provide an immediate, visible peace-dividend in food, shelter, and basic utilities until longer-term developmental projects can be implemented, and to move the population as rapidly as possible toward self-sufficiency and away from aid dependence. The goal of buying commitment to peace overrides economic objectives, for small repair tasks do not by themselves generate jobs or local economic activity, except in the rare cases where the international mission decides to favor local produce and purchase locally produced materials. Its political aspects are similarly narrow.

The connection between this approach and wartime relief is largely organizational. Agencies that have the budgetary authority to act quickly, taking aid decisions within hours or days, dispersing monies and matériel quickly, without cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, are the emergency response and disaster relief agencies that deploy under both circumstances.

Adaptation to the special conditions of a peace implementation mission did introduce another organization—civil affairs or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officers within military units of the peacekeeping troops—into the early delivery of aid. An innovation of the UK’s Overseas Development Agency (ODA, predecessor of the DFID), first in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1996, and now widely copied by other countries and the European Union (EU), CIMIC aimed to improve cooperation in emergency circumstances between development agencies and military forces—two organizations that represent two cultures and conscious distancing. Impressed by the importance of showing immediate, visible progress and by the fact that the first representatives of the international community to deploy in large numbers are military forces, officials at the ODA decided to develop a program of microreconstruction projects that soldiers would identify with the help of local communities and then supply. In turn, confidence would be built between the peacekeeping troops and the local population.16
Organizationally equipped to respond rapidly and often directly knowledgeable about the local conditions and the immediate needs of the population, humanitarian workers and the military nonetheless have a short-term approach, which they tend to continue beyond the initial stages of peace implementation because they gain a vested interest in the program's continuation. World Bank staff argue that this is a general problem, that "in the transition from relief to development, too much time has been spend in the relief phase." The debate over how fast one should move from emergency relief to development, however, often obscures the fact that development strategy for postconflict reconstruction has also been based on the same assumptions. The World Bank, the dominant force globally in defining postconflict reconstruction strategy, acknowledges in its 1998 review of Bank experience in postconflict reconstruction that the model underlying that strategy from its origins in the 1970s and 1980s to 1998 was also that of recovery from natural disasters.

**Postwar Stabilization and Reconstruction Model**

The postwar stabilization and reconstruction model is a neoliberal economic strategy emanating from the IFIs, particularly the IMF. The IMF determines the conditions for foreign confidence in a country's economic prospects and places priority on macroeconomic stability, both as the first task of economic policy and as the context within which all other aid and policy takes place. Its stabilization model has been criticized frequently for being in conflict with the goals of social peace and reconciliation. The tension has organizational and strategic aspects as well, between representatives of the IFIs and their role in financing reconstruction, on the one hand, and the representatives of the peace mission (most often the UN) and its mandate to implement the peace agreement, on the other.

As a postwar model, this strategy emerged in response to the particular needs of Western Europe after World War II, when short-term balance-of-payments constraints on foreign trade threatened the import needs of postwar reconstruction and the revival that depended on it. The IMF response in 1947 to the British liquidity crisis evolved over the next decades into a development strategy based on neoliberal principles of economic growth and free trade. The Articles of Agreement of the World Bank include the express purposes of "the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war" and "the reconstruction, on the one hand, and the representatives of the peace mission (most often the UN) and its mandate to implement the peace agreement, on the other.

The two-pronged strategy of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment begins with an IMF conditionality program and credits drawn on a country's special drawing rights (SDRs) at the IMF in support of stabilization based on orthodox deflationary principles of monetary and fiscal restraint. It is followed by sovereign loans mobilized from donors by the World Bank in support of Bank-designed projects for large-scale physical infrastructure and for reform of economic institutions and policies to effect liberalization and privatization that are said to promote economic growth and attract foreign investment.

**Barriers to Effective Economic Support of Peace Implementation**

**Sequencing**

Although there is internal coherence to these economic models and the strategies based on them, their application to contemporary postconflict settings creates a series of practical problems. Current practice is to treat this as a matter of tactics and, in particular, a question of sequencing. The parallel is strong with the debates in the 1990s over the sequencing of market transitions in postcommunist countries between advocates of shock therapy, who insisted on rapid stabilization, price liberalization, and privatization, and the gradualists, whose local expertise led them to emphasize the institutional and human infrastructure necessary for the expected supply response. Evidence from the successful postsocialist transitions and the developmental failures in Africa reinforce this challenge.
Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa

First, the alleged success of the orthodox model in post–World War II Europe occurred in dramatically different conditions than current cases of peace implementation. Post–World War II Western Europe faced the tasks of physical reconstruction and demobilization after an interstate war, in countries that were victors, and whose governmental and economic institutions were intact. Their tasks were not those of state-building, nation-building, and reconciliation after a civil war, integration of former enemies into one army and one society, overcoming underdevelopment, and the implementation of a peace agreement. Moreover, the characteristics of a war economy then were entirely different than the war economies created by civil war in poorer countries now. Priority on macroeconomic stabilization assumes, for example, that the economy is fully monetized when barter, informal economies, and illegal trafficking actually predominate. In contrast to mass mobilization for wartime production, the war economies that must be transformed to peacetime economies in contemporary cases of civil war are not emergency adjustments to otherwise normal economy but an entire transformation of social and political institutions. The role of women is critical in return, reconciliation, and the reestablishment of households, but “the Bank [not to speak of the IMF] has done little to incorporate gender issues in its post-conflict portfolio.”

Moreover, the neoliberal orthodoxy of IFI policy and practice in the 1990s even ignores crucial lessons of the post–World War II experience, particularly “the role that, historically, social policy has played in the development of western European economies.” Although “strong institutions that deliver public policy, the rule of law, and sustain open societies are fundamental to the functioning of a modern economy . . . they have been consistently underestimated by market fundamentalists.” This tendency has been powerfully reinforced by the “exclusionary clause” and the “doctrine of economic neutrality” of the charters of both the IMF and the World Bank, which, according to interpretations dominant in the legal offices of the organizations, explicitly prevent them from being involved in anything political, including funding for explicit peacemaking functions.

In postconflict conditions, there are several deleterious consequences. Privatization before business infrastructure exists makes no sense, while privatization of economic assets before the transfer of power from armies to accountable civilian governments and successful legal control over criminal networks will seriously delay—if not prevent—the political goals of the peace agreement. The method of privatization also has political consequences and should be subject to political as well as economic criteria if it is to contribute to successful implementation. Only belatedly have the IFIs begun to recognize that rapid privatization may be counterproductive to peace in many instances.

Likewise, IFI policies of macroeconomic restraint prevent the public expenditures that are essential to peace, such as building a new, competent civilian administration, financing demobilization, and providing social infrastructure such as healthcare and schools. Although in this aspect the IMF and the World Bank are frequently in conflict in their loan criteria and proposals, as manifested in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Macedonia, the World Bank tends to pull back, deferring to IMF targets on budget deficits despite their negative political effects. In its 1998 evaluation, for example, the Bank admitted that “the Cambodia case study finds that the Bank has continued to push for downsizing the civil service when the political coalition arrangement under the peace accords was based in part on raising the size of the civil service to absorb large numbers of the incoming parties’ functionaries. The Bank’s position was not politically realistic from the outset.” Orthodox stabilization policies also tend to increase and exacerbate economic inequalities, certainly in the short run, and tend to create more unemployment, when achieving...
the reverse is essential. Tight monetary policy inhibits cheap credit for the promotion of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs), even though their critical importance early on in the peace process is now widely acknowledged even by World Bank staff. Privatization and the promotion of agricultural exports work directly counter to the crucial task of land reform and redistribution and of poverty reduction.

IFI Rigidities

As mentioned above, the ability of IFIs to design and implement effective economic assistance to peace implementation has been hamstrung by strict interpretations of the charters of the IMF and the World Bank, which prevent funding for explicitly political tasks like peacemaking. By charter, too, the IMF and the World Bank deal only with sovereign lending, that is, they work only with recognized governments and are bound to respect their sovereignty. Although this is also true of the UN agencies, they are less constrained than the IFIs. For example, where there is no government (as in Somalia), where a government exists but is not a member of the IMF (as was true for a time of Bosnia-Herzegovina), where relations with the IMF have been suspended because of default (as in Liberia), or where circumstances such as these prevail, as is likely in many immediate postwar settings, the IFIs cannot act at all or cannot remain engaged once they have spent their small grant monies. If a peace agreement applies only to a region of the country (as in Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, and Kosovo in Serbia), then the fact that the IFI can only work through the recognized government may actually provide the means for that government to undermine the peace agreement. Indeed, this is precisely what the Croatian government attempted to do with the Erdut Agreement, an obstructionism that became an “open sore” for the mission of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES).

Coordination

Decisions on sequencing and priorities are also the source of conflicts in the field operation among organizations and approaches to peacebuilding. As Bruce Jones observes in Chapter 4, such obstacles to strategic coordination are more often than not resolved by pluralism—donors are left to pursue different approaches in different parts of the same country. Although this practical solution may reduce obstacles to the flow of aid, it introduces inconsistencies and potential political problems into the implementation strategy. In Mozambique, for example, some regions continued to receive food aid free while people in another region were required to pay, a disparity that can actually slow the peace process. Similarly, bilateral donors and UN agencies tend to leave leadership on macroeconomic stabilization and policy reform to the IFIs, while designing and financing development projects, either as donors to a World Bank program or as independent actors, along sectoral lines within that framework. They do not use their disagreements to propose an alternative strategy. Meanwhile, sectoral coverage can be hit-or-miss and lead to wasteful duplication. The “let a hundred flowers bloom” approach of these other agencies and donors does not mean that they support the IFI approach. In fact, the IFI approach generates much criticism. The problem, as Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo made abundantly clear in their seminal study, is that the economic approach and decisions of the IFIs, particularly the IMF, and the political tasks of implementing a peace mission are often directly in conflict.

Although the World Bank acknowledges that it has paid insufficient attention to sequencing and coordination in postconflict countries, this has not influenced the package of economic reforms that make up its advice and loans, or its conviction that these reforms should take place as early as possible so as to attract foreign investment. Perhaps the best evidence that these approaches to peacebuilding are inadequate was the acknowledgment by donors, particularly the World Bank, that their involvement in postconflict missions is ad hoc and in need of a framework. In 1996 the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the Bank was tasked to review its involvement in postconflict cases (18 countries with 157 Bank-supported operations representing $6.2 billion in lending at the time) and to draw lessons for future policy. Its findings, based on three field
studies (Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Uganda) and six desk studies (Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka), emphasized the key importance of speed and flexibility. Yet its recommendations suggest these two criteria are in conflict. While emphasizing speed, including more flexible and simplified procurement procedures to reduce delivery delays, the study urges greater flexibility on pace to be more sensitive to the social and political context. Sequencing of policy reforms had to be sensitive to the fact that in the early transition from war to peace, governments are fragile and unstable, and can rarely push rapidly on economic reforms. "Bank and Fund insistence on rapid increase in tax effort (ratio of tax revenues to GDP) may well have been counterproductive, constraining growth of the economy and the size of the tax base." Similarly with regard to tax policy in the cases of Guatemala and Uganda, "the Uganda case study finds that owing to a history of predatory government tax policy during the conflict periods, pressure by the Fund and Bank on tax effort (often included in a standard stabilization package) has had a chilling effect on private investment, driving economic activity into subsistence, or along with investable funds, abroad." Rapid privatization may make the "prospects for sustained, equitable development" worse. And many elements of conventional developmental wisdom, such as a focus on primary education and healthcare, may be incorrect for these circumstances when the effects of war may make secondary and tertiary education and hospitals far more urgent.

Nonetheless, these assessments evaluate the success in implementing specific donor projects, not their contribution to the overall implementation of the peace agreement or to sustaining the peace. Indeed, the three main recommendations in this World Bank study focus not on altering its approach but on increasing the role of the Bank's expertise in the peace process: first, that the Bank should encourage invitations to participate in the peace negotiations itself, to advise on the economic implications of particular choices; second, that it should act to coordinate donors and assistance programs in each case because external aid coordination is more important where a government has been weakened by war; and third, that unusually large, resident World Bank missions should be established to gain the flexibility and sensitivity possible from decentralized operations.

Similarly, the World Bank and the IMF have taken on board the recommendations made by de Soto and del Castillo in 1994: to be more transparent in their interactions with noneconomic peacebuilding actors and agencies through the systematic and regular exchange of information; to accept the need for coordination in the field; and to be flexible in their conditionality when it appears directly contrary to immediate peacebuilding goals. But this has meant that the World Bank seeks, with IMF agreement, to become the lead agency on reconstruction and development in the mission. Special funds for demobilization, de-mining, budgetary and recurrent expenditures (the Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip), a political risk guarantee facility (developed for Bosnia-Herzegovina), "peace technology," and postconflict projects have all been created in the late 1990s, but within the context of Bank programs and relatively "rich" cases (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine). Despite the negative lessons from El Salvador and Mozambique, for example, on the restraints on demobilization and reintegration imposed by IMF loan conditions on inflation, budget deficit, and credit targets, the IMF has not shown willingness to adjust loan criteria in the first crucial years so that peace goals can be financed.

Moreover, none of these changes amount to a strategy designed for the purpose of peacebuilding. As Jonathan Stevenson concludes after an analysis of the changes made between 1995 and 2000, "[The Bretton Woods institutions] have not critically explored the connection between structural adjustment and peace, have only circumspectly approached the sensitive issue of security-sector conditionality, and have not optimally synchronized structural adjustment and development strategies with political efforts aimed at consolidating fragile peace agreements following protracted periods of armed conflict."

Who Pays for Peace?

There is an underlying disequilibrium in the political economy of the first postwar years: a huge gap between popular expectations and peace requirements, on the one hand, and...
government revenues and fiscal capacity, on the other. Initial repair and political tasks are not particularly expensive relative to later capital investments, but the demand on public expenditures is huge in relation to the low capacity of new governments to extract resources from the population and of civil servants to use available resources efficiently. This problem of capacity is politically serious because of the central focus of external third parties on the signatories to the peace agreement and their commitment to implement it. An increasing emphasis on early elections as a major component of the peace process, aimed at increasing leaders' accountability for implementation, makes the political implications even more immediate and consequential. Instead, the insecurities of the first stage of peace implementation encourage politicians to seek votes on populist grounds, promising improved welfare or less onerous policies.

Therefore the critical question of economic strategy and policies, as de Soto and del Castillo posed it in 1994, is: Who pays for peace? The choices of policy and sequencing of tasks will be hostage to the source and availability of funds. If external resources are to fill part of the gap between inevitably insufficient local resources and the immediate needs of peace, early negotiations with the IMF and its stamp of approval are necessary. As the World Bank assessment in 1998 emphasized: the comparative advantage of the Bank and the Fund is in establishing a "sound macroeconomic framework," and they should take the lead on macroeconomic and external debt issues. Their comparative advantage on these issues does not, however, guarantee that the IFIs will accept that responsibility.

The World Bank nearly always takes the lead in designing a program for economic recovery. Bank officials are inclined to insist that it is better suited to do a needs assessment than any other agency. Bilateral donors also tend to defer to the Bank's sheer technical capacity for all aspects of a financial project. In addition, the World Bank Group has a special lending instrument for poorer countries—its IDA window—that is of particular use for most countries emerging from war. The very size of World Bank funds and reconstruction programs tends, in turn, to give it dominant influence in the field mission over the economic program chosen for peace implementation.

There are also reasons of international power why the IMF and the World Bank are likely to be the dominant shapers of economic strategy and sequencing. The U.S. Treasury Department consistently argues successfully for IMF leadership because of its policy of conditionality and its capacity to use conditionality in obtaining reform. Because the World Bank, in turn, does not operate on budgetary assessments of its member states, major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States lobby as well, and usually successfully, for World Bank leadership so that they do not have to pay additional budgetary assessments. Like most countries, they prefer to use their monies for visible bilateral aid projects for which they can claim direct credit and show taxpayers at home what they are doing.

As banks, the IFIs take account of exposure to risk and the political will to reform in their decisions to become involved and lend. Unless there is strong political pressure from a major member of the executive board of the IMF or the World Bank, the IFIs will be reluctant to support what appears to be a risky peace. This, in turn, can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies about the success of aid. The minimal amounts of aid in support of the peace agreement itself that flowed into Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola can be explained by initial assessments that the prospects for sustainability and reform were low. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the World Bank sought to reduce this problem by developing a new financial instrument, the political risk guarantee facility, but this is aimed at attracting private investors, not at easing IFIs' reluctance to engage.

Even where the IFIs choose to act, this caution often leads to very significant and harmful delays in financing. When they do act, it is often because the country has already been engaged in negotiations or has actual loan programs with the IMF and the Bank that preceded or accompanied the war. Although these programs are unrelated to the peace negotiations and the tasks of peacebuilding, their legacy imposes a burden on postwar
policy formation on both sides. For the IFIs, there appears to be an inclination to restore their reputation against those who would identify connections between their policies and the outbreak of conflict. Unfortunately, it is also not so easy bureaucratically to refashion the content of ongoing or stalled programs to the new demands of peace. For the government, the burden can be a psychological wariness based on hard experience with IFI programs in the past. This can dilute the prime political advantage claimed by the IFIs in imposing harsh conditions, that governments can more easily withstand public criticism and focus on reconciliation and social peace if they can blame inescapable budgetary stringency and austerity on the IMF.

Furthermore, an IMF program depends on a willing bilateral donor or group of donors. The problem of debt must be addressed. If new borrowing is not to be used simply to settle past debts, but is to go toward rebuilding, then a patron willing to risk an early commitment to the success of the peace must be found (such as the Netherlands did for Bosnia-Herzegovina). But this is not easy. In addition, if monetary stability is to be achieved without at the same time restricting public expenditures essential to peace implementation, then monies must also be found from a donor willing to finance a higher budget deficit level than the IMF would otherwise allow. These additional funds are also critical because donors tend to follow closely the terms of the IMF agreement in their own lending policies, despite their freedom to do otherwise and their frequent criticism of IMF conditionality. The result is a culture of conditionality toward a particular country, in some instances inflexible, while in others less so, that becomes fixed very early, influencing the long-term path of the peace process and its outcomes regardless of its detrimental effects.39

Despite the lesson that a too rapid pace of economic reform will be detrimental to a peace process, the sharp decline in official foreign aid during the 1990s and its replacement by foreign direct investment and commercial lending still appear to drive donor policy; major donors, led by the World Bank and the United States, place high priority on economic reforms aimed at attracting private foreign investors.

In conclusion, the relief-development "gap" actually represents the vacuum in financial mechanisms designed for peace implementation and the transition between emergency relief and long-term development. Relief occurs because humanitarian organizations and agencies of governments and international organizations exist to provide it. Long-term development also has its internationally institutionalized mechanisms for mobilizing resources and expertise. As Marika Fahlen wrote when she headed the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): “Unlike fund-raising for emergencies and annual pledges for long-term development, there is no specific resource mobilization mechanism for post-conflict recovery of a combined developmental and humanitarian nature. . . . The UNDP-led Round Tables are sometimes late in coming about and the World Bank-chaired Consultative Group meetings do not make much sense without a legitimate government in place.”40 As Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick demonstrate, there is no “international regime” for postconflict or peace implementation tasks; to the extent that resources flow, it is voluntary and ad-hoc.41 But the question remains: Will the power of the purse continue to drive strategy, or will there be a recognition first that “the tool kit international donors bring to post-conflict transitions was not designed for peace building”?42

Five Emerging Lessons

The experience of peace implementation says far more about economic reasons for failure or severely handicapped success than about economic aspects of success. The overall record points clearly to five emerging lessons: the need for broad-based impact assessments; the critical importance of an early emphasis on employment; the need for institution-building and public-sector strengthening; the political influence of sovereign lending on the peace process; and the economic distortions introduced by the international presence.
Measuring Impact

A search for evidence about the relative contribution of economic factors and assistance to the implementation of peace agreements reveals the limited character of most assessments. The overwhelming lesson is that these assessments rarely examine overall impact. The idea that success should be judged in terms of the political mission to establish sustainable peace tends to be lost in a world of symptomatic monitoring and a priori assumptions about the effects of a particular strategy, policy, or program.

Both in-house and independent evaluations perform audits of recordkeeping and financial transactions within the particular donor organization and its subcontractors, such as NGOs, and ascertain whether a particular aid project or program was implemented as planned. But “aid flows themselves tell us little about the impact of external assistance... performance is often evaluated according to success in transferring funds, rather than the appropriateness of the design of the aid— and its likely impact on recipient populations.”43 Similarly, “project-by-project assessments often do not provide the broader picture [and] delays as long as a year or more have reduced the usefulness of post-conflict completion reports.”44 For bilateral donors whose aid portfolio may be composed of a large number of small projects, often administered by autonomous NGOs, the problem of impact assessment is magnified many times.45

The World Bank evaluation of 1997–1998 recommends that post–conflict projects need a “process” rather than “blueprint” design,46 but process is far less amenable to standard evaluation techniques. A more serious problem is that donors have no reason to evaluate their impact on goals they never had in the first place, as the forthright Norwegian evaluation for the Mozambican case suggests: “Norwegian authorities gave little systematic attention to the links between supporting the peace process in the short run and sustaining the peace in the long run.”47

Because the effect of developmental assistance is intended to be long-term, there is also often little way to assess its positive contribution to the first years of a peace agreement. Short-term negative effects are excused as necessary for long-term sustainability on the basis of economic philosophy, not on the determinants of peacebuilding. Likewise, the longer-term effects of projects designed for the first years after war are also rarely assessed, with the consequence that the opportunity cost of wasted investments is not calculated. It is as if “quick impact projects” are never intended to have longer-term benefits. Vague benchmarks of progress substitute for analysis. The result in both cases is to provide little basis on which to propose mid-course adjustments in long-term programs or corrections to the method of planning and choosing immediate postwar projects and priorities.

It is even difficult to gain a clear sense of the total amount of aid provided, so as to evaluate aid’s contribution to the mission. In their pledges of assistance, many donors repackage funds previously committed or list amounts they are already contributing to their standing obligations so as to appear more generous than they are. Most peace missions have either no database of donors and projects or multiple databases, each with different assumptions and criteria for recording those data.48 The structure of much assistance, by which each donor insists on controlling its own accounts and projects and on channeling funds through a foreign intermediary, creates multiple budgetary systems that are difficult to capture in one snapshot. Even breakdowns of global flows that distinguish aid money that remains within the country from money to repay former debt (which does not remain within the country), or sums spent to facilitate refugee return that go to relieve the costs of their upkeep in host countries rather than cash and materials allocated to the communities of return, are hard to come by.

In 1999, the World Bank assigned to its Post-Conflict Unit the task of preparing quarterly monitoring reports on countries and regions affected by conflict, to a Post-Conflict Management Steering Group the task of reviewing these reports, to country desks the task of conducting Country Portfolio Performance Reviews every twelve months or less for post-
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conflict countries (instead of the normal twelve to eighteen months), and to the OED the task of developing guidelines “on how to apply evaluation criteria with greater sensitivity to the post-conflict political and economic environment when conducting completion reports.” Watching briefs are now required for every country emerging from conflict.\(^49\) It is too early to say whether these innovations will address the relationship between a peace process and economic assistance strategies of the IFIs. Social surveys now ordered by the Bank in post-conflict countries on a regular basis do not measure that relationship, while the emphasis on country-specific assessments, in place of a standardized system for monitoring and reporting impact, may work against drawing generalizable inferences on which new strategy and policies could be developed. One thing is clear: systematic monitoring and assessments of actual impact are sorely neglected, and without research designed to assess how aid contributes to peace, refinements of existing practice make little sense.

Employment: The Most Obvious but Most Neglected Lesson

A common problem for all cases of peace implementation is high unemployment that affects a large majority of the population in the first years after war. Lessons drawn about success or failure all point to the lack of employment opportunities. For example, the poor records on demobilization and reintegration into civilian life of soldiers and on the return of refugees and the internally displaced to their homes, both key aspects of all peace agreements, turn on the lack of jobs. Conversely, where partial success is claimed on demobilization, as in Mozambique, analysis points to specific funds designed for employment. High unemployment is a clear threat to peace, whether through disillusionment, lack of alternative activity and status to war, or the continued availability of the unemployed for mobilization by spoilers.

The critical role of active employment in redirecting behavior and commitments toward peace is so obvious that no one disputes its importance. Yet economic strategies are not aimed to overcome the problem. Neither the IMF approach to macroeconomic stabilization nor the World Bank emphasis on large-scale infrastructure promotes employment. Development assistance and advice are still focused on laying the basis for economic growth in the long run, and assume that employment will naturally follow. This is surprising in the case of the World Bank, which has long come to view SMEs as a core component of development, particularly to promote employment, and it would seem to be even more central in promoting peace. Only by 1999 did Bank officials draw this lesson from Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposing earlier and greater attention in a peace process to SMEs (for example, in revising their strategy for Kosovo, which was then in its first stages). At the same time, only twelve donors for Bosnia had committed funds for emergency projects designed to create jobs. But even here they were slow to deliver: only $146 million was committed (out of more than $5 billion) and only $116 million was actually disbursed, leading the Bank to conclude that the “primary obstacle” to reducing Bosnia’s “painfully high” unemployment was “lack of credit.”\(^50\)

Alternatively, the problem of employment may be the consequence not of policy but of sequencing. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, the reduction of resources to subsidize the army led to rapid cuts in pay and personnel, with the result that 8,000 newly unemployed soldiers defected to the guerrillas and the peace was lost. Arguably, had there been more coordination between the economic and political halves of the mission, such “mis-timing” might not have occurred. But if insistence on early cuts in public expenditures to establish macroeconomic stability always wins the day, and is not accompanied by explicit attention to alternative employment, it is difficult to see what benefit coordination would bring.

Equally costly is the reluctance—and downright refusal, for some donors—to finance core and recurrent budgets. This is costly because a peace agreement is, more than anything, about the transformation of wartime political structures or re-creation of government, the provision of public services, and a restoration of trust in public institutions. Government and other public institutions, however, need staff. Without monies to finance the salaries
of public officials, police, judges, teachers, doctors, and others who will actually restore basic public order, the most fundamental tasks will not occur. Initial reconstruction of schools and clinics is a waste if they remain empty for lack of recurrent costs for staffing and operation, a common experience. This donor reluctance goes beyond the generally recognized problem of the IFI’s priority in economic strategy on macroeconomic balance through cutting public expenditures and, therefore, public-sector employment.

Furthermore, donors to peace missions overwhelmingly favor technical assistance so as to avoid making political judgments in the sensitive early stages of peace implementation. Such assistance pays salaries to their own nationals to train and advise locals, which further reduces the possibilities for local employment. Donor preference for visible showcase projects also tends to neglect the employment aspect—that people are needed to make these projects operate, whether schools, hospitals, or factories. This requires monies for local salaries until there is local purchasing power sufficient to make World Bank cost-recovery policies actually work.

Finally, because people do have to find ways to survive, and relief is never sufficient for those who obtain it or fully comprehensive, the slow growth of paid employment also leaves many with little option but to turn to illegal or informal sources of earnings. The inevitable result is to create new problems—crime, patronage, and corruption—that undermine the rule of law and are particularly difficult to root out later. Informalization also slows monetization and other aspects of economic normalization, delaying the effectiveness of IFI policies, and reduces the state’s tax base further at exactly the moment when social trust and public confidence in government and the future are at a premium.

Institution-Building and Budgetary Support

Beyond demilitarization, a peace agreement must construct a new political order—government, a public sector and institutions, and public services. As many peace implementers attest, the primary lesson is “politics first.” By the late 1990s, based largely on the experience of market transitions in formerly communist or developmentalist states, major donors including the IFIs did begin to stress the importance of institutions and “good governance” to successful implementation of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. Recently, the World Bank has taken this aspect even further by emphasizing the importance of social trust to the creation and success of institutions.

The problem in the case of peace implementation is that macroeconomic stabilization is a result of certain monetary and fiscal policies and their effective implementation. That is, it cannot even begin, let alone become sustainable, if there is no government to adopt those policies or proper financial and legal institutions to make markets work and enforce contracts, property rights, and monetary and fiscal targets. Moreover, social capital is acquired. It is a response to functioning, trustworthy institutions, and a decline in social trust results from nonfunctioning or poorly functioning public institutions. Even the ability of a post-conflict country to use the aid monies and technical assistance provided—called its absorption capacity—depends on functioning institutions.

Similarly, a major step by the World Bank in 1998 in the direction of new strategy, its proposal to precede the preparation of a Country Assistance Strategy with a Transitional Support Strategy that would be prepared “as soon as resolution is in sight,” would require Bank staff to “collaborate with the government and other partners to prepare a national recovery program as an initial step toward a more comprehensive, full-scale reconstruction program.” The Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991 mandated that the Cambodians do just that, take the lead in determining their own recovery needs and formulating a national recovery plan. But its formulation had to await the formation of a postwar government, and delays in the latter meant delays in everything else.

Despite these lessons learned during the 1990s and what appears to be a new consensus, actual assistance strategies for economic development and peacebuilding continue to be based on the assumption that governments and economic institutions already exist—
at most, they may need reform, but not wholesale construction. While the IMF and the World Bank appear to be open to those who say that macroeconomic stability is important but not sufficient, they do not appear yet to have accepted that institutions must be built first, or at least simultaneously. The result is usually to place this power in the hands of interim bodies or simply individual officials. But the type of macroeconomic stabilization policy chosen is one of the most consequential decisions that a government can take, with huge political consequences for the quality and durability of the peace. Because of the political consequences, in fact, it is becoming increasingly common to rely on an IMF-managed currency board in the first years after the peace agreement, as was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so as to deprive local authorities of any policy discretion. This goes counter to the IMF’s own better judgment, the very narrow conditions in which currency boards are known to be effective, and the advice of most economists with an understanding of the political and social environment in which economies function.

The World Bank did move in 1996 to accept within its development mandate in post-conflict countries some tasks that it had previously considered “political” (and, by some interpretations, prohibited by its charter)—specifically, demining, demobilization and reintegration, public-expenditure realignment, and human and social capital. In its 1996–2000 Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP) to support the Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been the most innovative and well-endowed example of post-conflict engagement in the Bank’s history, it even classifies some projects as “peace implementation activities,” specifically those relating to the mass media, elections, human rights, and local security, including local police reform and a national border service. Nonetheless, by the end of 1998, after three years’ operation of the $5.1 billion PRRP, only $320 million had been pledged for these activities and only $217 million had been disbursed, amounting to about 8 percent of total disbursements of the PRRP. In 1999 the Bank’s assessment was that “institutional and policy reform has generally lagged behind physical reconstruction.” It is also in the Bosnia program where the importance of budgetary support for recurrent costs was first accepted. Nonetheless, even there, the Bank acknowledged that “emergency programs often failed to take into account the need for sufficient funding in recurrent costs.”

The importance to peace implementation of the development and maintenance of the public sector, both for critical institutional development and to give all parties a stake in reconciliation, is so great that some have proposed that all external aid be viewed as public-expenditure support. Rather than multiple, off-budget sources of reconstruction and capacity-building, the aim should be to strengthen the public sector. This would imply a major change in the way aid is delivered to peace processes. At the very least, others say, the focus should not be on how to control budgetary expenditures but on how to generate new budget revenues. The initial lack of institutions should be taken seriously in policy design as well, for example, to the kind of taxation that does not require sophisticated systems of collection and revenue management as are required for income taxes. Countries should be urged, argues Vito Tanzi of the IMF, to begin simply, say, with excise taxes, which are the easiest to raise, and not to add complexity until state agencies are able to manage that complexity.

Finally, the general absence of funding for key political tasks of peace implementation, such as police, judicial reform, civil administration, and democratization beyond elections, has been a particular grievance among the special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs). To a person, they argue that the most important innovation in peace-building practice would be to ensure a discretionary budget available to the SRSG to finance political goals as they arise. SRSG Aldo Ajello attributes his greatest successes in implementing the Mozambican peace agreement to the $17.5 million trust fund he managed to obtain and use to transform the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) from an army into a political party even though it allowed little discretion. According to Derek Boothby, deputy SRSG in UNTAES, implementing the Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Croatia, a true discretionary budget amounting to perhaps 2 percent of the total budget, would have made all the difference in what the mission could accomplish. The lesson may be getting through. Bilateral donors (particularly the UK’s DFID) did provide
a trust fund for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999, and the World Bank set one up for the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) the same year.

Assistance to Whom?

The distinction between political aspects of a peace mission and economic aspects is hardwired into thinking about peacebuilding and into analyses of the role that economic actors and assistance do and should play. In fact, the putatively economic actions of donors are highly political, with independent effects on implementation.

The most obvious effect is from decisions about whom to assist. While the idea that neutrality is a myth is gaining ground in the humanitarian community, economic assistance is still constrained either by the norm of sovereignty governing intervention or by the rules of sovereign lending that now dominate the international monetary system. Whether giving relief or loans, donors need sovereign partners. This has several consequences. Humanitarian organizations and bilateral donors empower local actors by their decision of whom to aid, whether the criterion is who appears most like a government or which political parties and leaders they want to support and strengthen politically. The IFIs must lend to governments, which will be held responsible for meeting loan conditions and eventually for repayment. But the search for sovereign partners, or the delay while governments get established, introduces substantial delays into the delivery of assistance and continues humanitarian relief long beyond its constructive role. To avoid these two problems, there is a growing resort to limit aid to technical assistance, which is seen as apolitical (in the sense that it appears not to be openly supporting one faction over another), but which takes the form of salaries to expatriate advisers, not to local actors and projects. Similarly, foreign donors increasingly seek out international NGOs to implement projects where they do not trust either the politics or the capacity of local governments. The result, again, is that a large proportion of the actual assistance goes to salaries and overhead of the international NGOs, not to locals in need of assistance. But in all cases, the decisions about whom to finance, whom to establish an aid relationship with, and whose preferences to consult have direct influence on the peace process and the success of implementing the provisions of a peace agreement.

A second set of effects results from the fact that money is power and, aside perhaps from infrastructural finance, is intended to influence behavior. Third-party assistance in implementation is a set of principal-agent relationships in which external actors seek not only to assist parties to a peace agreement but also to gain their compliance. A primary instrument of leverage over parties' behavior is through offers of assistance (or threats to withhold assistance), and no aid is given without some conditions attached. The ongoing debate about conditionality—to what extent and in what way aid should be used as leverage over parties' behavior—is based more on assumptions about influence than on studies of actual effects. No one doubts that there are effects, however.

The primary criticism of the policies of the IFIs grows out of their use of economic conditionality—conditions such as agreed levels of wages, prices, budget deficits, and sectoral expenditures (such as on the military or on pensions) that must be met to receive each distribution of a loan—because of the limits they impose on political flexibility, choice, and expenditures that may be necessary to building peace. A second criticism comes from those who believe that economic assistance should be used as political conditionality, to punish or reward political leaders for noncompliance or compliance with provisions of their signed agreement, which is in conflict with economic or loan conditionality. The IFIs generally oppose political conditionality for that reason, namely, that it is in violation of their legal charters, their economic philosophy, the conditionality they impose, and the efficiency and effectiveness of development plans. Some advocates go further in calling for peace conditionality, through which the enormous leverage of the IFIs and the sums that they or other major donors control are used primarily to nurture constituencies for peace by rewarding supporters, punishing opponents, encouraging vacillators, and holding parties specifically accountable to the terms of the agreement they signed. In addition, there is major disagreement about the best strategy for dealing
with potential spoilers. Should they be co-opted into the peace process, as UNTAC attempted to do with the Khmer Rouge and the Lomé Accords attempted to do with Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone, or should they be isolated, as Western policy over the Dayton implementation chose to do with two Bosnian Serb political parties and their leaders (the Serb Democratic Party and the Serb Radical Party)? Even the identification of potential spoilers is not immune from the political preferences of major external actors and donors. But even economic conditionality requires political choices. Leverage over the compliance of governments by the IFIs, particularly of the World Bank, is limited by their market relationship with borrowing governments. They cannot lend if governments are not willing to sign off on project loans that are proposed, while to succeed in a loan program, they need to maintain good relations with the government. The danger of cozy relations— including a government’s refusal to borrow for projects that might aid its rivals or former enemies, to act in ways that would harm its constituency, and to escape too much scrutiny over corrupt practices—is one of the motivations behind those who call for explicit peace conditionality with IFI financing.

A third political effect of economic assistance is the choice of political tactics by third-party implementers that result from what donors are willing or not willing to fund in the first years. For example, the tendency to focus their tactics on spoilers may result from the lack of donor attention to institutional capacity, although it may be a far better explanation of a leader’s apparent refusal to comply than any strategic choice to obstruct an agreement, as the concept of spoilers assumes. If local institutional capacity is not an explicit target of assistance in the first year or two of a peace agreement, a leader’s refusal to comply with special aspects of the peace agreement may not be a choice. Whereas a peace mission may be present for several years—say, between two and five—a leader calculates his political survival over a longer period of time. Any admission that he does not have sufficient power and authority to implement a task and obtain compliance from his followers or citizens is a far riskier political step than appearing strong by refusing compliance with outsiders. Similarly, doubts about the commitment of parties to a peace agreement have led donors and peace missions increasingly to emphasize bottom-up peacebuilding instead of top-down, that is, projects that are part of a loan package to governments but that emphasize local communities, NGOs, and popular participation as ways of circumventing national leaders. One effect, however, is to compound the problem of weak capacity at the center and to delay the “ownership” that outsiders demand. Another is that punishment— isolation, withholding aid, or circumvention—actually reduces one’s ability to influence behavior.

Distortions Induced by the International Presence

The very presence of an international peace mission, military forces, and aid agencies has economic consequences that are directly contrary to the political goals of self-governance and economic and political sustainability. This problem is rarely discussed, but it emerges vividly in every case study for this project.

The first set of distortions are those introduced into local labor, housing, and retail markets through the high salaries paid to expatriates and international civil servants, the rapid jump in demand for local translators and drivers, and the demand for local housing and services attuned to foreign tastes and salaries. Because the new peacetime governments cannot compete with the international organizations in the salaries offered, they find it difficult to attract the best professionals to government employment and public services, which delays local capacity- and institution-building further. In time, many locals employed as translators and drivers progressively lose their skills because they are not practicing their profession. The high prices paid for housing and food crowd out locals, while internationals do not consume enough locally to stimulate and sustain businesses.

A second set of distortions comes from the interaction between international and local actors in the peace process. The visibility of expatriates in their white foreign vehicles, eating at expensive restaurants reoriented to foreign clients, and buying in privileged, subsidized stores generates greater local resentment over economic hardships. The relative
cost of an international presence—for example, $1 million a day for the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), $4–5 billion a year for the Dayton implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the military deployment alone—provokes doubts about priorities when evidence regarding success tends to emphasize the importance of local initiative. For example, in Mozambique, the international mission concluded that where locals took on the tasks of return, reconciliation, and reconstruction themselves, the result was more durable. Robert Chavez, resident representative of the World Bank in Mozambique during ONUMOZ, warned that “relief agencies need to be more sensitive to the contribution of society to reconstruction and not try to impose too much order on the process.” According to a World Bank assessment of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1999, “implementation of reconstruction programs has been most effective in those sectors (e.g. in transport and energy) where priorities of donor assistance have been established jointly with the authorities.”

And while much attention in peace missions is now drawn to the problem of avoiding aid dependency, or a “culture of dependency,” there is also a risk of distortion from the timing and manner of the mission’s departure. The precipitous departure of ONUMOZ in Mozambique—where a “resource-intensive, high-profile operation engulfed Mozambique for two years and then left as swiftly as it had come”—is much criticized for its lack of regard for the effects of the rapid hand-over to locals. Although scholars of peacekeeping pay much attention to “exit strategies,” their criteria for exit (aside from political pressures for disengagement in troop-contributing countries) tend to be measures of progress along a list of benchmarks in implementing the peace agreement. The effect on that path of the exit itself, in its timing and its manner, does not enter calculations.

**Conclusion: The Need for a New Economic Strategy for Peace Implementation**

The economic strategy behind the implementation of peace agreements has been adopted from other purposes, and not designed explicitly for ending civil wars. Increasing criticism of the consequences, particularly the conflict between the priorities and tactics of the political mission and those of the economic actors, during the second half of the 1990s led to substantial efforts by donors to seek lessons and make improvements. The primary result has been to add new financing instruments for peace-related activities, such as for elections, police reform, and de-mining, and supplementary projects such as arms-for-land or trust funds for core and recurring budgetary expenditures. New financial facilities also aimed at gaining flexibility on IMF restrictions, while increased coordination among donors in the field and between the main officials in the economic and political tracks became the common denominator of reform. None of these responses addresses the differences in approach, priorities, and tasks that do or do not get funded. The fact that so little evaluation takes place of the impact of assistance on peace tasks makes it very difficult to demonstrate why and how these reforms misunderstand the problem. Moreover, the selective interest of outsiders in post-conflict cases means that even these remedies will not be available in many countries. There is, however, substantial fragmentary evidence from actual cases of what does not work and what needs to be changed. This evidence does not point toward larger resources in most cases, but toward the need for a strategy appropriate to the task that would, inter alia, promote far more efficient use of resources and greater likelihood of success. Indeed, the examples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Palestine suggest that too much money and too assertive an international presence may be counterproductive, just as the lessons drawn from the 1996 World Bank study of Bank-financed demobilization and reintegration programs in Africa were that low-cost solutions may be more effective than costly interventions, if one is sufficiently attuned to local context and culture. But as James Boyce and Manuel Pastor write, “unless the peace process is allowed to reshape economic policy, both will fail.” The vested interests in technical knowledge and in organizational autonomies and jurisdictions appear to be standing in the way of the substantial rethinking and collaborative design that would integrate both political and economic aspects into a peace strategy, building on the actual experience of peace missions and their lessons such as the five discussed above. The high proportion of failures (or political stalemates and worsening economic conditions) in current experience would seem to demand as much.
PEACE AGREEMENTS AS BASIS FOR
POST-CONFLICT STATEBUILDING
Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann, and Marcia Dawes
Excerpted from Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann, and Marcia Dawes,
Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and
Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements*, Chr. Michelsen Institute,
Bergen, Norway, 2007, 11–15

34. As noted at the outset, peace agreements can in some situations serve as a useful roadmap for post-war statebuilding. Whether or not to include provisions for statebuilding in peace agreements, however, typically involves difficult trade-offs. In the policy discourse, these are seen as effectiveness versus sovereignty; in the academic literature a similar trade-off between effectiveness and legitimacy is recognized. The literature also suggests trade-offs with respect to short-term goals (of ending the war), and long-term objectives (of sustaining the peace). Importantly, the academic literature contains few systematic studies of the consequences of including or excluding statebuilding provisions in a peace agreement. There are some valuable single-case studies, but only a few rigorous, comparative studies. This limits the possibility for generalising across cases.

35. Both the academic literature and the policy discourse have focused on the role of peace agreements in relation to broader peacebuilding issues rather than statebuilding as more narrowly understood. In other respects the two discourses are structured differently and will therefore be discussed sequentially.

The Academic Literature

The functions of peace agreements

36. Peace agreements are seen to have both ‘past and present’ functions. They must end the war and at the same time lay the foundation for sustainable peace.49 Traditionally, most studies on intrastate peace agreements have concentrated on the first function, assessing whether an agreement succeed[ed] in ending violence and prevented a relapse into war. This focus has shaped the more recent literature as well, which has concentrated on how agreements can provide incentive structures for the belligerents to stop fighting.

37. Nevertheless, there is an emergent literature which recognises that beyond short-term bargains between the fighting forces, sustainable peace requires long-term changes. This literature has produced three conclusions: (i) calls for greater policy harmonisation or inter-agency coordination in the process of ending the conflict and laying the foundation for post-war peace, (ii) warnings that including provisions regarding post-war statebuilding into a peace agreement may rest on uncertain legitimacy, and (iii) doubt whether including provisions for post-war statebuilding has any effect on the postwar transition at all.

38. The now-classic example of the first category is a well-known article by De Soto and del Castillo that assessed the peace process in El Salvador.50 The authors called for greater harmony between the obligations of the peace agreement and post-war economic policies, and, specifically, greater coordination between what they called the UN and the Bretton Woods processes. They argued that the implementation of two central aspects of the accords—the establishment of a new police force and the reintegration of ex-combatants through the ‘arms for land’ programme—had been jeopardised by the lack of funding, thereby potentially destabilising the peace. Famously, the authors compared the situation where the UN worked on the peace process and the IFIs on a stabilisation programme with a patient laying ‘on the operation table with the left and the right sides of his body separated by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side.’ The solution, as they saw it,
was greater agency coordination (which in this case meant the IFIs should have used more flexible financing criteria for post-war aid). The authors did not conclude that provisions to this effect should have been incorporated in the peace agreement itself. In fact, they did not raise the issue at all, even though other aspects of post-war economic policy were included in the agreement for El Salvador (a social fund to compensate for losses incurred by structural adjustment). Likewise, Boyce in his work on “peace conditionality” emphasizes the need to align post-war economic policies with the obligations of the peace agreement, but does not conclude that this necessarily requires incorporating such provisions in the peace agreement.51

39. Other analysts go further. Including economic and institutional reforms in peace agreements, they argue, is an opportunity to legally anchor reforms necessary for long-term stability. Coats concludes that the currency board mandated in the Dayton agreement ‘took a bone of contention off the table’ by eliminating the possibility of central bank lending.52 With regards to judicial reform, O’Neill claims that the moment ‘surrounding a peace agreement offers a unique opportunity’ to promote judicial independence.53 The absence of provisions for judicial reform in the Dayton Agreement, he suggests, helps explain why such efforts came so late in Bosnia. However, he also acknowledges that inclusion by itself is not sufficient for implementation, as the Guatemala case shows.

40. The Dayton Agreement more generally is often cited to show the problematic aspects of specifying a range of post-war statebuilding mechanisms in a peace agreement. The legitimacy of the domestic signatories may be in doubt (which could pose problems of implementation), and their role in shaping the peace agreement may freeze conflictual political structures in the form of questionable power-sharing agreements.54 There is also a practical issue. Detailed provisions for designing post-war structures or policies should ideally rest on a comprehensive needs assessment on this ground, but this is difficult to undertake in a pre-settlement environment.

41. There is at present little systematic knowledge regarding the consequences of including (or not) various state- and peacebuilding aspects in peace agreements. The studies we do have on human rights provisions suggest there are few consequences. Examining 16 peace agreements, Putnam found weak or non-existent correlation between [the] presence of human rights provisions in the agreement and the quality and quantity of human rights protection afterwards.55 In cases where peace processes reached the stage of drafting a constitution, this document would always contain substantive human rights elements whether or not such provisions had been included in the peace agreement. A more recent, major study analysed the role of human rights provisions (institutional provisions such as judicial and security sector reform as well as the human rights framework) in the mediation and wider peacebuilding processes of eight countries.56 Capturing intervening variables such as the intensity and nature of the conflict, the resources and willingness to implement the agreement, the study concludes on a cautious and ambiguous note. It does not find a clear causal link between the inclusion of human rights provisions and subsequent human rights protection, yet recommends that as strong a human rights framework as possible be included in the agreement (except in cases where the negotiating parties lack legitimacy).

42. Individual case studies have examined the causality of incomplete implementation. The peace agreement of Guatemala, for instance, contained perhaps unprecedented provisions for post-war socioeconomic reform (including taxation and land rights) and a broad commitment to political and social transformation towards greater democracy, equity and inclusion. Yet key provisions have not been implemented. Stanley and Holiday conclude that the commitments made by the government were broad and vague—just sufficient to end the war, but lacking in detail that could serve as basis for verification.57 For instance, the accords provided for a 50 percent increase in tax ratio but did not specify tax measures to be adopted.58 Many
provisions, moreover, were further dependent upon constitutional reform, which was rejected in a referendum.

43. The accords in El Salvador also contained provisions for economic recovery and reform, but these were mainly targeted to the goal of ending the war by helping ex-combatants and war-affected communities. The provisions had little relation to subsequent peacebuilding and development strategies of the country. These were left to be formulated by the elected bodies after democratic political reforms. Likewise, provisions for future socio-economic development in the accords were general in nature and the subject referred to the future deliberations of a tripartite Social and Economic Council. As it turned out, this Council proved ineffective in addressing what [were] seen as fundamental causes of the war.

44. The security reforms in the El Salvador accords, by contrast, were both specific and comprehensive, and more so than the equivalent provisions in the Guatemalan accords with which they are often compared. The El Salvador accords, for instance, call for the establishment of an entirely new police force, while the Guatemalan accords simply provided for the restructuring of old police forces. Critics have regarded the provisions in the Guatemalan accords on this point as inadequate in relation to the requirements of post-war state- and peacebuilding, but recognize the reasons for the inadequacy. The asymmetrical power relations between the negotiating parties in Guatemala gave the guerrillas little leverage on the government with regards to both the nature of the provisions and the subsequent implementation.

Balancing Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives

45. Including provisions for post-war reforms may at times appear to jeopardise the prospects for reaching a settlement. The familiar predicament has been described as a disagreement between ‘conflict managers and democratisers’, with the former emphasising reconciliation and a swift end of violence, and the latter concentrating on the longer-term solutions and addressing the root cause of the conflict. The issue has been extensively debated in the literature with regard to war crimes prosecutions (‘peace versus justice’); similar dilemmas apply to post-war statebuilding more generally.

46. Including provisions for democratisation and economic reforms can complicate negotiations and hinder the immediate stabilisation of peace. Some analysts find that peace agreements typically carry “what the traffic can bear” and leave many of the key issues unresolved in the interest of reaching a compromise to end the war. Thus, Ball argues that in the case of the 1994 Lusaka protocols, mediators faced a choice between a flawed agreement, which left out the status of Joseph Savimbi and control over Angola’s natural resources, or no agreement and a continuation of the violence. Similar cases have been cited. Seeking to obtain a comprehensive agreement in Sudan that would address the relationship between central authority and marginalised groups throughout the country arguably would have meant the end of the government and thus was unrealistic in the short term. Had the FMLN insisted upon provisions for comprehensive socioeconomic change in El Salvador’s peace accords, the negotiations probably would have collapsed. Some analysts conclude that peace agreements entailing negotiated settlements (as distinct from a victor’s peace) must give priority to short-term issues for ending the violence. In continuation of this analysis, several studies discuss incentive structures that could be incorporated in peace agreements to hasten the end of the war or prevent its recurrence.

47. The literature on incentives structures to end wars also points to some implications of introducing a post-war agenda for statebuilding and peacebuilding into the peace negotiations. Power-sharing may be necessary to end the war and as such constitutes a key element in peace agreements. In a narrow sense, power-sharing refers to an ‘elite pact’ where the main protagonists agree to join in a transitional national
unity government and permit "normal" politics to resume. Nonetheless, it is recognized that such arrangements are undemocratic and could consolidate the positions of unrepresentative leaders, thereby undermining long-term reform and compromising the effectiveness of transitional governance or stability.

48. In a broader sense, power-sharing refers to institutional arrangements that in principle are designed to ensure group rights with regard to issues such as representation, protection and welfare. Such provisions are meant to facilitate both the cessation of hostilities and—as elements of post-war peacebuilding—to prevent a relapse into war. The downside of locking such provisions into a peace agreement is a reification of group differences that makes it difficult to transcend differences that contributed to or were sharpened by the war. Moreover, a key feature of power-sharing is extensive mutual veto powers, which may paralyse policymaking and undermine long-term state effectiveness. This is widely seen to be the effect of the Dayton agreement in Bosnia.

49. Incentives for peace and related post-war statebuilding, it is often argued, must take into account the underlying causes of the conflict. One recent distinction developed in this respect with reference to Africa is between conflicts of government (which are driven by self-interest and fought over government positions) versus conflicts of governance (which are "fuelled by contested policies and fought over conflicting collective interests"). The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone are cited as examples of the former; the North-South conflict in Sudan is a case of the latter. If perpetrators of violence lack strong popular bases and collective agendas, power-sharing agreements and similar incentive approaches could mean rewarding violence and perpetuate war. Somalia is referred to as an example. In these cases, it is suggested, peace agreements should be as vague as possible in order to prevent the freezing of unrepresentative demands. Including civil society actors is relevant, as their empowerment and participation is likely to increase the legitimacy of the peace agreement.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS:
THE ECONOMICS OF POSTWAR STATEBUILDING
James Boyce and Madalene O'Donnell

The experiences recounted in this book provide valuable insights into the critical role of the public purse in postwar peacebuilding. In this conclusion, we first highlight some key insights from the preceding chapters and then examine eight policy issues that illuminate opportunities for greater synergy among public finance, statebuilding, and peacebuilding.

The first four issues pertain to resource mobilization: How should distributional impacts enter into revenue policies? How can postwar assistance do more to prime the pump of domestic revenue capacity? Should macroeconomic strictures prescribed for economic stabilization be relaxed to foster political stabilization? How should the benefits of external resources be weighed against their costs?

The second four issues relate to the expenditure side of public finance: How should the dynamics of conflict be factored into public spending policies? Can the pathologies of a "dual public sector"— one funded and managed by the government, the other by the aid donors—be surmounted by channeling external resources through the government with
dual-control oversight mechanisms to reduce corruption? How should long-term fiscal sustainability enter into short-term expenditure decisions? Last, is there scope for more innovative solutions to postwar legacies of external debts?

After discussing each of these issues, we close with some thoughts on the challenges of achieving policy “coherence” in the interconnected realms of public finance, statebuilding, and peacebuilding.

Overview of the Cases

In postwar settings, security and public finance are intertwined. As the case studies in this book illustrate, violence and insecurity impede efforts to collect and expend public resources. In Afghanistan, the fact that many customs posts remained effectively under the control of regional strongmen undermined the state’s monopoly on the legitimate collection of revenue as well as the legitimate use of force. Yet the government had little success in convincing the international community to help reestablish state control over these facilities. In Palestine, the ongoing conflict has created a deeply problematic environment in which to try to construct new fiscal institutions. After 2000, the second intifada and Israeli responses to it precipitated what the World Bank (2004b, 1) called “one of the deepest recessions in modern history,” and Palestinian Authority revenues dropped from more than US$900 million in 2000 to less than US$300 million in 2001. And in 2006, when the electoral victory of Hamas sparked the suspension of international aid and withholding of Israeli-collected revenues, the result was a fiscal as well as a humanitarian crisis.

At the same time, fiscal issues can have important impacts on security. In Timor-Leste, budget allocations that reflected donor preferences to finance the police rather than the military, notwithstanding the popular legitimacy of the former resistance fighters in the latter, contributed to a new eruption of violence in March 2006. In Guatemala, the failure to meet revenue targets is one factor inhibiting the government’s ability to respond to elevated rates of violent crime that persist a decade after the peace accords. In Afghanistan, a major crisis lies ahead in financing the Afghan army and police, who were trained and equipped without regard to domestic fiscal constraints.

Postwar states typically are characterized by low levels of domestic revenue mobilization. Among our six case-study countries, the ratio of revenue to gross domestic product (GDP) in the immediate postwar years ranged from approximately 4 percent in Uganda, Cambodia, and Afghanistan to 8 percent in Guatemala. This is not surprising. What is more, however, is that this ratio showed only modest improvements a decade or more after the peace accords in Uganda, Cambodia, and Guatemala, where it now hovers around 11 percent, still far below the average for developing countries. Progress in raising revenue in the more recent cases of Palestine, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan is hard to predict, but signs of problems are already apparent. Palestine briefly achieved revenues equivalent to 20 percent of GDP, but the bulk of these were customs duties collected by Israeli authorities on imports destined for the West Bank and Gaza and, as of this writing, these are being withheld. Timor-Leste’s revenue has increased since independence, but this is largely owing to petroleum royalties rather than tax revenues. Afghanistan initially made some progress in revenue mobilization, meeting the targets it negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but did so starting from a very low base.

Enhancing the state’s capacity to generate revenue is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the poor performance in revenue generation suggests that stronger efforts are needed on the part of both national governments and international actors. Even when national governments are convinced of the importance of expanding their own resources—rather than relying [on] external assistance—they often fail to provide the improved services that are the quid pro quo demanded by the citizenry. Among international actors, as the chapters on Guatemala, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan describe, we find a common pattern in which a subset of donors is seriously concerned with generating a stable flow of revenues for the state, whereas others are not, a situation that undermines incen-
tives to pursue this objective. In Cambodia, for example, bilateral donors generally favored liberal tax incentives to attract investors, whereas multilateral donors opposed them in light of the need for higher revenues, a mixed message that contributed to slowing the pace of reforms.

The scale and importance of international aid varied considerably across our cases. As a percentage of national income, aid ranged from nearly 60 percent in Timor-Leste to less than 2 percent in Guatemala. Aid can provide a critical means of financing core government services and operations in a context of poor revenue mobilization. But reliance on international aid to fund government operations has at least two disadvantages over domestic revenue collection. First, aid flows can be highly volatile, as illustrated vividly in the Palestine case. Second, securing and administering aid is a time-consuming undertaking for government officials, a point emphasized in the Afghanistan study. Yet even in the “older” cases of Uganda and Cambodia, the degree of reliance on aid to finance the state budget has not declined substantially over time, suggesting that aid has done little to “crowd in” domestic revenue mobilization.

In all cases, however, international aid to the state budget was dwarfed by aid that bypassed the government, flowing through international agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private contractors. In Afghanistan, the result was an “external budget” roughly twice the size of the government’s “internal budget.” The phenomenon of a dual public sector creates tremendous challenges for financing peace-related needs in a coherent fashion and for ensuring sustainable political, social, and economic development. It also limits the government’s ability to render accounts to its citizens, since its own budget process governs only a fraction of total spending in the country.

The Cambodia chapter referred to two competing mentalities among international aid donors—a “peace and security” mentality that tolerates patronage in the name of political stability and a “developmental” mentality that focuses primarily on the state’s role as provider of services. Although admittedly a simplification, this contrast highlights the fact that tensions among political, security, and socioeconomic objectives are a recurring theme of postwar transitions. This theme has particular salience for fiscal policy, for this is the key arena in which all operational state objectives—political, security, and socioeconomic—are pursued and reconciled with available resources.

There is a profound interdependence between the state’s ability to allocate and manage expenditures and its ability to mobilize domestic resources. On the one hand, the volume of domestic revenue limits the volume of expenditure, a constraint that can be eased but not eliminated by international aid and deficit finance. On the other hand, the willingness of the citizenry to pay taxes hinges on its perception that the state will effectively deliver public goods and services—including infrastructure, public safety, health, and education—in return. If the state fails to uphold its end of this social compact, its ability to raise revenue encounters serious political and administrative constraints. This reality was visible even in Guatemala, despite the fact that its peace accord explicitly mandated substantial increases in revenue and social expenditure.

The international community can help to resolve this chicken-and-egg dilemma by providing external resources. In principle, these can fund expenditures that enhance both the ability to pay taxes (by stimulating economic recovery) and the willingness to pay taxes by demonstrating the state’s capacity to deliver results. In practice, however, as the studies in this book attest, this positive outcome is not automatic. Budget allocation and expenditure management capacities do not spring forth spontaneously in response to resource availability; they must be built painstakingly over time. The legitimacy of the state rests not only on its ability to provide public goods and services but also on its willingness to respond to the expressed needs and demands of the public. If external resources fail to build core public finance capacities, and if the state’s attentiveness to the preferences of donors deflects it from responding to the needs and demands of its own people, then the long-run contribution of aid to this crucial dimension of state-building will prove marginal at best.
Peace and the Public Purse: Eight Issues

1. Who Pays? Revenue Through a Conflict Lens

In many postwar settings, a central task is to raise domestic revenue to provide sustainable funding for new democratic institutions and for expenditures to improve human well-being, strengthen public security, and ease social tensions. The size of government revenue relative to gross domestic product in war-torn societies typically is far below the average for other countries with similar per capita income. Yet as the contributions to this book attest, the needs for government expenditure are, if anything, greater. Hence concerted efforts are needed to increase revenues.

But size is not all that matters. In addition to the total of volume revenue, the distributional impact of revenue collection matters, too. The issue sometimes is slighted by economists who were taught in graduate school that distributional objectives are tackled most efficiently on the expenditure side of fiscal policy. Inattention to “who pays?” questions in revenue policy is dysfunctional, however, for the three reasons noted in Chapter 1: first, the axiom that distribution can be relegated to expenditure alone rests on a textbook “optimal planner” model that does not fit the real world; second, even optimal planners would need full information on the distributional impacts of revenue policies to achieve their targets; and third, if the public believes that the distributional effects of revenue policies matter, then politically they do.

Economists usually think about distribution in terms of “vertical equity,” differences between rich and poor. But “horizontal equity”—differences across population groups defined in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, or region—often figure as much (or more) in the dynamics of conflict.

For this reason, in the past decade scholars and policymakers have begun to pay more attention to intergroup disparities. Researchers have analyzed the role of horizontal equity in the genesis of civil wars (Stewart 2000, 2002, Østby 2004). Economists have begun to think hard about how to measure it, starting with spatial inequalities across regions (Kanbur and Venables 2005). International aid agencies increasingly recognize the need for “conflict impact assessment” as an input into policymaking and project appraisal, and some have begun to put this recognition into practice. Yet to date, little has been done to bring these insights to bear on revenue policies. The primary revenue goal of postwar government authorities, and of the international agencies that seek to assist them, has been to increase the volume of collections; the secondary goal has been to do so as “efficiently” as possible. To be sure, increasing the volume of revenue is no small task, even in cases where war has not led to state collapse, as Chapter 4 on Guatemala illustrates. And efficiency—if understood in terms of the realities of war-torn societies, as opposed to textbook axioms—is desirable. But neglect of the distributional impacts of taxation can subvert both of these goals.

The starting point for any effort to address this lacuna must be careful documentation of the distributional incidence of revenue instruments both vertically and horizontally. Collecting the necessary data will be a nontrivial task, for today there is a paucity of such information even in “normal” developing countries, let alone in war-torn societies. This can be contrasted with the situation in the industrialized countries, where the distributional impacts of proposed taxes typically are subjected to intense scrutiny by politicians and policymakers alike. Ironically, it is precisely where the need for such analysis is greatest— in societies embarked on the fragile transition from war to peace—that these issues receive the least attention. Technical assistance from the international community could play a valuable role in filling this information gap.

Documentation is only the first step. The second is to incorporate this information into policymaking. In choosing the mix of revenue instruments—the balance between tariffs, value-added taxes, and income taxes, for example—their distributional incidence must be considered alongside their revenue potential, administrative feasibility, and effi-
ciency effects. One option that would be likely to receive much more attention, once revenue is seen through the distributional lens, is luxury taxation. Taxes on [such] items as private automobiles and private aircraft can combine the attractions of administrative ease, distributional progressivity, and substantial revenue. Yet remarkably, they rarely feature in discussions of postwar revenue policies.

Finally, information on the distributional impacts of revenue instruments, and on the ways that government policies are taking these into account, must be disseminated widely to the public, so as to guard against misperceptions and to facilitate compliance by legitimizing the policies. The importance of this was demonstrated vividly in Guatemala, where the Peace Accords set explicit targets for increasing government revenue and social expenditure. To this end, the first postwar government attempted to increase the tax on large property owners. As described in Chapter 4, this effort was scuttled, however, in the face of protests not only from estate owners but also from small-scale indigenous farmers who thought that the tax would burden them (see also Jonas 2000, 171–172). The lesson is clear: successful revenue policymaking cannot be a purely technocratic preserve; it must be part and parcel of the democratic process.

2. Priming the Pump? External Support for Domestic Revenue Mobilization

Experience has shown that aid can crowd out domestic revenue mobilization, reducing the incentive for the government to tax its own populace. If aid instead is to crowd in domestic revenue, conscious efforts are needed to this end. The international community can support government efforts to mobilize domestic revenue in four ways: by providing technical assistance, by linking some of its aid to progress in domestic revenue performance, by helping to curb extralegal revenue exactions, and by reducing tax exemptions on postwar aid.

Technical assistance. Technical assistance (TA) is the most common type of support. The preceding chapters have documented many instances in which TA from the IMF, World Bank, and bilateral donors has helped to develop revenue capacities, ranging from drafting tax codes in Timor-Leste to setting up Guatemala’s Superintendency for Tax Administration, a unit within the finance ministry with special training and higher pay in an effort to insulate it from corruption.

In public finance, as in other arenas, the effectiveness of TA could be strengthened by efforts to adopt technologies and procedures that build on existing capacities, rather than opting for off-the-shelf imported solutions. In Afghanistan, for example, as recalled by Ashraf Ghani and his colleagues in Chapter 6, computerized information systems introduced at the Ministry of Finance were “unsuitable in terms of complexity and language,” prompting subsequent efforts to retool with Persian-language systems from Iran. More attention to training local personnel, rather than simply substituting for them, could also foster capacity building. In their study of Timor-Leste, Emilia Pires and Michael Francino remark in Chapter 5 that the concentration on expatriate advisory services was accompanied by “some neglect for formal training programs for national staff.” The ultimate goal of technical assistance is to become redundant.

There is also scope for greater conflict sensitivity in technical assistance. In some cases, TA providers have shown an impressive ability to cast aside orthodoxies and adapt their policy advice to local realities. For example, despite the aversion of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to trade taxes, import duties were recognized as the most feasible source of revenue enhancement in Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In the case of Timor-Leste, the IMF even supported introduction of a levy on coffee exports (see Chapter 5), a policy that verges on the heretical. In other cases, however, orthodoxy triumphed over pragmatism. In Guatemala, for example, even as the IMF gave rhetorical support to the revenue-enhancement goal mandated by the Peace Accords, the fund’s staff urged the government to cut tariffs. Theoretical work and empirical evidence cast doubt on both the efficiency advantages of a shift from tariffs to value-added taxes and the prospects for accomplishing this without a decline in total revenues. Nevertheless, this
remains a key plank of IFI policy prescriptions in developing countries. In postwar countries, where administrative capacities are especially weak and the need for revenue especially pressing, the case for departures from orthodoxy is all the more compelling.

Conditionality. Conditionality is a second way that donors can encourage domestic resource mobilization. On the expenditure side of fiscal policy, it is not unusual for donors to require “counterpart funding” by the government as a condition for aid to specific projects, a strategy intended to ensure domestic “buy-in” and to counteract fungibility (whereby aid merely frees government money for other uses). But on the revenue side, conditionality of this type has been rare. It would be a straightforward matter to link certain types of aid—notably budget support—to progress in meeting domestic revenue targets. Such a policy is akin to the provision of matching grants by private foundations. In both cases, the aim is to strengthen incentives for aid recipients to seek further resources, counteracting the disincentive effects of unconditional aid.8

Visiting Guatemala in May 1997, a few months after the signing of that country’s peace accords, IMF managing director Michel Camdessus took a broad step in this direction when he stated that the fund’s only condition for a standby agreement would be that the government comply with its peace accord commitments, including a 50 percent increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio.9 Making a tighter linkage, the European Union (EU) conditioned its budget support to the government of Mozambique in 2002 on increases in domestic revenue.10 One of the benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact signed in London in early 2006, which sets out the framework for international assistance to that country over the next five years, is to increase the revenue/GDP ratio from 4.5 percent in 2004–2005 to 8 percent in 2010–2011.11 But conditionality with respect to revenue mobilization remains the exception, not the rule.

Curbing extralegal revenue exactions. Curbing extralegal revenue exactions in some cases is a critical postwar task, one that is located on the cusp between public finance and security. When profits from the exploitation of nominally public resources, like Cambodia’s forests, flow into private pockets, this not only deprives the state of revenues but also often finances quasi-autonomous armed groups that threaten the peace (Le Billon 2000). When local warlords levy “taxes” on trade, sometimes including trade in narcotics, as in Afghanistan, they undermine the state’s monopoly not only on revenue collection but also on the legitimate exercise of force. Curtailing such activities may require the assistance of international peacekeeping forces, which is what prompted the Afghan finance ministry’s request for help in securing customs posts (see Chapter 6). Yet peacekeeping forces, even those with a relatively expansive mandate, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, typically have not seen this as a part of their job.

Even more problematic, powerful members of the international community may be reluctant to crack down on extralegal revenue exactions when they regard those involved as political allies. In Afghanistan, for example, efforts to consolidate revenue in the hands of the state and to fight drug trafficking have been complicated—to put it mildly—by the decision of the US government to enlist anti-Taliban warlords as partners in its global war on terror. Such marriages of convenience, reminiscent of US support to the anti-Soviet mujahadeen in the 1980s, may serve short-run security objectives but do so only at the expense of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state—and ultimately security too—in the long run.12

Reducing tax exemptions on postwar aid flows. Reducing tax exemptions on postwar aid flows could do a great deal to prime the pump of domestic revenue-collection capacity. In the first postwar years, aid often is the single biggest component of the formal-sector economy. Yet today aid flows, and many of the incomes generated by them, are tax exempt. The incomes of expatriate aid officials and aid workers are often tax free.13 The incomes of their local staff, quite high by local standards, are often tax free, too. The goods imported by the aid agencies, ranging from Toyota Land Cruisers to cases of Coca Cola and whiskey, are seldom taxed. The rents paid by expatriates for office space and housing—again, exorbitant by local standards—are often tax free. So are other services provided to them, such as hotels and restaurants.
These pervasive exemptions have several adverse consequences. Most obvious is the opportunity cost of forgone government revenues. In addition, scarce administrative capacity is devoted to administering different rules for different people. Goods that enter the country as aid frequently wind up on sale in local markets, undercutting legitimate competitors who pay import duties. Last but not least, the special treatment accorded to expatriates sends an unmistakable message to the local populace: rich and powerful people do not have to pay taxes. The result can be “the creation of a culture of tax exemptions,” in the words of a recent IMF review of postconflict experiences (Gupta et al. 2005, 12). This demonstration effect runs precisely counter to efforts to establish effective and progressive revenue collection systems. It also undermines the credibility of international agencies when they argue, as in Cambodia, that governments should reduce tax loopholes and “tax incentives” for local businesses (see Chapter 3).

Efforts to tax aid bonanzas—even with backing from the IMF—have run into adamant resistance from aid donors. In Timor-Leste, efforts to tax the floating hotels in the Dili harbor that accommodated the postwar influx of foreigners were rebuffed by lawyers at United Nations headquarters in New York, on the dubious grounds that diplomatic “privileges and immunities” extend to those who provide services to UN personnel (see Chapter 5). In Afghanistan, the introduction of a tax on rental incomes generated by expatriates in Kabul likewise met resistance; as Ashraf Ghani and his colleagues remark in Chapter 6, “the international community’s declarations on the importance of enhancing domestic revenue mobilization have not been matched by willingness to consider new initiatives to tap the revenue possibilities generated by their own presence.”

This issue has often pitted the IMF and World Bank, along with national officials, against other donor agencies. Writing in Chapter 5, Emilia Pires and Michael Francino recall “bit-ter fights between international officials at the Ministry of Finance and international officials of donor organizations . . . with the latter winning.” They go on to say that the finance ministry’s inability to tax the international presence where there was not an explicit legal basis for their exemption came as a “bitter blow” and that “the donors and the UN, who disagreed about many things, were as one on their inviolable right to a complete exemption from taxes, not only for themselves as individuals or for goods imported for their direct use but also on their contractors and goods imported for reconstruction.” Similarly, NGOs “ferociously defended every inch of ground” in resisting taxation of even their local employees: “Even when UNTAET offered to pay the taxes of international staff working with NGOs, provided they were prepared to declare the income they were receiv-ing, the answer was still no.”

As Pires and Francino explain in Chapter 5, donor agency staff made three arguments against paying taxes. The first was that this would be equivalent to budget support. This is true. But its implicit premise—that the government cannot be trusted to use tax revenues well—again sends a clear message to the local populace. The second argument was that expatriates were already paying taxes in their countries of origin. In cases where this is so, existing tax treaties allow credits for taxes paid elsewhere, avoiding the problem of double taxation. The third argument was that no other countries where they worked had taxed them, “so why should Timor-Leste be any different?” The answer to this objection is, of course, that desirable changes have to begin somewhere.

Two further points are worth mentioning here. First, income tax payments by expatriate or local aid personnel need not come from their own pockets. Those who pay taxes could be given salary “top-ups” to maintain their after-tax incomes. This is the current practice at the World Bank and IMF headquarters in Washington, D.C., where those employees who are US citizens must pay income taxes (unlike their non-US co-workers) but receive compensating pay increments in the interest of horizontal equity.

Second, initiatives could take the form of payments in lieu of taxes, a solution that has been adopted in a number of college towns in the United States, where municipal governments quite understandably want tax-exempt institutions of higher education to contribute to funding public schools, police and fire protection, and other local services. These negotiated payments maintain the legal privileges of those who make them and
open the door for individual donors who are serious about building domestic revenue capacity to act without waiting for across-the-board solutions.

3. Economic vs. Political Stabilization? Balancing the Budget Deficit

An alternative way that governments can mobilize domestic resources—apart from increasing revenues—is to borrow or print money to cover budget deficits. In many post-war settings, a lack of well-developed financial markets means that domestic borrowing is not feasible. Even where this is possible, governments may be reluctant to borrow, since this could push up interest rates and dampen private investment.

Printing money can be a more tempting option. This does not require the institutional capacities for a market in government bonds. Instead the government “borrows” from its own central bank. But this type of deficit finance has costs, too. If printing money fuels rapid inflation, this can disrupt the economy, hit the real incomes of the poor (who generally are least able to “index” their incomes to prices), and spark political unrest.

For these reasons, many economists advocate tight restrictions on budget deficits in general and restrictions on central bank financing of them in particular. One need not be a monetarist economist to appreciate the merits of this position. Yet controlling inflation is not the sole objective of economic policy. In settings with widespread unemployment and slack demand, modest inflation may be a tolerable price to pay for gains in employment and growth. The conventional economic wisdom today holds that inflation cannot boost employment in the long run. In the short run, however, there is no doubt that inflationary finance can provide an economic stimulus.

In postwar countries, short-run concerns have special salience. The macroeconomic goal of price stability must be pursued alongside the peacebuilding goal of political stability. The former requires efforts to balance the budget, or at least to rein in the gap between expenditure and revenue. But the latter may require expenditures to implement peace accord commitments and to address pressing social needs that surpass the resources available to the government. In such settings, the need for a balanced budget itself must be balanced against the urgent need for peace-related spending.

When confronted with the argument that relaxation of price-stability targets could increase political stability by allowing more expenditures to ease social tensions, proponents of “sound money” counter that price instability fuels social tensions, too. Both sides may be right. Beyond some point, high inflation—and certainly “hyperinflation” at rates of more than 50 percent per month—would harm the economy in general and the poor in particular, exacerbating tensions. At the same time, however, excessively tight money and a complete refusal to finance budget deficits via the “inflation tax” could impede efforts to fund peace-related needs.

If so, the relationship between the macroeconomic stability and political stability may take the shape of an inverted U rather than a straight line. The horizontal axis represents price stability, with movement away from the origin denoting lower inflation. The vertical axis represents political stability, with movement away from the origin denoting lower social tensions. Supporters of stringent anti-inflation policies assume that the country is on the upward-sloping part of the curve, where greater macroeconomic stability fosters greater political stability. In asserting that there is a tradeoff between the two, critics of these policies assume that the country is on the downward-sloping segment.

Both of these scenarios are plausible. Recalling the inflation rates presented in Chapter 1, postwar Cambodia with annual inflation near 100 percent may well have been on the upward-sloping part of the curve, so that anti-inflation efforts were consistent with political stabilization; in postwar Guatemala with only 7 percent inflation, on the other hand, a more relaxed macroeconomic stance might have allowed more fiscal room to maneuver to address peacebuilding needs. Research at the interface between macroeconomics and conflict impact assessment is needed to estimate where the turning point is located in
any given time and place. Equally important is to explore policies that might shift the curve, easing potential trade-offs between macroeconomic and political stability. If, for example, there is scope for shifting public expenditure from items that do little to consolidate peace to other uses that are central to this goal, this would help to reconcile the two stability objectives.

Even though some relaxation of budget-deficit targets may be warranted to advance the goal of political stabilization, the scope for financing public spending by this route is limited: at some point, price instability will feed into political instability. Printing money may increase the government’s room to maneuver at the margin, but it is not a “soft” substitute for domestic revenue mobilization. As Warren Coats remarks in Chapter 8, “historically the possibility of central bank lending to the government has often proven an irresistible temptation.” Opening the door a crack can let in a flood of inflationary finance. Moreover, there are some cases in which very strict monetary policies—or even a straitjacket on the central bank’s ability to print money, in the form of “dollarization” or a currency board—can enhance political stability, by taking a bone of contention off the table. Coats argues that that was the case in Bosnia, where a currency board arrangement was mandated in the Dayton Peace Agreement. There may be good arguments for recalibrating monetary discipline in light of the political demands of war-to-peace transitions, but there is no good argument for abandoning it.


Government expenditures can be funded by external resources as well as by domestic resources—that is, by grants and loans from overseas. In postwar countries, these external resources come mostly from official aid donors: the Bretton Woods institutions, the regional development banks, and bilateral aid agencies.

For recipients, aid has both benefits and costs. External budget support allows a government to spend money—for example, to pay teachers, healthcare workers, and public security forces—beyond the constraints otherwise imposed by its capacity to mobilize domestic resources. This buys time for the government to increase domestic revenues. The costs to the recipient country include the risk that external resources will crowd out domestic resource mobilization (see above, “2. Priming the Pump?”), the risk that external resources will lead to unsustainable expenditure commitments (see below, “7. Thinking About Tomorrow, Today?”), and the risks posed by exchange-rate appreciation and policies to counter it.

When a government’s popularity among aid donors enables it to attract substantial budget support, the IMF sometimes presses for ceilings on the “domestic primary deficit,” the extent to which the government uses aid to finance public expenditure. These ceilings are intended to contain the potential adverse macroeconomic effects of aid inflows. The logic is that foreign currency inflows from aid can lead to exchange-rate appreciation, making the country’s tradable-goods sector (exports and import substitutes) less competitive, a phenomenon akin to the Dutch disease in which a boom in natural resource exports has the same effect. If the central bank increases the money supply to counter upward pressure on the exchange rate, this can lead to inflation. If the central bank issues bonds to absorb the increased money supply and control inflation (a policy mix known as “sterilization”), this can push up domestic interest rates, adversely affecting private investment. Faced with the trade-offs among exchange-rate appreciation, inflation, and higher interest rates, aid ceilings represent a policy for damage control.

To control the domestic primary deficit in Uganda, the government imposes limits on the share of expenditure in each ministry that can be financed by external resources. As Léonce Ndikumana and Justine Nannyonjo observe in Chapter 2, these aid-intensity ceilings inflict yet another kind of damage, constraining expenditures that could improve social welfare. Uganda’s health targets go unmet even as unemployed doctors and nurses emigrate abroad in search of work. When a country has unemployed resources that can be put to work with aid financing—as appears to be the case in this instance—the very
elastic supply response means that the impacts of greater aid absorption on inflation and the exchange rate would likely be modest. Moreover, Ndikumana and Nannyonjo argue that aid-intensity ceilings fail to take due account of the fact that much aid is spent abroad on goods and services that do not compete with local production—for example, on technical assistance salaries that are deposited directly into foreign bank accounts. Since such aid does not pose sterilization dilemmas, there is no reason to include it in the calculation of expenditure ceilings.

A recent IMF study echoes these concerns. Instead of real exchange-rate appreciation as aid flows surged, Uganda actually experienced depreciation and low inflation, a scenario that suggests “a rapid supply response to aid expenditures or high import propensities” as well as fiscal and monetary policies designed to counter appreciation (IMF 2005b, 13). “Concerns about inflation,” the study cautions, “must be balanced against the dangers of failing to absorb the aid and of crowding out the private sector” (IMF 2005b, 5).18

Of course, there may be other good reasons for aid-intensity ceilings, apart from macro-economic concerns. “Plentiful aid,” Bevan (2005, 4) observed, “may induce corruption and other rent-seeking activities in much the same way that resource rents have frequently done.” Plentiful aid can lure governments into unsustainable expenditure commitments, a problem discussed below. Plentiful aid can undermine sovereignty: “Countries whose budgets rely heavily on aid flows rather than on their own domestic resources,” Heller (2005, 22) observed, “give up significant political autonomy in their capacity to manage and make decisions on budget priorities.” Plentiful aid also can undermine democracy, diminishing political accountability to the local populace and tilting the state’s attention instead to accountability to donors. And capping the ratio of external resources to total expenditures strengthens incentives for domestic resource mobilization.

Taking into account these costs of aid, as well as its benefits, policymakers again may face an “inverted-U” curve, with aid intensity on the horizontal axis and aid’s contribution to the goals of statebuilding and peacebuilding on the vertical axis: aid may advance these goals up to a point, after which its marginal impact turns negative. If so, again there is a need to analyze where this turning point is located in specific times and places and what can be done to shift the curve by enhancing the positive effects of aid and countering its negative effects.

Donor agencies, operating within an overall budget envelope, also face an opportunity cost: aid provided to one country cannot be provided to another. In recent years, donors increasingly have adopted country assessment tools in an effort to channel aid to those countries where it will have the greatest positive impact. The World Bank, for example, uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessment scores in allocating aid (World Bank 2005e). The European Union uses results-based performance indicators, such as vaccination and school enrollment rates, to guide its budget support to developing countries (European Commission 2005). This move toward selectivity has led to a bifurcation between “aid darlings” and “aid orphans”—governments that score well in such assessments and those that score poorly (World Bank and International Monetary Fund 2005, 17). War-torn countries are often in the latter camp.

Two innovations could make selective aid allocation better attuned to the requirements of postwar statebuilding. The first is the incorporation of trends, as well as levels, into existing performance indicators. The second is the development of new indicators that assess progress in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The latter would apply conflict assessment to the allocation of aid among countries as well as within them.

5. Who Benefits? Expenditure Through a Conflict Lens

Turning to the expenditure side of public finance, policymaking in postwar settings requires careful attention to questions of to whom as well as what.

The “what” question is about priorities. Faced with many pressing needs—for spending in areas such as public safely, the demobilization and re-integration of ex-combatants,
health, education, and the rehabilitation of economic infrastructure—how should scarce resources best be allocated? The key point here is that the aim must be not simply to maximize returns defined in terms of conventional development indicators but also to get the most “non-bang for the buck” in terms of building a durable peace.

Making the same point, the synthesis report emerging [from] the World Bank’s research program on violent conflict observed that this “creates the potential for trade-offs between policies that promote growth and those that promote peace.” In particular, a strategy focused exclusively on short-term economic returns might concentrate spending on the capital city and developed regions, leading to “a trade-off between the growth-maximizing geographic distribution of public expenditure and a distribution that might be regarded as fair.” Where such trade-offs exist, the report concluded, “the government may need to give priority to policies for peace building” (Collier et al. 2003, 166).

When viewed through a conflict lens, the “what” question in public expenditure cannot be divorced from the “to whom” question. Two sets of issues are particularly relevant. The first is how to incorporate vertical and horizontal equity concerns into spending decisions, the importance of which has already been noted in relation to revenue policy (see above, “1. Who Pays?”). The second is how to allocate expenditures across the political landscape so as to bolster incentives for the implementation of accords and the consolidation of peace.

Conflict impact assessments could address both sets of issues. These are analogous to environmental impact assessments, first introduced in the 1970s, with the difference that here the concern is the social and political environment rather than the natural environment. Just as environmental impact assessment aims to incorporate “negative externalities” of pollution and natural resource depletion into expenditure policies, so conflict impact assessment aims to incorporate the “negative externalities” of social tensions and violent conflict.

Today, efforts to incorporate equity impacts into expenditure decisions are still in their infancy. Information on vertical equity—the distribution of benefits across the poor-to-rich spectrums—is sometimes collected and sometimes used as an input into policymaking. For example, the World Bank’s 2003 public expenditure review in Cambodia presented data on the distribution of health and education spending, as did the Bank’s 2003 report on poverty in Guatemala (see Chapter 4). In many cases, however, even such basic data are not available.

In the case of horizontal equity—distribution across regions and groups defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, or religion—the current lack of information is even more glaring. Collection of regional data on expenditures in administrative units, such as states, provinces, and districts, would seem to be relatively straightforward, both practically (since ministries often allocate their funds across regional units) and politically (since regions often can serve as a proxy for more sensitive categories such as ethnicity). Yet today such data are remarkably few and far between. In Chapter 6, Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s former finance minister, and his colleagues recount their experience: “Obtaining the figures on provincial expenditures from line ministries required months of intense discussion and analysis of manual systems of recordings. When the figures were first presented to the cabinet, it came as a shock that the ten poorest provinces of the country were receiving the smallest amounts of allocation.” The most unusual feature of this experience is that the finance ministry went to the trouble to request this information. Faced with such paucity of data, conflict impact assessment today is roughly where environmental impact assessment was three decades ago.

In addition to equity, postwar expenditure policy must consider balances of power among and within competing parties. This requires attention not only to community-wide characteristics such as living standards and ethnicity but also to the stances of individual political leaders who often vary in their commitment to peace. Some leaders are enthusiastic about implementing peace agreements, others are lukewarm, and still others are prepared to resume war rather than make concessions for peace. Selective allocation of
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public spending can be one instrument to reward those who are committed to peace, penalize spoilers, and encourage vacillators to get off the fence on the side of peace implementation. If instead public spending strengthens the hand of hard-liners, this can contribute to an unraveling of the peace process.

Systematic attention to this dimension of the “to whom” question is rare. One exception is the selective allocation of aid to municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking into account the stance of local authorities regarding implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement’s key provisions. The “open cities” program of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, for example, targeted reconstruction assistance to municipalities whose officials agreed to welcome the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Similarly, the World Bank sought advice from the Office of the High Representative in allocating aid for rehabilitation of municipal infrastructure. To date, however, such conflict sensitivity in expenditure decisions remains the exception rather than the rule.

6. Dual Public Sector or Dual Control? External Support for Domestic Expenditure

The international community often seeks to help postwar governments to develop fiscal capacity to allocate and manage expenditure by providing technical assistance. More could be done, however, if donors were to channel a greater share of their resources through the state rather than bypassing it. This will require new strategies for combating corruption and ensuring fiduciary responsibility.

In this book, the useful role of technical assistance is illustrated by its contributions to establishing a payments system in Afghanistan, improving procurement procedures in Guatemala, and increasing transparency in public expenditure management in Uganda. These are not purely technical problems: they are political problems, too. The contrast between Afghanistan, where instituting a payments system was pursued as a high priority, and Cambodia, where the cash-based payments system remains subject to significant leakages, is instructive in this regard: lack of a reliable payments system not only harms government employees but also erodes the delivery of services and hence public perceptions as to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state.

Beyond the “dual public sector.” As on the revenue side, there is scope for donors to do more than provide technical assistance. As Ashraf Ghani and his colleagues emphasize in Chapter 6 on Afghanistan, the current practice of routing the lion’s share of external assistance outside the government gives rise to a “dual public sector”: an internal public sector that is funded and managed by the government and an external public sector that is funded and managed by the donors. In sheer money terms, the latter frequently dwarfs the former.

The dual public sector phenomenon has several adverse consequences. Most evident is the opportunity cost of failing to tap these resources to build state capacities to allocate and manage public expenditure. Less obvious, but no less serious, is the “crowding-out” effect as professionals are recruited into the external public sector, often at salaries that the government cannot match. The situation in Timor-Leste that Emilia Pires and Michael Francino describe in Chapter 5—where the much higher salaries paid by international agencies drew the “best skilled workers” away from the Timorese public service—is repeated again and again during postwar reconstruction. Ironically, aid donors then point to lack of capable government personnel as a rationale for continuing to bypass the state. Again, the failure to route resources through the government has feedback effects on domestic revenue mobilization, insofar as the willingness of citizens to pay taxes hinges on the perception that the state delivers services in return.

The fact that the external public sector is managed by numerous agencies, each with its own priorities, poses enormous coordination problems. This also leads to the waste of scarce administrative resources, as government ministries cope with the different reporting systems of multiple funders. Last but not least, there are no institutional mechanisms
that make donor agencies accountable to the local citizenry. No matter how imperfect the degree of democratic governance, the state arguably has a comparative advantage in this respect.

When pressed on this issue, donors maintain that they (and the non-governmental organizations and private contractors on whom they often rely) do a more effective job than the government in delivering goods and services. This is not an argument that can be dismissed lightly. There undoubtedly are situations in which the short-run advantages of circumventing the state are compelling. But once we recognize that the long-run aim of aid is—or ought to be—to build state capacities as well as to deliver services, the argument loses at least some of its force.

Experience shows that the “short run” can last a long time. In Chapter 3, Paul Smoke and Robert R. Taliercio Jr. observe that in Cambodia, where more than a decade has elapsed since the United Nations transitional administration handed power to a new government, the donors’ focus on delivering results still leads them to “bypass when possible—and ‘capture’ when not—the civil service” and that spending on technical assistance remains two to three times greater than the total wages paid to government civil servants. One cannot help feeling that something is wrong with this picture.

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) offers an instructive model for how donors can route aid through the government—in effect, helping to internalize external resources. The ARTF, as explained in Chapter 6, is a World Bank–administered account through which donors help to fund the government’s recurrent budget. The government allocates these external resources through its internal budgetary process, reinforcing the budget as the central instrument of policy. When the ministries spend the money—for example, paying teachers—an external monitoring agent appointed by the World Bank verifies that the accounting standards of the ARTF and government (which are the same) have been met and releases the funds. The ARTF thus is like a bank account with a fiduciary screen. Approximately two-thirds of the Afghan government’s nonsecurity recurrent budget is now being funded by the ARTF, although this amount remains small relative to total external assistance.24

Channeling aid through the government in this fashion does not imply that the donors abdicate control or responsibility for how their resources are used. The ARTF does not issue blank checks. Two signatures are required to release funds, one from the government and one from the external monitoring agent. The result is a dual-control system—a setup analogous to the dual-key system used to prevent an accidental launch of nuclear missiles.

Combating corruption. Corruption saps the delivery of public services, deters private investment, and fuels popular discontent.25 But efforts to combat it are complicated where corruption helps to maintain political cohesion by distributing resources through informal channels. Not all corruption is equally corrupt or equally corrosive: in some cases it is driven entirely by individual greed, but in others it provides patronage resources for wider networks. An example of the latter is the use of government revenues and profits from state-sanctioned monopolies to lubricate neopatrimonial governance in the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat (see Chapter 7).

Donors often adopt an “avoidance strategy” for dealing with corruption: avoid “leakages” by bypassing the government and avoid public discussion of the topic for fear of ruffling political feathers. This strategy is dysfunctional for two reasons. First, aid that is routed outside the government is insulated from neither the perception nor the reality of corruption.26 Indeed, the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms can fuel public perceptions that externally administered projects are even more prone to corruption than are government projects.27

Second, the avoidance strategy fails to harness aid to build the state’s capacity to budget and manage public expenditure effectively. And just as the refusal of the donor agencies
to pay taxes has a demonstration effect—sending a message to the populace of no confidence in the government—so, too, their refusal to route resources through the government sends an unmistakable signal.

An alternative strategy for addressing problems of corruption would have two prongs. The first is the use of dual-control systems, like the ARTF, to build more robust institutions for accountability and transparency along with public expenditure capacities. The second is to devise transitional adjustment assistance programs for people who have been dependent on patronage networks, recognizing that corruption for this purpose differs from personal corruption. Such assistance would be analogous, in a sense, to job training programs for workers displaced by the effects of trade liberalization in industrialized countries, and—closer to home—to the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs for ex-combatants that are often implemented in postwar countries.

7. Thinking About Tomorrow, Today? Getting Serious About Fiscal Sustainability

External resources that are spent today—regardless of whether they are channeled through the state or around it—often have implications for how domestic resources must be spent tomorrow. This is true both for recurrent expenditures, such as salaries, and for capital expenditures that will require spending for operation and maintenance in future years. Hence there is a need to think about the long-term fiscal implications of current decisions.

In the aftermath of war, attention to pressing short-term needs is perfectly natural and perfectly valid. But this does not imply that the future consequences of today’s decisions can or should be shunted aside for others to handle later. The long run begins in the short run. Myopia not only postpones getting serious about long-run problems but also can make them worse.

Although much can be done to enhance domestic revenue capacities (see above, “2. Priming the Pump?”), the sky is not the limit. Prudence demands recognition that budget constraints will always be a fact of life. In building new government institutions and infrastructure, this reality must be borne in mind. It would be a mistake to rely on a transitory flush of external funds to create structures that are not fiscally sustainable. The point may seem obvious, but past experience suggests that it is often ignored.

Consider, for example, security spending in Afghanistan, where the Afghan National Army has been built with large-scale funding from the US government. Security-sector expenditures in the three-year period from 2003–2004 to 2005–2006 were equivalent to 494 percent of the Afghan government’s revenue, or roughly one-third of the country’s GDP. “Total security expenditures will exceed forecast domestic revenues for some years to come,” warned a recent World Bank study (2005b, 47) that described the situation as “unaffordable and fiscally unsustainable.”

As Ashraf Ghani and his colleagues remark in Chapter 6, “Even under very optimistic projections for domestic revenue, such an expenditure on security would imply a totally inadequate allocation of resources for human capital, infrastructure, and other vital functions of government.” Even from a security standpoint, unsustainable expenditures are shortsighted. A well-equipped army that is not getting paid ceases to be a security force. Instead it becomes an insecurity force.

A recent operational note prepared jointly by the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank (2005, 4) drew the clear lesson from such experiences: “It is important to ensure that security issues are treated as an integral part of the national planning and budgetary process, rather than through separate fora which may lead to a lack of transparency or the taking of decisions which are fiscally unsustainable or undermine other reconstruction efforts.”
The problem of unsustainable expenditure is not confined to the security sector. Salary supplements for civil servants—including "sitting fees" for attending donor-funded workshops, where "the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries" (Moss, Petersson, and Vande Walle 2005, 7)—likewise can create problems for fiscal sustainability. Citing studies showing that additional remuneration to civil servants in Cambodia far exceeds their regular salaries, a United Nations Development Programme study concluded that "the principal incentive to work in public employment is the prospect of access to external salary supplements" (Beresford et al. 2004, 33).

Capital investments with high operation and maintenance costs also generate fiscal burdens down the road. Rex Brynen reports in Chapter 7 that in Palestine, aid donors have often ignored the development plans of the Palestinian Authority (PA), "undercutting any PA effort to monitor the cumulative long-term costs of donor-financed investments." Again he points to the resulting distortion in incentives: the "lure of donor money" encouraged government officials to put forward projects "not because they were a real priority but because they seemed most likely to attract some external funding."

A famous example of a costly, donor-driven project with high "flagpole value" but problematic fiscal implications is the Gaza hospital financed by the European Union (Brynen 2000b, 196–197). "Donor-driven investments in public hospitals are sometimes referred to as 'Trojan horses,'" noted a World Bank report (2005b, 52), "because of their large operating costs which crowd resources out of priority areas such as the basic package of health services."

Closely related to this problem is the bias of many aid-funded projects in favor of excessive reliance on imports. In deciding on the extent to which the goods and services purchased for relief, recovery, and reconstruction should be imported, as opposed to being procured locally, donors face another tension between short-run expediency and long-run capacity building—the capacity in this case being in the private sector. Again there are undoubtedly cases where the former trumps the latter: for example, where local sourcing would require large investments with long gestation periods. But there are also cases where local procurement could do more to stimulate economic recovery, and perhaps save money in the process.30

To cite an example of the pervasive bias against local suppliers, during the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste, some quarter of a million desks and chairs for local schools were purchased with money from the World Bank–administered Trust Fund for Timor-Leste. At the time, some Timorese officials suggested that some of these be procured locally to spur the growth of small and medium-sized woodworking enterprises. According to Emilia Pires and Michael Francino in Chapter 5, the international officials rejected this on the grounds that local procurement would be too slow. This was not a life-or-death case of emergency food supplies in which time was of the essence; the goods in question were school furniture.31

The interwoven challenges of building an effective state, a robust economy, and a durable peace all require thinking about tomorrow, today. Postwar inflows of external assistance cannot be sustained indefinitely. The success of this aid ultimately will rest on whether the structures built with it can be sustained without it.

8. Odious Debts? Facing War's Financial Legacy

Large external debts are often among the baneful legacies inherited by a postwar government. These debts impede the war-to-peace transition in two ways. First, debt-service payments absorb scarce resources that otherwise could be allocated to peace-building expenditures. Second, the overhang of accumulated debt deters investment and new lending to the country.

The original loans often were of dubious benefit to the country's people. Indeed, insofar as they financed predatory and oppressive regimes, some of the loans not only failed to benefit the majority of the populace but may even have actively harmed them.
To cite a stark example, after the fall of the Taliban regime the Russian government claimed that the new Afghan government owed it US$10 billion, most of it for aid provided in the 1980s when the Soviet army was fighting in Afghanistan. The Karzai administration refused to accept this obligation, arguing that “the Soviet Union spent the money for its own political and strategic purposes, not to benefit the Afghan people.”\textsuperscript{32} This argument echoed the stance taken a century earlier by the US commissioners at the Paris peace conference after the Spanish-American War. At issue were the external debts incurred by Cuba under Spanish colonial rule and the question of whether these would be passed to the new Cuban government. The United States repudiated these debts on the grounds that the purpose of the loans had been not to benefit the Cuban people but rather to finance “the continuous effort to put down a people struggling for freedom from the Spanish rule.”\textsuperscript{33} In international law, this became known as the doctrine of odious debt.\textsuperscript{34}

The Russian claims in Afghanistan might be seen as lying at one end of a legitimacy-illegitimacy spectrum, but the legitimacy of many other postbellum debts can be questioned, too. Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, inherited a US$12 billion external debt from the Mobutu regime (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998). Much of this arguably could qualify as odious debt, in that the Congolese people did not benefit and that the creditors knew or should have known that this would be the case. Similar questions can be raised about the wartime debts incurred by the Angolan government, some of them backed by liens on that country’s future oil revenues (Boyce 2005).

Yet the principle that external debts are sacrosanct, unless forgiven by the creditors, remains official doctrine today. In the case of the IMF and World Bank, for whom debt write-offs until recently have been taboo, this poses a stumbling block: lending to postwar governments cannot begin until past debt arrears have been cleared. This is usually accomplished by means of bridge loans from bilateral donors, which are used to clear the arrears, opening the door to new loans from the Bank and the IMF that in turn are used to repay the bridge loans.\textsuperscript{35} By this stratagem, debts contracted by the ancien régime are recycled as fresh debts of the postwar government.

Today there is renewed interest [in] the doctrine of odious debt. One recent proposal has been to empower an international body—such as the UN Security Council or an independent commission of jurists—to declare governments to be illegitimate, in which case subsequent loans to such governments would be designated as odious (Kremer and Jayschandran 2003). This might curb lending to noxious regimes in the future, but it would not address the legacy of odious debts created by lending in the past.

The case of Iraq has spotlighted the latter issue. Soon after the US-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, US Treasury Secretary John Snow declared, “Certainly the people of Iraq shouldn’t be saddled with those debts incurred through the regime of the dictator who’s now gone.”\textsuperscript{36} In a similar vein, two former US Treasury officials proposed the establishment of an international debt commission for Iraq that would examine all outstanding claims and disallow debt that was used for state security or military aggression (Mulford and Monderer 2003).\textsuperscript{37} Such ad hoc measures, devised on a country-by-country basis, may be better than nothing. A systematic approach to the problem of odious debt, however, could be implemented by establishing an international institution empowered to adjudicate questions of debt legitimacy in postwar countries. The Norwegian government’s call in 2005 for the creation of “an international debt settlement court” to hear matters concerning illegitimate debt is a step in this direction.\textsuperscript{38} In addition to easing debt-service burdens, an institution with a mandate to review debt claims in postwar countries could function as a financial “truth commission,” analogous to truth commissions that aid the reconciliation process by documenting responsibility for crimes of violence. The new Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations, established at the request of the September 2005 World Summit, might be an appropriate forum to launch such an initiative.\textsuperscript{39}

Apart from its benefits to the public purse in postwar countries, such an institution could have a salutary effect on the functioning of international credit markets in the future.\textsuperscript{40}
The risk that debts could be declared odious would curb the moral hazard problem that arises when creditors believe that they are insured against the risk of debt repudiation, diluting their incentives to guard against it. The existence of an international adjudication body would encourage creditors to exercise due diligence in lending decisions, helping to ensure that future loans are used for bona fide public purposes.

Getting Priorities Right

These themes have far-reaching implications for policymaking by governments and international agencies engaged in the interwoven tasks of postwar peacebuilding, statebuilding, and economic development. In the arena of public finance, there is a need for policy reforms aligned to the dynamics of war-to-peace transitions. These include paying more serious attention to distributional impacts on both the revenue and expenditure sides of fiscal policy, weighing potential trade-offs between macroeconomic stability and political stability in setting budget-deficit and aid-intensity targets, and devising innovative strategies to address postwar legacies of external debts.

In the arenas of peace implementation and economic development, there is a need for policy reforms aligned to the public finance requirements of statebuilding. These include devising ways to tap postwar aid inflows so as to prime the pump of domestic revenue collection, moving from the “dual public sector” toward dual control of aid-financed expenditures, and rethinking spending and procurement practices in light of the long-term goals of fiscal sustainability and economic recovery.

Policy Coherence

These reforms would foster greater policy coherence among the many actors engaged in postwar peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development activities. Coherence requires coordination among multiple agencies and institutions with the aim of fostering complementarities rather than duplicating efforts or working at cross-purposes. This is no small task. Although calls for better coordination have become so frequent as to be almost a platitude, efforts to achieve it run up against the familiar obstacles of bureaucratic rivalries and contests for resources.

Coherence also requires agreement on common goals. Getting priorities right presupposes agreement on ends of policy as well as coordination of the means. Policy coherence at this deeper level poses profound challenges, too.

Divergences in policy goals among and within institutions often play out behind the scenes, rather than being debated openly. Sometimes differences in goals are simply ignored, the implicit assumption being that they are complementary—in which case goal coherence is not really a problem. When problems caused by contradictory goals do get raised, they are often blamed entirely on others, and fail to provoke self-appraisal—in which case goal coherence becomes a euphemism for asserting the primacy of one’s own agenda.

Security and Development

Two central goals in much postwar policy discourse are security and development. The relation between these goals has been a focus of renewed attention in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., but the topic has a long history. In Robert McNamara’s book *The Essence of Security*, published in the same year that he left the helm of the US Department of Defense to become president of the World Bank, he argued that development is crucial for security. “In a modernizing society security means development,” he wrote. “Without internal development of at least a minimal
degree, order and stability are impossible. They are impossible because human nature cannot be frustrated indefinitely” (1968, 149).

Yet an operational note on policies in what are now termed “fragile states,” prepared jointly by the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, pointed out that a single-minded focus on economic development “has in cases led to serious shortfalls in funding for critical interventions in the political and security spheres, interventions that are critical to creating an environment for economic and social programs to deliver benefits for the population.” Moreover, the UN and the Bank observe that not all development policies are equally supportive of security: “Well-designed economic and social programs can contribute to political stabilization; ill-timed or badly targeted programs can undermine it (United Nations Development Group and World Bank 2005, 4).”

Although statebuilding can foster both security and development in the long run, the case studies presented in this book point to possible tensions between these goals in the short run. In Palestine, for example, Brynen depicts the contradiction between a patronage-based political order and the need for an economic environment conducive to investment and growth. In Cambodia, Smoke and Taliercio similarly point to the divergence between the “peace and security” approach to public finance, which sees the existing patronage system as necessary for political stability, and the “developmental” approach, which advocates reform in the name of economic growth and poverty reduction. In Afghanistan, as noted above, we find a tension between fiscally unsustainable security expenditures and long-term development needs.

On the surface, these examples appear to pit short-run expediency against longer-run goals. But there are deeper sources of tension that can be traced to competing visions of security and development. Is security merely the absence of violent conflict—what is sometimes called “negative peace”? Or is it the absence of social tensions that threaten to precipitate conflict—sometimes called “positive peace”? The former can be achieved, at least for a time, by means of repression and intimidation; the latter requires political inclusion and shared perceptions of justice. Similar questions can be asked about development: is this defined simply in terms of economic growth, or to qualify as genuine development must this growth be economically inclusive?

In the international community, a further source of tension arises from the differences between the priorities of donor governments and those of the people on the receiving end of aid. When international actors intervene in the name of security, whose security is paramount—the human security of the populace, the national security of the government, or the security concerns of outsiders? Is development success measured in terms of local livelihoods or of benefits to external commercial interests? When priorities do not overlap neatly, what are the overriding objectives of donor governments? During the Cold War, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recalled, “corruption and waste—indeed, results of any kind—were secondary to what donor countries wanted most, namely political allegiance” (2002, 8). It would be comforting, but naive, to assume that with the end of the Cold War this logic has been consigned to history’s dustbin.

The issues of the relationship between peace and the public purse with which this book has grappled are situated within this larger context. Once we recognize potential divergence among goals, however, getting priorities right is no longer only a technical challenge. It is a political challenge, too, forcing us to make choices about fundamental values and the kind of world in which we want to live.

Our premise is that in war-torn societies, building a durable peace should be a top priority for public policy—indeed, the top priority. Both statebuilding and economic development are central to this goal. We have pointed to ways that peacebuilding operations could support these processes more effectively. At the same time, we have pointed to ways that statebuilding and development strategies could be reframed with the objective of peacebuilding more firmly in mind. In war-torn societies, the soundness of public finance policies must be assessed in terms of their effects on the dynamics of violent con-
conflict. Not all policy conflicts can or should be resolved. But if peace is the ultimate public good, policies must cohere around this goal.

POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECOVERY: ENABLING LOCAL INGENUITY

United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery


Overview

The challenges of post-conflict economic recovery

Armed conflict terrorizes and kills large numbers of people. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, nearly a decade of violence in the 1990s led to over five million deaths, due directly to conflict-related casualties, as well as to disease and malnutrition exacerbated by conflict. In a few short years, civil war in Côte d’Ivoire displaced 750,000 people internally and triggered refugee outflows of half a million people. And of course, genocidal slaughter in Rwanda and Bosnia provides particularly tragic examples of the extreme human toll of violence and war.

The economic and political consequences of violent conflict are enormous as well. The legacy of conflict includes substantial loss of livelihoods, employment and incomes, debilitated infrastructure, collapse of state institutions and rule of law, continuing insecurity and fractured social networks. After a quarter of a century of protracted conflict, Afghanistan stands as one of the most impoverished, conflict-prone states in the world, and ranks near the bottom of all human development indicators. The Fund for Peace recently ranked the country in its Failed State Index as the seventh weakest state in the world.

Recent research indicates, however, that the number of armed conflicts globally—those that erupted either during or after the end of the Cold War in 1989—is in decline. There are now about 35 countries that can be described as having entered a post-conflict phase since then. Many of these are low-income countries where conflict has made the already difficult challenges of promoting development much more complex. Economic recovery is essential for reversing and transforming these adverse conditions, and to reduce the risk of a reversion to violence.

This report is about how countries can rebuild the foundations and establish the conditions for self-sustaining, inclusive growth in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. It asks three basic questions:

- What kinds of policies are needed to get the development process restarted?
- What must the national authorities strive for and what actions must they take?
- How can the international community be most helpful?

The report focuses on economic recovery because a sound economy is a fundamental requirement for human development, and because, in the post-conflict context, broad-based economic recovery is critical for avoiding the recurrence of violence.

This report examines the challenges of recovery from three angles. First, it looks at indigenous drivers of economic recovery. How best can the capacities and institutions that have survived a conflict be nurtured and reinforced? How can the efforts and initiatives of households, communities and enterprises be strengthened as they strive to rebuild their
lives at the end of a conflict? Indigenous drivers provide the most viable platform on which to base post-war recovery efforts and international support. Policies that harness and build on social processes and interactions on the ground, and on local capacities, are more likely to be successful and self-sustaining.

Second, the report examines the macroeconomic policies that post-conflict countries can deploy in pursuit of recovery. When war ends, countries face serious macroeconomic problems including massive unemployment, moderate to high inflation, chronic fiscal deficits, high levels of external and domestic debt and low domestic revenue. Successful economic recovery subsequently involves the challenging tasks of steering a course that manages inflation whilst attaining respectable growth, makes the best use of aid, builds a conducive environment for private investment and attains reasonable fiscal autonomy. Fortunately, there is extensive experience to draw on from many countries that have negotiated post-conflict recovery.

Third, the report analyses the role of the state in the economic recovery process. After war, the recovery and rehabilitation of the state itself is a priority, particularly because a functioning state is essential for peace consolidation. The governance and institutional needs that are critical both to economic recovery and peace consolidation include: restoring effective government control over public finances; reconstituting mechanisms for oversight and accountability; recreating a professional public administration; and rebuilding representative and inclusive political mechanisms and institutions.

Dynamics of post-conflict economies

Defining ‘post-conflict’ is not a straightforward task. In some situations, conflicts recur after a short period of peace. In other cases, some violence continues even when conflict has ostensibly ended. There is often no easy ‘before’ and ‘after’. This report characterizes post-conflict countries according to their progress along a range of ‘peace-building milestones’. A post-conflict country should be seen as lying somewhere along a continuum on each of these milestones, recognizing that it could sometimes move backwards. As long as a country does not slip back on too many of these milestones at once, it can reasonably be expected to continue towards recovery. The following are the most important peace-building milestones:

• ceasing hostilities and violence;
• signing of peace agreements;
• demobilization, disarmament and reintegration;
• return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs);
• establishing the foundations for a functioning state;
• initiating reconciliation and societal integration; and
• commencing economic recovery.

Using this approach, most of the countries whose conflicts ended after the Cold War [fall] within a broadly accepted core set of post-conflict countries. The analysis in this report focuses on these countries.

The most tragic consequence of conflict is, of course, the immense loss of lives. In addition, violent conflict invariably generates widespread destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure; reduced levels of human capital due to deaths, disease and displacement; capital flight and the collapse of economic growth; loss of jobs, employment opportunities and livelihoods; weakened institutions; and a decline of social capital, particularly the ‘bridging’ type of networks that reach across ethnic or communal divides. State capacity is generally weakened with the result that the state can no longer finance basic services or infrastructure.

War also causes significant changes in the structure of the economy. In particular, it leads to a substantial increase in subsistence agriculture and informal activities as people who have lost formal employment opportunities struggle to survive through informal produc-
Illicit activities also typically expand as conflict reduces the state’s power to regulate and increases opportunities for drug production and trade, smuggling and theft. To be clear, therefore, the economy never disappears altogether, even during the most pervasive and long-lasting conflicts. Some normal economic activities remain, but there are also shifts in economic activity reflecting the changes in structure and incentives that accompany conflict. Some of the new activities are directly related to conflict, such as the production of and trade in arms. Others flourish because the war situation permits them, such as brigandage, smuggling and drug production and trade.

A recurrent theme throughout this report is the importance of context. While some general trends and common characteristics of post-conflict economies can be discerned, there is a high degree of variation across countries. The length, scope and intensity of conflict, the terms of the peace and the level of development achieved prior to conflict all affect the situation on the ground and the prospects for recovery. Some countries emerge from war with a reserve of economic assets, human capital, functioning institutions and a formal economy that still works. Others do not, and face larger hurdles to both sustainable peace and economic recovery. Policy and programme regimes must be designed and tailored to each case and circumstance.

Countries recovering from war remain susceptible to the recurrence of conflict. Historical evidence suggests that there will be a recurrence in one quarter to one half of these countries. Post-conflict recovery activities must therefore be conflict-sensitive: they should not aggravate the risk of return to violence. Indeed, they should actively evaluate the distributional impacts of programmes and policies—including impacts on horizontal inequalities—to ensure that tensions are not inadvertently aggravated.

Recovery is a process of socioeconomic transformation and not the mere restoration of past structures and dynamics, or a simple return to pre-war levels and trends. As such, recovery is multidimensional and takes time. War results from as well as in socioeconomic and political imbalances. Such imbalances are major factors in the outbreak of conflict in the first place and high-risk factors in the recurrence of conflict. Hence, the extent to which a country is ‘recovering’ from war must be determined in the light of progress in these areas.

Nurturing indigenous drivers

The ultimate aim is to establish the conditions for self-sustaining economic growth and human development while addressing the major risk factors for conflict recurrence. Gender equity must be a key concern in the recovery phase, to recognize the different contributions that men and women make to economic and sociopolitical life, and to ensure, as a moral imperative, equal access to opportunities irrespective of gender.

Post-conflict recovery policy must begin with a robust understanding of the indigenous drivers of recovery. People who live in post-conflict settings do not, in general, wait passively for external agents to finance and direct their activities. Rather, they take charge of their lives with determination and show hard work and ingenuity in resuming or developing new economic activities. Recovery is likely to be more sustainable if it is grounded in the full understanding of these social dynamics and institutional processes, and if it fosters local capacities and initiatives.

Placing local actors and resources at the centre of recovery efforts should not, however, undervalue the crucial role of external assistance. In most cases, local efforts alone are not likely to be sufficient, given the magnitude of needs and the capacities available on the ground, and the various obstacles and challenges that obstruct their full development. There is, undoubtedly, a major financial and technical support role for external partners in working with, building on, and enhancing the efforts of people and their communities and institutions. The message is that external partners and agents must recognize and work with indigenous drivers, harnessing and building on social processes and interactions on the ground.
Some of the major challenges that people and countries face in the aftermath of war include reconstructing social and economic infrastructures, generating employment and livelihoods, reintegrating ex-combatants, reconstituting institutions and social capital, and mobilizing financing for recovery. The overarching message is to recognize that minimizing the risk of conflict recurrence is a critical priority in recovery efforts, and to do this requires understanding of the factors that may have contributed to the conflict.

The following are among the key requirements for nurturing indigenous drivers:

- National actors must take the lead in the recovery process. The best support for post-conflict countries is to work with them to have this capability in place in the shortest possible time.
- Using the logic of recovery alongside conflict risk minimization, basic services provided to ex-combatants should be extended to the host communities, and training programmes should be designed not only for ex-combatants but also for the large number of civilian unemployed youth. Massive public works interventions may be needed to jump-start employment creation.
- In restoring livelihoods, start by building on what is left after the conflict: for instance, by salvaging partially damaged crops and by providing seeds and tools for the rapid initiation of the next crop cycle, and by restoring or replacing damaged livelihood inputs (fishing nets, canoes, etc.).
- Draw on pre-war structures and practices (where they were not a source of tension) to reestablish local consultative mechanisms to anchor the rebuilding of local capacity, particularly for policy and planning design and implementation. Avoid capture of these processes by people who still have more of a stake in war than in peace.
- Avoid excessive reliance on parallel mechanisms to deliver development assistance. Instead, carefully weigh the costs of routing assistance through the state against the benefits of building the state's capacity to manage and deliver services to its citizens. Invest in local resources, procure supplies locally and enhance the capacity of the private sector.
- Microfinance and remittances play crucial reinforcing roles in economic recovery. Microfinance can fund self-employment and ease the financial constraints on poorer households; but its limited potential to generate jobs means it cannot be the anchor for economic recovery overall. Remittances are an important source of support to households, particularly for financing education and health. They should be actively encouraged by reductions in transactions costs and by linking them directly to development activities.
- Multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), and similar pooled funding mechanisms, are an important vehicle to give post-conflict leadership the breathing space to re-establish local consultative mechanisms and anchor the rebuilding of local capacity.

Macroeconomic policy design and management

Analysis of the macroeconomic conduct and performance of countries in recovery indicates that economic recovery is incremental and that policy sequencing is vital. Recognizing the imperative of reducing conflict risk, macroeconomic policy regimes should focus first on jump-starting the economy and on fostering private investment. Other considerations, such as bringing down inflation or raising domestic revenue, are probably better addressed as second-order priorities. More complex reforms, particularly in the domains of financial liberalization and privatization, risk backfiring if the appropriate regulatory regime is not in place. Reforms should be introduced in a way that is compatible with the domestic political economy realities in each country. Specifically, the evidence confirms the importance of commitment and credibility. Successful recovery requires the leadership of governments and domestic political elites that are serious about economic reform and consolidating peace.

Growth alone does not define economic recovery, but it is a necessary component. Dividing countries recovering from conflict since 1989 into two groups according to their
growth performance helps highlight the dynamics of post-conflict economic recovery. Not surprisingly, this exercise shows that growth matters. A return to steady and respectable growth is essential for sustainable economic recovery, the generation of badly needed jobs and the restoration of investor confidence. It is particularly important in post-conflict settings that growth be inclusive, broad-based and conflict sensitive.

The following are among the key requirements for good post-conflict macroeconomic performance:

- Successful growth recovery requires a gradual and sequential approach to reforms. The sequencing of reforms strengthens the reformers in government and builds the political will and institutional capacity to design and implement more difficult reforms later on. Such a gradual approach also allows post-conflict authorities to build the self-confidence and general goodwill that can then be deployed for more complex reforms.
- Recovering economies need to be particularly creative in soliciting the return of private investment. A robust risk-sharing facility can help bridge the gap between the private and social returns that characterize post-conflict situations. The considerable social returns include signaling that peace has been reestablished, which may crowd [sic] in additional investment. They also include the significant conflict risk reduction effect from the employment being generated.
- Countries in post-conflict recovery must re-establish monetary and exchange rate management regimes as soon as possible. They need a central bank that is substantially autonomous and immune to political pressures. Good exchange rate management is essential in post-conflict countries for restoring and maintaining trade competitiveness.
- Financing recovery and creating employment are the priorities of fiscal policy. Another key concern in the immediate aftermath of conflict should be to start rebuilding the capacity of fiscal institutions as quickly as possible. Public expenditures can be recovery enabling if they effectively address horizontal inequalities, promote inclusive growth and generate employment.
- To regain the confidence of the population and rebuild trust after years of uncertainty and violence requires the provision of jobs and basic social services for individuals and households. For communities and local government that means revenue sharing, institutional strengthening and relative fiscal autonomy; while for business it means political stability, clearly articulated economic policies and a commitment to rebuilding investment-enabling institutions. Restoring public services is an excellent start to rebuilding the social contract.
- Aid can be effective and important to post-conflict economic recovery. Managed well, aid does not undermine growth or competitiveness. Indeed it may be an important factor in sustained and high levels of growth. This requires external partners to make early and predictable disbursements of aid, and faster and deeper debt relief. It requires the governments of recovering countries to use the early dividends and space provided by official development assistance (ODA) to restore and reform the institutional capacities and policy-making process.

The role of the state

This report examines three of the core requirements of a functioning state—legitimacy, authority and effectiveness—in the context of recovery from conflict. Conflict undermines the legitimacy of the state, and the post-conflict leadership must work to re-establish legitimacy by including all major stakeholders in social and economic processes. In particular, it must strive to bridge inequalities between different groups. Similarly, it needs to rebuild its authority by re-establishing a social contract and regaining the ability to introduce and implement the required policy regime. Further, new states must assert their effectiveness by restoring their capacity to administer social, political and economic processes and to enforce individual and community security.

Among the key considerations in the role of the state in economic recovery are the following:
Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa

• A continuing absence of security will seriously undermine recovery and economic development. Providing security to all citizens and promoting the rule of law are top priorities for post-conflict recovery.
• Restoring state legitimacy in post-conflict states goes beyond transitional elections. It is imperative to restore representative institutions that foster an inclusive political process, particularly to mitigate the risks of conflict recurrence posed by political exclusion and continuing socioeconomic and inter-group inequalities.
• The ultimate measure of an authoritative, legitimate and effective state is one that has established a ‘social contract’ entailing the reciprocation between the state’s provision of security, justice and economic opportunity and citizens’ acceptance of the authority of the state.
• Priorities for ensuring sustainability of the state include building core capacities and particularly an effective civil service. Almost as soon as hostilities end, strenuous efforts are needed in training and retraining civil servants and public sector managers, and in improving incentives to attract returnees to the service.
• Restoring fiscal capacity means strengthening local revenue mobilization capacity, and controlling corruption and rent seeking, especially in states with abundant natural resources.
• Recovery efforts must work with and from the political, institutional and resource endowments actually available on the ground. These may include informal institutions and forms of governance that lie outside the generally accepted model of the developed countries.

Summary of key conclusions

Post-conflict countries differ from each other in important respects, including the level of income, the damage done by war, the nature of the peace and the resource base. Policies need to take these differences into account.

• The first requirement is that all recovery programmes should be context appropriate and based on a full assessment of the particular circumstances of the country.
• Second, conflict never leaves a ‘tabula rasa’—a ‘clean slate’. Local economic drivers often flourish and many local institutions and modes of social interaction survive during conflict. Post-conflict recovery efforts must understand, build on and work with the social and institutional dynamics as they are on the ground.
• Third, successful post-conflict recovery requires not only sustained economic growth, but also a pattern of growth that is likely to reduce the risk of conflict recurring. As such, growth must be accompanied by employment expansion and must address horizontal inequalities.
• Fourth, macroeconomic policies must give priority to minimizing conflict risk, even as they promote growth. This may mean tolerating moderate inflation and budget deficits. Critically, recovery efforts must also promote policies that attract private sector investment as well as the return of skilled workers.
• Fifth, aid can be very important for recovery, especially in the early stages. But the management of aid must be subject to the logic on promoting and using indigenous drivers and, to the greatest extent possible, should not be a vehicle to promote parallel systems.
• Sixth, a strong and inclusive state is essential for securing stability and recovery. Post-conflict countries need to rebuild state capacity quickly, including the capacity to collect revenue and allocate it effectively. Improved transparency is especially important in natural resource-rich countries where there is much potential for rent seeking.
Introduction

Peace and development remain inextricably linked—one feeding on the other, enabling the other, and securing the other. The renunciation of violence as a means of gaining and holding power is only the beginning. Then must follow a renewed commitment to national development founded on sober, sound and uncorrupted economic policies. (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan)

All these guns make for lazy minds. (Bishop Dinis Sengulane of Mozambique)

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Africa has become synonymous with conflict. There were armed conflicts in 16 of Africa's 54 countries in 1999—an ominous prelude to the new century (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). Moreover, peace is often fragile, making it difficult to apply the term ‘post-conflict’ to many countries.3 War can reoccur after a period of ‘disturbed’ peace (e.g. Angola and Sierra Leone), localized rebellion often continues following a regime change (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), cross-border insurgency poses a constant risk (Rwanda and Uganda), and widespread human rights violations can continue after a civil war’s ‘end’ (Liberia).

There is little chance for sustained pro-poor development in Africa while this tragedy continues. Moving from conflict to recovery is imperative, but how is this to be done? To begin, we must recognize that at least two objectives exist. First there is peace: the end of widespread and continuing violence. Second, there is broad-based recovery that improves the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people, especially the poor.

Much attention has necessarily been given to achieving peace. But broad-based recovery does not inevitably follow from peace. Peace may follow the decisive victory of one warlord over all others, but little may be done to help the majority to recover, and a narrow elite may reap most of the benefits. Similarly, belligerent nations may eventually make peace, but most people may be too weakened by war to share in the recovery (with the poorest being left behind). Again, the benefits of recovery will be narrow rather than broadly distributed.

This book is largely focused on this second objective: how to achieve a broad-based recovery from conflict. To explore this issue the book is organized around the issues facing national actors, specifically communities, the private sector, and the state. Thus unless communities rebuild and strengthen their livelihoods, neither reconstruction nor subsequent growth will be broad-based. But communities cannot prosper unless private investment recreates markets and generates more employment. And neither communities nor the private sector can realize their potential without a development state—one that wields legitimate power and is dedicated to broad-based recovery.

This is not to say that the international dimension is unimportant. Far from it, international actors can assist through better peacekeeping, more aid, and accelerated debt relief. But even if these are in place, recovery can still be too narrow in its benefits—or fail entirely—if communities, private sectors, and states remain weak. Strengthening the capacities of national actors is therefore essential for international assistance to work well.

Although our focus is mainly on the nature of ‘post-conflict’ recovery, rather than on achieving a peace settlement, broad-based recovery can help in securing peace, since it reduces grievances which are in turn major contributors to conflict. Grievances typically start to ferment when one or more socio-economic groups (defined by ethnicity, region, religion, or some combination of these characteristics) experiences a fall in its standard
of living in either absolute terms, or relative to another group. Grievance is often the product of policies that favour a narrow minority, typically widening inequality in incomes and access to basic services (Stewart 2001). Stable societies are those that successfully direct grievance into non-violent channels for both its expression and resolution, and over time most people come to respect these informal and formal institutions (or 'rules of the game' in the terminology of North 1997). But when institutions are weak—and many African countries inherited weak institutions at independence—grievance takes on an increasingly violent character and the social contract that underpins peace can be fatally weakened (Addison and Murshed 2001).

Accordingly, this book argues that changing those economic policies which favour only a narrow elite (and which also harm the poor) is crucial in achieving a broad based recovery from conflict. In so far as these have inflamed grievance, broad-based recovery will thereby increase the chances of a peace deal holding. But this is not to argue that broad-based recovery can necessarily always achieve peace. Those who profit from war may be willing to rip up any peace deal and return to war when political and economic reforms threaten their interests. For example, a transparent system of managing public expenditures is essential if more money is to be released for basic pro-poor services, but this can cut against the personal wealth of those in power. There is no single-lever that can be pulled to achieve peace.

Given the importance of decisions by national actors to a successful recovery, section 1.2 sketches the ways in which conflict affects their decisions. And since the need for reform to achieve broad-based recovery is central to the argument of this book, section 1.3 discusses the relationship between reform and reconstruction in more detail. Section 1.4 outlines the book's structure, and section 1.5 concludes that changing institutions and policies is a difficult but essential task.

1.2. COMMUNITIES, PRIVATE SECTORS, AND STATES

Conflict, be it inter-state war or civil war, has many destructive effects. How these are dealt with during war and in the early years of peace determines whether recovery is broad or narrow. The destruction of physical and human capital together with infrastructure obviously raises issues of priorities: what is to be reconstructed first, and who are the main beneficiaries of the chosen priorities? For example, is the household capital and infrastructure of poor smallholder communities a top priority, or will infrastructure serving high-income urban neighbourhoods come first? Priority setting for reconstruction is discussed at a number of points in this book. Here we address an additional problem that must be dealt with if broad-based recovery is to be achieved: the chronic uncertainty that besets conflict countries during wartime and which can persist long into peace, thereby distorting the decisions of communities, the private sector, and states.

As uncertainty rises during war, communities become unsure about their market access and the prices they are likely to face. They retreat into subsistence production and away from producing for the market, thereby losing opportunities to diversify their livelihoods, and their incomes consequently fall. And they focus increasingly on short-term survival rather than on investment for the future (their private rate of discount rises). One consequence is a shift away from the careful husbandry of the natural capital upon which their long-term livelihoods depend, and deforestation, over-fishing, and over-grazing are the results. Social capital, including the trust that creates informal safety nets, also degrades as families and communities lose members or turn on each other (the kidnapping and induction of children into armies is a particularly vicious example of this). And investment by households in education falls since its expected (long-term) return declines as labour markets contract and as private discount rates rise (an effect that is additional to the increasing inability of households to meet the costs of schooling). Uncertainty’s effects thereby add to the impoverishment and loss of output that results from the separate effects of physical destruction, loss of assets, and loss of life.

Conflict is not the only source of high uncertainty for communities. The government’s policy framework (if a government exists) also matters. Wartime economies can be man-
aged well or badly (see FitzGerald 1997). There are two issues here. First, the policy stance may be supportive of the livelihoods of the poor or it may be adverse (e.g. there may be positive incentives for smallholder agriculture, or it may be overtaxed). In many cases the policy stance is adverse. Second, communities may be unsure about what the policy stance is, and where it is going. Sudden and unexpected shifts in relative prices (input and output prices for agriculture, exchange rates, and interest rates) together with the imposition and relaxation of quantity controls (import licensing and the rationing of basic commodities) create major difficulties for consumers and for sellers of commodities, services, and labour. This issue is explored in a number of chapters in this book.

The same is true for the private sector. During war, the private sector increasingly turns to commerce—the buying and selling of scarce commodities in particular—which offers more immediate returns and also ties up less capital than production (making it easier to disinvest when uncertainty increases). The policy framework often accentuates this sectoral shift away from production; for example currency overvaluation favours non-tradables (which are predominantly services) over the production of tradables. Uncertainty about the direction of policy further lowers the expected profitability of investment in productive activities that have mainly long-term returns.

In summary, when uncertainty is high, communities focus on short-term survival and private sectors focus on short-term profit. For the economy as a whole, the level of investment not only falls, but also its composition shifts away from long-term investment in the productive sectors as well (see Addison and Murshed 2001 for a formal model). This effect can persist after the end of war when the credibility of the peace is in doubt (an uncertainty that can be lowered by better peacekeeping) and the policy framework is left unreformed (an issue discussed in section 1.3 and throughout this book). The prospects for broad-based recovery will then be limited: investment in employment-creating productive sectors will be held back; smallholders and micro-entrepreneurs will see little rebound in their markets; and the recovery in the economy’s tax base (and therefore the revenues for more pro-poor public spending) will be hesitant.

Finally, uncertainty undermines the third major national actor: the state and its institutions. The uncertainties of war shorten the time horizons of state actors, both high and low. Then corruption, together with war-profiteering, replaces long-term planning in the national interest. Corruption is a greater disincentive to community and private investment than equivalent taxation since its application is more random (see Wei 1997). This is exacerbated by policy frameworks that discourage community and private investment thereby adding to the collapse in GDP and the tax base. The state is then unable to maintain the real wages of public employees, leading to further erosion in its effectiveness and to more corruption.

In summary, the distrust that accompanies chronic uncertainty undermines the construction of developmental institutions, since these are ‘a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and shape, the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form expectations of what other people will do’ (Lin and Nugent 1995: 2306, emphasis added). Uncertainty reduces incentives to invest in institutions that have long-term benefits, and instead opportunistic behaviour flourishes in communities, the private sector, and the state.

A number of African countries have now entered an underdevelopment-conflict cycle. Since many countries inherited weak formal institutions from colonialism (and colonialism often dislocated informal institutions of conflict resolution as well). A history of weak institutions generates a climate of chronic uncertainty which in turn lowers and distorts investment. The result is low and unbalanced growth and human development, the intensification of old grievances and the creation of new ones, and fresh institutional destruction. Path dependence becomes critical; informal and formal institutions can eventually degrade to a point at which it becomes exceedingly difficult to resurrect them (the cases of Sierra Leone and Somalia).
This is not to imply that all is lost. Even in Somalia, civil society organizations are working hard to rebuild institutions and to dilute the power of warlords. Our point here is simply to emphasize the scale of the reconstruction problem which goes beyond just rebuilding shattered infrastructure and into the realm of altering the behaviour of national actors. And it leads to a key conclusion of this book that while better peacemaking and peacekeeping are vital, they must be supported by a framework of development policy that lowers uncertainty and encourages long-term investment by communities, the private sector, and the state. In this way, broad-based recovery can be initiated. It is to this issue that we now turn.

1.3. RECONSTRUCTION AND REFORM

Countries attempting to move from conflict to recovery face a daunting range of tasks—everything from conflict resolution to peace-enforcement to demobilization to shifting public money from the military and into development (to cite just four priorities). Moreover, this reconstruction agenda is often accompanied by, and interacts with, the agendas of economic and political reform. Thus national actors find themselves affected by changes in public spending, relative prices, and market opportunities. And the political landscape may change profoundly once a peace agreement is achieved.

The reconstruction agenda includes building peace and securing political stability, recreating or strengthening the basic functions of state administration, resettling refugees together with internally displaced persons (IDPs), demobilizing combatants, and rebuilding basic economic and social infrastructure. The reform agenda has both political and economic elements. Political reform may include rewriting the constitution, the introduction of multiparty competitive elections, and the decentralization of political power. In principle, economic reform can refer to any change in economic policy, not just to the type of reforms favoured by the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). Specific actions include public expenditure reform (changing the allocation of public money and its management), revenue reform (changing the origin and methods for collecting taxes and other revenues), trade and currency reform (altering the structure of import tariffs and quotas as well as policy towards the foreign exchange market), financial sector reform (adjusting controls on lending and borrowing by the financial system together with the institutions of financial supervision), and sector reforms (changing policies for agriculture, industry, energy, and utilities). It goes without saying that the reconstruction and reform agendas are highly controversial and, in the case of economic reform, their design has been intensely debated for years (Addison 2002).

Because these two agendas are so large, the question inevitably arises: which elements should be sequenced first? Obviously there are many elements of the reconstruction agenda that are urgent and immediate priorities, including demobilizing combatants and caring for refugees and IDPs. Some early political reforms are also needed to increase the chances of peace—a timetable for multiparty elections for example—while others might be left for later when some measure of trust has been established between former belligerents. All of this requires considerable political finesse on both the part of national political actors and the international community.

Sequencing the economic elements of the reform agenda is equally tricky. A common argument is that these should wait until reconstruction is well under way. This view is often linked to a periodization whereby a reconstruction phase is said to cover the first two to five years which, if it succeeds in stabilizing the political situation, can then be followed by a second phase during which economic reforms are implemented to secure human development and economic growth (and with humanitarian assistance dominating the first phase and deeper poverty reduction taking centre stage thereafter). Relatedly, it is often argued that economic reform will in some way undermine the chances of political settlement: political leaders can only afford to embark on economic reform once they have secured peace and a measure of social stability.
There is some merit in this perspective for it does at least begin to highlight the priorities. And it is evident at the operational level in the activities of the international community: the UN agencies are often more active in supporting the first phase (reconstruction) than the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) while the reverse is usually the case in the second phase (reform).

But is it correct? It is certainly true that implementing some economic reforms will take time, especially those that are very intensive in the institutional and human resources which are at a premium in the early years of peace. For instance, the need for better financial-sector supervision may be recognized early, but building the necessary central-bank expertise will usually take considerable time. Moreover, politicians may understandably wish to delay policy changes that have unacceptably high political risks—even if such reforms will ultimately deliver greater economic efficiency and/or better poverty reduction (replacing a general wartime food subsidy with better targeted food or cash transfers may fall into this category).

Nevertheless, the argument that economic reform is best kept for a second phase after reconstruction is often taken too far. For a start, it is unrealistic. Economic policy making does not remain ‘on hold’ during wartime or in the early years of peace. Unless the state and its authority collapses entirely (as in much of Somalia) then the economic exigencies associated with conflict force policy responses, and these can be either good or bad for human development (these exigencies typically include the balance of payments crises associated with the contraction in foreign exchange earnings and the fiscal crises associated with the downturn in tax revenue).

More fundamentally, well-designed economic reforms raise the chances that recovery will be broad-based, instead of narrow, in its benefits. Separating economic reform from reconstruction is therefore not only unrealistic, it is also undesirable. To see why, consider public expenditures, and specifically the money spent on reconstruction. In every conflict country, there are strong institutional (and political) biases towards recreating what was destroyed, but what was destroyed may well have been inferior from the perspectives of poverty reduction and human development (for example rebuilding the infrastructure that served large agricultural estates rather than investing in building entirely new infrastructure for smallholders might fall into this category). A thorough examination of public spending priorities and how public money is collected and managed is imperative (otherwise the resources released from reduced military spending will be wasted and the additional resources from reconstruction aid will not be effective). The earliest possible start must therefore be made on public expenditure reform.

Similarly, property rights—especially the rights of poor communities to natural capital (land, forests, fisheries etc.)—must be strengthened quickly through tenure reform, otherwise the poor lose out to the wealthy and powerful in the land-grab that occurs in the immediate years of peace, and they fail to recover the natural capital that they lost to predators in wartime. Moreover, the domestic and aid resources used in rebuilding infrastructure and services will have low returns if policies that hold back the livelihoods of smallholders and micro-entrepreneurs are retained. A thorough and early reconsideration of sector policies—especially towards agriculture which is the main livelihood of many of the poor—is therefore needed, a point that also applies to macroeconomic policy (which has powerful economy-wide effects that may swamp the good work of local and sectoral initiatives).

Finally, it is far from self-evident that economic reform will undermine the political settlement. For sure, badly designed policy-change—for instance an over-restrictive target for the fiscal deficit—could cause recession thereby undermining the political settlement by increasing the intensity of competition for a now shrinking social pie (and IMF fiscal conservatism is often cited as impeding recovery: see Hanlon 1996, Stiglitz 1998). Nevertheless, in assisting the resumption of growth, early policy change can encourage employment growth to absorb demobilized combatants and can, by raising national
income, damp down the economic grievances that are open to exploitation by unscrupulous political leaders. Again, early public expenditure reform is very important. A fairer allocation of public spending (and taxation) across regions and ethnic groups can begin to redress some of the deep social inequalities that often characterize the pre-war pattern of public infrastructure and services—inequalities that may have fed grievances and conflict itself (on the role of 'horizontal inequality' in the generation of conflict, see Nafziger et al. 2000).

In summary, there is only a limited chance for broad-based recovery and growth if policies that impede poverty reduction are not changed during the reconstruction phase (and during war itself, if circumstances permit). Accordingly, while some economic reforms (and some political reforms) might be delayed until after politicians have secured peace and national unity through reconstruction efforts, it is unrealistic (and undesirable) to view the transition from conflict to recovery as separated into a distinct phase of reconstruction followed by a phase of reform. Indeed, when the two are compartmentalized in this way what may well result is not a broad-based recovery in which the poor benefit the most, but a narrow recovery in which an elite (sometimes consisting of those who profited from war) strengthens its position while poor communities stagnate, or fall further behind.

1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book focuses on how to achieve broad-based rather than narrow recovery from conflict, an objective that we have argued requires close attention to the design of economic reform. Accordingly, we do not cover the whole range of issues involved in peace-building, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction—as vital as these may be (the reader is instead referred to recent studies such as Nafziger et al. 2000). Moreover, we do not attempt to cover the selected issues in all of Africa's conflict countries: this would inevitably produce superficial and unhelpful generalizations.

Instead our research strategy is to focus on a selection of key issues in a small, but carefully-chosen, sample of countries: Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. These countries share common histories: Portuguese decolonization in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique; Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia; and the influence of Marxism-Leninism on independence movements and post-independence governments—and the resulting interaction of these national political dynamics with the geopolitics of the cold war (see chapter 2). Subsequent challenges have included political and economic transition, as well as conflict resolution. However, peace has been elusive; Angola went back to war in 1998 (and is now trying for peace again after the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's leader, in early 2002) Guinea-Bissau is politically fragile, and Eritrea and Ethiopia were at war from 1998 to 2000. Only Mozambique has sustained peace. Their common histories yield important lessons not only for the selected country group, but also for conflict-affected countries across the world.

Reconstructing communities, especially poor communities, is the focus of Part II of the book. War fractures communities, destroying human and social capital. But unless the state disintegrates completely, there is potential to manage the wartime economy to mitigate the inevitable rise in poverty, and to lay the foundation for broad-based recovery if peace is achieved. Adaute de Sousa et al. (chapter 3) explore this issue using the case of Angola. Unfortunately, while schemes that support local initiatives (such as the Fundo d'Apoio Social) have helped, the quality of Angola's public expenditure management has not really improved. Consequently, the massive resources available from Angola’s oil boom—US$ 900 million in oil signature bonuses alone—are not being translated into basic pro-poor services or livelihood projects. Angola’s government is achieving far less for the poor than Mozambique’s wartime government, despite having far more resources.

If peace can be secured, then there are many urgent tasks. Even in resource-rich countries there are far more reconstruction priorities than resources. So we need to avoid ‘wish lists’—that is, long lists of everyone’s favourite projects (which simply distort and overwhelm national capacities). Instead, we need to focus on core priorities—those that give
the most return to broad-based recovery. But too often it is the wish lists that prevail. Trying to do a bit of everything results in nothing being done well.

To identify priorities we need good information on communities and poor people, collected using household surveys and participatory methods, and this information must be linked into the policy process (there are many good studies that could have significantly changed policy but which never inform policy design). All of the chapters in Part II illustrate how important data is. Using a unique dataset on households in Manica, Mozambique, de Sousa (chapter 4) provides a compelling snapshot of how households rebuilt their lives in the early years of peace. In particular, she shows how refugees from different backgrounds fared. And she highlights the depth of poverty in female-headed households, which results from a lack of productive assets and inadequate access to education, thereby identifying the public spending priorities that can best facilitate broad-based recovery in rural Mozambique (female poverty is also discussed, this time in an urban context, in Adauta de Sousa et al., chapter 3, and Kibreab, chapter 5, looks at gender discrimination in the post-war labour market of Eritrea).

Access to natural capital is critical to the livelihoods of Africa’s rural poor. This theme is taken up by Kibreab (chapter 5). He shows that the resettlement of refugees and IDPs in Eritrea was facilitated by the land tenure system (and good social capital), but he concludes that government policy on access to natural capital is storing up trouble for the future. Similarly, in Ethiopia Daniel Ayalew et al. (chapter 6) show how the demand for land for new households is rising, but tenure reform remains difficult to undertake, and uncertainty in land access limits investment (similar uncertainty afflicted rural households in Mozambique, see Clara de Sousa, chapter 4). Demobilized soldiers also need assistance in making new livelihoods. Project assistance was largely cost effective in Ethiopia’s demobilization but demobilized soldiers still faced a tough time, in part because of their lack of skills, and an urban labour market that weakened as the government reduced public employment under its fiscal reforms (Daniel Ayalew et al. chapter 6).

To round off Part II, Bigsten (chapter 7) focuses on the longer-term issues of poverty reduction in Ethiopia. He illustrates the difficult trade-offs in allocating scarce public money. Moreover, more resources for the social sectors are not enough. In education, for example, the social and private returns to educational investment will be low unless other reforms accelerate private employment growth. Sadly, Ethiopia’s progress since the overthrow of the Derg in 1991 was disrupted by the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea (the fiscal implications of which are discussed by Addison and Ndikumana in chapter 15 in Part IV of the book). Human development in Ethiopia (and Eritrea) is still a long haul— even to raise human development indicators to the average for low-income countries— and the high military spending associated with the meltdown in political relations between the two countries absorbs resources that are better used in helping poor communities.

To rebuild, and to have a chance of getting out of poverty, communities need functioning markets in which to sell their products, services, and labour and to buy food staples and inputs (certain that they can buy staple foods, households can diversify into non-food cash crops which also require secure supplies of purchased inputs). Whereas trade within and between communities does some of the work, raising the overall level of market activity (especially in wage labour), and creating well-functioning national markets (especially in food) requires substantial private investment by large- and medium-sized enterprises. But the investment decisions of such private actors are very much affected by the decisions of state actors, particularly as regards macro-economic policy (an issue that we raised earlier in this chapter), the transfer of state assets wholly or partly into private ownership, and the regulatory framework. The state's actions may have disincentive effects, they may be broadly supportive, or they may disproportionately benefit specific private sector actors, particularly the well-connected (sometimes to the detriment of both the less influential parts of the private sector as well as communities—in access and control over valuable natural capital, for example). The character of the private sector is therefore very much a product of state actions, where the latter are in part influenced by the private sector itself, as well as by pressure from communities (and inter-
national actors, both donors in their dialogue and conditionality on reform, as well as foreign commercial interests). Accordingly, these are the themes of Part III of this book, with its focus on ‘revitalizing the private sector’.

The problems that an adverse and constantly shifting policy framework creates for the private sector are highlighted in Aguilar (chapter 8) which discusses Angola’s incomplete transition from state socialism (chaotic reform, and the hyper-inflation associated with it, have also been terrible for Angola’s poor). At the same time as encouraging private investment, the state must regulate in the public interest. For instance, prudential supervision of the financial system is critical, especially if—as in many ‘post-conflict’ countries—restrictions are lifted on lending, and private banks are permitted to operate. Banking crises are common in post-conflict countries, and they undermine reconstruction. Recapitalizing bust banks has a large fiscal cost, and this takes public money away from social priorities (a case in point is the crisis in Mozambique’s two largest banks, in which the government retains part-ownership). Addison and Alemayehu Geda (chapter 11) address these issues using the example of Ethiopia. Following Stiglitz (1998) they argue for caution in financial liberalization until regulatory capacity is strong.

Unfortunately instead of protecting the public interest, favouritism may dominate policy resulting in narrow rather than broad-based reconstruction. For example, non-transparent privatization in Angola and Mozambique has led to large asset transfers that will affect the pattern of growth (and the distribution of its benefits) for years to come (an issue discussed by Castel-Branco et al. in chapter 10). The phenomenon of ‘straddling’ (alliances of state and private actors) is also prevalent, leading to market interventions that generate monopoly profits, to the cost of small enterprises and consumers (including the poor). A prime example is Angola’s ‘few trusted enterprises’, discussed by Aguilar (chapter 8).

‘Community’ is a useful shorthand for discussing common problems. Nevertheless there is significant stratification (and conflict) within and between communities, which war accentuates. In Mozambique, households with access, to the wartime parallel economy and connections to local elites acquired assets which facilitated their post-war recovery while poorer households often fell further behind (losing assets), thereby weakening their supply-responses to reform and reconstruction measures (Wuyts, chapter 9).

In summary, while the resources and decisions of communities and the private sector are crucial to broad-based recovery, these national actors need a capable and effective state to provide a clear development strategy together with public goods such as law and order as well as economic and social infrastructure. Transforming the state is the theme of Part IV of the book.

Eritrea provides an appropriate starting point, since a new state had to be constructed from scratch after the country’s independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s. Until 1998 at least, Eritrea provided a very positive example of what could be done to create better state institutions (Hansson, chapter 12). Among our selected countries it had the clearest development strategy, and arguably a higher level of national ‘ownership’ of that strategy than either Ethiopia or Mozambique (where donors have exercised considerable influence through the level of support they provide). But the 1998–2000 war, which went against Eritrea, and which has now resulted in an uneasy cease-fire, undermined much of the good work of the immediate post-independence years. Guinea-Bissau, in contrast, has struggled ever since independence to create a development state. After many years of increasing poverty, a promising reform programme was knocked off track by a military mutiny and a short, but vicious conflict, in 1998. Kovsted and Tarp (chapter 13) discuss the rebuilding of the country, and strategies for the international community to assist in shoring up what is an extremely fragile state. In particular, they argue for a ‘Win-Hold-Win’ strategy to guide donors in prioritizing when so many goals need to be met. This strategy may have applicability to other conflict-affected countries as well.
Without improved fiscal systems, to provide more domestic revenue and to better manage public expenditures, the transformation of states will go nowhere. And the improvement of human development indicators is critically dependent on getting more money into pro-poor services such as primary education and basic health care. At the same time, public spending levels and revenues must be compatible with an appropriate overall target for the fiscal deficit. Policymakers tread a thin line between ensuring that the overall fiscal stance facilitates reconstruction spending while at the same time avoiding the kind of overheating that results in the hyper-inflation that Angola has experienced. This is one of the most difficult areas of policy to get right.

Accordingly, the last two papers of Part IV focus on the fiscal dimension. Bevan (chapter 14) discusses how fiscal federalism in Ethiopia runs alongside political decentralization (essential for reducing regional grievances which otherwise fuel secession) and the problems that necessarily arise for poorer regions without large tax bases. Addison and Ndikumana (chapter 15) then provide a comprehensive overview of the fiscal crisis of the African state, including discussion of the fiscal effects of war itself (in particular the impact of the 1998–2000 war on the finances of the Ethiopian and Eritrean states), and the controversy over fiscal-deficit targets for economies in reconstruction (Mozambique in particular). They round off the discussion by addressing the debt relief dimension, which has assumed increasing importance, as countries struggle with unsustainable debt burdens.

In the concluding chapter (16 in Part V), Addison draws together the themes of the book, featuring in particular the interaction of politics with economics. Aside from being the condition of any peace agreement, replacing one-party states with multiparty politics offers the promise of political freedom—a essential, but traditionally neglected, dimension of development progress. But the transition to a multiparty system will not necessarily reduce favouritism in policy making, and may indeed increase it. Warlords can turn themselves into successful peacetime businessmen and politicians. Private contributions to winning parties can buy tax breaks, mineral concessions, media monopolies, regulatory capture, and dilution of prudential bank regulation.

And these concessions are against the public interest. They are also anti-poor (for example concessions of valuable natural capital to influential commercial interests, leading to a loss of access and livelihoods for communities). Meanwhile, countervailing powers—in particular trade unions—have sometimes been weakened by economic reform (Mozambique is an example). And new countervailing powers (for example an independent media) may be underfinanced and subject to state harassment (often the case in Angola and, worryingly, a new trend in Mozambique).

Wartime capital accumulation by state actors and rebels contributes to ‘post-war’ private investment. Such private investment converts ‘roving’ into ‘stationary’ bandits (in Mancur Olson’s terminology). This may lead to ‘peace’, but may not help broad-based reconstruction (e.g. Liberia). In summary, strong private investment is critical to recovery but the business–state relationship can be problematic, especially when democratic institutions—to oversee and protect regulators acting in the public interest—are weak or only just emerging.

1.5. CONCLUSIONS

Governments frequently compartmentalize issues of reform and reconstruction into separate strategies and separate ministries (the fate of poverty reduction as well). Donors do likewise, for each has its own responsibilities. However, reform and reconstruction cannot be kept separate if conflict is to be halted and poverty reduced. Biases in public spending, predatory taxation, and bad policy encourage conflict by reducing the incomes, both absolutely and relative to others, of social groups that suffer from such discrimination—thereby inflaming ethnic and regional tensions, and helping demagogues recruit their followers.
If resources are available, then rebuilding shattered infrastructure is a reasonably straightforward task. Reassembling pre-war institutions may not be too difficult either. But it is a lot harder to change institutions and policies, especially when these favour one social group over another. And unless this is done, then recovery will be narrow rather than broad in its benefits, poverty will remain high, and conflict will almost certainly return.
Peacebuilding begins with understanding the sources of a conflict. In debates over the last decade, many scholars have come to refute or discredit mono-causal explanations concerning the relationship between natural resources and conflict and have begun to search for transformative approaches to resolve natural resource conflict issues at all levels. The readings in this chapter look at the complex nature of the natural resources–environment conflict relationship and its rich and nuanced implications for peacebuilding.

The popularisation of the greed versus grievance theory of resource conflicts has prompted much debate in academic and policy circles over the last eight years. The primary thesis in this theory is premised on the idea that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the export of primary commodities—agricultural products and natural resources—are highly prone to violent conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that the cause of conflict can be attributed to greed or grievance, but that greed is the stronger motivating factor: there is a strong correlation between the greed of rebel groups and their trade in natural resources, mostly ‘lootable’ natural resources.\(^1\)

Many other scholars have sought to refute this explanation for the cause of war and the relationship between natural resources and conflict—that is, the premise that greedy rebels take up arms for financial and other benefits—and instead call for more reflective examination of the nature of the state and state-society relations as well as structural inequalities in North-South interactions. In ‘Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, Macartan Humphreys challenges the interpretation of the resource-conflict link that sides with the rebel greed hypothesis as the dominant explanation. He argues that this theory is insufficient in the face of pervasive state weakness and the inability of states to foster strong state-societal relations. He suggests eight alternative mechanisms to explain this relationship. These mechanisms include some obvious linkages—that natural resource dependence can be associated with greed rather than grievance, that natural resources provide a way to finance rebellions that have other reasons for their onset, and that rebels may not hold a monopoly on greed (as states and corporations engage in or foster civil conflicts)—as well as structural explanations, such as the fact that economies dependent on natural resources may be more vulnerable in terms of trade shocks, which can breed instability.

In ‘Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South’, Kenneth Omeje acknowledges that many of today’s intra-state wars occur in the South in countries where there is an abundance of resources and notes the propensity of these conflicts to arise in the face of the development of rentier economies. A country whose economic survival depends to a very large extent on economic rents generated from natural resources is said to have a rentier economy. Such economies generally have three distinguishing characteristics: rent from natural resources is the major source of government revenue; all or a majority of the rent generated from natural resources have external origins; and only a small number of people in the population are engaged in and benefit from rent-seeking activities.

\(^1\) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2000).
Omeje highlights the fact that rentier economies—often engaged in extractive industries, such as oil, diamonds, gold, and so on—are pervasive in Africa, not coincidentally home to the poorest countries and where development plans are often severely lacking and weak states prevail. A cursory look at the economies of Angola, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone reveal this phenomenon and explain in part the marginalisation of large segments of their societies and the high number of violent conflicts. Enhancing citizen participation in the economic development activities of the state lies at the heart of addressing these issues.

Neil Cooper, in ‘Peaceful Warriors and Warring Peacemakers’, focuses on the international arena, questioning whether ignoring (as many scholars do) the structural causes of conflicts, including globalisation and inequities in relationships between North and South, leads to skewed analysis of what drives war economies. Cooper suggests that concentration on certain ‘pariah actors’ and goods serves to obscure the breadth of actors and the underlying structures that play a driving role. This has important implications for peace-building.

He argues that the ‘control agenda’ that has developed over the issue of conflict trade is immersed in a discourse marked by a number of features that serve to circumscribe its application to post-conflict peacebuilding. The ‘control lite’ approach, which has been confined to voluntary initiatives, largely obviates the need to address the contradictions in neo-liberalism, most notably the fact that the same neo-liberal drive for free trade, open borders, and deregulation that forms the basis for prosperity and relative peace in the North also provides the permissive conditions for the de-territorialised network trade of conflict entrepreneurs. ‘Prophylactic control’, on the other hand, tends to address problems that war and informal economies export to the West, such as drugs, asylum seekers, and sex workers, protecting the West from contamination rather than dealing with structural issues. ‘Deep control’ is an alternative, Cooper suggests, that would require intervention in the global economy to redress inequalities between North and South (and within the North). This would include creating regimes able to place meaningful sanctions on firms and states that benefit from conflict trade, such as an international institution to tackle the crisis in commodity prices. He underscores the need to address the underlying social and structural dynamics that war economies create and reflect and to redress the ‘exclusion and peripheralization in the global economy that shadow trade is a response to’.

Sam Moyo and Prosper Matondi focus on structural dynamics that link the international and national with the historical through the case of land, a natural resource directly related to livelihood. In ‘The Politics of Land Reform in Zimbabwe’, they examine the relevance of historical context, here where colonial-based, severe structural inequalities related to land and other resources have spawned a protracted and at times latent conflict for more than a century. The authors assess the role of different actors in the land reform process, how they compete for land and other resources, the historical basis for their claims, and how they adapt positions as circumstances change. Moyo and Matondi identify ways in which political considerations have been inserted into the land policy process and how the government of the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front has espoused contradictory policies and resorted to extreme measures, such as intimidation and fear. Their research shows that conflict mediation in Zimbabwe has been complicated by the overly rigid positions of some NGOs and donor agencies over the land issue. They underscore that it may not always be possible to avoid violent conflict in the realisation of important and legitimate national goals and that international donors tend to privilege the preservation of law and order at all costs, which may entail the maintenance of unjust and inequitable social structures. They suggest the need for all actors to be more flexible in their policy stances on the issue.

In ‘Environment and Natural Resource–Related Conflicts’, Rolain Borel, Erin McCandless, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer argue that many natural resource–based conflicts also involve issues of identity and ideology and thus require examination beyond a hunt for technological solutions. While aiming to resolve structural issues, transformative approaches
require addressing and building trust and confidence between parties, using consensual and process-based mechanisms that recognise the interdependence of the parties involved, (re)establish local stewardship mechanisms, and incorporate roles for institutions. The authors examine various approaches being taken to try to transform natural resource–based conflict in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America—each with its own historical, political, economic, and conflict context but all relevant in designing peacebuilding interventions with greater potential for success.

These articles collectively illustrate the need for more nuanced and sophisticated understandings of the links between natural resources and violent conflicts in order to advance suitable and sustainable responses. Over the last couple of years, more attention has been given to thinking about the practical mechanisms that are being developed to harness and utilise natural resources as critical assets for post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding in ways that benefit stakeholders at all levels. A useful review of literature and practice on this topic can be found on the Peacebuilding Initiative’s Web site.²

² See under Thematic Areas at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org. From there, go to Economic Recovery and then to Natural Resources.
Most contemporary studies of international conflict, and many models of intrastate warfare, rely on a traditional image of a conflict as a contest between two well-defined, exogenous, and internally homogeneous sides. Whatever its value for the study of international disputes—where rally-round-the-flag effects often appear to quell disagreements within nations—this approach is inadequate for describing many contemporary civil wars, particularly those centered on natural resource wealth. In particular, the failure to recognize the diversity of actors and incentives results in an overly narrow consideration of the options available to policymakers.

Research since the 1990s suggests that the presence of natural resources can have unifying or fragmenting effects on political allegiances and military structures, depending on the motivations of fighters and the type of resources. This work has pushed researchers to look more carefully at how groups are constituted, what motivates them, and how these factors affect the onset, duration, and intensity of conflicts. This new work draws attention to a dizzying array of actors—government and rebel fighting units, themselves often fractured into multiple competing factions that fight against or alongside mercenary units, civil defense militias, government-sponsored paramilitary organizations, international peacekeepers (sometimes with agendas of their own), spillover factions from neighboring states, and criminal networks eager to get in on the action. Through their role in funding conflicts, other international actors are implicated. Foreign sources of funding include sponsorship by foreign governments and corporations, remittances from emigrant populations, the capture of international aid and relief, and financing provided by transnational organized criminal groups. Most prominently, international actors are implicated by the part they play in trade that finances the various parties to a conflict. While contemporary conflicts cannot be explained by “globalization,” it is nonetheless the case that density of international economic exchange has resulted in a wide set of global actors that are implicated in domestic conflicts.

Alongside a recognition of the multiplicity of groups and diversity of their interests comes a greater recognition that belligerents are economic as well as political actors. They are motivated in part by their economic conditions, the economic structures that shape their views, and the economic alternatives available to them. Economic structures affect the degree to which governments engage with their population, the attitudes of citizens and the ability of states to resolve disputes, either peaceably or through force. The choices fighters make during conflict are determined in part by the economic costs and benefits associated with different strategy options and by the structures of rewards and incentives in the group within which they fight. Economic structures affect the aims of groups: in some cases, patterns of fighting suggest that groups collude to perpetuate conflict in order to allow for local monopolies on extraction, production, and trade. Economic interest also affect the levels of violence employed against civilians.

So too, economic costs and benefits shape incentives for peacemaking: the attractiveness of peace depends, in part, on the economic conditions that fighters enjoy during conflicts and the economic pressures that can be brought to bear on them to bring conflicts to an end. Ending conflict also depends on the economic provisions of settlements—on provisions for continued control over “conflict commodities” and for jobs and training—and on expectations of future punishment for economic activities undertaken during conflict.

Such a diversity of actors and incentives suggest that there are many points of entry for policy to alter the linkages between exploitation and trade in natural resources and armed
conflict. In order to better identify policy opportunities, this chapter describes five modalities through which natural resources are linked with conflict. These include rent seeking, or the political impact of the availability of large natural resource rents to ruling elites, often referred to as the "resource curse"; grievances, primarily associated with the (mal)distribution of natural resource wealth and project-related impacts on local communities; economic instability, accruing from the distortions associated with the country’s high dependence on natural resources; conflict financing, or the channels through which access to natural resource wealth affects the means for belligerents to continue fighting; and, related to this, peace spoiling, by which natural resource wealth alters the incentives for peace. In describing each modality, I highlight the policy challenges involved and propose possible policy response and mechanisms—many of which are addressed in subsequent chapters of this volume. The diversity of these modalities demonstrates that the problem of managing the security implications of economic activity is not limited to the international politics of interrupting illicit commodity trades and breaking up transnational criminal networks but also to the more mundane tasks of promoting conflict-sensitive business practices among multinationals and helping governments to manage large annual variations in resource revenues and to facilitate balanced growth in resource-dependent economies.

**Natural Resources, Rent Seeking, and Conflict Risk**

The existence of natural resource wealth results in the availability of rents that can be easily monopolized by national elites. This can lead to three distinct types of conflict risk.

First, concentrated resource wealth may induce rebels to use violence to gain control over the state in order to capture these rents. Arguably in Sierra Leone, the Republic of Congo, and Angola, the availability of natural resource rents in the form of income from diamonds and oil worsened conflict risk by increasing the "prize" value of capturing the state. According to several accounts, the desire to control oil rents in Chad led to the assassination of President Ngarta Tombalbaye in 1975, the rise of Hissène Habré in the 1980s, and the coup against him by President Idriss Deby in 1990—all of which occurred long before any oil was actually pumped.

Second, even if elites do not monopolize rents, their usage of natural resource wealth may readily be perceived as corrupt. Natural resource wealth is commonly viewed as "unearned" and particularly easy to embezzle, especially where associated transactions are not conducted with transparency. For these reasons, and because populations often lack adequate information on how much revenue is generated from natural resources, natural resource income is commonly, and popularly, associated with corruption. The problems commonly associated with perceptions of corruption can be compounded in the case of natural resource extraction, when losers interpret the actions of elites as a sell-off of national patrimony. Widespread suspicion of corruption provides would-be rebels and coup makers with the legitimacy required to undertake actions against the state.

Third, and paradoxically, states that have access to large sources of income from external sources often have weak governance structures. When states rely on income taxation or corporate taxation for their revenues, they are compelled to respond to the demands of their citizens and to create institutions that engage their citizens. However, when they come to rely almost exclusively on "unearned income" such as revenues from natural resources, they may fail to develop these stronger institutional structures and, as a result, become more exposed to citizen alienation and even violent protest. In extreme cases, such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Sierra Leone, reliance on these external sources of revenue likely accelerated state collapse. Against this background, various policy options for managing the resource curse suggest themselves.

**Transparency Initiatives by Governments and Corporations**

Several initiatives have been developed to increase the transparency associated with payments from extractive industry corporations to governments in developing and
conflict-prone countries. Leading initiatives include the Publish What You Pay campaign, promoted by Global Witness and the Open Society Institute, which lobbies for greater transparency in reporting “who gets what” from natural resource wealth. More transparent budgetary processes would allow populations to see that political leaders do not receive private benefits from being in government and can reduce the financial incentives to take up arms to control the state. Such transparency removes the legitimacy of would-be coup makers by giving governments the ability to demonstrate that business dealings in the natural resource sector are in fact straight. Policy mechanisms to provide greater financial transparency are being designed and promoted, notably through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative initiated by the government of the United Kingdom in 2002. These mechanisms are beginning to be tested. The June 2004 Abuja Joint Declaration by the governments of Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe, for example, is a departure from common practice with a declaration of their willingness to publish production sharing contracts as well as all revenues received from oil corporations. To date, however, this sort of transparency remains rare. Even in the case of the World Bank–sponsored Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, often described as a model of socially responsible revenue management, the details of the deal struck between the governments of Chad and Cameroon and the oil consortium are not publicly available.

There is formidable opposition to transparency initiatives among host governments and corporations. A core aim in the discussion of improved practices of transparency should thus be to determine under what circumstances nondisclosure agreements work to their advantage or disadvantage. Certainly, as evidenced by Angola’s draft oil legislation of August 2004, states are often eager to maintain secrecy. And corporations can argue that they cannot effectively promote transparency if host governments are against it. So, alongside lobbying to promote transparency, a better understanding of why some states oppose transparency measures will likely help the development of strategies for greater openness in the industry. Hiding corrupt practices is one obvious motivation, but others may be as important. Plausibly, the revelation of poorly bargained deals in the past may weaken the hand of domestic negotiators in future rounds. However, the logic could work in the opposite direction: in sufficiently competitive markets, information on older profitable deals won by corporations could increase interest in future deals, to the benefit of oil-producing states.

Oversight Institutions

Another approach to greater transparency in the extractive industries is to improve institutions of financial oversight. This can be done by using citizen advisory councils, as recommended, for example, by the Open Society Institute and as instituted in Chad as part of the World Bank–supported revenue management program. There are several open questions as to how such advisory councils should be designed and, indeed, whether they should be used at all. Important design questions include (1) how to determine council membership, in such a way that the composition is genuinely representative of the population, (2) whether these councils should include international representatives as members, and (3) how the councils can be assured the political independence needed to take governments to task for inappropriate revenue management. Perhaps the most important design question concerns the powers that such institutions should have: whether they should be able to block budgetary processes ex ante or refer abuses to courts ex post and whether their mandate extends to the review of procedural or substantive issues. In assessing the utility of supplemental oversight bodies, a core consideration is whether they risk undermining normal institutions of governance by fulfilling functions normally undertaken by parliaments and courts.

Strengthening Interdependencies between States and Citizens

A third way of undercutting the pernicious effects of rent seeking is to strengthen the linkages between states and their citizens. One approach is to increase the level of popular involvement in financial and development planning. This could involve strengthen-
ing oversight of government planning through parliamentary commissions, public hearings, or national conferences. In general, a way of reaching consensus regarding the use of natural resource revenues is to tie natural resource expenditure to longer-term development planning, linking it with national poverty reduction strategies or with national strategies to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals. The concept of citizen advisory councils, discussed above, can also be broadened, for example, by making budgets subject to referendum or by structuring electoral competition more explicitly around expenditure plans.

A second approach focuses on policies that help to diversify the state’s revenue base. Prohibiting the use of resource revenues to fund particular government functions, such as defense, could provide incentives for states to maintain targets for income or commodity taxation, rather than relying exclusively on resource rents. To further reduce the incentives to rely on resource rents, donor governments could place restrictions on natural resource-backed loans by prohibiting liens or encumbrances on the use of future natural resource revenues. A final possibility for achieving a similar goal through nondistortionary taxation is to convert rents into income tax by distributing all natural resource revenue directly to citizens and then reclaiming a share of distributed revenues in tax.

Direct Distribution of Resource Revenues

A new approach to managing resource wealth is to allow natural resource revenues to bypass government altogether. One approach is to distribute revenues directly to citizens, as has been done in Alaska in the form of the Alaska Permanent Fund. This approach has political and economic implications. It reduces the “prize” value of the state, making it less attractive for violent capture or corrupt rent seeking. In principle, direct distribution could also help strengthen state institutions, as government revenues would depend on developing efficient tax-collection systems. The risk, however, is that if these tax alternatives are not available, direct distribution could result in starving well-intentioned states of resources that they could use to build their governance capacity.

Aside from the question of whether the approach actually strengthens government institutions, there is the difficult question of economic efficiency: in what circumstances will private expenditure decisions be more efficient than public ones? The choice of policy will likely depend on the extent to which governments are capable of managing revenues well. Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian suggest that in the case of Nigeria, whatever the difficulties associated with the distribution process itself, direct distribution would certainly lead to more efficient expenditure than that presently undertaken by the central government. It is likely, however, that the states that would benefit most from this option—those that are least likely to spend resource wealth well—are also the ones least likely to redistribute wealth widely.

Grievances: (Mal)Distribution of Natural Resource Wealth and Disruptive Social Impacts

There are many ways that a country’s natural resource wealth can induce political grievances that may ultimately turn violent. First, distribution of natural resource wealth is more likely to be perceived as unjust in those areas closest to the resource deposits, where populations are most directly affected. In Nigeria, for example, to legitimate their increasingly violent political struggles, communities in the oil-producing regions have pointed to the unjust distribution of revenues from resources exported from their regions. In Niger, insurgent groups in the north protested that the south benefited disproportionately from revenues gained from the uranium wealth generated in the north. In some cases, such as in Casamance (Senegal), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), and southern Sudan, arguments about inequitable distribution of resource wealth may reinforce existing ethnic or communal secessionist movements.

Second, the extraction of natural resources can spark new grievances in producing regions due to perceived inequity in the distribution of extraction and transport-related jobs.
Grievances may also arise from the production process itself, if it leads to forced migrations from a producing region or new inflows of migrants into the region. Where left unattended, such grievances can produce violence after operations start, as was the case, for example, in West Papua.

Third, grievances also may be provoked by the ways that security is provided to extractive operations on the ground. These operations, typically situated in remote areas, are often highly vulnerable targets of insurgent attack or criminal theft. In the Niger Delta, as much as 10 percent of all oil production disappears due to theft of oil from pipelines. In some cases, such as Sierra Leone, responses to such concerns have included the use by both extractive companies and governments of unaccountable security forces, some of which have been implicated in assaults on civilian communities, forced labor, and other human rights abuses. There are a number of policy options to help reduce such resource-related grievances. While these may be employed individually, a coordinated, multifaceted approach is likely to have greater positive impact.

Consultations

Too often decisions about natural resource operations remain the prerogative of companies and their partners in host governments, regardless of their broader societal impacts. An obvious way of reducing resource-related grievances is to strengthen the consultative processes whereby populations are involved in deciding whether and how resources are to be extracted, how revenues are to be spent, and what institutions should oversee the use of resource revenues. Here there are a variety of options available to governments and companies alike.

In Bolivia, a referendum was held to determine how to manage the country’s natural gas resources. This produced a limited form of national deliberation: the referendum itself consisted of five relatively complex questions, and many saw it as a vote of confidence in the government. Despite divisions in the run-up to the referendum, this approach appears to have brought political calm to the issue of resource management. São Tomé and Príncipe has undertaken a much deeper consultative process. In the summer of 2004, a national forum was held to discuss the economic future of the country. The forum involved printing up bulletins for every household with details of the government budget process, the structure of the oil industry, and the likely size and impacts of oil revenues. Then small meetings, open to all, were held throughout the country, at which community groups discussed expenditure priorities and appointed representatives to voice their position at the national level. These approaches are just being tested, and what is needed now is an evaluation of the extent to which sharing the problems of natural resource management broadly in fact reduces suspicions and frustrations.

For extractive industry companies, introducing routine consultations with local communities can help them to better anticipate and manage the risks associated with their day-to-day operations. These consultations can take the form of periodic informal meetings with local populations or more formal stakeholder arrangements that involve local populations in routine monitoring of company performance. In both instances, such engagement can, in principle, reduce mutual distrust, identify potential conflict points, and provide a channel by which local concerns can be effectively communicated. To date, however, there is a dearth of reliable evidence as to what sort of company engagement works and what does not. While some companies have undertaken selected case studies that have yielded some promising ideas, more systematic comparative study is needed to determine when and how these consultations produce the desired effects.

Earmarking Revenues for Resource-Producing Regions

A second approach is to ensure a fairer distribution of revenues to the areas whose populations are most likely to feel aggrieved—the producing areas. The government of Chad, for example, has earmarked 4.5 percent of dividends and royalties from annual oil production for “decentralized communities” within the oil-producing region. Although it is
still early to say how well this will work, there are deep suspicions in the south that these funds will not reach the official targets. Indeed, the fears are that these benefits will pass to northerners moving to the south, will be substituted for other funds, or may not be spent at all; after all, the law allocating the funds, passed in 1999, can be modified by decree every five years. Nonetheless, if these transfers are made, and made visibly, they would likely go some way toward countering complaints that the oil industry is based on the theft of southern resources by the northern government.

Besides being used to alter perceptions, earmarking can be used to alter incentives. An initiative in Sierra Leone is striking in this regard: in the diamond-rich Kono area, once a hotspot in the Sierra Leone war, the Diamond Area Community Development Fund has been established to earmark official diamond revenues for producing areas. The aim is to encourage local opposition to illegal mining by giving residents a stake in the legal diamond industry.

“Do No Harm”: Reforming Corporate Practices

There is a fairly broad consensus that corporations working in natural resource-producing areas should observe high standards for the respect of human rights, environmental protection, and respectful treatment of local populations. There is less consensus, however, about what exactly these standards should be and how they should be enforced. A large array of guidelines exist, including the Global Compact’s Ten Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions, and the United Nations Subcommission on Human Rights’ draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.” In addition, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights have been developed by the U.S. and UK governments, several companies, and nongovernmental organizations, specifically to address problems arising in the course of providing security to operations and personnel. The principles are a voluntary code of conduct by corporate and government actors to ensure that the security forces they hire conduct themselves responsibly.

These voluntary guidelines and principles carry no legal weight and typically are not accompanied by enforcement mechanisms. A core question, then, is what impact, if any, these guidelines have had. There are possible positive learning effects, to be sure, but there are also causes for concern. The fact that adherence to these guidelines is voluntary may mean that the companies most likely to sign on would be those least likely to violate the principles in the first instance. Furthermore, to the extent that compliance reduces the competitiveness of firms, the net result may be an increase in market share to firms that do not aim to comply. Even among those that do join, in the absence of enforcement, companies can reap reputational benefit by claiming to comply with guidelines without, in fact, altering their practices.

A second approach to corporate reform is the use of more robust regulation by the corporations’ home countries in order to govern activities by corporations in host countries. This is the principle behind the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1997), and, more recently, the UK’s Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2001, section 109). It is also the impetus that is driving recent plaintiff litigation against corporate misconduct in the developing world under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act.

The two approaches are not in principle mutually exclusive. One advantage of the binding regulation over the voluntary initiatives is that, as it can be undertaken by states unilaterally, it can be done more speedily. For the same reason, however, it has a limited effect on corporations based in states that have less activist public oversight of corporate behavior. Again, this could work to increase the market share of companies less concerned about corporate social responsibility, including conflict mitigation and human rights protection. In principle, this problem could be resolved through universal
adoption of norms, accompanied by international institutions of enforcement, but the development of the needed international consensus in support of such institutions will be a slow and complicated process.

The question, then, is how best to combine the regulatory strength of the first approach with the multilateral reach of the other. Some answers to this question may follow from an analysis of the Kimberley Process, discussed below, which succeeds in combining a voluntary framework with regulatory reform in participating states.

“Do Good”

While “doing no harm” should be an evident priority for companies engaged in extractive industries, large-scale resource extraction projects offer numerous opportunities for corporations to actually improve the standards of living of citizens in producing regions, and more broadly. The oil consortium in Chad, it seems, missed an opportunity to greatly improve relations with local communities when it did not move to support the development of the energy sector in Chad. With enormous technical skills compared to those of the host country, the consortium quickly built electric generation capacity of 120 megawatts for its own needs—capacity more than five times Chad’s total capacity at the time. A requirement that such infrastructure projects also take place in and for the benefit of producing regions may reduce real and perceived inequities. The fear, however, is that social projects may not achieve their aims: they may open up possibilities for local rent seeking and may not necessarily benefit all sides equitably, thereby creating secondary sources of protest.

The question, then, is whether and how corporations can use such projects to better develop their relations with local communities to the real economic and security benefit of the latter. As in the case of community consultations discussed above, the answer to this question can best be found, not by firms writing up select case studies of success stories, but by their partnering with research groups to engage in systematic comparative research in order to identify the relative efficacy of different types of interventions.

Resource Dependence and Economic Instability

Beyond the perverse incentives it creates for individual and corporate behavior, natural resource abundance, and particularly a country’s dependence on resource exports, can have broad implications for the structure of national economies. First, changes in the value of natural resources can weaken the manufacturing sector of an economy—an effect sometimes referred to as “Dutch Disease.” If the manufacturing sector is itself more intensive in internal trade, then the collapse of manufacturing may prevent the economy from benefiting from the conflict-mitigating effects of trade. Second, economies that are dependent on natural resources may be more vulnerable to terms of trade shocks. These could cause instability and dissatisfaction within groups that suffer from the shocks. Unless citizens understand the source of these shocks, instability and political dissatisfaction within groups that suffer can lead to high levels of dissatisfaction with, and even violent opposition to, government. In both cases, effective policy responses will require the generation of longer-term development plans and revenue management strategies that aim to mitigate the security risks.

Policies to Reduce the Impact of Price Fluctuations

Natural resource funds (such as oil funds) can be used to stabilize national natural resource income. If annual budget financing is based on the interest on accumulated savings, rather than on the revenue earnings of a given year, then annual variations in finances injected into the economy will be largely independent of year-to-year changes in commodity prices and production. Even if the share of annual revenues to be injected into the economy depends in part on estimates of the present value of future commod-
ility earnings, these can be calculated by using moving averages of prices in order to reduce the impact of year-to-year price fluctuations. Beyond the stabilization of actual injections, steps can be taken to manage expectations. Notably, the measures that promote transparency, as described above, have the benefit of allowing citizens to identify the international sources of (and to allocate blame for) income variation.

Policies to Ease Sectoral Reallocations of Labor

There are predictable effects of new finds of natural resources on sectoral labor allocations. If resources are extracted, natural resource booms will pull labor into the extractive sector itself, or into sectors that service it. In Chad, for example, the development of the Doba oil fields was associated with an influx of migrants from the north to the south. Even if the extraction process is conducted in an enclave, Dutch Disease effects can lead to labor flows from traditional export sectors to the nontradable sectors—or to new spin-off growth sectors. This can lead to frustrations in traditional export sectors as producers see incomes collapse, to clashes in producing regions as new migrants enter, and to new inequalities as some groups benefit more easily from new wealth opportunities than others.

Responses to these problems include retraining to facilitate movements to new sectors, particularly among disadvantaged groups, and allocating a share of revenue earnings for credit for start-up companies or for communities wishing to undertake individual projects. Such policies will likely involve economic inefficiencies. A basic policy question, then, is how to determine when conflict risks are such that these inefficiencies are worth accepting.

Economic Diversification

Each of these problems is likely to be reduced by policies that promote greater diversification of exports. The key problem, however, is that economies that are rich in natural resource exports will, by virtue of that fact, not have a strong comparative advantage in other economic sectors such as manufacturing. Contrary to the prevailing prescriptions of international financial institutions, diversification will likely require that countries not follow their comparative advantage. This, in turn, will likely require greater government involvement in the design of economic structures, possibly through the use of tax incentives or the establishment of free zones. An obvious strategy for governments seeking to reduce natural resource dependence is to link the extraction of resources to the development of associated industries—for example, developing shipping services in countries with offshore oil, promoting diamond-cutting and polishing industries in diamond-producing countries, and constructing oil refineries in oil-rich states. In some instances, firms involved in the extraction of natural resources have considerable expertise in related industrial sectors; in these cases, host countries could include projects designed to tap this expertise and to diversify domestic economic structures, as a part of their negotiations with extractive industries.

Conflict Financing: Natural Resource Wealth and War Making

Even if conflicts are started for other reasons, access to natural resource financing can sustain them. Financing keeps combatants alive and fighting, even in the absence of significant military victories by either side. The problem of protracted conflict may be particularly severe when both sides benefit from resources. The duration of the Angola conflict, for example, can be explained in part by the fact that both sides had access to natural resource financing to support their combatants. For this reason, much energy, in both the research and policy communities, has focused on ways to cut financing to belligerents once a conflict begins. Several policy options exist.

Sanctions

To date sanctions have proved to be a blunt weapon of policy, with most attempts at coercion through sanctions ending in failure. If armed groups finance their activity through trading in illegal commodities such as drugs or smuggling commodities such as arms or rough diamonds illegally, the existence of sanctions is likely to be irrelevant. There are
several political economy reasons that sanctions may fail. The ability to transship through neighboring states can severely reduce the impact of sanctions. Leaders can also turn sanctions to their advantage, both economically and politically, by maintaining control over increasingly scarce commodities. Hence, even when sanctions have real impacts, it is not just the intended targets that suffer.

Sanctions policies have become more sophisticated, with the development of targeted commodity sanctions and with the freezing of assets or blocking particular individuals’ freedom of movement. However, because of their lack of comprehensiveness, targeted sanctions may lead to the exemption of particular commodities through successful lobbying by industries with economic interests in those commodities. Needed, then, is a reexamination of ways to improve the use of sanctions, taking account of these political economy aspects.

Certification Regimes

A second approach targets commodities more than the individuals that control their flows. In some cases, such as efforts to curtail the trade in illicit commodities like narcotics, the implementation problems are old ones. A more recent challenge has been to devise methods to regulate illicit trade in legal commodities that can fuel conflicts. The commodity trade for which the greatest advances have been made is the trade in diamonds, particularly through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The Kimberley Process uses a certification scheme to regulate the international trade in rough diamonds, aimed at separating “conflict diamonds” from “prosperity diamonds.” The process is a good example of a voluntary mechanism that works. Unlike the Global Compact, for example, participants in the Kimberley Process include states and regional economic integration organizations as well as companies and encompass key exporting, refining, and importing countries. They are relatively few in number and are focused on a well-defined issue area of broad common interest. The process is multilateral but makes use of the domestic institutional strength of its members: one innovation of the Kimberley Process is its requirement that participating states pass legislation to ensure that diamond shipments are free of conflict diamonds. The process has demonstrated a commitment to ensuring that the scheme is not abused by participants hoping to whitewash practices taking place in their countries: following evidence of the Republic of Congo’s failure to enforce the provisions of the process, it was ejected from the process in 2004. Despite ongoing concerns about weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the Kimberley scheme has created an inclusive international regime for the certification of rough diamonds. It has also opened the prospect that the model can be extended to other conflict commodities.

Punishment

While sanctions target belligerents during the course of a conflict, tools also exist to punish economic actors after a conflict ends. Special courts have been established for holding actors accountable for their roles in violent conflict and egregious human rights abuse in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone. But, as yet, indictments have not been directed at actors for their commercial activities. Even in Sierra Leone, where the prosecutor of the Special Court has interpreted the war as being driven by greed and where his role has been to indict “those that bear the greatest responsibility” for war crimes, “economic crimes” have not resulted in indictments. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has also indicated willingness to investigate business entities that fuel conflicts and has begun his first investigations into Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stating that investigating “the financial aspects of the atrocities allegedly committed in Ituri will be crucial to prevent future crimes.”

Key questions in this regard are whether ex post punishment is sufficient to serve as a deterrent in these contexts and how the existence of ex post punishments can be balanced with the need to provide belligerents with the economic and political security they need to bring conflicts to a close.
Peace Spoiling: The Impact of Natural Resource Wealth on Incentives for Peace

Conflicts are likely to endure if belligerents gain more during conflict than they would in times of peace. One reason why parties to a conflict may not agree to peace arrangements— even those that leave everyone better off— is that wartime provides them opportunities to engage in activities that they would not be able to undertake during peacetime, either because the activities are illegal or because a party’s dominance in the industry depends on its ability to use violence. For natural resource–fueled conflicts, approaches to help bring such peace spoilers to the negotiation table include the following.

Ad Hoc Training and Investment

Providing alternative inducements for would-be spoilers and establishing bases for alternative livelihoods can make peace more attractive. Where conflicts were driven in part by natural resource predation, there may be especially strong arguments for the expansion of the public sector in order to provide alternative employment opportunities, even if such expansions otherwise entail efficiency costs. This may require timely aid increases in tandem with peace negotiations. Such strategies are being attempted with United Nations–led disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Haiti. Such programs can be expected to be particularly important in areas experiencing resource conflicts. Survey results indicate, for example, that fighters in Sierra Leone saw the provision of training and job creation as among the most important items of peace negotiations and an important incentive for laying down arms. However, while most were happy with the training supplied by the UN, few have been successful in integrating into the work force. Unemployment has been the greatest source of frustration for these ex-fighters, and, by some accounts, limited employment opportunities and possibilities of advancement for ex-combatants may yet undermine the security of the country. As one ex-fighter put it, “DDR should keep to their promise if they don’t want more problems in the country. The bad thing is, if there is a re-occurrence of war, you will find it very difficult to disarm the combatants because they will think that they are lying to them the second time.”

Integrating Development Planning and Conflict Resolution

Alternative livelihoods are a precondition for peace for many fighters, but the investments that are needed to create these livelihoods are unlikely to flow into conflict and postconflict settings because of the uncertainty and risks involved. One way out of this dilemma is to encourage and coordinate the participation of the private sector and development planners in peace processes. Doing so can increase the information that economic actors need in order to encourage investments that can support and enhance the viability of a peace agreement. Such a process may also serve to reassure belligerents that alternative economic futures are possible.

In all cases, providing material incentives for belligerents to resolve conflicts carries two concerns— one normative, one positive. The normative concern is that, in practice, such policies may be viewed as rewarding criminals, particularly where the greatest rewards are directed to the worst perpetrators of violence and associated human rights violations. The positive concern— which has not been well examined in empirical academic work— is that the strategy may induce “moral hazard,” the risk that expectations of future rewards for demobilizing may perversely encourage participation in future conflicts.

Conclusion

In this overview I have identified many policy options available to governments, corporations, and the international community more broadly. These options involve ways of cutting finances, managing expenditures, and distributing income with a view to breaking the major linkages between natural resource wealth and conflict. The options are promising, but many come with costs. The task undertaken in the subsequent chapters
of this volume is to evaluate the multiple options, argue ways in which they may be improved, and identify which options are appropriate in what contexts.

Let me close with a caution. In discussing the policy options available for outside actors to intervene in order to prevent or resolve violent conflicts, I have set aside the normative implications of these options. Alongside a discussion of how to intervene to produce sustainable peace there is a need for a treatment of when to intervene and whom to support. In practice, different policy options will typically have asymmetric effects on different parties to a conflict: advocating policies that target particular forms of commodity financing and financial flows means taking sides, depending on who is benefiting from the commodities at any particular point. Yet the arguments for favoring one side over the other are rarely articulated. Indeed, much of the policy discussion of the financing of civil wars is often grounded in an assumption that lucrative natural resource sectors function to the benefit of rebels only. In response, policy responses tend to focus on ways of cutting these finances. But the latent assumption that the rebels are the—or the only—“bad guys” sidesteps the thornier question of the legitimacy of armed struggle. This assumption poses three problems. First and most evident, in some instances the judgment may not be normatively consistent: a default position of opposing rebels may in fact serve simply to strengthen abusive states against populations with few options to express their grievances. Second, the likelihood of a military victory will depend not simply on the level of economic assets available to rebels but on the relative strength of the fighting groups. If rebel groups have the upper hand, then reducing their resources may make a decisive victory less likely. Third, perceptions of the legitimacy of a struggle have pragmatic as well as moral implications. In particular, in cases where there is local support for the actions of rebel groups, as with Chechen rebels, the Viet Cong, and the Irish Republican Army, and where people with regular employment can serve as “part-time guerillas,” rebellion may be cheap. Purely financial responses to conflict in such cases are likely to be inadequate.

The appropriate response to managing the resource dimensions of armed conflict will therefore depend on which side those undertaking intervention want to win or whom they want to benefit from a negotiated settlement. This is a political, not a technical, question. Successful policy coordination based on answers to the question requires the development of criteria to establish the neutrality of intervention or the development of criteria for choosing which side, if any, “we” hope will win. The current international norm is to support governments over rebels, no matter how abusive the former. But, as was made obvious by the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, while there is sometimes a powerful constituency supporting forced regime change, there is no international normative or practical consensus guiding when and how such regime change is appropriate.
The concern of this article is with the legacies that war economies and the discourses surrounding war economies leave for peacebuilding after conflict. In particular, it will be suggested that the concentration on certain pariah actors and certain goods serves to obscure both the breadth of actors and the underlying structures that drive war economies.

**Conflict, Trade, and War**

The trade in resources such as diamonds, drugs and even people has become one of the defining features of the “new wars” of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, there is now a burgeoning political economy school that highlights the rational calculations underpinning even vicious wars, and the sophisticated networks established by warring factions to exploit the shadow markets created by local wars in a globalized world. In so doing, the literature potentially offers an alternative to crude “ancient ethnic hatreds” explanations of conflicts such as those in the Balkans or to the notion of “new barbarism” used to explain what has been described as “the coming anarchy” in weak African states.

This alternative in itself is significant for peacemaking and peacekeeping because discourses emphasizing the primordial nature of current conflicts effectively disguise the complicity of the developed world in creating the conditions for conflict and thus the moral responsibility this brings to work for peace. Indeed, the characterization of contemporary conflicts as war between erratic primitives habituated to violence has encouraged some to argue that we should simply “give war a chance” as peacemaking between such actors is pointless prior to victory or war exhaustion. In contrast, the political economy characterization of local warlords as rational agents plugged into regional and global trade networks not only suggests such conflict entrepreneurs might be pressured into peace and peacebuilding but that they are as sensitive to a change in their framework of economic incentives as any other business. For instance, when the price of the mineral coltan, used in the manufacture of mobile phones, rose exponentially on world markets a few years ago, this led to the coltan equivalent of a gold rush as the warring factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) turned to mining the mineral to finance war.

Recognition of this sensitivity to external market forces has led to the emergence of a control agenda over the issue of conflict trade, most notably with respect to the trade in conflict diamonds. For instance, the UN imposed embargoes on diamonds from UNITA in Angola and the RUF in Sierra Leone. Sanctions have also been imposed on the export of rough diamonds from Liberia in recognition of its role as a conduit for RUF diamonds. In addition, states, industry and NGOs have come together in the Kimberley process to develop an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. The declared aim is to guarantee that rough diamonds traded around the world are not conflict diamonds. Although elements of the scheme are still under discussion, implementation began by the end of 2002.

**The Control Agenda and Peace**

Despite initiatives on diamonds, the discourse on war economies and the emerging control agenda has been marked by a number of features that have served to circumscribe its application to post-conflict peacebuilding.

The discourse has largely been focused on the role conflict trade plays in the inception and perpetuation of war. This may appear an odd statement to make, as war economies might seem by definition to be creatures of conflict. This is precisely the point however. The process by which war economies have been problematized has served to mark them
out as exceptional and distinct rather than reflective of broader responses to both globalization and the structural violence inherent in North-South relations. Indeed, conflict trade tends to be represented as a form of criminalized deviancy perpetuated by violent leaders or warlords whose interests exist outside of, and in opposition to those of the broader society they inhabit. Such trade is thus demarcated as an aberration grafted onto decent society by the conditions of war, leading to the concomitant assumption that the conclusion of war and the defeat (or reincorporation) of the deviant will inevitably create conditions for cessation of the trade—especially with a little dose of good governance and neo-liberalism.

In contrast, while war economies may well be a vehicle for predatory warlords, they can also serve important economic, social, and welfare functions, even amidst (and sometimes because of) high levels of violence. For instance, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has developed a sophisticated social safety net that includes a minimum wage for coca pickers and pensions for retired guerrillas. Similarly, the coltan boom in the DRC led to an influx of miners, which in turn created a local trade in prostitutes and treatments for sexually transmitted diseases—both paid for in coltan. Post-conflict strategies that emphasize criminalization/eradication without also establishing new mechanisms of profit and power for these communities are more likely to embed recidivism than to build peace.

Furthermore, narratives on the informal economy also undergo a shift in the transition from war to peace—while war economies are depicted as serving economic and political interests, albeit of homicidal warlords, war economies in peace are constructed as a problem of “ordinary,” de-politicized criminality or corruption. In other words, they are depicted as a problem of a different order and of a different kind. In reality, war economies not only reflect social transformations that amount to the creation of alternative systems of profit, power, and protection, but ones that have their roots in pre-conflict economic structures and which either persist in, or adapt to, the conditions of post-conflict peace. Indeed, at the extremes, the persistence of war economies after war may simply result in a homicidal peace in which post-war killings equal or exceed those in war.²

War economies, then, do not simply disappear as one deals with criminals or in response to the application of good governance initiatives after peace. Instead, they mutate in relation to the conditions of peace, often evolving to feed off the new dynamics created. At the extreme, as in the case of UNITA and the RUF, the ability to continue illicit trade means peace spoilers retain the wherewithal to resume war if peace seems to be delivering fewer benefits. Even where peace agreements hold, the influence that war elites establish over key economic sectors during conflict can reverberate through the process of state reconstruction and peacebuilding, effectively perpetuating war economies or the economic dominance of war elites, under conditions of non-war. This has been the case in both Bosnia and Cambodia.

Even where action, in the form of regulation and policing, is taken to address the legacies of conflict trade in peace, the effect can be to either create new opportunities for illicit trade or simply to act as a spur to innovation. For instance, the transition from war to peace in Sierra Leone is supported by a national Certificate of Origin Scheme designed to guarantee that only government-authorized diamonds are traded abroad and to implement the embargo on Liberian diamonds noted above. However, the effect of sanctions on Liberia has meant that the problem of RUF diamonds being routed through the country has been reversed, with Liberian diamonds now passing through dealers in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire who specialize in laundering Liberian rough. Indeed, according to some dealers, the introduction of a certification scheme in Sierra Leone has made it easier to launder diamonds as it obviates the need for complicated smuggling through other countries. Furthermore, insurgents in Guinea and particularly the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) in Liberia are now reportedly using diamonds and other commodities to fund their activities. It is also the case that illicit smuggling simply for tax avoidance purposes remains endemic across the region.
External intervention in the process of peacemaking and peacebuilding can also create new opportunities for shadow trade that pre-existing war elites can exploit, often drawing on the same global networks previously utilized to fund war. First, peace negotiations often focus on the agents of violence. The interests of civil society are consequently treated as an afterthought, considered only once the parameters of post-war power and political economy have been established in agreements with warlords or militaries whose main concern is maintaining influence, rather than transforming the status quo. At the extreme, peace agreements can simply entrench a warlord political economy, as occurred in Sierra Leone where the peace accord of 1999 allocated responsibility for the country’s diamond trade to Foday Sankoh, the leader of the rebel RUF. Sankoh simply used his position to facilitate personal business deals and the RUF continued to mine diamonds.

Second, aid workers and peacekeepers create a new and distorted local political economy that may even be antithetical to long-term development. A good example is the creation of a market in which translators and drivers are paid more than teachers and engineers. They may also create shadow markets too—most notably in the sex trade that arises to service the internationals. In some cases, intervention may even contribute to a political economy that promotes conflict. In Somalia, control over food aid and the provision of security guards to nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) gave local warlords a material interest in preserving the insecurity that fueled the trade in both.

Third, the very policies advocated by external agencies may create new economic opportunities for war elites while simultaneously undermining the goals that the policies aim to achieve. For instance, the application of neo-liberalism provides new openings for war elites to enrich themselves through control of privatization processes, while also fostering the illicit economy as an alternative to welfarism.

Pariahs and Peace

A further issue that the emerging control agenda on conflict trade raises for peacebuilding relates to the way its articulation both reflects and reinforces narratives of conflict. However, such narratives can skew perceptions of the challenges involved in the transformation of war economies in peace.

There are two aspects to this problem. First, while the literature on war economies inevitably highlights the complicity of first world businesses in fueling conflict, the concentration on certain pariah actors (UNITA, RUF, Charles Taylor) risks pinning the blame for conflict on avaricious warlords (as opposed to say avaricious Western businesses or arms exporting states). Indeed, some studies, e.g., Collier’s work emphasizing greed rather than grievance as the explanation for civil conflict, have elevated this bias to the status of economic fact. Thus, rather like the ancient ethnic hatreds thesis the literature purports to reject, much of the work in this field risks putting war down to the uncivilized barbarians outside the zone of peace rather than the actors inside.

Second, the control agenda has tended to define conflict goods as things that are traded by rebels, or at the outside certain pariah regimes. Typical of this is the definition on conflict diamonds given in a UN General Assembly resolution on the issue in December 2000. This defines them as rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments.

Thus, diamonds sold by UNITA are conflict diamonds but those sold by the Angolan government are not. This of course follows much the same logic that governs the sale of arms to states: that sovereign (and legitimate) governments have a right to self-defense. However, the definition of rebels (as opposed to say the “freedom fighters” of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance or in Northern Iraq) and the definition of legitimate states is more a function of the narratives constructed around individual conflicts than a reflection of objective reality or of the scale of resource predation. For instance, while Liberia and the RUF have experienced embargoes on conflict goods, the resource predation of Uganda
and Rwanda (both in favor with the UK and U.S.) in the DRC has gone unpunished. Similarly, it has only been Charles Taylor and the RUF that have been targeted for international opprobrium over the trade in conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. In contrast, a relative silence has been constructed around the trade conducted by peacekeepers, pro-government forces in Sierra Leone, and wider society in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.

This has implications for policy after war. There is a concomitant risk that narratives of past resource predation will have a detrimental influence on policy toward the political economy of present peacebuilding. In particular, there is a danger that external patrons will consider action against local or regional “rogues” as sufficient to transform war economies, while the activities of other actors continue to be overlooked or constructed as a problem of a lesser order. In Sierra Leone, for instance, while the diamond embargoes on the RUF and Liberia remain (quite rightly) in place, it is equally the case that the current government of Sierra Leone is widely viewed as corrupt by its citizens. This view is reinforced by the recent closed door decisions to grant large and long-term diamond and oil concessions to foreign companies, by the fact that four senior members are themselves reportedly engaged in illicit diamond mining, and by the use of diplomatic bags to smuggle diamonds.

Third, just as the activities of certain actors may be highlighted in the dominant narratives of conflict developed by external actors, so the trade in particular goods—most notably drugs and diamonds—has become the focus of concern. Again, this has implications for the strategies adopted in peace as many conflicts are in fact characterized by illicit activity across a range of sectors. For instance, an estimated 60–70 percent of the Taliban’s $100 million war budget was actually derived from revenue earned through the smuggling of fuel, consumer, and durable goods rather than opium.

To date at least, there has been a tendency to particularize both the range of actors who engage in conflict trade and the conflict goods deemed worthy of control. One consequence of this is to encourage a “drugs and thugs” cum pariah goods control agenda which effectively obscures attention to the broader political economy that conflict leaves as its legacy.

**Control-Lite and Prophylactic Control**

While this agenda certainly hampers the development of effective peacebuilding strategies, it nevertheless serves important functions in the maintenance of the neoliberal order. First, it keeps the responsibility for conflict neatly pinned on criminal leaders. At worst it extends complicity to the venality of specific individuals and companies in the developed world—who can usually cop a plea bargain. In contrast, the criminal effects of a global system that produces the permissive conditions (structural violence and underdevelopment) for much conflict are provided with an alibi.

Explaining war by reference to avaricious warlords obviates the need to explain why substantial portions of society often participate in the shadow trade that supports war economies or to consider the role of poverty in fueling conflict. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, the site of 40 percent of the armed conflicts in the world, nearly half the population live on less than a dollar a day. The average life expectancy of an African citizen is just 48 years—and falling, while the region’s share of world trade (excluding South Africa) fell from three percent in the 1950s to 1.2 percent in the mid-1990s. Between 1997 and 1999 the combined annual index of free market prices for primary commodities, which represent 80 percent of Africa’s export earnings, fell by 25 percent. In this context shadow trade, whether in war or peace, represents the means by which those excluded from or relegated to the periphery of the global economy reincorporate themselves into its workings. For instance, in Angola as little as 10 percent of the country’s gross national product (GNP) is thought to be produced through the formal economy while in Afghanistan an estimated 80 percent of the economy and 30–50 percent of the population has been involved in some aspect of the drugs trade.
Second, the focus on specific commodities or specific actors allows a judicious mix of “control-lite” and “prophylactic control.” Control-lite reflects an approach toward conflict trade in goods for the formal economy that leaves large swathes of business free of formal restrictions—whether it be oil in Angola, coltan in the DRC, or timber in Liberia. At best, control has been confined to voluntary initiatives by industry. The one exception is the issue of conflict diamonds. Even here, proposals for an international certification scheme for diamonds have been constrained by industry interests, with the result that the putative regime lacks teeth. For instance, monitoring and enforcement is by self-regulation and some elements of the system are merely “recommended” or subject to voluntary participation. This has led the U.S. General Accounting Office to note that, as currently envisaged, the scheme may simply “provide the appearance of control, while still allowing conflict diamonds to enter the legitimate diamond trade.”

Crucially “control-lite” avoids addressing the role of neo-liberalism in fostering inequality and conflict. In contrast, deep control would require intervention in the global economy to redress inequalities between North and South (and indeed within the North). For instance, Oxfam has called for an international commodities institution to tackle the crisis in commodity prices. This might also address the conflict trade in such goods. Deep control would also require the creation of regimes able to place meaningful sanctions on firms and states that benefit from conflict trade. Ironically, such sanctions tend to be most often available only when actors offend the principles of free trade. For instance, in 1999 British Airways was fined £4 million for breaching EU competition rules (by offering extra commission to travel agents who increased BA ticket sales). In contrast, funding war economies merely tends to result in the kind of PR problems that the oil firm Talisman has experienced over its operations in Sudan or that Sabeena has over its transportation of coltan from the DRC.

By focusing on rogues or individual companies (or even individuals within individual companies), “control-lite” also largely obviates the need to address the contradictions in neo-liberalism, most notably the fact that the same neo-liberal drive for free trade, open borders, and deregulation that forms the basis for prosperity and relative peace in the North also provides the permissive conditions for the deterritorialized network trade of conflict entrepreneurs. This is brought into sharp relief on those rare occasions when attempts are made to control conflict trade. Thus, the putative international certification scheme for conflict diamonds has been hampered by disagreement over how to reconcile the requirement to cease trading with nonparticipants and by agreements such as GATT, which enshrine free trade.

Prophylactic control, in contrast, tends to address the problems that war and informal economies export to the zones of peace in the West—e.g., drugs, asylum seekers, sex workers. The emphasis here has been on creating a cordon sanitaire around the developed world rather than addressing the structural causes of such trade. The aim is to prevent transmission (except by video camera) of the “virus of disorder” to the developed world. For instance, the UN Drug Control Program in Central Asia has largely focused on interdiction, border control, and strengthening of law enforcement agencies. Ironically, however, the emphasis on “sticks rather than carrots” has not only been criticized as hypocritical (the domestic strategies of many developed states do in fact emphasize harm reduction) but also as ineffective.

Conclusion

Both discourse and policy on war economies have tended to treat them as separate and distinct from both the pre- and post-conflict economy. In reality, war economies tend to represent simply more violent versions of the neo-patrimonialism and external trade relations that characterize many developing states both before and after conflict. Assuming that peace will inevitably resolve the legacies that war economies leave behind is thus a forlorn hope. In addition, the discourse and control agenda surrounding conflict trade has been constructed in a way that negatively affects peacebuilding. In particular, the
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focus on certain pariahs or specific conflict goods tends to understate the complexity of war economies and the social function they serve—features that persist into peace.

There is a need instead to address the underlying structural and social dynamics that war economies both reflect and create. In particular, it is important to redress the exclusion and peripheralization in the global economy that shadow trade is a response to. In addition, civil society needs to be empowered so that it can play a role in monitoring and influencing the political economy of peacebuilding. Last but not least, if a political economy of peacebuilding is to be constructed, attention needs to be paid to deconstructing the narratives of war and war economies that have developed, as these often produce a skewed and partial truth which hinders the development of effective policy and thus also inhibits the transformation of war economies in peace.

EXTRACTION ECONOMIES AND CONFLICTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: RE-ENGAGING RENTIER THEORY AND POLITICS
Kenneth C. Omeje

Excerpted from Kenneth Omeje (ed.), Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-Regional Perspectives on Rentier Politics (London, Ashgate, 2008), 14–23

Rentier Politics and Conflicts in Extractive Economies: Contending Perspectives and Empirical Trends across the Global South

A large number of recent research publications by highly regarded scholars and leading multilateral institutions such as the World Bank clearly suggest that developing economies with high rates of dependence on extraction and export of natural resources have a correspondingly high propensity to corruption, poor governance, mass poverty, societal fragmentation and violent conflicts (including civil wars). Natural resources, in particular, oil and hard-rock minerals like coltan, diamonds, gold and other gemstones, are said to play a key role in instigating, prolonging and financing these conflicts (Ross, 2003, p. 17). Other non-mineral resources like timber and coca (hard drug) have also been linked to major conflicts. There are different ways in which natural resources contribute to conflicts. These include:

1. Struggle over ownership and control of specific natural resources or ‘extractive spaces’ by various stakeholders (the state inclusive) and groups within a state or between states, often compounded by external intervention or support for one of the conflict parties.

2. Struggle over distribution and use of public revenues derived from natural resources by various local stakeholders and groups.

3. Inability of weak state institutions to cope with large rents from natural resources coupled with prebendal looting, misappropriation and exclusion of significant sections of the society, leading to violent protests and resistance.

4. Use of official and unofficial revenues from natural resources by the state and its governing elites to build up and finance strong repressive security machinery as a means to keep the hegemonic elites in power against opposition from counter-hegemonic forces.

5. Use of legal and illegal rents from natural resources by splinter groups, disgruntled factions of the governing elites and opposition forces to sponsor anti-government insurgencies, secession movements and insurrection.

6. Organized predation and extortion of big business (extraction and mining companies) by aggrieved militia groups protesting against issues of resource-related misgovernance, exclusion, biodiversity destruction and ecological damage.

7. The blatant politicization and mismanagement of conflict-issues and legitimate grievances related to natural resources and the rentier economy.
Interests and intervention of external parties and stakeholders, forces of imperial governance, predatory networks and militarist regimes on the extractive economy of a relatively vulnerable state.

As demonstrated in many contemporary civil wars and low intensity conflicts in rentier economies, the above factors are not mutually exclusive. As the various chapters in this study demonstrate, conflict instigating and aggravating factors in most affected countries are multiplex and context-specific just as the conflict stakeholders and protagonists are diverse and variable. Hence, a rigorous contextual analysis and multiregional comparison of the conflicts, a number of which can actually be classified as ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs), are essential. CPEs is a concept enunciated by the UN in the 1990s to describe the proliferation of major crises in transitional societies, the majority of which were intra-state conflicts, characterized by multicausality, and requiring multidimensional international responses, including a combination of military intervention, peace support operations, humanitarian relief programmes, high level political intervention and diplomacy.6

Theoretical Perspectives

In addition to this introductory chapter that engages the question of theorizing rentier politics in the global South, Usman A. Tar in Chapter 2 ‘critically explores the frontiers of theories on rentier politics, extractive economies and conflict in the global South’, as a means to ‘advancing alternative perspectives.’ Based on a systematic critique of what the author describes as ‘the first generation theory’ (i.e., the Rentier State Model of ‘mainstream’ pioneer theorists like Mahdavy, Beblawi and Luciani) and ‘the new generation theories’ (i.e., ‘resource curse’ versus ‘paradox of plenty’, ‘greed and grievance’, and the political ecology paradigm) the author underscores the relative under-theorizing of causal relationships between extractive economies and structures/outbreak of violent conflicts. He attributes the under-theorizing tendency to acute methodological shortcomings associated with the dominance of limited factor approaches (LFAs) and limited context approaches (LCAs) in the study of rentierism in the global South. Tar delved into a review of diverse scholarly works to establish the main discursive features and flaws of LFAs and LCAs. He finally argues that ‘to comprehend the dynamic terrains of, and correlations between rentierism, natural resources and conflict’ there is need for an integrated holistic approach (IHA) that takes into account the broad range of factors (multi-factor) and contexts (multi-context and cross-cultural), as well as underlying causalities and correlations in rent-related conflicts.

Country-Specific Studies

In Chapter 3 Michael Watts ‘explores the relations between the political economy of oil—and the ancillary question of the Nigerian rentier petro-state . . . — and the rise of . . . militant movements (insurgency) in the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta over the last fifteen years.’ Based on a critical analysis of the complexity of rentier politics and petro-violence in Nigeria against the backdrop of dominant theoretical explanations and discourses, the author repudiates the ‘foundational claims of predation theorists (state-insurgent, greed and grievance): namely, that greed is opposed to grievance, that peaceful protest stands in opposition to rebellion, that government opposes rebellion, and that rebellion equals organized crime’. He argues that ‘the simple binaries deployed by the predation theorists and the proposed political trajectories (from grievance to greed) are much too blunt and as a consequence fail to grasp the complexities of local political dynamics.’ The local political dynamics at the root of petroviolence in the Niger Delta, according to Watts, include ‘the detonative impact of state violence, the constitutive role of corporate practice, the intersection of formal (especially the electoral cycle and enhanced powers of governors) and insurgent politics and the shifting force field of inter-generational struggles driven by the contradictions between chiefly powers and massive youth unemployment and alienation against an ideological backdrop of “oil wealth” and “our oil”’. Local claims and narratives about the indigenous ownership of, and right to, oil wealth is taken up by Ukoaha Ukiwo in a latter chapter of this volume. These underlying local dynamics tie in with the cross-cutting interests of international
development agencies and contemporary energy ‘scramblers’, as well as the interests of protagonist of the strong oil-related black economy to create what the author calls the ‘oil complex’, which he argues to be at the root of oil insurgency in Nigeria. The operations of the oil complex, as Watts submits, is a ‘zone of political and economic calculations’ that inter alia creates violent and unstable governable spaces marked by unbridled primitive accumulation and ‘a form of parcellized sovereignty’.

In Chapter 4, Ukoha Ukiwo examines why and how oil generates conflicts in Nigeria, as well as the strategies deployed by the various socio-economic (classes) and socio-political (ethno-regional) groupings to gain access to or control over the strategic rentier space. He explores how the federal state and the hegemonic elites have systematically pursued and adopted policies aimed at ‘nationalizing’ the rentier space, especially since the end of the Biafra civil war. Had Biafra succeeded in its secessionist campaign, Nigeria would have lost a greater part of its oil wealth located in the former Eastern region of Nigeria that fought for a separate sovereign state in the civil war of 1967–1970. The architects and proponents of rentier space nationalization who form the most powerful segment of the hegemonic federal elites have their ethnic origins in the non-oil-producing states. Among the reasons advanced by the rentier space ‘nationalizers’ to back their case is the defeat of Biafra by the federal side, an episode that helped to preserve the oil wealth as a ‘federal good’. This argument irritates the bulk of the Niger Delta people (notably, youths and local elites) who, by reason of their increasingly violent anti-oil campaign, seek to de-nationalize and localize the rentier space ‘for the greater good of their indigenes’. The discourses on both sides of the rentier divide are couched in populist rhetorics that help to conceal the self-seeking and prebendal interests of protagonists. The federal side maintains a defensive lead of the discursive agenda, but not without the constant mobilization of the state’s material (oil wealth disbursement) and military resources to simultaneously placate and repress protagonists of rentier space ‘indigenization’ from the oil-rich Niger Delta. The oil industry, dominated by foreign transnational firms, seems to be at the crossroads of this political debacle. With huge deficits in corporate social and environmental responsibility over the nearly fifty years of oil extraction in the Niger Delta, the transnational oil companies are compelled by the disruptive violence of anti-oil protesters to become more responsive to the developmental needs of their host communities. They increasingly substitute for the development-provisioning obligations of what Ukiwo calls ‘the absentee state’ in the oil region (that is, the state that is supportive of foreign companies but is ‘not there for its citizens’). However, the developmental contributions of the oil companies, on the aggregate, remain very insignificant relative to the social and infrastructural requirements of the impoverished oil region. The greatest challenge for the future, concludes the author, is how to ‘bring the state back in’ and ‘transform it to serve as a catalyst for sustainable development’.

John Kabia's analysis of the Sierra Leone civil war in Chapter 5 is an attempt to re-study the greed versus grievance theory advanced by Paul Collier and his colleagues. ‘Political economy analysts like Collier’, argues Kabia, ‘link the outbreak of civil conflicts in many transitional societies to greed and economic opportunism—in the case of Sierra Leone, a conflict over diamonds—rather than structural inequalities and deep-rooted grievances’. Kabia argues that Collier’s resource-based, reductionist theory widely embraced by large sections of the academia, international media, as well as policy and donor community is a ‘simplistic and inadequate explanation’ because it essentially ignores or underplays the key role played by the state in sowing the seeds of conflict. ‘It is therefore not surprising that Collier’s interpretation of civil war is embraced by most government officials who find it as a convenient way of deflecting attention on their own misdeeds and accusing rebels as greedy people lacking any political agenda.’ Kabia argues that such faulty diagnosis of this nature, has often ‘led to a lack of understanding of the fundamental causes of conflict and hampered the process of negotiating civil war peace settlements, implementing peacebuilding programmes and initiating a feasible conflict prevention programme’. Based on a chronological analysis of the background to Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion, Kabia argues that ‘the primary factors of the Sierra Leone civil war must be located in the grievances that were generated by the patronial and clientelistic politics that characterized post-colonial Sierra Leone; greed and economic opportunism
can only be regarded as fueling and aggravating factors’. Further, Kabia debunks the ‘rebel-centric’ explanation of conflict diamonds, and goes on to unveil the complexity of the war economy and how various actors in the civil war (rebels, officers of the Sierra Leone Army, the government, private military corporations and mercenary fighters, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and individual combatants of the regional peacekeeping force ECOMOG) did at different times exploit and profit from conflict diamonds. This convoluted interest in rent-seeking was a dimension that clearly contributed to an aggravation and prolongation of the civil war.

In Chapter 6, Peter Woodward looks at the historical context of economic and political developments in Sudan and how it has generated conflicts over issues of ‘marginalization’ of minority groups and control of natural resources, including the more contemporary dimension of oil resources. He argues that ‘the grievances of Sudan’s people, especially those in the “marginalized” areas of south, west and east, pre-date the development of the oil sector, but oil has exacerbated political mobilization on all sides’. In addition, since coming on stream in 1999, oil has also significantly affected the rhythm of Sudan’s national and international politics, a phenomenon that has even become more apparent since the outbreak of hostilities in Darfur in 2003. The struggle over control of oil resources between the central government in Khartoum and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in the oil-rich war-torn South, according to Woodward, ‘has increasingly resembled the prebendal and predatory state model’. Oil rents provided enormous wealth for arms purchases (mostly from Asia and Russia) to prosecute internal conflicts. Consequently, the major Asian countries involved in oil exploitation (China, India and Malaysia), as well as some Western countries (such as France) tended to condone ‘the widespread human rights violations associated with the development of the oil sector’ and allowed the Sudanese government ‘the use of their local oil infrastructure for military purposes, thereby effectively contributing to state violence’. Woodward underscores the ambivalence of certain Western governments in Sudan, noting that it was partly their interests in ‘pursuing commercial opportunities in the burgeoning oil sector’ and ‘concern over the humanitarian situation, that encouraged them to take a lead in international pressure towards peacemaking between north and south.’ However, the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002 that ended the SPLA war seems to have deepened and consolidated the interests of the rentier elites in Sudan’s north and south regions at the expense of other regional elites, the generality of the underprivileged populations and the popular aspiration for balanced economic development. This rentier tendency is a major threat to the survival of Sudan as a coherent state and the peace settlement between the north and south.

Gerhard Seibert discusses the new frontier of rentier politics presented by oil in one of Africa’s smallest and poorest countries, São Tomé and Príncipe (see Chapter 7). The island-nation of São Tomé and Príncipe located in the highly coveted oil-rich Gulf of Guinea is a largely ‘aid-dependent micro-state’ of about 155,000 people. Seibert argues that recent external interest in the country’s offshore oil resources is not the root of rentierism in the national political economy as ‘a rentier culture based on foreign aid and other external resources had already been firmly established’. The chapter analyses: (i) the complexity of negotiation of maritime boundaries for oil mining purposes between São Tomé and its offshore neighbours (Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and, especially Nigeria); (ii) international interest in bidding for acquisition of offshore oil mining spaces; (iii) the convergence of interest in oil rent between the Santomean governing elites and sections of the external stakeholders (mostly Western investors and Nigerian companies suspected to be fronts and speculators because of their insufficient technical capacity and experience in offshore exploration); and (iv) how the Santomean government’s lack of expertise in international negotiation and oil legislation adversely affects the outcome of their involvement in oil matters. The author finally explores the unique opportunities São Tomé and Príncipe has as a ‘newly emerging oil producing country to avoid the “resource curse” and negative consequences of oil wealth experienced by many other oil producing countries’. Already, there is considerable goodwill, support and pressure from the international community to help the government of São Tomé and Príncipe mitigate existing rent-seeking practices and aim at equitable national development.
In another country case study in Chapter 8, Germain Tshibambwe Ngoie and Kenneth Omeje explore the political economy of mineral resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the structure of conflicts it generates in the leading mining provinces of Kasai and Katanga. The chapter attributes the phenomenon of conflict goods in the DRC to the ‘deep-rooted patterns of patrimonialism and corruption’ in the postcolonial state ‘that disposes state functionaries to use their public offices and positions to accumulate both official and unofficial “revenues” that are basically appropriated for personal and prebendal purposes’. ‘The recourse to, and exploitation of, primordial identity and cleavages such as ethnicity and provincialism as basis for conflict mobilization by rent-seeking elites serves as an aggravating factor.’

The DRC’s strategic mining sector and provinces have been historically conflict-ridden. The intensity of the conflicts has varied from time to time, but for a greater part of the post-independence history, the leading mining provinces have been characterized by low intensity conflicts (LICs).

Writing in Chapter 9, T. Debey Sayndee examines how Liberia was plunged into a long-drawn-out vicious civil war, the operations and stakeholders of the war economy, as well as the key obstacles to peacebuilding in the post-war dispensation. Even though Liberia is the oldest self-governing democracy in Africa, the conditions for political instability and civil strife have been prevalent in the country since the 1847 independence proclamation by the more privileged minority settlers (America[n]-Liberians—emancipated black slaves from the Americas), who subsequently embarked on a regime of ethno-political segregation against the indigenous majority. Consequently, neo-patrimonial corruption and decline were systematically driven to a crescendo from independence through to the Samuel Doe era in the 1980s. Sayndee argues that it was against this historical background that Charles Taylor’s NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) was launched in 1989 and originally welcomed by many Liberians as a war of national liberation. But the so-called liberators not only despoiled and liquidated the country, but also plunged the entire West African subregion into a ‘Zone of Terror’, criminality, anarchy and war. The formal economies of the war-affected subregion were for the most part displaced by clandestine rent-seeking economies predicated on the massive exploitation of conflict goods (notably diamond and timber) by warlords, insurgents, mercenaries and a host of international business collaborators. Sayndee argues that although the war formally ended in 2003, peacebuilding efforts in the post-war dispensation [are] blighted by a host of structural factors, not least a collapsed economy, the continued illegal exploitation of natural resources, the lack of economic opportunities for the teeming number of militarized youth populations, as well as the complex nature of ethnic tension linked to struggle for scarce public and environmental resources. Consequently, international civil society organizations and the donor community have turned post-war Liberia into a theatre for experimenting assorted kinds of peacebuilding programmes that have marginal relevance to the needs and aspirations of the people.

Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies

Jeremy Keenan analyzes the evolution and contemporary dynamics of the rentier state in the Sahara-Sahel states of Algeria, Niger and Chad and how their rent-seeking escapades in resource exploitation under various guises trigger grassroots resistance and conflicts (see Chapter 10). He argues that the destabilizing conflicts and wars in these countries, especially during the 1990s and 2000s, would not have occurred, or if they did would have most likely been less severe and quickly resolved, had vital natural resources like oil (and in the peculiar case of Niger—oil and uranium) not been at stake. The heightened interests of major powers like the US, France, and increasingly, China, in the Sahara-Sahel regions [are] chiefly because of the vital natural resources in the regions. On the part of the Bush Administration in the US, this energy interest, as Keenan argues, overlaps with and is expediently disguised as part of the global war on terror. Old internal political conflicts are exacerbated and new ones orchestrated in many countries of the Sahara and Sahel as a result of the interplay of imperialist interests in the exploitation of the rentier economies, regardless of how these interests are disguised. Within the two
regions, Algeria is the largest and most audacious rentier state, with the hydrocarbon sector being the mainstay of its economy and pivot of accumulation and politics since independence. Keenan argues that regional powers like Algeria, and to a lesser extent, Libya, have long nurtured and pursued sub-imperialist interests across countries of the Sahel, ‘sometimes in partnership with and sometimes in competition [with] “western” companies’ and ‘global interests’, but impacting disastrously on existing structures of political and resource conflicts. Given the rentier nature of the states, the abundant natural resources revenues accruing to the Sahara-Sahel states have practically benefited the governing elites who not only expand accumulation through corruption, but also increase military expenditure to ensure regime survival and continued suppression of all opposition forces (real or imagined). As all these are happening, the ‘global oil and mining companies are buying up exploration concessions by the dozen’ and ‘busily exploring and exploiting almost every corner of this vast but little known zone of Africa’. Hence, the regions remain sorely enmeshed in violent conflicts.

In Chapter 11 Anna Zalik uses the examples of [the] Niger Delta and Mexican Gulf to demonstrate how two divergent constitutional frameworks for oil extraction have emerged historically to shape popular struggles for greater equity in revenue distribution and environmental protection. Whereas the Nigerian oil conflict has a strong ethnoregional base and is championed by . . . ethnic minority groups of the oil-rich Niger Delta region, the push for the Mexican struggle has mostly emanated from organised labour and agrarian producers championing grassroots, working-class-oriented, anti-imperialist interests. However, both movements employ the rhetoric of resource sovereignty, by which they demand greater control of oil resources and revenues by local populations inhabiting the region of extraction for their overall socioeconomic and ecological advantages. But the outcomes of the two resource sovereignty struggles are markedly different. In the case of the Niger Delta, the host communities’ anti-oil struggles (agitation for greater oil revenues against the federal state; rapid developmental transformation of the impoverished oil region, etc.) are characterized by communal conflict (inter/intra-ethnic) and social fragmentation that resonate with the history and administrative structures of colonial and post-colonial rule and serve as a direct claim on the Nigerian state. With regard to Mexico in the revolutionary period, grassroots struggles partially unified organized labour and smallscale agrarian producers against forces of global capital and for a redistributionist state. In this respect, the Mexican nationalization of foreign companies’ policy of 1938 that prohibited oil exports for over three decades and employed the commodity for developmentalist ends was at least a partial victory for Mexican oil workers—whose ranks expanded to incorporate some under-privileged agrarian classes. Furthermore whereas resort to disruptive anti-oil violence by ethnic militias in the Niger Delta aims to demand benefits from both the state and operating oil multinationals, in Mexico, popular struggles for ecological and resource sovereignty in the present conjuncture seek to protect certain hard-earned privileges of the developmental state from neoliberal assault.

In Chapter 12, Julia Buxton analyzes how the rentier space and rent-related conflicts have historically evolved in the different extractive economies of the South American region. She advances two critical arguments, namely— that with a couple of key exceptions: (i) ‘access to and opportunity for rent accumulation has traditionally generated intense competition for control of the state’ but ‘these antagonisms have historically been channelled on class, not ethnic lines (as in many African countries) and articulated through the ideological and conceptual lens of socialism, populism, anti-imperialism, military authoritarianism or neoliberalism’; (ii) ‘contending forces have typically argued that their motivation for power and resource control is “inclusivist” . . ., hence, the South American discourse has always been framed (or disguised) as a positive sum game and legitimized through reference to the national interest’. Buxton analyses the various factors that have historically accounted for the low proclivity toward virulent resource-based civil wars in the South American region, much of which have to do with the relatively stable institutionalization and settled territoriality of the state. This has systematically and increasingly helped to establish formal politics (as opposed to rebel insurgency) as the pivot of political competition and regime succession in most countries of South America. Buxton finally
examines how the ascendancy of neoliberalism and revival of economic nationalism, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, have directly and indirectly contributed to ‘a reconfiguring of the rentier space’ in Latin America at both the national and regional spheres. Capitalizing on [the] huge oil boom in the 2000s, for instance, the President Hugo Chavez administration in Venezuela, in particular, has provided significant transformative and exemplary leadership at the regional level (to the utter irritation of the US administration) through ideological mobilization for regional integration and development cooperation and at the national level where the government ‘has fundamentally restructured the rentier space in Venezuela by displacing traditionally privileged elite sectors and foreign interests as the main beneficiaries of rent access and accumulation’, and uplifting diverse previously excluded underprivileged groups using well crafted social development policies and programmes. But [the] problem of sustainability of social welfare-oriented programmes persists. This, as Buxton concludes, creates significant ‘potential for intensified conflict’ given ‘the possible inability of resource nationalist states (e.g., Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc.) to meet the immense popular expectations that government and the commodity boom have generated’, coupled with the virtual ‘absence of institutions capable of mediating conflict and monitoring economic policymaking’.

Rolf Schwarz in Chapter 13 analyses the history and dynamics of state-formation and state-building in the Middle East and argues that ‘oil rentier states’ defy the ‘war makes states’ theory of Charles Tilly et al. He presents a comparative analysis of two contrasting oil-rich Middle Eastern rentier states, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Schwarz argues that the massive influx of oil revenues during the 1970s enabled the bellicose regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq to pursue a policy of ‘guns and butter’—defined as ‘extravagant spending on expanding its military-security machinery and on welfare benefits (social development)’. At the domestic front, the expanded military-security profile of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq was designed to consolidate the dictatorship of the ruling Ba’thist party. On the external front, the bloated military-security complex was used to engage in aggressive foreign policies, which led to the outbreak of war with Iran (1980–1988). Most disastrously, it also culminated in Iraq’s abortive annexation of oil-rich Kuwait in Saddam Hussein’s bid to shore up Iraq’s rentier revenues as a way out of the country’s fiscal crisis. The devastating Gulf Wars and UN sanctions provoked by Iraq’s bellicosity have seen the country decline from a boisterous rentier state to a failed state. On the other hand, argues Schwarz, ‘the UAE have tried to combine the positive attributes of a rentier state (huge oil investment and revenues) with those of a production-oriented welfare state’. As opposed to building a grandiose military infrastructure, the UAE have channelled their huge oil revenues to pursue an active policy of economic diversification to backstop the social welfare programmes the state has progressively taken on board since the oil boom period of the early 1970s. Consequently, ‘the UAE have managed to . . . develop a regional hub for foreign investment in the areas of construction, tourism, waste water treatment, desalination, natural energy exploration, and in the transportation sector and through the use of free trade zones’. Schwarz argues that whereas Iraq followed more or less the ‘war makes states’ Tillian model, and has gravitated from a boisterous rentier state to a failed state, the UAE, on the other hand, have not followed the Tillian model but tried to break away from both the resource curse paradigm of most rentier states by embracing perspective development planning [and] have made a significant transition from a rentier state to a production-oriented welfare state. Schwarz finally identified and analysed the major challenges facing developmentalist and production-oriented rentier economies such as the UAE.

In Chapter 14, Dauda Abubakar introduces a fascinating regional dimension to the theoretical conceptualization and politics of rentierism based on a searching critique of the orthodox intellectual paradigms. His focus of analysis is the oil-rich countries of the Arabian Gulf. At the conceptual level, Abubakar argues that although the theory of the rentier state helps to elucidate the diverse impediments to the development of oil-dependent countries in the global South, the explanatory structures and discourses of the theory scarcely incorporate the critical trajectories of geopolitical conflicts, often aggravated by external interventionism and militarization. He therefore proceeds on the basis of a political ecology approach to resource conflicts and rentier politics to present a crit-
ical ‘interrogation of the interface between oil, state power and external militarization, and their implications for socio-political stability within the Arab Gulf states, as well as regional and international security’. Drawing extensive empirical illustrations from the oil-exporting states of the Persian Gulf—namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Yemen, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—Abubakar argues that close economic and military alliances with external [western] patrons, largely motivated by their greed for oil resources, perceptibly compromises the sovereignty and identity of the predominantly theocratic and Monarchical-Sultanic rentier plutocracies of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, this tendency precipitates and accentuates societal fragmentation, thereby deepening violent responses from marginalized youths and fundamentalist groups opposed to western ideologies of modernity and politics of interventionism. The resultant effects are the growing security problems that are now common knowledge: escalation of military expenditures among the Gulf states, slashing of social development budgets and benefits; exacerbation of national and regional instability; intense anti-Americanism, counter-hegemonism and Islamist terrorism against western targets in the Islamic world and beyond, as well as unending militarization and globalist intervention in the name of the war on terror.

THE POLITICS OF LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

Sam Moyo and Prosper Matondi

Excerpted from Mwsiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds.), From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, Project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003), 73–92

The struggles over land reform and redistribution in Zimbabwe have drawn the international community’s attention to the land issue in southern Africa and beyond. Attempts at reforming the structural ownership and access to land raise a number of critical questions for Zimbabwe, with lessons for other countries in the southern African region. Whereas independence ended the violent conflict of the liberation struggle over land in the name of peacemaking, the structural forms of conflict remained.

This chapter provides a historical analysis and broad-based treatment of the various forms of conflict and struggle over land, including the complex and competing social and political tendencies that underline and define many of the social actors engaged in land reform. This includes a focus on how different actors compete for various resources, including land, and the historical basis for such contestations. The major social and interest groups (or stakeholders) involved in policymaking and implementation processes and the actual social practices are discussed. Instead of assuming that certain groups will have predetermined interests or outlooks, the chapter examines the social dynamics involved in how groups articulate certain positions in particular circumstances and how they also change as those circumstances change. Social groups are not immune to the wider political and economic contests.

Given that land reform and resettlement are by nature material processes, and given the crucial role sustainable environmental management plays in the economic well-being of the southern African region, attention will also be directed toward the agrarian dynamics of the land-reform process. The chapter also elaborates on the attempts to resolve land conflicts in the postindependence period. The variety of land conflicts of different intensities and magnitudes at both the local and national level are discussed within the context of six main thematic areas: land acquisition, beneficiary selection, agrarian issues, land rights and land tenure, institutional processes, and international capital and donors.

The Land Question in Zimbabwe

In postcolonial Zimbabwe, the land question is the most wrenching unresolved issue from the liberation struggle. Previous research has documented various phases and intensifi-
Land conflicts in Zimbabwe have a long history, spanning over a century. Many of the less informed or less honest discussions today lean toward presenting the current land conflicts as a new phenomenon, despite persistent intense conflicts over land, sometimes involving physical violence, both before and after independence. Land occupancy and other local, national, and international pressures have led to a variety of attempts by postcolonial governments to mediate the conflict over land, including through responding to the demands for land itself.

Table 5.1 provides a periodization of the main phases of conflict over land since 1980. During this period, conflict has centered on how land should be acquired, the mode of resettlement (model types and tenure arrangements), the criteria for beneficiary selection, and, more recently, how to respond to the needs of farmworkers and women. Despite changes in specific issues and types of conflict over time, these basic sources of conflict have remained consistent, highlighting the importance of approaching the current conflicts in historical perspective.

In the period 1980 to 1985, conflicts revolved around the transition from the liberation struggle to the actual implementation of those long-standing objectives for which the war was fought. During this period, a large number of spontaneous land occupations took place across the country. By 1986/1987, the government moved to put a stop to what were deemed to be illegal occupations of commercial farms, communal lands, national parks, urban areas, and state land, often through violent means.

The brutality with which these evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, was reminiscent of earlier evictions carried out in the decades prior to independence. Land occupations, and the overall pace of land reform, slowed down substantially after 1986. Beginning in 1997, however, the incidence of land invasions began to grow, and from February 2000 the number of land occupations increased exponentially.

Nonetheless, for the last twenty years discussion of the land question has been marked by entrenched positions at local, national, and international levels bolstered by contrasting understandings of land use, race, and history itself. These positions have led to rhetorical and physical conflicts between a changing constellation of interest groups, including the central government, local governments, commercial farmers, communal land communities, traditional leaders, commercial farmworkers, veterans of the liberation struggle, international donors, political parties, and farmers on existing resettlement schemes. Such conflict has emerged even more explicitly within the ruling party itself. More militant tendencies grew stronger within the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) [ZANU(PF)] concerning issues of land reform, indigenization, and market reforms. This conflict also needs to be placed within the context of economic collapse in the country starting in 1996, which has seen a steady erosion of living standards for the majority of the population, exacerbating divisions within the ruling party and the larger polity itself.

**Six Analytical Dimensions of the Land Question**

Conflict over land started when Europeans expropriated land, forcibly expelling Africans and resettling them in predominantly poor agricultural areas. Native reserves were created to make way for European farms, towns, and mines during the colonial period; and ever since, conflict and struggles over land have continued to erupt over the landscape of the region. The conflicts not only surround land acquisition itself and its pace but also include the type of land tenure to be implemented on resettlement schemes, the models of land use, the selection of beneficiaries, the institutional setup of the schemes, and the role of donors in the land reform.
Land Acquisition

The key conflict of the land question is the structural inequality in land ownership and access. This conflict has been fanned by both competing methods of land acquisition and dissatisfaction with the different methods by various actors. Since the late 1990s, there have been five means of acquiring land either proposed or implemented. The first approach entails depending on the market to purchase land on a willing seller–willing buyer basis. This was the dominant method used in the 1980s, and donors and commercial farmers still strongly promote it while it is resisted by the government and other stakeholders. The second approach is compulsory acquisition, whereby the government gazettes land for acquisition and only pays for improvements to the land and not for the land itself, with the obligation to pay for the land being placed on the United Kingdom to compensate for its role in colonial expropriation. This approach is favored by the government and by some segments of civil society but opposed by the commercial farmers and donors. The third approach involves negotiated sales, whereby individual farmers and government negotiate a sale of the land or a swap of one of the farms owned by the individual farmer. Some commercial farmers support this approach. The fourth approach relies on individual non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to devise their own way of land acquisition and resettlement in consultation with government. The final approach is land occupations, whereby individuals and groups occupy private or state land and allocate themselves stands or plots. Recently, war veterans have spearheaded land occupations, while combinations of different levels of government, politicians, and traditional leaders either support their actions or their eviction. Landholders, donors, and many other groups in Zimbabwe who want stability are against occupations. Differing forms of land acquisition are also colored by political competition. Before the June 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU(PF) leaders were calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the “whites” and supporting the land occupations, while leaders of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) called for a more orderly process of land resettlement. Aside from the issue of compensation for landowners, there is also the recurring question of compensation for farmworkers who are retrenched by such acquisition.

The policy debates over the forms of land acquisition at the macro-level are thus informed by actual practices of land acquisition; groups and individuals that invade land are motivated by many, sometimes competing motives, ranging from restitution of lost lands to the need for residential stands, from the need for agricultural land to fulfillment of the liberation struggle promises, from local leaders’ attempts to bolster their authority drawing on colonial-era frameworks of traditional leadership to politicians carrying out terror tactics on farmers to fulfill personal ambitions. Such diversity of possible forms of “local-level legitimacy” can lead to clashes of different groups of people on occupied land. The inherent conflicts in different modes of land acquisition are thus exacerbated by localized power struggles as well as by party politics. Bad relations between individual commercial farmers and farmworkers, or neighboring resettlement farmers or communal land farmers, can also exacerbate conflicts.

Some of the factors that aggravate conflict over land acquisition include lack of agreement on the means and the scale of acquiring land; the type and source of payment for the land acquired; confrontational approaches by all sides involved, intensified by biased media reports; rigid donor policies; macroeconomic forces like budgetary allocation for land resettlement, donor support or lack thereof for land acquisition, and the general investment climate that affects the land market itself; the level of violence of the land occupations; the pace of actual land acquisition and resettlement; the type of support or pressure from regional governments, particularly South Africa’s; and overt political party positions and perceptions of the various moves by the key stakeholders.

Beneficiaries Selection

There is conflict over who decides who will be selected for land resettlement and by what criteria decisions are made. There are also debates and conflicts over the number of
farmers needing to be resettled, the proper racial mix of large-scale farmers, and the classifications of access between smallholder and large farmers. Contentious issues can include settlers’ prerequisites such as financial capital, farming history, location of settlers’ home area compared to the area of resettlement scheme, and political party connections or lack thereof. The characteristics of settlers are also divisive: the mix of war veterans, peasant farmers, town dwellers, and farmworkers; the weight of settler “capability” versus “need” and how these terms are defined and operationalized; the gender and age of the settler; whether the settler needs to be a full-time farmer or not; whether the settler should be from district or neighboring chieftdom or not [sic]. Selection committees can also give rise to wrangling (due to the differing roles and powers of traditional leaders, district administrators, councillors, war veteran organizations, and others), as can the question of whether settlers will have to meet certain requirements (productivity levels, amount of construction, investment) and, if so, what the penalties for failure should be. There is also the debate over what infrastructure is provided and by whom (beneficiaries, donors, NGOs, the state, or some combination thereof). Beneficiaries selection is ideologically charged by intense competition for access to land and resources.14

Land redistribution in the early 1980s aimed at rehabilitating society and included refugees, displaced persons, the landless, war veterans, and displaced farmworkers.15 Some of these were placed on very productive resettlement farms,16 but others got the most marginal land and farms that had been run down during the war. The resettlement program was not adequate in terms of its goals, coverage, quality, and equality. Even today there are no proper records or a systematic way of quantifying the types of war veterans who benefited from the land reform program in relation to their various groups (the disabled, women, unemployed, civil servants, politicians, widowed, etc.). The majority of the ex-combatants did not benefit from all the other programs of rehabilitation. There are different classes of criteria that can be used to say who did not qualify or benefit; major examples are rural women, the destitute, and the disabled.

In the 1990s, the new criteria for beneficiaries of land redistribution were broadened even more toward indigenization through farm leases, and some people started looking at beneficiaries based on their history and political status. Some civil servants, businesspersons, academics, military officers, ex-combatants, and politicians who were also ex-combatants benefited much to the chagrin of those who felt that they too “sacrificed to the liberation struggle to become marginalized” after independence.

The Agrarian Context of Land Reform

One of the more intractable policy debates is that of the balance between land and agrarian reform. The main argument from critics is that agrarian reform involves changes in the property relations, and therefore ownership, as well as access to land to promote equity in resource benefits.17 The success of agrarian reform depends to a larger extent on access to productive land, yet the availability of land using the market principles has been in vain. Less than 30 percent of the land in the Mashonaland provinces has been accessed for resettlement purposes.18 The agrarian transformations that have taken place include policy reforms, tax incentives, financial reorganization, institutional reforms, and water sectoral reforms that have benefited the current landowners and land users in the large-scale commercial farms.19

Moyo discovered that in the 1990s the pressure to evolve “efficient” large-scale commercial farms (LSCF) land markets by relaxing the subdivision and land-use conversion regulations and provision of export incentives stimulated production, diversification, and agricultural growth.20 Visible gains were made from new land uses such as horticulture and tourism, which yield higher profits on smaller land units than were the norm in the LSCF. This, however, did not lead to more land redistribution as was expected. The Economic and Social Adjustment Program (ESAP) adopted by the government in the 1990s offered no concrete resources to black smallholder export-led growth in commodity production (as had happened in Kenya), due to the restrictive land, water, and infrastructural conditions of communal areas. Large-scale farmers, with their long disproportion-
ate access to such resources, responded to ESAP incentives, which influenced changes in Zimbabwe’s land use and land tenure tendencies and consolidated the move toward an increasingly market-oriented conception of Zimbabwe’s land question. The effect of ESAP policy influences was to sharpen the class- and racially based inequalities over access to land and resources and to give ammunition to elements within the ruling party arguing for a more radical, equitable, and rapid land-reform process.

While these conflicts shape the scope, pace, and support of the Land Redistribution and Resettlement Program (LRRP), the conflicts on the ground are often characterized by attempts by authorities to mandate particular land uses against the wishes of the farmers themselves. All of these debates are fueled by ESAP’s emphasis on nontraditional exports and tourism in agriculture. This changing macro-environment also led to revaluation of formerly underutilized land among all landholders and to new struggles and alliances over that land. An example of this is the new (white and black, state and private) capital investment in communal lands through the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources and other forms of tourism and outcropping that lead to the displacement of some farmers from land for the benefit of the tourist industry.21

Differences between smallholders and large-scale commercial farms in terms of productivity, efficiency, and environmental impact have been noted by donors, government officials, researchers, the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), and NGOs. But the various actors’ assumptions based on ideology, race, and modernity have varied.22 Indeed evaluations of the first LRRP are marked by similar debates.23 These assumptions also influence discussion of policy instruments such as the land tax. Although there have been significant academic contributions to these debates, there needs to be more research on the actual land uses of resettlement farmers, including environmental impacts,24 rather than resting claims on ideological assumptions about the size of the farm and the race of the farmer.

Land Rights and Tenure

At the heart of the land question is the debate about the needs and forms of security of tenure desired by various classes and groups including the landless, the land short, (white) large-scale commercial farmers, women, farmworkers, and other claimants to Zimbabwe’s LSCF lands. Even once land is acquired, many questions remain concerning the land rights and tenure regime of the settlers. In policymaking documents there is agreement that the permit system should be discontinued and that leaseholds or freehold rights should eventually be given to settlers (and, by extension, to farmers in the communal lands). There seems to be a growing consensus on this approach among government officials, donors, and farmers’ groups. Yet it goes against existing forms of land rights and tenure, such as security through ruling lineages; permission given by local leaders, councillors, and, more recently, war veterans; a growing informal “land market” in communal areas; and resettlement schemes.

The divergences of these practices from existing policy have led to many confrontations between different levels of the state and smallholders.25 There is also the debate over the possibility of resettling farmworkers or providing them with residential stands.26 This too has been a source of conflict during the current occupations, as farmworkers either join the occupiers or team up with their employees to fight them back because of the insecurity of tenure. Here, the scale of farm worker families in need of land, or who would be displaced as a result of land redistribution, tends to be exaggerated. Farmworkers have reasons besides insecurity of tenure for siding with the war veterans. Violence committed by some commercial farmers against farmworkers has a long and historic legacy in Zimbabwe. To this day, there is much brutality committed against farmworkers. Their pay is very low; their living conditions are substandard; they are often exploited; and severe punishments are meted out for even the most minor infractions. Finally, there is the pressing question of the security of tenure for women raised by many NGOs but often resisted by policymakers and traditional leaders.27 All of these questions and conflicts regarding land rights are amplified in particular locales by growing land demands, which then exacerbate divisions between various groups.
Institutional Processes and Actors

There is a wide and complex array of actors involved in the policy formulation and implementation stages of the government's national land policy. At the formal institutional level, responsibility for formulating and implementing policy is "shared" between the various central government ministries, including the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, and Rural Resettlement; the Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development; and the Ministry of Environment, Mines, and Tourism. The lines of responsibility then shift downward, to the provincial governments, the rural district councils, and the village committees and traditional leaders. Conflict-inducing problems have characterized all levels of the formal institutional policy process, stemming from lack of coordination between various ministries and departments, lack of capacity, the preservation of turf, and the intrusion of personal interest in the land acquisition and resettlement process. Furthermore, problems have arisen out of the imperfect decentralization process, generating additional conflict on the roles of local government structure and traditional leaders.

Enmeshed within this formal institutional structure is a web of other nonstate actors, with varying degrees of direct and indirect involvement in the policy process. These include the donor agencies; a wide range of NGOs (whose activities involve policy advocacy, the provision of technical support, academic consulting, and local-level policy implementation); and the various farmers' unions, farmworkers' organizations, and local-level community-based organizations. Attempts to formalize the role of these various actors in the policymaking and implementation process are reflected in their inclusion in the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development and the National Economic Consultative Forum's Land Reform Task Force, under the Inception Phase Framework Plan (1999–2000).

Interaction among these various actors, and between them and the government, has been highly conflictual, from 1980 to the present. The sources of conflict stem, in part, from the vastly divergent power positions of these actors, where some enjoy superior organizational capacity and considerable financial resources (e.g., donor agencies and the CFU), while others are significantly weaker (e.g., the Women's Land Lobby Group, the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union, and the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe [GAPWUZ]). Serious conflict has also risen over the highly divergent policy preferences and priorities of these organizations, as well as their differing abilities to promote their interests and the difficulty of building consensus among them.28 The policy process has been further complicated by the "intrusion" of actors not formally invited to play a role, most notably the war veterans, the landless, and the land-stressed in the communal areas.

The role of the ruling party creates an additional layer of complexity. While a clear conceptual distinction must be made between the government and the ruling ZANU(PF), in practice that distinction is often less clear. The political interests and priorities of the ruling party have impinged on the land policy process at every level of government, and at the intersection between the government and the various nonstate actors. There are serious internal divisions within the ruling party over key issues such as the land tenure question, as well as over succession politics. The rift within ZANU(PF) has exacerbated conflict through the insertion of political considerations in the land policy process, the espousing of contradictory policies, and the willingness to use extreme measures, such as intimidation and fear.

Conflicts within and between the various governmental, party, and nonstate actors (both domestic and external) are usually played out in a nonviolent manner but, more recently, have been associated with violence. In the most recent phase of the land struggle, the police have been both unwilling and unable to maintain "law and order" (a value-laden term), and the Zimbabwe National Army has come to play a more visible role. This has both potentially positive and negative implications for the alleviation of conflict.
Mutual suspicion and distrust have often characterized Zimbabwe's relationship with international donors, including bilateral donor agencies and multilateral donors such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Although an understanding was reached in the late 1980s with the World Bank over market-based reforms, culminating in the introduction of ESAP in 1991, relations have since soured for a variety of reasons (not all directly related to the land question). ESAP, which failed to integrate the need for land reform in its design, introduced new sources of conflict (and aggravated old ones) with direct implications for the land question. The program reinforced an extremely inequitable land ownership structure, and it soon became apparent that the mostly white commercial farmers were the main beneficiaries of reforms promoting production for export markets. Furthermore, ESAP had the effect of altering land use practices discussed earlier, which created new demands for land and new sources of conflict between white and black elite with easy access to capital. Depending on the issue, the small black commercial elite have formed alliances with white commercial farmers; however, the push to indigenize the commercial farming sector is clearly contradictory to the interests of white farmers.

Another effect of ESAP has been to internationalize interests in the land question through the introduction of stock-owning and shareholder arrangements, introducing yet another source of conflict in the land equation and creating new allies for commercial farmers. The intrusion of foreign interests in the land question has added yet another layer of complexity in terms of national politics. The role of international capital in funding NGOs, in particular those lending their support to the opposition, adds complication to the political process. Up to now, up-to-date foreign ownership of huge tracts of underutilized agricultural land, mining concession areas, and productive eco-tourism projects have been a key source of the internal and external dimension of land conflicts. Thus, British, South African, and German multinationals, including highly influential groups such as the Anglo-American Corporation, are major actors in the tensions between Zimbabwe and the rest of the world. At the regional level, there is a surprising amount of public support among SADC countries for Zimbabwe's land-reform program, but this support may wane if more donor pressure is exerted on these countries.

The World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the major multilateral donors taking initiative on the land question. There appears to be considerable policy coordination between them and the major bilateral donor agencies, most notably the UK Department for International Development and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This has resulted in a united policy front over such issues as transparency in the land acquisition and resettlement processes, the preference for respect for private property rights, and a minimal role for the state in the land-reform process. The preferences of the government with respect to its national land policy are often diametrically opposed to those of the multilateral and bilateral donors, generating conflict and stalemate in resolving the struggles over the land. The result is that international donors have missed important opportunities for moving forward on land reform. The policy effect of missed opportunities for resolving conflict has been the strengthening of those elements within ZANU(PF), in alliance with the powerful war veterans, who prefer a radical solution to the land issue. There has been a shift in government thinking on whether land reform is dependent on donor support. The reality is that farms are being acquired—both by force and voluntarily—without the provision of compensation, with the government's position being that Britain should compensate farmers for the value of the land.
of Our Lord 1997. "33 The context of that attempt has to be analyzed in the failed nego-
tiations of the 1996 GoZ mission to the UK and the new Labour government there. The
GoZ, faced with the slow pace of land reform due to lack of resources, renewed its
attempts to negotiate with the British. Verbal promises were made with the Tories, but
no funds were forthcoming and this was worsened with the election of the Labour gov-
ernment. The Labour government naively pointed out that they were not responsible for
the actions of their colonial peers and were therefore not going to pay for a land reform
based on “colonial reparations” but would focus on poverty reduction through land reform.

At least 1,471 farms were identified throughout the country as part of reaching the 5 mil-
ion hectares targeted in the 1990 National Land Policy.34 This led to an international
outrage on the economic implications of this move, contributing to positive pressure
brought to bear on all stakeholders to dialogue and map the way forward with the land
reform. A donor’s conference in 1998, coupled with a resurgence in land occupations, kept
the land reform on the agenda until the state made contingency plans for land redistrib-
bution by developing a comprehensive national land policy,35 an implementation plan
of the Second Phase of Land Reform and Resettlement, and an inception phase to tryout
various innovative approaches to land reform and resettlement. With the 1,471 commer-
cial farms targeted for compulsory acquisition and an unbudgeted payout to the war vet-
erans promised in August of 1997, donors and the international financial institutions
began raising concerns about the government’s macroeconomic stability and its plans for
land resettlement.

Broader Land Policymaking Processes

The government of Zimbabwe, with the strong participation of international donors and
national civil society groups, prepared several frameworks and policies for a second phase
of the Land Redistribution and Resettlement Program to build on the first phase of the
program that occurred in the 1980s. The key focus of these consultations was the Donor
Conference held in September 1998, when government and donor representatives agreed
that land redistribution remains one of the most critical issues to be resolved in
Zimbabwe. They further agreed that the approaches to land acquisition and resettlement
needed to be widened to facilitate participation by other stakeholders, as well as bene-
ficiaries, and that the program would begin immediately with an inception phase start-
ing with the farms currently on offer to the government.

Out of these consultations came the national land policy document and the Inception
Phase Framework Plan (IPFP). The policy document outlines the broad framework of land
reform and resettlement and was presented to the government for consideration and adop-
tion in November 1998. The IPFP introduced in early 1999, was a detailed implementa-
tion plan and budget that set out specific principles and objectives for proceeding with
a limited land redistribution exercise over twenty-four months involving 1 million
hectares. But many of the people who have been involved in preparing these frameworks
or who are said to be the beneficiaries have reacted to various components of the frame-
work with suspicion, distrust, or bad faith, given the deep-seated conflict over the land
question. It is fair to say that all the major parties to the agreement did not meet the
expectations.

In 1997, spurred on by pressure from the powerful war veterans, the government
employed the relevant sections of the Land Acquisition Act to designate 1,471 large-scale
commercial farms for compulsory acquisition. The top-down approach of the government,
and its failure to consult widely with interested stakeholders, compromised the success
of this initiative. The government then launched a broad-based consultation process with
a wide variety of nonstate actors in order to develop a national land policy and the LRRP
Phase 2 that embraced the principles of transparency, accountability, and democratic par-
ticipation. In 1998, the government launched its national land policy and the LRRP Phase
2. The changing land policy interest reflected by the main operational policy documents
of the government of Zimbabwe, including the IPFP, reflects a gradual acceptance of a
variety of civil society organizations participating in the land reform process.
The IPFP reflected the eventual compromise that would be used to implement the government resettlement models and to test out a variety of approaches to land redistribution, with the key objective of “learning by doing.” During this phase, the government aimed to finalize a new land policy, which would introduce an agricultural land tax, streamline subdivision regulations, and improve land tenure arrangements. The IPFP was founded on a “twin-track” approach, which anticipated harmonious collaboration between government and nonstate actors’ efforts to enhance land reform. The plan that was supposed to be implemented through the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development, supported by a technical support unit, coordinated the work of various line ministries and departments, rural district councils, stakeholder organizations, and private or NGO agencies to be engaged in the LRRP. The inception phase was to be financed by the government and donors, while it promoted the direct disbursement of funds to implementing agencies in and outside of government. The framework plan promised to improve the existing government land acquisition and resettlement approaches and for nonstate actors to try out new approaches of land acquisition, including selecting settlers, procuring finance, and planning infrastructure for the settlement program.

The IPFP was severely challenged by the widespread and at times violent land occupations that began after the defeat of the draft constitution in a national referendum in February 2000. The latent conflicts over the pace and type of land redistribution, when coupled with intense political contests between ZANU(PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), emerged in the form of mass land occupations led by veterans of the liberation war. The violence directed toward white farmers and black farm-workers as part of a political campaign on behalf of the ruling party for the June parliamentary elections led to the freezing of donor support to the IPFP, which donors had already only half-heartedly financially supported. This led the government to adopt a fast-track land resettlement program (June 2000), based on the compulsory acquisition of farms, with compensation to be paid only for the value of improvements on the land. In response to this move, there have been simultaneous negotiations between government officials, leaders of the war veterans and the CFU, and with some of the major donors, but these do not seem to have been able to keep pace with the developments on the ground.

Context of the Land Occupations

Periodization of Land Occupations

The land occupancies have remained on the political agenda in the last twenty years with scant attention being provided by the state, civil society, opposition political parties, and the private sector. The first phase saw low-profile, high-intensity occupations throughout the country from 1980 to 1985, while a parallel process of land resettlement funded mainly by the British was moving in tandem with the occupancies. The period between 1985 and 1990 witnessed normal, low-intensity occupations, which began in the context of dwindling resources for continued land resettlement and economic liberalization due to retrenchments as most people lost their jobs in urban areas and the mines.

The severe drought in the 1991–1992 farming season led to extensive commercial farm retrenchments, adding to the pressure on communal area land resources. Yet during this time the state had the ability to solve the land question with the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992. The grounds for severe conflicts were created during this time and acutely captured through research on new land uses in the Mashonaland provinces by Sam Moyo. From the middle of the 1980s, the state began to evict, often in violent fashion, those deemed to be occupying land illegally on commercial farms, communal lands, national parks, urban areas, and state property. This occurred simultaneously with increasing violence taken by property owners, particularly white farmers, on illegal occupants, often with implicit or explicit state approval. Land occupancies then slowed slightly in the late 1980s but then expanded more and more, culminating in an intense period of high-profile land occupancies involving war veterans and rural peasants from 1997 onward.
In August/September 1997, land occupations started to occur in isolated areas of the country; those taking part had the explicit aim of redistributing land from white farmers to landless villagers and war veterans. The occupations came in waves, starting with just a few in 1997 and reaching well over a thousand by 2000. The constitutional reform process created a form of discord that ultimately became linked to the land question. Before the draft constitution was put to a referendum in February 2000, the government introduced a number of changes to the final draft. Included in these changes were an additional clause that reinforced the right to compulsory acquisition, and qualified the existing market criteria for compensation of the land, and a statement that obliged the British to pay for land compulsorily acquired by the state. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), formed to push for constitutional reform, and the MDC, a political party launched in September 1999, both campaigned against the draft constitution, contributing to its defeat in the referendum. Shortly thereafter, twelve war veterans occupied farms in Masvingo, complaining that the white farmers had connived to defeat the constitution in the referendum. The former governor of Mashonaland Central and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) came in full support of the actions of the veterans. When leaders of the ZNLWVA and the ruling party realized by the end of March that white farmers were actively campaigning for the MDC, and encouraging farm-workers to do the same, farm occupations grew violent, becoming intertwined with the political campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary elections.

The interest of the international community and the international media has been focused, rather narrowly, on the current land occupations and the murder of white farmers and MDC supporters. Approximately 1,000 commercial farms, owned and operated mainly by white farmers, have reportedly been occupied by war veterans and their supporters in the peasant areas and the cities.40 Available information bulletins suggest that about one-third of the occupations have been marked by violence, and serious human rights abuses, including rape and torture, have characterized the period both before and after the June elections. Yet various other data sources, including fieldwork, suggest that the scale of the invasions and violence at their peak could have affected 60 percent of the above figures, given the uneven range and iterative nature of the land occupations. However, the period since mid-February 2000 represents an intense propagation of the land question in Zimbabwe, as it has been for the second time brought to the attention of the world.41 The interest of the international community and the international media has been focused on the current land occupations and the growing rift over procedures with land reform. It is estimated that from 800 (survey data) to over 1,500 (CFU reports) commercial farms owned and operated mainly by white farmers (but also including farms owned by black farmers, multinational corporations, and the state) have been occupied by veterans of the liberation struggle and their supporters in the peasant areas and the cities. The occupation has been marked by sporadic violence, with many people injured and the levels of tension remaining high on many of the farms.

The 2000 Election and Political Competition over Land

The parliamentary election campaign of 2000 was the most bruising in the history of elections in Zimbabwe. The campaign focused on land and the economy as major issues. The ruling ZANU(PF) Party campaigned on the basis of land through its campaign slogan of “Land is the Economy, the Economy is land,” whereas the opposition MDC emphasized the economy, not land. A host of other smaller parties became submerged, and it was difficult for them to sell their agenda to the electorate. The campaign became a two-party affair, with accusations and counter accusations between the two. For instance, ZANU(PF) accused the MDC of trying to reverse land reform, of wanting to sell the country to the former colonial masters (as the party was alleged to be receiving financial assistance from the white farmers, white business, and a host of civil society organizations linked to the UK such as the NCA). The MDC accused ZANU(PF) of giving land to the cronies,42 and of monopolizing the land issue— an argument that the party had continued to use as a campaign strategy in every election since 1980 and had failed to resolve in twenty years.
The land issue will always be a campaign issue, in spite of the oppositional politics that argue that it is a national issue and not for party politics. There is a critical need for opposition parties to come up with strategies or positions on land reform to keep it on the national agenda. However, the last election proved that indeed most of the smaller parties do not have a firm land-reform agenda. Internationally, all parties that yearn to govern tend to identify major development issues around which they campaign for political office. It is within this scope that ZANU(PF) has used the land issue as a campaign strategy. There are indications that it has kept its election campaign momentum on the land issue to prove that it was campaigning beyond the elections. However, the party's critics interpreted this as ZANU(PF)'s official campaign strategy for the 2002 presidential elections. At the same time, since the election the MDC has rhetorically opposed the government land-reform program but has failed to develop its own position on land issues.

Within the MDC, there seems to be no agreement as to what the party position on land reform should be. In its election manifesto, the MDC advocated a land commission to lead the land-reform processes. While a land commission will be the most appropriate framework to deal with all aspects of land,43 there is a need to craft a framework to deal with the current occupations so as not to evoke violent reactions from the stakeholders, particularly the war veterans occupying farms. Furthermore, the land commission, which will come into being as a result of cumbersome procedures that involve statutory reform, must not be seen as a diversionary tactic or a process of delaying land reform.

In early June the government gazetted a list of 804 farms for compulsory acquisition. The election later that month saw ZANU(PF) win 62 and the MDC 57 of the 120 contested parliamentary seats. The war veterans began to reemphasize the demand for land on the occupied farms as the government, the CFU, and donors negotiated the way forward. The latest policy framework on land reform has been emerging out of the negotiations and actions taken to respond to the land occupations in 2000. The government in June adopted a "fast-track" LRRP to speedily resettle war veterans and villagers on at least twenty farms per province to kick-start their aim to acquire 5 million hectares. In response to court cases brought against President Mugabe in July by the CFU and others, the government announced it was going to resettle people on over 3,000 farms by the start of the rains in October. Debates and negotiations continue around questions such as when and how land occupations will end and farms will be acquired and resettled, especially given the context of conflicting expectations for the land acquired. The uncertainty and conflict on farms remains an important national issue.

**The Regional Dimension of Land Questions in Southern Africa**

There is an important regional dimension to the land question in Zimbabwe, given the impact of settler history on current land use, labor migration patterns, and markets, as well as on the growing regional political, economic, and communications ties. The debates surrounding land reform in southern Africa have had an influence on those in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, land-reform developments in Zimbabwe are having a significant impact on the region as a whole.

Although the exact contours of the struggles over land are shaped by the national histories of individual countries, conflict remains universal to the land question throughout the region. While governments, donors, and national lobby groups debate about the need for and models of land reform, the structural imbalance of land ownership and use inherited from colonial times continues to fuel antagonism. Conflicts over the land tend to focus on the following areas: land use and demands, land administration, approaches to land reform, the impact of liberalization, and the notion of community-driven land reform. In terms of land use and demands, compelling and unresolved dilemmas persist that are centered around the impact of land on social distribution, utilization efficiency, and the contribution it makes to improving the welfare of the majority of people in the region. The dynamics of land reform raise difficult questions about the goals being accomplished and issues surrounding kinship, land use, and gender bias in favor of males.
In land administration, conflicts have polarized around competing claims over jurisdiction on matters that impinge on the realization of land rights. The legitimate rights and roles of various authorities, ranging from the central government to provincial governments, local authorities, and traditional authorities in allocating land and adjudicating land disputes need to be clarified.

Variations in approaches to land reform relate to whether priority is attached to the redressing of past grievances, and the promotion of justice and equity, or to the narrower concerns of economic efficiency. Underlying these different land-reform approaches is the distinction that is emerging regarding the relative merits of land-rights-based approaches to land transfers, as opposed to land redistribution approaches. The latter are based on the identification of generalized demands for land for survival, agricultural growth, and rural development. The legally sanctioned approaches to the restoration of land rights have been termed the “land restitution” approach. The relative merits of these approaches are controversial, warranting further investigation.

The pressure on southern African countries to liberalize their economies through structural adjustment programs (SAPs) has altered strategies for land reform. The preference for market-assisted approaches by donors and interested national stakeholders influenced a shift from radical to more liberal land-reform strategies that privilege guarantees for uninterrupted land productivity for globalized markets. The neoliberal preference for a minimal role for the state, and for decentralization, have further driven the encouragement of community-driven or “negotiated” land reform. A key—and questionable—assumption of this approach is that impoverished and marginal rural populations can initiate land reform themselves, without falling prey to the hegemony of traditional chieftancy and dominant-party political systems.

Conflicts over land in the 1980s centered around two tensions: between the government’s push for land reform and redistribution based on a social justice criteria of redressing colonial wrongs and those who resisted that demand, and between administrators who called for an orderly, well-planned, and heavily controlled land resettlement exercise and popular demands for land and for following other forms of governance and land-use practices. In the 1990s, the conflicts over land were between, on the one hand, donors, the government (at times), commercial farmers, and a few other groups promoting more of an economic efficiency criteria for land resettlement and, on the other hand, those communities and their supporters among traditional leaders, politicians, war veterans, and at times the government itself, who were upset with the slow pace and the selection process of beneficiaries.

Conclusion

In Zimbabwe, conflict mediation has been complicated by the overly rigid positions of some NGOs and donor agencies over the land issue, the contradictions within the ruling party, and the way in which those contradictions get played out in the policy process. The media (both national and international) have played an unhelpful role by distorting the policy positions on all sides to the dispute, as well as negatively shaping people’s perceptions of what is actually happening on the ground. During the recent violence, the intense emotional atmosphere and state of uncertainty have complicated the task of mediation efforts. The most crucial mediation effort is to keep the channels of communication open and encourage dialogue.

Further research needs to explore the extent to which the state has an independent view on the land question, in the face of a multitude of societal actors, with different interests and ideologies based on class, gender, race, and ethnicity. A better understanding is needed of the alliances formed both between domestic actors and between domestic and external actors (e.g., NGOs and donor agencies), and of their comparative ability to position themselves in the various forums for debate (e.g., the National Economic Consultative Forum). The relationships among different organizations and those they claim to represent, the overlapping membership between various organizations, and the
impact of those acting outside formal organizational structures (e.g., peasant protest) need further exploration.

An obvious means to ameliorate the conflict would be for both donors and the government to be more flexible in their policy stances. This appeared to have been accomplished with the cooperation between donors, the government, and a variety of other stakeholders in the preparation of the IPFP, which grew out of the second phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Program. The IPFP basically entailed a compromise between the government’s preferred approaches to implementing the LRRP Phase 2 and other “complementary approaches” (all favoring a market approach) preferred by the international donors. However, it is not clear to what extent either the donors or the government were truly committed to the compromise reflected in the IPFP, and events have (temporarily at least) minimized its relevance. The degree of the apparent policy coordination between the various donors needs to be validated empirically, in order to determine the extent to which some potential donors might be persuaded to relax their policy positions.

The chapter has also taken as a starting point the understanding (or assumption) that it may not always be possible to avoid violent conflict in the realization of important and legitimate national goals, such as land redistribution and resettlement. International donors tend to privilege the preservation of (law and) order, but in doing so, this may entail the maintenance of unjust and inequitable social structures. If the avoidance of all violence comes at the expense of meaningful change through legitimate processes, then the value attached to the preservation of order may be questioned. However, the outbreak of violence can unleash forces that ultimately undermine legitimate social goals, which points to the critical importance of minimizing violent conflict.

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE-RELATED CONFLICTS: MOVING TOWARDS TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACHES
Rolain Borel, Erin McCandless, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer

This issue investigates strategic approaches to address conflicts across the globe that centrally involve natural resources and the environment. Our authors are concerned with transformative rather than management approaches as they challenge the boundaries of policy and theoretical debates with rich description and analysis of unique case studies where different approaches are attempted. The cases examined in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America involve conflicts related chiefly to the land, water, forests and protected parks. Several authors identify ideological, economic, geographic and identity-based exclusion mechanisms as playing a central role in entrenching conflict involving natural resources. In responding to these conflicts, most of the authors argue in favour of structural changes to eradicate the causes. However, the nature of the conflicts, and the high numbers of the parties involved, often require complex inter-institutional approaches rather than short-term technological fixes. Several authors point out that long-term transformation should be based on the establishment, or re-establishment, of local stewardship mechanisms. All the articles appear to share the ultimate aim of identifying means for building peace and development which are sustainable in regions that have experienced ongoing war involving natural resources.

Two articles and one briefing in this issue analyse strategies to address persistent challenges related to natural resource management in post-war reconstruction efforts of war economics. Kaysle Brown surveys the policy and practice of United Nations peacekeeping missions in post-conflict situations where natural resources have played a major role in fuelling war. Drawing on international examples, she traces the evolution of
approaches—from not addressing the issue at all (in Cambodia) to explicit components of the Mission mandate (in Sierra Leone and Liberia). While newer peacekeeping mandates include the imposition of sanctions, experts’ panels and voluntary codes, they are insufficient, Brown argues, to deal with the economic dimensions of war that remain a source of threat in post-conflict situations. She challenges the UN to match the new seriousness being given to peacebuilding with greater attention towards transforming persistent economic dimensions of war.

Erin McCandless and Tyler Christie amplify Brown’s arguments in an in-depth case study of the post-war, natural resource-related threats that continue to exist in Liberia. The case of Sapo National Park offers new insights into how such threats can be addressed and highlights the key challenges that persist in doing so. Beyond the particulars of a well-executed evacuation of illegal gold miners from the Sapo National Park under delicate conditions, the article makes visible the multiple local and international dimensions of such an operation. It is less about a few hundred evicted settlers than about the international pressure to re-establish the rule of law in a war-torn country that has a long history of pillage of its natural resources. The authors also examine the dynamics of negotiating effective arrangements between locals and international agencies. The effectiveness of the operation rests on a variety of factors, notably the coordinated engagement of international forces (especially the United Nations Mission in Liberia), the national government, NGOs and local communities. They acknowledge, however, that the longer-term components of the proposed solution—in particular the creation of alternative livelihoods for evicted miners and communities around the park—are ultimately more complicated to implement given the lack of strong, practical security-development linkages.

Another perspective on innovative post-conflict efforts designed to sustain peace in Liberia is an analysis by James Rochow, Robert Simpson, Alfred Brownell and Oliver Pierson of the forest concession review process—a key component of restoring the rule of law and, ultimately, to the lifting of sanctions on timber. Important lessons emerge in the review process, such as the need to follow a clear methodology in a transparent way; build ‘informed constituencies of support’; apply pressure from local and international sources on the government; and link the concession review to legal and institutional reform. The authors argue in their briefing that the structure and methodology of the forest concession review provide a model for internationalised action adaptable for reforms of other sectors and the elimination of sources of conflict, in Liberia and elsewhere.

Turning to countries that have witnessed conflicts which span decades, several authors examine the role of natural resources as they link to identity—both in prolonging conflict and as issues that must be addressed in the longer term interests of peace. In an article about Sudan, Mahmoud El Zain focuses on the processes of resource appropriation by elites from the Nile Valley, which led to the exclusion of large segments of the population on the periphery, especially non-Arab, non-Muslim groups in southern Sudan. El Zain identifies one exclusion mechanism in the development and dissemination of a ‘frontier-caste ideology’ through which the non-irrigated lands in and outside the Nile Valley were declared a ‘common resource’ in the ownership of the Sudanese state. The process, which began under British colonial rule, continued with the distribution of these ‘commons’ mainly to Muslims and Arabs—many of them of nomadic origin from the North—who also benefited from subsidies to establish large-scale mechanised agriculture. Combined with other factors of cultural and religious identity, this ideology sowed the seeds of a decade-long civil war. Now that the war is over, El Zain makes a convincing case for re-establishing the original rights of the land owners as the way to achieve long-term reconciliation and peacebuilding. Such an arrangement would address the root causes of the conflict, and they would need to be integrated in the current peace process or agreement between the government and political leadership in southern Sudan.

Examining Israeli and Palestinian relations as they have unfolded in a Palestinian village whose land was divided by the separation barrier, Maia Carter Hallward argues that interest-based or policy dialogue conflict management approaches cannot ultimately
resolve protracted conflicts involving natural resources, particularly where identity is involved. Transformative approaches, she argues, should meet three conditions, namely to contribute to the empowerment of the weaker actors, to address the identity issues and values related to the land, and to respond to a systemic analysis of the needed interventions. While the obstacles to such an approach are profound in the Israeli/Palestinian case, the author identifies transformative strategies that can be undertaken by a variety of actors. They include the creation of new national narratives on both sides that link people to the land in non-exclusive ways; generating concern for the destruction of natural resources and the negative effects of conflict in the region; thinking of the land as a natural resource to be protected and sustainably used and shared; and pursuing creative ways to share the geographical space beyond the strict geopolitical boundaries.

Two other submissions are focused on the Middle East—in particular on water. Mounah Abdel-Samad and Amal Koury revisit the old but relevant question about the role of water scarcity in intensifying conflicts and, alternatively, in securing cooperation. The authors develop and illustrate their arguments through case studies of Turkey, Syria and Iraq and their shared dependence on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. While politicians and media are often quick to focus on the imminence of ‘water wars’, this article lays the groundwork for a critical and creative examination of peaceful means to address water-related tensions. Like Carter Hallward, the authors emphasise the shared history and values of the countries in creating a context for cooperation. They argue that to build peace and increase development, the countries can share expertise, undertake common projects, create joint think-tanks on water issues, and work to complement each others’ economies rather than simply compete. Cooperation on water issues, they argue, can prepare the ground for strengthening relationships between the countries in other areas.

Eric Abitbol critically analyses the possible impacts of the construction of a projected canal that would link the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to mitigate the alarming and continuing drop of the waters of the Dead Sea and produce hydro-electricity. Abitbol highlights problems associated with the use of technological solution to solve a problem that has its roots in complex political, sociological, ethnological and economic dimensions. The proposed solution is supported by Jordan and Israel and bilateral and multilateral actors, and follows a pattern of many large investment projects worldwide. Abitbol concludes with a plea to consider other solutions to the decline of the Dead Sea level which can draw on the wisdom and ingenuity of an array of existing institutions and which would prove less costly and destructive than the proposed canal.

In another submission that invites further thinking about transformational approaches to natural resources and the environment, Valerie Hickey explores the concept of environmental injustice as one of the drivers of environmental conflicts. She reminds us that geographical asymmetries compound social ones, given the costs and benefits of resource extraction, pollution and waste disposal. The asymmetry is obvious at both the national and international level. Of special concern is the potential of environmentally minded initiatives, like the declaration of protected areas or the protection of endangered species worldwide, to increase the gap between affluent and vulnerable groups and countries. The author proposes that the strengthening of the local stewardship mechanisms, the so-called ‘green’ civil society, might help reverse the trend. While such measures certainly can contribute, structural factors of international environmental injustice (among many other forms of injustice) require an international approach at the level of policy and institutions, for their analysis and transformation.

Daniel Stillwaggon and Sara Cobb present a stakeholder analysis tool that was developed in a conflict case in El Petén, Guatemala, where several stakeholders—including international investors and NGOs, national government and local communities—were divided over proposals to develop an area of protected forest parkland as a national park. The stakeholder landscape in El Petén is historically complex and tense, and a mechanism had to be devised that would not only accommodate different perspectives, but also generate the confidence to establish dialogue. The proposed approach classified the actors in relation to their origin (i.e. international, national, regional and local) and in three
categories according to the hierarchy, or their power in the decision-making process. This ultimately allowed for the identification of the actors who would be best placed to con-
voke and conduct the dialogue, as well as those who effectively had the power to block
its success.

As in previous issues of the Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, we discover instances
which demand peacebuilding processes and tools to ensure that the distribution and util-
isation of resources in a development context do not exacerbate violence and conflict.
Conflicts involving natural resources and the environment— whether deep-rooted and pro-
tracted or in a post-settlement phase— need conflict transformation mechanisms to
ensure the sustainability and protection of resources and environment. In most of the
cases presented in this issue, building trust and confidence between the conflicting par-
ties (in Liberia, Palestine/Israel and Sudan’s north and south) is identified as the first
step toward negotiating genuine and lasting peace. Conflicts involving natural resources
may be more complicated in terms of the issues they raise and the number of parties they
affect, yet their dynamics and possible means of resolution resemble conflicts that involve
aspects of identity or ideology.

Creating technological solutions for environmental or natural resource problems is cer-
tainly important, but an exclusive emphasis on technological approaches may be valid
only in the short term. Besides, it can complicate the conflict if the solutions are imposed
unilaterally or without wide consensus. Shared dependence and interdependence among
stakeholders on natural resources and the environment in conflict situations invariably
emerge as valuable dimensions in which to advance processes of conflict transformation
and peacebuilding in their needing a requirement for basic cooperation. These shifts are
certainly necessary to appreciate the role of natural resources in a conflict situation.
Knowing what can facilitate movement, however, is only the first challenge. Convincing
the parties to adopt them is the next.

The articles in this special issue only scratch the surface in understanding and uncover-
ing the nature, dynamics and possible transformation of conflicts over natural resources
and the environment. While some may not articulate concrete and feasible ways forward,
they do open up critical new areas for future research and examination that may catal-
yse transformation in protracted conflicts involving resources, and point to new poten-
tial resources for prevention.

There are many other dimensions that have not been examined here, such as the identi-
fication of the concrete steps to bring peacebuilding into natural resource conflict at the
design, implementation and monitoring stages; ways in which conflict resolution and
peace advocacy intervention programmes have implications for natural resources and envi-
ronment; and a theoretical framework to guide the field of environmental peacebuild-
ing. We invite you to explore these with us in future issues.
CHAPTER 9
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo

Conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention are two key conceptual approaches at the heart of peacebuilding efforts to pragmatically address sources of conflict. Although conflict prevention has been around somewhat longer than conflict sensitivity and has been identified as an institutional priority within leading organisations working on peace and conflict, such as the United Nations, its application has been hindered by concerns of infringement upon state sovereignty. Relatively recent efforts to ensure that policy-making and programming are ‘conflict sensitive’—that is, factoring awareness of the conflict context into decision-making—have made significant headway in policy discourse, but practice lags behind, challenged by political will, the tendency for bureaucracies within institutions to obstruct change, as well as the lack of coordination required but often lacking in international actor efforts. Given the developmental sources and drivers of so many conflicts in Africa, conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention are critical avenues for linking peacebuilding and development on the continent.

As the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict observed many years ago, deadly conflict is not inevitable, and the need to act preventively is urgent. The problem is not the necessity of early warning, but for early action. The UN secretary-general’s ‘Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict’ is perhaps the most important document outlining lessons learned and challenges that persist for international action. It targets three areas for conflict prevention measures—operational, structural (within states), and systemic—and highlights normative development, political and institutional progress, and gaps between rhetoric and reality.1

Operational measures are those applicable in the immediate crisis. They concern addressing issues before they lead to violent conflict, strengthening means for protecting civilians in armed conflict and post-conflict settings, using sanctions as a bargaining tool to bring parties to the table, and providing humanitarian aid aimed at prevention (i.e., addressing food insecurity and agricultural underproduction and resource scarcity). Structural measures within states designed to prevent conflict from occurring should focus on horizontal inequalities, governance-related issues (i.e., the failure of public policies to achieve even-handed results and prevent corruption, which violates public trust), and development programming that focuses on decreasing structural risk factors. Systemic measures—where there is a recognition that conflict, and thus its prevention, requires transcending state boundaries—involve reducing specific risk factors (such as environmental degradation), regulating conflict-perpetuating industries, halting the flow of illicit arms, and promoting human development.

Important work is being done in each of these areas, with norms and institutions for peace advancing with them. At the same time, the fundamental obstacle to conflict prevention—particularly when it becomes violent—is often political in nature. The role of politics at the national and international levels in advancing or blocking international action is often underestimated, or if recognised, not adequately addressed.

1 The report builds upon the 2001 version of the UN’s prevention assessment (A/55/985–S/2001/574) and ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, a report by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that addresses six areas of vulnerability (http://www.un.org/secureworld).
Given the propensity for settled, violent conflicts to reignite—largely due to the failure of traditional peacemaking approaches and to inadequate efforts to address the factors that led to war—it is of paramount importance to ensure that programming and policy-making are done differently in post-conflict settings than in regular development settings. In recent years, many approaches suggesting what a conflict sensitive approach should look like have been developed and shared. Consensus has evolved that such an approach is indeed one that factors considerations of conflict into programming and policy-making in the planning, implementation, and evaluation stages in order to contribute to peace rather than conflict. This is driven by efforts to take into account the positive and negative effects of interventions (in terms of conflict or peace dynamics) in the contexts in which they are undertaken and to consider the impact of these contexts on the intervention.2

Conflict sensitivity represents, according to Thania Paffenholz, the third phase of like-minded approaches that have developed around a concern for evaluating and improving the effectiveness of peace and conflict efforts. In ‘What Is the Aid for Peace Approach for Conflict Zones?’, she describes a trajectory for which the first phase begins (around 1998–1999) with peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA) and is marked by Mary Anderson’s ‘do no harm’ approach, presented here in ‘Framework for Analyzing Aid’s Impact on Conflict’. Anderson’s contribution starts from the premise that aid can never be neutral: all aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training) into a resource-scarce environment. In conflict situations, humanitarian aid and how it is administered can cause harm or can strengthen peace capacities in communities, notably by exacerbating ‘dividers’ or conversely building upon ‘connectors’. To do no harm and to support local capacities for peace requires the following: (1) careful analysis of the context of conflict and the aid programme, examining how aid interacts with the conflict, and a willingness to create options and redesign programmes to improve its quality; and (2) careful reflection on staff conduct and organisational policies so that the ‘implicit ethical messages’ that are sent communicate congruent messages that strengthen local capacities for peace.

The second and third phases described by Paffenholz describe the deepening engagement of a broader range of actors with conflict sensitivity and a proliferation of tools. The period from 1999 to 2003/2004 she characterises as one marked by the development and introduction of new tools, mainly inspired by peace research, into development cooperation. The final and current phase has brought PCIA into broader acceptance and expanded the focus beyond assessing the impact of aid interventions on peace and conflict towards that of conflict sensitive programming and policy-making.

Current thinking is reflected in a number of approaches. Work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), notably through its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and its Network on Development Evaluation, represents movement at the policy level, illustrating that governments are recognising the importance of the discourse and practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and of learning to evaluate such activities with a view towards improving their effectiveness and building sustainable peace. The factsheet ‘Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities’ introduces the network’s approach.3

Paffenholz’s ‘aid for peace’ approach builds upon and integrates different tools from the fields of peacebuilding, evaluation, and planning and focuses on needs within a specific country, with the aim of tailoring aid interventions to improve their relevance and effec-

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tiveness in peacebuilding. Departing from most PCIA frameworks, this approach can be applied at the programme/project and policy levels. It can be used to plan and assess peacebuilding programmes as well as humanitarian and development assistance.

The World Bank usefully extends thinking on conflict sensitivity into the realm of development and economic policy frameworks in its analysis of a selection of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP). The methodology presented in 'Toward a Conflict Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy' focuses on five areas:

• participation: the process of developing a PRSP can be 'conflict mitigating'—that is, used as a communication and collaboration mechanism between and among groups—and the process can serve to develop trust in authorities, build capacity, and establish accountability by actors involved;
• poverty diagnostic: the strategy should focus on conflict-induced poverty and integrate conflict analysis with poverty diagnostics, undertaking analysis of the relationship of poverty, poor governance, and marginalisation;
• policy actions: the selection, prioritisation, and content of policy actions should be systematically assessed through a conflict lens;
• institutional arrangements: to promote conflict sensitivity in PRSPs, institutional arrangements are needed that flow from conscious design that acknowledges conflict factors, stresses transparency, reflects broad-based and inclusive formations, and devolves power and transfers resources as needed;
• donor behaviour: donors should prioritise country ownership, strengthen countries' capacity to implement conflict sensitive policy, and improve harmonisation.

It is worth highlighting that this approach does not accompany the poverty reduction strategy process in countries; its adoption (in part or full) is totally voluntary, and to date there is little evidence that these methodological recommendations to advance conflict sensitive PRSPs have been undertaken in countries developing these strategies. Most important, this approach has not been well understood or mainstreamed within the World Bank itself.

There are also efforts that focus on bringing conflict prevention squarely into the development cooperation agenda. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Robert Picciotto, in the introduction to 'Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation', underscore that addressing structural sources of conflict implies choices in economic and social policy that are at the heart of growth and poverty reduction strategies. In 'Promoting Group Justice', Frances Stewart, Graham Brown, and Alex Cobham illustrate a conflict sensitive analysis and approach in the area of fiscal policy. There is now widespread consensus that 'horizontal' economic inequalities among groups defined along ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, and religious lines can generate social tensions and fuel violent conflict. The authors focus on tax and expenditure policies in post-conflict settings, making recommendations for incorporating distributional effects into fiscal policy-making in order to address horizontal inequalities and thus move towards sustaining peace.

While advances in thinking about conflict prevention and conflict sensitivity hold much promise in contributing to enabling peace and human development on the African continent, their success ultimately rests upon how well the obstacles of lacking political will and resistance to institutional change by bureaucracies and poor coordination—which prevent or undermine action—are tackled. Identifying and addressing the sources of conflict require achieving some degree of consensus, which is never an easy task. It also requires actions that might challenge particular personal, group, or national interests. International actors must, as they are increasingly promising to do through such efforts as the DAC guidelines and the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, be genuinely interested in working collectively to support such efforts, even if and when it does not directly or obviously serve their national interests. These are not small challenges, but a clear path has been lit. Will it be taken?
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT
United Nations Secretary-General

Introduction

1. This is my second comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict, prepared in response to General Assembly resolutions 55/281 and 57/337, as well as Security Council resolution 1366 (2001). This report fulfils my remaining reporting obligations stemming from these resolutions and provides information on the implementation of resolution 57/337, including the mandated capacity review of the United Nations system with respect to prevention. In September 2003 I submitted an interim report on the prevention of armed conflict fulfilling the reporting requirements of resolutions 55/281 and 56/512.

2. My first comprehensive report on this subject (A/55/985-S/2001/574 and Corr. 1) recognized that conflict prevention is one of the chief obligations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and that primary responsibility belongs to national Governments. The report made clear that national sovereignty is strengthened by early action to prevent armed conflict because such action obviates the need for unwelcome external interference later on. The report also exhorted the United Nations system—many constituent parts of which have an important role to play—to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.

3. I note with satisfaction that a culture of prevention is indeed beginning to take hold at the United Nations. Since 2001, there has been important normative, political and institutional progress on this matter, most notably in the adoption of the resolutions mentioned above and Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) on strengthening the effectiveness of the Council’s role in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1), Member States solemnly renewed their commitment to promote a culture of prevention of armed conflicts as a means of effectively addressing the interconnected security and development challenges faced by peoples throughout the world, as well as to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed conflict. There is even some evidence to suggest that the overall trend in the number and severity of armed conflicts worldwide is decreasing and that this can be attributed in large measure to an upsurge of international activism in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Some Member States have also begun to advance the indispensable notion of national infrastructures of peace and to clarify what external support is needed. Moreover, the United Nations system has developed important tools and mechanisms to work cooperatively in conflict prevention, on which I will provide more detail below.

4. An unacceptable gap remains between rhetoric and reality in the area of conflict prevention. The time has come to ask some hard questions about why this gap has proved so difficult to bridge. What more can we do to bridge it? In 2001, mindful of the enormous regional consequences of our failure as an international community to avert genocide in Rwanda, I noted that we had an obligation to the victims of violence in that country and elsewhere to rise to the challenge of prevention. Too often the international community spends vast sums of money to fight fires that, in hindsight, we might more easily have extinguished with timely preventive action before so many lives were lost or turned upside down. Over the last five years, we have spent over $18 billion on United Nations peacekeeping that was necessary partly because of inadequate preventive measures. A fraction of that investment in preventive action would surely have saved both lives and money. So, while I am gratified that real progress can be documented in the present report, I feel more strongly than ever that we have a long way to go and no time to waste.

5. To that end, in this report I want to move our debate from a focus on mandates and responsibilities to a deeper awareness of what we are trying to prevent and how we must go about it. To prevent armed conflicts we must understand their origins and seek to make violence a less reasonable option. We must also take care that preventive action does not ignore the underlying injustices or motivations that caused peo-
ple to take up arms. Violence finds followers when people lack alternatives and feel voiceless. Our dual challenge is to address or diminish the sources of tension for society and to strengthen the institutions that give it the ability to channel conflict non-violently and to allow for dialogue.

6. These principles most evidently apply to intra-State and transnational conflicts, which make up the bulk of wars in the last several decades, but they are equally valid for preventing inter-State disputes. Going to war must be made as unattractive an option as possible, while mechanisms for peacefully resolving disputes and laying the ground for ongoing dialogue in which all stakeholders have a voice must be made more appealing and more accessible.

7. In the case of both intra- and inter-State armed conflict, the key is to equip States and societies to manage their own problems in ways that are most appropriate to them. If we are to enhance the impact of our efforts and address the root causes of conflict, the thrust of preventive work must shift—as indeed it has begun to do—from reactive, external interventions with limited and ultimately superficial impact to internally driven initiatives for developing local and national capacities for prevention. This approach fosters home-grown, self-sustaining infrastructures for peace. Its aim is to develop the capacity in societies to resolve disputes in internally acceptable ways, reaching a wide constellation of actors in government and civil society. It should be complemented by broader development programming that is sensitive to conflict dynamics. External support for such efforts must be informed by an understanding of the countries and societal dynamics concerned.

8. This structural approach must be complemented by action at other levels, both globally and nationally. In my 2001 report I introduced the distinction between structural and operational prevention. The latter refers to measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis, and the former consists of measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place and, if they do, that they do not recur. While acknowledging that such distinctions do not always completely hold in reality, I nevertheless find them useful conceptual tools. In this report I would like to introduce a third sphere of preventive action, namely, systemic prevention. Systemic prevention refers to measures to address global risk of conflict that transcend particular States. For example, global initiatives to reduce the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, to tackle environmental degradation, to regulate industries that are known to fuel conflict and to advance the global development agenda not only are important in and of themselves but also serve to reduce vulnerability to armed conflict. Combined with ongoing, country-specific structural and operational preventive measures, systemic initiatives further bolster the chances of peace.

9. By more consciously situating our actions at the systemic level as contributing to (or detracting from) conflict prevention, we are following through on the important and stark message from the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which issued its seminal report “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” in December 2004 (see A/59/565 and Corr. 1). The Panel underlined our mutual vulnerability to six clusters of interconnected threats, which could be addressed only collectively. It also emphasized the importance of addressing those threats early and in ways that resonate most in the different parts of the world. Finally, the Panel highlighted development as “the indispensable foundation of a collective security system that takes prevention seriously” (A/59/565, synopsis, twelfth para.). I bore these messages in mind in the preparation of the present report, and I urge all Member States to do the same as they read and debate its contents.

10. That prevention is clearly a shared responsibility does not, however, diminish the primary obligation of Member States to exercise their sovereign duties to their citizens and neighbours. Many of the aspirations elaborated in the present report pertain to all societies and all Member States. No society can claim full immunity from tensions that have the potential to turn violent. There are many ways that Governments, supported by the international community, can work to minimize the potential for armed conflict. This report identifies many such opportunities and encourages all concerned to make use of the assistance that is available.

11. In section II, the present report looks at actual and potential ways to address the sources of tension that make States, societies and, indeed, entire regions more vulner-
able to armed conflict. In doing so, it distinguishes between actions at the systemic, structural and operational levels, making clear that we must be active at all those levels simultaneously to stand the best chance of making a difference. The report then turns in section III to how we can strengthen the norms and institutions that make armed conflict less viable and less likely. There is a good deal of progress to report in this area, which is heartening, but there is also a lot more to be done internationally, regionally and nationally. The same is true of the institutions that exist to allow for the peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes, which is the focus of section IV. While the activities and mechanisms described in sections II to IV are among the most prominent or important, they do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible options, but rather serve to illustrate the many ways in which prevention can be advanced.

12. Sections V and VI of the present report draw attention to the many actors that can contribute to effective preventive action. First and foremost, individual sovereign Governments remain fully accountable for maintaining peace within their borders. But they are not alone. They can and must be able to rely on the support of external actors whose activities can be crucial in preventing conflict, from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations to the private sector and civil society. The contribution such actors can make, and the importance of their acting in concert with the Government concerned and with each other to take timely preventive action, is the focus of section V. In fulfillment of General Assembly resolution 57/337, section VI looks specifically at how United Nations capacity has been and continues to be enhanced so that the Organization can better fulfil its preventive mission.

13. Finally, I conclude the report with a small number of important recommendations. These include suggestions for addressing systemic sources of tension and strengthening global norms and institutions for peace. I also make recommendations for actions at the country level that will similarly reduce risk factors and enhance national infrastructures of peace. Additional recommendations focus on the importance of all relevant players acting in concert, and I close with a series of recommendations pertaining to the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil its mandate in the area of conflict prevention.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AID’S IMPACT ON CONFLICT
Mary B. Anderson
Excerpted from Mary B. Anderson,
Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace— Or War
(Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 67-80

Aid workers have learned many practical and useful lessons about how aid interacts with conflict. These lessons can be used to improve the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of future aid programs in conflict areas. By using what has been learned through past experience, aid workers can ensure that future aid does not exacerbate or prolong conflict and that it does strengthen connectors and support local capacities for peace.

In this chapter we pull together the ideas and lessons presented in the preceding chapters into an Analytical Framework for Assessing Sources of Tension, Dividers, War Capacities, and Connectors and Capacities for Peace in conflict situations. This planning tool has emerged from interactions and discussions with aid agency staff in many areas.

Expectations for International Aid

To set the context for using the framework, we should first clarify expectations. What can aid do and what can aid not do in conflict situations?

The evidence clearly shows that aid saves lives, reduces human suffering, and supports the pursuit of greater economic and social security in conflict settings. This is what aid is intended to do, and overall the record is good. We expect aid to have these impacts.
But how realistic are we to expect that aid should also have positive impacts on conflict? What are its limitations?

Aid neither Causes nor Ends Wars

Even if aid workers applied the lessons of past experience and carried out perfect programs, wars would still happen. People and societies fight wars for their own reasons; outsiders cannot prevent wars. People and societies must achieve their own peace; outsiders cannot make or guarantee peace for anyone else. To arrogate too much power to aid, to operate as if aid can make war or bring peace would be to disrespect recipient societies’ right and responsibility to choose.

As we remind ourselves of the limitations of international aid, two additional realities must be noted. First, whereas societies overall are responsible for their own warring or non-warring decisions and actions, within societies many individuals and groups feel powerless in relation to those decisions and would, if they could, choose peace rather than war. Because this reality appears to be universally true, the dismissive comment sometimes made by international observers that “we should leave them alone to fight their own wars and not get involved” is inappropriate and fundamentally counter to humanitarian principles. Every society has people—often many people—who decry their country’s wars and who value external aid because it enables them to express their opposition to destructive violence. Aid has a responsibility to respond to and join with these people.

The other reality that must be recognized even as we acknowledge aid’s limitations is that even small amounts of aid have power. Although aid may be marginal when compared with the total resources devoted to wars, there is sufficient evidence showing its influence on the course of warfare that aid providers must take responsibility for its impacts. Aid’s impact on conflict ranges from no effect at all to sizable and significant effects.

Some things happen in war on which aid has no effect. Some things happen that would happen regardless of whether aid existed, but because aid is provided in the context in which they occur it has an impact on them. In these circumstances aid workers must accept responsibility not for the fact that the events occur but for the ways in which their aid either worsens and prolongs destructive events or supports and strengthens positive ones.

Some events are caused by aid. When this happens, aid workers are challenged to ask if their aid has created new or increased tensions among people and whether it can help to re-strengthen relationships or forge new connections among them.

In the complex conflict settings in which aid is provided, aid workers must be both realistic and humble enough to know what they cannot affect and what is not their responsibility, and they must be idealistic and bold enough to hold themselves accountable for the events they affect or cause. This is no small challenge.

With this understanding of both the limitations and possibilities for aid to influence conflict, we offer the analytical framework for planning aid programs.

**Analytical Framework**

International assistance can make conflict worse in two ways: It can feed inter-group tensions and weaken inter-group connections. When aid has either of these impacts, it inadvertently exacerbates conflict. Conversely, aid can help war to end by lessening inter-group tensions and strengthening inter-group connections.

The framework has three basic steps; it also prompts a dynamic feedback process for ongoing assessment of a situation and appropriate program redesign.

Step 1 involves identifying the dividers, tensions, and war capacities in the context of conflict and assessing their importance. Step 2 involves identifying, and assessing the importance of, the connectors and local capacities for peace in the same context. Step
3 involves identifying the pertinent characteristics of the aid agency and its program and assessing (and reassessing) their impacts on the dividers, tensions, and war capacities and the connectors and capacities for peace.

The Context of Conflict—Dividers, Tensions, and Capacities for War

Aid providers must first understand and assess what divides people, the tensions between them, and the capacities for war (who gains from it) in any area in which they are working. This is true whether the area is embroiled in open warfare or is prone only to low-level and occasional inter-group tensions.

Some dividers and tensions may be obvious. Warring parties often cite reasons for their wars. Histories of prejudice and exclusion, struggles for control of disputed resources, and differences in understanding how a just society should be organized are reasons people may go to war.

On the other hand, as we have seen, these issues may not underlie a conflict. Putative leaders may manipulate opinion and promote inter-group tensions, but the fighting may do very little to address systemic justice issues.

In assessing dividers and tensions, aid workers should differentiate between those that arise from injustice or historical inequalities and those that have been manipulated or that result from conflict itself. That is, aid workers should distinguish between root and proximate causes of conflict.

Not all sources of tension or divisions in societies have the same potential for damage. Some are local or matter to small numbers of people. Others reach across societies and involve virtually everyone. Aid’s impact on dividers and tensions will vary depending on how broadly or narrowly they are shared.

Some tensions that are widespread may actually connect people on all sides of a conflict. For example, the common experience of lawlessness can add to overall suspicion and thus divide people, or it may motivate people to reach across conflict lines to reconnect in common cause against the threat of uncontrolled thuggery.

Some dividers and tensions exist within society, whereas others may be prompted and promoted from outside. Regional issues and external powers contribute to a number of current conflicts. Surrounding countries sometimes arm combatants for their own purposes (e.g., Afghanistan); events within neighboring countries sometimes spill into and destabilize another country (e.g., the Horn of Africa). The location of the source of conflict must be considered when assessing the potential impact of aid on dividers and tensions.

Assessing the importance of dividers, tensions, and capacities for war. In this step it is important that aid workers not only identify dividers, tensions and capacities for war but that they also assess their importance. A critical question is, Who is divided? Between or among which groups do the tensions or divisions exist? Tensions are often found within societies that although important do not overlap with an identity that would be likely to erupt into open conflict.

Additionally, in assessing the importance of dividers and tensions, aid workers should consider how deeply people are committed to their conflict. How widely is a commitment shared? Who gains from the continuation of conflict, and how widely shared are the gains?

Some important categories for identifying and assessing dividers, tensions, and war capacities are root or proximate cause, broad-based or narrow involvement of people, and internal to society or externally induced. Aid’s actual and potential impacts on dividers and tensions will vary depending on the depth and breadth of the commitment to war within the society in which aid is provided.
Conflict Sensitivity and Conflict Prevention

The Context of Conflict—Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace

Step 2 of the framework involves identifying and assessing connectors and local capacities for peace (LCPs) in the context of conflict. Whereas dividers and tensions may be overt and obvious, few connectors or capacities for peace are as readily apparent to aid workers, and they also vary widely in different contexts. It is insufficient to identify categories of groupings that might be connectors, such as elders, women's groups, or schools. Although in some settings such groups may bring people together in spite of war, in many societies they promote hatred and reinforce divisions.

Assessing the importance of connectors and local capacities for peace. To identify genuine connectors and local capacities for peace in any specific location requires attentiveness to the actual systems, actions, and interactions in that setting. Questions to be considered are, What are the lines of conflict in which connectors and capacities for peace are important? Where do people maintain overt contact and connections across fighting lines? Where do people stay connected in less obvious ways? How widespread or limited are both the overt and the less obvious interactions?

Some important categories for identifying and assessing the importance of connectors and capacities for peace include long-standing, historical or new, as a result of conflict; broad-based, inclusive or narrow, an opening wedge; internal or external; and actual, existing or potential (can aid provide incentives?). Aid's ability to affect connectors and peace capacities will vary depending on these realities.

The Aid Program—Planning, Implementing, and Monitoring

Step 3 of the framework involves analyzing the aid agency and its program. An aid program should be constantly reviewed as the context changes and as staff understanding of the context grows. Such review should prompt continual appropriate programmatic modifications.

The center column depicts an aid agency's initial intervention. Here we list all aspects of an aid agency that affect and shape its field programs. The agency's mandate, funding structures and sources, and headquarters' organization are relatively fixed regardless of field programs undertaken. (Note, however, that if field experience indicates that this core structure is counterproductive, even these aspects of an agency's identity can be changed.)

In addition, in any field effort aid agencies make a series of programming decisions. These include whether to intervene and why (stated explicit goal), where to intervene, what to provide, when and for how long, with whom (beneficiaries), by whom (field staff), and how. Some of these decisions are made at headquarters, some are shared by headquarters and the field, and some are made almost entirely in the field.

Decisions about whether, why, and where to intervene are usually made before an agency enters the field. Although they may be based on a field assessment mission, these decisions are made mostly at headquarters. Decisions about what to provide and the timing and duration of a program are often also dictated by donor policies and headquarters' mandates and structures. They are often shaped and adjusted, however, in response to field learning once a program is under way. Decisions about who shall be the beneficiaries of aid and what kinds of staffing should carry out a program are closer to the field, although international staffing patterns will be decided at headquarters. Finally, decisions about how to carry out programs are made primarily in the field. Although headquarters' policies may determine the shape and style of programming in general terms, staff in the field make local, specific, daily, and ongoing decisions about how they do their work. Decisions at every level can affect the impacts of aid on conflict.

The location of the various decisions between headquarters and the field highlights who has the responsibility and power to affect aid's interactions with conflict. People who make
decisions at headquarters are responsible for the way their choices play out in the field. If the decisions have negative impacts, those individuals should assume responsibility. Likewise, people at the field level bear the responsibility and have options for determining how their choices affect conflict. Although the chain of decision making is connected, individuals at each level always have options and latitude to ensure that their part of the process does less harm and more good. The entire system may not be changeable, but a thoughtful individual can adapt his or her part of the program to have a more positive effect.

Step 3 in the framework involves identifying the characteristics of an aid program according to the categories outlined and relating them to the analysis of the context (dividers or connectors) to anticipate how each programmatic choice will affect the context. For example, programmers should ask, Will a decision about staffing reinforce any division or tension we have identified? Will it feed into war interests? Or will it lessen tension? Can it support capacities for peace and connectors?

If staffing choices are seen as reinforcing divisions and tensions, it is time to consider the range of staffing options (options columns). Programmers should ask, How else can we staff this program? What about the number of staff? What types of people might we hire (men, women, all parties to the conflict, only one side, and soon)? What are the possible ways of working (paid staff, reliance on volunteers, working through government agencies, and the like)? Given what we understand about the divisions and tensions in this situation, how will each option affect them?

If the answer to reinforcing connectors is “no,” one goes to the options column and considers all of the alternatives for staffing that might also build on and support connectors and capacities for peace. Programmers should ask, What do we know about local capacities and connectors? Can we devise a staffing pattern that will do the job and at the same time reinforce or reward a capacity or a connector?

The dynamic feedback elements of the framework require that each programming decision be checked through the two sides (dividers/tensions and connectors/LCPs). If staffing is adjusted to be sure tensions are not being made worse, the adjustment should also be tested against the connectors side of the framework. Programmers should ask, Is this the best we can do in terms of staffing choices not to feed tensions and at the same time support connectors? If not, is there another option?

Similarly, if an option is found that reinforces connectors, programmers should recheck to see whether there is any way it will inadvertently reinforce a tension. If so, what other options exist?

The process is less complicated than it sounds. Once an aid provider has internalized the idea of dividers/tensions and capacities/connectors, she or he will always view choices through these lenses. It will become second nature to think about the inadvertent side effects of programming decisions in the context of conflict. It will remain primary to ensure that the agency’s mandate and programming purposes are achieved. Additionally, it will become natural to consider how to do so in ways that do not exacerbate intergroup tensions but that support and strengthen connections among people as they build a just and peaceful society.

In Chapter 3, we identified a range of types of dividers and connectors, including systems and institutions, attitudes and actions, values and interests, experiences, and symbols and occasions.

What a Framework Tool Does and Does Not Do

A framework tool does three things. First, it identifies the categories of information that have been found to be the most important in affecting the way aid interacts conflict. Second, it organizes that information. Third, it highlights relationships among the categories and allows one to anticipate likely outcomes of alternative programming decisions.
This facilitates an assessment of whether the anticipated impact is the best one available and if not allows an examination of options and alternatives to improve the impact.

A framework does not prescribe actions. It does not interpret events and factors for aid workers. It does not tell them what to do.

This tool, as with all tools, depends on its users’ skill for its effect. But as is also true of all tools, a skilled worker can do better work with a good tool than without it.

How Much One Needs to Know to Use the Framework

It is important to begin any program design with an awareness of the context of conflict, including dividers and tensions and connectors and capacities for peace. Aid workers, however, will never know all of these aspects in detail and will certainly not know them when a program begins. Fortunately, they do not need to know everything at first.

They do need to be aware that some tensions are deep-seated whereas others are superficial, that aid itself can create new sources of tension if care is not taken to identify divisions in the society, that in all situations people stay connected through a range of factors that offer opportunities for aid support. With these three simple ideas and the motivation to look for and understand dividers and connectors, aid workers can design more effective programs.

Oddly experience shows that people with long-standing knowledge of an area of conflict may not be in the best position to identify these elements and assess their importance. People who know “too much” often become mired in the complexities of the situation (which are real) and therefore lack sufficient distance to see opportunities for change. They see the present situation as inevitable. They often believe solutions can come only from outside, from external political actors. They can miss opportunities for local grassroots actions that support—and sometimes lead—political action.

Dynamic, Not Static

Earlier we emphasized the dynamic, iterative process of using the framework. It is also important to realize that a context of conflict is in constant change. Today’s dividers may be tomorrow’s connectors (as, for example, the common experience of war). New connectors may appear, new tensions may also appear. War itself often produces local capacities for peace. Aid workers should keep the categories in mind and be alert to change. They should regularly fill in the framework because using it can help to identify and highlight changes in reality—and in understanding—over time, which are important for effective programming.

In Part 2 of this book the framework is applied to six representative case examples of aid programming in conflict settings. These and other cases first illuminated the ways aid and conflict interact. We include them here both to illustrate how these ways emerged from varying realities and to demonstrate how the analytical framework can help us to understand the dynamic interactions of aid and conflict.
WHAT IS THE AID FOR PEACE APPROACH FOR CONFLICT ZONES?

Thania Paffenholz

3.1. Objectives

The Aid for Peace approach is a multi-purpose and -level process that can be used for development and peace interventions. Its objectives are to support users

- to plan new, or assess and evaluate existing, intervention designs in such a way that they:
  - will reduce the risks caused by violent conflict
  - will reduce the possibility of unintended negative effects on the conflict dynamics
  - will enhance the intervention’s contribution to peacebuilding
- to develop a conflict and peace monitoring system, or integrate the conflict and peace lens into standard planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures
- to assess the success or failure of peace processes on the macro level

3.2 The Basic Model

The essence of the Aid for Peace approach is a basic model that focuses on the needs for peacebuilding in a given country or area, tailors the intervention’s objectives and activities to these needs through identifying the peacebuilding relevance and through developing peace and conflict result-chains and indicators for understanding the effects of an intervention on conflict and peacebuilding. From the basic model, separate modules for planning, assessment and evaluation purposes have been developed focussing on peace or aid interventions.

The Aid for Peace approach is not exclusive: Within its different modules, it builds in and combines the most important methods and tools in the fields of peacebuilding, evaluation and planning that stem from the previous PCIA and other debates. During the process the user also gets to know when, how and for what types of projects, programmes or policy interventions to best use what kinds of methodologies and tools.

I consider the Aid for Peace approach a major breakthrough, since it achieves an explicit connection between the conditions in a specific conflict context (peacebuilding needs), the peacebuilding goal of an intervention (relevance) and the actual effects of the intervention’s activities on peace and conflict.

3.3 Areas of Application

The Aid for Peace approach can be applied
- for peace as well as aid programmes, and other interventions with different objectives than peacebuilding
- by a broad range of different actors (local and international, governmental and non-governmental, peace and aid donors, agencies and communities)
- for all levels of interventions (policy, programme, project)
- for different purposes (planning, assessment, evaluation)

3.3.1 Working in Conflict Zones with the Objective of “Peacebuilding”

This refers to all interventions directly aimed at contributing to peacebuilding, such as peace, reconciliation or democratisation projects, programmes or policies. Here the project planning is already designed to fulfil the purpose of peacebuilding. The reasons for using the Aid for Peace approach are
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- to ensure the relevance of the intervention in terms of peacebuilding
- to monitor, assess and, ultimately, improve the effects of the intervention on peacebuilding while avoiding risks and problems caused by violent conflict by engaging in a systematic planning, assessment and evaluation process.

3.3.2 Working in Conflict Zones with Other Objectives

This refers to all interventions that have objectives such as development (water, health, agriculture), security reform, or humanitarian work. The goal of development interventions is to contribute to the development of a country or region. The reason for applying the Aid for Peace approach is to reduce the risks the intervention will encounter in the violent conflict situation, ensuring that the intervention will not have an unintended negative effect on the conflict dynamics, and increasing the chance that it will also contribute to peacebuilding.

Interventions aimed at enhancing democracy and good governance can fall in both categories (peace or other objectives), depending on their specific objectives.

3.4 Development of the Approach

The Planning and Assessment for Conflict Zones project that led to the Aid for Peace approach was first started in 2000 on the basis of previous research done by Luc Reychler on Conflict Impact Assessment Systems (CIAS) (Reychler 1999). Subsequently, the Aid for Peace approach was developed by myself in cooperation with Luc Reychler building on

- the further development of the debates on PCIA, “do no harm” and conflict sensitivity
- the debate on evaluation of peacebuilding interventions
- social science research on policy analysis and evaluation (Patton 1997, Rossi et al. 1999, Bussmann et al. 1998)
- the debate on evaluation of aid interventions in the OECD, the World Bank and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
- methods of participatory planning for aid and peace interventions (European Commission 2002, Action Evaluation Research Institute (AEPRO), Aria Group)
- field experience, testing and training

Field testing and training was done in cooperation with the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies and the Field Diplomacy Initiative in Leuven, Belgium, with both donors and aid agencies looking into various aspects of the assessment or planning process in conflict zones (2001: Rwanda; 2002: Bosnia, Burundi, South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, and Nepal; 2003: Angola, Sri Lanka, South Kivu, and Nepal). In addition, a three-day training module was developed and tested during 2003 and 2004 both with headquarters and field staff of a number of aid and peace donors and agencies.

EVALUATING CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES: FACTSHEET 2008

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development


Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities

When violent conflict breaks out, development is derailed and the human, societal and financial costs are high. With an increasing share of aid resources being allocated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions, there is a growing interest amongst the
donor community to learn what works, what does not work and why. Still, there is also recognition of the obstacles faced by those undertaking evaluations in conflict settings. Assessing and demonstrating the impacts of work in this field remains a challenge.

In response to this challenge, two networks of the OECD-DAC, working on conflict and on evaluation, initiated a process to develop guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. Improved evaluation practice will enable systematic learning, which will in turn enhance the effectiveness of donor investments. It will assist experts and implementing organisations in improving the quality of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work and thereby contribute to preventing violent conflicts and securing the pre-conditions for sustainable development.

Why Is Guidance Needed?

Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities poses unique challenges. For instance, work ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict involves activities that differ from well established development operations and takes place in highly politicized environments. Access to reliable data is scarce and misinformation is rife. The evaluation process itself may have unintended consequences by influencing the behavior of conflict protagonists. Because of these and other obstacles, guidance is needed to help improve evaluation techniques in this rapidly evolving field.

Why Preventing Conflict and Building Peace Is Important

The World Health Organisation estimates that each year about 700,000 people are killed by violence or die in armed conflicts around the world. Hundreds of thousands more are displaced from their homes or die from the hunger and poverty that so often follow armed conflicts. In addition to the 17 major armed conflicts currently raging violence affects people in many countries all over the world.

Not only is the human cost of conflict devastating but its impacts on political, social and economic development are profound. The benefits of development assistance can be reversed by violent conflict, which is not only an accompaniment of poverty but is one of its main causes.

With the presence of open conflict in a country, economic growth declines an average of 2.2% per year. The approximate cost of a “typical” civil war, measured by lost GDP and reduced human health, has been estimated at between US $4 and $54 billion. Worldwide military spending per year has reached approximately $1204 billion.

Meanwhile, in 2006 OECD member countries spent about $6 billion on peace work, through official development assistance and the funding of UN peacekeeping missions.

What Are Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding?

The terms conflict prevention and peacebuilding are used in this guidance as a fast-developing field that covers four broad areas of intervention: equitable socio-economic development, good governance, the reform of security and justice institutions and truth and reconciliation processes. Conflict prevention activities share the goal of averting the outbreak of violence. Peacebuilding work focuses on reducing or ending violent conflict and/or promoting a culture of peace. A few examples, amongst many, of activities that would benefit from this guidance include police training in human rights, bias reduction education, land dispute mediations, or a road construction project involving opposing groups. An indicative list of work themes within these four areas is detailed below.

What Is Evaluation?

Evaluation assesses the merit and worth of an activity. It offers a systematic and objective appraisal of relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency. This
learning process helps ascertain the quality of policies and programmes, enhance performance, identify good practices and define appropriate standards. Strong evaluations not only help ensure accountability and achievement of outcomes, but can lead to more effective peacebuilding and conflict prevention policies and programmes.

Key questions for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and policies include:

- **RELEVANCE:** Does the intervention relate in a meaningful way to current, key driving factors of the (potential) conflict? Are the assumptions or theory of change on which the activity is based logical or sensible in this context at this time? Are outputs consistent with the objectives of reducing or preventing conflict?

- **EFFICIENCY:** Are/were activities cost efficient? Is this the most efficient way to contribute to peace? Compare costs: what a war would have cost had it happened vs. the cost of this particular approach to prevention.

- **IMPACT:** What happened as a result of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity? Why? What were the positive and negatives changes produced, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended? In this field, the focus may be on impacts on the conflict: how did the intervention impact key conflict actors or affect on-going conflict-creating or peace-promoting factors?

- **EFFECTIVENESS:** To what extent were the objectives achieved? What factors contributed to achievements?

- **SUSTAINABILITY:** Will benefits be maintained after donor support has ended? Has the intervention addressed the role of “spoilers” (those who benefit from on-going conflict) or attempted to engage the “hard-to-reach” (combatants, extremists, men, etc.)? Do locals have ownership of the activity or programme, where possible? Have durable, long-term processes, structures and institutions for peacebuilding been created?

- **COHERENCE:** How does the activity relate to other policy instruments (trade, migration, diplomacy, military)? Are different efforts undermining each other? What are the costs or impacts of coordination?

**Who Is This Guidance For?**

This guidance is designed to fit the intersecting needs of practitioners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, who may have limited familiarity with evaluation practices, and evaluators, who may have limited experience with evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. It has been developed for donor policy staff and desk officers, at headquarters and in the field, responsible for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes, policies, and projects; and for evaluation managers and consultants. The audience also includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, United Nations organisations and other development agencies working in conflict affected regions. In addition, this guidance will be relevant to practitioners in partner countries, partner governments and academics.

**Guidance For Effectively Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities Will:**

**Support evaluators and those commissioning evaluations by:**

- providing more clarity on key emerging concepts in this field;
- suggesting techniques for the use of current and complete conflict analyses, to help strengthen evaluation of the relevance of activities in a particular conflict context;
- demonstrating the importance of assessing assumptions about how peace can be achieved (theories of change);
- stimulating critical thinking about, and strategies for, demonstrating impacts on key conflict and peace dynamics;
- specifying how the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance can be adapted to this field;
- furnishing advice and principles on how to evaluate ethically and successfully in conflict environments; and
• providing guidance on dealing with common problems in this field, including: con-
tradictory and/or unavailable data; dangerous and rapidly evolving contexts; a lack
of clearly defined objectives for these activities; a lack of consensus on effective
strategies; and partner government involvement in the conflict.

Help conflict prevention and peacebuilding practitioners and policymakers by:

• promoting the use of evaluation, as well as monitoring, as tools to improve learning
and accountability, and ultimately enhance the effectiveness of conflict prevention
and peacebuilding interventions;
• encouraging rigorous analysis and critical thinking about what actually contributes to
peace and what does not;
• providing lessons about operational design, beyond those provided through audit and
monitoring;
• helping to refine theories about the causes and dynamics of conflict, which will in turn
lead to better designed interventions;
• providing specific tips on drafting Terms of Reference and picking effective teams for
conflict, peace and security activity evaluations;
• supporting more strategic approaches that link programmes, policies and projects;
• promoting harmonisation of donor assistance; and
• encouraging coordination and coherence amongst the various government entities
including security, military, trade, private, development, humanitarian, and peace-
building fields.

Empower and protect citizens by:

• reducing violence and suffering through more effective peacebuilding initiatives;
• improving accountability and transparency in both donor and recipient governments;
• promoting participation of local people to learn about and have a say in conflict pre-
vention and peacebuilding work, particularly among women and marginalised groups
(based upon a full analysis of stakeholders and their objectives); and
• enhancing development effectiveness of tax money spent on donor-funded conflict
prevention and peacebuilding activities.

TOWARD A CONFLICT SENSITIVE POVERTY
REDUCTION STRATEGY

World Bank
Excerpted from World Bank, ‘Toward a Conflict Sensitive Poverty
Reduction Strategy: Lessons from a Retrospective Analysis’,

Summary

Building on a retrospective analysis of the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) experience
in nine conflict-affected countries—Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH), Burundi, Cambodia,
Chad, Georgia, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka, this report aims to determine
how the causes and consequences of violent conflict can best be addressed within a coun-
try’s poverty reduction program. The purpose is to provide lessons and guidance on how
to increase the conflict sensitivity of the PRSP, which has become the primary tool in
nearly 60 low-income countries for articulating a vision for growth and poverty reduc-
tion. The analysis identifies the main conflict challenges that have affected the nine
countries in the sample; examines how the PRSPs took these conflict factors into account
in developing their strategies for growth and poverty reduction; and attempts to draw
lessons based on the findings. The analysis does not cover assessment of resource allo-
cation, budget or implementation because of uneven data and implementation time line between the nine cases.

Interrelationship between Conflict and Poverty

The analysis is based on the recognition that conflict and poverty are closely interrelated. Empirical evidence shows that poorer countries are more likely to experience violent conflict, while conflict-affected countries tend to experience higher levels of poverty. Violent conflict results in the destruction of economic and human capital. A country emerging from conflict is faced with damaged physical infrastructure, scarce employment opportunities, reduced foreign investment, and increased capital flight. In addition, conflict increases military expenditures, which diverts resources from public and social spending, and erodes the government’s ability to collect taxes and manage revenues, thus undermining post-conflict recovery. This situation is worsened by weak governing institutions, which are often unable to implement policy and uphold the rule of law. Conflict often contributes to poor-quality education, inadequate social service delivery, and high levels of brain-drain. The intersection of these factors increases both the depth of poverty and the risk of conflict being reignited.

Viewed from the other direction, although poverty itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for conflict, poverty factors increase the likelihood of violent conflict in three main ways. First, a combination of poverty and unequal income levels tends to result in many people, particularly young men, who can be easily mobilized and recruited to armed groups. Second, weak and undemocratic governance structures, usually present in poor countries, are often incapable of preventing the onset of violence by peaceful means. Third, if a country with a large poor population is endowed with significant natural resources, rebel organizations are able to raise finances and galvanize public resentment against perceived or real injustices.

The interrelationship between conflict and poverty is often affected by group-based inequalities, i.e., those that develop between and among distinct social groups on the basis of their ethnic, social, regional, or other characteristics. These horizontal inequalities may serve to escalate conflict into violence when ethnicity is politicized and social capital, defined as associations within and between groups in a society, is distorted via the strengthening of intra-group bonds at the cost of weakening ties between groups.

Findings and Lessons Learned

The analysis identified several factors of conflict that were present to varying degrees in all nine countries. These factors constitute challenges related to governance; economic performance; in-country regional disparities; social divisions along ethnic, religious or clan lines; access to land and resources; militarized society; and external factors such as subregional politics, refugee flows, and the influence of the Diaspora. The following section discusses the extent to which different aspects of the PRS process—participation, poverty diagnostic, policy actions, institutional arrangements and donor behavior—were sensitive to conflict and seeks to understand what facilitated or hindered conflict sensitivity in each of these aspects. The report suggests ways to strengthen their sensitivity to conflict.

Participation

- In countries with traditions of limited public participation, and relative to their starting point, engagement with populations on poverty issues through the PRS process opened up space for greater inclusion and domestic accountability.
- PRS formulation generally took place in environments of low state capacity and legitimacy with weak links among political power, bureaucracy, and conflict-affected populations. Prospects for the PRSP becoming a vehicle for stabilization increased where the government demonstrated that poverty reduction initiatives were for the benefit of all citizens.
• Limited effort was made during the PRS process to diversify the means and geographic span of communication with conflict-affected groups on PRS goals.

• Managing expectations was addressed most effectively through institutionalized dialogue between conflict-affected groups and the policy level. Efforts were less successful where the participatory process was misperceived to be a one-time consultation exercise with no impact at the policy level.

Poverty Reduction Strategies are expected to be built upon a country-owned development model supported by principles of broad and deep stakeholder participation, domestic accountability, and social inclusion. These principles have special relevance for conflict-affected societies, where transparent policymaking and attention to inequality are likely to be limited during and immediately following periods of violence. Expectations of what can be achieved in such circumstances therefore need to be tempered with realism, while conflicting parties begin to build trust and a mutual desire for poverty reduction in the country as a whole.

The case studies revealed conditions that posed obstacles to participation, but they also reflected the use of a variety of approaches which were seen as positive steps towards civil society engagement. Countries concentrated their participation efforts largely at the national level. Local government and community level participation was generally weaker, although the Rwanda case highlighted conflict mitigation mechanisms in participatory rural appraisals at the cellule-level, thereby rooting participation in traditional processes.

Weakened institutions and social divisions in conflict-affected countries often resulted in authorities relying more heavily on peace accords and donor support to jump-start development and social cohesion. Participation was generally defined as engagement with civil society organizations (CSOs), whose ability to engage depended on their level of economic literacy and ability to represent constituents. In postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, a leading NGO stated: "For the first time, citizens have been asked to express their opinions directly through public debates. [The PRSP] has thus presented unique opportunities not only for improving the lives of the poor […], but for empowering citizens to take part in the creation of future BiH priority actions and policies."8

The following capacity limitations were also discerned on the part of governments managing the PRS process: limited in-country experience with the country-driven model, a lack of know-how for engaging with unstable areas, and a belief that the PRSP was a technocratic exercise undertaken to fulfill donor requirements. On occasion, the PRSP lacked the ownership at the highest level of government needed to sustain dialogue with civil society.

Conflict Sensitivity of the Participatory Process

Given the diverse range of country settings, there was considerable variation in the recognition of conflict factors in participatory processes, and therefore in the extent to which these could be considered conflict sensitive. The potential for the PRSP to become a vehicle for stabilization depended on the government’s ability and commitment to involve broad communities of stakeholders, and to demonstrate that poverty reduction is for all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or region.

In PRSP formulation, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda employed participatory processes that specifically addressed the re-integration of war-affected groups. The Rwanda PRS implementation process was reinforced by a well-structured approach to consultations; which were consciously used to include war-affected groups and prevent further outbreaks of violence. In other countries, the participatory process was partially sensitive to conflict factors, but was not implemented in conflict-affected areas of the country.

A crucial component of participation was the extent to which communications were used strategically to engage conflict-affected populations. Authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, for example, promoted participation of marginalized and war-
affected groups through print and radio media. There was generally limited effort to provide documentation in languages other than English, including ethnic minority languages, or in formats accessible to illiterate audiences. Another aspect of communication related to the management of expectations, so that exchanges with the population could promote stability and mitigate a recurrence of violence. The Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Rwanda strategies considered the PRSP to be a vehicle for social cohesion, and appear to have done this effectively, while in other cases participation was misperceived to be a one-time consultation exercise with little potential for impact at the policy level.

PRS participatory processes could be more conflict sensitive if:

- country ownership is manifested through the explicit inclusion of war-affected groups in socioeconomic and policy dialogue;
- each country finds its own formula for collaboration and reconciliation— it cannot be imported;
- trust in the authorities is built through respect for laws on freedom of association and access to information, and when reconciliation commissions and ombudsmen are seen to administer justice in an equitable manner;
- traditional— potentially conflict-mitigating— mechanisms are used to ensure communication and collaboration between and among groups;
- parliaments are strengthened in order to carry out PRS oversight and constituency representation more effectively, especially for conflict-affected groups;
- governments and partners capitalize on the energy and outreach of youth, especially where youth groups tend to be marginalized and at risk for recruitment;
- media and strategic communications are used to disseminate information on the PRS to remote and conflict-affected communities, and more importantly, to channel feedback to policy levels, thereby enhancing the voice of those most affected by conflict; and
- capacity building for domestic accountability and post-conflict participation processes is promoted and supported by partners.

Poverty Diagnostic

- Poverty diagnostics presented a multi-dimensional view of poverty that recognized not only the income dimension but also social, human, and structural dimensions of poverty.
- Conflict issues were considered in the poverty diagnostic, but the discussion of the manifestations of conflict were not the result of systematic conflict analysis; there were only limited efforts to explore how factors of conflict and poverty drive each other.
- Genuine political constraints prevented governments from explicitly addressing poverty-conflict linkages.
- Lack of capacity and paucity of up-to-date socioeconomic information were the major practical constraints to the poverty diagnostic.

The PRSP is expected to present a comprehensive diagnostic that sets out the determinants of poverty as a basis for developing a suitable program of actions. Conflict-affected countries would benefit by going beyond assessing traditional structural-based poverty to develop an in-depth understanding of conflict-induced poverty. This will contribute to the development of a conflict-sensitive poverty diagnostic which in turn will influence the formation of conflict-sensitive policy actions.

Most governments in the sample put forward a multi-dimensional view of poverty that recognizes the social, human, and structural dimensions of poverty in addition to the income dimension. In direct consultations, poor people also stressed the multi-dimensional nature of poverty affecting their lives. In these countries, in addition to the structural poverty factors that afflict many developing countries, poverty manifests itself in new ways due to the devastation of physical, human, and social capital. The PRSPs in conflict-affected
countries would benefit by the recognition of these specificities of conflict-induced poverty in their poverty diagnostic.

Evidence from the poverty diagnostics across the nine cases demonstrate that the diagnostics considered aspects of conflict. Burundi and Sierra Leone (I-PRSP), and Rwanda, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Chad (PRSP) considered conflict issues to some degree in their poverty diagnostic, and recognized the interaction between conflict issues and poverty. The ramifications of their being conflict-affected, however, were not informed by any systematic conflict analysis and there was limited effort to explore precisely how factors of conflict and poverty drive each other.

While lack of a conflict analysis certainly weakens a comprehensive understanding of conflict and poverty, it seems that some governments faced genuine political and practical constraints that prevented them from explicitly addressing poverty-conflict linkages. On the political front, some countries suffered from the vestiges of violent conflict and tried to rebuild trust between groups, which made it politically untenable and insensitive to discuss conflict factors in the poverty diagnostic. In terms of practical constraints, weak capacity and the lack of recent and comprehensive socioeconomic data undermined the government’s ability to undertake effective poverty analysis, particularly if it was recently emerging from war. Countries that were further removed in time from violent conflict were better able to conduct reliable poverty surveys due to internal security, the presence of international organizations and even international peacekeeping forces in some cases, internal capacity strengthened by external assistance, and ongoing reconciliation efforts.

In some cases, the poverty diagnostic benefited from qualitative and quantitative data collected by humanitarian agencies and NGOs that were active in the conflict-affected regions of a country. However, sometimes data generated by humanitarian agencies were viewed with suspicion by the government because they tended to depict poverty in ways which were contrary to the profile the governments wished to project.

As governments prepare a poverty diagnostic, donors can contribute by building capacity, providing technical support, and assisting in the development of methodologies like participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) suited to conflict environments. A well-developed poverty diagnostic that is sensitive to conflict factors could, in turn, influence the prioritization of policy actions.

Poverty diagnostics could be more conflict sensitive if they:

- focus on a discussion of conflict-induced poverty;
- systematically integrate conflict analysis tools with poverty diagnostics, i.e. go beyond cognizance of conflict factors by undertaking systematic analysis of the interrelationship of poverty, poor governance, and marginalization;
- collect data with the support of donors that can provide technical expertise and support capacity building;
- combine quantitative and qualitative approaches (needs assessments, PPAs) to better cover the non-income dimensions of poverty;
- use data collected by humanitarian agencies and NGOs that operate in the conflict-affected regions of a country; and
- draw from expertise of humanitarian agencies, NGOs, or donors to develop proxy indicators that provide a reliable picture of conflict-related poverty.

Policy Actions

- The PRSPs of all nine countries included policy actions or programs that sought to deal with the consequences of violent conflict. The sample displayed great variation in range and scope, with countries just out of war giving the most attention to such actions.
- Security issues were considered important by most of the countries, but actions tended not to be part of an integrated security strategy.
• In several of the countries, policy actions were clearly informed by knowledge about conflict; but overall, the conflict sensitivity of policy actions was constrained by a weak contextual analysis of conflict factors and their link to poverty.

• The countries showed little systematic attempt to address sources of conflict through policy actions. They also showed little systematic attempt to consider the potential impact of the policy actions on the conflict situation.

Analysis of Context

None of the sample countries appear to have used systematic analysis of conflict as a method to guide the selection, prioritization, or content of policy actions. However, knowledge about conflict was applied to some degree in several cases. The Chad PRSP, for example, included a macroeconomic analysis that gave attention to conflict factors such as oil revenue management and diversification to non-oil sector productivity, and provided a basis for appropriate action.

Weak contextual analysis made it difficult to determine how programs should be prioritized and sequenced. In one I-PRSP, the policy actions covered the entire gamut of war-torn recovery needs. Individually, the proposed activities made sense, but there were too many to be taken seriously, and they were considered too vague to have much impact.

Getting the analysis right is crucial for the efficacy of an action program. There was a tendency in several of the PRSPs to frame complex problems, such as criminalization of the economy and resulting insecurity, as a purely technical issue rather than as one that is intimately linked to insecurity more widely, and to the quality of governance and the potential for escalating conflict. A problem as complex as criminalization of the economy cannot be addressed by simple technical solutions such as improving the tax administration or increasing the number of customs officers.

Addressing Consequences of Conflict

The PRSPs of all nine countries included policy actions designed to deal with the consequences of conflict. The Burundi I-PRSP aimed to address the challenges of transition from war to peace, and was framed as one of the tools to implement relevant parts of the Arusha peace agreement. The Sierra Leone government decided to tackle the effects of conflict first, and the top-priority in its I-PRSP was to improve the security situation by demobilizing ex-combatants and retraining the government security forces.

Improved security was a key concern in several other countries. In Chad, the PRSP proposed an action program to deal with land mines, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, and justice sector reform— but not as an integrated or operational strategy. The Cambodia NPRS12 made explicit reference to the way land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) contribute to poverty and inhibit poverty reduction efforts. It included plans to restructure security and reduce defense expenditures, and to disburse the funds on sectors such as health, education, agriculture, and rural development.

Several of the PRSPs considered the question of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees. The Bosnia-Herzegovina policy action program highlighted the fact that despite considerable progress, an estimated half of the 1995 caseload of IDPs remained reluctant or unable to return to their homes. The situation of internally displaced people was also addressed in the policy action programs in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Georgia.

Policy Actions and Conflict Prevention

To what extent did the policy actions attempt to address sources of conflict? There was a close thematic overlap between the conflict factors identified in the countries and the PRSP’s policy actions because many of the factors affecting poverty and those affecting conflict are closely linked, but the linkages were not systematically explored. And while much of the planned action would contribute to preventing conflict if implemented,
despite not having been primarily designed for that purpose, there were also missed opportunities given the limited exploration of the linkages with conflict and consideration of those linkages in the design.

Characteristics of governance were identified among key conflict factors in all the country case studies. While most of the reviewed PRSPs did not explicitly recognize the governance-conflict link—some perhaps because it was politically impossible, and others because conflict did not figure in the analysis—a few did. The Rwanda PRSP promoted more inclusive political processes to improve relations between the government and citizens. The Cambodia NPRS promoted governance measures that would have contributed to reducing the chances for future conflict escalation; however, the actions necessary to support those measures, including development of the legal and regulatory framework, were never fully implemented.

Actions on economic development offer both positive and negative lessons on sensitivity to conflict. The Nepal PRSP, for example, placed strong emphasis on stimulating rural growth based on the recognition that growth previously had excluded large parts of the population from development. Given the strong linkage between the conflict and the underdevelopment of certain rural areas in Nepal, effective rural-oriented action could potentially contribute to de-escalate conflict if designed sensitively.

Policy actions could be more conflict sensitive if:

- selection, prioritization and content of the policy actions are systematically assessed through a conflict lens;
- strong contextual analysis includes identification of key conflict drivers and their interaction with poverty, and is an integral part of the poverty diagnostic;
- security issues are integrated into a cohesive strategy for improved governance of the security sector and linked with policy actions for economic opportunities;
- they assess and monitor the potential impacts of policy actions on the conflict dynamics;
- conflict impact assessments consider the effects of individual action programs as well as the potential impact of policies and strategies, for example, the distributional impacts of a growth strategy;
- they use innovative ways to consider politically sensitive issues such as ethnicity;
- they take account of volatile situations by providing flexible implementation options.

Institutional Arrangements

- Some governments placed a high premium on developing institutional arrangements that considered conflict issues (ethnic or religious divisions, regional imbalances) by designing structures that either consciously ignored conflict factors or purposefully took them into account.
- Other governments made limited efforts to consider conflict issues, reinforcing beliefs that the establishment of pluralistic values was not a priority for the government.
- Even though institutional arrangements were relatively broad-based in design across the sample cases, not surprisingly perhaps, they showed mixed results in their level of devolution in PRSP preparation.
- In many cases, the PRS process has resulted in enhanced cooperation among sectors and ministries.
- Parallel peacebuilding processes in-country have influenced and been influenced by the PRS framework.

Institutional arrangements refer to formal structures and rules that determine the design and implementation of the PRSP. Given that the PRSP is the key policy document in some countries, the manner in which power is distributed through institutional arrangements, and the structure of relationships between government and non-government actors, can either reinforce the power imbalances that contributed to conflict or seek to redress them. By establishing inclusive and broad-based arrangements, it is likely that governments will be seen to recognize and perhaps even address con-
Conflict factors related to exclusion, concentration of power, and the control of public assets by a single group.

The case studies found that some governments placed a high premium on developing these types of institutional arrangements for the PRS process, while others made limited efforts to consider conflict issues, including ethnic and religious divisions and regional imbalances, in their institutional arrangements. In turn, this reinforced beliefs among certain groups and regions that the re-establishment of pluralistic values was not a priority for the government. The analysis showed, however, that in a few cases, for example Bosnia and Sierra Leone, governments were cognizant of conflict issues and designed institutional arrangements that purposefully took them into account. Even if conflict fault lines were not reflected in the design of institutional arrangements, some governments, such as Rwanda, consciously decided against incorporating conflict factors in institutional arrangements because they believed that doing so would risk cementing the divides that had led to war.

The cases demonstrate that at least in design most institutional arrangements for the PRS process were relatively devolutionary, with different organs of government and NGOs being accorded specific responsibilities. The cases however showed mixed results on institutional arrangements being devolutionary during PRSP preparation, with the actual level of the influence and involvement of parliament, government bodies, NGOs etc., varying across the cases.

BiH is a best practice example of actions being taken to ensure that the PRSP reflected a nationwide consensus. Nepal is another excellent example of effort being devoted to eliciting opinions of local government in the eastern, central, and western provinces during I-PRSP preparations. The PRSP also highlights the country’s desire for an increased role for local government in development planning.

Most governments made a good start by establishing comprehensive institutional arrangements for PRSP preparation. Since most cases are now in the early stages of implementation, it is neither appropriate nor possible at this point to make an informed judgment about how governments will follow through on their commitment to devolve their institutional arrangements, in terms of decisionmaking authority and resource allocations. Reluctance of governments to be inclusive in the implementation phase of the PRSPs could be counterproductive, since the success of the PRS process is predicated on institutional arrangements that devolve power and transfer the control of resources to lower levels of government.

PRSP principles envisage that collective responsibility will increase as cross-sector collaboration and coordination between the center and local governments improves. The case studies indicate that the PRS preparation process resulted in enhanced cooperation among sectors and ministries, and produced a strategic and mutually-beneficial outlook on the part of ministries. Going beyond the PRSP, parallel peace-related processes in a few cases have influenced and been influenced by the PRS framework and helped to strengthen intersectoral and inter-ministry relations. The PRSP has promoted the inclusion of poverty-related issues into peacebuilding processes, and conversely reconciliation issues have been integrated into the PRSP— as seen in Rwanda and Nepal— resulting in both processes learning from each other.

Institutional arrangements could be more conflict sensitive if they:

- result from conscious design, with the incorporation of conflict factors;
- stress transparency and inclusion in design and implementation;
- reflect broad-based and inclusive formations, which can serve as important vehicles for cohesion and reconciliation;
- devolve power and transfer resources to support the implementation of PRSPs, particularly if the government is aware that if it does not follow through with their commitment of devolution, the institutional arrangements could collapse, with irreversible damage to both the PRS and the process of peace consolidation; and
- draw from ongoing peacebuilding processes and in turn strengthen them.
Donor Behavior

- Country ownership of the PRSP tended to increase as the country moved further out of violent conflict.
- Donors tended to have unrealistically high expectations of the quality of PRSPs in post-conflict countries, given capacity weaknesses and continuing divisions among population groups.
- In some cases, donors consciously refused to align their strategy with the PRSP if it did not address conflict issues as this would imply that they endorse the exclusion of conflict.
- Lack of prioritization in the PRSPs made it difficult for donors to align their programs with the country program.
- Donor coordination was not optimal in many cases, although harmonization efforts are on the rise.

For PRS preparation, donors need to examine their own behavior, consider how they can engage with conflict-affected countries more effectively and coordinate more systematically in order to support the PRS process, i.e., not drive it. The PRSP model envisages a partnership between donors and the country. Consequently the PRSP seeks to change donor behavior on three key fronts:

Donor Assertiveness vs. Country Ownership

Country ownership, a key pillar of the PRSP, suggests that the PRS be representative of the needs and priorities of the diverse stakeholders in a country. The case studies indicate that countries that had not experienced active conflict for a few years and were able to successfully recognize, even if not resolve, conflict challenges were more likely to lead the exercise with donors playing a supportive role and providing technical assistance.

A common complaint across the countries however was that in countries weakened by conflict and with low capacity, donors had unrealistic expectations of the PRSP and set priorities that the governments had no alternative but to follow. In some cases, donors made their support contingent upon the government preparing a PRSP that was congruent with donor vision. Donors respond that in conflict-affected countries, they encourage governments to make conflict issues a primary concern; and that they have the prerogative of not aligning their programming to the PRSP if it addresses conflict issues only superficially. They further argue that the country needs to create appropriate structures to tackle conflict challenges if it wants to receive donor support.

Donor Coordination

Donors acknowledge that differing priorities and limited coordination in the past resulted in overlapping programs or incompatible policy actions. In some cases, tension occurred between donors that provided budgetary support to the PRSP and those that continued to support projects that were not necessarily in the priority areas identified in the PRSP. In other cases, donors did not agree that the PRSP was the most useful strategy for the country and developed other strategies that they felt were more appropriate.

Cases of inter-donor disagreements persist, and tensions over how countries should be encouraged to integrate conflict issues in strategy formation continue. Yet, by and large, the cases show that a uniform voice is gradually emerging that calls for donors to harmonize their efforts on conflict and development, with a focus on how to carry out development activities in a conflict context. DEPAC (the Development Partnership Committee) in Sierra Leone, the Donor Framework Group in Georgia, and the Donor Working Group in Sri Lanka are some examples of institutionalized coordination among donors. Their programs are concerned with both poverty reduction and activities supported outside of the PRSP framework, such as the multi-donor conflict assessments.
Donor Alignment with PRSP Priorities

Donors should ideally realign their country strategies to conform with the priorities presented in a country’s PRSP. The case studies found, however, that donors only minimally considered the PRSP in determining country assistance because the PRSP encompassed a wide-ranging set of priorities. This is unfortunate and potentially a concern also in non-conflict countries, since one of the main aims of the PRSP is to encourage donors to rethink their strategy and help address the main concerns outlined by the country.

In a few cases, when the PRSP ignored conflict challenges, donors consciously decided not to align their country strategy to it because alignment would suggest that they endorse the exclusion of conflict. In these cases, donors continued to support activities that contributed to poverty reduction and conflict mitigation independent of the priorities identified in the PRSP. Donor decisions to not align their strategies to the PRSP in these situations are understandable, given their belief that aid will not be effective if the PRSP does not account for conflict concerns.

Donors could support conflict sensitivity more effectively if they:

• make a concerted effort to prioritize country ownership over promotion of their own priorities, if the PRSP is to be an effective framework;
• strengthen the country’s capacity by providing technical assistance to ensure that conflict issues are carefully considered, and that structures have peacebuilding impacts;
• create an environment that enables countries to deal with conflict-related sensitivities;
• differentiate between legitimate reasons for omission of conflict issues and exclusionary policies that do not justify ignoring conflict; and
• improve harmonization and establish formal coordinating mechanisms to take advantage of comparative strengths, and to avoid duplication of support and contradictory policy advice and incentives.

Key Issues for Conflict-Sensitive PRS Development

A PRSP needs to be specific to the country context and flexible in responding to changing circumstances, while taking account of potential risks.

• Country specific. The most fruitful PRS design is based on a thorough assessment of the country context, including specific conflict factors. This means there is a strong need for good contextual analysis and for avoiding the mechanical use of tools and lessons. The PRS should draw heavily on in-country processes such as peace agreements, joint needs assessments, and transitional results frameworks. In many conflict-affected countries, humanitarian, recovery and development needs will overlap and the PRS needs to take this into account.

• Nimble and flexible. Conflict-affected countries are often characterized by great volatility and quickly changing situations, while facing serious capacity constraints. There is a real need for a PRS framework in such countries, but the process and strategy could be structured such that design and implementation allow the countries to (i) respond relatively quickly to changing situations; (ii) be flexible in their design and implementation; and (iii) produce alternative options when changes render current measures irrelevant. While flexibility is key for the PRS in conflict-affected countries, this should not be interpreted as allowing for a laissez-faire approach but as the ability to develop unique and innovative methods.

• Risks. As any activity in a conflict-affected country, the development of a PRS carries certain risks. The more carefully the process takes conflict factors into account and the more realistically the PRS content reflects the context, the better the potential risks can be managed. Risks may include instability because of unmet expectations among specific groups; the government’s avoidance of prioritization and hard choices in order to maintain support from divided constituencies; insensitive treatment of divisive issues; and attention to short-term needs in ways that undermine longer-term recovery.
Introduction

The statistical association between low incomes, low growth and conflict is robust and reflects reciprocal causal links. First, the damage caused by war amounts to development in reverse. Second, underdevelopment exacerbates vulnerability to conflict. Both insecurity and poverty are associated with weak state capacity to protect citizens, manage the economy, deliver services and defuse social tensions. But the last decade's research on the development-conflict nexus reveals that not all development contributes to security and indeed that some development patterns exacerbate risks of conflict when they undermine state capacities, exacerbate group exclusion, generate horizontal inequalities or sustain over-dependence on natural resources.

How can external engagement target conflict prevention? What risk factors and vulnerability indicators should be tracked? Should the mitigation of horizontal inequalities figure on the agenda of poverty reduction strategies? How should aid effectiveness be analyzed if donors wish to prevent conflict? What aid vehicles are best adapted to peace building? What aid allocation criteria would best contribute to peace and stability?

These policy questions are especially relevant to Sub-Saharan Africa, the only region of the world where the share of people living in absolute poverty is rising; where nearly 40 percent of world conflicts are taking place; where the deadliest confrontations of the last decade and a half have been experienced; and (as shown in the latest Human Security report from the University of British Columbia) where the incidence of violent conflict is increasing in stark contrast to trends in the rest of the world which has witnessed reduction in war and war deaths since the end of the Cold War.3

By reviewing the literature, debating the policy issues at a Wilton Park conference and examining donor practices at the country level, the joint JICA-UNDP initiative aims to relate available knowledge about conflict prevention to the design and implementation of donor countries' security and development policies towards Africa.

The purpose of this initial concept paper is to provide a common framework for all participants in the JICA/UNDP initiative. It sets out:

• The rationale of the initiative;
• Its analytical framework;
• Its objectives.

Addressing structural conditions

There is increasing attention to violent conflict in poor countries. This is motivated by concerns for international stability and humanitarian action. It is also driven by the growing public support for reducing global poverty. As the background papers show, violent conflicts are concentrated in the countries farthest behind in achieving the MDGs. They also create major obstacles to their achievement. Since the 1990s, much work has been done to develop a better understanding of conflicts and their relationship to development. Some policy results have already emerged. Building on work that started in the 1990s, the OECD DAC adopted guidelines for effective engagement with fragile states in 2006 (Annex 1).
A rich and diverse academic literature continues to grow. But the development community has yet to engage fully with the need for new policy approaches that can help prevent conflict. Far more attention has been devoted to post-conflict recovery and peace building than to conflict prevention. Policy work on conflict prevention has emphasized the Hippocratic Oath: ‘first, do no harm’. This approach helps to ensure that aid is not diverted to benefit conflict protagonists and that it does not inadvertently exacerbate the tensions that underlie the violence. But they rarely address the structural conditions that increase vulnerability to political violence and conflict.\(^4\)

In fact, it is surprising that many of the factors that have been repeatedly identified by research studies on the economic and social correlates of war are not taken into account in the design of development policies of national governments or in the policy work of donors active in fragile states. For example, while the latest World Bank report on MDGs, Global Monitoring Report 2007\(^5\) focuses on state fragility as a major challenge for achieving the MDGs and identifies violent conflict a key obstacle to poverty reduction, it does not engage with the policy factors that raise the risks of conflict. On the ground, donor approaches to ‘fragile states’ are widely disparate as documented in a recent ODI study for JICA.\(^6\)

Thus a wide gap still exists between research findings and policy formation at the crossroads of security and development. In part it is because the research community has been divided on the relative importance of various findings: low opportunity costs for joining rebel forces\(^7\); horizontal inequalities; exclusion of ethnic and other groups from power and assets\(^8\); environmental pressure related to migration\(^9\); the ‘youth bulge’ coupled with unemployment and exclusion\(^10\); overdependence on (and poor management of) mineral resources\(^11\); breakdown of the social contract between the state and its citizens\(^12\), etc.

While disagreements remain, the literature and debates have evolved beyond initial controversies, and these findings are increasingly acknowledged to be more complementary than mutually contradictory. In fact, in many countries, many of these factors coexist. While low per capita GDP and slow growth are correlated with high risks of conflict, not all roads to higher growth will reduce the risks. Some kinds of development exacerbate horizontal inequalities, environmental pressure, over-dependence on mineral resources, youth unemployment and exclusion, and the neighborhood effects associated with conflict spillover etc.\(^13\) Moreover, a common factor underlying these conditions is the nature and the capacity of the state, that is weak and often oppressive to its citizens.

Addressing structural causes implies choices in economic and social policy that are at the heart of growth and poverty reduction strategies, as well as developing a better understanding of state capacity and fragility. Without addressing the root causes, sustainable peace cannot be achieved. About half of peace agreements fail; conflict resumes within five years\(^14\) despite significant outlays and heavy involvement by the UN and/or other actors.

Peace agreements often freeze conflict rather than resolve it. Combatants suspend violence in the hope that the basic issues that led them to violence will be addressed and that they will be given a major stake in the new economic and political order. This recurring pattern in post conflict countries suggests that it would be preferable to nip conflicts in the bud before they escalate into major confrontations.

The fact is that post-conflict recovery programs are necessarily reactive: they take place well after a conflict has gone beyond a threshold of deadly destruction measured in heavy losses of life and property as well as social strife and political cohesion. By contrast, conflict prevention is proactive and seeks to prevent violent conflict through early action by addressing underlying concerns and competing demands. It addresses root causes, i.e., the underlying structural conditions that create incentives as well as the grievances that fuel conflict. At its most effective, conflict prevention addresses competing claims before animosities fester and balloon into full-fledged crisis and the ultimate resort to violence.
Executive Summary

Evidence suggests that economic inequalities—particularly “horizontal inequalities” among groups defined by ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, and religious lines—can generate social tensions and fuel violent conflict. Well-designed fiscal policies can help build a sustainable peace by working to reduce these inequalities. This paper reviews some challenges raised by analyzing the impacts of tax and expenditure policies on inequality in post-conflict settings, and makes recommendations for incorporating distributional effects into fiscal policy making.

The Challenge of Measurement

The first step in understanding the status and dynamics of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is to map the group boundaries that form the basis for discrimination or favoritism. A careful scoping exercise is needed to answer four key questions:

1. Are the salient groups ranked hierarchically?
2. Are they geographically concentrated, or dispersed?
3. Are they specialized in certain economic sectors or activities?
4. Does the government have the political inclination to tackle inequalities?

After the relevant groups are defined, both income and non-income dimensions of HI should be measured. The latter include ownership of land and other assets, employment, education, and infant and child mortality. Simple comparisons of averages—such as per capita income—can conceal distributional differences within groups, so comparisons at various points across the distribution are also needed.

This paper proposes three approaches to tackle these measurement challenges:

- Where data needed to measure horizontal inequalities are not available (or highly inadequate), small-scale household surveys should be conducted to assess inter-group disparities in (a) asset ownership; (b) employment; (c) incomes; (d) education; and (e) health and nutrition.
- Where conflict-relevant group boundaries are not evident, perceptions surveys should be conducted on attitudes toward identities and inequalities.
- In addition to regional and linguistic categorizations, statistical offices should be encouraged to include ethnic, religious, or racial categorization (if relevant and politically feasible) in subsequent data collection.

Taxation Policies

Tax policies in post-conflict settings can and should aim not only to mobilize revenue but also to address inequality. These aims are interrelated as perceptions of tax-policy inequity can undermine the legitimacy of the taxation system and deter compliance, impeding revenue collection. Addressing distributional issues by making tax liability directly dependent on religious, ethnic, or racial identity, risks strengthening group divisions. Policies can be devised, however, to increase progressivity and tax more heavily those groups that are relatively privileged. To this end, the paper recommends that policy makers:

- Increase the general progressivity of the tax system by (a) increasing the role and progressivity of direct taxes and property taxes, and (b) increasing the progressivity of
indirect taxes by raising rates on luxuries and exempting basic goods consumed by the poor.

- Design indirect taxes to bear more heavily on privileged groups, by introducing taxes or increasing rates on geographic areas and production and consumption activities in which such groups are concentrated.

**Expenditure Policies**

Expenditure policies also can be designed to redress HIs. People benefit from public expenditure in the allocation of contracts and employment, as well as in their access to public services.

Four relevant types of expenditure can be distinguished:

1. Expenditures with differentiated effects on both inter-regional and intra-regional lines, such as expenditure on infrastructure.
2. Expenditures with differentiated benefits across groups but not necessarily across regions, such as airline subsidies.
3. Expenditures with differentiated benefits across regions but not necessarily within regions, such as expenditure on environmental quality.
4. Transfer payments to specific communities, households, or individuals.

To improve the distributional impacts of public expenditures, the paper offers the following recommendations:

- In the construction of facilities and delivery of services, allocation of contracts and employment should explicitly consider fairness among groups. Potential policies to promote this include competitive and transparent bidding procedures for contracts; “fair” employment legislation and rules; and technical assistance and possibly quotas to ensure equitable distribution.
- The distributional impacts of public services should be monitored, and allocations made to ensure greater horizontal and vertical equity by targeting pro-poor sectors, activities within sectors, and locations. In federal or decentralized systems, revenue-sharing formulae should be designed to improve regional equity. Aid allocation should follow similar principles.
- Aid donors should assist governments to identify types of expenditure that will reduce inequalities, drawing on available data, light surveys, and evidence from other countries. Where capacity is a constraint, they should provide technical assistance to integrate distributional impacts into public expenditure reviews and planning. Where willingness to tackle inequalities is a constraint, they should undertake policy dialogue and conditionality, and direct their own resources to improving horizontal and vertical equity.

**Conclusion**

The need to tackle horizontal inequality in post-conflict policies is increasingly recognized. Innovative policies can address this need. Collecting data on inequalities will enable policy makers to analyze the distributive impacts of the fiscal system, and to devise tax and expenditure policies to redress these biases. Aid donors have an important role to play in ensuring a government’s success in these efforts.
CHAPTER 10
NONVIOLENCE AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION FOR PEACE AND CHANGE

Sam Gbaydee Doe

War, along with its grotesque imagery and attendant misery, has dominated the media and scholarly literature on Africa since the end of the cold war. Youth and women have suffered the brunt of the misery caused by conflict. In light of ongoing tragic dramas, skeptics view Africa as a continent irredeemably condemned by destiny. Their loud and strong voices, complemented by media images, have left an indelible, pity-evoking image of Africa on the conscience of the world. Consequently, while the rest of the countries around the world engage as equal partners in development and global politics, those in Africa are perceived as a funnel for aid or the home of rampaging criminal elements. Only a few scholars and journalists have given thought to the possibility that the lingering turbulence on the continent might be a cry for significant foundational changes or a reaction to externally driven policy prescriptions.

Notwithstanding the negative perceptions and appalling realities, organic change dynamics are evolving from Africa's catastrophes. Throughout the continent, women and youth, despite being the primary victims of anarchy, are emerging as critical purveyors for change. The means they have adopted for the change process are a mix of violent and nonviolent approaches. Some restive youths are being or have mobilised themselves as foot soldiers in internal wars and criminal cartels in failing states across Africa, while others, resigned to the challenges facing them, have chosen to disengage and traverse the Sahara in search of better lives in Europe. The few lucky enough to go to college use this intellectual forum to agitate against their elite-dominated state systems. While mobilised youth groups have lifted the veil from the myth of the state as the sole legitimate instrument of organised violence, the 'entitlement pathology' and militancy resulting from the process have become one of the most destabilizing factors in post–cold war Africa. Youth violence and the issues surrounding it are examined here in 'The Political Child', by Afua Twum-Danso, and in ‘Review of Policy Frameworks’ and ‘Conclusions and Recommendations on the Way Forward’ from 'Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis', a report by the United Nations Development Programme.

Women, unlike male-dominated youth groups, are turning their victimisation into a force for peace. The Women's Movement for Peace in Sierra Leone, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network, and the Women in Peacebuilding Network are credited with the return of peace in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia (specifically) and the entire Mano River basin region (generally). Anyone who kept informed of Liberia’s brutal civil war will remember

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3 Although some African youths have adopted the instrument of violence to make their case, it is important to stress that not all youth organisations and groups use violence to protest the prevailing system. Some student movements engage nonviolently in their efforts to influence policy.
the ‘white t-shirt’ women. The moral voice they introduced amid the noise of terror and the light they shone in the darkness that enveloped the country became determinant factors in bringing about peace. Other actors—including inter-religious bodies, professional non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, tribal associations, and trade, teachers, and student unions—have also emerged throughout Africa and are exerting themselves in the public and private spheres.

There is certainly no shortage of change actors in Africa. As Alex de Waal points out, in ‘Social Mobilization for Peace’, in every country on the continent, including those governed by despots, the pressure for change—whether from primary mobilisers, professional advocates, or coalitions and networks—is intensifying to a point too overwhelming for tyrants to obstruct. Patrick Bond underscores that people’s struggles brought down three dozen dictatorial regimes between 1990 and 1994. In ‘Global Uneven Development, Primitive Accumulation and Political Economic Conflict in Africa’, he goes on to note that Africa’s civic groups have also taken mass mobilisation to the capitals of the imperialist allies of African elites. There, in partnership with people’s movements in those countries, they have scored significantly against imperialist designs. Based on these phenomenal achievements, Bond argues that Africa’s hope lies in its emerging people’s movements and social mobilisation.

This new energy challenges de Waal’s theory that successful social mobilisation is a function of a favourable political environment. In fact, recent experience shows that primary mobilisation complemented by professional advocacy and strong national and international coalitions are more vibrant in contexts of repression or state collapse in Africa, as suggested by Catherine Barnes in the Main Findings of ‘Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War and Building Peace.’ It is increasingly evident that instead of authoritarian and despotic regimes undermining change mobilisation, in the case of Africa they are sustaining momentum galvanised during periods of repression and wars in budding democratic environments that are becoming a challenge in post-war African states.

Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (president of the Republic of Liberia) observe in ‘Organizing for Peace’ that women withdraw from the public realm once peace is achieved. Some of the reasons they cite include a lack of safety, resources, political space, and access to decision-makers. While there is some truth to this assessment, it is hard to believe that issues of safety and access to decision makers are sufficient reasons for abandoning post-conflict rebuilding challenges, given the even greater risks the women confronted in efforts to bring about peace.

The fragility of social movements, particularly women’s movements, and post—cold war change dynamics present conundrums that beg deeper inquiry beyond Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf’s suggestions. First, as pointed out by Christopher Mitchell in the introduction to ‘Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution’, the contemporary literature is surprisingly limited in deepening understanding of the nature, intensity, and rapidity of change. Building on Mitchell’s observation, it can be argued that the responsiveness of the context and repetitiveness of the catalytic events that accelerate change are also insufficiently examined in scholarly works. Second, although the number of scholars who acknowledge that the vision for change and the purveyors of change must be indigenous to the context is increasing, the structural and policy reforms necessary to catalyse indigenous dynamics remain limited, as Bond highlights. This is problematic given the urgent need to build on the organic change dynamics emerging throughout Africa.

Third, understanding motivating factors in social mobilisation is crucial to sustaining people’s struggles in all phases of change as intimated by de Waal. Aside from the physical

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needs often cited for people's agitation for change, there are needs of a higher order—social justice, respect, dignity, freedom, and so on—that continuously propel the engine of change. Understanding these motivators, why they are critical drivers, and designing strategies to deploy them in social mobilisation beg further inquiry. Fourth, it is yet to be fully documented whether social movements and social mobilisation practices in Africa revolve around charismatic leaders, a well-defined cause or vision, or both. Regardless, the flexibility required to adjust the goal to changing conditions and times tends to be overlooked.

A lack of understanding of these elements tends to drain the energy of civic (and particularly women's) movements once a crisis recedes. This is a phenomenon to which scholars should pay more attention if the new tides of change are to realise desperately needed transformations in Africa.
The previous chapter has highlighted some of the dangers of militaristic modes of governance, and in particular has pointed to their tendency to use violence to resolve political problems. Of necessity, any peace settlement must be negotiated among belligerent parties, and therefore give prominence to militaristic leaders. However, the sustainability of any such agreement will depend crucially on the demilitarization of governance. This in turn is closely related to the extent to which a wide range of social groups can be involved in a peace settlement.

This chapter is concerned with how three of the most important categories in any society—women, youth and the poor—the impoverished and marginalized—who are also those with the greatest stake in peace, can make their voices heard and their presence felt during war, and help to promote peace. This is a laudable aim: who would be opposed to women, young people and the poor facilitating peace? There is no doubt that these are the people who suffer great burdens and risks during any armed conflict, and especially the protracted internal civil wars that are too common in much of Africa.

There are huge challenges facing those who wish to organize peace groups or peace movements in Africa. There are few successful ‘issue-based’ social movements in Africa, that are capable of effecting social or political change, such as ending armed conflict. The opportunities for civil society and social mobilization are few. In addition, the power relations inherent in armed conflict tend to further subjugate such people, and make their participation in the political life of the country more difficult. The prevalence of militarism, as analyzed in the previous chapter, is perhaps the single major constraint on effective social mobilization.

We must also note that these categories are not simple. ‘Women’, ‘youth’ and ‘the poor’ are not organic social groups that automatically adhere together. They all have multiple loyalties, and especially during times of war, some of these other loyalties—to ethnic group or political party—will be much stronger than their identification with other women, youths or poor people. Many youth and poor people and some women are themselves combatants. (It is often overlooked how ordinary rank-and-file soldiers are victims of war. They suffer the highest casualty rates, and although some of them inflict abuse, they are also victims of abuse. And because they are embeded at the bottom [of] a military hierarchy, they cannot express their views without risking court martial for insubordination or worse.) For those who advocate for these marginalized groups, what strategies can be followed?

This chapter asks the question, how the representation of women, youth and the poor, who are among the key stakeholders in peace, can be promoted. It approaches this issue from several angles, including not only the mechanisms whereby these groups can be mobilized, but also how the means, material, political and ideological, whereby these groups are marginalized, can be tackled.

Civil Politics and Social Mobilization

The term ‘civil society’ is widely used, but with little analytical precision. As a prelude for approaching the challenge of involving key stakeholders in peace, we need to develop a more incisive framework for understanding how different categories and groups can become actively involved in pursuing their interests. The first requirement is to identify several kinds of civil society activities related to peace, governance, human rights and other mobilization for social progress and change.
1. Primary mobilization. This consists of the mobilization of multiple grass-roots organizations and constituencies; the mass mobilization of individuals in pursuit of what they see to be their own interests, or a wider moral cause. This ‘primary mobilization’ is the core constituency for any truly effective peace-building. Their intimate and ongoing involvement is the key to the maintaining the relevance, moral determination, sensitivity and sense of accountability of such mobilization.

2. Professional advocacy. Advocacy organizations represent the ‘second generation’ of human rights activism. Advocacy in this sense has policy-oriented and adversarial components. Policy-oriented advocacy is the activism of professionals in the area who can bring the issue to the public eye, provide legal and policy expertise, and advise governments and international organizations. Adversarial advocacy is the investigation and documentation of cases of abuse, and the extent of abuse, in different countries; and the exposure (‘naming and shaming’) of governments that have turned a blind eye or worse to the practice. This includes bringing cases to court and providing legal aid to victims. Journalism and law are key professions in this kind of work.

3. Material assistance. Assistance agencies, ranging from local NGOs and community-based advice centres, to international NGOs, to UN organizations, to governmental donors, all have a role in building peace. Aid provision can be a vital part of peace-building and especially of the success of post-conflict transitions. However, a focus on resources also has its dangers, because it may lead to a neglect of the essential social and political activities that must underpin effective peace-related activities.

4. Coalitions with concerned policymakers. Sympathetic individuals in governments (legislature, executive and judiciary), and also in business, the UN, foundations, etc., must be key parts of any coalition concerned with peace. These ‘policymakers with a conscience’ are strategic allies in terms of enacting policy changes and taking key leadership decisions.

Historically, the most successful social movements have consisted of a coalition between the ‘primary mobilization’ of constituencies—the mass mobilization of people in pursuit of their own rights and interests—and the ‘secondary activism’ of professionals, who can use the tools of publicity, the law, and international alliance-building to lead such movements. The principled activism of some lawmakers and judges has also been instrumental. Africa has had few of these successful primary-secondary coalitions. The non-violent independence movement in the 1950s and 1960s was one case. The anti-Apartheid movement was a variant on the theme. The short-lived civil coalition that overthrew the Nimeiri dictatorship in Sudan in April 1985 was another. The pro-democracy movements of the late 1980s and the sovereign national conferences of Francophone countries in the early 1990s were another encouraging case. But it is very rare in Africa (as indeed elsewhere in the world) for there to be a mass peace movement in a country that is at war, especially when the war is close to home. For many reasons, peace movements are easily divided or manipulated, and it takes remarkably courageous individuals to resist the taunts of ‘traitor’ that will be leveled by one side or the other.

In seeking to explain the paucity of effective social mobilization in Africa, we must turn our attention to the political environment. There are many dimensions to this, including the extent to which society is organized on the basis of citizenship or kinship, the extent of economic development and especially industrialization, and the nature of political culture, in particular the extent of militaristic governance. The following discussion seeks only to isolate one dimension among these, and suggests a simple four-fold categorization of kinds of political authority in Africa. The categorizations apply in variant forms both to governments and to rebel movements, and to left- and right-wing systems of rule (cf. Moore and Putzel, 1999).

War—whether civil conflict or inter-state war—tends to destroy or distort systems for political representation. A tolerant liberal government will become much more authoritarian when it is in war mode. Suddenly, dissent may be regarded as treason, or just a step away. Rebel groups and militias usually depend upon total loyalty for their political survival. However, war does not mean that there are no channels of communication, no
opportunities for organization and expression. Other socio-political structures remain intact, and some may even become strengthened. Hence, any state in one of the following categories is likely to shift towards a more repressive and authoritarian category, when it is afflicted by war.

The following categorization runs from collapsed states to liberal democracies. For each case, we ask what kind of civil society is possible, and what it can do. Note that in this context, civil society includes civilian political parties, trade unions and other organized interest groups, as well as NGOs and community-based organizations.

Category one is collapsed states, with the absence of any effective governing authorities, including organized administration by militia groups or former rebel fronts. The opportunity for any form of civil mobilization is very limited, and will probably be confined to local NGOs seeking to protect and assist displaced people, perhaps with help from international donors. No organized political representation is possible.

This draws attention to the fact that in most situations of armed conflict, the primary need for any individual is security and survival. These needs are best met by seeking the protection of a party to the conflict, which in turn means not mobilizing in any manner that may challenge that party. Where the conflict has a regional or ethnic dimension, these loyalties may become by far the most important organizing principle, so that individuals are uninterested in promoting their interests as women, youth etc., and instead identify with the political and military struggle. Those who resist this identification may be branded as ‘traitors’ and crushed.

However, we must not place all conflict-affected countries in this bracket, with the implication that nothing can be done. This is for several reasons. First, countries at war may still have civil politics in one form or another, especially in the capital city. For example, Sudan had a functioning parliamentary system during 1986–9, despite being at war. Despite the current war and collapsed state in the D.R. Congo, the city of Kinshasa continues to have civil space and political activities by parties and individuals. Second, the warring parties themselves differ greatly in terms of their internal organization. While some are highly authoritarian and may even be the personal fiefdoms of their leaders, others have the capacity for civil administration and the implementation of social programmes, that may actually promote the emancipation of marginalized groups such as women. In addition, in some countries with collapsed states, some areas may be peaceful, and civil organization around NGOs or grassroots organizations may be possible. Many parts of Somalia are like this. However, in other cases, there is such a widespread breakdown of the socio-political order that any form of organized representation of interest groups is impossible.

Category two is personal rule or arbitrary rule. This characterizes some governments, and many armed groups. Policies are unstable; political activity is focused on taking or retaining power and enriching those in power. Groups such as women and the poor have few or no political options, and effective public policies are improbable and if they do occur, they are unlikely to last long. Again, those who challenge the authority of the government or anti-government group may find themselves crushed. Even raising alternative agendas and viewpoints may be politically and personally dangerous.

In Africa, most such systems of government are dominated by a ‘big man’ who seeks to evoke traditional images as the ‘father of the nation’ or chief of the tribe. His citizens are infantilized as ‘subjects,’ who should be grateful for their leader’s generosity and consideration, and should not be so insolent as to demand ‘rights.’ The ‘big man’ does not consult, he preaches. This kind of rule tends to be much more effective in rural areas, where adapted traditional forms of authority prevail, than in urban areas. Any civil society mobilization is antithetical to this neo-traditional rule. Commonly, civil society will therefore be largely an urban phenomenon, arising from the same social groups that mobilize opposition political parties and demand greater political freedoms. The government will tend to dismiss both civil society leaders and opposition politicians as elitists who represent...
only narrow urban interests. This charge may contain an element of truth: any form of social mobilization presupposes that people envisage themselves as citizens and bearers of rights, not as subjects, and if this kind of socio-political culture is confined to urban areas, this is where civil society and social mobilization will occur.

Some slender options for mobilization to represent civil interests offer themselves in such cases. First, there may be a small opening for organizing groups in a solidarity mode, avowing their loyalty to the ruling party, and those groups may then move on to undertake other forms of advocacy in a discrete way. But, when challenged or fearing challenges, such groups must always put their solidarity with the dominant political force above any other consideration.

Second, using external linkages may be an option, if used carefully. That is, a group will seek the protection of an international organization, or will build a coalition with an exile or expatriate organization, in order to press their case. Alternatively, the initiative may come from diaspora groups, who enjoy the silent support of people inside the country. The interests of women, or youth, or certain ethnic groups, will then be represented by leaders who are outside the country or who have positions or influence in international NGOs. These leaders may of course develop their own agendas, or may not effectively serve their constituencies— but in the absence of opportunities for the mobilization of the group in question internally, there may be no other mechanism for making their voices heard. The influence of such groups is likely to be marginal.

This type of mobilization will be effective in proportion to the weakness of the ruling authority. When that authority is weak— it has few resources and needs international respectability— then it may concede space for independent groups to operate, if doing so is its only means to gaining access to international resources. However, should the authority obtain its own sources of income, it is likely to squeeze that small space for civil action.

Lastly, if the government or opposition represents a coalition, then there will be political space provided by the differences between the coalition partners. A coalition entails a forum for discussion between the different party leaders. Any such forum is also an opening for civil groups to make their voices heard. Once again, managing this without falling foul of the parties will demand skill, sensitivity and patience.

Category three is institutionalized government with limited political freedoms and minimal pluralism (either left-wing, right-wing or simply authoritarian). Governments or (more rarely) opposition fronts may be able to run effective administrations and deliver social services.

In such situations there are much greater possibilities for the mobilization of interest groups. Where the authorities have a broadly leftist political programme, it may be easy for them to respond to some demands from women, youth, the poor, etc. Mass organizations may have some autonomy which can be used to push the interests of their constituents. Under right-wing authorities, it is possible that religiously-based groups may be able to mobilize and represent interests. It is possible that there will be international NGO involvement in service provision, which increases opportunities for stakeholders to make alliances with external groups. However the authorities’ response is likely to be top-down, and the institutional mechanisms whereby these groups are given some political representation are likely to be dominated by the political apparatus.

In such circumstances, internal constituencies may take the lead in mobilizing stakeholders, but only for limited agendas. Once again, we will find that civil groups are likely to define their primary loyalty to the political cause, and use this as a platform for pressing for their specific interest. Meanwhile external groups— either international organizations or expatriate or exile groups— may still play a crucial role, because they can provide an arena for more open debate and discussion of alternatives, that may be impossible within the limited political space available internally.
In such circumstances, civil groups can mobilize for peace, but only indirectly. Some may adopt a formal agenda for ‘peace’, but on examination their loyalty to one or other belligerent party means that they really mean ‘peace through victory.’ Others may seek peace indirectly by promoting local reconciliation within limited localities, or by developing independent civil society organizations in the small niches available. But civil groups will be able to openly call for peace only when the party that protects them endorses that call.

The fourth and final category is institutionalized government with political pluralism. These are stable and mature democratic states with legitimate organizations and civil and political rights. They normally provide a wide range of welfare services, and there is much debate and scrutiny of service provision. Interest groups have the scope to organize, though other axes of political mobilization (such as ethnicity) may dominate. Groups that are otherwise invisible politically (e.g. the handicapped, very small ethnic minorities) may find a voice. There are myriad opportunities for promoting the interests and mobilization of women, youth and other groups. International networking by these groups is possible and can be done in an open manner.

It is rare for such a government to be involved in a protracted armed conflict, internally or with a neighbor. However, there are transitional cases in which either or both government and opposition are engaged in open public debate about peace, creating a space in which pro-peace constituencies can organize. Where the government or opposition consists of a broad coalition with different political agendas, this political space is more likely. Under these sorts of government, there is the possibility for a genuine ‘peace movement’ that is independent of government or military opposition, and brings real political pressure for peace to bear on the parties.

Options and Strategies for Civil Society

The above categorization underlines how it is inherently difficult for civil society groups to mobilize when their need to do so is greatest. It emphasizes how the interests of stakeholder groups may be primarily linked to ethnic, regional or political affiliations, on which survival and security depend in the short term. It draws attention to the strategies that such groups are likely to follow.

During conflict, the primary identification of any civil society organization or social group is likely to be with the major agenda of one of the parties to the conflict, because of ethnic, religious, political and regional allegiance and because of the need for physical security. Only when the political tension relaxes, for example in the context of hopeful peace negotiations, will it be possible for cross-cutting allegiances to be mobilized. (This implies that civil society can mobilize for peace only when peace is already on the agenda of the principal belligerents.) A variant of this occurs when a group may work within the institutions setup by one of the parties, trying to test the autonomy of that institution (e.g. a women’s organization or a humanitarian agency). Another variant occurs when an independent group may be in solidarity with one of the parties, [also with] an ulterior agenda of promoting the rights of specific interest groups. Thus, a women’s organization may seek to promote the rights of women within a particular party or the territory it controls.

All groups will be extremely cautious in undertaking any visible mobilization in a way that challenges the warring party under whose authority they reside. A group with an existing constituency in the area— for example a church organization— will be very cautious in protecting the interests of its constituents, by seeking not to offend the controlling party. But, under certain circumstances, it may be ready to advocate boldly and publicly, confident that its combination of local constituency and international linkages will provide some protection.

Groups may utilize external links with international NGOs and exile groups in order to promote their particular interest and point of view, or to create a space in which wider issues such as peace can be discussed openly.
Certain categories of people—including our three target categories—have particular interests in peace. But they are also categories of people whom it is difficult to mobilize as such. They have more interests that divide them and few natural structures for organization and authority, implying that any mobilization will probably be transient. The following sections of this chapter deal with these three groups, and the challenges of mobilizing them or representing their interests.

**Women and Mobilization for Peace**

The idea of ‘engendering the peace’, bringing women’s outlook and voices to bear on peace processes, is gathering momentum. In most societies, women are seen, in one way or another, as a force for peace and harmony, as nurturers and carers. This may be a myth, a cultural construct, that actually originates in sexist values. However, if these cultural stereotypes can be used in the course of promoting peace, they may bring some benefits to women and men alike. This section looks at some of the challenges of mobilizing women and representing their interests in war-afflicted countries.

**Women and War**

Women suffer terribly during war. Women in Africa suffer from poverty, inequality, discrimination, and abuse during normal times. During conflict, all these elements are worsened.

Women suffer from changes in economic roles. Women already do the majority of the work in the home and in agriculture throughout Africa. War usually entails even greater workloads and responsibilities. Whether they are at home, with their menfolk gone (fled, conscripted or dead), or displaced (also commonly without their menfolk), women have to take on greater responsibilities. Women in female-headed households have to take on the exclusive responsibility for caring for the family members who remain, perhaps augmented by orphaned members of the extended family. They may find themselves with the sole responsibility of growing food and earning an income, perhaps from petty trade. They may have to venture into new economic areas, which may involve running risks when travelling to buy food or trade. While for some women it may be a liberating experience to be freed from the confines of domestic work and farming, for many it is simply an additional burden and an extra set of risks. Elder daughters may find themselves withdrawn from school in order to help look after younger siblings; their future is sacrificed for the immediate needs of the family.

Women who are poor and desperately in need of food or money for themselves and their children are vulnerable to exploitation. They can be economically exploited by traders who buy their assets cheaply, or farmers who employ their labor at below-market rates. Young women may have no option but to become commercial sex workers or to attach themselves to a series of male partners for survival.

Women are vulnerable to sexual abuse. Particularly when they are outside the framework of their village, clan or extended family, women may be extremely vulnerable to rape. This has the attendant risks of HIV infection (and soldiers are one of the highest-risk occupational categories for transmission of HIV), other sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, stigmatization, trauma, and perhaps being forced into commercial sex work.

For poor women during wartime, life can consist of trying to manage multiple risks. Nothing is certain. There are no reliable guides for how to act. No information can be relied upon. Many women find themselves with unacceptable choices every day: they have to choose between husbanding seed (not knowing if they will be able to plant at all) and feeding their children; between using scarce time walking a safe path to a well or risking land-mines on a shorter path; between risking HIV by offering sexual favors and the ‘safety’ of begging for charity that may not come.
Women are under pressure to support warring parties. Women in war-affected areas or refugee camps tend to have few possessions. But this does not deter soldiers or rebels who consider even the smallest contribution to the war effort, or their own personal welfare, a worthwhile sacrifice. Women may be forced to surrender crops, food rations, basic possessions to soldiers. They may be required to cook for soldiers, or even to abandon their homes and travel with army units as camp followers, cooking, doing the laundry, acting as porters, and providing unpaid sexual services as well.

Men, of course, suffer too during war, especially poor men and youth, because, in most wars, it is men who predominantly suffer death or disability during combat. Widows and orphans may suffer, but they are still alive. In many wars, however, civilian casualties are greater than military, and women may suffer disproportionately from the combined effects of social vulnerability, sexual abuse, displacement and hardship.

Commonly, men also suffer most during food crises. For every single famine and refugee crisis for which statistical information is available, death rates for men have been higher than for women. This is true, with very few exceptions, across all age ranges from very young children to old people. This appears to be related to two factors. One is the greater physiological resilience of women, who survive prolonged undernutrition and related stresses better than men. The second is the fact that in the lower-status occupations, on which survival depends during times of extreme stress, women have advantages compared to men. (E.g. selling cooked food, collecting wild foods, domestic labor.)

The idea of men somehow ‘escaping’ from famine or conflict zones, abandoning women to suffer, is not generally borne out by the facts. We need to be cautious in assuming that men somehow ‘benefit’ from conflict: most of them do not.

Women in Peacemaking: The Case Against

There is a case to be made that women do not have a useful role to play in peacemaking. This is a ‘realist’ view. It should be taken seriously: responding to these arguments provides the foundation for organizing women in support of peace. The argument runs something like this.

Peace is made between those who control armed forces. In fact peacemaking is a futile exercise if it is merely conducted among those who desire peace but have no power to deliver it. Given the structure of power in Africa, especially military power, it follows that women’s role in peacemaking will always be marginal.

Women’s advocacy for peace is open to some common misconceptions. Some women argue that their sex is necessarily more pacific: they are the bearers of children, the nurturers, the bringers of harmony, and that therefore they should be peacemakers. It is almost certainly correct that women are less warlike than men. Also, it does not follow that women will make better peacemakers.

Women’s primary loyalty is not necessarily to peace, nor to other women. Women often mobilize strongly in support of their ethnic group or community, taking militant positions. Women in formal political positions will hold to their party’s line, even when it comes to taking a stand on women’s issues that contradicts women’s rights. Women can agitate for war, help promote war ideologies, and carry out other actions in pursuit of war. They can also participate in fighting, and commit atrocities.

Women have some traditional sanctions against war in Africa. For example, there are cases in which the women of some communities have refused sexual relations with their men-folk until those men have seen sense and abandoned their wars. However, this tool just shows how weak women’s capacity for pressing for peace really is. How common is this strategy? How difficult is it to organize? And how long does it last?
It is important not to forget that men have as much interest as women in peace, if not more so. After all, it is mostly men who die. Why should women’s voices be given a special privilege?

Most advocacy for peace by women’s organizations has been by external organizations that do not directly represent the voices and interests of women inside the countries concerned. Foreign organizations have commonly organized or sponsored these initiatives. These may have good intentions at heart, but it is questionable whether they have the organic links and accountability to war-affected women for them to be true representatives of them or their interests. Without this foreign sponsorship, these ‘women for peace’ organizations and conferences would simply not occur. In extreme cases, critics argue that foreign women’s organizations are meddling in affairs about which they understand little, and are pursuing their own interests at the expense of women in war-stricken countries.

Women in Peacemaking: The Case in Favor

Strong following arguments may be made in favor of women having a special role in peacemaking. First, women are not seeking a privileged role, or the sole role, in making peace. They are not seeking to exclude or marginalize men, merely to make warmakers aware of the impact of war on women, which is something that they may not know or may have chosen to ignore. Women are aware that it is up to the warmakers to make peace, but they believe that if their voices are heard, then warmakers are more likely to consider seriously the harm of war and the benefits of peace, which may bring peace closer.

Secondly, some women may be stakeholders in war; some may commit atrocities or benefit from conflict. But on the whole, women are purely victims of violence, while men are both perpetrators and victims. Women are also the prime carers of children, especially during wartime, and children are also solely victims of war and not its beneficiaries. Giving a voice to women therefore stresses the negative aspects of war. It makes it more difficult for warmakers to justify continuing war, if there is an option of peace. Also, the fact that some women participate in war and atrocity shows that women have a choice: when women advocate for peace, it is not because they are naturally programmed to do so, but because they have made a moral choice to do so. This should make their contribution all the more valuable.

Third, although women’s role in peacemaking is limited, their role in peacebuilding may be much more substantial. Adult women are the prime carers of young boys and can play a crucial role in socializing them into becoming more peaceable men. Young women, if empowered, are the group who can help forge key values among their male contemporaries. If every young woman wants to marry an army officer, it will be difficult to overcome a culture of militarism.

Fourth, women cannot enforce peace. It is hard for women to organize to represent their common interests as women. It is particularly hard for them to do so in patriarchal societies such as are common in Africa, and even harder in war-affected authoritarian and militaristic societies. Women have very few sanctions. There is little direct pressure they can bring to bear. But their weapon is the weapon of the weak: an appeal to conscience and long-term good sense and self-interest. Precisely because women are so vulnerable, their voice carries a moral authority. Women should be listened to, not because they can enforce their demands, but because they speak on behalf of the powerless, and raise questions that cannot be ignored.

Finally, the international component of women’s mobilization should be welcomed, not dismissed. Those women who are fortunate enough to be internationally networked and protected should speak out on behalf of their sisters who live in conflict-ridden areas, who are downtrodden and vulnerable and unable to organize or speak on their own behalf. Those who decry the international orientation of women’s mobilization should provide the resources, opportunity and freedom for women at home to organize, and then listen...
to what they have to say. And if international mediators choose to listen to women’s voices, while the warring parties are still not ready to do so, whose problem is this? Certainly there is a problem of foreign agencies having divergent agendas— but at least there is some overlap of aims between them and women affected by war, whereas the agendas of national war leaders and their female citizens seem often to have no convergence at all. Should women refuse to talk to the international community just because their national warmakers would rather that they remained silent?

Options for Women’s Mobilization

The above discussion has some important implications for the strategies for women’s mobilization in pursuit of peace. The main lesson is that we should not expect a mass women’s movement in a war-affected country. It is simply too much to expect that hundreds of thousands of women will mobilize themselves to demonstrate for peace, pressuring and shaming their government or belligerent party into abandoning war in favor of negotiation. Women’s activists may keep this as a vision in their minds, as an ultimate goal, but it is some way away.

The experience of women in Burundi, and their engagement in the long peace process in that country, is an important experience, from which many lessons can be learned. The voice of Burundi’s women was heard at the Arusha talks, which was positive. But the women also brought with them their social and political agendas, associated with their alignments with social and political groups. The women were not an external, ‘innocent’ force: they were an integral part of the conflicted society.

The experience of the ‘Engendering the Peace’ initiative for Sudan, led by the Netherlands Government, also had strengths and weaknesses. It was an unprecedented opportunity for Sudanese women to make their voices heard internationally, and to meet with one another and with prominent women activists from across the world. But they too brought their politics with them. Most notably, the final conference in Maastricht did not include a delegation of women aligned with the SPLA, because the SPLA leadership took a political stand against the initiative. Meanwhile, the Sudan Government delegation to the conference was led by men!

For the time being, women’s mobilization for peace is likely to be opportunistic, in a positive sense. It will take and utilize what opportunities exist for mobilizing women and representing their concerns. This strategy may include:

1. Contacting, informing and mobilizing whatever women’s groups exist or can be brought into being, whether they are ‘primary’ constituencies of women in the affected country, or ‘secondary’ activist groups either inside or in the diaspora.
2. Researching the condition of women in war-affected countries. Documenting their plight, the difficulties they face and the risks they run. Recording their voices, so that their experiences and views can be known to the world.
3. Providing practical assistance to women affected by war. Encouraging humanitarian agencies to prioritize women’s concerns and set up programmes that deal specifically with women’s needs (this agenda is already well advanced). Helping women with access to information and legal protection where possible.
4. International networking, bringing together different women’s groups interested in peace. Bringing women’s viewpoints to international fora including peace negotiations. Using every moral pressure to make sure that the national parties and international mediators consider women’s views.

Note that these strategies, or variants of them, can and should also be adopted as a preventive strategy. In countries that are not at war, but there is a clear risk of conflict, it is likely that the capacity for women’s mobilization and advocacy will be greater than in a country already in the grip of conflict. Women’s advocacy for preventing war may be both more possible and more effective.
Youth

Where would warmakers be without youth? The great majority of soldiers in any army consists of young men and boys in their late teens and early twenties. Many are conscripted, either forcibly or because they have no other options for a livelihood. Others join voluntarily because of grievance or frustration (closure of schools being a classic reason), or for excitement.

‘Youth’ is a problematic category. It is tempting to define ‘youth’ in terms of age (e.g. the group between ages sixteen and thirty). But this is an arbitrary measurement that misses the key point: youth is a category that is exploited by warmakers. The challenge for peace-makers is, can youth also be a category that can be mobilized for peace?

Youth Organization for War

As outlined above, both right-wing and left-wing militarists have sought to organize or at least mobilize youth. We may recap on this, add an additional category, and summarize the types of youth organization and ideology that are useful for military mobilization.

1. Right-wing proto-military youth organizations. The ‘youth wings’ of certain political parties are a variant on this, with discipline played down and wanton thuggery played up. These are hierarchical organizations, controlled from the top.

2. Left-wing youth organizations. These may have a (partly) pacific ideology, perhaps oriented towards ‘development’ or ‘international solidarity’. But they can still form the basis for instilling discipline and loyalty, and be the foundation for military organization. These are also hierarchical organizations, and some ‘youth’ leaders may stay in the posts for many years, reaching ages that stretch any age-based definition of ‘youth’ somewhat.

3. Traditional warrior organizations. Among some ethnic groups, particularly pastoralists, there were warrior age-sets or similar means of mobilizing fighters. Some of these mechanisms remain in adapted form and can still be called upon for mobilizing young men.

4. Youth mobs and ‘social bandits’. The excitement of armed confrontation and the possibility of looting, may be sufficient to mobilize unruly mobs of youth for transient rioting.

5. There are hybrid cases. For example the Interahamwe militia of Rwanda include elements of right-wing proto-military organization, adapted traditional warrior mechanisms, and youth mobs. Given the dispersal of the Interahamwe throughout Central Africa, this model now has regional ramifications.

The fourth type of military youth mobilization raises questions. The youth mob, in this form, is a recent historical phenomenon, certainly in Africa. Why might this be so?

A basic point is that Africa is now a continent of young people. Rapid population growth means that there are far more children and young people than mature adults. In the past, and in European countries, stable populations meant that youths were a scarce commodity. States needed to nurture and develop them, as all would be needed for future mobilization. However, African countries have (relatively speaking) a surfeit of youth. Military planners and others seeking to mobilize youth can afford to be more wasteful and less efficient.

In addition, in contemporary Africa, the previously existing life trajectories for young people are no longer valid (Seekings, 1993). In traditional societies there were rites of passage for young people to become adults, at which point they were entitled and obliged to fight, and thereafter they would marry, own land and cattle, and become senior members of the community. In more recent times, there was an expectation that modernity entailed a new trajectory: living at home as a child; attending school; leaving school and finding work. For many this was just a hope, but it was at least, a norm. In the last decades, with the decline in the formal economy we have a new trajectory: school-‘youth’-
uncertainty. Youths live with unemployment, some chances in the informal sector, with risk-taking, and with few expectations that they will achieve the same standard of living as their parents or grandparents.

Youth—or, to be precise, male youth—are seen as militant, rebellious, impatient, malleable, and risk-taking. If these energies cannot be channeled into a courageous commitment to a national cause (national liberation, or jihad, or something similar), then there is the possibility of mobilizing youth in a violent and anarchic way. Some writers, observing the apparently uncontrolled and irrational violence of the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have hypothesized that Africa's youth are now out of control; a combination of frustration, lack of education, access to drugs, and the readiness of cynical warlords to provide them with weapons has created a dangerous new class of armed thugs with no agenda other than enjoying themselves at the expense of civilized values.

This is of course an exaggeration. The majority of young combatants across Africa have rather conventional aspirations for their future lives. They would like an education and a useful job. Like young people across the world, they rebel against their elders, ignore advice, and enjoy taking risks. The advent of the AIDS pandemic has shortened time horizons, narrowed expectations, and heightened risks. But, given the option, is very likely that most young people would prefer a future of security and domesticity.

It is striking how little research there is on this area. There are very few surveys of the background and aspirations of young soldiers in Africa. There is very little sociological or economic analysis of youth and their needs and strategies for survival. Any wide-ranging plans for bringing stability to Africa must include intensive study of these questions.

Other Options for the Mobilization of Youth

Non-military means for mobilization also exist. We can identify several types of formal youth organization, including especially:

1. Leftist youth organizations. Although, as mentioned, these organizations may be co-opted by militarists or neutralized by vanguardist organizations, they also tend to have a pacific and internationalist ideology, which can be the basis for autonomous action and international networking that can promote peace.

2. Student unions. Student unions are probably the most representative and influential civil organization for youth. Student politics has a disproportionate influence in many African countries. In 1964 it was the Khartoum Student Union that sparked the 'October Revolution' that brought down the military dictatorship of General Ibrahim Abboud. Many African governments closely watch student politics. Often they find it difficult to intervene and control student unions, perhaps because student organization is so fluid and fast-changing that it is difficult to set up patronage and supervisory structures that can work effectively. By the same token, student unions can only mount short-lived challenges to political authority.

3. Church youth groups. Africa's main religions organize young people for self-advancement and as the core of their future congregations. Their politics tends to follow that of the parent religious organization. Although they may seem over-formal with a top-down hierarchical organization, such youth groups often succeed in capturing the energies and commitment of their members. They can be key intermediaries in spreading public health messages such as AIDS prevention. With the rapid growth of youth-oriented Pentecostal churches, this form of mobilization of young people is becoming more significant.

4. Sports groups. Football clubs and supporters' clubs are some of the most vigorous and authentic youth organizations in Africa. They have loyal and dedicated followers.

Turning to less formal organizations, we can identify a wide range of other youth organizations. These include: student clubs (both male and female students have clubs that vary greatly in their degree of formal organization), music associations and clubs, secret soci-
eties (in west Africa, especially Nigeria, these are common), gangs of various kinds, vigilante groups, and community associations.

Generally speaking, more is known about male organizations than female ones. Their variety, informality and transience makes them difficult to study. Also, some are based on a culture of resistance: i.e. they will deliberately not cooperate with any authorities and may in fact react in an adverse way to any attempt to mobilize or co-opt them.

All these factors make it intrinsically difficult to mobilize ‘youth’ as a force for peace. However, the very fact that a large proportion of Africa's youth, especially in urban areas, is organized into clubs and societies of one form or another presents opportunities for mobilization. Such mobilization can be addressed incrementally. The best foundation for youth mobilization are the more durable and structured youth organizations, such as international leftist youth organizations, federations of students’ unions, and church youth groups. But the effectiveness, authenticity and vitality of youth mobilization will be best served by a wider coalition that embraces other less formal organizations, such as football supporters' clubs, music clubs, etc. The latter have the particular advantage that they can potentially mobilize important celebrities and stars as role models and advocates.

**The Poor**

The political mobilization of ‘the poor’—or the ‘broad masses’, the impoverished, and workers and peasants—in Africa has been a Holy Grail for the left on the continent for many decades. The limited success of sustained attempts by civilian leftist parties to mobilize workers and peasants as an effective political force should warn against any easy assumptions that poor people can be mobilized as a force for peace. Some guerrilla movements have proved effective at mobilizing the peasantry, with programmes of land reform and the removal of harsh taxes. However, extending this mode of mobilization to other groups has usually proven difficult. The poor are particularly vulnerable during wartime: any attempts to make their voices heard are likely to meet with violent repression. However, there are some limited options in terms of organizing the less poor through trade unions, and indirectly representing the interests of the poor through development organizations.

**Trade Unions**

The most successful mobilization of economic groups in Africa has been trade union activity, in South Africa and a few other major cities. Miners, industrial workers and tenants on irrigated agricultural schemes have all scored some successes through trade union organization. Though poor by international standards, these groups are relatively well off in comparison to many of their compatriots, for example people who work in the informal sector selling cooked food or farmers on marginal land in remote areas.

Trade unions can play an important role in mobilization. For example, trade unions were at the forefront of the struggle against Apartheid, and they were the backbone of the 1985 popular uprising in Sudan. Their local base can be strong. Individual members of trade unions also tend to have a high level of political consciousness, especially when they are operating within the framework of union activities. Their leaders often have strong organizational capacities. Trade unions also have the important asset of international connectedness: they can call upon foreign partners and friends to press their case at the ILO and other international fora.

As a force for peace, trade unions suffer the same difficulties as general civil society organizations as outlined above. Their capacity to organize and present the case for peaceful settlement of conflicts is likely to be greatest when the belligerent parties have already begun to move towards peace. If they make claims before this point, they will be running the risk of major political confrontation with their governments.

Trade unions face special challenges arising from the current economic context of globalization, austerity measures that have cut back public sector employment, and the infor-
malization of African economies. These developments have had a negative impact on trade unions, undermining their constituencies and reducing their influence. Outside a few industrial and mining centres, trade unions are generally a weakening force.

Development Agencies

Development agencies, whether they are local NGOs, international NGOs, inter-governmental organizations or other variants, do not seek to mobilize the poor. But they do claim, to some degree, to represent their interests. Depending on their position, their options vary considerably.

Domestic NGOs in war-affected countries are a component of civil society, and as such the constraints they operate under and opportunities they have are similar to trade unions and other civil society actors. There are options for indirectly promoting peace however, for example by initiating discussions on what policies and programmes should be implemented when peace has come. Merely talking about a peaceful future can help belligerents consider the rewards of peace more actively.

International development NGOs tend to work with local partner organizations and have to be careful about the implications of any advocacy activities for their partners. They also tend to prioritize their access and operationality over any advocacy on matters of principle. (This is a structural conflict of interest that regularly hampers international NGOs effectively addressing the underlying causes of poverty, war and famine.) Thus, while a relief or development NGO operating in Southern Sudan may advocate peace in general, it is unlikely to call for a particular peace deal or a practical strategy to promote peace, because this may risk offending the party under whose auspices it must operate. However, if international agencies were to collaborate more closely with one another on such advocacy strategies, they might be able to achieve more: belligerent parties would be less likely to expel a whole group of them. There are also opportunities for documenting the effects of war on poor people, and presenting these in national and international fora, allowing the audience to draw its own conclusions. Much work has been done in this direction, but there is room for ensuring that these agendas and strategies are articulated more closely with regional organizations that may be more closely engaged in negotiating peace.

International organizations, including African and UN organizations, international financial institutions and western donor governments, well understand the devastating economic impact of war, and generally speaking their assistance and lending policies are run accordingly. There is, however, a clear lack of common principles and coordination, both between the assistance agencies themselves, and between them and any regional or international mediators involved in promoting peace. Achieving such coordination is difficult, because of the intrinsic problems of coordinating different bureaucracies across different countries and continents, and because the demands of peace mediation (flexibility, rapidity of action) are very different to the slow pace and formal procedures of decision-making in development assistance bureaucracies.

The route of using development institutions to advocate on behalf of the poor is fraught with complications. The most serious of these is that development agencies are not always run with the aim of relieving poverty. Economic development, environmental protection, tackling disease and a host of other mandates overlap with poverty alleviation but are not identical. In addition, those that have a specific concern with poverty alleviation do not always combine this with an approach that focuses on representing the poor. (The paternalistic outlook of some missionary organizations is an obvious case in point.) It would be very unwise to assume that any aid institution can advocate authentically and effectively on behalf of the poor. However, it may be that aid agencies, pursuing their own interests, can help promote peace by making it clear that peace is a precondition for generous or effective development assistance.
Implications

Africa's 'unarmed battalions' are intrinsically difficult to mobilize, but their involvement is important for sustainable peace and security. Creative means of ensuring that these groups can find a voice, and become part of broader coalitions, is an important task if we are to promote sustainable peace. Political settlements may be negotiated among the leaders of belligerent parties, but at the risk of entrenching militarized parties in power, with the attendant danger of militarizing governance over the long term. This is not only undesirable in its own right, but also undermines the long-term prospects for peace and the establishment of security communities.

The agendas of peace and democratization—including civilianization—are inexorably linked. As the analysis of constraints on stakeholders' mobilization has shown, it is only possible for the key groups to organize themselves when they are freed from the ideological and organizational shackles of militaristic-type mobilization. While conflict and militarism prevail, the forces of peace remain fragmented, disorganized and unable to articulate their agendas clearly. But, as civil society grows in confidence, and different stakeholder groups are able to mobilize themselves and ensure their voices are heard, it will be more and more difficult for militarists and warmakers to have their way.

ORGANIZING FOR PEACE

Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf

History will acknowledge the crucial role of women human rights defenders in building up sane and safe societies... Which values are we betraying when exposing crimes committed in our name by our own governments? Certainly not the values that are enshrined in each and every one of our constitutions—values that our governments and armies so often trample. Rather than 'traitors', we are the very guardians of these values

Marieme Helie-Lucas, Founder, Women Living Under Muslim Laws

In April of 1915, World War I had been raging across Europe for nine months. According to some estimates, more than 5,500 soldiers died every day in a war that would ultimately leave 8.5 million dead. Many people were numbed by the devastation, but a group of women activists decided they could no longer sit and wait for the end of war. For the first time in history, women crossed borders in wartime to talk about how to end the carnage. They gathered in The Hague—over 1,000 women from 12 warring and neutral countries—and convened the first International Congress of Women (ICW). Their plan of action did not simply call for universal disarmament and an end to the war. It demanded equality between women and men and among nations, and the creation of a non-partisan international organization to mediate disputes between countries.

The ICW sent 30 delegates on the first women's peace mission to bring the plan of action to the heads of European states. Meanwhile, ICW president Jane Addams, who later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts, met with US President Woodrow Wilson, providing him with many of the '14 points' that he took to the Versailles talks that ended the war. ICW participants went on to form the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which is still active today.
Contemporary women’s peace missions are rarely greeted with the deference that heads of state accorded the delegates from the International Congress of Women. But this indifference has not stopped women from organizing for peace. They are still active, and their work is still just as vital. Throughout our journey—in the Mano River countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia; in the Middle East and Latin America; in East Timor, Cambodia, the Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, Rwanda, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo)—we met brave and tireless women who had much in common with the women of the ICW. They shared the ability to see beyond national boundaries, even while their governments maintained isolationist or pro-war positions. They shared a vision for peace based on respect for the dignity of the individual, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or economic background. And they shared the understanding that peace is linked inextricably with equality between women and men, a concept introduced by the ICW and recognized some 85 years later in a statement made by Security Council President Anwarul Karim Chowdhury of Bangladesh on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2000: “Members of the Security Council … affirm that the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”7 We were inspired by the women peace activists we met, who were working steadfastly in the midst of deadly conflict, undeterred by threats to their safety, limited resources or their marginalization by decision makers.

Women have sacrificed their lives for peace. They have challenged militarism and urged reconciliation over retribution. They have opposed the development, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and the small arms trade. They have contributed to peacebuilding as activists, as community leaders, as survivors of the most cataclysmic horrors of war. They have transformed peace processes on every continent by organizing across political, religious and ethnic affiliations. But their efforts are rarely supported or rewarded.

“Women are half of every community ... Are they, therefore, not also half of every solution?” asked Dr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Namibia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who acted as President of the Security Council during October 2000 when Resolution 1325 was unanimously passed. It is a question that needs answering, for despite their peacebuilding efforts, women are rarely present at the peace table. It takes fierce determination and intense lobbying for them to be included as participants in transitional governments. Political parties that are building democracy rarely turn to them.

Women’s Peace Work

Grass roots organizing

Women’s leadership role is most visible in their communities; it is here that they organize to end conflict and build the skills necessary for peacebuilding and reconstruction. “The role of women in the overthrow of the regime was extremely important,” said Stasa Zajovic from the Serbian peace group Women in Black, which is also part of an international network. For years, Women in Black members stood in silence outside government offices, holding placards calling for peace and denouncing the government of Slobodan Milosevic. Stones were thrown at them, they were spat upon, beaten, and arrested, yet every week they returned and stood in silent witness. “By turning our discontent into public demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience, we transformed ethical principles into concrete acts of disloyalty towards the regime,” stated Zajovic. “Along with many other women’s organizations operating in war zones, we built networks of solidarity combining feminism and anti-militarism. We created alternative women’s policy on the local, regional and global level, entering women’s resistance to war and militarism into alternative history.”

The government did everything it could to isolate the group. “They demonized us so much that the people were afraid of us,” said Zajovic. A turning point came when Women in Black was awarded the Millennium Peace Prize by International Alert and UNIFEM: “After
the Prize, women from inside the country, in small towns and villages, were proud of us for the first time.”

Efforts like those of Women in Black as well as many other civil society groups created and run by women provide a visible alternative to violence and hatred. Women create campaigns and demonstrations, institute human rights reporting, lobby for ceasefires and build networks to care for victims of war. For Ruth, building peace in her village outside of Freetown, Sierra Leone, meant taking in the children of neighbours, friends or family members who were killed in the war. For Tatiana in Kosovo, peace work meant rebuilding damaged houses as well as friendships with former neighbours who had turned against her during the conflict. In Bosnia women have established mobile health clinics to provide gynaecological and psychosocial care to women survivors of rape and assault, most of whom had never seen a doctor or a counselor. In Colombia, we joined some 20,000 women organized by the new National Movement of Women Against the War in a march to demand an end to a conflict that kills about 3,500 each year. Their protest, “We won’t give birth to more sons to send to war,” rang through the streets of Medellín. Mercedes Vargas, a teacher and union leader, travelled eight hours by bus from the provincial capital of Manizales to join the demonstration. “The women have something in common,” she told us. “We want peace. We are here demanding a negotiated end to this conflict.”

In some conflicts, women’s social status becomes a basis for organizing. In Kosovo we met Sonia, who was part of a group of widows that met regularly. “As widows, we share a lot in common,” she told us. “We struggle to claim our inheritance from our late husbands’ families and, sometimes, even the custody of our children. We want to know where our husbands are buried so we pressure the authorities to investigate their disappearances. And we turn to each other to help raise our children and the orphans who lost both parents to the war.”

AVEGA, the association of Rwandan widows, originally met under a tree in Kigali. Within a week of their first gathering, more than fifty women had joined. Like so many other self-help and humanitarian organizations created by women, the Association provides psychological and social support and health services to its members. As one member told us, “We’ve always faced uncertainty, but had to carry on with our lives and care for Rwanda’s children. Otherwise, what would happen to the next generation? But widows of the genocide in Rwanda are discriminated against and blamed for the HIV epidemic. With little help from the government or local authorities, we have little choice but to rebuild our nation and try to heal the wounds ourselves.”

Some organizations limit their support to special categories of women: to widows, to the mothers of disappeared, or to the wives of political leaders, but many women believe it is a mistake to use social categories when offering support. “It’s not only widows who are raising children by themselves, caring for the sick and elderly, or struggling to claim their lost property,” said Elsie, the leader of a non-governmental organization (NGO) in Rwanda, who is raising a child born of rape. “Many women in this village have come together to support each other. Some are widows, some are not. They all have special needs and different fears. But they don’t want to be divided or privileged differently because of their social status—because one lost her husband to war, and another never married. What about Sophie, who is supporting her family and her husband who is sick with HIV/AIDS, and Cenina, whose husband fled the village in fear of retaliation by other village members?”

Organizing across borders

Women’s organizing at the grass-roots level often lays the groundwork for organizing across borders—in sub-regions and internationally. The Mano River Union Women’s Network for Peace, which has members from Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, brings together high-level women from established political networks as well as grass-roots women, all searching for a way to end the fighting that has debilitated their three countries. “Women’s networks have been pivotal in the resolution of the conflict in Sierra...
Leone, and in getting negotiations started between the Mano River countries,” said Isha Dyfan, an activist from Sierra Leone. Dyfan is a former member of the Women’s Forum, which was created long before the war started in Sierra Leone in 1991. Because the Forum had already brought women together, they were able to “raise our voices and opinions to the highest level. Our national network helped us to reach out regionally and internationally,” said Dyfan. Eventually the Sierra Leonean women became involved in the regional Mano River Union Women’s Network for Peace, the continent-wide Federation of African Women’s Peace Networks (FERFAP), which was created with support from UNIFEM and with WILPF on the international level.

Women in Black, founded in Israel in 1988, has become a model for a different kind of cross-border organizing. Women in Black groups, like the one Zajovic is part of in Serbia, have sprung up around the world, creating an international network of women with a shared vision of peace and demilitarization. Support from the network provides a measure of solidarity for members in many countries who confront regimes bent on aggression. International conferences can provide a similar sense of solidarity. Luz Mendez, one of the few women to participate in Guatemala’s official peace negotiations, told us how important it was for her to meet other activists at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing: “I had felt so isolated during the negotiations in Guatemala. In Beijing, I found many other women sharing the same struggles. I returned invigorated, with new ideas and strategies. And I had an international platform to support my arguments.”

Getting to the Peace Table

On 2 May 2000, 92 Somali women stood outside a huge military tent in the town of Arta, Djibouti. The Somali National Peace Conference was about to begin, the fourteenth attempt since 1991 to find a peaceful solution to the civil war. The women had been chosen to be part of delegations representing traditional clans, but their ultimate goal was to break out of clan-based allegiances. “We knew that peace in our country would come from cross-clan reconciliation, not official negotiations among warlords and faction leaders,” one delegate told us during our visit to the country a year later. “So we cared for the wounded and built schools in communities regardless of clan, ethnic and political affiliations.”

At the Conference, the women presented themselves as a ‘sixth clan’ (delegations came from four major clans and a coalition of minor ones) that reached beyond ethnicity to a “vision of gender equality,” said Asha Hagi Elmi, a leader of the Sixth Clan Coalition. “In Arta, we presented ‘buranbur’—a special poetic verse sung by women—to show the suffering of women and children during 10 years of civil war. We lobbied for a quota for women in the future legislature, the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). But we faced opposition from the male delegates. ‘No man,’ they told us, ‘would agree to be represented by women.’”

But the women did not give up easily and ultimately helped create a National Charter that guaranteed women 25 seats in the 245-member TNA, and protected the human rights of women, children and minorities as well. The Charter “ranks among the top in the region and the best in the Muslim world,” said Elmi.9

As the Somali women’s experience shows, it is not easy to translate women’s activism into a presence at the peace table. Certainly not all women’s groups want to be at the table if it involves negotiating with the warlords or tyrants who helped create the conflict, but most peace activists feel that women’s presence is essential. Yet women are rarely included in formal negotiations, whether as members of political parties, civil society or special interest groups. Their organizing efforts are ignored, as are their roles as combatants and political leaders in national liberation movements. In Colombia, despite the fact that as many as 30 per cent of the fighters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are women, FARC included only one woman, Mariana Paez, among its representatives to official negotiations with the government.10 Women were absent from the Dayton peace talks that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.11 According to Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika, President of FERFAP, “Women establish their credibility as
peacemakers at the grass-roots level but are marginalized from official negotiations. Making it from the grass mat to the peace table has nothing to do with their qualifications as peacemakers. Once the foreign mediators come and the official negotiations start, you have to be able to sit at the table, and speak their language. Often women are not trained or given the chance.”

When women are there, the nature of the dialogue changes. Women’s concerns come not merely out of their own experiences, but out of their rootedness in their communities. They represent different constituencies: those in need of education, of health care, of jobs and of land. They have a different experience of war from male fighters and politicians. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell credits women with helping to achieve an agreement in the Northern Ireland peace negotiations: “The emergence of women as a political force was a significant factor in achieving the agreement. Women were among the first to express their weariness of the conflict. . . . The two women that made it to the [negotiating] table had a tough time at first. They were treated quite rudely by some of the male politicians . . . Through their own perseverance and talent, by the end of the process they were valued contributors. When the agreement included the creation of a new Northern Ireland Assembly, women got elected there too. Overall, in achieving the level of stability now enjoyed, women’s involvement at all levels was a very important factor.”

Training and facilitating

Throughout our visits, when we did meet women who had made it to the peace table and beyond, it was through a combination of women’s organizing and support from the international community. International organizations that support women’s activism have seen that, as Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika indicates, women need training and preparation to open the doors that are consistently shut in their faces. Organizations like Search for Common Ground, International Alert, the US Institute for Peace and many other groups have been providing training for women to develop negotiation skills and leadership.

International groups have also become facilitators, helping to bring together groups of women so they can plan strategy as well as learn new leadership skills. UNIFEM is one of the pioneers of this approach. In July 2000 UNIFEM and the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Foundation convened the All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in Arusha, Tanzania. Despite restrictions on Burundians leaving the country, the delegates found ways to get there, because it would be one of the last chances for women to affect the peace accords, which all-male delegations had been hammering out for four years. Winnie Byanyima, a Ugandan Member of Parliament (MP), who served as a facilitator at the Women’s Conference, described the importance of the meeting:

“The men who had been negotiating didn’t feel that women had any right to be there. These men felt they had a right to be there because they were fighters, or had been elected to some parliament before the war escalated. But Burundi women who had suffered so much didn’t have any legitimacy in their eyes. But by bringing in women the documents have more legitimacy now. People from the grass-roots have made their input to the future. The conference created a space that was necessary but lacking, not only between women in political parties and women working for peace and reconciliation at the grass-roots level, but also between international facilitators and women.”

Since that meeting, the process has been replicated in other parts of the Great Lakes region. In 2001 UNIFEM was asked by Sir Ketumile Masire, the former President of Botswana, and the facilitator of the Inter-Discussion to help develop methods for promoting women’s participation in the Inter-Discussion. Two sessions were convened, providing training to women on the gender dimensions of constitutional, electoral and judicial reform. Ultimately, 40 women from government, opposition parties and civil society participated in the Sun City Talks in March 2002.

International organizations can also be facilitators, bringing different groups together for working sessions. A particularly successful partnership enabled Afghan women in the diaspora to meet with women from inside the country to develop an agenda on how to contribute to national reconstruction. With the fall of the Taliban, it was essential that
women meet quickly. They had to get to know international donors who were supporting reconstruction and they had to get to know each other so they could present their demands for women’s participation as a united front. In December 2001 Equality Now, the European Women’s Lobby, V-Day, the Center for Strategic Initiatives of Women and The Feminist Majority Foundation hosted the Afghan Women’s Summit for Democracy in Brussels, in collaboration with the Gender Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and UNIFEM. At its conclusion, 40 women participated in a two-day Women’s Roundtable, hosted by UNIFEM and the Belgian Government, which brought the women together with donors and heads of UN agencies. The Brussels Action Plan— which included recommendations on education, media and culture, health, refugees and internally displaced persons and human rights and the constitution— was adopted and informed the UN Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan in 2002.

Quotas

Tradition and cultural practices can present formidable obstacles to the inclusion of women in peace processes or post-war governance unless a formal mechanism is in place to support this. To date, the use of quotas has been one of the most successful methods for guaranteeing a minimum percentage of women in official negotiations as well as in government positions. We visited many countries where the use of quotas had brought women into the political process. As noted above, quotas ensured Somali women’s participation at the Arta peace conference.13 In Mozambique the Organizacao da Mulher Mocambicana, created in 1973 by the now-ruling FRELIMO party, recruits women for decision-making positions, and women now make up 30 per cent of Mozambique’s legislative bodies. Similarly, in South Africa, the African National Congress’s commitment to a party quota resulted in 29 per cent representation of women in the nation’s first parliamentary elections in 1994.

The Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) calls for a 30 per cent minimum representation of women in decision-making bodies and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 urges the appointment of women in decision-making bodies and peace processes. Some NGOs have expressed dissatisfaction at the 30 per cent minimum, especially when considering the lack of progress seven years after Beijing. Instead, they call for parity, with a range of 45 to 55 per cent as acceptable in a democracy.

But the international community has been equivocal at best about honouring the calls for either formal or informal quotas. The UN has not always supported quotas in countries with UN-mandated transitional governments. Within the organization itself, only one woman currently serves as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In East Timor women’s groups overwhelmingly supported quotas for the national election when they met at the National Congress of Women, held prior to the elections.14 But the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) told the transitional government that the UN did not support quotas.15

“At one stage we were told that they would pull out and would not run the elections in East Timor if we insisted on quotas,” Milena Pires, Deputy Speaker of the East Timor National Council told us. “We had comments from two missions that I know of that considered that gender was a luxury in East Timor. In the end even though we didn’t have quotas, we offered training, with UNIFEM’s support, to 160 potential women candidates for the constituent assembly, and 24 women were elected out of 88 members. However, now there have been replacements. One political party decided that the woman they had placed first on their list wasn’t able to represent their interests, so they replaced her with a man who came after her on the list.”

Certainly quotas alone cannot guarantee the emergence of a ‘gender perspective’ in the political process— although one is more likely to develop when a critical mass of women are in decision-making positions. We recognize that especially when numbers are small and cultural barriers enormous, quotas can only put women in power; they cannot guarantee that grass-roots concerns will be addressed. In Bosnia women parliamentarians told us they
did not support action to legislate parental leave because they believed in women’s traditional role in the family. The Minister of Foreign Trade agreed with them: “Just because I am a woman,” she told us, “I will not fight for women’s rights.”

These disconnects may occur for many reasons. They may be the result of a lack of communication, outreach and advocacy. Sometimes they are due to continued violence, or a lack of financial and operational support from donors and national governments that should be promoting gender issues at all levels. Quotas must be seen as a temporary solution to increase gender balance. They are a first step on the path to gender equality, both a practical and a symbolic measure to support women’s leadership.

But they cannot replace long-term projects that address the socio-economic constraints that keep women from participating in the political process.

**Restoring the Rule of Law and Women’s Access to Justice**

Peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction must do more than focus on ending warfare. The nation-building process that is mandated by the peace agreement should include the revision of key laws in order to recognize women’s contributions, to build gender equality and to protect women. Failing to establish a firm foundation built on law increases the danger of chronic instability and collapse into violent confrontation all over again. Support for the rule of law, multi-party systems and elections have become the benchmarks of peace-building. Without these women cannot live in safety. In many places we visited, threats from armed groups, including the national military, have drastically reduced women’s ability to work for peace. In Colombia, we met with the daughter of a murdered political activist; her mother had ignored warnings from paramilitaries to drop out of a local city council race. In August 2000 paramilitaries burst into their house and forcibly removed the woman and her husband. When their children went to the police to report the disappearance, they were beaten and told to go home. The bodies of the woman and her husband were later found in the town dump. The organization the woman worked with is trying to support the eight orphans left behind, who have also become targets. “I was kidnapped [by paramilitaries] and held for 16 days,” one daughter told us. “After that I sought refuge in another country, where I stayed for a year. But I had to come back to continue the struggle for peace. Since returning, I have received three bomb threats.”

**Constitutional reform**

No matter how many women are included in peace negotiations or the reforms that ensue, it is up to all participants, women and men, to ensure that gender issues are addressed at all levels. Gender equality should be enshrined in a nation’s constitution and bill of rights and be specified in all relevant clauses, including those setting up the parliament, the executive and the judiciary branches. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the core international document for women’s rights, but a full range of guarantees are set out in other treaties and consensus documents. These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Beijing Platform for Action. Women have a right to expect that all of these will be reflected in post-conflict constitutions that embody the needs of the local population. In Guatemala, the peace accords spelled out the government’s responsibility to revise national legislation to eliminate discrimination against women using CEDAW as a guide, although, as with other aspects of the peace accords, this has not been fully carried out.

The constitution should contain simple and clear language so it is accessible to all, not just legal scholars. It should also be written with gender-sensitive rather than neutral language to avoid ambiguity and to ensure fairness and equality. Translating the document into local languages ensures that all the different ethnicities within a country are aware of their rights.
Typically, producing a gender-sensitive constitution is a hard-fought effort. Women’s networks, supported by international organizations that can supply the knowledge and the funds, have been central in the fight. In Rwanda a Legal and Constitutional Commission is responsible for reforming the old constitution. Three of the twelve commissioners are women, and women make up more than 50 per cent of the Commission’s employees. Both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNIFEM have provided support, including training on CEDAW which, the women told us, provided a focus for their efforts. In Cambodia, UNIFEM-supported consultations among women have led to constitutional protections for rural women, equal pay for domestic workers and paid maternity leave. Like Cambodia, East Timor was a nation with almost nothing left when the fighting ended. Women’s groups got together to make their needs clear, and a coalition of national and international organizations, such as Oxfam and the Asia Foundation, helped establish a Gender and Constitution Working Group that developed a ten-article Charter of Women’s Rights. Nine of the ten articles were adopted into the Constitution, which guarantees, among other things, social, health and educational rights, equal access to traditional law and protection from domestic violence. It also provides citizenship protections for children born of rape.

Electoral issues

Constitutional and political reform must ensure women’s citizenship, and their right to vote and stand for public office. Quotas and proportional representation on ballots can help elect women into office. Proportional representation encourages voters to focus on parties and their policies, rather than on particular individuals, so women candidates are less likely to be defeated by bias and negative stereotypes.

In East Timor when the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) informed women’s groups that they would not be able to use quotas in the national election, activists looked for other ways to get women elected. UNIFEM and UNTAET’s gender advisor put together a training workshop for women who would consider running for office. “We planned for about 50 women and one workshop,” Lorraine Corner, UNIFEM’s regional advisor in Bangkok told us. “But we were afraid no one would come. Well, we had 180 applications and we had to expand the number of workshops to five.”

Along with helping to support the workshops, the then UN Special Representative, Sergio Vieirá de Mello, used incentives to get women on the ballot. He promised transportation and media access—space in newspapers, ads on radio and television—to those parties that not only ran women candidates but put them near the top of their lists. “Only a few of the women we trained got into office,” said Sherrill Whittington, the UNTAET gender advisor, “but that turned out not to be the point. They went back to their towns and ran voter education workshops for women. They are preparing a new generation of women to vote and to run for office.”

Judicial reforms

Women seeking a new national standard for their legal protection can draw upon the precedents set by international courts, as well as on international customary law and even on non-binding tribunals. War crimes trials in national courts can play an important role in judicial reform by helping to rebuild the judiciary and the criminal justice system: Lawyers and judges are put in place who know and respect international humanitarian law; and open court proceedings become a model for the future. It is also essential to monitor human rights in the immediate post-war phase so that the highest possible standard of law is enforced.

However, national judicial systems in post-conflict societies have rarely delivered for women. Most investigations at the national level do not focus on violations against women. When they do, they lack both the systems and the capacity to carry out forensic investigations. Too often, judicial systems discriminate against women. They minimize the violence women experience, indulge in sexual innuendo and humiliate them. In Cambodia, Croatia and Kosovo, UNIFEM-supported women’s groups are working with the judiciary to sensitize judges and lawyers. But much more can be done. Legal literacy
programmes can help raise women’s awareness about the operation of courts and the judicial system. Police units trained to investigate crimes against women can enhance legal access. Counselling programmes can advance the process of healing and reconstruction.

**Implementation**

It has become clear to us during our visits to conflict areas that peace agreements, electoral and judicial reform and government restructuring are only as good as their implementation. Time and again women described the wonderful documents that had been created and signed—and the failure to implement most of what had been promised. Asha Hagi Elmi of Somalia correctly calls the National Charter of Somalia “one of the best in the Muslim world” in terms of women’s rights. Yet Somalia today is one of the most dangerous places on earth, still ruled by warring factions that have no commitment to honouring the National Charter.

In spite of the ground-breaking contributions made by women’s groups in Burundi, Liberia and many other areas, the gender equity mechanisms created during peace negotiations often remain weak. Renewed violence can stop implementation in its tracks. In Guatemala, according to Luz Mendez, the coordinator of the National Union of Guatemalan Women, “Almost five years after the signing of the peace accords, the majority of the commitments referring to women have not been implemented.” Many women’s groups believe the Government is unwilling to honour its promises to women, as well as other aspects of the peace agreement.

In the peace accords the Guatemalan Government committed to promoting legal reform that included the classification of sexual harassment as a criminal offense. “If the offense is committed against an indigenous woman, it is considered an aggravation in determining the penalty,” Mendez told us. Indigenous women “confront higher levels of gender-based violence as a result of their double discrimination, both as women and as indigenous people,” she said.

Indigenous women’s groups have been lobbying unsuccessfully since the accords were first signed to have this reform approved. “This experience erodes people’s trust in the peace process. It is extremely important to support the strengthening of women’s organizations both during the armed conflict and the peace-building so that they will be better prepared to impact the implementation of the peace agreements,” Mendez added.

While it is ultimately a State responsibility to honour the agreements that have been signed, and to create an environment in which they can be implemented, the international community also has a role to play. Whether international donors are in a country as advisers, as peacekeepers or as educators, they must keep gender issues at the forefront of their work. They must focus more effort on supporting the implementation process through training, support of women’s organizations and capacity-building. Specific mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee women’s continued presence through constitutional, judicial, legislative and electoral reforms. And, of course, they must work to guarantee the peace that will allow reforms to be implemented.

**What Do Women Need?**

Women’s participation in peace processes and new governments, and their efforts to rebuild judicial and civil infrastructure, cannot be achieved unless their organizing is supported. The women organizers we met needed four things to contribute to peace processes and decision making about security: safety, resources, political space and access to decision makers.

**Safety:** In conflict situations, political activists and their organizations frequently face security threats; many have been killed and many more abducted, beaten and tortured. Women are particularly vulnerable, first because they are subject to sexual attacks in addition to the other dangers, and second because they are often seen as stepping outside
their traditional role—which can lend cultural justification to the idea that they need to be ‘taught a lesson.’ Without adequate protection, women are frequently compelled to abandon activism. We suspect this persecution has drastically reduced the number of women’s organizations in many places we visited. An enabling environment, that allows organizations and individuals to express their opinions in safety and security, would sustain current activities and encourage more women to become active.

**Resources:** Almost all the groups we visited, whether they are coping with a country in conflict, in transition or in post-conflict reconstruction, have significant unmet needs. A much larger pool of funds is needed to maximize the potential of women’s organizing efforts. In many places we visited, the financial outlay necessary to keep an organization going or enhance its effectiveness would be minimal and the benefits enormous. Women told us that just a computer or a cell phone, or even some paper and books, would make a major difference in their work. There is often fierce competition for humanitarian and development resources, which does not enhance collaboration between groups. Longer-term investments in human resources would be more expensive, but no less crucial. Often, foundations and donors will only fund projects and not the ongoing costs of maintaining staff and institutions, making it nearly impossible for long-term endeavours to properly develop. However, support should not be thought of as only material aid. Frequently, even activists with very limited resources emphasized that international political solidarity and messages of support are priceless.

While UNIFEM has been able to provide funds to ‘innovative and catalytic’ projects, it cannot begin to meet all the challenges it confronts on its current budget. It is operational in only a handful of countries. We returned from our journey more convinced than ever that women’s peace work reinforces the broader effort to extend and protect human rights and expands the political space that allows women to address gender issues. We believe that ensuring the support this work needs and deserves will require a dedicated pool of funds, such as a United Nations Trust Fund. This fund would be able to leverage the political, financial and technical support women’s civil society organizations and women leaders need so they can have a significant impact on peace efforts nationally, regionally and internationally.

**Political space:** Sometimes ensuring that women play an important role in building peace requires carving out space and time for a women-only gathering. Recent initiatives show what can be accomplished with foresight and funding. To enhance the participation of women in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), Femme Afrique Solidarité and WOPPA-DRC (Women As Partners for Peace in Africa—Democratic Republic of the Congo) created space for women to find common ground. These cross-party groups gave women an opportunity to develop a joint declaration and plan of action that offered a gender perspective to the Dialogue. Thanks to the political space provided by UNIFEM, a similar consensus was achieved by women observers of the Burundi peace process, many of whose recommendations were included in the final document.

**Access to decision-makers:** While activists and NGOs are often viewed as a source of innovative ideas and information, governments and international organizations sometimes regard them as a nuisance or even a threat to their interests. Activists who have won an opportunity to meet with decision-makers at the national or international level often told us how crucial it was to share information and to build relationships. NGOs have had a formal relationship with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through Article 71 of the UN Charter. However, the doors to the General Assembly and the Security Council, where peace and security matters are discussed, remain officially closed.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called NGOs “the conscience of humanity.” To truly become this conscience, the voices of women’s organizations must be heard and heeded by governance structures in which they are fully and consistently represented. Kofi Annan understood this when he said at the 2000 meeting to evaluate progress made in implementing the Beijing Platform for Action, “Five years ago, you went to Beijing with a simple statement: ‘We are not guests on this planet. We belong here.’ Five years on, I would
venture that we all know this is an understatement … not only do women belong on this planet … the future of this planet depends on women.”

On peace building the experts call for:

1. **The Secretary-General, in keeping with his personal commitment, to increase the number of women in senior positions in peace-related functions.** Priority should be given to achieving gender parity in his appointment of women as Special Representatives and Envoys, beginning with the minimum of 30 per cent in the next three years, with a view to gender parity by 2015.

2. **Gender equality to be recognized in all peace processes, agreements and transitional governance structures.** International, regional organizations and all participating parties involved in peace processes should advocate for gender parity, maintaining a minimum 30 per cent representation of women in peace negotiations, and ensure that women’s needs are taken into consideration and specifically addressed in all such agreements.

3. **A United Nations Trust Fund for Women’s Peace-building.** This Trust Fund would leverage the political, financial and technical support needed for women’s civil society organizations and women leaders to have an impact on peace efforts nationally, regionally and internationally. The Fund should be managed by UNIFEM, in consultation with other UN bodies and women’s civil society organizations.

4. **UNIFEM to work closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to ensure that gender issues are incorporated in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in order to integrate gender perspectives in peace-building and to support women’s full and equal participation in decision-making, and for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) to strengthen its work in emergency situations in order to build women’s capacity in conflict situations.** UNIFEM and UNFPA should be represented in all relevant inter-agency bodies.

5. **Peace negotiations and agreements to have a gender perspective through the full integration of women’s concerns and participation in peace processes.** Women’s peace tables should be established and enabled through financial, political and technical assistance.

6. **The UN and donors to invest in women’s organizations as a strategy for conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building.** Donors should exercise flexibility in responding to urgent needs and time-sensitive opportunities, and foster partnerships and networks between international, regional and local peace initiatives.
Addressing the needs and aspirations of adolescence is . . . an important aspect of long-term prevention strategy. In addition, youth can also be an important resource for peace and conflict prevention.

— Secretary-General’s Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict

This chapter examines existing UN policy frameworks that touch upon the issue of youth and violent conflict. While a number of policy instruments directly or indirectly provide guidance on youth and violent conflict, a coherent or agreed framework for analysing and responding to youth and violent conflict does not exist. The chapter focuses on three distinct policy frameworks: the conflict prevention agenda, the youth agenda and the development agenda.

Policies devised as part of the conflict prevention agenda randomly refer to youth in analyses of the causes, conditions and dynamics of conflict. In contrast, the youth agenda focuses on youth as a discrete group navigating their environment, with violent conflict or a post-conflict situation providing one such environment. While the former fails to unpack the concept of youth, the latter fails to explain the context of violent conflict. Finally, the development agenda, currently driven by the MDGs, is also limited because it focuses mainly on one particular aspect of the issue (employment as a solution for a perceived youth crisis). Individually, neither framework is sufficient, but the way in which they are converging also offers little help in terms of defining the scope or parameters of the problem, identifying priority areas or defining objectives.

The ways in which such policy frameworks touch on the relationship between youth and violent conflict, as well as the ways they omit or ignore it, are indicative of the problems of framing this issue. A holistic, comprehensive and systematic framework that captures the complexity of the youth situation in relation to violent conflict has not yet emerged.

3.1 The Conflict Prevention Agenda

3.1.1 How Youth Is Addressed Within the Conflict Prevention Agenda

Outlining the broad framework for collective security and the UN’s role in the 21st century, the Report by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change points to youth as a threat to security. In the only personal anecdote throughout the report, one woman during a consultation in Africa, asked “how have we let what should be our greatest asset, youth, become a threat to our security?”

The report identifies youth unemployment as both a cause of violence and a consequence of failed post-conflict peace-building potentially leading to further violence. It also notes that women and young people are disproportionately poor.

The report reiterates and reinforces what is already found in Security Council resolutions and statements on West Africa linking youth and conflict, which point to youth unemployment as a prime condition for and cause of violence. During the Security Council mission to West Africa in June/July 2003:

in every country visited, the mission heard about the problem of unemployment, especially among young people, and how this was a perennial source of instability in West Africa.
In the second Security Council mission to the region in June 2004, Council members heard about “the importance of tackling the major socio-economic problems, which, if left unresolved, could present a risk to the country’s security.” All actors consulted agreed, “creating jobs and economic growth, particularly for young people, was crucial.”

The Security Council also recommended that devising a practical and concerted regional approach to youth unemployment should be an important area of work of the UN Office for West Africa.

This depiction of unemployed young people as a condition and cause of conflict is not restricted to strategies for West Africa, it is also evident in the overarching agenda for conflict prevention contained in the Secretary-General’s Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. In his report, the Secretary-General notes:

Young people with limited education and few employment opportunities often provide fertile recruiting ground for parties to a conflict. Their lack of hope for the future can fuel disaffection with society and make them susceptible to the blandishments of those who advocate armed conflict. This problem can be especially acute in countries that have a ‘youth bulge’, a population comprised of a large number of youth compared to other age groups. . . . Addressing the needs and aspirations of adolescence is therefore an important aspect of long-term prevention strategy. In addition, youth can also be an important resource for peace and conflict prevention.

While young people are seen as agents of violence, they are not necessarily identified as full actors in peace settings, and they are not recognized as having an active role as civil society actors, political constituents or participants in measures to redress violence. Young people are sometimes urged to be peacemakers, but they are seldom mentioned in responses to conflict through governance and political measures. For example, while the Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict establishes that the responsibility for conflict prevention rests with Member States and will only be successful in so far as there is national ownership, it does not identify where that ownership lies, who bears that responsibility for holding leaders accountable and from where in society change is supposed to emanate. Such recommendations do not reflect a changing context, with the West African context largely defined by very young populations.

3.1.2 Youth and the Agenda on Children and Armed Conflict

In addition to general conflict-related agendas, there are other policy and legal instruments that establish a strong linkage between violent conflict and young people. In particular, the issue of youth is partially addressed in what can be called the agenda on children and armed conflict.

Convention on the Rights of the Child and Optional Protocol

The agenda on children and armed conflict is legally grounded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989, and entered into force in 1990. The CRC provides protection to every individual under the age of 18 (unless the applicable national law states majority is attained earlier). It is the most universally accepted human rights instrument, having been ratified by all countries in the world, except the United States and Somalia.
The CRC legally binds states to its provisions and unequivocally sets forth the rights of children and standards to ensure their well-being in every part of the world, particularly where children are affected by armed conflict, inadequate social conditions, hunger and illiteracy. Four general principles underpin the Convention: non-discrimination (Article 2), best interest of the child (Article 3), right to life, survival and development (Article 6), and the right for children to have their views heard and given due weight in decisions affecting them (Article 12). The CRC calls on governments to do everything they can to protect and care for children affected by war, and establishes that children under the age of 15 should not be forced or recruited to take part in a war or join the armed forces (Article 38). This is the only provision of the CRC that does not apply to all children under the age of 18.

The CRC was reinforced by the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000, and entered into force in 2002. The Optional Protocol states that individuals under the age of 18 should not be forcibly recruited into national armed forces (Article 2). Voluntary involvement is allowed, but “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities” (Article 1), in consideration of the fact that “persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to special protection” (Article 3). States should also put in place the appropriate safeguards to ensure that this recruitment is genuinely voluntary and that proof of age is sought and verified. The Optional Protocol explicitly prohibits non-state armed groups from both recruiting and using persons under 18, and calls on state parties to criminalize such activities.

The CRC and the Optional Protocol established a precedent of strong legal norms for the protection of children, helped to establish standards and expectations about protection and created practices within the international community and within states to fulfil the commitments in the CRC. They also established a legal framework of human rights consisting of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights accorded to every child as indivisible, interrelated and non-hierarchical. The CRC established children as subjects of their own rights, as individuals and as members of the family and the community.

Machel Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children

The Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (also known as the Graça Machel Report) builds on the principles established by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The report documents the impacts of armed conflict on children and proposes the elements of a comprehensive agenda for action to improve the protection and care of children in conflict situations. It demonstrates the centrality of these issues to the international human rights, peace and security and development agendas. The report also draws attention to youth, particularly as human capital in conflict-affected societies, advocating that “young people should be seen... as survivors and active participants in creating solutions, not just as victims or problems.” More than other agenda frameworks, this report highlights the unique pressures on young people in situations of armed conflict:

All cultures recognize adolescence as a highly significant period in which young people learn future roles and incorporate the values and norms of their societies. The extreme and often prolonged circumstances of armed conflict interfere with identity development. . . . Moreover, sudden changes in family circumstances, such as the death or disappearance of parents, can leave youth without guidance, role models or sustenance. During conflicts, some adolescents become responsible for the care of younger siblings. . . . Despite all of this, adolescents, during or after wars, seldom receive any special attention or assistance. This is a matter of urgent concern.

If the values and norms of society are not transmitted to youth and by extension to future generations because of conflict, then that society must recover from more than just violent conflict.

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

On the recommendation of the Graça Machel Report, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict was established in 1997.
to draw attention and respond to the plight of children affected by armed conflict. In its role as advocate, catalyst and convenor, the Special Representative considers key issues affecting children in conflict situations, including child soldiers, girls in war, HIV/AIDS, education, displaced children, sexual violence and so forth.

Security Council Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict

Since 1999, the Security Council has adopted six resolutions on children and armed conflict. Security Council Resolution 1261 was adopted in 1999 and formally affirmed that the protection and security of children affected by armed conflict is an international peace and security issue, hence falling within the remit of the Security Council. The following year, Resolution 1314 stated that situations of flagrant and widespread violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, including that relating to children in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 1379, adopted in 2001, addressed additional areas of concern, including the linkage between HIV/AIDS and armed conflict. Other resolutions were adopted in 2003 (1460), 2004 (1539) and 2005 (1612), focusing on the need for implementation of international norms and standards on children and armed conflict.

3.2 The Youth Agenda

Distinct from the agenda to protect children, there is also a well-developed UN youth agenda, which focuses on the global situation of youth. Identified as Empowering Youth for Development and Peace, it is led by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), which houses the UN focal point on youth. Throughout the evolution of this agenda, three basic themes are advocated: participation, development and peace. Whereas young people are considered to be a problem in most other policy frameworks, in this framework youths are elevated to the position of solution to the world's most fundamental problems. The focus of the approach is primarily on youth as the future of humanity, as an invaluable resource, as a positive force for change and as activists:

Young people represent agents, beneficiaries and victims of major societal changes and are generally confronted by a paradox: to seek to be integrated into an existing order or to serve as a force to transform that order.

As the key advocacy tool for youth, the youth agenda also serves to draw international attention to the precarious situation of youth, whose needs and aspirations are still largely unmet. This denial of one's potential is contributing “to the increased marginalization of young people from the larger society, which is dependent on youth for its continual renewal.”102 The youth agenda starts from the premise that today’s young people are living at a time of unprecedented and profound economic, political, social, cultural and environmental change, where “young people are particularly affected, because it means that their transition to adulthood is made more difficult.”103

3.2.1 World Programme of Action for Youth

In 1985, the UN General Assembly called for the observance of the International Youth Year to draw attention to the important role of young people and their potential contribution to development and the goals of the UN Charter. On the 10th anniversary of the International Youth Year, the UN adopted an international strategy to more effectively address the problems of young people, to increase their participation in society and to make governments more responsive to their aspirations.

The World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond, adopted in 1995, is a blueprint for action revolving around ten priority areas: education, employment, hunger and poverty, health, environment, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, leisure-time activities, girls and young women as well as youth participation. It provides a policy framework as well as practical guidelines for national action and international support to improve the situation of youth. It focuses, in particular, on measures to strengthen national capacities in the field of youth and to increase the quality and quantity of
opportunities available to young people for full, effective and constructive participation in society. It also underlines the need to scale up investments in youth, to create verifiable indicators for the priority areas and to ensure vulnerable or disadvantaged young people receive special attention. In 2001, five new areas were added: globalization, information and communications technology, HIV/AIDS, conflict prevention and intergenerational issues.

In 2003, the Programme launched a wide-ranging report that provides an overview of the global situation of young people by exploring the ten priority action areas and five areas of concern. The World Youth Report advocates:

Adolescents and young adults are an important target group for all social development efforts, since they are often disproportionately affected by poverty, unemployment and social exclusion and since the impact of such conditions during young age will most likely influence the entire lifespan. At the same time, young people can also be a major resource in the social mobilization needed to combat these very problems.

Although this agenda differentiates young people according to region, gender and social background, it embodies a global approach encapsulating all youths in the world aged between 15 and 24. While the fact that the majority of young people live in developing countries ensures that development challenges are highlighted, this is accompanied by a more comprehensive cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary agenda, based on the assumption that young people have similar aspirations. Thus the youth agenda exhibits a global approach, creating global standards to meet the needs of young people, to ensure youth participation at the global level and even to create a global youth policy.

Nevertheless, the youth agenda acknowledges that the responsibility for the implementation of the programme rests with national governments, which are expected to produce national youth policies and action plans based on processes that consult with young people. However, it does not have a conception of success other than a better world in which young people can live. Proposals for action urging governments to create jobs are admirable, but not instructive for overcoming the real obstacles that prevent job creation. Moreover, in calling for greater participation in decision-making as well as in society more generally, the youth agenda offers little explanation as to the added impact of a particular focus on youth, nor does it say how to overcome the impediments that deny most citizens participation in their society. In some ways, the advocacy for the youth agenda undermines itself because it assumes the invaluable role of young people as peacemakers and future decision-makers is self-evident and under-emphasizes the challenges that prevent youths from taking on these roles.

3.2.2 How Conflict Is Addressed Within the Youth Agenda

Initially, the relationship between youth and violence was only considered in the context of the problem of juvenile delinquency and the need to prevent violence and crime in society. In 1996, the World Programme began to note the “increasing difficulty for young people returning from armed conflict and confrontation in integrating into the community and gaining access to education and employment.”

In 2001, conflict was identified as an additional area of concern for the situation of youth. This special focus emerged in recognition of the fact that young people are disproportionately affected by violent conflict, both as victims and as active participants.

The World Programme outlines the impact of conflict on youth and highlights the role youth should play in peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It emphasizes, in particular, the role of youth and youth organizations in promoting peace and non-violence as well as in mobilizing youth for post-conflict reconstruction. In this understanding of the relationship between youth and violent conflict, young people are treated as a special target group whose perspectives should be included in processes to prevent or end conflict.
3.3 The Development Agenda: Youth, Unemployment and the MDGs

In addition to a general agenda for youth, the single most prominent issue to emerge as a concern in the international community is youth unemployment. Young people constitute nearly half of the world’s unemployed, but:

while the youth population grew by 10.5 percent over the last 10 years to more than 1 billion in 2003, youth employment grew by only 0.2 percent suggesting that the growth in the number of young people is rapidly outstripping the ability of economies to provide them with jobs.

This is particularly problematic in developing countries where young people make up a larger portion of the workforce. Not surprisingly, “the regions with the largest shares of youth within the working-age population (South Asia, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa) fare worst in terms of youth unemployment.”

If youth is a formative stage where one gains needed experience, then the lack of employment creates one more obstacle to the attainment of full adulthood with potentially harmful consequences for the economy and society. As stated by the International Labour Organization:

The link between youth unemployment and social exclusion has been clearly established; an inability to find a job creates a sense of vulnerability, uselessness and idleness among young people and can heighten the attraction of engaging in illegal activities. For many young people today, being without work means being without the chance to work themselves out of poverty.

By including youth unemployment in the MDGs, the Millennium Declaration had an important and catalytic impact on drawing international attention to the problem of unemployed young people. Under target 16 in Goal 8, the resolution “to develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work” is the only explicit reference to youth in the MDGs. While some of the MDGs have elements that target youth, in particular, achieving universal primary education using the literacy rate of 15 to 24 year-olds as one indicator, promoting gender equality at all levels of education, improving maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases, most of the MDGs are only implicitly relevant to the needs of youth.

However, it is interesting to note that the MDG campaign is targeting young people as important advocates and partners for the MDGs. Young people are key actors for the achievement of the goals, but through their participation in the MDGs, youth can also be empowered and hence benefit from the attention on MDGs. As discussed below in Chapter 4, UNDP has identified youth as a key partner in the Millennium Campaign and is seeking to mobilize youth activism by holding 2015 summits in all regions, such as the Pan-African 2015 Summit held in Dakar in 2004.

3.3.1 Youth Employment Network (YEN)

Under the auspices of the Millennium Declaration, the Youth Employment Network, a consortium of the ILO, the World Bank and the UN was established to address the global challenge of youth unemployment. At the Millennium Summit, heads of states “resolved to develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a chance to find decent and productive work.” YEN emerged from a high-level policy network that set forth five principles, or global priority policy areas: employability, employment creation, equity, entrepreneurship and environmental sustainability.

The YEN approach recognizes that traditional international initiatives may have expressed a commitment to engaging youth groups as equal partners in the policy-making process but often failed to do so. Consultation was often limited and the development of policy was based on a “perceived notion of what is best for young people.” The YEN seeks to change this by viewing young people as partners in devising solutions to a common problem and ensuring that its policy recommendations support the aspirations of young people, rather than impose perceived needs upon them. The YEN seeks to ensure that young people play an active role rather than just “being viewed as a target group for which employment must be found.”

The Youth Employment Network is seen as an instrument for the attainment of one of the targets under the MDGs, but also as a contribution to the attainment of the MDGs as a
whole. The YEN advocates for the integration of a youth dimension into all comprehen-
sive employment strategies, strong institutional support for youth employment policies,
investment in education, training and life-long learning and youth access to employment
services and support. The YEN campaign also calls for an integrated, UN System-wide
approach, stressing the fact that it is not a programme but a network representing all
sectors—multilateral, bilateral, corporate/private—as well as international NGOs. Youth
employment is treated as an entry point to the broader employment agenda. In addition
to policy development and advocacy, research and pooling experiences and knowledge,
the YEN has sought to become more operational with activities in countries on the
ground, but this has had limited success so far. Nevertheless, the YEN keeps youth unem-
ployment on the international agenda.

3.3.2 What Did the MDGs Miss?

The MDGs and the Millennium Declaration are driving the development agenda for the
21st century by determining development priorities, shaping development funding and
framing development policy. The ways in which the MDGs omit, include or refer to youth,
seek to use youth, and how youth groups attempt to influence the MDG agenda also reveal
underlying assumptions about youth. While some argue that young people are absent
from the MDG agenda, others contend that the MDGs implicitly target youth. They are
either “directly related to children, the youth of the next generation, or to issues of
greater concern to young people, such as maternal health and HIV/AIDS.”

While there seems to be an assumption that young people are useful as agents or repre-
sentatives of the MDG campaign, there is little to suggest that there has been a serious
process of engagement or consultation with youths on how they view the MDGs. There
also appears to be some confusion about whether the MDGs should target youth to meet
the challenges for youth or to advance development in general.

With respect to youth and violent conflict, the MDG framework promulgates an assump-
tion that links youth unemployment and violent conflict, and points to the risk that
the lack of productive work makes young people vulnerable to recruitment for violent
or illegal activities. The 2005 Millennium Project Report identifies the nexus between
poverty and conflict: “Without productive alternatives, youths, especially, may turn to
violence out of frustration or for material gain.” The report also refers to the
‘exploding’ youth population and recognizes greater conflict risks associated with
demographic profiles of high child-to-adult ratios. Thus, like many other policy frame-
works, the MDGs treat youth as a single identity group, and target unemployment as
a key factor in relation to violent conflict as well as juxtaposing employment against
involvement in conflict.

3.4 Conclusions

To date, the UN lacks a specific policy framework for youth and violent conflict that
explains the intersection between the two, or offers realistic and implementable recom-
mendations rather than ambitious wish lists. The policy frameworks in the conflict preven-
tion, youth and development agendas that refer to the issue offer limited guidance. Policies
on youth only superficially consider the dimensions of violent conflict, the conflict pre-
vention agenda has relatively little to say about youth, and the development agenda suf-
fers somewhat from a limited focus on employment. A better-informed framework is
urgently needed.

This framework should necessarily be holistic and crosscutting. The magnitude of the
problem demands real investment in young people and their societies. It requires a shift
in thinking from merely consulting youth to putting young people—in all their diversity—at
the centre of the process for developing policy, advocacy, programmes and so forth, by
creating space for their participation. It means acknowledging and assuming that youth
is multi-faceted, that young people are simultaneously individuals and part of society,
that they are in transition from childhood to adulthood but retain a unique identity as
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD

What does civil society mean if the majority of its members feel that they don’t belong to it?
— Mark Sommers

This chapter pulls together the main findings of the research presented in the preceding chapters. After discussing tentative conclusions and their implications for policies and programmes, it proposes some ideas for creating a new framework to address the challenges posed by youth and violent conflict, and then offers specific recommendations for policy and programming.

6.1 Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Youth and Violent Conflict

The review sets out to better understand the relationship between youth and violent conflict and to array the types of strategies and programmes put in place by UNDP, UN agencies and others. What clearly emerges is that the ‘problem’ of youth and violent conflict is a serious concern to many international actors, and this has led to a myriad of different responses.

However, as outlined in Chapter 3, there is an absence of a working framework for youth and violent conflict, reflecting a lack of consensus on how to understand the issue. The assumptions that are found in existing policy frameworks and programmes are often deterministic (particularly the idea that conflict is driven by a small number of factors such as youth unemployment and a demographic ‘youth bulge’). The dynamics that generate violent conflict are more complex and less automatic.

UNDP and other actors in the UN system, along with donors, have been trying to address some of the challenges of the situation of youth. Activities have ranged from traditional and special education measures, volunteering and peace training to youth employment schemes and reintegration of ex-combatants. For the most part, these efforts have been small-scale, time-limited and under-resourced.

A more comprehensive framework is needed with urgency. Above all, such a framework for youth and violent conflict should stress the importance of ‘doing no harm’. This requires an accurate definition and characterization of young people and their relationship to violent conflict. Agencies should also be realistic and avoid generating false expectations that the situation of youth is going to be vastly improved by means of development programmes alone.

In place of ad hoc and small level interventions with grand ambitions, a framework is needed that is holistic and crosscutting, that reflects the importance of taking into account the necessity of working at multiple levels of society (individual, households, communities) and that links programmes that directly target youth with those that benefit youth indirectly.

Furthermore, a new framework must place more emphasis on the social and economic challenges that youth face, rather than assuming that young people are themselves the problem. The widely accepted emphasis on training is important, as is employment generation through the public or private sector and developing entrepreneurship among young people who are outside school or the formal economy. However, the youth employment challenge is larger than just creating jobs; it concerns the fundamental and challenging problem of how to establish functioning economies, to promote and redistribute growth and to generate government revenue. If youth employment is to be seriously addressed, training must be accompanied by governmental regulations and incentives favourable to

youths and that they possess personal, social and public identities. Finally, it requires a stronger, more nuanced understanding of the context of societies in development, and a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the intersection between youth and violent conflict in such societies. . . .
the employment of young people, an increase in international investment and an improved macroeconomic environment.

Finally, a new framework must take into account the necessity for programme design and implementation to be context-specific. While programmes can always benefit from the lessons learned in other parts of the world, there are no approaches or methodologies that are universally applicable to the challenges facing youth. The critical measure of success for any youth programme is how the programme addresses the specific reality of youth within any given country. In the preparatory stages, needs assessments should be situation-based, age-specific and participatory and should investigate the resourcefulness of young people. They should account for and build upon the coping mechanisms young people develop during emergencies and in the periods following conflict.

A better-informed focus on youth and its relationship to violent conflict provides a different way of thinking about development. It reminds us that the transition from childhood, through the experience of adolescence to becoming an adult, is critical for the family, community and political structures that underpin society. This means re-conceptualizing development and societal transformation through the processes whereby children become youths, youths attain adulthood and adulthood is fully realized. Developing a framework for youth and violent conflict is useful for conflict prevention, but its significance is greater in its potential contribution to building a durable peace and for development itself.

Below, the key challenges for youth policy and programmes are outlined, as emerging from this review.

6.1.1 Defining Youth

Both policy and the programming it informs often treat youth as a homogenous category that isolates this particular age group from the rest of society. Youth is a complex reality— not a generic label. Approaches based on conceptions of youth as a self-defining, cohesive group are informed by a stereotyped vision and therefore are bound to lead to flawed responses. Age-based definitions must be complemented by an understanding of youth as a transition from childhood to adulthood. Youth strategies and programmes should take into consideration the inherent complexity of the notion of youth as a social and functional construct.

6.1.2 Defining the Problem to be Addressed

One significant obstacle to designing and implementing relevant programmes for young people in conflict situations is the perception that the adolescent males and young men involved are personally threatening to those seeking to help them. This perception underlies programming which treats this group as essentially a security threat to be disarmed, distracted and kept occupied.

It is important not to treat youth as merely a security issue, particularly because the majority of young people do not get drawn into violence. National and international agencies dealing with youth should recognize that youth violence (and the participation of youth in violent conflict as a specific manifestation of it) is a complicated phenomenon, which should be addressed at multiple levels of society. Working with young people is necessary not only because they can resort to violence if ignored, but because allowing young people to channel their vitality in positive directions can lead to outcomes that are beneficial to the whole of society.

The causes of the youth crisis are largely exogenous to youth— they have much to do with the shrinking of economic, social and political prospects that young people are confronted with. To a large degree, the 'youth crisis' is to be understood as a crisis of the transition from youth to adulthood. Young people in most developing countries have few education and employment opportunities, and thus decreasing chances of establishing themselves as
adults in an increasingly competitive world. Excluded from decision-making, they may see the mainstream political channels as irrelevant. Their responses can be violent or non-violent, but their actions often reflect a lack of status, and are taken in an attempt to renegotiate the youth passage to adulthood. The problem, therefore, is to increase both the concrete opportunities available to young people and their sense of inclusion in society.

Responses need to take a comprehensive approach that deals with economic, social and political challenges, rather than working from the assumption that young people are inherently a problem.

6.1.3 Promoting a Gender-Sensitive Approach

In analytical and policy frameworks, programmes and activities, girls and young women are often mentioned en passant and then they disappear from the picture. On the ground, “youth programmes tend to attract far more adolescent boys and young men than adolescent girls and young women.” This tendency to overlook girls and young women emerges primarily because the relationship between girls and violent conflict is not well understood.

As a result, youth strategies and programmes tend to adopt a gender-biased approach that focuses on male youths as actual and potential generators of violence, and female youths as actual and potential victims. Stereotypes need to be broken with regard to gender issues and how to deal with them.

Policies and programmes should be based on the awareness that the priorities of males and females are different, that boys are likely to be much more visible and vocal and that their roles in society and their own expectations are different. Responding to the needs of girls and young women is not merely a question of ‘involving girls more’ in the implementation stage. Similarly, responses aimed at boys must not see them primarily as potential perpetrators of violence. It is therefore crucial that a gender-sensitive approach be adopted when planning, implementing and evaluating policies and programmes.

6.1.4 Promoting Meaningful Participation

While young people constitute a majority of the population in some countries, their majority status is not reflected in the distribution of recognition, access to education/employment or their economic/political position in relation to other groups in society. For example, although young people constitute a majority of voting-age citizens in Africa, very few elected officials are under 30. Often, youth wings of political parties are used merely as tools to amass political power. Moreover, cultural norms that value the leadership of elders in the community and in politics might create a generational conflict between a youth majority and older generations. The mass disenfranchisement of youth constitutes one of the key stumbling blocks in the development process, the transition from war to peace and the prevention of violent conflict. Young people have neither been recognized as legitimate agents of change, nor have they been empowered or capacitated to fulfil this responsibility.

Whilst donors and international aid agencies have recognized the need for greater participation of youth in projects, the gap between intention and practice can be quite large. Many adolescents are forced prematurely into adult roles and responsibility through war, social upheaval and increasingly the HIV/AIDS crisis. In this context, Jane Lowicki notes: participatory methodologies involving young people without their having a significant level of control over inputs and outcomes are absurd and belittling. . . . While participatory processes can empower young people, they can also further manipulate them, depending on the level to which adolescents are consulted and able to make choices—full participation goes beyond consultation to opportunities for leadership.

For maximum effectiveness, youth participation should go beyond consultation to real, meaningful involvement where young people are viewed not only as beneficiaries or
targets of assistance but as decision-makers. At the same time, parents, teachers and community leaders should be involved in projects to ensure sustainability.

In trying to increase youth participation, UN organizations appear to have placed considerable emphasis on youth organizations, youth NGOs and leaders. Though an attractive option in terms of accessibility, in practice there are several problems with this approach. First, youth movements might replicate existing societal patterns, and be dominated by the most articulate and socially engaged young people. Engaging with them does little or nothing for the vast majority of young people—often the most marginalized ones—who do not belong to youth organizations.

Secondly, more attention should be paid to how the large number of round tables, forums and workshops, as well as the resulting declarations, are translated into actual decision-making. So far, the youth leadership forums and summits that have emerged in various parts of the world were mostly consultative exercises: young people were free to say what they wanted and the power structures were free to ignore what they said.

It is essential that mechanisms be created that make youth participation part of decision-making structures on an ongoing, sustainable basis. Both decision-makers and programming specialists must learn to see their role as working with youth to design programmes rather than designing programmes for them. This requires a shift in thinking from consulting youth to putting young people, in all their diversity, at the centre of the process for developing policy and programmes.

However, while more meaningful participation of youth is necessary, it is also insufficient to produce a noticeable improvement in young people’s lives without greater investment in development.

6.1.5 Recognizing the Importance of Working with Youth

Comprehensive programming, based on a more complete view of youth’s potential, can be both costly and lengthy. This is a serious issue given the short-term nature of crisis funding, and the limited funding available. Such funding for young people as is available often needs to be divided between children and young adults, each of which may require very different programming approaches. Programming for young adults may be harder to ‘sell’ compared to programming for children, particularly if they are seen as supporting people who should take care of themselves.

Undertaking a reliable assessment of the youth situation in a given time or place throws up its own methodological difficulties. These include the mobility of youth (relative to other age groups), cultural attitudes that prevent young people, and especially girls, from speaking their mind. If the programming approach is one based on involving youth partners, there may be problems in identifying individuals who can speak for their peers and who are acceptable to them.

In some post-conflict situations, youth needs fall into the gap between humanitarian and development assistance. While literacy training can be important for employment and thus security, it is not life-saving and therefore not classified as humanitarian; in contrast, skills training projects within demobilization programmes are considered to be humanitarian but they are not sustained long enough to have any real benefit. This gap is compounded by funding shortfalls in post-conflict situations, with fewer resources available once the humanitarian crisis is considered to be over. The international community should recognize the building and protection of livelihood strategies for adolescents and adults in emergencies as a crucial component of a humanitarian response and should act to intervene earlier. An earlier response may help prevent adolescents’ conscription into military forces, prostitution and exploitative labour practices.
6.2 Recommendations on the Way Forward

6.2.1 Policy

1. Leading UN agencies, such as UNDP and UNICEF, the World Bank, donors and NGOs should institute a consultative process to determine how the international community can help governments and populations respond to the challenge of youth and violent conflict.

2. The conflict prevention agenda should adopt a more sophisticated understanding of youth, both as a factor in violent conflict and as agents of peaceful change in societies. If governments and societies bear the primary responsibility for conflict prevention and peace-building, young people should have an important role in these efforts.

6.2.2 Programming

The following recommendations suggest a best practices approach to any type of programming, whether specifically targeting youth or integrating a youth dimension into traditional programming.

1. Adopt a working definition of youth that accounts for their diversity and does not treat them as one homogenous group. Programmes and activities need to specify who they mean by youth and which youth they are trying to reach.

2. Understand that youth is a fluid category marking the transition from childhood to adulthood, where identities multiply and shift, and contradictions are intrinsic to the process. Programmes need to be context-specific, and they should be continually evaluated to ensure they remain pertinent to the evolving needs of young people, the challenges they face and the mechanisms they adopt to cope with their environment.

3. Place youth at the centre of the process, from the assessment of the problem, through programme design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. Youth participation needs to move beyond the focus on youth activists and youth organizations towards involving the most marginalized young people.

4. Do not treat youth as an isolated category. Targeting programmes to young people does not mean identifying them as something disconnected from their societies. Holistic and crosscutting approaches offer the most useful framework.

5. Ensure that girls and young women do not ‘disappear’ by recognizing that youth includes young men and young women, boys and girls. In some contexts, girls and young women may be harder to reach, but this obstacle should not be an excuse for overlooking them. The crisis of society concerns young women as much as young men, with gender-specific consequences. A gender-sensitive approach involves more than just inviting more girls to participate, it requires a better understanding of the gender dimension of youth.

6. Above all, ensure a ‘do no harm’ approach that does not create false expectations among young people with promises of projects and funding that will suddenly and visibly improve their lives. The challenge is immense; success will be limited and partial. Programming to improve the situation of young people will not be easy and there are many risks of failure. Programmes should adopt realistic objectives: ambitious wish lists of activities that are unlikely to materialize suggest naivety and are misleading to young people.

7. Beyond youth-specific programmes, ensure that mainstream development programmes and strategies are conflict-sensitive and do not contribute to the conditions and motivations that encourage young people to engage in violence and to withdraw from society. Anything that increases or aggravates feelings of distrust, resentment or loss of status is likely to affect youth more than other age groups. International actors must consider how their efforts are perceived by youth in addition to the intended outcomes and impacts.

8. Collaboration amongst international agencies is a prerequisite. The issue of youth and violent conflict is not the purview of any single agency or organization. The issue cuts across mandates and agendas, and the magnitude of the problem requires the contributions of all actors.
**History of Child and Youth Participation in Africa**

When the history of child and youth agency in Africa is taken into consideration, two particular trends can be identified: the denial of the capacity of young people by adults and their consequent subordination, leading the young to react economically or politically in order to assert their freedom and independence, and demonstrate their capabilities; and the ‘harnessing’ of the agency of youth in post-independent liberation movements, whilst at the same time marginalising or excluding this ‘agency’.

Although there are numerous societies in Africa with different and conflicting beliefs and practices, it can be argued that in many pre-colonial societies, young men and women were subordinate to the power of male elders, which was expressed at the local level by treating all social subordinates as children. In northern Nigeria, a traditional gerontocratic society, wealth, authority and legal control were vested in the senior man of the household and his senior wife. In Hausa society, which was broadly divided into yara (the young) and dattijai (the elders), a division based partly on age and partly on behaviour and character, the dattijai made the decisions and the young carried them out. Thus, if the young made decisions on their own or rejected the advice of their elders, it was viewed as a rebellion (fitna).

Despite this, the youth have managed to accede to power in northern Nigeria quite dramatically on at least four occasions over the last 200 years. One of these was during the pre-colonial era: the Sokoto jihad (1804–8), which consisted of two distinct sets of young men: those around the spiritual leadership of a Shaikh, i.e. his students and young converts to Islam; and independent youths from Fulani pastoralist families who had lost their cattle. As the war progressed, the jihad army came to be dominated by the latter, more undisciplined group. The senior shaikhs and older scholars eventually resigned, leaving men in their late 20s and early 30s in charge. The new state that was formed afterwards (circa 1812) was ruled by these young commanders who governed the Emirates for the next 30 years. Thus, as Last argues, in time, the caliphate came once again to be ruled by ‘elders’ as political control passed back from the young to the old.

With the advent of colonialism (itself enforced by young men) opportunities for young people quickly emerged. The need for skilled labour was particularly advantageous for the youth who rushed to fill the vacancies for literate clerks, secretaries and low-ranking officials in the government machinery. As a result, ‘Western’ education became highly coveted as it was seen “as a ticket to freedom from the protracted subordination to one’s elders”. Bayart puts it succinctly, for the elders, “the era of the Whites became the era of insolence”, when children, “their mouths on fire . . . came out of their silence”. For the first time, young men did not need to wait too long before gaining entry into privileged society. A ‘short-cut’ was provided through salaried employment; in this way some were able to wield power over traditional elders. Again, in northern Nigeria, Last illustrates how, in 1903, the conquest of the northern Emirates by the British-led forces deposed most of the ‘elderly’ emirs, and created a new world, which was essentially a “young man’s world”. Early colonial rule is said to have empowered the young, giving them both new authority and new knowledge; and disempowered the old, except insofar as the old still carried the morality and integrity of the once independent Islamic state. Once again, these young men who gained power clung to it, but gradually power returned to the old; that is, until the anti-colonial movement provided the next generation of youth with an opportunity to depose the old.
The anti-colonial movement was essentially led by men who were not necessarily young biologically, but who identified themselves as ‘youth’ in order to distinguish themselves from their elders, who were supposedly content either to be loyal colonial servants or placid rural chiefs and small-holders; which further supports the idea that the term ‘youth’ is a political construction. A number of nationalist movements identified themselves as ‘youth’; for example, the Somali Youth League, which led the march towards independence in 1960. Turning to the example of northern Nigeria once more, Last claims that the anti-colonial movement was led by young men who were rebelling against their elders (i.e. those who had come to power as youths in the early 20th century assisted by colonial rule) as well as working to topple the colonial government. Independence was, therefore, not only a revolt of educated and ambitious young men against foreign-imposed rule, but also a rebellion against their fathers, and a demonstration of their desire to overturn the traditional gerontocratic socio-political order.

The Fortunes of Young People after Independence

Independence itself brought mixed blessings to young people. On one hand, the socio-economic changes that have taken place have resulted in the creation of a new generation of educated young people who work and have access to better resources than their parents did, particularly those remaining in the rural areas. Consequently, this has transformed power relations in the family in favour of the youth and against the elders, who hitherto relied on their control of land for the power they wielded over their children. In this new relationship the youth have gradually become more powerful within the framework of the family. Although it is maintained that traditional notions of childhood and expectations of children still exist, the views of the youth within the family decision-making framework now carry greater weight owing to their economic power, on which many family members depend for survival.

While economic changes and urbanisation have created avenues for the youth to escape the ‘stranglehold’ of elders in the villages, disadvantages are also evident. Economic niches in the cities, predominantly in the informal sector, often result in low incomes and high levels of insecurity. Many young people have been forced into the informal sector, possibly even into crime or prostitution. In Senegal, for instance, where the public sector has been in a process of streamlining since the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the mid 1980s, only 5% of young people entering the employment market after completing education find jobs in the formal sector. The rest are required to enter the informal sector, sometimes on the fringes of criminal activity. In Mali the route to economic independence is also blocked for the young, leading to further tension within families. Students, traditionally considered the privileged among the youth, have also been affected. Compared to the varied and numerous prospects for young graduates in the years immediately following independence, recent generations have been faced with deteriorating conditions on campuses and bleak prospects after graduating because of a potentially explosive combination of SAPs, national economic crises, increasing withdrawal of state support, imposition of tuition fees and the streamlining of the civil service. As a result, graduates are obliged to defer their entry into adulthood indefinitely as they are unable to achieve the economic independence necessary for marriage and family, arguably key markers of adulthood.

Youth in the Post-Independence Period

Politically, Africa’s youth were the key to the various liberation movements in the early years of independence. In 1964 Khartoum University students in Sudan were instrumental in the uprising that deposed the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud. Similarly, radical students in Ethiopia initiated the revolution that led to the overthrowing of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Zanzibar presents an interesting case study illustrating the importance of young people to politics. Not only were the youth instrumental in ending British colonial rule in 1963, but they were also key actors in the 1964 revolution, which brought a permanent end to Arab political and economic hegemony in the islands. The two leading parties involved in the revolution (the Zanzibar Nationalist
Party and the Afro-Shirazi Party) regarded young men as necessary for the success of any political coalition, and so especially targeted them for recruitment. In fact, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) established the Youth’s Own Union (YOU) as the party’s semi-independent youth wing, which quickly emerged as a powerful body owing to its visibility. The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), a party claiming to represent the large majority of Zanzibaris of African descent, also established its Youth League (ASPYL) in May 1959, which was intended as a recruiting organism, although with a focus on a different class of youth. Despite the inclusiveness of youth in politics at this time, there still remained an exclusive element. According to Burgess:

The state recruited, celebrated, and foregrounded the vitality of youth on the public stage, and granted a measure of local power to its most committed cadres... And yet the state also excluded from its notions of citizenship images of youth that appeared to conflict with the nationalist imperative of building the nation and its selective invocation of African traditions... Youth were supposed to serve as the vigilant defenders and enforcers of the new order, yet they were also accused of some of its most flagrant transgressions.

The struggle against apartheid in South Africa during this period must not be overlooked. In June 1976, demonstrations and strikes took place all over the country against apartheid, which began as a protest by school children in Soweto, a Johannesburg township, against the insistence of the government that Afrikaans be used as the medium of instruction in schools. The revolt soon extended beyond Soweto, and hundreds of people were killed before it was brutally suppressed by security forces. In a statement issued after the uprising, Nelson Mandela, who was in prison at the time, paid tribute to the young people:

At the forefront of this 1976/77 wave of unrest were our students and youth. They come from the universities, high schools and even primary schools. They are a generation whose whole education has been under the diabolical design of the racists to poison the minds and brainwash our children into docile subjects of apartheid rule. But after more than twenty years of Bantu Education the circle is closed and nothing demonstrates the utter bankruptcy of apartheid as the revolt of our youth.

In the 1980s, the violence became more widespread. In 1984 South African children and youth were once again visibly at the forefront of further demonstrations, staging widespread school boycotts. The following year, schools ground to a virtual halt in black townships, as pupils were particularly angry at the banning of the Congress of South African Schools. During this period of struggle, the South African regime imprisoned thousands of children precisely because of their prominent role in initiating resistance. That children were initiators and leaders, and not merely followers, is evident in the following statements:

We cannot take it any longer. It is our parents who have let things go on far too long without doing anything. They have failed. We have been forced to fight to the bitter end.

Go to work and disregard the groups of young intimidators telling people not to go to work. People must go to work and just thrash the children stopping them.

The South African example illustrates the collaboration between adults and the youth, which was vital to the ending of apartheid. Undoubtedly children and young people were active participants in the struggle to end apartheid. They were crucial to its collapse.

Young People and the Contemporary State

Although the marginalisation of Africa’s youth has intensified, even in the new politically liberal states, they have continued to find ways of reacting to the conditions working to exclude them from society, both economically and politically. In Cameroon, angry Anglophone students who feel even more marginalised than their Francophone peers have long been voicing their grievances, which not only include academic concerns, but also the wider issue of Anglophone subordination to a Francophone-dominated state. In 1985, they wrote an open letter, appealing to their parents “to assume squarely their responsibilities before history concerning the grave [Anglophone] identity situation and help solve the problem”. Should their parents fail to take immediate action, the students threatened to resort to violence in the future. Relations between the Anglophone stu-
dents and the government and university authorities have deteriorated rapidly since the early 1990s. In May 1995 the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) was founded to reinforce the role of the educated Anglophone youth in the struggle. It vowed to “revive, defend, protect and preserve the independence and sovereignty of the once nation, the Southern Cameroons and to serve as the militant youth wing of the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC)”. Its membership is largely composed of young disaffected people who would prefer to die fighting than continue “to submit to the fate imposed on Southern Cameroons by La Republique du Cameroon”.

The Cameroonian government, which still sees the SCYL as the most dangerous Anglophone movement, has responded with its own youth militia—PRESBY (President Biya’s Youth), formed in Yaoundé in 1996 (interestingly only a year after the formation of the SCYL). In 2001 it was estimated that there were 120,000 members and 7000 officials in the group. Though PRESBY claims to be apolitical, its links to the government are evident. Members obtain CPDM (Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) membership cards, and it enjoys widespread support and patronage from CPDM elites. Furthermore, PRESBY, whose members are armed and receive active support from the security forces, has regularly been used by the state to terrorise and counteract the activities of Anglophone groups, particularly the SCYL.

In Nigeria, the current political landscape is dominated by discourses on the legitimacy of the state, rising partly from state economic mismanagement, state regional marginalisation and the state’s inability to effectively tackle high crime rates. This situation has enabled various local groups, in disaffected areas in particular, to challenge the very idea of the Nigerian state. Despite efforts to marginalise them, the youth have been key players in this discourse since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the beginning of economic reforms led to the extension of the duration of ‘youth’ as a phase of life. As in Cameroon, the reduction of public sector opportunities has left a large number of the population ‘stuck’ in the youth category, not because of age, but rather because of economic and social circumstances, with little hope of advancement in the near future. Therefore, localised collective identities have become crucial in order to gain access to resources and economic transitions. In urban areas, where there is intense competition over land and economic opportunities, the distinction between ‘sons of the soil’ and ‘strangers’ has become important. This has led to the emergence of ‘area boys’, a collective grouping that comprises local, young individuals with a close social and spatial identification with a particular area. By identifying themselves with particular areas and communities, area boys are able to claim the right to access those local resources from which they are normally excluded. Importantly, area boys gain their legitimacy from the wider community by acting as vigilantes; should they fail in this role, they themselves become accused of criminal activities by the community. Although they have emerged all over the country, they share certain characteristics: they draw upon pre-colonial idioms of organisation in which young men were enforcers of community rights, morals and laws; they have emerged under the combined effects of the introduction of SAPs and post–Cold War privatisation (in fact, area boys in Lagos joined forces with students from the University of Lagos to protest against the SAPs); and they have been criminalised because of their role in the drugs trade and their use as political thugs.

Within this context, Nigerian politicians have also used the youth for their own, often dubious, ends. Firstly, the category of ‘youth’ has been appropriated by a range of protagonists in order to identify with young people and co-opt them in challenging the federal government over, for example, the national oil allocation to the various states. They have formed a grouping as the self-promoted ‘young’ politicians in order to form a common base for action to gain control of oil revenues through the courts and, informally, through personal political networks. Gore and Pratten have put forward the case that certain southern governors have aligned themselves as part of the youth category in order to engage with and hold accountable the nation state. More blatantly, politicians have used the youth as instruments of disorder. Area boys in Lagos were recruited as political thugs in the Babaginda transition period. Members of the Hausa Yandaba, a youth group, have been used as henchmen by rival politicians during elections. The problem has
become of such concern in the South that the Delta state governor, Chief James Ibori, recently warned youths of the state to resist attempts to use them as “retrogressive agents”. He argued that, as future leaders, young people should rather devote their time and energy to activities geared towards the promotion of peace and tranquility in their communities.

Where youths are used as instruments of violence, it is not always a simple case of manipulation and abuse. Area boys, for example, often have formal and informal patrons who support them financially, or sponsor special events in which they are involved. In return, the patrons are assured of extra security, political support and a means of effecting disorder. The use of young men to inflict violence, particularly at crucial political moments, is not specific to Nigeria. As shown above, the Cameroon government has used the youth as a key means of tackling their opponents and, in Zimbabwe, the fact that the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) has relied heavily on the youth in its violent ‘land-grabbing’ policy has been widely publicised in recent years.

Youth and Armed Conflict

Wherever there is a conflict in Africa, there are children and young people serving as soldiers. Argenti asks, “Where would war makers be without youth?” The reality is that as long as weak political and economic structures exist and the continent remains dominated by young people, they will continue to become involved in conflicts. Thus, their large numbers and their estrangement from the formal social and political order will continue to be explosive combinations in times of political instability. It follows, then, that instead of advocating for the end of child soldiers, it would be more worthwhile to spend our energies addressing the structural conditions that make it easy to militarise Africa’s children and youth. As Rabwoni argues, if there are good reasons for young people to volunteer to fight, they will do so, and no number of special programmes and laws will be able to prevent them from taking up arms. Therefore, the key is for all to work at removing those “good reasons”.

The Sierra Leonean conflict, which was dominated by the youth to the extent that it was labelled a “youth crisis,” presents a noteworthy case study for highlighting those so-called “good reasons”. To understand the presence of large numbers of children and young people in all warring parties during the decade-long civil war, it is necessary to appreciate the pre-war context. The devastating effects of APC (All People’s Congress) rule since 1968 had arguably destroyed the possibilities for young people to carve out a meaningful life for themselves in the cities. Corruption in all sectors was rife. It was also believed that health and sanitation services had deteriorated owing to government neglect and this, in turn, had led to an alleged life expectancy of 21 years by 1987. The education sector had also suffered because of both government action (and the lack thereof) and the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Abdullah and Muana further support this point:

Central to an understanding of war in Sierra Leone is the role of alienated youth, especially lumpen youth in the urban and rural areas, for whom combat appears to be a viable survival alternative in a country with high levels of urban unemployment, where the economy is dominated by a precious mineral sector in long-term decline.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the war provided the youth an opportunity to overturn traditional gerontocratic socio-political orders and that some youth relished it, making it a point to target and humiliate elders during raids on villages.

Agents of Peace, Not of War

Because of their prominent role in politics and conflict, either as independent agents or pawns used by older political actors, youth are often perceived as deviants. In fact, Argenti claims that the use of young people for the personal advancement of a few military elites in situations of political Insecurity is the single greatest reason for the pejorative connotations associated with the category of ‘youth’ in Africa today. This has impli-
cations for their role in post-war societies and in the development of their societies, which is currently minimal. As Rabwoni observes:

“Our political experience is that young people are forgotten except when politicians need to mobilise them for war or for electoral campaigns. It is very rare that young people are mobilised in pursuit of other ideals such as peace. If young people are provided with better education and skills and the prospects of a better future, they will be less likely to be cannon-fodder for war-makers.

Indeed, the evidence shows that whilst political parties have been quick to use youths as instruments of violence, they have been slow to involve them in peace processes/initiatives. South African children and young people were a key to the ending of apartheid, but they are now invisible in the so-called ‘peace,’ where their marginalisation has arguably contributed to their political apathy. This apathy was underlined in the general elections of 1999 when less than half the country’s 18–20 year olds registered to vote. Since the ending of conflict in Sierra Leone the extent to which young people have been involved in the post-war process of peace building and reconstruction is questionable. The problems young activists raised before the war are being repeated by the youth of Sierra Leone today: lack of health care, educational opportunities, shelter, clothing, food and water, as well as the persistence of poverty and unemployment. They have repeatedly indicted the government, in particular, for dismissing their concerns and neglecting their capacities. As rebels and the government currently negotiate peace in Liberia, it remains to be seen whether there will be a niche for the young people of Liberia on whose backs the sporadic 14-year conflict was fought.

That young people want to be involved in achieving and maintaining peace in their societies and contributing to the development of their countries cannot be doubted. In Sierra Leone, young people are calling on the international community to place their concerns and their capacities at the centre of recovery efforts. They recognise that they were at the centre of the war, and thus now insist that they be placed at the centre of peacemaking and reconstruction. As the report of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children claims, “without better support and respect for their rights, young people will become more angry and disaffected, and are likely to become a major source of new unrest”.

Furthermore, whilst political and social structures continue to exclude the youth, they are finding alternative means to participate. Thus, no matter the obstacles blocking their path, young people are participating in society anyway—because the will to participate is innate in every human being. Examples of alternative avenues open to them include organised religious movements such as Pentecostal movements and Muslim brotherhoods. Argenti has put forward the case that Pentecostal churches, some of which are almost entirely run by young people, provide opportunities for them to participate in civil society, something that political structures and established churches deny them. In Nigeria, area boys are carving niches for themselves whilst they continue to be excluded by mainstream politics. In Cameroon, Anglophone students, who continue to be targeted and excluded by the Francophone-dominated government, are finding means to participate and voice their grievances. They have been so effective in this that the government regards them as being more dangerous than any other Anglophone group in the country. Thus, as Argenti argues:

While the authorities look the other way, young people are reaching a critical juncture in Africa, silently becoming key figures in the promotion of socio-historical change. The innumerable informal means by which they are doing so—desperately understudied though they are—make them crucial potential partners in the formulation of development programmes.

Conclusion

If African governments are serious about ending the use of children and young people in conflict, a first step should be to involve this group effectively in peace initiatives. If they continue to be excluded, the effects will resonate across the continent. It would undoubtedly be irresponsible leadership at its worst. Engaging with children and the youth constructively, building their capacity, providing them with opportunities to participate in the life of their societies economically, politically and socially will not only benefit them, but their entire communities as well. When the youth do accede to power, it is important that
they not discriminate and exclude on the basis of age, gender, class or disability, and, crucially, that they be ready and willing to relinquish power to the next generation when the time comes. Failure to do so will lead to the persistence of ‘elder power’ and ‘youth rebellion’, which has been a central element in the vicious cycle of conflicts in Africa.

CONFLICT, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
AN ENQUIRY

Christopher Mitchell


1. INTRODUCTION

The literature dealing systematically with the connections between change and conflict is hardly extensive, and that directly dealing with precise relationships between change and conflict resolution is even more sparse. In a way, this is surprising, for many writers in the field have made implicit, and in some cases explicit, connections between some form of change and the formation of conflicts, while others discuss conflict “dynamics” as well as those changes that are needed before any kind of resolution of a conflict can realistically be sought. A recent (and admittedly unsystematic) search of one university’s modest library revealed over 420 entries combining the words “change” and “conflict” in their title, while a similar search of a data bank of dissertation abstracts produced over 3,500 such citations.

This relative neglect may, itself, be starting to change and there seems to be renewed interest within the field in the relationship between change and conflict. Partly this seems to be because the world of the late 20th and early 21st centuries itself appears to have become more dynamic. At a macro level, the long drawn out rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union may have been unpleasant but at least it seemed stable and the relationship helped to “explain” many conflicts throughout the world. One knew where one was. The ending of the “Cold War” affected existing conflicts as distant from one another as those in the Middle East, in South Africa, in South East Asia and even in Northern Ireland, and produced a whole set of ostensibly new and different conflicts— in former Yugoslavia, in Transcaucasia, or in Central Asia— although many of these had been lying suppressed or latent for over sixty years. If the end of the “Cold War” produced a much more uncertain, changing world, then this uncertainty was reinforced by the events of September 11th 2001 and by the declaration of new, but nebulous global struggles involving different kinds of “enemy”; by statements about the need for new and different modes of achieving “security”; and by claims about accelerating changes brought about by the information revolution and various aspects of “globalisation”. Conflict analysts thus had to confront questions about the sources and impacts of major changes, while practitioners had to deal with the practicalities of managing change and conflict, so as to minimise violence and destruction.

In spite of this intellectual and empirical turmoil, there still seem to be few works that focus in general terms on connections between the two concepts, or on the process of conflict resolution as a phenomenon involving change from the relationship of enemies—or adversaries— into something else.1 Hence, this essay endeavours to make some contribution to filling this gap in the literature by discussing the relationship between “change” and “conflict” in very general terms, rather than focussing on particular changes that have either created conflict between specific communities, societies and countries, or changes that have led towards a resolution of any specific conflict, which had pro-
tracted and become violent. It can be considered, therefore, as a small contribution to the development of a general theory of change and conflict—or, more particularly, conflict resolution. An understanding of the dynamics of conflict formation and perpetuation should have implications for methods of resolving (or at least coping with) even the most intractable of conflict relationships. As such, the essay may be a starting point for the development of a set of theories of conflict dynamics as well as a practical set of guidelines concerning modes and timing of “resolutionary” interventions.

The essay, then, starts with an attempt to set out a framework for thinking systematically about the relationship between conflict and change, distinguishing between changes that create conflicts and those which make conflict more intense or which help to ameliorate it. This leads to a discussion of the nature of “change” itself, and the kinds of change that seem relevant to creating or resolving protracted conflict. The latter half of the paper switches focus to consider changes necessary to bring about the resolution (or transformation) of a conflict, once it is thoroughly under way—as well as common obstacles to bringing about such “resolutionary” changes. Finally, I suggest ways of thinking about possible actors that can help to bring about resolutionary change, and what strategies might be necessary to move protracted and intractable conflicts towards some lasting and self-supporting solution.

6. OBSTACLES TO CHANGE AND MEANS OF OVERCOMING THEM

In the literature on conflict dynamics there are frequent references to “malign conflict spirals” (an early example is Deutsch 1973) but very little that systematically deals with means of arresting or reversing them. Clearly there are dynamics and other phenomena that encourage conflict perpetuation and act as obstacles to change. There is a literature that suggests what these obstacles might be, but in a highly piecemeal fashion, ranging from suggestions that the greater the costs incurred in pursuing a goal, the more highly people value that goal—what Kenneth Boulding calls “the sacrifice principle”—to Roger Marris’ generalisation that almost everyone is psychologically resistant to change (Marris 1986) or Louise Diamond’s interesting but unexplored concept of a “conflict habituated” society (Diamond 1997).

6.1. Four Types of Obstacles to Change

One fruitful way of beginning to lay out a systematic framework for dealing with this general issue of obstacles to change in protracted and violent conflicts might be to adopt the standpoint of the leaders of adversary parties in such a conflict and to ask:

“Confronting the option of continuing (or even escalating) the conflict, or changing to a more conciliatory stance that seeks a nonviolent resolution, but involves the abandonment of the previous strategy, what factors frequently militate against such a change?”

Adapting a framework first suggested by organisation theorists Barry Staw and Jerry Ross (1987), four categories of obstacles to change can be suggested:

1. Policy determinants
2. Psychological determinants
3. Social determinants
4. Political determinants

The first cluster of factors—policy determinants—militating against change involves the nature of the conflict itself, and focuses mainly on the centrality of the issues involved and the value ascribed to gaining the goals in contention. In Staw and Ross’s terms, we are talking about a project that involves a large pay-off and a perceived “infeasibility of alternatives”, especially in the many cases in which conflicts become perceived as involving existential issues (e.g. the physical survival of the community, or the creation of a distinct national political system via separation), or core identity issues (e.g. freedom to practice a religion unencumbered, or the recognition of the existence of “a people”, with
their own culture and language). If protracted conflicts were not about such salient issues, then they would hardly protract in the first place. Furthermore, protracted and deep-rooted conflicts are also situations which have a high “long-term investment” characteristic, which helps to keep them going. Rewards only come at the very end of the struggle through “victory”, so that the investment nature of the process itself becomes a reason for not changing until ultimate success. To employ an analogy, one does not gain the benefits from building a bridge until the structure is finally completed. There is no point to a half-finished bridge. Likewise, investment in struggle to a half-way point seems sacrifice for nothing, especially when no alternatives to struggle seem feasible.

If factors to do with the nature of the conflict itself often militate against changing course, a number of common psychological factors reinforce a tendency not to change. These include a leadership group’s direct responsibility for the “investment” in the struggle—the costs, the sacrifices, the lost resources, opportunities and lives—that cannot be lightly abandoned without feelings of responsibility and guilt for having advocated the course of action leading to such sacrifices in the first place. They also include the ego-committing claims that leaders have made about achieving success in the conflict, and the number of occasions each leader has publicly endorsed the policy and called for the necessary sacrifices in order to achieve what are characterised as “shared, salient and—sometimes—sacred” goals. Another psychological factor is often the degree to which such individual leaders—and their followers—have had drummed into them positive models of “perseverance” and of persistence leading to successful “turn arounds” and ultimately to success.

Many of these ideas are usually subsumed under the title of “misperception and miscalculation”, a blanket term which actually covers a wide variety of psychological and socio-psychological factors. These include the widespread tendency of people to link costs and sacrifices both with the value of the goals for which sacrifices have been made and the likelihood of achieving it, together with a number of factors to do with self-justification, avoiding acknowledgement of responsibility, denial of the (possibly increasing) evidence for stalemate or failure, and the different ways prospect theory tells us that people evaluate gains, losses and resultant willingness to take further risks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). All of them, however, seem to be factors making for continuation rather than change.

Again, another set of social factors can also act as obstacles to changing course once a party is thoroughly embroiled in a conflict, some of which link to and reinforce the effects of psychological influences. Many are subsumed under the blanket label of “face saving” and are particularly powerful when a leader or group of leaders becomes so thoroughly identified with a course of action in a conflict that abandonment becomes virtually unthinkable. Thus, further costly investments in and commitment to a strategy become a symbol of the original correctness of that policy and a signal to followers and others of determination to “see it through” rather than admit error and responsibility by a change of course. This tendency to carry on can be, and often is, reinforced by social norms that support consistency rather than flexibility, steadfastness rather than learning from experience, and willingness to sacrifice for the cause rather than accepting that the time has come to cut losses. In many societies, honour is paid to “heroes”—who then become models—who have held fast in the face of adversity and sacrificed for the cause rather than compromise. In many societies, withdrawal is generally viewed negatively as a sign of weakness, while unwillingness (or inability) to change course is viewed as a sign of strength.

Finally, there are a number of what might best be termed political factors arising from the internal structure of each adversary that can and frequently do present obstacles to changing course in the midst of a conflict. At the very least, the factors of internal rivalry and potential challenges to the existing leadership need to be taken into account. As Staw and Ross (1987) emphasize, “job insecurity” is frequently a factor militating against appearing to admit to mistakes by changing a policy long espoused. Even relatively secure leaderships need to be careful of alienating supporters, giving opportunities to rivals, and generally diminishing their internal support. Leaders of parties involved in protracted and violent conflicts have not infrequently “lost their jobs” by assassinations, coups and
mass protests, as well as through intra-governmental and electoral defections. Hence, anticipation of such possibilities can act as a major deterrent to considerations of major policy change. As Fred Ikle pointed out many years ago (Ikle 1971), nothing arouses contention and furious opposition as much as a decision to end a war, and the same appears true of many other protracted conflicts, in which major sacrifices have been made in the light of promises of future success.

Furthermore, nowhere are the political obstacles likely to be more immovable than in cases where the very purpose of the entity concerned has been the prosecution of, and success in, the struggle and where the possible ending of the conflict may involve the disappearance of an organisation or a movement, or at best a difficult transformation into something quite different, needing different skills and leadership qualities and hence a downgrading of the influence of existing leaders. The more the survival and even existence of the organisation is tied to success in the conflict, the greater will be the unwillingness to consider a major change in strategy and a conversion from a winning mind set to one featuring possible negotiation and an outcome that is less than total “success”.

6.2. Entrapment as a Barrier to Change

Apart from the Staw-Ross model, many of the above obstacles have been discussed at one time or another in the literature on entrapment, which also addresses psychological aspects of this dynamic (sacrifices changing the original goals in conflict to that of making the enemy pay, and the extent of existing sacrifices diminishing the evaluation of anticipated sacrifices); economic aspects (the wish and need to reclaim or justify “sunk costs”); and political aspects (a threatening intra-party opposition ready to point out and exploit shortcoming in leaders’ repeated public commitments to carry on to “the bitter end”). The overall impression from historical cases and from existing theories is one of the existence of immense obstacles to changing strategies away from coercion and violence towards something more conciliatory.

However, it is undoubtedly also the case that such changes do take place, and obstacles are overcome or removed. Just as entrapment processes cross key intensifying thresholds—as when the need to reclaim past “investments” becomes a stronger motivation than that of achieving original goals—so parties and their leaders come to mitigating thresholds, and other factors or evaluations become psychologically dominant. For example, past costs can come to be seen as “unacceptable losses” rather than “investments”. Likely future costs become more certain and hence insupportable. Conflict behaviours do change, interaction patterns alter and even the most protracted and intractable conflicts can be moved towards a resolution. How might such a change come about?

6.3. Overcoming Obstacles and Changing Direction

A number of basic methods for bringing about change that is likely to lead in the direction of conflict resolution or transformation suggest themselves:

1. Changing leaders
2. Changing leaders’ and followers’ minds
3. Changing strategies, policies and behaviour
4. Changing parties’ environments

To suggest that one way of overcoming inherent obstacles to changing the course of a protracted conflict is to change leaders is not to be taken as advocating “regime change”, which in any case seems to produce more conflicts than it resolves. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that the change from one leadership group to another—however accomplished—can bring into positions of power and influence individuals or factions who are not as tied to past policies as their predecessors who might have initiated and hence be seen as responsible for those policies. This is not to say that a new leadership inevitably will change and become more conciliatory—they might be committed by past statements to intensifying the conflict. However, at least the opportunity is there and it is reinforced
by the fact that there are likely to be expectations—on the part of the adversaries and other third parties—that, with a new leadership, change could come about. In itself, this belief (even if initially mistaken) can bring about resultant behaviour that leads to some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Anticipated change brings about behaviours based on that very anticipation, in turn making the expected change easier to undertake.

Changing people's minds seems likely to be a more problematical and long drawn out process, especially when the challenge is to change the minds of large numbers—the followers, mass public opinion, the "street". Moreover, it is hardly an easy task to change the minds of key leaders or their advisers. The great thing to bear in mind when faced with apparently intractable belief systems or apparently closed minds (Rokeach 1960) is that people do learn and change, especially if placed in an appropriate setting that encourages alteration. The difficulty, of course, is that conflicts are quite the worst environment for bringing about significant changes in goals, interests and underlying beliefs. In such circumstances, the predominant ideas about learning and changing involve beliefs that it is the other side that has to learn and that hurting them is the best way of bringing about such learning. The lesson that there may, indeed, be alternatives to coercion, violence and victory is one that is particularly difficult to absorb when one is oneself on the receiving end of the Other's effort to make one learn through their coercive techniques. And yet people's evaluations of their situation, of their goals, of the costs they are suffering and might have to go on suffering, of their futures, of their alternatives, of themselves and of their adversaries can and do change. Hierarchies of goals alter over time (Saaty and Alexander 1989), costs become more salient, alternatives become more attractive, certainties become discredited. For anyone interested in conflict resolution, the key issue becomes how such changes might best be brought about and how the numerous obstacles in the path of change leading to resolution might best be overcome.

Changing people's minds is intimately linked to changing their behaviour, although which change comes first is something of a matter for debate among social psychologists. A common sense approach would hold that until a change has taken place in the perceptions, evaluations or goals of people in conflict, behavioural change is highly unlikely. On the other hand, some commitment theorists have argued that it is a change of behaviour that leads, through a process of habituation, to new attitudes and beliefs (Kiesler 1971). Whatever the direction of the causal arrow, or the nature of the causal loop, the salient and publicly obvious nature of the behavioural component of a protracted and violent conflict usually makes changing adversaries' behaviour the initial objective of any conflict resolution process. Conciliatory gestures are sought and—perhaps—conveyed, communications channels opened, ceasefires and truces suggested and negotiated, "talks about talks" are initiated. This kind of change often takes centre stage in initial resolution efforts, both bilateral and multilateral.

Lastly, some obstacles will undoubtedly be removed by major structural changes in the parties' environment, which make available more of a good in dispute, render that good irrelevant or provide alternatives for it, remove a threat or render other problems more pressing. Such changes are often slow and gradual, as when technological change makes a scarce resource of lesser value or a frontier defence system obsolete. On occasions, a major environmental change can be abrupt and far-reaching. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the environment of many conflicts from the Middle East to South America and provided opportunities for moving conflicts in those and many other regions towards a resolution.

This last type of change is undoubtedly the most difficult for third parties to bring about deliberately. While it might be possible—yet difficult—to change leaders' and followers' minds, and possible—yet probably undesirable given the current shambles in Iraq—for leaders to be changed, it seems rare for anyone (especially outsiders) to be able to bring about structural changes in conflicting parties' environments. However, all four "revolutionary" changes—in leaders, in minds, in behaviours and in environments—need to be considered if our final question is to be even partially answered:

What can assist in making changes that help to move a conflict towards resolution?
Agents for Change: Key Functions of Civil Society

Civil society responds to conflict in numerous ways. While often part of the forces supporting war, it is also one of the powerful forces promoting peace. CSO roles in humanitarian relief, development and human rights protection are well understood. What is less well known are the myriad ways that they actively build peace. Yet they play roles at every point in the development of conflict and its resolution: from surfacing situations of injustice to preventing violence, from creating conditions conducive to peace talks to mediating a settlement and working to ensure it is consolidated, from setting a global policy agenda to healing war-scarred psyches. These roles can be mapped out into eight main functions of civil society peacebuilding.

Waging Conflict Constructively

Sometimes the prevailing power structures in a society are deeply oppressive. While there may not be full-scale warfare, life for many is impaired by profound structural violence, often combined with actual or threatened direct violence. Civil society activists can play crucial roles in changing these situations by surfacing the conflict and escalating it non-violently to bring about necessary changes. Often mobilized by some triggering situation that provokes an ‘enough is enough!’ response, they gather the sparks of resistance throughout the population into a movement capable of challenging the relevant power structures. Sometimes they use existing institutional and legal systems to hold regimes to account or to address injustices. They often combine formal legal strategies with approaches that aim to foster public awareness and the transformation of conflict attitudes and relationships. CSOs can bear witness to violations and undermine the moral authority and legitimacy of abusers. The very act of public disclosure and/or denouncing the situation can make the truth evident in ways that are very difficult to ignore and may empower people to take action to change the situation. This exposure sometimes stimulates conditions that lead to the collapse of regimes over the long term. They can also dissuade the wider public from accepting or participating in acts that enable abuse and oppression.

Conflict is therefore embraced as a way of working proactively toward social change goals and is a feature of the struggle for justice. Civil society activists can manifest both the ‘power to resist’ oppressive forces—typically through mobilizing effective mass movements for change—and the ‘power to expose’ oppression and thereby de-legitimize the authority of the oppressors. Furthermore, they have the ‘power to persuade’ both popular opinion and decision-makers of more constructive ways to respond to specific conflict situations and to address the structural problems that give rise to conflict. This points to the importance of channeling conflict through peaceful processes capable of delivering constructive change.

Shifting Conflict Attitudes: The Power to Re-frame and Change Perceptions

Many grassroots peacebuilders in societies locked in protracted conflict promote people-to-people dialogue across the conflict divides to begin to shift entrenched conflict dynamics. This is often facilitated by establishing direct communication between people with some common attribute: such as a similar occupational role (e.g., teachers, journalists), identity characteristics (e.g., women, youth), or common experiences of the conflict (e.g., ex-combatants, policy advisors). The experience of encountering those who have been regarded as enemies and perceiving them as human beings can shake perceptions of ‘the other’ and challenge the discourses of hate. This can shake up their perceptions of the conflict and ultimately result in personal transformation. They—and those in the circles around them—may begin to seek alternatives to continued war because they now know that there are people in the other community who are similar to themselves in seeking a reasonable solution to the conflict.
Envisioning a Better Future: Power to Identify, to Analyse and to Propose

Civil society actors can help shape peace policy by identifying overlooked problems and policy gaps, analyzing issues and recommending solutions. In short, they can identify the central agenda of issues that need to be addressed in responding to a conflict situation and dealing with peace and security issues more widely. Civil society groups can analyze the situation, formulate recommendations, develop policy options and engage in policy dialogue to address conflicts. They can also mobilize advocacy campaigns to generate political will amongst decision-makers and implement strategies to achieve the desired results. Thus civil society efforts at raising public awareness about a particular set of problems [are] intertwined with efforts to motivate political decision-makers to take action to address them.

Sustainable peace processes need to be about more than finding ways to end the fighting; attention must also be directed to supporting societies on the path towards a more equitable and peaceful future. In some conflicts, civil society activists have stimulated widespread public deliberation about what kind of society members want to create. This has resulted not only in a ‘blue print’ of the goals for the future but has also helped to reveal the deeper causes of conflict that must be addressed if this aspiration is to be fulfilled. In some cases, these ideas have fed directly into the negotiating agenda for peace talks and proposals for how these issues should best be addressed.

Mobilizing Constituencies for Peace: Generating Support and Applying Pressure

Those involved in armed conflict often justify their actions on the basis of their authority as governments or by claiming to represent popular causes. Civil society actors may challenge these assertions by demonstrating that public opinion rejects military approaches and supports alternatives. Peace media, art projects, concerts, and other creative methods have all been effective in reaching out to the wider public. Sometimes efforts involve mass protests at the use of military force or demonstrations in favor of peace processes. By revealing that there are significant constituencies for peace, they can be a persuasive force in altering the responses of governments and armed groups. This can help to transform social and political dynamics to support [an] atmosphere conducive to peacebuilding and a factor in the viability of a political peace negotiation process.

Yet local people are often unable to address all the dimensions and drivers of conflict on their own. This can be especially challenging when there are severe power imbalances; when there are numerous external parties to the conflict (such as powerful countries allied to one of the armed groups); or where the conflict parties are largely motivated to sustain the benefits derived from the ‘war economy’. In these cases, strategies may well require solidarity and collaboration between the civil society actors with governments and others who have an interest in or influence over the situation. This can be enhanced through coordinated lobbying and raising awareness among domestic and international audiences.

Promoting Security: Power to Reduce Violence and Promote Stability

It is very difficult for people to engage in and support peacemaking when their basic security is threatened. This is one of the reasons why those who want to wreck a peace process escalate violence against civilians. While conventional state security forces can play an important role in protection; too often they are a part of the problem or are simply incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. Military peacekeepers are often deployed too late, too few or with a mandate that is inadequate to provide sufficient protection of the civilian population. Yet state security forces and internationally mandated peacekeepers are not the only ones equipped to respond to violence effectively. Violence-affected communities are not merely victims of events. In many cases, they have been able to take action to prevent violence and ameliorate the effects of armed conflict. Community-level structures—especially when they work in partnership with authorities and international missions—can monitor developments and take proactive steps to de-
escalate violence. In a number of places torn by violence, one of the most effective ways to address this problem is for the community to become proactively involved in trying to prevent the violence by resolving localized disputes and preventing those with specific personal grievances from mobilizing others in conflict. Furthermore, cooperation in helping to achieve mutual security can be a powerful confidence-building measure. This experience can help prepare communities for peaceful co-existence in the wider society.

**Power to alert and to act: early warning and early response.** People based in a society are often best placed to identify the reasons for a conflict, the motivations of those who are driving it, and to suggest specific actions that could channel it in a more peaceful direction. These insights can support the development of subtle and highly targeted strategies that do not require extensive resources or coercive measures, especially when addressed at an early point in a conflict cycle. While CSOs can be the source of vital inputs shaping international responses to conflict, it is also vital to stimulate local systems for responding to the risk of violence.

**Civilian monitoring.** Civil society monitoring initiatives explicitly aimed at supporting peace processes are little known. Yet they can be uniquely influential in creating sufficient stability and space needed to underpin official political negotiations and to address the local dimensions of wider conflict contexts. They typically draw upon detailed local knowledge of the specific dynamics and developments that can trigger conflict escalation. Utilizing credible (and usually independent) monitors, they can issue information and analysis that is accepted by the conflict parties and other stakeholders. They often issue recommendations explicitly aimed at fostering confidence building and may work with all involved to see them implemented. Their credibility often stems from the fact that they are perceived as either non-partisan or multi-partisan (e.g., comprised of people with links to all the conflict parties), with the interests and needs of non-combatant civilians their primary concern. In addition to monitoring formally agreed ceasefires, community monitors can become involved in activities that help to generate public confidence, such as monitoring developments in state institutions or relations between communities.

**Interpositioning, accompaniment and civilian peacekeeping.** Based on the observation that the mere presence of outside witnesses can help to deter violence in many—if not all—contexts, there has been an emergence of unarmed, civil society efforts to reduce political violence and protect civilian noncombatants. Civilian peacekeeping activities include monitoring, protective accompaniment and inter-positioning, i.e., physically positioning themselves between opposing forces to prevent violent attack. Many initiatives are based on using a system of international-local contacts, with foreigners linked to locals to provide a symbolic presence, thereby indicating that the world is watching. Success often rests on perception of potential attackers that the foreigners have international linkages. This perception can change their assessment of the ‘costs vs benefits’ that could be gained by attacking. These initiatives can also provide support for local people’s conflict resolution efforts.

**Making Peace: Helping to Reach Agreement**

Negotiations to end armed conflict are often viewed as the exclusive realm of governments and the leaders of armed groups, with concerned governments and IGOs acting as conveners and mediators. The ‘official’ nature of these processes meant that the potential contributions of civil society were overlooked. Numerous civil society peacemaking initiatives since the 1990s, however, have revealed their invaluable potential for supporting the prospects of a sustainable agreement.

**Back channel communications and unofficial dialogue.** As well as helping to create a climate conducive for talks, civil society actors sometimes have a direct peacemaking role. They can help open channels of communication between parties in conflict. Using their unofficial and low-key status, they can provide confidential ‘back channels’ to convey messages between opponents. CSOs can also facilitate unofficial Track II and Track 1½
dialogue processes, involving those close to government leaders and armed opposition
groups. Both methods provide parties the opportunity to engage in the communication
necessary to determine whether political negotiations may be viable, build relationships
and deepen understanding of the others’ perspectives on the conflict and explore options
for its resolution.

Mediating/facilitating peace negotiations. Unofficial civil society actors have also served
as the main mediators and facilitators of formal peace negotiations. This role is more typ-
ically taken by diplomats from concerned governments or by the UN or regional organiza-
tions. These mediators often offer financial resources and, in many cases, bring political
pressure to bear on the negotiations. Yet in some circumstances the very fact that civil
society–based mediators can offer only their trust-worthiness and skill is a key reason why
they are acceptable when other mediators are rejected. They typically deploy non-coercive
and participatory processes to enable those involved to better understand the reasons for
the conflict and what needs to be done to resolve it. Instead of relying upon an external
force to exert pressure and inducements for the parties to reach an agreement and then
supply the resources to help implement it, the parties must instead work jointly through
the options until they are able to reach mutually acceptable arrangements. The agreements
are then more likely to endure because those involved tend to understand why the com-
promises were necessary and why the agreement reached is the best one possible.

Public participation in peace negotiations. Yet there are some peace processes where
civil society groupings participate directly in the negotiations. Such processes are usu-
ally aimed at reaching comprehensive agreements on new state structures and other key
issues at the heart of conflict. It is here that civil society can be especially invaluable
because [it is] typically motivated more by the desire to promote sustainable change than
by the quest for governing power.

Consolidating peace agreements. Conflicts are not transformed by agreements alone; they
need a commitment to address ongoing problems through political means. Civil society
also plays important roles in helping to sustain agreements reached by the parties, includ-
ing through raising awareness and educating the public about the agreement itself. They
can be crucial for consolidating support. A sense of public ownership of the peace process
can be crucial to its durability. If the public and organized civil society have been excluded
from the process or believe that it has not addressed their real needs, they are less likely
to work actively towards its implementation. Without a broad public constituency in sup-
port, there are few safeguards against those who want to derail the agreement.

‘Pragmatic peace’: community-level peacemaking. Many initiatives— especially those
undertaken by civil society peacebuilders— are aimed at peacebuilding at the local com-

munity level. Protracted armed conflict within states generally penetrates all levels of
society. National and regional conflicts interconnect with self-sustaining conflict dynam-
ics at the local community level. In some cases, continued violence at the community
level generates pressure towards greater chaos, undermining efforts at macro-level peace-
making. Conversely, effective conflict prevention and peacemaking locally can underpin
macro-level peace processes by creating sufficient stability so that wider political
processes towards peace can take hold. This is particularly true when people in other com-
mmunities see what is being achieved and are inspired to launch their own initiatives.

Even when national level peace processes are stalled or non-existent, local communities
can act to address the issues that generate conflict and escalate violence locally. They
Sometimes they address volatile local dynamics that could escalate into violence and
intensify conflict and war in the wider society. Often they are connected to efforts to
make a practical difference in the daily lives of people of the community. Sometimes they
are able to foster ‘islands of peace’ amidst a wider context of war. Local peace agreements
rarely have any formal legal status. They rely on people keeping the commitments they
made— often backed by considerable peer pressure by other community members. Yet it
is precisely because community members realize that it is in their own self-interest to
find a way to live together peacefully that these outcomes can be so durable.
Transforming the Causes and Consequences of Conflict

Addressing the structural causes and consequences of armed conflict. Agreements on paper mean very little if people are still suffering from the consequences of war and if the inequities that gave rise to it are left unaddressed. Sustained financial, technical, and political commitments are necessary to transform these conditions. Determined government efforts combined with appropriate international aid are needed to facilitate the rehabilitation of war-affected communities and help ensure that a ‘peace dividend’ is widely experienced. This can be strengthened through the involvement of local and international CSOs in policy analysis as well as program implementation and service delivery.

Ultimately, however, it requires government commitment to policies that will create structures and conditions that are more capable of equitably meeting the needs of all. Civil society can play an important role in generating the political will to shore up this commitment. Yet simply recreating pre-conflict structures—which for many seems the most obvious action after a war—may contribute to prolonging the conflict (or even restarting the violence) rather than solving it. Local civil society, often supported by international partners, can play a crucial role in promoting this structural transformation over the longer term and in helping to address ongoing conflicts over developmental priorities through peaceful processes.

Demilitarizing minds, healing psyches and fostering reconciliation. While addressing the practical needs is imperative for sustainable peace, transforming conflict-impaired relationships can require even more complex processes that enable people to reclaim their dignity and foster empathy across conflict divides. This may involve parties fully acknowledging their responsibility for abuses they committed and taking steps to address past and continuing injustices. It also requires a shift in the attitudes that enabled and sustained the conflict; a shift from seeing the ‘other’ as enemy—implicitly questioning their membership in the human community—to perceiving them as fellow human beings with whom one can, at a minimum, co-exist. Although such transformation may not be necessary to ensure a formal end to war, the failure to do so can mean that underlying conflict dynamics remain unresolved, potentially creating the seeds for future discord. While governments can—and should—take a leadership role in fostering reconciliation, this involves a transformation of the ‘hearts and minds’ of those who have been touched by the conflict and, as such, cannot be engineered. These changes can be triggered by the authentic initiatives of civil society actors, who rely essentially on creativity to generate experiences that allow people to connect across divides and to spark changes in perceptions. This often involves activating cultural traditions and spiritual resources that touch upon the deepest sources of meaning for those affected by conflict. Civil society groups have often found ways of fostering truth-telling processes and ensuring that the past is not simply hidden behind a wall of denial. Initiatives can range from documentation projects and academic studies, to theatre and other artistic and literary projects, to memorials and symbolic or ritual expressions of grief, atonement and recognition of those who suffered. All these forms can provide access points that enable people to remember and to engage with the past.

Disarmament, demobilization and re-integration. Protracted armed conflict tends to militarize significant sections of the affected population. Societies are often saturated with military weapons, as well as with soldiers—sometimes including large numbers of children—whose lives have been shaped by the experience of fighting. A significant factor in the success or failure of DDR processes is the degree to which they are inspired by and respond to the ideas and needs of those involved. Prospects of success are enhanced if weapons collection programs are seen as promoting the interests and needs of community members from which the fighting forces are drawn. Local civil society actors can serve as a kind of lightning rod to elicit and implement appropriate and sustainable strategies.

Transforming values and cultures: educating for peace. Many CSOs aim to address sources of structural violence and to promote human security. Through participation in political processes, policy dialogue, monitoring, advocacy campaigns, and protests they help to make governments and state structures more responsive to the needs of their
citizens. They can also play important roles in helping to alleviate social tensions and conflict. They challenge racism, xenophobia and discrimination and promote tolerance and a culture of peace. Person-focused methodologies, such as prejudice reduction workshops and inter-faith dialogue, can complement efforts to address discrimination through policy reform and structural change. Often these initiatives are focused on youth, who may have greater capacities for change than older generations. Summer camps, integrated schools, and exchange programs can all promote what has become known as ‘next generation work’. People of all ages can be empowered to address conflicts from the grassroots upwards. As their knowledge and skills grow, it should become entrenched in the mainstream consciousness. One of the means of doing this is through changing norms and supporting constructive responses to conflict by systematizing peace and conflict resolution education.

GLOBAL UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE RETURN OF THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM
Patrick Bond

Social Movement Solutions?

Elite-driven conflict resolution will not bring sustainable peace to the African continent. Similarly, elite reform proposals ranging from Millennium Development Goals to multilateral restructuring and other forms of ‘global governance’ (Bond 2007) will not reverse the outflow of African wealth or serve the deeper agenda of African development, which is to meet the reasonable needs of all its citizens. Social movement campaigns mostly fail, but the key examples of victory suggest principles of ‘de-commodification’ and ‘de-globalisation of capital’ that we should take seriously. Specific campaigns aimed at reversing resource flows are emerging from grassroots struggles and progressive social movements. They are targeting issues such as:

• De-commodification movements to establish basic needs as human rights rather than as privatised commodities that must be paid for;
• Campaigns to de-globalise capital, such as de-funding the World Bank and securing the right to produce generic (not patented) anti-retroviral medicines for people with AIDS;2
• Demands for civil society oversight of national budgets; and
• Activism to ensure equitable redistribution of resources in ways that benefit low-income households, grassroots communities and shop-floor workers.

Were there even a single genuinely leftist government in Africa (Zimbabwe does not qualify due to its brutality against poor/working people by a corrupt elite), a variety of national policies could be applied to reverse socio-economic collapse:

• Systematic default on foreign debt repayments;
• Strategies to enforce domestic reinvestment of pensions and other funds;
• Reintroduction of currency exchange controls and prohibition of tax-haven transfers;
• Refusal of tied and phantom aid, along with naming and shaming of fraudulent ‘aid’;
• Import-substitution development strategies;
• Refusal of foreign investments that prove unfavourable when realistic projections factor in costs such as natural resource depletion, transfer pricing and profit/dividend outflows; and
• Reversal of macroeconomic policies that increase inequality.

Reversing the trends towards socio-economic collapse in the absence of government policy in this direction requires bottom-up social movements to intensify their work. It is cru-
cial in the short run to recognise anti-capitalist efforts to bridge intra-African, global-local and Northern-African divides. They include the mid-2007 general strikes by revitalised labour movements in Swaziland, South Africa and Nigeria; campaigning for reparations and the closure of the World Bank and IMF by Jubilee Africa; AIDS treatment advocates breaking the hold of pharmaceutical corporations on monopoly anti-retroviral patents; activists fighting Monsanto’s drive to introduce genetically modified crops in several African countries; blood-diamonds victims from Sierra Leone and Angola generating a partly successful global deal at Kimberley; the Kalahari Basarwa-San community raising publicity against forced removals as the Botswana government clears the way for De Beers and World Bank investments; Lesotho peasants objecting to displacement during construction of the continent’s largest dam system (intended solely to benefit Johannesburg); a growing network questioning Liberia’s long exploitation by Firestone Rubber; and the OilWatch network of civil society activists that link Nigerian Delta communities and many others in the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere. When at its strongest, the South African chapter of the global Jubilee movement addressed political-economic exploitation, socio-political conflict and foreign debt in picketing eight international banks in Johannesburg in September 2005 (Jubilee SA 2005). The Washington-based Mobilisation for Global Justice and a coalition of Swiss activist organisations joined Jubilee protesters in solidarity demonstrations.

Citibank was a particular target, for as the UN’s Special Committee against Apartheid had observed in 1979, ‘Citigroup has loaned nearly one-fifth of the $5 billion plus which has gone to bolster apartheid’ and in subsequent years made yet more loans for segregated housing and for the rollover of apartheid debt during the 1985 financial crisis. In Berne, Credit Suisse and UBS were the subjects of protest because from the early 1980s they replaced U.S. and British banks as the main apartheid financiers. By late 2007, the case for reparations against these banks and corporations was so strong that the U.S. Appeals Court overturned a lower court rejection of an Alien Tort Claims Act lawsuit for $400 billion filed by Jubilee SA and the Khulumani victims’ support group, allowing the case to proceed potentially as far as the U.S. Supreme Court.

There are no shortages of such opportunities, for African movements regularly voice anger against international capital. David Seddon and Leo Zeilig identify a ‘first wave’ of popular struggles and ‘IMF riots’ from the mid-1970s through 1980s which might be seen as a ‘precursor to the contemporary phenomenon of the “anti-globalisation movement”; others are more sceptical, seeing them as merely localised expressions of anger and outrage’ (Seddon & Zeilig 2005:16–22). The second wave of popular protest during the 1990s, say the authors, was ‘more explicitly political with more far-reaching aims and objectives’, involving 86 major protest movements in 30 countries evident in 1991 alone, and three dozen dictatorial regimes swept out of power from 1990-94 ‘by a combination of street demonstrations, mass strikes and other forms of protest’.

In no cases, however, did the ‘three dozen dictatorial regimes’ give way to genuine democracies and prosecution of those responsible for long periods of enforced looting. It is here that much greater international solidarity deserves our attention. The most formidable single case of this since the anti-apartheid movement itself may have been the Treatment Action Campaign’s international effort to end the pharmaceutical patent monopoly on lifesaving anti-retroviral medicines during the early 2000s. Given that AIDS has so much potential for generating social conflict in micro and macro settings, such cases deserve continual revisiting and revitalisation with the aim of linking issues and movements in a manner capable of responding to vast challenge represented by uneven development, primitive accumulation and social conflict.

In sum, to become a more effective force in fighting for eco-social justice and not only peace (for one without the other is impossible), social movements need to transcend the often purely political analysis offered in the shallower (or even neoliberal) versions of peace studies. A far-reaching critique of capitalist social relations is crucial to prevent the kinds of renewed socioeconomic conflict that emerges between elites in ‘post-conflict’ situations. For Africa, suffering such intense, unrelenting looting, perhaps theories such as uneven and combined development can assist with more accurate diagnoses, and potentially guide us to a broader politics of genuine, durable conflict resolution.
CHAPTER 11
AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS: SECURING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ACROSS BORDERS

Tim Murithi

The African continent continues to endure the tragic affliction of violent conflict and the effects of underdevelopment. Persistent violent confrontation as well as political instability plague Africa, but a significant number of countries are undergoing post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. The fact that some countries are either incapable of resolving or unwilling to resolve their internal disputes shifts the burden of making and building peace to sub-regional, continental, and international institutions. The efficacy of such institutions in promoting peace is therefore an appropriate topic for analysis and research. The articles and chapters here describe and analyse the institutional processes and frameworks that have been established to secure peace and development across African nations’ borders.

Past and present efforts to ensure sustainable peace and development in Africa have been systematically undermined by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day. After colonialism, it was the cold war; currently, the phenomenon and pressure of globalisation are affecting African peace and development efforts. A major challenge in trying to resolve disputes in Africa is to effectively deal with the role of international actors in fuelling conflict. Peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions therefore have a key role to play in moderating the pressures resulting from the external forces of globalisation as well as internal forces.

External actors can succeed in undermining peace and development in Africa only with the collusion of corrupt local leaders. Africa’s ability and capacity to promote peace has also been undermined by the lack of political will among its leaders. What is certain now is that the promotion of peace and development across Africa is no longer the task of the individual nation-state. As David Francis notes in ‘Linking Peace, Security and Developmental Regionalism’, advancing peace and development is at the least a continent-wide challenge that requires ensuring greater integration and coordination; at its greatest extent, it is a global responsibility that requires effective multilateralism.

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union was motivated, at least theoretically, by a spirit of solidarity and institutional cooperation. In particular, the African Union’s Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, issued in Addis Ababa on 28 February 2004, outlines a broad strategy for collective security on the continent. The AU Peace and Security Council was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of 2002. The council interacts with a range of other institutions, including the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System, and the Panel of the Wise. The AU Peace Fund was established to underwrite peace operations. Apart from the Peace and Security Council, the other institutions that constitute the AU’s peace and security architecture are yet to become fully operational. The objective is to ensure a degree of interoperability between AU institutions and those of the United Nations.

The United Nations is vital to the peace, security, and development of Africa. Although its primary mission is to save populations from the ‘scourge of war’, it has not always
lived up to Africans' expectations. These include the tragic abdication of responsibility to protect witnesses during the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and the current failure to implement the UN Security Council resolution on the hybrid peace operation in the Darfur region of Sudan. The United Nations needs urgently to reassert itself as a vehicle for multilateralism and leader in the collective resolution of disputes in Africa as elsewhere around the world. As Tim Murithi notes in 'Towards a Symbiotic Partnership', the UN Peacebuilding Commission will have to play a key role in stabilising African countries emerging from conflict, but this can be effectively achieved only through close collaboration with the institutions of the African Union and regional economic communities.

Development is the glue that holds together the peace. To sustain peace in Africa, institutions must also ensure that development proceeds in tandem. There is a need for the African Union to emphasise economic independence and identify programmes that will bring genuine development to African peoples. The AU's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was designed by African leaders and adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001. NEPAD proposes ways to advance and accelerate Africa's peace and security by building a strong foundation for development and economic growth. One of the criticisms of NEPAD, however, is that it did not include the views of African civil society, and even after its creation, the African Union has made no effort to consult civil societies. John Tesha notes in his article, 'Reminiscences and Personal Reflections', that NEPAD 'defines as the major preconditions for development, peace, security, and stability and economic cooperation.' This framework focuses on improved access to education and training, access to healthcare, and the building of infrastructure necessary to make Africa an equal partner in global trade and economic development. Some critics of NEPAD argue that the programme cannot succeed because it tries to integrate Africa into the global framework of neo-liberal, laissez-faire economics that is part of the reason why Africa finds itself in its current situation.

As for institution building, it is evident that the views of African civil society are often ignored or marginalised. Institutions working in isolation cannot promote peace and development across African borders. Thelma Ekiyor and Noria Mashumba, in 'Civil Society and Collaborative Arrangements with ECCAS', discuss this issue at length. 'The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Central Africa', the report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution from which it is excerpted, emphasises that the institutional interface between civil society and African organisations is vital for the promotion of peace and development across the continent.

Strategies for Promoting Peace and Development: Policy Recommendations

The transnational nature of the threat to human security, peace, and development caused by conflict, misrule, and corruption suggests that African and international institutions need to adopt innovative and robust strategies for addressing these issues. At the heart of this strategy is a commitment towards pan-Africanism and the acceptance and internalisation of pan-African norms, values, and principles. One legacy of colonialism is a 'hyper-sensitivity' in most African countries to 'unauthorised' or coercive actions by external actors. Indeed, a number of African leaders have adopted a strategy of blaming 'western' interests whenever their corrupt governance practices are called into question or indigenous civil society actors challenge the legitimacy of their rule. As a result, although Africa requires a range of multilateral actors and institutions to support its peace and development initiatives, there exist substantial challenges in doing so.

Despite such challenges, the United Nations remains engaged in Africa, and rightly so. In terms of peace and security, Africa remains part and parcel of the core business of the UN Security Council. The ongoing reluctance of the United Nations to establish a 'permanent' African voice in council proceedings, however, exemplifies how global institutions remain skewed against African interests. The same situation is replicated in the international financial institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The status quo ensures that Africa will remain for the time being a target recipient of the paternal largesse of the 'developed' world.
It is clear that a dual approach is needed to strengthen the capacity to promote peace and development in Africa. The first component is for Pan-African institutions to establish a greater degree of internal coherence as well as the ability to monitor and manage misrule across the continent. The second component is a transformation in global institutions so they can effectively accommodate and internalise African perspectives and work effectively in tandem with Africa’s institutions. Furthermore, these dual approaches should be linked by civil society initiatives at national, continental, and international levels to support, monitor, and keep in check the progress of the African continent towards stability, peace, democratic governance, and development.
LINKING PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM:
REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

David J. Francis

Abstract

The multiplicity of wars and armed conflicts in Africa, coupled with diverse security threats and challenges, has refocused international policy and academic attention on the peace-security-development nexus. A particular area of concern is what role African regional economic and security organisations could play in conflict stabilisation, conflict management and winning the peace in transition societies in post-Cold War Africa. This article critically explores the nexus of peace, security and development within the framework of the resurgence of economic and security regionalisms with a particular focus on regionalist projects in Africa, including ECOWAS in West Africa, SADC in Southern Africa and IGAD in the Horn of Africa. Of particular relevance is the exploration of the role of viable, strong and modern states in driving and strengthening the nexus within the framework of economic and security regionalism in Africa.

Introduction

Nowhere in the world are the problems and challenges of security and development more prominent than in Africa. The multiplicity of wars, armed conflicts and security threats (from both military and non-military sources) has foisted on academics, policy practitioners and development and conflict interveners the imperative to engage with the link between peace, security and development (henceforth the 'nexus'). A focus on economic and security integration in Africa provides an innovative perspective and context for understanding the connections of the nexus. The inextricable link between economic regionalism and security integration highlights the fact that it is impossible to achieve the economic growth and development objectives of integration in an environment of wars, armed conflicts and perpetual regional political instability. Violent wars and multiple security threats have challenged the narrow traditional academic and policy approaches to Development Studies, Peace Studies and Security Studies as separate disciplines with little or no interconnectedness. Africa provides a range of challenges and opportunities for understanding the conceptual, policy-relevant and empirical understanding of the nexus.

To illustrate the critical connections, this article advances the framework of a peace-security-development nexus as a disciplinary bridge for understanding this nexus. The first section outlines the international policy setting, which leads to an interpretation of peace and security theoretically linked to developmental regionalism and cast in terms of new regionalism in Africa. The second section applies the peace-security-development nexus to European Union integration, assessing insights and applicability for Africa. The third examines how wars and armed conflicts have undermined the achievement of the regional economic integration and development objectives, and in the process forced on the regionalist projects the imperative to develop peace, security and conflict management mechanisms as a strategy to maintain regional peace and security—the prerequisite for regional economic growth and development. The fourth section evaluates three regional case studies: regional economic integration and peacekeeping interventions in West Africa; regional economic and developmental regionalism in the Horn of Africa; and regional economic and security integration in Southern Africa. The article concludes by arguing that despite the limitations and challenges facing Africa's economic and security regionalisms, especially the fact that weak states drive the regionalisation process, the continent provides valuable insight into understanding not only the dynamics of the peace-security-development nexus, but also how to strengthen the policy approaches and responses to development and conflict interventions.
Redefining Peace, Security and Developmental Regionalism: The Critical Connections

Agenda Setting of Security and Development Policies: What We Know and Why Limited International Action?

A glance at the literature and policy practice of conflict and development interventions by a range of national, regional and international actors illustrates that regional economic and security integration has been the missing link in development and security studies. These actors have assumed a positive correlation between security and development. This assumption has recently been applied to the practice of economic and security regionalism in Africa with the understanding that conflict can no longer be treated primarily as a peace and security issue, but rather should be treated as an important development issue. This raises some questions. How do we know that there is a positive correlation between security and development? How do we theoretically and methodologically explain this correlation?

Evidence suggests that the assumed positive correlation is not rooted in rigorous research and in-depth policy analysis. The policies and social realities of the security development nexus are disjointed and do not provide a coherent and useful guide for conflict and development interventions. In effect this nexus has been policy driven and not research-driven. In addition, the compartmentalisation of security and development as separate disciplines has obfuscated the critical connections. To understand the disciplinary intersections, one should start by challenging some of the dominant discourses on development and security, in particular the imposition of ‘security’, ‘development’ and ‘liberal peace’ agendas on the developing world. A research programme should also include an evaluation of the effects of the policies and interventions of the rich countries (the global North) on developing countries (the global South). In addition, there is need to focus on human development and security that confronts both vertical and horizontal inequalities, in particular the focus on the resilience of developing countries and peoples. A critical dimension is how to engage with the failure of development in the South and why does the international community “conveniently” ignore some of the failures? Rather than simply describe the security-development nexus in terms of positive outcomes, we should recognise and incorporate the tensions, contradictions and potential social costs in the implementation of the nexus. This requires a critical review of the informal dimensions of ‘development’ (e.g. informal economy) and ‘security’ (e.g. civil militias), and how to utilise local and regional actors in conflict and development interventions owned by the local communities and peoples. Security and development are thus mutually reinforcing, though with tensions, contradictions and potential social costs. Let us now endeavour to provide an understanding of the narrow and traditional compartmentalisation of development, security and peace studies, and work towards their reconceptualisation.

Traditionally, economic integration has been treated as an approach to regional economic growth and development, creating concepts such as customs union theory, transactionalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism to explain the phenomenon of international integration (Caporaso 1998; Keohane & Nye 1987). Even within the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations, despite acknowledging the normative underpinnings of regional economic integration as an approach to peace and security, not much effort was made conceptually and empirically to explore the connections between regional economic integration, peace and security—in particular how they reinforce each other. More recently the political economy approach to regional economic integration, cast in terms of the new regionalism debate within the context of globalisation, has contributed to bringing the academic and policy debate on the nexus (among) peace, security and economic regionalism to the fore. To understand the linkages it is important to start with brief definitions for peace, security, development and economic integration.

Defining Peace

If we argue that there may be a link between peace, security and development, it is important to illustrate what kind of peace are we referring to, specifically peace for ‘whom’
Peace is a contested concept and has attracted different interpretations. Briefly peace is about the absence of war, fear, conflict, anxiety, human suffering and violence and about peaceful co-existence. The Norwegian peace theorist, Johann Galtung (1996), has pointed to three types of violence relevant to the understanding of peace: direct violence (physical, emotional and psychological); structural violence (i.e. deliberate policies and structures that cause human suffering, death and harm); and cultural violence (i.e. cultural norms and practices that create discrimination, injustice and human suffering). Galtung also differentiates between ‘negative peace’—the absence of direct violence, war, fear and conflict at individual, national, regional and international levels—and ‘positive peace’: the absence of unjust structures, unequal relationships and injustice, and inner peace at an individual level. While these conceptual categories may be useful, it is important to highlight that different cultures and civilisations have different interpretations of peace which are grounded in the particular historical experience and specific political context of a country, society or region. For example, the majority of people in the Great Lakes region of Africa associate peace with the absence of war and armed conflict, while those in Southern Africa associate peace with the absence of depressing social and development indicators such as poverty and the AIDS pandemic (Freedman & Poku 2005). The concept of peace in all its manifestations is therefore about security, development and social justice. It is this broader understanding of peace that links it to security and development.

Redefining Security

A reconceptualisation of peace, conflict and development practice illustrates the inextricable link between peace and security. According to Terry Terriff et al (1999), even though peace is widely accepted as the absence of warfare, the concept of peace has remained unexplored, until recently, as a security issue. But how do we define security and how does it relate to peace? Security, albeit a ‘contested concept’, is generally understood to be about the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to acquired values. Put simply, security is about survival and the conditions of human existence (Buzan 1991; Thomas & Wilkin 1999). The traditional concept of security has largely focused on the state as the primary referent object of security.

Various scholars have criticised the traditional military conception of security because it does not account for the emerging non-military sources of threat to security at the individual, societal, state, regional and global levels. This has led to the broadening of the concept to embrace non-military dimensions such as environment, migration, ethnoreligious and nationalist identities, poverty and economic insecurity, and disease. This broadening of the security agenda is now described as Critical Security Studies. In the African context there are both military and non-military sources of security threats. Security is about protection and preservation from fear and danger that threatens the survival of societies and peoples. It is about survival and the conditions of human existence in a continent with depressing social and development indicators, with an estimated 47% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa living on less than a dollar a day. Security, therefore, is about peace, development and justice because the absence of all three of these creates the conditions for conflict and armed violence. In this conceptualisation we see the inextricable linkages between peace and security and the imperative for the securitisation of peace.

Securitising Development

Violent wars in Africa and the devastating consequences on development and security highlight the limitations of the traditional interpretation of development studies and practice. The emerging post-Cold War debate is on the securitisation of development, i.e. treating development as a security issue because wars and armed conflicts exacerbate the problems of underdevelopment and insecurity. The problems of underdevelopment such
as poverty, social exclusion and gross violations of human rights in some cases instigate violent conflicts. Hence development studies and practice have been forced to look beyond their traditional focus to critical issues such as peace, security and the impact of violent conflict. But what is development and what type of development are we describing, in particular development by and for whom and for what purpose? Some argue that development is a relative term, meaning different things to different peoples and communities. In general, the concept is a positive one, connoting ‘progress’ or ‘change for the better’. As such the definition has embraced: economic growth; basic human needs and human development (food, shelter, clothing, education and health care, and freedom, democratic participation and human dignity); sustainable development and political development (Allen & Thomas 2000; Burnell & Randall 2005).

From this expanded definition it follows that development is about equality and social justice; positive change at personal, societal, national and global levels; and about peace and security. But development is also driven by contradictions and tensions because the process of achieving positive social change also includes negative social costs. In the practice of development a whole range of actors—governments, donor agencies, international development and financial institutions and regional groupings—have been silent about the social and destructive costs of development. Furthermore, the dominant development paradigms advanced by the North, such as modernisation and neo-liberalism within the context of globalisation, have emerged as the universal blueprint for the policies and practice of development, and in the process neglected all other alternative forms and approaches to development. Accepting the varied interpretations of development, it becomes easy to appreciate the interconnectedness between peace, security and development.

Conceptualising Developmental Regionalism: Explaining the Missing Link

To appreciate the critical connections of the nexus, we have to explore further their links to regional economic integration. The driving force for the establishment of regional economic integration in contemporary world politics has generally been seen as an approach to economic growth and development for maintaining regional peace and security. In economics and development terms, the advantages derived from regional complementarity of goods and services, economies of scale, comparative advantage and industrialisation were motivating factors for the creation of regionalist projects in different parts of the world. Regional political, security and identity-based issues were also reasons motivating geographically proximate states to cooperate and integrate their economies and communities. A dominant interpretation of regional economic integration has to do with the normative assumptions, i.e. about development, regional order, security and peace. In effect regional integration was perceived as a ‘good thing’. After World War II international integration became a dominant strategy for international cooperation and regional development.

Functionalists such as David Mitrany (1966) argued that the provision of common needs through functional strategies across national borders would unite people and the evolving mutual interactions and interconnectedness would potentially create an identity of community citizenship. Karl Deutsch (1957) also outlined a framework for the emergence of a security community that avoided the use of force in inter-state relations and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Both Mitrany and Deutsch, in describing the normative underpinnings of international integration, talked about the potential for developing ‘islands of peace’ and a ‘working peace system’ based on liberal economics and democratic politics. However, the normative assumptions are silent on the potentially negative dimensions of regional economic integration, i.e. that increased regional integration has a tendency to create regional conflicts and perpetuate economic exploitation. Often regional integration carries the risk of reproducing dominant forms of power; the stronger and more developed states tend to be the net beneficiaries (Francis 2001; Schulz et al 2001). In addition, regional economic integration creates a ‘growth pole’ detrimental to weaker states in the integration grouping, whereby the majority of the foreign direct investors and regional institutions tend to favour the more developed and stronger states (Schulz
et al 2001:1-7; Fawcett & Hurrel 1995; Francis 2001). Finally, regional integration entails a ‘pooling of sovereignties’ which by implication undermined the political, economic and fiscal sovereignty of member states in a regionalist project.

The Peace-Security-Development Nexus: European Integration

European integration in the post-war period is one of the few successful examples to demonstrate the peace-security-development nexus. Europe, emerging from the devastation of World War II, experimented with the concept and practice of regional integration and cooperation. In the immediate post-war era, the primary consideration was how to prevent inter-state wars in Europe, create a conducive environment for regional peace, order and security and build cooperation among the states and communities that would ensure interdependence. The difficult transition from post-war recovery to development and dealing with Europe’s perpetual security problems led to the creation of a regional integration and cooperation grouping. Consequently when the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, they were based on the notion of sharing regional collective resources in development and security terms.

Between 1960 and 2003 the EEC expanded to 25 member states in a European Union (EU), with a common ‘European community identity’—a supranational institution in the form of a European Commission with a parliament and a common currency, the Euro. The established EU governmental structure is based on principles of liberal economics and democratic politics.

But Europe as we know it today has not always been stable and economically developed with viable modern states. William Wallace argues that ‘West European integration was a product not only of a common culture and history, and of a particular geographical density, but also of a common disaster and predicament: the war and its aftermath, American hegemony and the Soviet threat’ (Wallace 1995:201). To respond to these diverse regional problems, Europe implemented constructive development and security programmes and policies such as the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Lomé Convention outlining the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific economic relations (ACP), a common market with a customs union, political cooperation and a common foreign and security policy. These regional postwar development and security programmes were supported by the U.S.-backed Marshall Plan. The regional policies and programmes led to the building and intensification of economic, social, political and security interdependence. In addition, European policies on regime and security convergence led to the political stability and democratic success of former military and authoritarian regimes such as Greece, Spain and Portugal and the new member states from the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe. Traditional ‘enemies’ such as France and Germany are now locked into a mutual economic, security, development and political partnership. Despite the progress in linking security and development in Europe, however, the EU is still plagued by the perpetual amity-enmity divide about the nature of the European project either as a ‘partnership of nations’ or a ‘federal political union’. The rejection of the EU proposed constitution by France and Holland in 2005 reinforces the view that the security development nexus is not problem-free.

What we see emerging in the EU is a deliberate policy and practice to gradually link regional peace-security-development in order to build diverse interdependent states and peoples sharing a ‘common European identity’. The EU case also illustrates that viable, strong and modern states are crucial to the nexus at both national and regional levels.

The African Context

To what extent are African states—most of which have weak, failing and cash-strapped economies—able to lend themselves to the difficult and demanding project of linking peace, security and development both at national and regional levels? Are there any successful African examples? Answering these questions requires examining ‘why’ and ‘how’
regional economic integration and cooperation in Africa expanded into the domain of regional peace, security and conflict management.

An overview of contemporary violent conflicts and the socio-development situation in Africa gives an insight into the 'why' and the imperative of the nexus. The post-colonial political and security landscape of Africa is littered with inter-state and intra-state wars and armed conflicts. By 2002 there were 18 active wars and armed conflicts in Africa at different levels of intensity or at different stages of transition from war to peace. Most of these wars are being fought in some of the world's poorest countries. Civilians have become the main target and victims in these civil wars, accounting for more than 90% of the casualties (UNDP 2002:16). According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2002, an estimated 3.6 million people were killed in internal warfare in the 1990s and half of all civilian casualties are children, with an estimated 200,000 child soldiers in Africa of the 300,000 worldwide. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons grew by 50%. The civil wars in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone have led to state collapse and societal fragmentation. Attempts have been made to negotiate civil war peace settlements, and multinational peacekeeping forces, both regional and from the United Nations, have been deployed. Low-intensity ethno-religious and political conflicts in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sudan and Central Africa Republic continue to undermine peace and stability on the continent.

The cumulative effect of armed conflicts and instability is that they undermine and deter the attainment of regional economic integration and development objectives. Hence a variety of complex domestic, regional and external factors have forced the originally established economic groupings in Africa to expand into the peace and security domain. Experimental regional peace and security initiatives by originally chartered economic groupings, despite their limitations and shortcomings, illustrate the resilience and resurgence of regionalism in Africa—and a tacit recognition that development and economic integration objectives cannot be achieved in an environment of insecurity, wars and armed conflicts. This section therefore explores the specific regional context of the peace-development-security nexus in Africa.

**ECOWAS Integration and Regional ‘Collective’ Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in West Africa**

Robert Kaplan portrayed the West African sub-region in 1994 as having the potential to become the ‘real strategic danger’ threatening international peace and security. Why West Africa? The sub-region comprises 16 geographically proximate states that have emerged as distinct political and socio-economic entities. Its diverse political history is reflected in the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone colonial divide which has often played itself out in the arena of sub-regional politics. In the immediate post-independence period most countries in the region had promising economic development prospects, but a combination of domestic and external forces have turned the sub-region into one of the least developed in the world. The countries are excessively reliant on official development assistance and export economies based on extracting minerals such as diamonds and oil. Their demographics describe a large and growing youth population, mostly unemployed, lacking in skills and educational opportunities. These depressing social and development indicators have a devastating impact on the sustainability of human security. In the 1990s the combined effects of the end of the Cold War and the negative impacts of globalisation, coupled with the nature of domestic politics—based on neopatrimonialism—and economic decay, led to state collapse and civil wars as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire.

The nature of conflicts in West Africa demonstrates the importance of understanding the ‘regional conflict complex’ exacerbated by local, intra-state, regional and international factors. These armed conflicts are not just confined to state borders, but the regional dynamics also often fuel and sustain these wars through the activities of the shadow economy and ‘peace spoilers’. The military security threats in West Africa are not only limited to wars
and armed conflicts, but include criminal and intra-communal violence and involve civil militias and mercenaries and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

In recognition of the security and development challenges faced by the West African states, in 1975 the countries in the sub-region established a regional integration and cooperation grouping in the form of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), comprising 16 member states with market integration and common market objectives. ECOWAS has had limited success in achieving its economic integration and development objectives, notably in facilitating intra-regional trade, regional economic growth and social progress, and has had a negligible impact on the lives of West Africans. Despite its attempts at market integration and facilitating the free movement of the factors of production within the region, physical or regional infrastructural integration is limited.

Developments in the 1990s forced ECOWAS to expand into the peace and security domains. These included the devastating impact of violent civil wars in the region which spilled over into neighbouring countries, the changed international political and security environment with the end of the Cold War, and the perceived international neglect of Africa after the Cold War. This prompted the realisation that violent wars and regional instability undermine and prevent the achievement of regional economic and development objectives.

Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon, was instrumental in the creation of ECOWAS. With the new conflict and security challenges, Nigeria played a leading role in the formation of the regional peacekeeping and intervention force, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which gave it the opportunity to promote and achieve its foreign and security policies. ECOMOG was an ad hoc coalition of ‘willing states’ deployed in 1990 in Liberia to assist in stabilising and managing the civil war. Its experiments in regional peacekeeping and conflict management/stabilisation in West Africa covered:

- ECOWAS civil war peace settlements and ECOMOG peacekeeping and conflict management in Liberia from 1990 to 1997, and ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in August 2003;
- ECOWAS/ECOMOG peacekeeping and ‘democratic intervention’ in Sierra Leone (ECOMOG II) in 1998;
- ECOWAS as peace broker and ECOMOG ceasefire monitoring in Guinea Bissau in 1999; and
- ECOWAS civil war peace settlement and ECOMICI conflict stabilisation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004.

The ECOWAS experiments in maintaining regional peace, security and order have been supported by UN-ECOMOG co-deployment peacekeeping and peace support operations, external pivotal states interventions such as the British ‘Operation Palliser’ in Sierra Leone, French peacekeeping deployment in Côte d’Ivoire, and U.S. military deployment in Liberia in 2003.

In the light of the above, West Africa may not be the best example of linking peace, security and development because the efforts to respond to regional conflict and security challenges have not been based on constructive and long-term strategies to link the issues. In addition member states of ECOWAS, in pursuit of selfish strategic interests, have supported and instigated wars and armed conflicts in neighbouring states. An example is the Liberia-backed insurgency in Sierra Leone. Even within the framework of regional peacekeeping intervention the members have often failed to agree on a common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, ECOMOG peacekeeping and intervention efforts have been largely in pursuit of Nigeria’s political security, and economic and military strategic interests. Regional peacekeepers have been involved in gross violations of human rights and the exploitation of war economies in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is therefore questionable whether the ECOWAS expansion into the peace and security domain provides building blocks for promoting the realisation of the nexus.
Developmental Regionalism and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa: Attempts to Link Security and Development

In contrast to the West African sub-region, a variety of developmental challenges caused by natural disasters such as drought and famine, further accentuated by perennial wars and violent conflicts, have forced countries in the Horn of Africa to develop policies that illustrate the nexus. The Horn comprises Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.

The Horn demonstrates diversity in ecological, political, socio-cultural and economic terms. Most of its peoples depend on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism in the face of scarce natural resources. The pervasiveness of conflict and the rampant use of land-mines in the region have had devastating effects on economic activities and the environment. Most countries in the Horn have implemented structural adjustment programmes with varying degrees of success. Their level of development is reflected in depressing economic and social indicators, reinforcing the perception of the region as a ‘disaster zone’. Peter Woodward (2003:173) comments that the Horn is the ‘stage on which Africa’s tragedy is played out in stark and violent form’. The regional impacts of environmental and development problems on human security led to the formation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986. IGADD initially focused on issues of drought, famine and desertification in the region. The resurgence of regionalism in world politics in the 1990s caused the political leadership of IGADD to consider transforming the authority, and at an extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa in 1995 the decision was taken to revitalise the institution and to expand its remit to cover peace and security. At a 1996 summit in Nairobi IGADD agreed to establish the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Its three primary areas of focus were food security and environmental protection; infrastructural development (transport and communications) and regional conflict prevention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs. An evident manifestation of the peace-security-development nexus in the Horn is the transformation of IGAD from its original preoccupation with environmental protection and development cooperation to address the nascent problems of regional peace and security. IGAD has made efforts to facilitate civil war peace settlements in Somalia and Sudan in collaboration with sub-regional pivotal states such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and other external actors such as the EU, the U.S. and the African Union.

Though the developmental regionalism efforts by IGAD have not provided the expected economic and development benefits, due to a combination of national, regional and international factors, the regional organisation has started to put into place the structures and mechanisms for linking regional peace, security and development. It has established the IGAD Centre for Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and facilitated conflict management in both Sudan and Somalia. The expectation is that peace and stability in the Horn will potentially create a conducive environment for the achievement of regional economic and developmental objectives.

However, it is premature to perceive the peace and security efforts by IGAD as laying a solid foundation for regional security and development. IGAD member states, like ECOWAS countries, habitually intervene to instigate armed conflict in neighbouring countries. IGAD countries have failed to forge a common foreign and security policy necessary for regional peace and a stable political order. Rather, the relative success of IGAD’s preventive diplomacy efforts in both Sudan and Somalia has been made possible by the EU-IGAD Partnership Forum and U.S. financial, political and diplomatic backing. In particular the Bush Administration, for a variety of political considerations, including pressures from the American Christian right, the ‘war on terror’ and oil energy needs, has backed the Sudan and Somalia civil war peace settlements.

SADC and the Challenges of Regional Integration in Southern Africa

The heterogeneous regional space now described as ‘Southern Africa’, according to Fredrick Söderbaum, has been collectively constructed by ‘state, market, society and external
actors in a historical perspective’ (2002:59). The political history of Southern Africa had been largely dominated by the struggles for political independence of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonial domination, the political liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and its policy of regional destabilisation. The end of the Cold War ushered in a wave of democratic governance in Southern Africa and led to the transformation of some of its authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes. South Africa is the economic giant in the sub-region. Though Britain, the U.S., Japan and Germany remain South Africa’s main trading partners, Southern Africa is emerging as an increasingly strategic and valuable export market.

However, the depressing social and development indicators in Southern Africa not only reveal the disparity among the countries of the region, but also manifest the multidimensional security problems and challenges that belie the putative economic growth and development in the SADC region. Life expectancy at birth in 2001 of relatively developed countries such as Seychelles and Mauritius is 72.2 and 71.6 years respectively. This is in sharp contrast with life expectancy in other relatively developed states in the region such as South Africa (50.9), Namibia (47.4), and Botswana (44.7) (UNDP 2004: 238-9). The AIDS pandemic is largely responsible for this depressing disparity. The multiple security and development challenges led to the creation of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980 as the regional development mechanism to respond to these problems. However, SADCC’s sectoral development approach was a failure, and coupled with the changed international security and political environment with the end of the Cold War, the regional body was transformed in 1992 to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with a common market objective. The end of apartheid in South Africa and of the Cold War have led to relative political stability in much of Southern Africa.

Regional integration in Southern Africa, like West Africa and the Horn, is driven by the amity-enmity dynamic. While it may foster mutual interdependence and an ethos of collective security, it may also lead to competition, conflict, mutual suspicion and a lack of peaceful coexistence. The personality conflict between former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe flowed into the complex politics of the region, with South Africa emerging as the reluctant subregional hegemon and Zimbabwe as the hegemonic pretender—in effect dividing the region into rival political camps, the ‘two SADCs’.

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the threat to regional peace and security led to intervention by neighbouring states such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on the one hand, and the deployment of the SADC Allied Armed Forces (SADC-AAF), including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, on the other. This gave rise to what has been described as ‘Africa’s First World War’ and the partitioning of DRC into rival security, military, economic and political spheres of strategic interests. The deployment of the SADC-AAF peacekeeping and conflict stabilisation force helped to contain the conflict, forced ceasefire and peace agreements on the warring factions, succeeded in stopping some of the killings and created a fragile security situation that ensured the survival of the Kinshasa government. It also made possible the deployment of the French-led EU peacekeeping force—Operation Atermis—in the east of the country. This paved the way for the withdrawal of foreign troops by Rwanda and Uganda and the eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC. The peace has yet to hold and is threatened by a variety of regional ‘spoiler’ problems.

SADC expansion into regional peacekeeping and conflict management, like that of ECOWAS, has been fraught with problems. There is a debate as to whether the SADC intervention was a peacekeeping deployment or a ‘coalition of willing states’, in particular Zimbabwe, in pursuit of strategic security and economic interests in a ‘free-for-all’ exploitation of DRC’s war economy. This article argues that SADC’s expansion into regional conflict management has not been based on a coherent policy approach in linking the nexus in practical terms. Rather, this ad hoc intervention is largely driven by the diverse and conflicting strategic interests of major regional partners. The real challenge for SADC
is how to capitalise on this ad hoc intervention to begin the process of institutionalising the nexus.

**Beyond the Ad Hoc Approach: Opportunities for Institutionalising the Nexus**

Returning to the question of Africa’s potential to provide constructive examples of the nexus at national and regional levels, the response is both ‘no’ and ‘yes’. While efforts undertaken so far have been fraught with challenges that lead to questions of sustainability, sub-regional examples unfailingly illustrate ‘why’ and ‘how’ we need to understand the nexus in Africa. In all the three regional case studies, the lack of pre-existing integrative approaches to development and security led to violent wars and armed conflicts, state collapse, warlordism and societal fragmentation. Now, however, some tentative efforts are being made to tackle problems of violent conflicts and insecurity in an integrative regional manner. The ECOWAS/ECOMOG peacekeeping and conflict management interventions in West Africa have reinforced the need for a stable regional peace, security and political order to achieve development and economic growth. Similar lessons could be drawn from the preventive diplomacy interventions of IGAD and the SADC-AAF deployment. Out of these ad hoc, ‘fire brigade’ interventions we see the emergence of regional mechanisms put in place to attempt to address the peace, conflict, security and development problematic. Examples are the ECOWAS 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 1996 SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. However, the mere establishment of these regional peace and security structures does not guarantee practical implementation.

Several key lessons from the European model explaining the nexus are relevant for Africa. First, for regional economic and security integration to succeed there should be strong, viable and modern states; this has not been the case in Africa. Any project in Africa linking security and development will require efficient political and economic management of the state. Furthermore the international systemic factors that marginalise African countries in accessing world markets and global economic forces all pose serious external challenges to the possibility of efficient African states and therefore reduce the possibility of successfully linking security and development. Second, the European experience shows that consolidating the gains of the security-development nexus is a drawn-out and gradual process, not a ‘quick-fix’ project. Some media commentators and international policy practitioners are often critical of Africa’s slow pace or lack of progress in establishing the nexus in practical terms; hence we see depictions of Africa as the ‘Hopeless Continent’, as The Economist described it in 2000. These analysts do not take into account that it has taken Europe more than six decades to successfully link regional peace, security and development.

Despite available EU lessons, African sub-regional economic and security integration experiments have not yet produced a viable model for Africa. A variety of reasons account for this, including the nature of domestic politics and bad governance leading to armed conflicts and state collapse. Most of the states in Africa are weak and therefore do not have the capacity to lend themselves to the demanding tasks of linking regional peace, security and development. Three decades on, regional economic and security integration in Africa is still driven by the governing elites with limited participation by civil society and, worse still, lack of societal ownership of the regionalisation process. In addition Africa’s regionalist projects are far too busy copying EU and OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) models of economic and security integration, rather than exploring alternative strategies of linking the nexus that are context-specific and historically relevant and reflect the African realisms.

What do we learn from the nascent efforts of weak, poor and underdeveloped states responding to the complex problems and challenges of linking regional peace, security and development? Rather than conclude on a pessimistic note, the author believes that real opportunities exist in Africa to link peace, development and security. Nascent institutional mechanisms and ad hoc structures are being established, as demonstrated by all the regional examples. The real challenge is how to move beyond the ad hoc approach...
to long-term regional strategies of institutionalising the nexus. Perhaps the international political commitment and goodwill generated by the ‘Year of Africa’ (2005) provides a window of opportunity to incorporate the nexus into all international policy processes and responses on Africa.

**TOWARDS A SYMBIOTIC PARTNERSHIP:**
THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND THE EVOLVING AU/NEPAD POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK

Tim Murithi


“Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements . . . if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner.”

— Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, March 2005

**Introduction**

Post-conflict reconstruction processes depend principally on the commitment and efforts of the primary actors in a dispute. There is, however, a role for external actors such as civil society and intergovernmental organisations. The United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission was established in September 2005 with the express mandate to assist countries in post-conflict transition to consolidate their peacebuilding processes. The African Union (AU) and its flagship programme the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has also enumerated a framework to enhance the capacity and efficacy of African countries to promote peace and to consolidate reconstruction (see Mwanasali in this volume). As things stand, there is still no formal relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission and the AU/NEPAD frameworks for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. Currently, there are no formal relationships between the Peacebuilding Commission and other regional bodies. This chapter will make the case for greater collaboration between the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU/NEPAD framework. In particular, we will argue that the Peacebuilding Commission and AU/NEPAD need to develop a symbiotic partnership predicated on complementarity. Such a relationship is necessary in order to avoid the duplication or replication of functions and strategically to target the disbursement of mobilised resources.

This chapter will briefly outline the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. It will then briefly enumerate what is meant by the promotion of a symbiotic partnership. This will be followed by an assessment of the emergence of the UN and AU frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction, before identifying ways in which a symbiotic partnership can be forged between the UN and the AU.

**The Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

The conflicts that have plagued parts of post-colonial Africa have brought about the collapse of social and economic structures and generated political tension. Infrastructure has been damaged and education and health services have suffered, not to mention the environmental damage which has been caused by conflicts. Socio-economic development has also been severely retarded as a result of the carnage and destruction caused by con-
flicts. The effects of conflicts in terms of refugee flows into neighbouring countries and the emergence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has demonstrated that no African country is an island unto itself (see Deng in this volume). Refugee camps in the Mano River Union region of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have served as a source of instability for countries in the region. It is estimated that there are close to three million refugees in central Africa alone. The camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from the Rwandan genocide of 1994, remain a source of concern for all the key actors involved in the Great Lakes region. Two hundred thousand refugees have spilled into Chad as a result of the violent conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region, creating tension along the border. These situations illustrate the need for effective post-conflict reconstruction processes and the institutions to back them up. IDPs and refugees make it difficult for host communities and displaced communities to settle down and initiate development. Therefore, a central pillar of post-conflict reconstruction is the incorporation of IDPs and refugees into the host community or the repatriation of refugees, after consideration of possible risks, back to their country of origin.

By post-conflict reconstruction, we are referring to the medium to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This includes the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. It also includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law in order to consolidate peacebuilding, reconciliation and development. Local populations in war-affected regions generally tend to be the worst affected by the scourge of violence. Women and children are often faced with tremendous social upheaval. Reconstruction therefore needs to proceed with the active participation of these sectors of society. An effective strategy for promoting post-conflict reconstruction necessarily has to take into account all of these elements. Such a strategy must promote measures and propose the establishment of institutions that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. As the UN High-Level Panel Report of December 2004 noted, half of all countries emerging from conflict in the post–Cold War era relapsed into conflict within five years as a result of inadequate post-conflict peacebuilding.

Towards Symbiosis in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

One of the problems facing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes is the proliferation of external actors. These external actors engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes for various reasons. While there are those who are genuinely interested in improving the welfare of the target populations, there are others who may seek to engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes in order to secure their own economic or political interests. Non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations primarily fall into the former category. However, there are instances where these organisations can harbour ulterior motives for engaging with a post-conflict reconstruction process.

External actors come with self-ascribed mandates to assist with the peacebuilding process. As a result, there can often be a proliferation of external actors in any given post-conflict situation. The process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a war-affected community requires several different programmes functioning simultaneously. However, if multiple actors are conducting their affairs without any sense of coordination, then a duplication of functions can occur. This can lead to a waste of human and financial resources. Even though the efforts of external actors are well intentioned, they can ultimately undermine the very objective that they are trying to advance. One solution is to ensure that there is a greater degree of co-ordination based on an understanding of the needs of the local target population. This means that external actors and organisations have to establish a level of symbiosis in their peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Symbiosis refers to a relationship between two organisms or organisations which is mutually enhancing and complementary. A symbiotic relationship therefore benefits both
organisms and organisations. With reference to peacebuilding a symbiotic organisation operating in tandem with another seeks to promote a partnership in order to achieve the ultimate objective, namely, post-conflict reconstruction. Inter-organisational symbiosis in post-conflict reconstruction essentially means promoting a complementarity of functions and avoiding the duplication or replication of activities.

Three strategies for symbiosis in post-conflict reconstruction include: first, articulating more explicitly a commitment to partnership with other post-conflict reconstruction actors in the policies and mandates of their organisations; second, since policy does not always translate to practice, institutional structures need to be established to ensure that this interface actually takes place; finally, once these official structures exist, it is important to ensure that they actually work together on the ground.

The key objective of establishing a symbiotic partnership between two organisations would be to promote a complementarity of functions. Such a partnership would also strive to identify areas in which there is an unnecessary duplication of functions. The next section will examine the emergence of the UN and AU frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction prior to assessing how these organisations can enhance their strategies for promoting symbiosis in post-conflict reconstruction in Africa.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Mandate

The UN Charter of 1945 makes provisions for the promotion of peace, notably through Article 33 which states that “parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.” However, the UN, for the sixty years of its existence, has had more conflict resolution failures than successes—particularly during the Cold War—and has not lived up to its ambitious mandate of maintaining international peace and security.

The first post–Cold War effort to reform the UN in order effectively to address the issue of building peace, was undertaken by the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his landmark An Agenda for Peace published in 1992, Boutros-Ghali set out an international strategy for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction peacebuilding. Post-conflict reconstruction has therefore been part of the lexicon of building war-affected communities for more than a decade. The end of the Cold War also increased incidences of intra-state conflicts which complicated post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The support that had previously been provided by the superpowers during this era of ideological polarity was gradually withdrawn from both governments and armed resistance movements. This meant that internal disputes were left to degenerate into even more pronounced violence in war-affected countries. In Africa, major challenges were faced in rebuilding war-torn countries such as Somalia and Angola. The role of the UN in assisting to promote peace was prominent in the case of Mozambique from 1992 to 1994. With the advent of the twenty-first century, Africa is still plagued by the persistence of post-conflict challenges. The United Nations has maintained an engagement with Africa and is currently implicated in post-conflict reconstruction efforts across the continent including in southern Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Guinea-Bissau.

The Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in a March 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, recommended that UN member states establish a Peacebuilding Commission to fill the institutional gap that exists with regards to assisting countries to make the transition from war to lasting peace. Annan noted that the UN’s record in implementing and monitoring peace agreements has been tainted by some devastating failures, for example in Angola in 1993, Rwanda 1994, and challenges in Bosnia 1995 and East Timor in 1999. Since about half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years, an integral part of addressing the “scourge
of war” must involve establishing an institutional framework to ensure that peace agreements are implemented and post-conflict peacebuilding is consolidated.

It was after Annan’s report that debates about the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission increased. This culminated, in September 2005, in the UN world summit and the 60th session of the General Assembly at which the recommendations of the report were reviewed. The General Assembly adopted an Outcome Document at the close of the meeting which the UN Secretary-General described as “a once-in-a-generation opportunity” to forge a global consensus on development, security, human rights and reform. On 20 December 2005 the Security Council and the General Assembly concluded their negotiations on the operationalisation of the recommendation of the world summit and adopted joint resolutions establishing the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The Birth and Functions of the UN Peacebuilding Commission

Paragraph 97 of the Outcome Document recognised “the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation.” The Document also identified the importance of “achieving sustainable peace and recognising the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery.” On this basis, the General Assembly decided “to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental advisory body.” The established Peacebuilding Commission backed by a Peace Support Office and “a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund” marks a new level of strategic commitment to enhancing and sustaining peace after conflict.

As noted earlier, the Peacebuilding Commission intends to “bring together all relevant actors to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict Peacebuilding and recovery.” The core work of the Commission will be its country specific activities. It will strive to ensure that the international community supports national authorities, but the focus will have to be focused on country-based realities. The Peacebuilding Commission has committed itself to ensuring that national priorities are supported by the necessary mobilisation of resources. Predictable and reliable funding will need to be identified for short-term early recovery activities as well as financial investment for development over the medium-to longer-term period of recovery. The Peacebuilding Fund is therefore tasked with ensuring the provision of these resources.

The Peacebuilding Commission has been endowed with a monitoring and review function. At regular intervals, the Commission will meet to review the progress towards medium-term recovery goals, particularly with regards to developing public institutions and laying the foundations for economic recovery. The role of the new body will be to alert the international community if progress is not being made so as to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. The Commission, through effective post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, will also in effect have a preventive role in terms of preventing violence from recurring. During the debates leading up to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission several countries from the global South did not want to provide Peacebuilding Commission with a conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy role. This was due to fears of an infringement on their sovereignty by more powerful states in the rich North. The Peacebuilding Commission will therefore focus more on post-conflict peacebuilding than conflict prevention.

More concretely, the Peacebuilding Commission will have an organisational committee for a specific country which will include representatives from the country under consideration; countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process; other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue; as well as relevant regional and sub-regional organisations; the major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort; the senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives; and regional and international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
In order to support this work, the Peacebuilding Commission is assisted by a Peacebuilding Support Office staffed by qualified experts in the field of peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Support Office will prepare the substantive inputs for meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission through analysis and information gathering. The office will also contribute to the planning process for peacebuilding operations by working with the relevant lead departments in the UN, the international community and civil society. The office will also conduct an analysis of “best practices” and develop policy guidance as appropriate.

The need to address global security challenges through global responses requires the recognition that African concerns are the world’s concerns. The “responsibility to protect” doctrine needs to now become mainstreamed in international politics (see Mwanasali in this volume). However, military interventions should be consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter. In particular, they should comply with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter which authorises the use of force only in cases of legitimate self-defence. The UN is not capable of solving all the problems faced by Africa. It is therefore important to identify what the UN can realistically do for Africa. Challenges such as the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan’s Darfur region, have proved to be particularly resistant to decisive UN action, due to the interests of powerful countries behind the scenes, notably China’s oil interests.

The UN is nevertheless conducting peace operations in the Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Western Sahara. The UN also has a political office for Somalia. Historically, peace operations have been conducted by the UN in Mozambique, Angola, and Rwanda with mixed results. Commentators have subsequently argued that local solutions to peacekeeping and peacebuilding are preferable because actors would have a better understanding of the region they are working in. In the absence of robust local peace operations, there is still a need to strengthen the role of the UN in keeping Africa’s peace and promoting economic development and democratic consolidation efforts on the continent. The UN must also play a role in consolidating post-conflict reconstruction through the effective monitoring and policing of the illicit trade of natural resources and small arms, as well as curtailing the activities of mercenaries in war-affected regions. The UN should continue to play an important role in assisting with refugees and internally displaced persons.

The Structure and Membership of the Peacebuilding Commission

The permanent Organisational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission will include 31 members and its decision-making process will be based on consensus. The UN Security Council will be represented by seven members, including its permanent five members—the US, Russia, Britain, France and China and two selected by the Council; while the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) will be represented by seven members. The membership will also include the five top contributors of UN funds and the five top contributors of peacekeeping troops to the UN. In March 2006, Denmark and Tanzania were selected by the Security Council, as the two additional members to complement the five permanent members.

There is a strong case for African membership of the Peacebuilding Commission in particular South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya are Africa’s leading troop contributors in ongoing peacekeeping operations. These countries have distinguished themselves in the field of peacekeeping, they can thus bring a substantial amount of institutional memory to a Peacebuilding Commission.

In terms of the staff complement within the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office, there should be a representation weighted towards individuals from countries affected by war. In particular, there should be significant African representation since the Peacebuilding Commission will play a vital role in promoting a more secure future for Africa.
The successful creation and operationalisation of the Peacebuilding Commission has significant implications for Africa. This is an unprecedented framework which, if it succeeds in its objectives, can reduce and ultimately stop the loss of human life due to the recurrence of conflicts on the continent. Africa is plagued with a number of post-conflict situations which urgently need to be addressed. If the Peacebuilding Commission becomes politicised, then the opportunity for it to function in the short-to-medium-term will be severely hampered. If given the necessary backing, a pragmatic Peacebuilding Commission that is appropriately funded can, as Kofi Annan noted, go a long way “to improve our success rate in building peace in war-torn countries.”19 The challenge as with all other cases of institution building will be to convert rhetoric into reality. Effective partnerships between the Peacebuilding Commission and other intergovernmental organisations must be urgently established. In particular, the efficacy of the Peacebuilding Commission will depend on the degree to which it can create symbiotic partnerships with other international organisations such as the African Union, a subject to which we now turn our attention.

The African Union and NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework

The AU has the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent according to its Constitutive Act of 2000 signed by 53 African countries. NEPAD’s role is in supporting post-conflict reconstruction and the mobilisation of resources for the AU Peace Fund. In theory, the AU and its programme NEPAD are supposed to be working closely together and coordinating their efforts. In practice, the communication lines between the AU secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the NEPAD secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, are not as clear as they should be, despite NEPAD becoming a specialised agency of the AU in 2006.

The African Union has recognised that, in order to achieve its goals of sustainable peace and development there is a need to adopt a comprehensive strategy for post-conflict reconstruction.20 In this regard, the AU and NEPAD programme has developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework through a broad consultative process which included partnering with civil society organisations in April 2005.21 This Policy Framework emphasises the link that exists between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Previously, in March 2002 the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) met in Abuja, Nigeria, to map out the objectives of the AU and NEPAD with regards to post-conflict reconstruction. The HSGIC requested the NEPAD Sub-committee on Peace and Security to “support efforts at developing early warning systems ... support post-conflict reconstruction and development ... including the rehabilitation of national infrastructure, the population as well as refugees and internally displaced persons.”22 The Implementation Committee also emphasised the importance of focusing on disarmament and demobilisation programmes based on ending the illicit trade of small arms. The leaders also stressed the promotion of democracy, human rights and the upholding of the rule of law as the basis for the African post-conflict reconstruction strategy. The intention behind the creation of the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework was to articulate a policy that would coordinate and guide the AU Commission, the NEPAD Secretariat, regional economic communities (RECs) such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), civil society, the private sector and other internal and external partners in the process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This is based on the premise that each country should adopt a post-conflict reconstruction strategy that responds to its own particular context.

Aspects of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

Key aspects of the AU Policy Framework include the attempt to put in place the pillars of a post-conflict reconstruction system which recognises the importance of an appropri-
ate response to complex emergencies, to social and political transition following conflict, and to long-term development. Therefore, according to the Policy Framework, a post-conflict reconstruction system has at least five dimensions: security; political transition, governance and participation; socioeconomic development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and, coordination, management and resource mobilisation. In order to maximise the chances of establishing an effective post-conflict reconstruction process, there must be an acknowledgement of the importance of ensuring that there is a degree of complementarity and mutual reinforcement between these five dimensions. Policy planning therefore has to proceed on the basis of establishing coherence among the strategies that are adopted for each of the five areas.

The AU policy framework also acknowledges that each conflict situation is context-specific. As such, the post-conflict reconstruction strategy adopted must correspond to the specificities of each situation. Post-conflict reconstruction systems and strategies therefore have to be relatively flexible in responding to changing situations. For example, making the transition from a complex emergency situation in Sierra Leone may require different strategies to deal with peacebuilding given the particular nature of the conflict which involved the massive looting of state resources in particular, diamonds and timber. The people of Sierra Leone would need to feel re-assured by any post-conflict reconstruction process that the injustices of the past are addressed through the process. Which means that the social and political transition after conflict has to reflect this need. The institutions and mechanisms put in place to consolidate post-conflict reconstruction also have to emerge from these considerations. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2000, and operationalised in 2002, to deal with the atrocities committed by the leaders of the various armed movements during the decade-long war. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established by the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, to address the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Both of these bodies have contributed towards dealing with the difficult post-conflict situation that Sierra Leone's citizens are confronting. This does not mean, however, that such institutions can be transplanted to deal with the post-conflict process, for example, in Burundi, which had, and still to a certain extent has, qualitatively different challenges. Essentially, the AU's Policy Framework provides an overall strategy from which individual country programmes can develop their own context-specific plans and strategies.

Another aspect of the AU Policy Framework includes a recognition that there is a natural relationship between peace, security and development. In this context, the Policy Framework proposes the need to address the false dichotomy that is often advocated between political stability and economic efficiency. In reality, this is a false dichotomy because one presupposes and reinforces the other: one cannot have economic efficiency without political stability, nor the effective management of economies without political order and the rule of law.

The AU Policy Framework also identifies “the lack of sufficient local ownership and participation” in post-conflict reconstruction. Externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes cannot be sustained if they are not owned by the people that they are targeting. When the international community— in the form of the UN, bilateral actors and international civil society— come into a post-conflict reconstruction process they immediately distort the economies of the war-affected regions in which they are operating. It is vital for strategies to be adopted which emphasise transferring the management of all affairs directly to the local citizenry in the shortest time possible. In order to ensure this, there needs to be greater collaboration between the AU and NEPAD and the regional economic communities as well as external actors to outline an exit strategy and timetable for external actors when a mission is being planned. This is vital in order for war-affected communities to become self-reliant and self-sufficient in the shortest time possible.

The Policy Framework has proposed the establishment of an AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit to undertake the day-to-day task of coordinating and implementing this work. The Unit, whose location is yet to be determined, would also undertake advo-
cacy and develop post-conflict reconstruction programmes in partnership with RECs, civil society and other inter-governmental organisations. The Policy Framework has further identified the need for resource mobilisation. It emphasises the need for a more strategic targeting of sections of society that are in greatest need including: child soldiers; IDPs; refugees; women, particularly victims of sexual violence; and persons afflicted by HIV/AIDS. In order to focus efforts to raise funds, an AU Peace Fund has been established to focus resources on post-conflict reconstruction.

Recent Developments on the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Agenda

The AU in collaboration with the South African-based NGO, SaferAfrica, convened a meeting in September 2005 in Durban, South Africa, which brought together representatives of the AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council and other AU member states’ permanent representatives. The objective of the meeting was to reflect on post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in Africa. The meeting discussed the experiences and lessons learned by various organisations working in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and development. Durban also identified the key actors and the institutional set-up and coordination that will be required to generate broad agreement on the criteria for an AU framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. The meeting also suggested that in order to ensure the necessary resources to ensure successful post-conflict recovery, an AU-managed African Development Fund could be established to act as a catalyst for accessing and targeting resources for the continent’s peacebuilding needs.

An effective AU post-conflict strategy must also focus on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants with a view to ensuring that demobilised fighters have access to rehabilitation programmes that enable them to acquire new skills and to facilitate their transition back into society after conflicts. Security sector reform (SSR) is also vital for ensuring that national defence and police forces re-orient their activities towards building sustainable peace in their respective countries. The Durban meeting also noted that national institutions need to be rebuilt to ensure the consolidation of democratic governance, the rule of law, and the protection of the human rights of citizens in transitional societies. In order to guarantee the sustainability of these institutions, education and training must be provided to establish professionalism and integrity.

Concluding Thoughts: Towards a Symbiotic Partnership

In order to enhance the symbiotic partnership between the UN and the AU there is a need to forge formal links between the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU/NEPAD. One way in which this could be done is through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU would outline the specific areas in which inter-organisational collaboration can yield the greatest impact with regards to peacebuilding efforts in Africa. An MoU on the specific issue of post-conflict reconstruction would emphasise the importance of establishing a symbiotic partnership to deal with the multiple challenges that face war-affected societies.

The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the articulation of the AU Policy Framework suggests that the opportunity now exists for the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction systems. These systems will include a network of institutions, mechanisms and processes which can guide, plan, monitor and evaluate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. The challenge as always is one of transforming these policies into coherent and practical strategies on the ground. This will require a greater degree of partnership between the institutions of the UN and those of the AU.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission will be critical for Africa. There is still a prevailing danger that if the Commission politicised, and used to serve the interests of powerful countries, then it might be dead before it is born. The continent is plagued with a number of post-conflict situations which urgently need to be addressed. If the Peacebuilding Commission becomes politicised then the opportunity for it to function in the short-to medium-term will be severely hampered. If given the necessary backing, however, a prag-
matic Peacebuilding Commission, that is appropriately funded, can go a long way “to improve our success rate in building peace in war-torn countries.” Even though the AU Policy Framework exists, it is unclear whether the organisation will be able to mobilise the resources and build the capacity to undertake peacebuilding effectively. This is why it is necessary to establish a symbiotic relationship with external actors like the UN and the World Bank which have far more resources and experience in this critical area. To succeed, this relationship must be based on a complementarity of functions. In order to overcome some of the limitations currently affecting post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa a symbiotic relationship between the UN and the AU must avoid the duplication or replication of functions. There is no question of whether the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the African Union should collaborate. The only question is how deep the partnership between the two organisations should be in order to improve and enhance post-conflict reconstruction systems in Africa.

REMINISCENCES AND PERSONAL REFLECTIONS:
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES FOR AFRICA
John A. Tesha
Excerpted from Africa Institute of South Africa (ed.), Africa's Development Thinking Since Independence: A Reader (Pretoria, 2002), 9-16

Introduction

The supreme irony of the African continent is that, despite being the origin of humans and early civilisations, the continent has failed to make a sustained impact on later global efforts towards re-shaping the destiny of humanity in general. It is left to nostalgia to recapture the historic memories of the Egyptian pyramids and the Great War generals, empires and kingdoms that characterised the African continent many centuries ago.

The earlier cultural and intellectual reservoirs of the continent do not seem to have played a significant role in Africa's contemporary development thought. Indeed, who cares to remember and give credit to the Universities of Timbuktu and Al-Azar, which were established before the advent of Christianity? Equally, who cares to remember and recognise the great walls of Mapungubwe or the great civilisations along the Nile River or the Rift Valley? How does one explain the fact that Africa, with its abundant natural resources and human capital, has the largest number of hungry people and the lowest income levels? Moreover, the continent is riddled with conflicts, that have in turn produced the highest numbers of refugees and displaced persons in the world.

It must be pointed out that Africa's contemporary problems cannot be simply attributed to the continent's colonial history. Indeed, it would be nonsense to suggest, as some historians have sought to argue, that all the problems confronting the continent are only as a result of its history. We should also acknowledge that the existence of pervasive corruption, bad governance, skewed income distribution and the prevalence of conflicts are largely to be blamed on Africans themselves. But at the same time it cannot be denied that the history of the continent has been inextricably linked to the history of its integration into the global economy. Scholars like Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin have distinguished three periods that correspond to specific functions of the non-industrialised countries at the service of essential needs of the countries of Europe and North America.

The first phase was the scourge of the slave trade and its long-term impact on Africa's underdevelopment. The scandal of the slave trade resulted in the forced migration of millions of Africans to the colonial plantations and mines in the Americas as well as the institutionalisation of political violence on the continent. European colonialism represented
yet another long historical process of perverse integration of the African continent into the global capitalist system through production, investment, trade and politics. Africa’s integration in the global economy through colonial imposition and further restructuring of economies and politics has distorted and at times undermined the efforts of Africans to recover from the effects of such integration. The third, and contemporary, phase of integration is neo-colonialism. One of the major features of neo-colonialism has been the emergence of multilateral institutions as key actors in the policy management of development cooperation. These are the institutions that are responsible for setting the pace, direction, conditionalities and cross-conditionalities of development cooperation and international relations.

Although Africa has the potential to be the richest continent on earth, its present and future, like its past, remain the object of international manipulation, exploitation and ridicule. The solution to Africa’s development dilemma thus lies squarely with Africans themselves. External partners can only supplement our own efforts; they cannot replace the initiatives of the African peoples and their leaders. Africa’s capacity to address its own problems was clearly demonstrated during the liberation struggles, when African leaders and peoples committed themselves and resolved to fight foreign domination in all forms including the dismantling of the racist apartheid regime of South Africa. The same determination and resolve should be marshalled to effectively respond to the contemporary challenges of globalisation, marginalisation and exclusion.

It is certainly true that in the course of the three phases of Africa’s integration into the global economy we can contextually explain the many development challenges that have confronted and continue to confront the continent. It is also against this background that we must recognise the efforts that have been deployed by African leaders within the framework of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) to address many of these challenges. In establishing the OAU, the founding fathers recognised the imperative need to work together to ensure the collective security of individual member states and of the continent. In this regard, they agreed to coordinate their efforts and policies in the areas of defence and security. This policy decision was of critical importance if the wars of liberation were to produce their intended results. And, indeed, the war against colonialism and for political independence had dramatic achievements. In fact, the OAU will be remembered in the historical records as the one major regional organisation that provided a strong platform for its member states and the people of the continent to successfully fight for political freedom. It was during this period that African leaders attempted to specifically address and answer the political dimension of the supreme irony of the continent.

In the post-independence period, African leaders quickly recognised that political independence was meaningless without economic emancipation. The OAU’s leaders therefore made a strategic shift from a political to an economic focus. This was partly in response to the changing development imperatives of the 1970s, which saw African leaders giving more and more attention to economic issues while at the same time maintaining a political agenda both within and outside the continent. For most African leaders, a new, equitable and democratic world order was necessary in order to correct the imbalances and asymmetries that had been created by the colonial and neo-colonial order. In this regard, a process of transformation and reconstruction of the world economic order was essential if Africa was to play its role in international economic relations. It was in this context that Africa was among the regions that initiated, in 1973— at the end of the first decade of the OAU and towards the end of the liberation struggles in Africa—the debate towards the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The demand for a New International Economic Order was quickly rejected by the major industrial powers. It was labelled communist in its thought and orientation. The quest for a new order was therefore encapsulated during the Cold War within the framework of East-West relations. Paradoxically, this was also the same period when debate on détente also emerged in world politics. To the Africans a relaxing of tensions between the East and the West would have provided and facilitated the struggle towards meeting the demands for
the re-shaping of the new world order. To the West, the NIEO was seen as a communist plot directed towards destroying the system of capitalism and with it western civilization.

Having failed to work towards an NIEO, African leaders decided to initiate an inward-looking regional development policy for the transformation and development of the African economies. The first of such regional policy initiatives was the adoption of the African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence in 1973. The Declaration provided a strategy for Africa's gradual disengagement from the world economy within a framework of individual and collective self-reliance. It was also an instrument for translating the provisions of the OAU charter on economic cooperation into reality. In fact, the Declaration provided the basis for yet another Declaration, the Kinshasa Declaration on the Principle of the Establishment of an African Economic Community, also adopted by the OAU Heads of State and Government in 1973.

Five years passed and the results of the two landmark Declarations were not yet visible. This created some concern among African leaders and indeed the OAU Secretariat. Against this background of anxiety and concern, the Secretary General convened a meeting of African experts to review the situation and establish the way forward towards an accelerated implementation of the two major Declarations adopted in 1973. A group of African experts met in Monrovia, Liberia in 1979 and drafted the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa. The Monrovia gathering of African experts provided the background for yet another major document, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, adopted by the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in 1980.

The adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action coincided with the World Bank Report on the Social and Economic Condition of the Continent. The report suggested that Africa was in a worse situation than it was in the 1960s. But, while the Lagos Plan provided a great opportunity for Africans to translate the aspirations of the 'founding fathers' of the OAU into concrete reality, it fell short of providing the requisite resources for its implementation. It remained essentially a blueprint for Africa without the requisite resources for its implementation. While its philosophy was essentially African, it was, however, dependent upon the goodwill and commitment of the international community for its implementation.

During the 1980s, African leaders became increasingly concerned about the lack of implementation of the LPA and decided to establish a Steering Committee of OAU member states to recommend to the OAU Heads of State and Government modalities for an accelerated implementation of the LPA. The Steering Committee established while the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was Chair was also charged with the responsibility of preparing for the second session of the UN General Assembly devoted to the social and economic problems of the African continent.

The Steering Committee that worked with the support of African experts and in collaboration with the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa (EA) recommended to the Assembly the adoption of a document entitled 'Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER)'. The adoption of the Report of the Steering Committee by the Heads of State and Government marked a strategic shift from the usual Declarations adopted by Heads of State to a specific programme aimed at improving the living conditions of the majority of the African people. It also constituted Africa's submission to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Africa.

The UN General Assembly was being convened at a time when the World Bank was also pushing ahead with its programme of Structural Adjustment. In fact, four years after the adoption of APPER in 1985, no resources were available for its implementation and therefore the accelerated implementation of LPA envisaged still did not materialise. In 1990, the ECA recommended to the African Finance Ministers the adoption of an African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Social and Economic Recovery and Transformation, popularly known as AAF-SAP. The OAU Assembly of Heads
of State and Government adopted this programme and recommended its implementation to the member states. In adopting AAF-SAP the OAU member states were expected to totally reject the World Bank's SAPs, which they had adopted at great social cost. What was being suggested was that the World Bank's SAPs had led to increasing social pressures on governments and budgets in Africa, and were therefore becoming increasingly unacceptable.

Like the other regionally negotiated documents, neither APPER nor AAF-SAP was able to produce the intended results. The Special Session of the General Assembly deliberated on Africa's submission and adopted the United Nations Programme of Action for African Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). This programme claimed to have pioneered a new partnership between Africa and the international community. Under UN-PAAERD, the international community agreed to provide additional resources for the economic recovery and development of Africa. But soon OAU member states discovered the promised additional resources were not forthcoming and in fact their demands for new and additional resources were completely ignored by the donor community. The new partnership proposed under UN-PAAERD thus came to be seen as a mockery if not a scandal. As a result, the time-frame provided for its implementation came to an end without any significant improvements in the resource flows to Africa. But at the same time SAPs continued to ravage African economies, while ironically no African government had yet put in place internal measures for the implementation of AAF-SAP

Africa's development bodies, frustrated with the rate of marginalisation in global political and economic governance as a result of the reluctance of the major powers to accept the need to restructure the international system, thought that the translation of APPER to UN-PAAERD might mitigate the impact of marginalisation. At the same time, local initiatives went ahead, and in 1991, years after the adoption of the Principles of the Establishment of the African Economic Community in 1973, the OAU met to adopt the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community (AEC).

Between 1990 and 1995 the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a series of policy documents meant to galvanise the international community into providing the necessary and requisite resources for the social and economic transformation of the continent. One of the major Declarations adopted in 1990 was on “Fundamental Changes taking place in the World and Africa's Response”. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West conflict, as a result of the end of the Cold War, precipitated the gradual development of a new world configuration of power which took attention away from African countries to the new democracies in Eastern Europe. It was in this context that African leaders thought of developing their own response to events that were taking place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The concept of a common European home being proposed also made the African leaders nervous about their role in international politics. It was thus considered time for Africa to return to the principle of African solutions to African problems. The Declaration on Fundamental Changes was to provide the means and chart the way.

With the changes that were taking place in Europe, it was thus time for Africa to put its own house in order. Good governance, which was already a conditionality of technical assistance and development aid, became a major issue in Africa notwithstanding AAF-SAP and the UN-PAAERD. During the mid-term review of UN-PAAERD it was generally acknowledged that it had not achieved its intended objectives, and the partners agreed to exert more efforts towards realising the targets set. Paradoxically, the Programme came to an end without any significant contribution to Africa. Yet, African countries deployed more efforts to work out and negotiate a successor arrangement to UN-PAAERD. The UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations New Agenda for Development (UN-NADAF). Like UN-PAAERD, UN-NADAF raised the expectations of OAU member states, but little transpired as a result. This reinforced the determination of African leaders to develop inward-looking policies towards the social and economic development of the continent.
In 1990, Africa’s leaders decided to adopt another landmark declaration, commonly referred to as the African Charter for Population Participation in Development. The Charter recognised the vital role of the people themselves and their organisations in development. For the first time African leaders recognised the role of civil society and grass-roots organisations in Africa’s economic development and growth. Women’s organisations were given special mention in the Charter, as were the youth of the continent. But the Charter for Popular Participation has largely remained a document in the archives of member states and university libraries. Its major contribution was that it helped to complete the work of the African Charter on Peoples and Human Rights. With the two Documents, the African agenda for democracy, good governance and the protection of peoples’ and human rights appears to have been placed on the forefront of the preoccupation of African leaders.

Four more key documents were adopted during the period between 1990 and 1995. These included the Strategies for Revitalisation, Recovery, and Growth of Africa’s trade in the 1990s and beyond, adopted in 1991, and the Second Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA) adopted in 1992. It is difficult to evaluate the contribution of either of these strategies for the promotion of trade or the industrial development decade for Africa. But, from the situation on the ground today one conclusion we could make is that, as the adage goes, the more things change the more they stay the same. Africa is exactly where it was before the trade strategy and the pronouncement of the IDDA. But in spite of this, it seems that African leaders have an incredible appetite for new Declarations and new Programmes. In 1995, the continents leaders adopted the Cairo Agenda for Action, which supposedly was to put things in order and ensure the implementation of all other declarations. As in the case of the previous declarations and programmes, the African partners for development agreed to support the Cairo Agenda, which become a major topic for the Africa-Europe Summit.

The 1990s also saw the adoption of the Cairo Declaration establishing, within the OAU, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Declaration provided for the establishment of an OAU Conflict Management Centre as servicing arm to a Central Organ composed of member states and charged with the responsibility of monitoring conflicts in Africa and making recommendations on how such conflicts should be managed and resolved. In establishing the mechanism, the African Heads of State and Government recognised that the security of the continent is paramount for the social and economic development of the continent. African leaders had finally recognised that managing and resolving conflicts together with supporting Africa’s democratisation process and the protection of peoples’ and human rights were conditions necessary for economic development.

When the proposal to establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was being deliberated upon, the African Leadership Forum (ALF), an NGO headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, convened a meeting in Kampala, Uganda which came up with a proposal to establish an African Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). On the whole, the African leaders for a number of reasons rejected the idea of the CSSDCA. It was not until President Obasanjo was elected to power in Nigeria that the idea of a CSSDCA resurfaced. Eventually, the OAU Assembly adopted a decision to accept the idea of the CSSDCA within the Secretariat of the OAU. The decision of the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU was no doubt in line with the desire of the “founding fathers” of the organisation to promote political stability and economic development on the continent. The Assembly observed that all decisions taken by the OAU reflected the interlinkages between peace, stability, development, integration and cooperation. Significantly, the Assembly stressed the point that the CSSDCA process creates a synergy between the various activities currently undertaken by the OAU and should therefore help to consolidate the work of the organisation in the areas of peace, security, stability, development and cooperation. In addition, the CSSDCA was expected to provide a policy forum for the elaboration and advancement of common values within the main policy organs of the OAU. The Heads of State and Government were of the view that the interactive approach embedded in the CSSDCA initiative would provide an invaluable tool for the pur-
suit of the agenda of the OAU in the new millennium, with particular reference to the issues of security; stability, development and cooperation. But, it was eventually left to Nigeria to provide the initial resources for the creation of a unit to handle CSSDCA matters in the OAU. The rest of the resources were supposed to come from the international community and from the regular budget of the OAU.

Four decades after the establishment of the OAU, African leaders decided that the time had come to establish an African Union as a successor arrangement to the OAU. This was indeed an effort to translate the Abuja Treaty into concrete reality and also to realise the long-held aspiration for the creation of a United States of Africa. The African Union was launched after long deliberations at the Lusaka Summit of the OAU Heads of State and Government, as provided for in the Sirte Declaration of 1999. The Secretary General was requested to work on modalities for the transition from the OAU to the AU and to ensure that the AU takes on board all the initiatives that have been adopted by the OAU Assembly.

As the AU was being launched, a new initiative emerged under the name of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Unfortunately, there has as yet been little clear debate on the relationship between the NEPAD process and the CSSDCA process. NEPAD, like the CSSDCA, defines as the major preconditions for development, peace, security and stability and economic cooperation and redevelopment. The CSSDCA combines all these into one agenda, focusing on security, stability, development and cooperation. Both aim at promoting long-term conditions for development and security, both talk of the necessity to build the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as enhancing African institutions’ capacity to prevent manage and resolve conflicts. Both are also predicated on the goodwill of the international community for the implementation of their respective mandates. The two initiatives thus seem complementary but they also present in a strategic sense some room for internal conflict, and more attention will thus have to be paid to the linkages between the two important development plans.

**Conclusion**

Clearly, Africa is not short of ideas. In fact, perhaps Africa has so far had too many ideas about its development prospects. The problem lies with the operationalisation of such ideas. There are indeed lessons to be learnt. What Africa needs is to find out what went wrong with all these noble ideas. Why has Africa failed to make any headway in its peace and development agenda? There are three aspects of the many African initiatives that we need to take into account. First, the initiatives must be home-grown, participatory, and democratically conceived and implemented. Second, such initiatives should be backed with African resources, both financial and human. More precisely, there can be no ownership without the capacity to implement such ideas, policies and strategies. Ownership goes with responsibility and accountability. Africa has the potential to discharge its responsibilities for the implementation of its own ideas and initiatives. Lastly, influence of the international community should be confined to a facilitating role.

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**CIVIL SOCIETY AND COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ECCAS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH ECOWAS AND SADC**

Thelma Ekiyor and Noria Mashumba

Excerpted from Centre for Conflict Resolution, ‘The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Central Africa’, Cape Town, 2006, 7–8

The need for structured mechanisms to prevent and mitigate conflicts is critical to achieving Africa’s peace and development agenda. Early-warning systems for the early detec-
tion and mitigation of potentially violent conflicts are thus a priority for Africa’s emerging security architecture. Within these new security arrangements, civil society is becoming an important player, particularly as the causes of conflict are increasingly located in human security challenges such as human rights abuses; economic exclusion; governance and democracy; and gender-based violence.

A core element of Africa’s emerging security mechanisms is the emphasis on a holistic approach that calls for partnerships between civil society and governments in promoting peace and development. In central Africa, the conflict prevention and regional integration agenda is complex and rests on two different but overlapping institutions. The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), created in 1994 to replace the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC), is focused on strengthening the monetary and economic integration of its member states. ECCAS, established in October 1983, provides for a wider economic community of 11 members, including the seven countries in CEMAC.

The member states of CEMAC include Chad, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and São Tomé and Príncipe, all comprising a total population of about 35 million people. In 1983, the ECCAS mandate was broadened to include a conflict prevention and management role. Its security organs are modelled along similar lines to those of SADC and ECOWAS, with a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) created in 1999 by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa. COPAX consists of a Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC); a Defence and Security Commission (CDS); and a Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC). The provisions of MARAC encourage multi-sector collaboration in conflict prevention and management efforts in the sub-region.

A poor resource base and persistent and often divisive conflicts in the sub-region have hampered implementation of the ECCAS early-warning mechanism. The huge disparities in domestic stability and economic development of member states have further complicated the challenges of the institution. The presence of a strong conflict prevention and peacebuilding institution in the sub-region, working closely with civil society to promote security and stability is imperative.

Consolidation of peace in central Africa will require building the capacity of ECCAS and civil society actors, as well as providing them with the necessary resources. ECCAS must generate its own funding as a sign of commitment to peace, security, and economic development for the sub-region. The international community, which has played a decisive role in promoting peace in central Africa, also has a stake in advancing stability and development in the sub-region.
## Web Resources

The following descriptions are reproduced from organisation Web sites. They have been edited in some instances for publication here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Africa Peace and Conflict Journal</strong></td>
<td>APCJ is a biannual publication of the University for Peace Africa Programme. It provides a vehicle for African scholars and others to express views from multidisciplinary and distinctly African perspectives on issues of peace and conflict affecting Africa. APCJ also serves as an outlet for African viewpoints on global concerns.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.apcj.upeace.org">www.apcj.upeace.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</strong></td>
<td>ACCORD is a civil society organisation working to bring creative African solutions to the challenges posed by conflict in Africa. ACCORD's primary aim is to influence political developments by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue, and institutional development to the forefront as alternatives to armed violence and protracted conflict. ACCORD publishes the African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Conflict Trends, and an occasional papers series aimed at stakeholders in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and governance. Its publications are available online.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.accord.org.za">www.accord.org.za</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>African Forum and Network on Debt and Development</strong></td>
<td>AFRODAD is a civil society organisation focused on securing lasting solutions to Africa's debt problem, which has negatively affected the continent's development. It seeks an equitable and sustainable development process to secure policies based on a human rights value system that will redress the African debt crisis and lead to prosperous African societies. The AFRODAD Web site has downloadable papers related to debt and aid as well as African case studies.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.afrodad.org">www.afrodad.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>African Security Sector Network</strong></td>
<td>ASSN seeks to improve the coordination of African organisations working in the area of security sector reform (SSR). Its Web site provides links to papers about SSR and governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org">www.africansecuritynetwork.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Berghof Conflict Research</strong></td>
<td>Berghof Conflict Research explores constructive procedures and models for dealing with ethnopolitical conflicts. Its goal is not only to contribute to an increased understanding of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes, but also to actively support such work. The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, occasional papers, working papers, and various reports on a wide array of peace and conflict topics are available on the center's Web site.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org">www.berghof-conflictresearch.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Beyond Intractability</strong></td>
<td>Beyond Intractability is an online database of research papers, case studies, summaries of books, and news on intractable conflicts and peacebuilding. The Web site, hosted by the University of Colorado, Boulder, also offers educational resources for instructors.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.beyondintractability.org">www.beyondintractability.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bonn International Center for Conversion</strong></td>
<td>BICC is an independent, nonprofit organisation dedicated to promoting and facilitating peace and development through research, advisory services, and training. It seeks to assist in preventing violent conflicts and</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.bicc.de">www.bicc.de</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Economic and Policy Research</td>
<td>Hence contribute to their constructive transformation. While disarmament frees resources, which can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion allows for the reuse of these resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.cepr.net">www.cepr.net</a></td>
<td>The center organises its work around the issues of peace and development, global trends and export controls involving arms, small arms and light weapons, natural resources and conflict, migration and conflict, and peace-building. BICC publishes books, briefs, papers, and a quarterly newsletter, many of which are available online.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center on International Cooperation</td>
<td>CEPR promotes democratic debate on the economic and social issues that most affect people's lives by informing citizens about the problems and choices that they face. It conducts professional research to fill gaps in the understanding of economic and social problems, and the impact of policies. CEPR presents the findings of research in a way that allows broad segments of the public to understand what is at stake in major policy debates. Its issue briefs and reports on economics and development are available online.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding">www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding</a></td>
<td>CIC, at New York University, works to enhance international responses to humanitarian crises and global security threats through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the broader policy community. Reports from the CIC's three programmes are available online.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>CCR promotes peace in Africa through creative and cooperative approaches to conflict resolution. It focuses on training, policy development, research, and capacity building. CCR offers a wide range of African peace-building-related publications online. In addition, the Web site provides a Peace Library, where visitors can browse an online catalogue and find links to African online journals and Web sites.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za">http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za</a></td>
<td>CSSM, at Cranfield University, seeks to promote the development and effective management of the security sector for enhanced peace and security. Its Web site offers an online library, SSronline, that provides access to case studies, academic articles, a database of organisations engaged in security sector management, and the Journal of Security Sector Management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre for Security Sector Management</td>
<td>DCAF provides in-country advisory support to governments and practical assistance programmes in the areas of security sector reform and security sector governance. DCAF offers online access to security sector–related papers and handbooks.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.ssronline.org">www.ssronline.org</a></td>
<td>CMI is an independent centre for research on international development and policy. Its research aims to inform and influence policy and to contribute to the public discourse on international development issues concerning rights, democracy, and development; poverty reduction; peace, conflict, and the state; and public sector reform. CMI has a network of research partners and works in close cooperation with researchers in the South. Its Web site has an extensive database of online articles, working papers, and other publications.</td>
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<td>Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network</td>
<td>The CPR Network, managed by the UN Development Programme, is an informal network of donor countries and partner UN agencies dealing with issues of conflict management. Its Web site provides access to the CPR Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding, which provides practical tools and operational frameworks. The CPR Network hosts an online resource library for documents related to practical, operational issues on responses to emerging or current conflict situations.</td>
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<td><a href="http://cpr.web.cern.ch">http://cpr.web.cern.ch</a></td>
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<td>Conflict Sensitivity Consortium</td>
<td>The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium comprises a diverse range of agencies with an interest in understanding what 'conflict sensitivity' means in practice, in terms of organisational systems as well as during the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of specific interventions. Its Web site seeks to inform on issues of conflict sensitivity and to improve humanitarian, development, and business practices in conflict-affected societies. It offers access to research reports, briefing papers, articles, and training packets on conflict, conflict sensitivity, and peacebuilding.</td>
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<td><a href="http://conflictsensitivity.org">www.conflictsensitivity.org</a></td>
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<td>CRInfo: The Conflict Resolution Information Source</td>
<td>CRInfo, a web service hosted by the University of Colorado, Boulder, provides an online catalog of more than 20,000 web, print, and organisational peace and conflict resources, as well as event listings and links to other conflict resolution resources.</td>
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<td><a href="http://crinfo.org">http://crinfo.org</a></td>
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<td>Crisis Management Initiative</td>
<td>CMI is an independent, nonprofit organisation that promotes and works for sustainable security through analysis, action, and advocacy. CMI's Web site provides online access to publications about post-conflict peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://cmi.fi">www.cmi.fi</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Gateway</td>
<td>Development Gateway is an international, nonprofit organisation that provides Web-based platforms to make aid and development efforts more effective. Its portal connects people worldwide through virtual communities and provides access to the largest online directory of official aid activities, tenders and contract information, and country resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://dgfoundation.org">www.dgfoundation.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Centre for Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>ECCP is a nongovernmental organisation that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and supports and connects people working for peace worldwide. Most of its activities center on the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the network of which the ECCP holds the Global Secretariat. The ECCP Web site includes a searchable database for the survey sections of Searching for Peace publications, a directory of organisations working in the field of conflict prevention, and an online library of conflict-related articles.</td>
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<td><a href="http://conflict-prevention.net">www.conflict-prevention.net</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>GFN-SSR promotes security by working with local actors through networks of policy makers, practitioners, and civil society organisations involved in security sector reform, capacity building, and information sharing. Its Web site provides an online document library that summarises and links to other organisations' publications. GFN-SSR also publishes and makes available online reports related to security sector reform.</td>
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<td><a href="http://ssrnetwork.net">www.ssrnetwork.net</a></td>
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<td>Global Witness</td>
<td>Global Witness seeks to expose and stop human rights abuses funded by natural resource exploitation. By exposing this link, and documenting cases where these incidents occur, Global Witness hopes to break the cycle of conflict, which leads to poverty and further instability. The Global Witness Web site provides access to in-depth reports and fact sheets on such issues as the diamond trade, forests, and oil and their role in conflict.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.globalwitness.org">www.globalwitness.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance and Social Development Resource Centre</td>
<td>GSDRC, funded by the UK Department for International Development, aims to help reduce poverty by informing policy making and enhancing professional knowledge and competencies. Its Web site offers an extensive online document library organised by topic, among which are included conflict, fragile states, and security and development.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.gsdrc.org">www.gsdrc.org</a></td>
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<td><a href="http://www.iss.co.za">www.iss.co.za</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute of Development Studies</td>
<td>IDS is an organisation for research, teaching, and communication on international development. Its Web site includes an online bookshop, where a number of development-related publications are available for free download.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.ids.ac.uk">www.ids.ac.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Alert</td>
<td>International Alert is an independent peacebuilding organisation seeking to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict. It has a presence in more than twenty countries and territories, working directly with people affected by violent conflict as well with governments and major regional and international bodies to shape policy and practices. International Alert's Web site offers publications on peacebuilding and country-specific issues for free download through a searchable database.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.international-alert.org">www.international-alert.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Center on Nonviolent Conflict</td>
<td>ICNC is an independent, nonprofit educational foundation that develops and encourages the study and use of civilian-based, nonmilitary strategies to establish and defend human rights, democracy, and justice worldwide. An online database provides links to downloadable articles and educational aids on nonviolent conflict. Its Web site also features a recommended resources section for a variety of media.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org">www.nonviolent-conflict.org</a></td>
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<td>International Conflict Research</td>
<td>INCORE, a joint project of the United Nations University and the University of Ulster, seeks to address the causes and consequences of conflict and to promote conflict resolution management strategies through research. Academic publications, research reports, papers, and annual reports on conflict and peace are available on the INCORE Web site.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk">www.incore.ulst.ac.uk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
<td>ICG is a nonpartisan, independent organisation dedicated to providing analysis and recommendations to policy makers on the prevention and resolution of conflict. It publishes CrisisWatch, a monthly bulletin on current conflicts. The ICG Web site offers access to arti-</td>
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### Resource Description

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<tr>
<td><strong>International Peace Institute</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.ipinst.org</td>
<td>IPI, formerly the International Peace Academy, is an independent institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts through policy research and development. It makes available online a wide variety of monographs, policy papers, and meeting reports, as well as summaries of books and occasional papers on peace and security issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Journal of Peacebuilding and Development</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.journalpeacedev.org</td>
<td>JPD is an international refereed journal providing a forum for the sharing of critical thinking and constructive action on the issues at the intersections of conflict, development, and peace. It strives to foster South-North and theory-practice linkages, and to build the capacity of southern scholars and practitioners to write and publish in ways that support integrated scholarship, policy, practice, and activism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Jubilee South</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.jubileesouth.org</td>
<td>JS is a network of campaigns, social movements, people's organisations, communities, nongovernmental organisations, and political formations that advocates repudiation of debt. It is an offshoot of Jubilee 2000, which had advocated a debt-free start to the millennium for a billion people and then split into an array of organisations. JS operates in more than fifty countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. Its Web site publishes articles, reports and statistics related to debt and development in the South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.kaiptc.org</td>
<td>KAIPTC offers local, regional, and international participants the opportunity to examine peace operations issues at the operational level and to update and share their knowledge of the latest practices through conferences, discussions, lectures, and computer-assisted training exercises. Its Web site provides access to research papers and reports related to conflict prevention, management, and resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Economics Foundation</strong>&lt;br&gt;<a href="http://neweconomics.org">http://neweconomics.org</a></td>
<td>NEF is an independent think tank that aims to improve quality of life by promoting innovative solutions that challenge mainstream thinking on economic, environmental, and social issues. NEF combines analysis and policy debate with practical, on-the-ground solutions, often run and designed with the help of local people. The organisation also develops new ways of measuring progress towards increased well-being and environmental sustainability. Many of NEF’s publications are available online.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.oecd.org</td>
<td>The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy. It collects economic and social data and monitors trends and analyses and forecasts economic development. The OECD Web site makes available the Outlook and Country Surveys series along with statistics and downloadable publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pambazuka News</strong>&lt;br&gt;www.pambazuka.org</td>
<td>Pambazuka News, published by Fahamu, presents analysis produced by a pan-African community of academics, policy makers, social activists, women's groups, civil society organisations, writers, artists, poets, bloggers,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Initiative</td>
<td>The Peacebuilding Initiative, a project of HPCR International, is an online Web portal of peacebuilding research for practitioners and policy makers. It provides synthesised analysis on peacebuilding themes and detailed abstracts of recommended resources. The Peacebuilding Initiatives also hosts a portal on peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacemakers Trust</td>
<td>Peacemakers Trust is a nonprofit organisation dedicated to research and education on conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Its Web site offers a bibliography for peacebuilding-related resources and links to country information portals, definitions, and peacebuilding organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies</td>
<td>The Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies engages in research, graduate training, and public education about international affairs and contemporary global problem solving with a focus on multilateralism and international institutions. Its major programmes are the Consortium on Security and Humanitarian Action, the United Nations Intellectual History Project, the Program on States and Security, the Academic Council on the United Nations, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. The institute's Program on States and Security (PSS), based at the City University of New York, seeks to connect scholars, policy makers, and practitioners through research. Its Web site houses a database on post-war scholars and provides access to new research and working papers, primarily related to state-building and governance. PSS offers an extensive list of development, environment, peace and conflict research, and institutional databases.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saferworld</td>
<td>Saferworld is an independent nongovernmental organisation that works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote cooperative approaches to security. It works with governments, international organisations, and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research, and policy development and by supporting the actions of others. Saferworld produces and makes available online research reports, briefing papers, articles, and training packets on peace and conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Arms Survey</td>
<td>Small Arms Survey provides public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence and monitors national and international initiatives. Its Web site offers access to online papers and databases, as well as the annual Small Arms Survey.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute</td>
<td>SEATINI is an African initiative to strengthen Africa’s capacity to take a more effective role in the global trading system and to better manage the process of globalization. It deals specifically with issues and debates concerning the World Trade Organization and African relationships to it. SEATINI initiates and commissions</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network <a href="http://www.saprin.org">www.saprin.org</a></td>
<td>SAPRIN is a global network established to expand and legitimise the role of civil society in economic policy making and to strengthen organised opposition to structural adjustment programmes. It works with a broad range of citizens’ groups on four continents to organise public processes to assess the impact of economic reform programmes supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and to chart a course for the future.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third World Network <a href="http://www.twnside.org.sg">www.twnside.org.sg</a></td>
<td>TWN is an independent, nonprofit international network of organisations and individuals involved in issues related to development, the Third World, and North-South issues. It conducts research on economic, social, and environmental issues and provides a platform representing broadly southern interests and perspectives at international forums and processes. TWN publishes the daily SUNS (South-North Development Monitor), Third World Economies, and Third World Resurgence. Its Web site offers information on issues and interests ranging from tourism to health and human rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery <a href="http://www.undp.org/cpr">www.undp.org/cpr</a></td>
<td>The UNDP's BCPR works to restore quality of life for people devastated by natural disaster or violent conflict by providing a bridge between humanitarian agencies and long-term development organisations. Its Web site provides access to conflict- and peace-related reports, speeches, and publications as well as access to multimedia reports.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa <a href="http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/index.asp">www.un.org/africa/osaa/index.asp</a></td>
<td>OSAA assists in improving coherence and coordination of the UN system's support to Africa, enhances international assistance for Africa's development and security through advocacy and analysis, and facilitates intergovernmental deliberations on Africa at the global level, in particular regarding the New Partnership for Africa's Development. OSAA's Web site provides access to reports on peace, security, and post-conflict recovery strategies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Commission <a href="http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding">www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding</a></td>
<td>The PBC is mandated to assemble, coordinate, and advise on integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long term; and develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian, and development actors. UN resolutions, country-specific meeting notes, and reports on lessons learned are available on the Web site.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations University <a href="http://www.unu.edu">www.unu.edu</a></td>
<td>UNU contributes to the resolution of global problems through research and capacity building. Its Web site houses an online learning section for self-study or for educating others. Many UNU publications related to the environment and sustainable development, peace and governance, and capacity building are available for free download.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States Institute of Peace <a href="http://www.usip.org">www.usip.org</a></td>
<td>USIP is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by the U.S. Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intel-</td>
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<td>University of Peace</td>
<td>Intellectual capital worldwide. USIP regularly publishes an array of comprehensive analysis and policy recommendations and makes many of them available online.</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.upeace.org">www.upeace.org</a></td>
<td>UPEACE is a UN-mandated institution established to provide higher education for peace with the aim of promoting a spirit of understanding, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence, stimulating cooperation among peoples, and helping lessen obstacles and threats to world peace and progress. In 2002, UPEACE established the Africa Programme to strengthen African capacity and to build broad expertise for a better understanding of conflicts in Africa and their prevention and to create an environment favorable to lasting peace and development in the region. UPEACE makes available online publications related to conflict, peace, and development as well as links to related databases.</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
<td>WANEP seeks to enable and facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among civil society-based peacebuilding practitioners and organisations in West Africa. It aims to promote cooperative responses to violent conflict by providing a platform for practitioners and institutions to exchange experiences and lessons learned on issues of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and social, religious, and political reconciliation. WANEP’s Web site provides access to annual reports, WARN (Early Warning and Early Response) policy briefs, its quarterly newsletter, and peacebuilding-related papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.wanep.org">www.wanep.org</a></td>
<td>The World Bank provides financial and technical assistance to developing countries through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association, which are owned by 185 member countries. Its Web site includes a section on fragile and conflict-affected countries and provides access to numerous reports, analytical tools, and statistics on development, peacebuilding, and conflict-related issues.</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
<td><a href="http://worldbank.org">http://worldbank.org</a></td>
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Recommended Reading

The following are recommended resources to complement and supplement the articles, chapters, and documents presented in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa. Publications by such organizations as the United Nations and World Bank, research institutions, and government-supported departments and programmes are typically available for download online, free of charge. Some book chapters may also be accessible on the internet. Readers are advised to search the Web for a publication of interest even if its availability is not indicated below.

Chapter 1 Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages

On Peace


On Development


Chapter 2  The Political Economy of Conflict


On Causes of Conflict and Risk Factors


Chapter 3 Economic Policy, Conflict, and Peace


Chapter 4 International Peace and Humanitarian and Development Aid: Strategies and Impact


On the Orientation and Impact of Aid


On Humanitarian Aid during Conflict and Peacetime


On the Effectiveness of International Peacebuilding


Chapter 5  Demilitarisation and Human Security

On Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration


On Security Sector Reform


On the Security-Development Nexus and Human Security


Chapter 6 State-Building and Democracy


Chapter 7 Economic Aspects of Reconstruction, Recovery, and Peace


Maynard, Kimberly. ‘Post-Conflict Community Participation: Using a Development Approach In a Chaotic Environment’. Paper on behalf of the United Nations Development Pro-


Chapter 8 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Peacebuilding


On the Resource Dimensions of War and Peacebuilding


Chapter 9 Conflict Sensitivity and Conflict Prevention

On Conflict Sensitivity and Conflict Prevention in Programming and Policy


On Peace and Conflict Evaluation and Impact Assessment


Chapter 10 Nonviolence and Social Mobilisation for Peace and Change


On Women and Peacebuilding


On Youth


On Social Mobilization


On Nonviolence


Chapter 11  African Institutions: Securing Peace and Development across Borders

On Regional Integration and African Institutions


On Peace and Security Institutions


On Governance, Development, and Economic Reconstruction through Institutions in Africa

Centre for Conflict Resolution. ‘The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture.’ Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Centre for Policy Studies, Policy advisory group meeting, 11–12 December 2004.


Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader presents scholarship extracted from academic writings, reports from the United Nations and nongovernmental organisations, speeches, and official documents. It is part of the evolving series Peace and Conflict in Africa, published by the UN–affiliated University for Peace (UPEACE). The primary objective of the series is to provide readily accessible resources to lecturers, students, and researchers that can be used in African universities, where the availability of materials is often limited. The volumes in the series can also be used by practitioners and policy makers in building peace and human development on the continent.

Other publications in the series include the Compendium of Key Human Rights Documents of the African Union; Human Rights, Peace and Justice in Africa: A Reader; and the Compendium of Key Documents Relating to Peace and Security in Africa. Volumes on gender and peacebuilding, the media and peace, and endogenous methods of mediation and peacebuilding are also envisioned.